Seminar of European Ideas Network

EIN Working Group on Innovation  Demography and Immigration:

Political Implications 2020

Immigration and its consequences

David Coleman, University of Oxforddavid.coleman@spi.ox.ac.uk

http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop

Immigration and the rise of ethnic minority populations.

Historically, Western Europe a region of emigration.Large-scale migration in peacetime mostly from 1960s:

Guest-workers to some countriesEasy entry from former colonies – for a time.Subsequent entry of dependants and new spousesChain migration from non-European countries helped by ‘familist’ culture, large family size, revolutions in information, transport, rights.Renewed recent interest in skilled migration

Policy important but erratic; most now restrictive.

Selected European populations, percent of residents born abroad, 2010. Source: Eurostat

16.315.315.2

14.314.013.9

12.712.4

12.011.3

11.111.111.111.0

10.89.0

8.07.5

6.54.44.3

3.81.2

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0

EstoniaLatvia

AustriaSweden

SpainBelgium

IrelandSlovenia

GermanyUnited Kingdom

FranceGreece

NetherlandsIcelandNorway

DenmarkItaly

PortugalLithuaniaHungary

FinlandCzech Republic

Poland

Series1

US Census questions on race, Hispanic origin and ancestry

Contrasts of UK with Europe, US

Near-absence of guest –worker or recruitment policies (unlike Germany, Netherlands, France)

Therefore little immigration form Europe’s neighbours (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Maghreb) except asylum from 1980s.

Inflows from Ireland substantial (part of UK until 1922; no controls). Inflow reversed in 1990s, now reversed again..

Family migration restricted to spouses, immediate dependants (not other family, as in US)

Colonial and former colonial immigration from 1950s (West Indies, South Asia).

Before that, non-European populations very small (perhaps 50,000 in 1950).

Near-absence of provisions for return migration.Net immigration from Europe modest until 2004.

Recent UK migration situationUneasy consensus on restriction since 1960s broken in 1997.Public dislike of large inflows contributed to Labour election

defeat in 2010.Labour government policy 1997-2010: easier entry for labour

and non-labour migration, family, students.New government 2010 promised to reduce net inflow to ‘tens

of thousands’.Net inflow 2009 198,000; foreign +242k net, UK -44k. Net

inflow since late 1990s historically high. Most net immigration not work related.Consequent inflow of 3 million immigrants since 1997; 2

million additional immigrant population. Fastest population growth since 1962. 16 million additional population projected up to 2051.

Some facilitating factors

Unequal progress of economic development and demographic transition.

Geographical proximity.Political / historical connections.Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and

rights.State policy in sending and receiving countries.Expansion of EU and its powersInternational conventions.The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.

Turkey and Western Europe

Population trends and projections, selected European countries and Turkey 1950-2050 (millions). Source: United Nations 2004-based estimates.

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

France

Germany

Italy

United Kingdom

Turkey

Migration flows to European Union and USA 1960 - 2011n.b. about 40% of the EU inflow is from one EU country to another.

-500

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Net immigation to EU-15, EU27 countries, gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2011 and net inflow to USA 2001-2011 (thousands). Sources: Eurostat, US Dept of Homeland Security.

Net immigration to EU-15 countries

Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)

Net immigration to EU27 countries

Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).

France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) according to reason for admission (percent).

PercentStudent Worker Family Other All by area

EEA 3 37 10 50 100 21Non-Europe 26 5 50 19 100 79

All 21 11 42 25 100 100Source: INED

Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total).Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.

Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2011.

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2011 (thousands). Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series

MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2019.

Foreign citizensForeign citizens (post 1991)UK citizensUK Citizens (post 1991)All citizenships

OXPOP

Net migration to selected European countries 1997 - 2011

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2011, thousands. Source: Eurostat

Denmark

Germany

France

Netherlands

Sweden

United Kingdom

Switzerland

Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2011. Note: increase partly due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal

residence through amnesties.

-100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2011 (thousands). Source: Eurostat.

SpainItaly

Migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2011.

- 300 000

- 200 000

- 100 000

-

+ 100 000

+ 200 000

+ 300 000

+ 400 000

+ 500 000

+ 600 000

+ 700 000

+ 800 000

1954

2)

1956

2)

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Migration to Germany 1954 - 2011, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.

Net migrationGermans including aussiedlerForeignersGermans without aussiedler net flow

Ethnic change

Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.

If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.

Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

TFR trends of UK ethnic minority populations 1965 – 2006data from Labour Force Survey by own-child method, 7-year moving averages

TFR ethnic minorities, UK 1965 - 2006 from LFS by own-child method; seven-year moving averages

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

White

Black-Caribbean

Black-African

Indian

Pakistani

Bangladeshi

Chinese

Estimates of foreign origin and immigrant

population, selected European countries. Sources: national statistical offices

Numbers of foreign citizens, and immigrants, enumerated in selected European countries, around 2009

Foreign‘Foreign ‘Foreign ImmigrantsImmigrants citizens as

Population Origin’ Origin’ as percent ofpercent ofMillions (millions) (percent) (millions) total pop. immigrants

Austria 2011 8.4 n.a. n.a 1.00 11.9 92.4Belgium 2007 10.6 n.a n.a 1.38 13.0 70.4Denmark 2011 5.6 0.57 10.2 0.43 7.7 80.7Finland 2010 5.4 n.a n.a 0.25 4.6 67.7France 2008 64.0 n.a n.a 5.34 8.4 69.5Germany 2009 81.9 16.04 19.6 10.60 12.9 67.3N'lands 2011 16.7 3.43 20.6 1.78 10.7 42.7Portugal 2007 10.6 n.a n.a 0.65 6.1 68.9Spain 2007 44.9 n.a n.a 6.00 13.4 72.4Sweden 2009 8.0 1.73 21.7 1.34 16.7 45.1UK 2010 61.4 10.24 16.7 7.14 11.6 62.5

Convergence in fertility: total fertility of Pakistani

women in the UK by birthplace. Source: Coleman and Dubuc 2010.

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99

period

TFR

and

95%

con

fide

nce

inte

rval

Pakistani-born women in UK

All UK Pakistani women

UK-born Pakistani women

Indian population, England and Wales Census 2001 (percent)

5.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90 +

percent of population

females males

Pakistani population, England and Wales Census 2001 (percent)

7.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90 +

percent of population

males females

Ethnic change in New Zealand

New Zealand 2001-based projection by ethnic origin (revised 2005).Source: Statistics New Zealand 2005

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2001 (base) 2006 2011 2016 2021

European

Maori

Asian

Pacific

All non-European

Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.

0.000

50.000

100.000

150.000

200.000

250.000

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

2026

2029

2032

2035

2038

2041

2044

2047

2050

2053

2056

2059

2062

2065

2068

2071

2074

2077

2080

2083

2086

2089

2092

2095

2098

Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH

Sweden 1980 – 2020. Foreign-born and ‘foreign

origin’ population, as percent of total population.

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Foreign -born and foreign origin population in Sweden, 1980 - 2020, percent of total population. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003

Foreign birthplace

Foreign background

Comparison of results of European ‘foreign-origin’ projections

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,

selected countries, as percent of total population.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

per

cen

t

Germany medium variant

USA medium variant (excludes black population)

Netherlands base scenario

Denmark 2002- based medium variant

Sweden foreign background 2004 based

Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.

UK population projection 2051 by age, sex and origin Assumptions for total population as GAD Principal Projection 2006 (net migration 190K;

TFR 1.84)

UK population 2051 projection by age and origin (1000s).Assumptions for total population: migration, TFR as in GAD Principal Projection 2008.

3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80-84

85-89

90-94

95-99

100+

Males British origin Males foreign originFemales British origin Females foreign origin

Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001.

Source: 2001 Census.

All born in born born in born % of % of

birth- UK overseas UK overseas total non-white

places (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) pop. pop.

All Mixed groups 661.0 524.3 136.7 79.3 20.7 1.3 14.6W/ Black Caribbean 237.4 222.9 14.5 93.9 6.1 0.5 5.3W/ Black African 78.9 52.9 26.0 67.1 32.9 0.2 1.7W/Asian 189.0 144.5 44.6 76.4 23.6 0.4 4.2Other mixed 155.7 104.0 51.7 66.8 33.2 0.3 3.4

The faces of the future?

Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (percent).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Black-Caribbean

Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese

perc

ent

Women 1991-1996 Women 1997-2002 Men 1991-1996 Men 1997-2002

An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations.Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups

(percent).

UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2001

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

2055

2060

2065

2070

2075

2080

2085

2090

2095

2100

White

Black

Asian

Mixed

Will all populations end up as diverse as Western countries?

Many were always diverse – more like empires than nation states (India)

Others became more diverse through 17th / 19th century colonial policy (Brazil, Malaysia)

Outside Europe, so far relatively small minorities from recent 20th century immigration: 2% – 3% of populations born abroad.

‘West’ currently receiving most immigrants (60%+)

Conclusions

Migration from developing world will be over in a century (?); but effects on ancestry permanent.

Migration the key driver; in theory under policy controlSignificance for social and political change: religion, identity,

segregation, language, law, foreign policy? (depends on numbers, pace, origins, policy).

Integration / assimilation, or ‘community of communities’? And who adapts to whom?

Is parity or majority important? Inter-ethnic union may change relative group size, eventually

create a completely new mixed population.No ‘nature reserve’ for ‘natives’?