setting priorities for nuclear modernization

8/20/2019 Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

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Setting Priorities for

Nuclear ModernizationBy Lawrence J. Korb and Adam Mount February 2016

WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.O


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Setting Priorities forNuclear Modernization

By Lawrence J. Korb and Adam Mount February 2016


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1 Introduction and summary

4 The politics of modernization

9 The current cycle

19 Recommendations

27 Conclusion

29 About the authors and acknowledgments

30 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

Introduction and summary

In he nex decade, he Unied Saes will have o make decisions ha will shape

is nuclear arsenal or much o he nex cenury. Nearly every missile, subma-

rine, aircraf, and warhead in he U.S. arsenal is nearing he end o is service lie

and mus be replaced. As Congress and he Obama adminisraion coninue o

wresle wih he effecs o sequesraion on projeced levels o deense spending,

he U.S. Deparmen o Deense has begun a series o procuremen programs

ha will nearly double he amoun he counry spends on is nuclear deerren

in he nex decade compared o wha i spen in he pas decade. Over he nex30 years, he cos o he nuclear deerren could pass $1 rillion and crowd ou

deense and domesic invesmens needed o keep he Unied Saes srong and

compeiive. In addiion, i could undermine U.S. credibiliy on he issue o

nuclear prolieraionespecially when i comes o dealing wih regimes such as

ussia, China, and Norh Korea.

I is no acciden ha so many modernizaion programs mus begin in his

decade. Te Unied Saes, like ussia, modernizes is nuclear arsenal in cycles.

Te curren U.S. nuclear arsenal enered service in he 1980s when Presiden

onald eagan dramaically expanded he unding devoed o nuclear weapons.

Ta decade saw he Deparmen o Deense field he B-1 and B-2 bombers; he

Peacekeeper Inerconinenal Ballisic Missile, or ICBM; and he Ohio-class

ballisic-missile submarines, or SSBN. Wih he benefi o hindsigh, i is now

known ha his modernizaion cycle was highly inefficien: in he years ha ol-

lowed, poliical, budgeary, and sraegic evens would modiy he U.S. arsenal

rom is inended shape. Iniial plans o deploy 244 B-1A bombers were reduced

o 100 B-1B bombers, which were removed rom he nuclear mission in 1993; he

expeced purchase o 132 B-2 bombers was firs cu o 75 and hen o 21; and 24

planned Ohio-class submarines were cu o 18, our o which were subsequenlyconvered o a convenional role.1


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Now, some 30 years laer, hese weapons sysems are nearing reiremen and mus

be replaced. Tis new modernizaion cycle represens a major challenge or he

Unied Saes, as well as an opporuniy o ensure ha he arsenal is he righ size

and shape o mee naional securiy needs in a cos-effecive manner. Tere is litle

reason o hope ha he curren modernizaion cycle will be easier han he las. In

Congress, budgeary poliics have become even more difficul. Te Budge Conrol Ac o 2011 has severely consrained ederal spending, including projeced levels

o deense spending. A he same ime, each o he miliary services is undergoing

conenious and cosly modernizaion o convenional weapons sysems. reasured

prioriies, including Ford-class aircraf carriers; Virginia-class atack submarines;

a large and diverse surace flee; he F-35 mulirole aircraf; and Army readiness

could all be affeced by he curren plans o modernize he nuclear arsenal.

I hisory is any guide, modernizing he nuclear arsenal will be a difficul

endeavor. Congress is unlikely o appropriae unding or ull modernizaion

plans. Frank Kendall, he Penagon’s acquisiions chie, admited o reporersin early 2015 ha he plans are likely “a anasy, ha wha we’re going o end up

wih is nowhere near wha we requesed.”2 o ensure ha he nuclear orce can

coninue o serve he nex presiden’s sraegic guidance, he execuive branch

should review nuclear spending and pu in place an affordable plan or he com-

ing decades. I i does no, he shape o he nex nuclear arsenal will likely be se

by he vagaries o congressional poliics as hey seek o curail whichever pro-

grams happen o ace cos overruns.3

Tis repor describes our changes o U.S. nuclear modernizaion plans ha ensure

sraegic sabiliy in a cos-effecive way:

1. educing he planned number o submarines rom 12 o 10

2. Cancellaion o he new cruise missile

3. Eliminaion o he acical nuclear mission

4. A gradual reducion in he size o he ICBM orce


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Collecively, hese changes could save roughly $120 billion over he nex 30

years. Tese savings would increase he likelihood ha he services will have he

consisen unding necessary o efficienly modernize he nuclear orce and would

lower he risk hey will have o quickly accommodae shocks o he nuclear orce

srucure on shor noice.4 Tis plan preserves he overall srucure o he nuclear

riad o bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles while remaining ahe warhead ceiling allowed by he New Sraegic Arms educion reay, or New

SA. Tese changes would no reduce eiher he number or ypes o arges

ha he Unied Saes could hold a risk nor he yield or speed wih which i could

srike hese arges. However, he plan does decrease he number o ways ha he

services could srike he same arge. I may also marginally diminish he surviv-

abiliy o some warheads under cerain coningencies. In he auhors’ judgmen,

he benefis o mainaining his redundancy simply do no jusi y is coss when

measured agains oher miliary and domesic prioriies.

Beore leaving office, he Obama adminisraion can ake hree seps o ensure hahis successor has he inormaion and flexibiliy necessary o make hese needed

changes. Firs, he presiden should cancel wo programs: an effor o consolidae

varians o he B61 graviy bomba lower-yield nuclear weapon dropped rom

figher aircrafas well as a program o produce a new cruise missile launched

rom a bomber ha is able o maneuver o is arge. Second, he presiden should

revise deerrence requiremens ha currenly consrain modernizaion plans.

Tird, he Whie House should order he Penagon o generae analysis in order o

inorm he nex Nuclear Posure eview regarding opions o limi he moderniza-

ion plans.

When he new presidenial adminisraion akes office in January 2017, i should

implemen hese changes o he nuclear orce srucure and seriously consider

wo addiional seps: a urher reducion o he submarine orce rom 10 subs o 8

subs, as well as a delay o he Long-ange Srike Bomber program.

aking hese seps will no only save a leas $120 billion, which will allow he

Penagon o und more criical prioriies, bu will also permi Presiden Barack

Obama’s successor o have he flexibiliy o make even more reducions o he U.S.

nuclear arsenal wihou undermining nuclear deerrence.


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The politics of modernization

Ongoing debae abou he size and shape o he U.S. nuclear arsenal may be due

in par o a disagreemen abou how he counry ses he nuclear orce srucure.

On paper, he process is orderly and apoliical.5 Under his model, a new presiden

issues broad requiremens or he nuclear orce. Te secreary o deense and he

Penagon hen use hese requiremens o generae specific guidance on argeing

objecives and atack opions. Tereafer, U.S. Sraegic Command produces a se

o war plans or he employmen o sraegic orces and deermines he invenory

o sysems necessary o mee boh he presiden’s deerrence requiremens andhold a risk he specified arges. In pracice, ormer officials describe he process

as ineracivehe Penagon and he Whie House will work ogeher o se num-

bers and requiremensbu officially he process ends here. Te execuive branch

assumes ha Congress will appropriae he unding necessary o allow he services

o procure he requesed invenory o sysems.

Many sraegiss seem o believe ha his is more or less an accurae model o how

nuclear orce srucure is decided.6 Or, a leas, many seem o hink o his objec-

ive heory as a kind o ideal ha should be worked oward. Tere are advanages

o his model: I i works, here is a high probabiliy ha deerrence requiremens

will be me and risk will be minimized. Furhermore, predicabiliy in he bud-

geing process will ensure ha acquisiions are efficien. However, here are also

disadvanages: I he Whie House does no provide clear and curren guidance,

procuremen policy may no efficienly adap o changing sraegic condiions.

Tis approach may no adequaely accoun or he diplomaic or economic conse-

quences o nuclear modernizaion. Mos imporanly, his model does no allow

he execuive branch o accoun or poliical and fiscal pressures ha may preven

he services rom procuring he nuclear orce ha argeing analysis implied.

An examinaion o pas modernizaion cycles ells a differen sory. Te arsenal

ha exiss oday is he resul o poliical infighing; concessions o budgeary pres-

sures; aborive acquisiion effors ha were laer reversed in cosly and inefficien

ways; casual compromise; and roe esimaion. In oher words, i was an inefficien


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and poliicized mess. I makes sense or analyses o nuclear weapon policy o begin

rom a heory abou he opimal orce srucure or sraegic sabiliy. However,

when hese analyses ignore or assume away he hisorically sochasic naure o

nuclear modernizaion, hey risk misleading policymakers. Like all public policy,

nuclear sraegy is, o some exen, an exercise in he poliically and fiscally pos-

sible. Worse sill, hinking o nuclear sraegy as an absrac and objecive domainproeced rom normal poliical pressures prevens scholars and praciioners rom

learning rom pas modernizaion cycles. Imporanly, surveying pas moderniza-

ion effors reveals several paterns ha are likely o recur in he coming decades.

Bombers

Since he Kennedy adminisraion, he U.S. sraegic bomber orce has sruggled

wih almos coninual conroversy. epeaed effors o replace and upgrade he

B-52 subsonic inerconinenal bomberwhich firs flew in 1952have beencancelled or have seen heir purchase orders reduced dramaically. oday, despie

ambiious plans and piched poliical batles, he sraegic bomber flee consiss o

76 B-52s and only 20 sealhy B-2s.7

A he beginning o he Eisenhower adminisraion, he Sraegic Air Command,

or SAC, was he primary arm o he U.S. nuclear arsenal. esponsible or imple-

mening a sraegy o massive realiaion o counerbalance he Sovie’s numeric

advanage in convenional weapons, SAC reained 1,500 inermediae-range B-47

bombers saioned a home and in allied counries. Soon afer World War II, he

U.S. Air Force began developing a long-range sraegic bomberhe B-52and,

by 1962, he Air Force had purchased o 742 B-52 bombers capable o delivering

nuclear weapons.

Because he Air Force was concerned ha he B-52s would be vulnerable o Sovie

inercepor aircraf, i also began work in he early 1950s on he B-70: a large six-

engine aircraf capable o reaching speeds in excess o Mach 3, or hree imes he

speed o sound, while flying a 70,000 ee. However, by he lae 1950s, he Sovie

developmen o surace-o-air missilessuch as he ones ha sho down he

U-2 spy planepu he B-70’s near invulnerabiliy in doub. Tereore, despieopposiion rom he Congress, Secreary o Deense ober McNamara canceled

he bomber in 1961.


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a wase. Afer negoiaing wih he Air Force, he Bureau o he Budge, and he sec-

reary o deense, Presiden Lyndon Johnson came o an agreemen wih Air Force

Chie o Saff Curis LeMay on 1,000 Minueman missiles. As Desmond Ball, he

ormer head o he Sraegic and Deense Sudies Cenre, noed, his number was

a resul o a visceral eeling on he par o Secreary McNamara and his aides ha

1,000 was a saisacory and viable compromiseboh sraegically and poliically.In oher words, he decision was no he resul o a precise calculaion o wha was

needed or deerrence and second-srike capabiliy.10

However, less han a decade laer, he Air Force argued ha Minueman echnol-

ogy was becoming obsolee and proposed building a new ICBM ha would incor-

porae more echnologically advanced eaures, such as increased range, greaer

accuracy, and variable-yield warheads.

Congress originally me he proposal wih skepicism, concerned ha silo-based

missiles would be vulnerable o Sovie ICBMs in a firs srike. Bu, by 1979aferhe Sovie invasion o AghanisanCongress changed is posiion, and Presiden

Carer auhorized he deploymen o 200 mobile MX, or Peacekeeper, missiles.

Presiden eagan iniially cu he number o missiles o 100, bu Congress limied

he number o 50. Tese missiles were hen deployed in exising Minueman silos.

Evenually, hese 50 missiles were decommissioned beween 2003 and 2005 as

par o he 1991 Sraegic Arms educion reay, or SA.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

During he Eisenhower adminisraion, in he even o a Sovie invasion, he

naional miliary sraegy was o respond o is superior number o convenional

orces by escalaing o he nuclear level. As a resul, he Air Force, which possessed

sraegic bombers and land-based missiles, received he lion’s share o he deense

budge. In order o increase is share o he deense budge and gain a more

prominen role wihin Presiden Dwigh Eisenhower’s sraegy, he Navy decided

o ry o ge ino he nuclear game by developing a ballisic missile ha could be

launched rom a submarine.

In 1953, when his idea was firs proposed o Admiral ober Carney, he chie o

naval operaions, he reused o allocae money or i ino he Navy budge, deeming

he projec oo risky and expensive. However, his successor, Admiral Arleigh Burke,

decided ha he projeced payoff was so grea ha i was worh risking scarce dollars

on he program. Evenually, i became he mos expensive par o he nuclear riad. 11


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Te Navy’s original analysis showed ha he mos cos-effecive opion or he

submarine-launched ballisic missile, or SLBM, program was o place 32 missile

ubes on each submarine.12 Te nuclear atack submarine communiy, concerned

ha he program would no work and undermine is own program, said hey

could only suppor 24 missiles on each submarine. Te program chie, Admiral

William ayburn, asked i 16 missiles would gain heir suppor. Tis deermina-ion allowed he program o go orward and has shaped submarine requiremens

o he presen day.

Similarly, he ac ha he Navy ended up building 41 o hese vessels was also

more o a hisorical acciden han a sraegic calculaion. Admiral Burke believed

ha a orce o 40 Polaris submarines, each equipped wih 16 missiles, was more

han enough or deerrenceeven wihou bombers or land-based missiles.

During his enure in office, which ended in 1961, he Navy unded 19 subma-

rines. Admiral Burke had unsuccessully ried o ge he submarines unded

ouside he Navy budge, arguing o Presiden Eisenhower ha Polaris was anaional program.

Te Kennedy adminisraion, which increased deense spending dramaically

even beore he war in Vienamadded anoher 22 submarines beore sopping

a 41 subs. However, Presiden John Kennedy lef open he possibiliy o a urher

increase o as many as 47 submarines. He did his as a way o increase Secreary

McNamara’s bargaining power wih he Navy.13

When i came ime o replace he Polaris submarines wih Ohio-class subma-

rines carrying he new riden missile, he Navy waned o buy 24 boas, each

armed wih 16 missilessimilar o he Polaris. However, because o fiscal

consrains, Melvin LairdPresiden ichard Nixon’s secreary o deense

direced he Navy o place 24 ubes on each submarine and cu he number o

boas by one-hird o 18.14

In he 1970s, budge consrains orced he cancellaion o he B-70 bomber;

cu he purchase o FB-111s by 70 percen; cu he procuremen o Peacekeeper

missiles by 75 percen; and resuled in 12 ewer ballisic-missile submarines being

buil han originally planned. Despie hose cus, he Unied Saes successullydeerred a Sovie Union ha possessed larger convenional and sraegic orces

and also concluded several arms-conrol agreemens.15


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The current cycle

As he Unied Saes begins a new nuclear modernizaion cycle, all branches o

governmen should work o avoid he inefficiencies o pas cycles. However, con-

diions have changed since he 1980s. Changes in he domesic poliical oulook,

he inernaional miliary balance, and he global poliics o nuclear weapons will

all consrain and complicae he effor o modernize he U.S. arsenal.

In pas cycles, Congress has been a major source o inefficiency in modernizing

he nuclear arsenal. Program delays, cancellaions, and changes in he quaniieso unis ordered all impair he abiliy o he Deparmen o Deense o modernize

as efficienly and quickly as possible. Alhough parisan poliics have always had

an effec on he arsenal, poliical scieniss find ha polarizaion is increasing,

wih pary ideology scores diverging and each successive Congress passing ewer

bills.16 Nowhere are hese effecs more prominen han on he poliics o he

ederal budge.

oday, he oal naional deense budge sands a $616 billion.17 Despie wide-

spread concern ha he counry is no spending enough on deense, his figure

adjused or inflaionis higher han wha he Unied Saes spen during all bu

wo years o he Cold War; a he heigh o he Korean War; and a he very peak

o he eagan adminisraion’s deense buildup.18 Te Unied Saes now spends

roughly 12 percen more on deense han i does on all discreionary domesic

spending. Te difference beween deense and nondeense spending$68 bil-

lioncould double he unding or he U.S. Deparmen o Sae and oher iner-

naional aid programs wih enough lef over o double NASA’s budge as well.19

Te Budge Conrol Ac, or BCA, o 2011 and he deb-ceiling figh ha preceded

i; he sequesraion and governmen shudown o 2013;20

and he endency ound he governmen under coninuing resoluions are all exemplary o a new and

divisive poliics ha has gripped he ederal budge and imposed limis on deense

spending. In he las five years, he Obama adminisraion’s 10-year projecions o

deense spending have declined, meaning he Penagon has had o scale down is


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plans even as i is approaching a “bow wave” o convenional weapons moderniza-

ion.21 (see Figure 1) Las year, Secreary o Deense Ash Carer warned ha he

Deparmen o Deense was having rouble absorbing “more han hree-quarers

o a rillion dollars in cus o is uure-years deense spending.”22 Year-o-year

unding degrades he Deparmen o Deense’s abiliy o plan efficienly or major

deense acquisiion programs, a siuaion Secreary Carer called “managerially

unsound.”23 Te Ocober 2015 budge agreemen beween he Whie House and

Congress ha se spending levels or he nex wo years was reached when nego-

iaors agreed o circumven he BCA caps by using unds placed in he uncapped

Overseas Coningency Operaions slush und.24 Tough his deal will alleviae

pressures in he near erm, he BCA caps and he anagonisic poliics ha pro-

duced hem will complicae nuclear modernizaion hrough he enire cycle.

As he U.S. nuclear arsenal has adaped o he end o he Cold War, U.S. presi-

dens have aken on new commimens ha limi nuclear modernizaion. Te

2010 Nuclear Posure eview was a modes documen by mos measures and

laid he groundwork or oday’s nuclear modernizaion plans, bu i also made

several commimens ha will boh consrain and shape modernizaion. Is

pledge o reduce “he role and numbers o U.S. nuclear weapons” and o ensureha “Lie Exension Programs (LEP) will use only nuclear componens based on

previously esed designs, and will no suppor new miliary missions or provide

or new miliary capabiliies” places maerial consrains on how he services can

modernize.25 In addiion, he 2013 Nuclear Employmen Guidance provided or

FIGURE 1

White House projections of defense spending have declined

Budget Control Act caps are pushing down expected 10-year spending plans

Source: Amy Belasco, “Defense Spending and the Budget Control Act Limits” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015),

available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44039.pdf.

$5.0

$5.5

$6.0

$6.5

FY 2012 plan

$5.9

$5.8

$5.6$5.6

FY 2013 plan FY 2014 plan FY 2015 plan FY 2016 plan

BCA caps

$6.4


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“increased reliance on convenional or non-nuclear srike capabiliies”26 and also

saed a preerence o mainain muliple warhead ypes in each leg o he riad;

hough i conceded ha his requiremen is no absolue and ha he Unied

Saes should prepare in some cases o compensae or shorcomings in one leg

wih sysems in anoher. Lasly, he Nuclear Employmen Guidance direcs he

services o reain “he abiliy o ‘upload’ sraegic delivery plaorms in responseo geopoliical or echnological surprise,” which requires he services o reain

excess delivery capaciy.27

Te Nuclear Employmen Guidance conained anoher ineresing provision: a

deerminaion ha he counry can “ensure he securiy o he Unied Saes and

our allies and mainain a srong and credible sraegic deerren while saely pursu-

ing up o a one-hird reducion in deployed nuclear weapons.”28 Tis is because he

exising arsenal is “more han adequae or wha he Unied Saes needs o ulfill

is naional securiy objecives.” Tis finding confirms ha here is no argeing

analysis ha mandaes an arsenal much in excess o 1,000 warheads. Furhermore,he documen does no make his deerminaion coningen on ussian orce

levels. Alhough i is unlikely ha a U.S. presiden would order major reducions

in he arsenal wihou reciprocal and verifiable seps rom ussia, he guidance

suggess ha o do so would no damage U.S. naional securiy.

Wih litle prospec o concluding a new arms conrol agreemen wih ussia, he

recommendaions presened below assume ha he U.S. nuclear arsenal comprises

1,550 deployed sraegic warheadshe level se by he New SA agreemen.29

Underaking a urher one-hird reducion o 1,000 warheads would require sig-

nificanly rehinking he U.S. nuclear orce srucure. A reducion o his magni-

ude would leave a large quaniy o unfilled warhead slosvery expensive empy

spacei no accompanied by a commensurae reducion in delivery vehicles.

Furhermore, i would be difficul o jusiy mainaining a riad o suppor a orce

o 1,000 warheads. A urher one-hird reducion would shrink he ICBM orce

o 300 warheads or ewer. A his level, procuremen programs or missile compo-

nens would have even greaer difficuly achieving economies o scale and become

somehing o an arisanal process. I may simply be easier o reire he land leg o

he riad alogeher.

As geopoliical circumsances change, here will be calls o renege on hese com-

mimens. However, seps ha dilue or reverse hese commimens could do seri-

ous damage o he global nonprolieraion regime, as well as o relaionships wih

some U.S. allies who remain invesed in disarmamen. Te global poliics o nuclear


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weapons have changed subsanially since he end o he Cold War. Presiden

Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague, which renewed he U.S. commimen o

seek a world wihou nuclear weapons, resonaed globally and helped o repair U.S.

moral auhoriy.30 In recen years, ineres in nuclear disarmamen has expanded

urher. Te global movemen o explore he humaniarian effec o nuclear weap-

ons has encouraged some counries, including some U.S. allies, o move owarddrafing a ban on nuclear weapons. Te coss and visibiliy o nuclear moderniza-

ion programs are already helping o radicalize his movemen, which conribued

o he ailure o he Unied Naion’s 2015 Nonprolieraion reay, or NP, eview

Conerence and could urher damage he nonprolieraion regime. Limiing mod-

ernizaion plans could help o bring hese counries back ino he old o he NP,31

while reneging on exising commimens could have serious consequences.

Current modernization plans

Wih each major sysem in he U.S. nuclear arsenal nearing he end o is service

lie, he Unied Saes is iniiaing several acquisiions programs o replace exis-

ing nuclear delivery vehicles. In addiion, he Deparmen o Deense is plan-

ning o renovae is nuclear command and conrol sysems, or NC3, and he U.S.

Deparmen o Energy will reurbish several classes o warheads.

More han wo-hirds o U.S. nuclear warheads are deployed on Ohio-class

submarines carrying riden II D5 sea-launched ballisic missiles.32 O 14 sub-

marines, wo are in overhaul a any given ime. o mee he New SA reay

limis, he Navy is disabling our missile ubes on each submarine. Under he

new sysem, each o he 12 deployed subs will carry 20 missiles or a oal o

240 deployed launchers. Each riden missile is capable o carrying up o eigh

warheads, bu he missiles are reporedly loaded differenially in order o preserve

a range o srike opions. o replace is exising SSBNs, he Navy has begun he

Ohio eplacemen Program. As recenly as he fiscal year 2012 budge cycle, he

Navy expeced o begin deailed design work and early procuremen on he firs

replacemen submarine in 2015. However, in 2013, he Navy pushed he program

by wo years and now expecs he firs hull o be laid down in 2021, wih service

expeced o begin in 2030. In March 2015, he Governmen Accounabiliy Officeesimaed he oal acquisiion cos o he program a abou $95.8 billion: $14.5

billion or he lead submarine and $5.2 billion in FY 2010 dollars or each subse-

quen boaa modes increase rom heir previous esimae o $4.9 billion.33


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Te air leg o he nuclear riad is more diverse. Te naion’s

bomber orce consiss o 44 operaional B-52H Sraoorress

bomberswhich carry up o 20 air-launched cruise missiles, or

ALCMsas well as 18 operaional B-2A Spiri sealh bomb-

ers, which carry up o 16 nuclear graviy bombs on an inernal-

roary assembly.34

In addiion, he Unied Saes deploys some180 B61 nuclear graviy bombs a six air bases in Europe as par

o an assurance mission, which are compaible wih F-15E and

F-16 figher-bomber aircraf. Each o hese sysems is nearing

he end o is service lie.35 Te B-52 and B-2 bombers are se o

be replaced by he Long-ange Srike Bomber program, which

he Air Force hopes will yield 80 o 100 smaller, cheaper, and

sealhier aircraf. Te Air Force plans o replace he ALCM wih

he Long-ange Sandoff Weapon, or LSO, which will deploy

around 2025 on he ougoing B-52H. However, i will evenually

be deployed on B-2 and B-3 bombers as well.36 Lasly, he B61graviy bomb is undergoing a complex lie-exension program

ha consolidaes hree varians ino onehe B61-12and

ataches a new guided ail ki ha improves he weapon’s accu-

racy and abiliy o glide o is arge.37

Te land leg o he nuclear riad consiss o a single sysem: he Minueman III

ICBM. Firs deployed in 1970 wih he capabiliy o carry hree warheads, he

2010 Nuclear Posure eview direced ha each missile carry only one warhead.38

A oal o 450 Minueman missiles are now disribued across hree wings a bases

in Wyoming, Monana, and Norh Dakoa and have undergone requen mod-

ernizaion programs, including recen updaes o propulsion, guidance, re-enry,

and argeing sysems, as well as a new effor o replace he missiles’ uzes.39 In July

2014, afer years o uncerainy, he Air Force compleed an analysis o alernaives

and oped or a plan o “deploy a new missile in is exising Minueman inrasruc-

ure” raher han o exend he lie o he Minueman III hrough 2075 or procure

a new road-mobile ICBM.40 Te Air Force expecs ha he program will cos

$62.3 billion in hen-year dollars over 30 years, wih he firs new ICBMs opera-

ional in 2029.41

Te confluence o hese new programs will dramaically raise he cos o he

nuclear deerren. Te Congressional Budge Office, or CBO, places he nomi-

nal 10-year figure a $348 billion, roughly 75 percen higher han in he pas 10

years.42 Tiry-year coss all in he range o $1 rillion.43

TABLE 1

Projected U.S. nuclear force structure

under New START treaty, 2018

Deployed (nondepl

Launchers War

Minuteman III 400 (54) 4

Ohio-class submarines 240 (40) 10

Strategic bombers

B-2 18 (2)

B61-7/-11 and B83

gravity bombs~

B-52 42 (4)

Air-launched cruise missile ~2

Tactical aircraft

B61-3/4 ~

*For the purposes of the the New START treaty, each deployed bomberas one warhead. These numbers are estimates of the actual number of d

warheads.

“Source: Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Develand Issues” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015), p. 8, avhttps://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf; Hans M. Kristensen and

S. Norris, “US nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71 (2)available at http://thebulletin.org/2015/march/us-nuclear-forces-20158


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Tere is subsanial debae abou wheher his sum is affordable. For example, he

nonparisan congressionally mandaed Naional Deense Panel ound ha recapi-

alizaion o he riad is “unaffordable” under curren budge consrains.44 In early

2015, Under Secreary o Deense or Acquisiion, echnology, and Logisics

Frank Kendall said, “ We’ve go a big affordabiliy problem.”45

Supporers o he modernizaion plans disagree, poining ou ha as long as he

Unied Saes mainains a nuclear riad, many o he coss associaed wih i are

fixed. Because he coss o operaing he nuclear orce remain relaively low

and because much o he cos o procuring a new weapons sysem is in research,

developmen, and esingi is very difficul o selecively wring money rom he

nuclear enerprise. Wih ew excepions, real savings are only possible by cancel-

ling sysems or providing or major cus in orce srucure. Tis ac is even more

pressing in he near erm. Because much o he spending increase is no due o hi

he books unil he mid-2020s, when procuremen coss on he SSBN and new

bomber will maerialize, i is especially difficul o find subsanial savings in henear erm when budge consrains may be mos severe. As a resul, he auhors

o an influenial Cener or Sraegic and Budgeary Assessmens , or CSBA,

repor concluded, proposed reducions in he nuclear modernizaion program

would no resul in significan savings.46 Tereore, reallocaing unding o oher

areas is no worh he risk. I is, according o he common rerain, a “hun or

small poaoes,” hey said.47 Because nuclear weapons will represen roughly 5

percen o he oal deense budge, “he issue is no affordabiliyraher, i is a

mater o prioriizaion.”48

o say ha operaing and modernizing he nuclear deerren will accoun or

no more han 5 percen o he Penagon budge is roughly ruebu his claim

obscures more han i reveals.49 Tis figurewhich he CBO says could reach 6

percen and Penagon leadership claims could approach 7 percenis se o rise

seadily rom is curren level o jus more han 3 percen o he deense budge.

I will reach is peak in 2029 when he heigh o submarine and bomber procure-

men drives he oal sum o more han $34 billion.50 o pu his in perspecive,

in 2029, he Deparmen o Deense will spend abou as much on nuclear weap-

ons as he oal budge o he U.S. Deparmen o Jusice. Tis sum is more han

double NASA’s oal budge his year FY 2016.51

Te procuremen budge in isenirey is less han 20 percen o he deense budge, whereas he enire ship-

building budge is only 2 percen.52


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Te deense budge is vas and provides or a wide variey o expendiures. Some

o hese expendiures, such as research and developmen o new aircraf, are analo-

gous o hose ha will be necessary o recapialize he nuclear riad. Many ohers,

such as he salaries and benefis o 450,000 acive duy U.S. Army servicemen and

women, are no direcly involved in nuclear operaions. Many o hese expendi-

ures are mandaory or inelasic and canno be easily adjused o find more moneyor nuclear iems. While nuclear deerrence represens a leas 5 percen o overall

deense spending, i will consume ar larger proporions o criical accouns such

as naval shipbuilding and aircraf procuremen. In 2030, he Ohio eplacemen

Program alone will accoun or abou 8 percen o oal deense procuremen.53

Te danger is no ha he ederal governmen runs ou o money o und nuclear

modernizaion; i is ha members o Congress, he miliary services, and he

Penagon leadership are unwilling o sacrifice oher programs o pay or new

nuclear sysems. Tough he counry has known ha i would have o und nuclear

modernizaion, he services have no saved up or he new expendiures and haveinsead pressed ahead wih major procuremen programs ha hey consider vial

o heir core missions. As a resul, boh he Navy and he Air Force now say ha

nuclear modernizaion would seriously damage heir operaions i hey are no

graned addiional unding ha exceeds congressionally mandaed spending caps.

Te Navy has esimaed ha i i were orced o buy he Ohio-class replacemen

submarine as a par o is normal procuremen budge, i would have o orgo

consrucion o as many as 32 oher naval vessels.54 By 2022, he Navy hopes o

expand he surace flee rom 273 comba ships o 308 comba ships.55 o boh

replace ships ha are reiring and expand he flee, he Navy will have o build 264

comba and suppor ships beore 2046. Tis56 effor will increase he shipbuild-

ing budge by abou one-hird over he nex 30 years relaive o he pas 30 years.57

Wih major shipbuilding effors underway o produce new Virginia-class atack

submarines, Ford-class aircraf carriers, and new flees o desroyers, officials

are anxious o avoid leting he new SSBNs “gu he he res o our shipbuilding

programs,” as Secreary o he Navy ay Mabus recenly said.58 Te CBO recenly

concluded, “[I] he Navy is no provided addiional unding or [Ohio replace-

men] procuremen, he batle orce invenory will all shor o he … orce

required, and he shipbuilding indusrial base will be severely degraded.”59

Whenasked, Under Secreary o Deense Kendall old reporers, “We don’ have a solu-

ion o ha problem righ now … I rankly hink he only way we can address i

and keep he orce srucure in he Deparmen o Deense ha we would like o

have is higher budges.”60


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Te Air Force has ound isel in a similar bind. In he 2020s, he Air Force plans

o begin ull-rae producion o he F-35 mulirole atack figher, he KC-46 reuel-

ing anker, as well as he new Long-ange Srike Bomber.61 Tese hree programs,

plus remoe-piloed aircraf, accoun or 99 percen o he Air Force’s acquisiion

budge and will crowd ou all oher procuremen programs and consume large

proporions o uure years’ research and developmen budges.62

Te budgecrunch is so severe ha he Air Force is reporedly discussing cus o he F-35

procuremen programlong considered aboo because i could se off a cascade

o similar reducions in parner counries, which would drive up he cos o he

program even urher.63

Te siuaion is made even more acue by he possibiliy ha nuclear procure-

men programs could ace cos overruns and delays. In pas modernizaion cycles,

Congress has ofen cu programs acing cos overruns. While he nuclear arsenal

during he Cold War was large enough o absorb cus wihou changes o nuclear

sraegy, oday’s slimmer arsenal will have o make significan adjusmens oaccommodae any such cus. In recen years, several major deense acquisiion

programs have incurred significan cos overruns, including he Zumwal-class

desroyer, he Seawol-class atack submarine, and he F-22 figher. 64 In each case,

Congress severely cu purchase quaniies, driving up he cos per uni.

While, a he ouse, i is difficul o predic which programs will ace cos over-

runs, i is clear he poenial remains or his o occur. Nearly one-hird o all

major deense acquisiions programs since 1997 have breached legal hresholds

or cos growh. On average, procuremen programs in 2013 ook abou one-year

longer han hey did 20 years earlier, which also conribues o increased coss.65

Based on he experience o similar pas programs, he CBO esimaes ha cos

growh will accoun or abou $49 billion o he oal $348 billion oal cos o U.S.

nuclear orces unil 2024.66 Tough i is oo soon o ell how he major modern-

izaion programs will are, cos esimaes o he B61 lie-exension program have

already expanded rapidly. Over he course o 2011 and 2012, he Naional Nuclear

Securiy Adminisraion, or NNSA, increased is esimae o program coss rom

$4 billion o nearly $10 billion. Te Air Force’s esimaed cos o he B61 ail ki

has also expanded by 50 percen o $1.2 billion.67 Oher componens o he riad

are likely o ace similar pressures. Analyss widely expec he Air Force o arexceed is $55 billion esimae or he oal cos o he new sealh bomber, previ-

ous examples o which have seen very high cos growh.68 A he same ime, cos

esimaes or programs o replace ICBMs and cruise missiles remain skechy.


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Te Penagon leadership has repeaedly said ha he nuclear deerren is heir

op prioriy. Shorly beore leaving office in 2014, Secreary o Deense Chuck

Hagel declared ha he nuclear deerren is “DOD’s highes prioriy mission. No

oher capabiliy ha we have is more imporan.”69 In heory, his saemen may

seem o sugges ha he Penagon will ully und he modernizaion planseven

i i means cuting oher programs. In pracice, he Navy and he Air Force arehighly invesed in heir convenional procuremen prioriies and will resis any

cus. Cerainly, he Army and he Marine Corps will resis effors o cu heir

budges in order o purchase nuclear plaorms or he Air Force and Navy. Boh

he Air Force and he Navy, ully aware o he upcoming bow wave o nuclear

spending, could have developed heir uure-years procuremen schedules in

such a way ha allowed hem o und nuclear sysems. Insead, hey oped o pu

convenional programs on he books firs and hen seek supplemenal und-

ing or nuclear sysems. In his conex, saemens regarding he prioriy o he

nuclear deerren may be read as a way o convincing Congress o appropriae

hese supplemenal unds.

As a way o preserving heir convenional procuremen budges, boh he Air

Force and he Navy have asked Congress o esablish special unds o purchase

he B-3 bombers, as well as he new SSBN.70 Congress has aken early seps

o esablish such a und or he Navy, bu he oulook or he Air Force und is

dubious. However, esablishmen o he unds will no by isel solve he und-

ing problemsand he realiy is ha hey mus sill be filled somehow. Tere are

wo ways ha his sraegy could help secure unding: eiher by breaking hrough

he congressionally mandaed budge caps or by drawing unding rom oher

Penagon accouns, including he Army. In his way, he unds are likely o srike

up a rivalry beween he services over scarce dollars, raising poliical ensions over

he modernizaion programs even urher.

Te Whie House should undersand ha, while he miliary services will behave

sraegically o mee heir requiremens, Congress may no. Facing a budge

reques ha asks or everyhing, Congress may choose o prioriize nonessenial

projecs. For example, many members o Congress are moving o und exraneous

programs such as an effor o conver he B61 graviy bomb o a guided weapon; a

new cruise missile; and a doomed plan o ge rid o excess miliary pluonium byconvering i ino uel or commercial nuclear power plans.71 Tese unds would

be beter spen ensuring ha he core sysems necessary or deerrence mee heir

capabiliies and numerical requiremens.


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Even i here was agreemen wihin he Penagon, Congress does no always share

is leadership’s prioriizaion: Many members o Congress will figh o preserve

specific deense programs or poliical or sraegic reasons. I is unlikely ha

Congress will read his reques or special naional-deerrence unds as a way o

ensuring he coninuiy o hese programs. More likely, i will see i as an admis-

sion ha he programs are highly expensive and no direcly required or heservices’ core missions. I is poliically difficul o esablish and ully und new

accounseven i members o Congress agree in principle ha he iems in ha

accoun are worhwhile. I is easier o pare down large coss han o find offses or

he ull amoun. Te bes way o proec nuclear modernizaion unding would be

or he services o include he requess in heir base procuremen budges and o

ask or modes increases o und convenional sysemsbu hey are unwilling

o do his. As a resul, prioriizing he nuclear mission will no necessarily make

unding he programs any easier. In pas decades, he imporance o he nuclear

mission did no insulae modernizaion rom eiher poliics or cus. I would be

impruden o rus oday’s Congress o ake a long-erm view.


22/37


Recommendations

A raional and realisic plan or nuclear modernizaion is criical o naional

securiy. Curren rends will exacerbae acue budge pressures and bring nuclear

prioriies ino conflic wih convenional ones. Every dollar spen on nonessenial

nuclear capabiliies endangers one ha is needed or sysems criical o deerrence,

naional deense, or imporan domesic invesmens. Boh recen and disan

hisory suggess ha Congress is unlikely o appropriae he ull amoun requesed

or he curren modernizaion plans. o ensure ha he nex nuclear arsenal is

balanced, sabilizing, and mees deerrence requiremens, he Whie House musreview he curren modernizaion plans o ensure ha hey are realisic given cur-

ren fiscal consrains. I i does no, i will be leaving he nuclear orce srucure o

he Congress, which may no make cus in a sraegically or fiscally raional way.72

Submarines: Reduce the planned number from 12 to 10

Te sea leg o he nuclear riad is he mos survivable, conains he mos warheads,

and is he mos cosly. Accordingly, how o replace he Ohio-class ballisic missile

submarines is a quesion o special concern. Unil 2013, he Navy’s plan or replac-

ing is SSBN flee was o shif rom 14 Ohio-class submarines in service o 12

replacemen submarines known as he SSBN(X). Tis plan did no enail a change

in orce srucure because, a any given ime, wo Ohio-class submarines are being

reueled, leaving 12 available o roae on parols. Tis schedule mean he Navy

would begin o procure he lead SSBN(X) in 2019, wih i evenually enering

service in 2029. Ohio-class submarines would begin o reire as hey reached he

end o heir service livesone per year beginning in 2026wih he final ship,

he USS Louisiana, o be reired in 2039. As new submarines replace old ones,

he oal number o SSBNs in service would drop rom 14 in 2026 o 12 in 2029,remaining a his oal indefiniely. Because he SSBN(X)’s reacor will no require

reueling, all ships would be available or parol hroughou heir service lives,

obviaing he need o procure wo more ships.73


23/37


In is 2013 budge reques, he Navy slipped is Ohio-class submarine replace-

men program wo years. (see Figure 2) Under he curren plan, procuremen o

he firs SSBN(X) will begin in 2021 and i wil l ener service in 2030. Because

he Ohio-class submarines mus sill reire on he same imeline, he oal

number o submarines in service will drop rom 14 in 2026 o 10 in 2030, and

he flee will operae wih 10 boas or years. In 2041 and 2042, he ninh and

10h SSBN(X) submarines will ener ino service and drive he oal number o

operaional subs up o 12. Tis schedule is somewha odd in ha i seems o pro-

vide or wo periods o excess capabiliy: he firs when he flee is a 14 opera-

ional submarines beween he final Ohio-class reueling period in 2015 and he

reiremen o he fifh Ohio-class in 2031 and hen, again, afer 2040 when he

final wo SSBN(X)s come online.74

Te plan is an admission ha a flee o 10 subs is sufficien o mee exising

deerrence requiremens or exended periods. Because every dollar spen on

excess capaciy endangers a dollar ha could be spen on a sysem necessary ordeerrence, i is unlikely ha Congress will appropriae unding o expand he

flee o 12 subs afer i has been operaing wih 10 subs or he beter par o a

decade. Te SSBN flee, like he U.S. arsenal overall, should be sized a is mini-

mum effecive level.

FIGURE 2

Plan to modernize a fleet of 10 ballistic-missile submarines

Comparisons between CAP and Navy plans to replace the Ohio-class submarine, 2015–2043

Source: For the Navy plan, see Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington: Congressional Research Service,available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf.

Ohio

2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027

Hull numbers of retiring Ohio-class submarines, by year:

2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041

0

5

10

15

SSBN(X)

In Navy plan

Total operational SSBNs, Navy’s plan

X-1

730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743

X-2

X-3

X-4

X-5

X-6X-7

X-8X-9

X-10

X-11X-12

Total operational SSBNs, proposed


24/37


aher han allow he oal number o submarines o flucuae, he Navy should

size is flee o 10 subs or he duraion o he modernizaion cycle. Under his

plan, he Navy would complee is ongoing program o reueling Ohio-class sub-

marines as planned. aher han increase he size o he operaional orce in 2019,

he Navy would reire is our oldes SSBNs, one per year, beginning in 2017 wih

USS Henry M. Jackson. Tese reiremens would downsize he flee o 10 subma-rines by he end o 2020, where i would remain indefiniely. Tis schedule allows

he Navy o delay he SSBN(X) program one more year, beginning producion on

he firs ship in 2022 and having i operaional by 2031. Procuring one submarine

per year hereafer, a flee o 10 Ohio-class replacemen submarines would be

operaional by 2040. Te CSBA’s budge analysis shows ha his plan could save

$27.6 billion in hen-year dollars over 24 years relaive o he curren plans.75

Due o he excess warhead capaciy o he Ohio’s riden missiles, his plan would

no require major redisribuions o warheads across he riad. A flee o 10 Ohio-

class subs could accommodae heir curren allomen o 1,090 warheads wih638 excess warhead spaces, while a flee o 10 SSBN(X) ships would have 190

empy spaces. Tese exra spaces are a valued commodiy or wo reasons. Tey

allow he Navy o differenially load heir riden missiles, allowing more flexible

srike opions, and hey represen an abiliy o upload nondeployed warheads in

case o an emergency. While reducing he flee o 10 submarines consrains hese

capabiliies somewha, i does no eliminae hem enirely.

SSBN operaions are srucured o mee demanding logisical requiremens.

Wih a orce o 12 operaional submarines, a any given ime, he Navy is hough

o mainain our o five submarines on hard aler in parol areas wihin range o

heir arges. While hese subs are on saion, he ohers are ransiing o or rom

parols, undergoing mainenance, modificaion, refi, or exercises. In order o

reduce he flee o 10 subs, he presiden would have o revise he curren required

number o submarines ha mus remain on saion a all imes. However, his revi-

sion is probably no dramaic.76 Tree acs sugges ha he curren modernizaion

plans are in excess o deerrence requiremens: Te ac ha he Navy plans o

operae or a decade wih a flee o 10 subs; he Nuclear Employmen Guidance’s

asserion ha curren plans are “more han adequae”; and declassified inorma-

ion ha shows a seep decline in he rae ha SSBNs parol.77


25/37


Above and beyond his proposal, he nex presiden should seriously consider

reducing he SSBN flee o eigh ships. Tis opion, which he CBO esimaed

could save $20.9 billion over he nex nine yearsas well as more hereafer

would require more serious modificaions o he orce.78 A flee o eigh curren-

generaion submarines would only have 190 vacan warhead slos, while eigh

nex-generaion submarines could only have 1,024 slos66 shor o he 1,090 warheads programmed o he submarine orce under New SA. Tis would

severely consrain submarine loadous andalong wih he oher cusmake

i difficul or he Unied Saes o mainain he same number o deployed war-

heads afer he expiry o he reay. Furhermore, an eigh-submarine flee could

no mainain as many boas on saion, requiring a greaer revision o deerrence

requiremens. However, ransiioning o eigh subs would alleviae significan

pressure on Navy shipbuilding. Te cos savings over nine years wih eigh subs is

roughly equivalen o a year’s worh o he enire shipbuilding budgeor abou

he cos o an aircraf carrier, an atack submarine, a desroyer, hree small surace

combaans, and our logisics ships.79

Bombers: Cancel the new cruise missile and eliminate the tactical

nuclear mission

Te air leg o he nuclear riad is he mos flexible and diverse. Is primary mod-

ernizaion projec is o consruc a new bomber o replace he B-52, he B-1B,

andevenuallyhe B-2 or boh convenional and nuclear missions. Te Air

Force says low-observable aircraf are necessary in order o ensure ha hey can

penerae increasingly capable enemy air-deense sysems and hold arges a risk.

In Ocober 2015, Norhrop Grumman received a conrac o produce beween 80

o 100 bombers a a cos o $511 million per uni in 2010 dollarswell below he

Penagon’s cos arge o $550 million.80 However, ew analyss expec he program

o mee his arge.81 Te expeced delivery dae or he firs unias well as he

Penagon’s projeced unding schedule or he bombersugges ha major devel-

opmen work has already been compleed.82

Modernizaion o he riad’s air leg also includes aircraf-delivered muniions.

In Ocober 2015, ormer Secreary o Deense William J. Perry and recenlydepared Assisan Secreary o Deense Andy Weber recommended cancelling

he new Long-ange Sandoff Weapon, which is inended o be a replacemen

or he air-launched cruise missile.83 Se o reire in 2030, he ALCM allows he

B-52 o reain a nuclear mission. Unable o penerae enemy air deenses, he


26/37


B-52 requires he sandoff capabiliy o a cruise missile o hold arges a risk.

However, he procuremen o he sealhy B-3 bomber raises he quesion o

why a peneraing bomber requires a sandoff capabiliy. A an esimaed cos o

$20 billion or he missile and a program o exend he lie o he W80 warhead,

he LSO is an expensive redundancy ha is unlikely ever o be used. Sea- or

land-launched ballisic missiles are sufficien o hold any arge a risk, are morereliable, and posses a shorer ime o arge.

Addiionally, he Unied Saes should abandon he acical nuclear mission.

Couning he cos o susaining he 180 warheads saioned a bases in Europe

and he cos o modiying he F-35 o carry he B61, as well as he savings rom

he cancellaion o he B61 lie-exension program,84 he CSBA esimaes a

poenial savings up o $28.8 billion over 24 years i he weapons were wihdrawn

immediaely.85 Tese unds can be a leas parially reinvesed in new deerrence

and assurance seps or NAO ha are more closely ailored o he subconven-

ional hreas posed by ussia and he Islamic Sae o Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS,including rapid-response orces and roaional deploymens or U.S. orces.86

Eliminaing he acical nuclear mission will have a marginal effec on NAO’s

abiliy o deer ussian aggression, as he weapons canno be deployed or monhs

once aleredand only hen on vulnerable nonsealhy aircraf. emoval o he

conenious weapons may well do more o enhance alliance solidariy han derac

rom i. Te exising warheads can be wihdrawn rom European bases a he mos

poliically expedien momen.

Land: Gradual reduction in the size of the ICBM force

Te role o he ICBM orce is o provide an addiional hedge agains an adversary

seeking a firs-srike capabiliy over he Unied Saes. Each missile is saioned in

a hardened silo, which would require ha an enemy program a leas wo war-

heads o have a reasonable chance o disabling each missile. Because each U.S.

Minueman missile carries only one warhead and because i akes a leas wo

warheads o desroy a hardened silo wih any cerainy, ICBMs resul in a poor

exchange raio or an enemy: A ull 60 percen o he ussian sraegic arsenal

would be required o eliminae he U.S. ICBM orce. In shor, he ICBM orce ishough o serve as a sponge or an enemy’s warheads.


27/37


ICBMs are less useul in regional coningencies ha migh resul in limied

nuclear use. Sriking virually any arge in he world requires flying over ussia,

which would se off heir early-warning sysem and raise he risk o a major calam-

iy.87 Furhermore, according o he byzanine logic o nuclear-deerrence heory, a

srike ha originaes in he coninenal Unied Saes places he counry a greaer

risk o realiaion han a U.S. weapon delivered by oher means.

Te remoeness o a large-scale nuclear exchange means ICBMs are o litle rele-

vance o sraegic sabiliy oday. Tey are increasingly unlikely ever o be used and

do litle o help he mos pressing exended-deerrence problems ha he Unied

Saes aces oday. Tese consideraions have already shrunk he size o he ICBM

orce o less han hal o is Cold War peak, and officials expec o make urher

reducions in he coming years.88

Te economics o he ICBM orce are complicaed. Over he pas 20 years, sus-

aining and operaing he Minueman orce has averaged abou $1.4 billion a yearhough modernizaion programs could increase ha figure o as much as $2 bil-

lion.89 As he missiles age, he coss o susainmen could increase. eiring small

numbers o missiles would have litle effec on overall coss. o achieve significan

savings, he Air Force will have o reire a leas one o he hree missile wings and

close he base associaed wih i, which would save close o $500 million over he

firs five years plus he reduced cos o modernizing each o ha wing’s 150 mis-

siles.90 In he near erm, he coss o reiring a missile wing limis he savings pos-

sible because missiles mus be removed rom heir silos, aken offline, and sored.

Ten, he silos mus be secured and he launch conrol ceners closed.

Wih his in mind, he Unied Saes should limi unding or he ICBM orce

o wha is required o keep i sae, secure, and effecive. Te Air Force should

no move oward milesone A on is program o procure a new missile. Insead,

i should make he invesmens necessary o reurbish he Minueman missiles

in heir exising silos. I should rededicae is ICBM research and developmen

program, called Dem/Val, o concenrae on susaining he Minueman raher

han developing a new missile.91 A 2014 RND Corporaion analysis ound ha

he 39-year lie cycle coss o susaining he Minueman could cos $24 billion

o $35 billion less han he curren Air Force plan o procure a new missile wihsimilar specificaions.92


28/37


Tere is one addiional concern wih respec o he ICBM orce. In order o ensure

ha he Minueman remains effecive, he Air Force carries ou regular ess o

reired missilesusually hree or our per year. Tis schedule will deplee he

excess invenory o missile bodies available or esing in 2030, a which poin he

es program will have o be modified or more operaional ICBMs will have o

reire in order o provide es missiles.93

A his poin, he Air Force should plano reire he ICBM wing a Mino Air Force Base, decreasing he orce by roughly

one-hird and redisribuing he excess warheads across he riad in ways consis-

en wih whaever arms-conrol regime is in place ollowing expiry o he New

SA reay in 2021. In his way, reducing he number o missiles ha require

modernizaion and operaion would offse he cos increase o susaining an older

ICBM orce. Te CSBA’s analysis pegs he cos savings o cuting an ICBM wing a

$9.6 billion over 24 years.94 However, he savings o his plan will be subsanially

larger han his sum because i would downsize he NNSA’s ambiious plan o con-

solidae warheads used on ICBMs so ha hey are ineroperable wih SLBMs. Te

NNSA esimaes ha his program would produce is firs uni in 2030 and couldcos beween $9.1 billion and $14.8 billion in oday’s dollars.95

The process

Te upcoming presidenial elecion complicaes he effor o bring nuclear mod-

ernizaion spending under conrol. Tough no all o hese changes can be made in

he Obama adminisraion’s final year, his Whie House should make every effor

o ensure ha he nex presiden has he flexibiliy and inormaion necessary o

make he recommended changes. Tere are several seps ha Presiden Obama

can ake in order o ensure ha he nex presiden’s Nuclear Posure eview can

make deliberae and inormed decisions abou he nuclear orce srucure. Te nex

Nuclear Posure eview will ake a year o complee, and in his ime, nuclear issues

are unlikely o be he firs prioriy in he nex adminisraion. Wihou concered

acion rom Presiden Obama’s Whie House, coninued progress on cerain

programs will consrain he nex presiden’s decision making and make i difficul

o modiy or cancel he programs. Furhermore, expendiures increase wih each

passing yearso moving quickly is essenial o achieving real savings.

Firs, Presiden Obama should order he Penagon o generae analysis ha can

inorm he nex Nuclear Posure eview. A clear and comprehensive analysis

o he fiscal effec o nuclear modernizaion plans should be ready or he nex


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adminisraion on day one. Tis analysis should convey no only he expeced

coss o he various procuremen programs bu also heir expeced effec on con-

venional modernizaion sysems.

Nex, he presiden should aler guidance and requiremens ha currenly keeps

he services rom considering alernaives o he curren modernizaion plans.Te Nuclear Employmen Guidance is a good sep in his regard, bu he Obama

adminisraion can go urher in is las year. Specifically, he presiden should

revise he parol requiremens or SSBNs and order he Navy o produce a sudy

ha explores he pracical effecs o reducing he flee o eiher 10 submarines or

eigh submarines. He should also order he Air Force o plan o incremenally mod-

ernize he Minueman ICBM and prioriize research and developmen accordingly.

Lasly, he Whie House should ake immediae acion o cancel he B61-12

consolidaion program, as well as he Long-ange Sandoff missile. Tese pro-

grams have marginal deerren effecs and are no worh heir cos. I hey are nocancelled beore Presiden Obama leaves office, his successor will find i ar more

difficul o cancel or modiy hese programs. o prepare or he day when hese

capabiliies are removed rom he orce, he Unied Saes should begin discus-

sions o inorm allies in Europe and Asia o he decision, explain is effec, and

discuss compensaory measures as necessary in order o ensure ha allied deer-

rence posures remains srong.

When he nex adminisraion akes office, he Nuclear Posure eview should

order he immediae reducion o he SSBN flee o 10 subs and affirm he deci-

sion o incremenally modernize he ICBM orce in place. I should also seriously

consider delaying he Long-ange Srike Bomber and urher reducing he SSBN

orce o eigh subs. I should reaffirm U.S. ineres in negoiaing urher arms

reducions wih ussia , includingi possiblebeore he expiraion o New

SA in 2021. o his end, he Nuclear Posure eview should also develop

new arms-conrol proposals ha will help o limi U.S. and ussian modernizaion

efforswhich are fiscally unsusainable or boh counriesin an atemp o

sabilize he sraegic balance ar ino he 21s cenury.


30/37


Conclusion

I is no easy o recommend cus o he U.S. nuclear arsenal. All oher hings being

equal, he conservaive impulse o hedge agains uncerainy is pruden. Each

nuclear modernizaion program is suppored by a se o reasonable argumens and

appears valuable or specific scenarios. Cerainly, ussian aggression and China’s

expansion o is erriorial claims require he Unied Saes o ensure ha i can

deer sophisicaed adversaries rom hreaening is allies.

However, hese consideraions miss he larger picure. Tere is litle evidence haniche nuclear capabiliies, such as cruise missiles and acical graviy bombs, are

necessary o deer adversariesespecially in an age where ussia and China cali-

brae heir aggressive acions o remain ar below he hreshold o where nuclear

use would be plausible. And i is imporan o keep in mind ha when i comes

o miliary spending, he Unied Saes coninues o ouspend is adversaries by a

wide marginspending which yields vasly superior convenional orces.96

Moreover, all oher hings are no equal: In an age o finie resources, nuclear

modernizaion programs will crowd ou oher deense prioriies, including

sysems and programs ha are designed o respond o he hreas ha he Unied

Saes and is allies ace oday. Wihou expediious acion o bring he plans

under conrol, hey are likely o provoke piched poliical batles ha urher

raise he coss o modernizaion and imbalance he riad wih impruden cus.

Te benefis o reaining redundan or niche sysems in he orce simply are no

worh $120 billion over 30 years.

While he moneary and opporuniy coss are relaively easy o abulae, he

broader coss o nuclear modernizaion are unappreciaed and poorly undersood.

ising U.S. expendiures on nuclear weapons are already raising concern aroundhe world among allies and nonaligned saes, undoing much o he good will

engendered by Presiden Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, where he rededicaed he

counry o a vision o a world wihou nuclear weapons.97 Te sar o he modern-


31/37


izaion cycle comes a an unorunae ime or he global nonprolieraion regime,

which is acing pressure rom nonnuclear-weapon saes rusraed a wha hey

perceive is he slow pace o nuclear disarmamen.

Lasly, modernizaion comes a an unorunae ime in inernaional securiy:

ising ensions wih ussia and China mean ha hese counries are closely waching wha he Unied Saes does wih is arsenal. Increased spending and

public asserions ha nuclear weapons can help he Unied Saes prevail over

is adversaries in a crisis could provoke reacions in hese counries and hey

may eel pressure o ramp up heir own modernizaion effors in order o ensure

ha heir orces remain survivable. Te resul, warns ormer Secreary o Deense

William Perry, could be a cosly and dangerous new arms race.98

Avoiding a new arms race, resraining nuclear prolieraion, and mainaining a

balanced nuclear deerren all require decisive acion o bring he curren nuclear

modernizaion plans under conrol. Te naional ineres can be beter served byinvesing unds in he convenional weapons sysems mos relevan o naional

deenseas well as in America iselin order o ensure ha he Unied Saes

remains compeiive ar ino he uure.


32/37


About the authors

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress. He

is also a senior advisor o he Cener or Deense Inormaion and an adjunc

proessor a Georgeown Universiy. Prior o joining American Progress, he was

a senior ellow and direcor o naional securiy sudies a he Council on Foreignelaions. From July 1998 o Ocober 2002, he was council vice presiden, direc-

or o sudies, and holder o he Maurice Greenberg Chair. From 1981 o 1985, he

was assisan secreary o deense.

Adam Mount is a Senior Fellow a he Cener. Previously, he was a Sanon nuclear

securiy ellow a he Council on Foreign elaions. Beore ha, he worked on

nuclear eliminaion coningencies a he RND Corporaion. Moun’s wri-

ing has been published in Foreign Affairs, Survival, Te National Interest, Te

Diplomat, Democracy , and oher oules. He is also a columnis a he Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, where he wries on nuclear sraegy and orce srucure. He holdsa docorae in governmen rom Georgeown Universiy.

Acknowledgments

Te Cener or American Progress hanks he Ploughshares Fund or heir suppor

o our Naional Securiy and Inernaional Policy programs and o his repor.

Te views and opinions expressed in his repor are hose o he Cener or

American Progress and he auhors and do no necessarily reflec he posiion o

he Ploughshares Fund. Te Cener or American Progress produces independen

research and policy ideas driven by soluions ha we believe will creae a more

equiable and jus world.


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Endnotes

1 Stephen Schwartz, Atomic Audit (Washington: Brook-ings Institution Press, 1998).

2 Marcus Weisgerber, “Bob Hale: Targeted PentagonBudget Cuts Likely,” Defense One, March 4, 2015,available at http://www.defenseone.com/manage-ment/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/.

3 For an earlier version of this argument, see AdamMount, “The fiscal threat to nuclear strategy,” Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists, March 5, 2015, available at http://thebulletin.org/fiscal-threat-nuclear-strategy8080; Colin Clark, “LRS-B, Next Boomer May Force WeaponsCuts,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2014, availableat http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/lrs-b-next-boomer-may-force-weapons-cuts/.

4 This figure is a very rough approximation based onCBO and CSBA cost estimates of the recommendedprograms and policies. Lacking strong estimates of thecost of replacing new ground and air-launched mis-siles—GBSD, LRSO—as well as the likely cost growth ofall programs, it is impossible to reliably project the costof nuclear modernization with any precision. Indeed,this is one of our primary arguments.

5 Government Accountability Office, “Strategic Weapons:Changes in the Nuclear Weapons Targeting ProcessSince 1991,” July 2012, available at http://gao.gov/assets/600/593142.pdf ; Government AccountabilityOffice, “Strategic Weapons: Nuclear Weapons Target-ing Process,” September 1991 http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/89136.pdf; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S.Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to MinimalDeterrence” (Washington; New York, NY: Federation ofAmerican Scientists; The National Resources DefenseCouncil, 2009), pp. 8–13, available at https://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdf.

6 For an external assessment that describes a similarlyobjective process, see Clark Murdock and others, “Proj-ect Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to Defin-ing U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050”(Washington: Center for Strategic and International

Studies , 2015), pp. 11–24 available at http://csis.org/publication/project-atom.

7 For an overview of bomber procurement, see StephenI. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequencesof U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington: Brook-ings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 115–22. For a historyof U.S. aircraft inventory, see James C. Ruehrmund Jr.and Christopher J. Bowie, “Arsenal of Airpower: USAFAircraft Inventory” (Portland, ME: Mitchell I nstitute,2010), available at https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/UploadedImages/Mitchell%20Publica-tions/Arsenal%20of%20Airpower.pdf .

8 Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Timesof Robert McNamara (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993).

9 For the debate on the B-1 bomber, see Nick Kotz, Wild

Blue Yonder: Money , Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (NewYork: Pantheon Books, 1988).

10 Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Mis-sile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, CA:University of California Press, 1980), p. 198.

11 Arleigh Burke, interview, September 1968. For more dis-cussion, see Lawrence J. Korb, Joint Chiefs of Staff: FirstTwenty-five Years (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UniversityPress, 1976).

12 On Polaris procurement, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, ThePolaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Program-matic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1972), pp. 14–60; Robert Love, Historyof the U.S. Navy: Vol. 2 (Mechanicsburg, PA: StackpoleBooks, 1992), p. 409; Arleigh Burke, interview, Septem-ber, 1968.

13 Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, p. 99; Ball,Politics and Force Levels, pp. 242–244, 274–275

14 Melvin Laird, interview, November 2015; Love, The His-tory of the Navy, p. 608.

15 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon& Schuster, 1999), p. 123; Love, The History of the Navy,pp. 407–416.

16 Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s EvenWorse Than It Looks (New York: Basic Books, 2013);Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal,“Polarization in Congress has risen sharply. Whereis it g oing next?”, The Washington Post, February 13,2014, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/.

17 U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense BudgetEstimates for FY 2016 (2015), available at http://comp-troller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY16_Green_Book.pdf .

18 According to Gallup, Americans today are as likelyto believe that we are spending too little on defenseas too much. Justin McCarthy, “Americans Split onDefense Spending,” Gallup, February 20, 2015, availableat http://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspx. The sentiment is nearlyubiquitous in Congress and the Pentagon.

19 The White House, “The President’s Fiscal Year 2016Budget: 5, Summary Tables,” February 2, 2015, availableat: https://medium.com/budget-document/summary-tables-1bfa22a85812#.u3xr5w73j.

20 Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the FY2013 Defense Budgetand Sequestration” (Washington: Center for Strategicand Budgetary Assessments, 2012), available at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/; U.S.Government Accountability Office, “Sequestration: Ob-servations on the Department of Defense’s Approachin Fiscal Year 2013,” GAO-14-177R, November 7, 2013,available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-177R.

21 Todd Harrison, “Defense Modernization Plans throughthe 2020s: Addressing the Bow Wave” (Washington:Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016),

available at http://csis.org/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdf .

22 Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Urges Senators to SupportStable Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of DefenseMay 6, 2015, available at http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604586.

http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/http://thebulletin.org/fiscal-threat-nuclear-strategy8080http://thebulletin.org/fiscal-threat-nuclear-strategy8080http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/lrs-b-next-boomer-may-force-weapons-cuts/http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/lrs-b-next-boomer-may-force-weapons-cuts/http://gao.gov/assets/600/593142.pdfhttp://gao.gov/assets/600/593142.pdfhttps://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdfhttps://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdfhttp://csis.org/publication/project-atomhttp://csis.org/publication/project-atomhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/http://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttp://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttp://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspxhttp://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-177Rhttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-177Rhttp://csis.org/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-177Rhttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-177Rhttp://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/http://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspxhttp://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttp://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttp://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy16_green_book.pdfhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttps://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/afa/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/uploadedimages/mitchell%252520publications/arsenal%252520of%252520airpower.pdfhttp://csis.org/publication/project-atomhttp://csis.org/publication/project-atomhttps://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdfhttps://fas.org/pubs/_docs/occasionalpaper7.pdfhttp://gao.gov/assets/600/593142.pdfhttp://gao.gov/assets/600/593142.pdfhttp://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/lrs-b-next-boomer-may-force-weapons-cuts/http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/lrs-b-next-boomer-may-force-weapons-cuts/http://thebulletin.org/fiscal-threat-nuclear-strategy8080http://thebulletin.org/fiscal-threat-nuclear-strategy8080http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/bob-hale-targeted-pentagon-budget-cuts-likely/106740/


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23 Ibid.

24 Joe Gould, “US Budget Deal Provides Industry, MilitaryStability,” Defense News, October 31, 2015, available athttp://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/10/31/us-budget-deal-provides-industry-military-stability/74868238/.

25 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Re- port (2010), p. 17, 39, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/NPR.

26 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employ-ment Strategy of the United States (2013), p. 9, availableat http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/us-nuclear-employment-strategy.pdf .

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 6.

29 Amy Woolf, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits andKey Provisions,” Congressional Research Service, Febru-ary 4, 2015, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf.

30 The White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obamain Prague As Delivered,” Press release, April 5, 2009,available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-deliv-ered.

31 For this argument, see Adam Mount, “New Dawn forthe NPT,” Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2015, available athttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-04-22/new-dawn-npt.

32 For more on the Ohio-class and its replacement,see Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces:Background, Developments, and Issues” (Washington:Congressional Research Service, 2015), available athttps://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf ; RonaldO’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) BallisticMissile Submarine Program: Background and Issuesfor Congress” (Washington: Congressional ResearchService, 2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf .

33 Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisi-tions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs,”

March, 2015, p. 148, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-342SP.

34 The figures listed here are the primary mission aircraftinventory. The total inventory consists of 93 B52-H and20 B-2A. The B-1B Lancer, originally assigned to thenuclear mission, was converted to a solely conventionalrole in 1993.

35 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US nuclearforces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71 (2)(2015), available at http://thebulletin.org/2015/march/us-nuclear-forces-20158075.

36 Kingston Reif, “Air Force Wants 1,000 New Cruise Mis-siles,” Arms Control Association , May 7, 2015, availableat https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_05/News/Air-Force-Wants-Thousand-New-Cruise-Missiles.

37 The tactical fighter aircraft that carry the B61 are alsodue to be replaced by the new F-35. Due to the smallnumber of airframes that will be assigned to thenuclear mission, the F-35 program is not generallyconsidered a major part of nuclear modernization.

38 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review”p. 23.

39 Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,” pp. 12–15.

40 Ibid., pp. 17.

41 Kingston Reif, “Air Force Drafts Plan for Follow-On ICBM,”Arms Control Association, July 8, 2015, available athttps://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_0708/News/Air-Force-Drafts-Plan-for-Follow-on-ICBM.

42 Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S.Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024” ( 2015), available athttps://www.cbo.gov/publication/49870.

43 There is general agreement on these estimates, whichare drawn from official figures. Jon Wolfsthal, JeffreyLewis, and Marc Quint, “The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad”(Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonprolifera-tion Studies, 2014), available at http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf ; Todd Harrison and Evan B. Montgomery “The Costof U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave and Be-yond” (Washington: Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, 2015), available at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/08/the-cost-of-u-s-nuclear-forces-from-bca-to-bow-wave-and-beyond/; Tom Z. Collina,“The Unaffordable Arsenal: Reducing the Costs of theBloated U.S. Nuclear Stockpile” (Washington: ArmsControl Association , 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/files/The-Unaffordable-Arsenal-2014.pdf.

44 William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, “Ensuring a StrongU.S. Defense for the Future” (Washington: United StatesInstitute of Peace, 2014), pp. 53–55, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR.pdf.

45 Tom Z. Collina, “Can Ash Carter Tame the Nuclear Weap-ons Budget?”, Defense One, January 22, 2015, availableat http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/01/can-ash-carter-tame-nuclear-weapons-budget/103479/.

46 Todd Harrison and Evan B. Montgomery, “Are U.S.Nuclear Forces Unaffordable?” (Washington: Center forStrategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), availableat http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/06/are-u-s-nuclear-forces-unaffordable/.

47 David Mosher, “The Hunt for Small Potatoes: Savings in

Nuclear Deterrence Forces.” In Cindy Williams, ed., Hold-ing the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 130.

48 Harrison and Montgomery, “Are U.S. Nuclear ForcesUnaffordable?”

49 The CBO puts the costs of nuclear forces at 5 percentto 6 percent of the national defense budget for thenext 10 years—and higher thereafter—while seniordefense officials put the figure at close to 7 percentfor the 14 years after 2021. Deputy Secretary ofDefense Robert Work and Vice Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld,