Security / Cybersecurity

ITU

Herbert Bertine, Chairman ITU-T Study Group 17

DOCUMENT #: GSC13-GTSC6-05

FOR: Presentation

SOURCE: ITU

AGENDA ITEM: GTSC, 4.2

CONTACT(S): Herbert Bertine

Submission Date:July 1, 2008

2

Strategic Direction

Cybersecurity – one of the top priorities of the ITU Plenipotentiary Resolution 140 (2006), ITU’s role in implementing the

outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society – The important moderator/facilitator role of ITU in action line C5 (building confidence and security in the use of ICTs).

Plenipotentiary Resolution 149 (2006), Study of definitions and terminology relating to building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies

WTSA-04 Resolution 50, Cybersecurity – Instructs the Director of TSB to develop a plan to undertake evaluations of ITU-T “existing and evolving Recommendations, and especially signalling and communications protocol Recommendations with respect to their robustness of design and potential for exploitation by malicious parties to interfere destructively with their deployment”

WTSA-04 Resolution 51, Combating spam – Instructs the Director of TSB to “prepare urgently a report to the Council on relevant ITU and other international initiatives for countering spam, and to propose possible follow-up actions” - Done

WTSA-04 Resolution 52, Countering spam by technical means – Instructs relevant study groups “to develop, as a matter of urgency, technical Recommendations, including required definitions, on countering spam”

3

Highlights of current activities (1)

ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA)– A Framework for international cooperation in cybersecurity– ITU response to its role as sole Facilitator for WSIS Action Line C5– Five key work areas: Legal, Technical, Organisational, Capacity

Building, International Cooperation – World renowned Group of High-Level Experts (HLEG) working on global

strategies • GCA/HLEG met 26 June 2008 to agree upon a set of recommendations

on all five work areas for presentation to ITU Secretary-General

ISO/IEC/ITU-T Strategic Advisory Group on Security Coordinates security work and identifies areas where new standardization

initiatives may be warranted. Portal established. Workshops conducted.

Identity Management– Effort jump started by IdM Focus Group which produced 6 substantial

reports (265 pages) in 9 months– JCA –IdM and IDM-GSI established – main work is in SGs 17 and 13– First IdM Recommendation – X.1250, Requirements for global identity

management trust and interoperability - now in approval process

4

Core security (SG 17)– Approved 14 texts in 2007, 17 so far in 2008, 15 more for action in

September 2008• Summaries of Recommendations under development are available at:

http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/0A/0D/T0A0D00000D0003MSWE.doc

– Covering frameworks, cybersecurity, countering spam, home networks, mobile, web services, secure applications, ISMS, telebiometrics, etc.

– Work underway on additional topics including IPTV, multicast, and USN security; risk management and incident management; traceback

– Questionnaire issued to developing countries to ascertain their security needs

– Updated security roadmap/database, compendia, manual; strengthened coordination

Security for NGN– Y.2701, Security Requirements for NGN Release 1 - published

– Y.2702, NGN authentication and authorization requirements – determined

Highlights of current activities (2)

5

Challenges

Addressing security to enhance trust and confidence of users in networks, applications and services

With global cyberspace, what are the security priorities for the ITU with its government / private sector partnership?

Need for top-down strategic direction to complement bottom-up, contribution-driven process

Balance between centralized and distributed efforts on security standards Legal and regulatory aspects of cybersecurity, spam, identity/privacy Address full cycle – vulnerabilities, threats and risk analysis; prevention;

detection; response and mitigation; forensics; learning Agree uniform definitions of cybersecurity terms and definitions Marketplace acceptance of Information Security Management System

(ISMS) standards (ISO/IEC 27000-series and ITU-T X.1051) – the security equivalent to ISO 9000-series

Effective cooperation and collaboration across the many bodies doing cybersecurity work

PSO help is needed in keeping security database up-to-date Informal security experts network – needs commitment

There is no “silver bullet” for cybersecurity

6

Next Steps/Actions for ITU-T

All Study Groups have proposed Questions for next study period• Most study groups have Questions concerning security• Questions are mainly evolution of existing work program• See Supplemental Information

The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA) in October 2008 will make decisions on the priorities, work program (Questions) and organization of Study Groups, including security / cybersecurity work

Meanwhile, the present work program continues under the current structure – See Supplemental Information• E.g., Study Groups 17 and 13 will each meet in September to

approve additional security Recommendations A new edition of the ITU-T “Security Manual” is scheduled

for October 2008

7

Proposed revision to Resolution

Resolution GSC-12/19, Cybersecurity• Add a new Resolves follows: 5) supply updated information on their security standards

work for inclusion in the ICT Security Standards Roadmap, a database of security standards hosted by the ITU-T at:http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/ict/index.html

8

Supplemental Information

Supplemental Information

Security activities• ITU General Secretariat

• Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T)

• Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R)

• Telecommunication Development Sector (ITU-D)

Useful web resources

9

Supplemental Information

ITU

General Secretariat

Corporate Strategy Division

ITU GlobalCybersecurity

Agenda

A Framework for International

Cooperation in Cybersecurity

11

• Constant evolution of the nature of

cyberthreats

Issues and Challenges

Major challenge is to develop harmonized and comprehensive

global strategies at the international level

Major challenge is to develop harmonized and comprehensive

global strategies at the international level

• Vulnerabilities in software and hardware applications and services

• Low entry barriers for cyber-criminals

• Loopholes in current legal frameworks

• Absence of appropriate organizational structures

• Inadequate cooperation among various stakeholders

• Global problem which cannot be solved by any single entity (country or organization)

• Increasing sophistication of cybercrime

12

WSIS and Cybersecurity

“Strengthening the trust framework, including information security and network security, authentication, privacy and consumer protection, is a prerequisite for the development of the Information Society and for building confidence among users of ICTs. “

WSIS Geneva Declaration of Principles, Para 35

“We reaffirm the necessity to further promote, develop and implement in cooperation with all stakeholders a global culture of cyber-security, as outlinedin UNGA Resolution 57/239 and other relevant regional frameworks.”

WSIS Tunis Agenda, Para 39

Confidence and security are among the main pillars of the information society

Confidence and security are among the main pillars of the information society

13

ITU’s Role as WSIS C5 FACILITATOR

At the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), world leaders and

governments entrusted ITU to take the leading role in coordinating international

efforts on cyber-security, as the sole Facilitator of Action Line C5,

“Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs”

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) provides the global

perspective and expertise needed to meet the challenges, with a track record

of brokering agreements between public and private interests on a level

playing field ever since its inception in 1865.

Third Facilitation Meeting

22-23 May 2008, ITU Headquarters, Geneva

http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/WSIS/3rdMeeting.html

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A Global Strategy for Action

The strategy for a solution must identify those existing national, regional and international initiatives, work with all relevant players to identify priorities and bring partners together with the goal of proposing global solutions to address the global challenges we face today.

• A framework for international multi-stakeholder cooperation in cybersecurity

• ITU Response to its role as sole Facilitator for WSIS Action Line C5

• World renowned Group of High Level Experts (HLEG) to develop global strategies

• Representing main stakeholder groups working towards the same goals

: Developing harmonized global strategies

ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA)

15

GCA Work Areas

GCA rests on five pillars

or work areas:

Legal Measures

Technical and Procedural

Measures

Organizational Structures

Capacity Building

International Cooperation

1

2

3

4

5

16

Elaboration of global strategies for

1 the development of a model cybercrime legislation

2 the creation of appropriate national and regional organizational structures and policies on cybercrime

3 the establishment of security criteria and accreditation schemes for software applications and systems

4 the creation of a global framework for watch, warning and incident response

5 the creation and endorsement of a generic and universal digital identity system

6 the facilitation of human and institutional capacity-building

7 international cooperation, dialogue and coordination

High-Level Experts Group (GCA/HLEG)

High-LevelExpert Group

(HLEG)

provided advice on strategiesin all five work areas or pillars

A global multi-stakeholder think-tank made up of high-level experts from: • Governments• Industry• Regional and international organizations • Research and academic institutions• Individual experts

17

Argentina Brazil Cameroon Canada China Egypt Estonia Germany Japan India Indonesia Italy Malaysia Morocco Portugal Republic of Lithuania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa Switzerland United States

• Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland • Information Security Institute, Australia • Moscow Technical University of Communications, Russian Federation• African Telecommunication Union (ATU)• Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation • Telecommunications (APECTEL)• Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisations (CTO)• Council of Europe• Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)• European Information and Network • Security Agency (ENISA)• International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)• Organisation International de la Francophonie• Society for the Policing of Cyberspace (POLCYB)• UMTS Forum• United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

• Authentrus• BITEK International Inc.• Cybex• Cisco• Garlik• Intel Corporation• Microsoft Corporation• Télam S.E.• VeriSign, Inc.• Stein Schjolberg, Chief Judge, Moss Tingrett Court, Norway• Solange Ghernaouti-Helie, HEC-Université de Lausanne, Switzerland• Sy Goodman, Georgia Institute of Technology, United States• Nabil Kisrawi, Chairman of WG-Def, Syrian Republic • Bruce Schneier, Security Technologist, Unites States• Marco Gercke, Professor, Cologne University, Germany

GCA/HLEG Members

Diversity of Participation

18

GCA/HLEG

Leveraging expertise for international consensus

On a Global level, from government, international organizations to industry

For a Harmonised approach to build synergies between initiatives

Through Comprehensive strategies on all levels

1

2

3

Legal Measures e.g. Cybercrime legislation (Council of Europe), Moss Tingrett Court Norway, Cybex

Technical and Procedural Measurese.g. Software (Microsoft) , hardware (Intel), Networking (CISCO), Security Apps/Services (Verisign), Global Standards and Development (ITU)

Organisational Structures e.g. Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, OECD

Capacity Buildinge.g. United Nations Institution for Training and Research (UNITAR), European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)

International Cooperatione.g. Interpol, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

GCA/HLEG is building synergies with existing initiatives and working with stakeholders in these five key areas:

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HLEG

• The HLEG work is an ongoing dynamic process with information-sharing and interaction relating to the elaboration of Global Strategies to meet the goals of the GCA and the ITU role as sole facilitator for WSIS Action Line C.5.

• Three meetings held: – First Meeting of the HLEG held on 5 October 2007– Second Meeting of the HLEG held on 21 May 2008– Third Meeting of the HLEG held on 26 June 2008

• Chairman's Report: – The results of the work of the HLEG, including recommendations, the

views expressed during the meeting and additional information about the previous work of the HLEG are contained in the Chairman’s report which will be available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/hleg/meetings/third/index.html

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GCA Sponsorship Programme – Join us!

• This Sponsorship programme – will ensure that all relevant stakeholders are aware of HLEG’s valuable work, will increase also a global understanding about how to work together to implement effective strategies. It will then be up to the stakeholders themselves – within their respective mandates and capabilities – to translate these strategies into concrete actions.

• GCA Sponsors will help to promote the goals of this initiative around the world by participating in high-profile business activities including publications, pubic campaigns, an annual conference and other events. In addition to the opportunity to meet with high-level decision makers, Sponsors also stand to enhance their image and credibility with their stakeholders.

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Dr Óscar Arias Sánchez

Nobel Peace Laureate,

President of the Republic of Costa Rica,

Patron of the Global Cybersecurity Agenda.

"The world must take action. It must stand united. This is not a problem any one nation can solve alone"

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Conclusions

The threats to global cybersecurity demand a global framework!

The magnitude of this issue calls for a coordinated global response to ensure that there are no safe havens for cybercriminals.

ITU will act as a catalyst and facilitator for these partners to share experience and best practice, so as to step up efforts for a global response to cybercrime.

In this way, working together, we can create a cyberspace that is somewhere safe for people to trade, learn and enjoy.

Dr Hamadoun I. TouréSecretary-General, ITU

Towards a global Cyberpeace…

23

ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda

& ITU Activities in Cybersecurity:

http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/

Email: gca@itu.int

For More information on:

24

Supplemental Information

ITU-TTelecommunication Standardization

Sector

25

SG 17, Security, Languages and Telecommunication Software Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Security

SG 2, Operational Aspects of Service Provision, Networks and Performance

SG 4, Telecommunication Management SG 5, Protection Against Electromagnetic Environment Effects SG 9, Integrated Broadband Cable Networks and Television and Sound Transmission SG 11, Signalling Requirements and Protocols SG 13, Next Generation Networks SG 15, Optical and Other Transport Network Infrastructures SG 16, Multimedia Terminals, Systems and Applications SG 19, Mobile Telecommunication Networks

ITU-T

ITU-T Security and Cybersecurity Activities

26

ITU-T SG 17

ITU-T Study Group 17Security, Languages and Telecommunication Software

Q.4/17, Communications Systems Security Project Q.5/17, Security Architecture and Framework Q.6/17, Cyber Security Q.7/17, Security Management Q.8/17, Telebiometrics Q.9/17, Secure Communication Services Q.17/17, Countering Spam by Technical Means Q.2/17, Directory Services, Directory Systems and

Public-key/Attribute Certificates

27

SG 17 – Q.4/17: Communications SystemsSecurity Project

ITU-T SG 17 Question 4Communications Systems Security Project

• Overall Security Coordination and Vision

• Outreach and promotional activities • ICT Security Standards Roadmap• Security Compendium• ITU-T Security manual

• Focus Group on Security Baseline For Network Operators

28

SG 17 – Q.4/17 results achieved

• Successful workshop organized at start of Study Period to consider future direction of security standards

• Security Standards Roadmap developed – includes security standards from ITU, ISO/IEC, IEEE, IETF, ATIS, ETSI, OASIS, 3GPP

• Security Compendium and Security Manual maintained and updated

• Security Baseline for Network Operators developed

29

SG 17 – Q.4/17 challenges

• Overall shortage of participants and contributors

• Roadmap issues/challenges:

– Taxonomy (always a challenge!)

– Finding out about new standards and when to post them

– Appearance of the database

– Need to develop a short guide to the update process

30

SG 17 – Q.4/17 progress since GSC-12

Security Roadmap

• The listing of standards has been converted to a searchable database

• Further updating is planned to ease navigation• A new section (Part 5) has been added on

(non-proprietary) Best Practices

31

SG 17 – Q.4/17 focus for next study period

• Will continue to be primary SG contact for security coordination issues

• Will maintain and update outreach material– Security Manual– Security Roadmap– Security Compendium

• Responsibilities will be limited to coordination and outreach – no Recommendations

32

SG 17 – Q.5/17: Security Architecture and Framework

ITU-T SG 17 Question 5

Security architecture and framework

• Scope• Strategic direction• Challenges• Major activities and accomplishments• Actions for the next study period

33

SG 17 – Q.5/17 scope

X.805_F4

Acc

ess c

ontr

ol

Infrastructure security

Services security

End-user planeControl plane

Management plane

THREATS

VULNERABILITIES

8 Security dimensions

ATTACKS

Dat

a co

nfid

entia

lity

Com

mun

icat

ion

secu

rity

Dat

a in

tegr

ity

Ava

ilabi

lity

Priv

acy

Aut

hent

icat

ion

Non

-rep

udia

tion

Destruction

Disclosure

Corruption

Removal

Interruption

Security layersApplications security

Policies &procedures

Securityprogram

Technology

Definition & Planning

Implementation

Maintenance

Recommendation X.805 has been a foundation of Q.5/17 security studies and shaped the scope of its work

X.1034, X.1035X.1036X.1031

Supplement to X.800-X.849, Guidelines for implementing system and network security

34

SG 17 – Q.5/17 scope (continued)

• Q.5/17 has developed Recommendations that further develop the concepts of X.805 and provide guidance on their implementation

• X.1031, Security architecture aspects of end users and networks in telecommunications - provides guidance on applying the concepts of the X.805 architecture for distributing the security controls between the telecommunication networks and the end user’s equipment.

• X.1034, Guidelines on Extensible Authentication Protocol based Authentication and Key Management in a Data Communication Network and X.1035, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (PAK) - specify protocols and procedures that support functions of the Authentication security dimension.

• X.1036, Framework for creation, storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for network security further develops the concept of the security policy described in X.805.

• Supplement to X.800-X.849, Guidelines for implementing system and network security provides guidelines for implementing system and network security utilizing the concepts of X.805 and other security Recommendations and standards.

35

SG 17 – Q.5/17 strategic direction

• Development of a comprehensive set of Recommendations for providing standard security solutions for telecommunications in collaboration with other Standards Development Organizations and ITU-T Study Groups.

• Studies and development of a trusted telecommunication network architecture that integrates advanced security technologies.

• Maintenance and enhancements of Recommendations in the X.800-series and X.103x-series.

• Coordination of studies on NGN security (with Question 15/13)

36

SG 17 – Q.5/17 challenges

• Authentication and key agreement is one of the most complex and challenging security procedures. Question 5/17 has developed Recommendations that contribute to the standards solutions for authentication and key management

• X.1034, Guidelines on Extensible Authentication Protocol based Authentication and Key Management in a Data Communication Network– Establishes a framework for the EAP-based authentication and

key management for securing the link layer in an end-to-end data communication network.

– Provides guidance on selection of the EAP methods.

• X.1035, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (PAK)– Specifies a protocol, which ensures mutual authentication of

both parties in the act of establishing a symmetric cryptographic key via Diffie-Hellman exchange.

37

SG 17 – Q.5/17 major accomplishments

• Recommendations developed by Q.5/17:– X.1031, Security architecture aspects of end users and networks in

telecommunications– X.1034, Guidelines on Extensible Authentication Protocol based

Authentication and Key Management in a Data Communication Network– X.1035, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (PAK)– X.1036, Framework for creation, storage, distribution and enforcement of

policies for network security

• A Supplement developed by Q.5/17– Supplement to X.800 - X.849 series Guidelines for implementing system

and network security

• Other technical documents prepared by Q.5/17– In response to the WTSA Resolution 50, Question 5/17 has prepared

Guidelines for designing secure protocols using ITU-T Recommendation X.805.

• Major coordination activity conducted by Q.5/17– Question 5/17 has coordinated security studies with Question 15 of SG 13,

NGN Security ensuring alignment of the standards work in both groups.

38

SG 17 – Q.5/17 actions for next study period

• How should a comprehensive, coherent communications security solution be defined?

• What is the architecture for a comprehensive, coherent communications security solution?

• What is the framework for applying the security architecture in order to establish a new security solution?

• What is the framework for applying security architecture in order to assess (and consequently improve) an existing security solution?

• What are the architectural underpinnings for security?• What new Recommendations may be required for providing security

solutions in the changing environment?• How should architectural standards be structured with respect to existing

Recommendations on security?• How should architectural standards be structured with respect to the

existing advanced security technologies?• How should the security framework Recommendations be modified to adapt

them to emerging technologies and what new framework Recommendations may be required?

• How are security services applied to provide security solutions?

39

SG 17 – Q.6/17: Cyber Security

ITU-T SG 17 Question 6

Cyber Security

• Motivation• Scope• Challenges• Highlights of activities • Actions for Next Study Period• Collaboration with SDOs

40

SG 17 – Q.6/17 motivation

• Network connectivity and ubiquitous access is central to today’s IT systems

• Wide spread access and loose coupling of interconnected IT systems and applications is a primary source of widespread vulnerability

• Threats such as: denial of service, theft of financial and personal data, network failures and disruption of voice and data telecommunications are on the rise

• Network protocols in use today were developed in an environment of trust

• Most new investments and development is dedicated to building new functionality and not on securing that functionality

• An understanding of cybersecurity is needed in order to build a foundation of knowledge that can aid in securing the networks of tomorrow

41

SG 17 – Q.6/17 scope

• Definition of Cybersecurity• Security of Telecommunications Network Infrastructure• Security Knowledge and Awareness of Telecom Personnel and

Users• Security Requirements for Design of New Communications

Protocol and Systems• Communications relating to Cybersecurity• Security Processes – Life-cycle Processes relating to Incident

and Vulnerability• Security of Identity in Telecommunication Network• Legal/Policy Considerations• IP traceback technologies• Authentication Assurance

42

SG 17 – Q.6/17 challenges

• How should the current Recommendations be further enhanced for their wide deployment and usage?

• How to harmonize common IdM data models across the ITU

• How to define and use the term Identity within the ITU• How to detect and predict future threats and risks to

networks• How to harmonize various IdM solutions• What are the best strategies to improve Cybersecurity• How to maintain a living list of IdM terms and definition

and use it informally across the ITU

43

SG 17 – Q.6/17 highlights of activities

No. Title

X.1205 Overview of Cybersecurity

X.1206 A vendor-neutral framework for automatic checking of the presence of vulnerabilities information update

X.1207 Guidelines for Internet Service Providers and End-users for Addressing the Risk of Spyware and Deceptive Software

X.1250* Requirements for global identity management trust and interoperability

X.1303 Common Alerting Protocol (CAP 1.1)

Completed Recommendations

* Currently in the approval process

44

SG 17 – Q.6/17 highlights of activities (2)

Recommendations under development

ITU-T X.eaa | ISO/IEC xxxx, Information technology – Security techniques – Entity authentication assuranceThis Recommendation | International Standard provides a framework for entity authentication assurance which is the quantification of the risks that an entity is who or what he/she/it claims to be. In other words, entity authentication assurance is a measure of the confidence or risks associated with the authentication process and mechanisms.

ITU-T X.gopw, Guideline on preventing worm spreading in a data communication networkThis Recommendation describes worm and other malicious codes spreading patterns and scenarios in a data communication network. The Recommendation provides guidelines for protecting users and networks from such malicious codes.

45

SG 17 – Q.6/17 highlights of activities (3)

Recommendations under development

ITU-T X.idif, User Control enhanced digital identity interchange frameworkThis Recommendation defines a framework that covers how global interoperable digital identity interchange can be achieved and how an entity’s privacy is enhanced by providing an entity more control over the process of identity interchange. In addition, the Recommendation defines the general and functional requirements of the framework that should be satisfied. Based on the requirements, a framework is defined with basic functional building blocks for identity interchange and enhancing entity control.

ITU-T X.idm-dm, Common identity data modelThis Recommendation develops a common data model for identity data that can be used to express identity related information among IdM systems.

46

SG 17 – Q.6/17 actions for next study period

• Enhance current Recommendations to accelerate their adoption• Work with SG 2 in Trusted Service Provider Identifier (TSPID)• Collaborate with Questions 5, 7, 9, 17/17 and with SG 2 in order to achieve better

understanding of various aspects of network security• Collaborate with IETF, OASIS, ISO/IEC JTC1, Liberty Alliance and other standardization

bodies on Cybersecurity• Work with OASIS on maintaining the OASIS Common Alerting Protocol V1.1 (ITU-T

Recommendation X.1303)• Study new Cybersecurity issues – How should ISPs deal with botnets, evaluating the output

of appropriate bodies when available.• Study technical aspects of Traceback techniques• Joint work is ISO/JTC1 SC 27 on Entity Authentication Assurance• Progress work with Liberty Alliance on Identity Authntication Frameworks• Working with SG 4 and SG 13 on common IdM Data Models.• Developing frameworks for User control enhanced digital identity interchange framework • Developing guideline on protection for personally identifiable information in RFID

application • Developing requirements for security information sharing framework • Developing guideline on preventing worm spreading in a data communication network • Maintaining the IdM Lexicon document

47

SG 17 – Q.6/17 collaboration with other SDOs

• ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27• IEC/TC 25• IETF• IEEE• Liberty Alliance• OASIS• W3C• 3GPP• ETSI/TISPAN

48

SG 17 – Q.7/17: Security management

ITU-T SG 17 Question 7

Security management

• Scope• Challenges• Highlights of activities • Actions for Next Study Period• Collaboration with SDOs

49

SG 17 – Q.7/17 scope

For telecommunications organizations, information and the supporting processes, facilities, networks and communications medias are all important business assets.

In order for telecommunications organizations to appropriately manage these business assets and to correctly continue the business activity, Information Security Management is extremely necessary.

The scope of this question is to provide GUIDELINES and BASELINES of Information Security Management to be appropriately applied for telecommunications organizations. Studies related on this issue can be a little bit extended to cover the following items:

- information security management guidelines (baseline) - information incident management guidelines - risk management and risk profiles guidelines - assets management guidelines - policy management guidelines - information security governance - etc.

50

PolicyAssets

Personnel

PhysicalOperational

SecurityAccessControls

IncidentManagement

BCP

Compliant

OrganizationalSecurity

SystemsSecurity

VulnerabilityHandling Announcement

Alert HandlingIncident

Handling

Other IncidentManagement

Policy Mang.Risk Mang.Asset Mang.

IncidentMang. Maintenance

Mang. Event Mang.

Other Managements

Risk Management& Risk Profiles

Practical Implementation Methodologies

Assets ManagementMethodology* * *

Information SecurityGovernance

X.sim: Security Incident Mang.X.rmg

FrameworkX.ismf

Based on the proposals from NSMF

Baseline

SG 17 – Q.7/17 strategic directions

51

SG 17 – Q.7/17 challenges

• How should information assets in telecommunications systems be identified and managed?

• How should information security policy for telecommunications systems be identified and managed?

• How should specific management issues for telecommunications organizations be identified?

• How should information security management system (ISMS) for telecommunications organizations be properly constructed by using the existing standards (ISO/IEC and ITU-T)?

• How should measurement of information security management in telecommunications be identified and managed?

• How should an information security governance framework be identified and managed?

• How should the small and medium telecommunications organizations be managed and applied for security?

52

SG 17 – Q.7/17 highlights of achievements

No. Title

X.1051 Information security management guideline for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002

X.rmg* Risk management and risk profile guide

X.sim* Security incident management guidelines for telecommunications

X.ismf* Information Security Management Framework for Telecommunications

Recommendations

* Currently under development

53

SG 17 – Q.7/17 actions for next study period

• Review the existing management Recommendations/Standards in ITU-T and ISO/IEC management standards as for assets identification and security policy management.

• Study and develop a methodology of assets identification and policy management for telecommunications based on the concept of information security management (X.1051).

• Study and develop information security management framework for telecommunications based on the concept of information security management (X.1051).

• Study and develop security management guidelines for small and medium telecommunications based on the concept of information security management (X.1051).

• Study and develop a methodology to construct information security management system (ISMS) for telecommunications organizations based on the existing standards (ISO/IEC and ITU-T).

• Study and develop an information security governance framework for telecommunications that encompasses information technology and information security management.

54

SG 17 – Q.7/17 collaboration with SDOs

• ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC27• ETSI• TTC• NIST

55

SG 17 – Q.8/17: Telebiometrics

ITU-T SG 17 Question 8

Telebiometrics

• Scope• Strategic Direction• Challenges• Highlights of activities • Actions for Next Study Period• Collaboration with SDOs

56

SG 17 – Q.8/17 scope

BiometricSensors

Matching

Application

Yes/No

Score

NW

Extraction

NW

NW:Network

NW

NWDecision

NW

Storage

Acquisition(capturing)

Safety conformity

Digital key / Secure protocol / Authentication infrastructure /System mechanism / Protection procedure

57

SG 17 – Q.8/17 strategic direction

Safetyin interaction with sensors

Authentication infrastructureBiometric Digital key

BioAPI interworking protocol

System mechanism among Client/Server/TTP

Protection procedures

Security and Protection for telebiometric application systems

58

SG 17 – Q.8/17 challenges

• How should security countermeasures be assessed for particular applications of telebiometrics?

• How can identification and authentication of users be improved by the use of interoperable models for safe and secure telebiometric methods?

• What mechanisms need to be supported to ensure safe and secure manipulation of biometric data in any application of telebiometrics, e.g., telemedicine or telehealth?

• How should the current Recommendations be further enhanced for their wide deployment and usage?

59

SG 17 – Q.8/17 highlights of activities

No. Title

X.1082 Telebiometrics related to human physiology

X.1083 BioAPI Interworking Protocol

X.1084 Telebiometrics system mechanism – Part 1: General biometric authentication protocol and system model profiles on telecommunication systems

X.1088 Telebiometrics digital key – A framework for biometric digital key generation and protection

X.1089 Telebiometrics authentication infrastructure

Approved Recommendations

60

SG 17 – Q.8/17 actions for next study period

• Enhance current Recommendations to accelerate their adoption to various telebiometric applications and populate the telebiometric database.

• Review the similarities and differences among the existing telebiometrics Recommendations in ITU-T and ISO/IEC standards.

• Study and develop security requirements and guidelines for any application of telebiometrics.

• Study and develop requirements for evaluating security, conformance and interoperability with privacy protection techniques for any application of telebiometrics.

• Study and develop requirements for telebiometric applications in a high functionality network.

• Study and develop requirements for telebiometric multi-factor authentication techniques based on biometric data protection and biometric encryption.

• Study and develop requirements for appropriate generic protocols providing safety, security, privacy protection, and consent “for manipulating biometric data” in any application of telebiometrics, e.g., telemedicine or telehealth.

• Prepare a manual on telebiometrics.

61

SG 17 – Q.8/17 collaboration with other SDOs

• ISO/IEC JTC 1/SCs 17, 27 and 37• ISO/TC 68 and TC 12• IEC/TC 25• IETF• IEEE• International Bureau of Weight and

Measurement (BIPM)

62

ITU-T SG 17 Question 9Secure Communication Services

• Focus• Position of each topic• Strategic direction• Challenges• Major achievements• Security work proposed for next study period

SG 17 – Q.9/17: Secure communication services

63

SG 17 – Q.9/17 focus

Develop a set of standards of secure application services, including• Mobile security• Home network security• Web Services security• Secure application services• NID/USN security Under study• Multicast security Under study• IPTV security Under study

64

SG 17 – Q.9/17 position of each topic

Mobile Terminal

Mobile

Network

Mobile security

Home network security

Secure application services

/Web Services security

Home Network

IPTV security/Multicast security

Content Provider

STB

Home Gateway

Application Server Client

Ubiquitous Sensor Network

Home Network

USN security

NID securityNID reader

NID tag

USN gatewayUSN Application Server

NID Application Server

Core Open Network

65

SG 17 – Q.9/17 strategic direction

For developing the draft Recommendations on IPTV security matters: Participate the ITU-T IPTV-GSI event (January – December, 2008) to

develop them being consistent with relevant Recommendations being developed by other Questions

Propose X.iptvsec-1 (Requirements and architecture for IPTV security matter) for consent by September 2008, to meet urgent market need

Based on X.iptvsec-1, continue to study a set of possible draft Recommendations which complement X.iptvsec-1 technologically

Continue to develop a set of draft Recommendations in domain-specific areas: Mobile network, Home network, (mobile) Web Services, application

services, NID/USN service, IPTV service multicasting service, etc. Continue to adopt or update the mature standards (i.e., SAML,

XACML) developed by other SDOs, especially by OASIS, in the area of Web Services security

Develop a common text of X.usnsec-1 (Security framework for USN) with ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 6 (as of June 2008)

Keep maintaining liaison activities with 3GPP, 3GPP2, JTC 1/SC 6, 25, 27 to develop the relevant draft Recommendations

66

SG 17 – Q.9/17 challenges

For the domain-specific draft Recommendations, it needs to strengthen the coordination work with other relevant Questions/SDOs to develop them to be consistent with their work.

During this Study period, Q.9/17 has been focused on the security framework for various domain-specific networks. However, from now on it should be emphasized to develop the pragmatic draft Recommendations which have significant impact on industry for the domain-specific networks with the collaboration with industries, other relevant SDOs and network/service providers.

For developing the draft Recommendations on IPTV security matters, the various detailed work items should continue to be identified in the future.

67

SG 17 – Q.9/17 major achievements

Mobile security X.1123, General security value

added service (policy) for mobile data communication,Approved 2007

X.1124, Authentication architecture in mobile end-to-end data communication,Approved 2007

X.1125, Correlative reacting system in mobile network, Approved 2007

NID security X.1171, Framework for Protection

of Personally Identifiable Information in Networked ID Services, Consented 2008

Home network security X.1111, Framework for security

technologies for home network, Approved 2007

X.1112, Certificate profile for the device in the home network, Approved 2007

X.1113, Guideline on user authentication mechanisms for home network service,Approved 2007

X.homesec-4 Authorization framework for home network,to be consented 2008

USN security X.usnsec-1 Requirement and

Framework for Ubiquitous Sensor Network,New work item in 2007

68

SG 17 – Q.9/17 major achievements (2)

Multicast Security X.mcsec-,1 Security Requirement

and Framework in Multicast communication,New work item in 2007

IPTV security X.iptvsec-1, Functional

Requirements and architecture for IPTV security aspects,New work item in 2008

X.iptvsec-2, Requirement and mechanism for Secure Transcodable SchemeNew work item in 2008

X.iptvsec-3, Key management framework for secure IPTV communications,New work item in 2008

Web Services security X.1143, Security architecture for

message security in mobile Web Services,Approved 2007

Secure applications services X.1151, Guideline on strong

password authentication protocols, Approved 2007

X.1152, Secure end-to-end data communication techniques using Trusted Third Party services, Consented 2008

X.1161, Framework for secure peer-to-peer communications,Consented 2008

• X.1162, Security architecture and operations for peer-to-peer network, Consented 2008

69

SG 17 – Q.9/17 work for next study period

Q.9/17 for current Study Period

• Mobile Security• Home network security• NID/USN security• Multicast security• IPTV security

• Web Service security• Secure application security

• Mobile Security• Home network security• NID/USN security• Multicast security• IPTV security, etc.

• Web Service security• Secure application service, etc.

Q.O/17 for Next Study Period

Q.P/17 for Next Study Period

Secure Communication Service Security aspects for ubiquitous telecommunication service

Secure application services

Divide Q.9/17 into two Questions: Q.O/17 and Q.P/17, considering the enormous workloads.

70

SG 17 – Q.17/17: Countering spam by technical means

ITU-T SG 17 Question 17

Countering spam by technical means

• Scope• Strategic direction• Challenges• Highlights of activities • Actions for next study period• Collaboration with SDOs

71

SG 17 – Q.17/17 scope

Develop a set of standards for countering spam by technical means, including:

• General technical strategies and protocols for countering spam

• Guidelines, frameworks and protocols for countering email spam, IP multimedia spam, SMS spam and other new types of spam

72

SG 17 – Q.17/17 strategic direction

Technologies involved in countering email spam (X.1240)

Framework Recommendations IP multimedia application area (X.fcsip)

Technical framework for countering email spam (X.1241)

Overall aspects of IP multimedia application spam (X.1244)

Technology Recommendations:Interactive countering spam gateway system (X.tcs-1) etc.Technical means for countering email spam (X.tcs) TBD

Technical strategies on countering spam (X.1231)

SMS spam Filtering System Based on Users’ Rules (X.ssf)

73

SG 17 – Q.17/17 challenges

• What risks does spam pose to the telecommunication network?• What technical factors associated with the telecommunication

network contribute to the difficulty of identifying the sources of spam?

• How can new technologies lead to opportunities to counter spam and enhance the security of the telecommunication network?

• Do advanced telecommunication network technologies (for example, SMS, instant messaging, VoIP) offer unique opportunities for spam that require unique solutions?

• What technical work is already being undertaken within the IETF, in other fora, and by private sector entities to address the problem of spam?

• What telecommunication network standardization work, if any, is needed to effectively counter spam as it relates to the stability and robustness of the telecommunication network?

74

SG 17 – Q.17/17 highlights of

activities

Approved Recommendations

No. Title

X.1231 Technical Strategies on Countering Spam

X.1240 Technologies involved in countering email spam

X.1241 Technical framework for countering email spam

X.1244* Overall aspects of IP multimedia application spam

* Currently in approval process

75

SG 17 – Q.17/17 actions for next study period

• Act as the lead group in ITU-T on technical means for countering spam• Establish effective cooperation with the relevant ITU Study Groups,

other standard bodies and appropriate consortia and fora.• Identify and examine the telecommunication network security risks

introduced by the constantly changing nature of spam.• Develop a comprehensive and up-to-date resource list of the existing

technical measures for countering spam in a telecommunication network that are in use or under development.

• Determine whether new Recommendations or enhancements to existing Recommendations, including methods to combat delivery of spyware, worm, phishing, and other malicious contents via spam and combat compromised networked equipment including botnet delivering spam.

• Provide regular updates to the Telecommunication Standardization Advisory Group and to the Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau to include in the annual report to Council.

76

SG 17 – Q.17/17 collaboration with SDOs

• Standardization bodies:

– IETF

– ISO/IEC JTC 1

• Other bodies:

– OECD

– MAAWG.

77

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - X.500 security aspects

ITU-T SG 17 Question 2

Directory Services, Directory Systems and Public-key/Attribute Certificates

• X.509 as basis for other specifications– Certificates– Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)– Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)

• Protecting directory information– User authentication– Access control– Data privacy protection

78

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - X.509 applicability

• Secure Socket Layer (SSL)• The IETF Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure

(PKIX) activity• The IETF Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail

Extensions (S/MIME) activity• The ETSI Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures

(ESI) activity• Etc.

The X.509 specification is the base for many other specifications:

79

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - X.509 applicability (2)

• Secure e-mail• Online banking• Medical electronic journals• Online public service• Etc.

The X.509 specification is the base for:

In short: The whole electronic world

80

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

• PKI is an infrastructure for managing certificates. It consists of one or more Certification Authorities for issuing certificates in a secure way following a set of policies.

• It includes maintaining information about certificates been revoked.

• Directories are major components of the infrastructure.

81

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)

• PMI is an infrastructure for managing authorization using attribute certificates. It consists of one or more Attribute Authorities for issuing attribute certificates in a secure way.

• It includes maintaining information about attribute certificates been revoked.

• Directories are major components of the infrastructure.

• Recent development - (PMI) has been extended to allow privileges obtained in one domain to be used in an other domain (federation of privileges).

82

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - Protecting Directory Information

Authentication of users• None• Name• Name + password• Name + protected password• Strong authentication based on X.509

83

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - Protecting Directory Information

Access control• Access control is about right-to-know

(Who may do what based on level of authentication)

• X.500 has comprehensive access control features

• X.500 is the only directory specification having these features

84

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - Protecting Directory Information

Data Privacy Protection• Data Privacy Protection is about right-to-

know and need-to-know.• Protection against malicious searches• Protection against data trawling• Minority protection

85

SG 17 – Q.2/17 - New security extension work

• Password lifetime• Maintain password history (avoid reuse)• Password quality• Password warnings• Error signalling• Etc.

Password policy, that is rules for administration of password to increase directory security:

Part of next X.500 edition (2011-2012)

86

ITU-T SG 2

ITU-T Study Group 2Operational aspects of service provision, networks and performance

87

SG 2 – Scope of security study

• Operational aspects such as prevention and detection of:– Fraud– Misuse

• Corresponding operational measures• Security requirements

88

SG 2 – Accomplishment

• Recommendations:– E.156 Guidelines for ITU-T action on reported misuse

of E.164 number resources   – E.408 Telecommunication networks security

requirements – E.409 Incident organization and security incident

handling: Guidelines for telecommunication organizations

– Numerous Recommendations on operational aspects of network management

   

89

ITU-T SG 4

ITU-T Study Group 4Telecommunication management

90

SG 4 – Scope of security study

• Security of management plane• Management of security for

telecommunications management• Protocols of securities for management

91

SG 4 – Strategic direction

• Establishment of interface Recommendations among security function groups or entities for management of security (Enhancement of M.3410)

• Study on use of IdM in management plan• Study on the management of IdM• Continuation of protocol profiling for security

management

92

SG 4 – Challenges

• Fill the gap in security on management plane and management of its security

• Collaboration with ATIS TMOC and ETSI TISPAN on the subject

93

SG 4 – Accomplishment

• Consent of Recommendation M.3410– Guidelines and Requirements for

Security Management Systems to Support Telecommunications Management

94

SG 4 – Next steps

• Enhancement of M.3016 series Recommendations for security of management plane

• Enhancement of M.3410 Recommendation for management of security for telecommunications management

• Enhancement of Q.811 and Q.812, management protocol profiles from security subject perspective

95

SG 4 – Questions

• What security mechanisms and protocols are required to support security of management for NGNs?

• What management mechanisms and protocols are required to support management of security for NGNs?

• What use of Service-Oriented Architecture concepts should be applied in specifying protocol and security Recommendations?

• What collaboration inside and outside the ITU-T is needed to develop protocol and security functions?

96

ITU-T SG 5

ITU-T Study Group 5Protection against electromagnetic

environment effects

97

SG 5 – Scope

• To provide guidance on the protection of Telecommunications and Data Centres against disruption of service and/or physical damage due to:– Natural EM phenomena

• Lightning, Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)

– Interactions with the RF Spectrum• Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

– Man-Made/Malicious Electromagnetic threats• High-altitude EM Pulse (HEMP);• High-Power EM weapons (HPEM);

• To provide guidance on the protection of electronic data from interception via EM means

98

SG 5 – Strategic direction

• Do not reinvent the wheel– Reference existing K-Series Recommendations

wherever possible• Lightning, ESD, EMC

– Develop effective liaisons with other International Standardization Organizations to exploit additional expertise

• Liaison with IEC TC 77 – Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) – SC 77C – High Power Transient Phenomena – provided expertise in HEMP and HPEM

• Liaison with National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) of Japan – provided expertise on EM interception of data

– Apply existing expertise to the telecommunications and data centre domain

99

SG 5 – Challenges

• Knowledge management– Liaisons with other bodies has granted access to rich

veins of existing expertise– This has taken time to assimilate and present within the

context of a telecommunications and data centre

• EM intercept– Previously officially secret in some regions (i.e. previously

known as TEMPEST within the US)

100

SG 5 – Recent accomplishments

• A document set is planned• K.sec – basic introduction that references the following:

– K.hemp

– K.hpem

– K.leakage

– K.sec_miti

– Existing K-series Recommendations on lightning

– Existing K-series Recommendations on EMC

• Steady progress has been made on developing the document set

101

SG 5 – Next steps/actions

Document Title of the Recommendation Timing

K.sec Guide for the application of electromagnetic security requirements - Basic Recommendation

2011

K.hemp Application of requirements against HEMP to telecommunication systems

2008

K.hpem Application of requirements against HPEM to telecommunication systems

2008

K.leakage Test method and requirements against information leak through unintentional EM emission

2009

K.secmiti Mitigation methods against EM security threats 2011

Development of document set continues with the following timing

102

ITU-T SG 9

ITU-T Study Group 9Integrated broadband cable networks and

television and sound transmission

103

SG 9 – Scope of security work

Security requirements are spread across multiple questions:– Improve the security of conditional access systems used for

television subscription, pay-per-view and similar services distributed to the home by cable television (Q3)

– Security, conditional access, protection against unauthorized copying, protection against unauthorized redistribution requirements to be supported by an universal integrated receiver or set-top box for the reception of cable television and other services (Q5)

– Security requirements and protocols associated with high-speed bidirectional data facilities intended to support, among other payloads, those utilizing Internet Protocols (IP) exploiting the broadband capacity provided by hybrid fiber/Coaxial (HFC) digital cable television systems (Q8)

– Security requirements and protocols for Voice over IP/Video over IP applications in IP-based cable television networks (Q9) 

– Extend the security requirements for entertainment video delivery associated with cable network video service onto the home network (Q10)

Provide all the security requirements for the network elements and services offered by cable operators

104

SG 9 – Strategic direction for security for Cable Networks

Network Elements Home Networking – Devices and Applications

- Link privacy for cable modem implementations J.125- Third generation Transmission systems – security services J.222.3- IP Cablecom security specification J.170- IP Cablecom 2 architecture including securityJ.360- Security features based on 3G mobile telecom system as modified for Cable J.366.7- IMS network domain security specification J.366.8- Generic authentication architecture specification J.366.9

- A Residential Gateway to support delivery of cable data services J.192- Requirements for next generation set-top boxes J.193- High level requirements for DRM Bridge for Cable access Network to home network J.197- Next generation set-top box architecture J.290- IPTV requirements for secondary distribution J.700

105

SG 9 – Challenges for cable networks security

• Authentication, privacy, access control and content protection both on the access network and the bridge to home network are key considerations for multi-media applications/services

• Security requirements for network elements in the access networks determine how the applications (voice, video and data) are transmitted securely to authenticated users/subscribers

• Security requirements for network elements in the home network such as residential gateway and set-top boxes meet the access control for the user

106

SG 9 – Major accomplishments

• Approved 2 security requirements Recommendations:• “Link Privacy for cable modems” (J.125)• “Third generation transmission systems” (cable Modem and

Cable Modem Termination System, J.222.3)

• Approved “IPTV requirements for secondary distribution” (J.700)

• Approved the Recommendation on “Component definition and interface specification for next generation set-top box” (J.293)

107

SG 9 – Security work for next study period

Security studies for the next study period will be continued in the following questions:

• Cable television delivery of digital services and applications that use Internet Protocols (IP) and/or packet-based data

• Voice and video applications over cable TV networks

• Functional requirements for a universal integrated receiver or set-top box for the reception of cable television and other services

• The extension of cable-based services over broadband in Home Networks

• Security requirements for IPTV interfaces for secondary distribution (identified in J.700)

108

ITU-T SG 11

ITU-T Study Group 11Signalling Requirements and Protocols

109

SG 11 – Scope of security work

Each Question of SG11 has to consider security aspects to develop protocol Recommendations used for network control signalling, based on the general requirements developed by other SGs, such as SG 2, SG 13, SG 17 and SG 19.

Q.7/11, entitled as “Signalling and control requirements and protocols to support attachment in NGN environments”, has specific requirements for authentication and authorization of users and terminals.

110

SG 11 – Strategic direction

• Security consideration has been incorporated within the text for each Question of SG11.

• Various security arrangements are embedded within the protocols defined at various reference points, by reusing existing mechanisms defined by other organization (e.g., IETF and 3GPP).

• Strengthen the coordination on security issues across SGs, as well as among Questions within SG 11 by proposing a dedicated new Question on security coordination for the next study period.

111

SG 11 – Challenges for secure protocols

• Design interface protocols which have various security mechanisms based on Recommendations / specifications developed by SG 17 and other SDOs.

• Special attention should be drawn to the interface between legacy telephone networks and emerging NGN.

• It would also be necessary to guide actual protocol implementations so that there will be no security holes, for example, by defining implementers’ guides.

112

SG 11 – Recent accomplishments

• 24 Recommendations and 6 Supplements have been approved so far, regarding NGN protocols with security mechanisms embedded.

• The following two Recommendations have been approved at the January 2008 SG11 meeting in Q.7/11 in Network attachment control protocol work:– Q.3201, “EAP-based security signalling protocol

architecture.”Note - EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol

– Q.3202.1, “Authentication protocols for interworking among 3GPP, WiMax and WLAN in NGN.”

113

SG 11 – Security work for next study period

New Question on security coordination• What is the content of an appropriate policy for the

consideration of protocol security in the work of the Study Group?

• What are the means to assure that such a policy is being followed in practice?

• What exceptions to the general policy are permissible in the case of specific Recommendations?

• What is the impact of security-related work in other groups on the work of protocol security within this Study Group at the policy level?

• What are the means by which technical developments in protocol security achieved in other groups may be communicated to interested Questions in this Study Group, and the reverse?

114

ITU-T SG 13

ITU-T Study Group 13Next Generation Networks

115

SG 13 – Scope of NGN security work in Q.15

Conduct NGN Security studies to develop network architectures that:– Provide for maximal network and end-user resources

protection – Allow for highly-distributed intelligence end-to-end – Allow for co-existence of multiple networking technologies – Provide for end-to-end security mechanisms – Provide for security solutions that apply over multiple

administrative domains– Provide for secure Identity Management– Provide for security solutions for IPTV that are cost-

effective and have acceptable impact on the performance, quality of service, usability, and scalability

Provide security guidance on NGN security to all Questions of SG 13 and other Study Groups

116

Y.2701 is built onapplication of the concepts

of X.805

to Y.2201 ,NGN requirements

and Y.2012,NGN Functional Require-ments and Architecture

SG 13 – Strategic direction for NGN security

Y.2702 NGN Authentication and Authorization Requirements

Y.2701 Security Requirements for NGN Release 1

NGN Security Mechanisms

NGN Certificate Management

NGN AAA

Y.2701 is a base for development of the detailedRecommendations on NGN Security

NGN IdM Framework

Identity Management has evolved intoa separate topic of the NGN security work

NGN IdM Use cases

NGN IdM Requirements

NGN IdM Mechanisms

•IdM Framework defines the concepts of the IdM•IdM Use cases is a base for deriving the IdM requirements•IdM Mechanisms provide support for the requirements

117

SG 13 – Challenges for NGN security

• Authentication is one of the most complex and challenging procedures in NGN security. The following study items of SG 13 are focused on various aspects of authentication:– Y.2702, NGN Authentication and Authorization

Requirements– NGN Security Mechanisms– NGN Certificate Management – NGN Authentication Authorization and Accounting– NGN IdM Requirements– NGN IdM Mechanisms

118

SG 13 – Major security accomplishments

Question 15/13 has:– Achieved determination of the draft ITU-T Recommendation

Y.2702, NGN Authentication and Authorization Requirements– Defined the direction for the studies of Identity Management

(IdM) for NGN and started development of four ITU-T Recommendations on IdM

– Provided security expertise to other Questions and Study Groups through active participation in NGN-GSI and IdM-GSI

– Continued productive collaboration with ITU-T SG 17 - Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Security and started joint (with Q.6/17) development of Recommendation X.idm-dm, Identity Data Model

– Initiated a liaison exchange with 3GPP SA 3 aimed at harmonization of the standards on media security

119

SG 13 – Security work for next study period

Security studies for the next study period will address:• What new Recommendations or guidance to other Study Groups are

needed to standardize identification of NGN threats and vulnerabilities? • What are the security requirements of NGN to effectively counter these

threats? • What new Recommendations are necessary to enable comprehensive,

end-to-end security in NGN that span across multiple heterogeneous administrative domains?

• What new Recommendations or guidance are necessary to enable attachment of terminals in a secure fashion, including Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) considerations, to NGN?

• How to define security architecture of Identity Management in NGN?• What are security requirements to Identity Management in NGN?• What new Recommendations are needed for supporting security

requirements of Identity Management in NGN?• What new Recommendations are needed for supporting secure

interoperability among different Circles of Trusts (CoT) in NGN?• What new NGN Recommendations are needed for supporting security

requirements of IPTV?

120

ITU-T Study Group 15Optical and Other Transport Network

Infrastructures

ITU-T SG 15

121

SG15 is responsible for the development of standards on optical and other transport network infrastructures, systems, equipment, optical fibres, and their management and the corresponding control plane technologies to enable the evolution toward intelligent transport networks. This encompasses the development of related standards for the customer premises, access, metropolitan and long haul sections of communication networks.

This responsibility includes security-related aspects, including encryption, protection and restoration, and security management.

SG 15 - Responsibilities

122

Question Topic and security-related issues

1/15 Coordination of Access Network Transport standardsAccess Network Transport planning security aspects

2/15 Optical systems for fibre access networksExample: Link level encryption

3/15 General characteristics of optical transport networksOTN planning security aspects

4/15 Transceivers for customer access and in-premises networking systems on metallic conductorsExample: Notching out frequency bands used by amateur radio etc.

6/15 Characteristics of optical systems for terrestrial transport networksSafety and reliability requirements

9/15 Transport equipment and network protection/restorationSecurity requirements for equipment functions and protection switching processes for transport networks

10/15 Optical fibres and cables for the access network to and in buildings and homesSafety and reliability requirements

12/15 Transport network architecturesArchitecture aspects, including security-related issues

14/15 Management and control of transport systems and equipmentSecurity requirements for managing the transport network/system/equipment and the supporting management communication network and signalling communication network

SG 15 – Security related work in SG 15

123

SG 15 – Major security accomplishments

The common transport equipment management requirements Recommendation G.7710/Y.1701 (7/2007) has added M.3016 Series (2005) as normative reference for management plane security requirements.

 

The requirements in G.7710/Y.1701, including the security requirements, continue to be the base for managing technology-specific transport equipment, including EoT in G.8051/Y.1345 (10/2007) and T-MPLS in G.8151/Y.1374 (10/2007).

124

 Will continue to study security requirements for managing transport network/system/equipment and their control plane and revise the recommendations are necessary

 

G.806 (Generic Equipment Functions) will be revised and security requirements will be included.

SG 15 – Security work for next study period

125

ITU-T Study Group 16Multimedia terminals, systems and

applications

ITU-T SG 16

126

SG 16 – Q.25/16, Multimedia security in NGN

• Study Group 16 concentrates on multimedia systems.• Q.25/16 focuses on the application-security issues of

MM applications in existing and next generation networks

• Standardizes multimedia security• So far Q.25/16 has been standardizing MM-security for

the “1st generation MM/pre-NGN systems”:– H.323/H.248-based systems

127

SG 16 – Evolution of H.235

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Initial Draft

H.323V2 H.323V4

H.235V1approved

Core SecurityFrameworkEngineering

Consolidation Improvement and Additions1st Deployment

2003

H.235V2

Annex D

Annex E

approved

Annex FH.530

consent

H.235V3+

Annex I

Security ProfilesAnnex DAnnex Estarted

2004

H.235V3 Amd1 + Annex H

H.235V3 Amd1

H.235 Annex G

H.323V5

1996 2005

H.235V4H.235.0

~H.235.9

approved

Reorganization

H.323V1 H.323V6

2006

128

SG 16 – H.235 V4 sub-series Recommendations

• Major restructuring of H.235v3 Amd1 and annexes in stand-alone sub-series Recommendations

• H.235.x sub-series specify scenario-specific MM-security procedures as H.235-profiles for H.323

• Some new parts added• Some enhancements and extensions• Incorporated corrections

• Approved in September 2005

129

SG 16 – H.323 Security Recommendations (1)

• H.235.0 “Security framework for H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimedia systems”

Overview of H.235.x sub-series and common procedures with baseline text

• H.235.1 "Baseline Security Profile” Authentication & integrity for H.225.0 signaling using shared

secrets

• H.235.2 "Signature Security Profile” Authentication & integrity for H.225.0 signaling using X.509

digital certificates and signatures

130

SG 16 – H.323 Security Recommendations (2)

• H.235.3 "Hybrid Security Profile" Authentication & integrity for H.225.0 signaling using

an optimized combination of X.509 digital certificates, signatures and shared secret key management;specification of an optional proxy-based security processor

• H.235.4 "Direct and Selective Routed Call Security"

Key management procedures in corporate and interdomain environments to obtain key material for securing H.225.0 call signaling in GK direct-routed/selective routed scenarios

enhanced

extended

131

SG 16 – H.323 Security Recommendations (3)

• H.235.5 "Framework for secure authentication in RAS using weak shared secrets"

Secured password (using EKE/SPEKE approach) in combination with Diffie-Hellman key agreement for stronger authentication during H.225.0 signaling

• H.235.6 "Voice encryption profile with native H.235/H.245 key management"

Key management and encryption mechanisms for RTP

Amendment 1 (June 2008) added support for cipher key lengths of 192 and 256 bit to AES

enhanced

modified

132

SG 16 – H.323 Security Recommendations (4)

• H.235.7 "Usage of the MIKEY Key Management Protocol for the Secure Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) within H.235"

Usage of the MIKEY key management for SRTP

• H.235.8 "Key Exchange for SRTP using Secure Signalling Channels"

SRTP keying parameter transport over secured signaling channels (IPsec, TLS, CMS)

• H.235.9 "Security Gateway Support for H.323" Discovery of H.323 Security Gateways

(SG = H.323 NAT/FW ALG) and key management for H.225.0 signaling

NEW

NEW

133

SG 16 – Other MM-SEC results

• H.350.2 (2003) “H.350.2 Directory Services Architecture for H.235”

An LDAP schema to represent H.235 elements (PWs, certificates, ID information)

• H.530 (2002) “Symmetric security procedures for H.323 mobility in H.510” + Cor.1 (2003)

Authentication, access control and key management in mobile H.323-based corporate networks

• H.460.22 (2007) “Security protocol negotiation” + Cor.1 (2008)

Negotiate security protocols (IPsec or TLS or others) for H.323 signaling

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SG 16 – Q.5/16 (H.300 NAT/FW traversal) results

• H.460.18 (2005) “Traversal of H.323 signalling across FWs and NATs”

H.323 protocol enhancements and new client/server proxies to allow H.323 signalling protocols traverse NATs & FWs;H.323 endpoints can remain unchanged

• H.460.19 (2005) “NAT & FW traversal procedures for RTP in H.323 systems”

Uses multiplexed RTP media mode and symmetric RTP in conjunction with H.460.18 as a short-term solution

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SG 16 – More Q.5/16 results

• Technical Paper (2005) “Requirements for Network Address Translator and Firewall Traversal of H.323 Multimedia Systems”

Documentation of scenarios and requirements for NAT & FW traversal in H.323

• Technical Paper (2005) “Firewall and NAT traversal Problems in H.323 Systems”

An analysis of scenarios and various problems encountered by H.323 around NAT & FW traversal

• H-Series Supplement 10 (2008) “Proxy-aided NAT/FW Traversal Scheme for H.323 Multimedia Systems”

Describe proxy-aided NAT/firewall traversal mechanism as a NAT traversal solution for H.323 multimedia systems

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SG 16 – New security items under current study

• MM security aspects of Advanced Multimedia Systems (AMS) under Q.12/16

Security consideration in the third generation MM system with a decomposed and distributed architecture

• Security aspects of IPTV system under Q.13/16 Content protection related metadata

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SG 16 – Summary

• Multimedia systems and applications as being studied by SG16 face important security challenges:

– MM-security and NAT/FW traversal• Q.25/16 and Q.5/16 are addressing these issues and

have provided various Recommendations• The work continues in the scope of

NGN-Multimedia Security• Security considerations are key part of draft new

Question B7/16 “Advanced functions for H.300-series systems and beyond”

– Other Questions will also address the topic within their areas of competence

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ITU-T SG 19

ITU-T Study Group 19Mobile Telecommunication Networks

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SG 19 – Scope of security work

• Scope: IMT-2000 Family Member Networks

• Broad requirements for security are covered in the following ITU-T Recommendations:– Q.1701 “Framework for IMT‑2000 networks”

– Q.1702 “Long-term vision of network aspects for systems beyond IMT-2000”

– Q.1703 “Service and network capabilities framework of network aspects for systems beyond IMT-2000”

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SG 19 – Strategic directions

• Mainly derived from Q.1702 and Q.1703 – Q.1702 indicates the following objectives to provide

network security among heterogeneous inter-connected networks:

• Comprehensive, cross-provider security infrastructure support

• Well-defined and conducted routine system risk analysis• Robust system intrusion monitoring and response

system to control damage• Low overhead security protocols to accommodate

wireless bandwidth limitation • Provide seamless security across heterogeneous access

technologies

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SG 19 – Strategic directions

• Mainly derived from Q.1702 and Q.1703 – Rec. Q.1703 specifies that at least the following

security services should be provided:• Integrity: contents as received are exactly as sent• Confidentiality: user data is kept secret from

unintended listeners• Non-repudiation: prevent denying a transmission was

initiated• Mutual authentication: assurance that a participant is

who he claims to be• Authorization: control user access to various network

resources

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SG 19 – Security challenges

• To address security concerns arising due to:– Migration from circuit switching to Packet switching (using

IP in wireless networks)– Fixed Mobile Convergence (FMC): access & services

across heterogeneous networks (GSM, Wi‑Fi, PSTN, WiMAX, etc.) with the usage of IP

• To define a security framework applicable across heterogeneous networks

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SG 19 – Major security accomplishments

• Q.1707/Y.2804 (02/2008) “Generic Framework of Mobility Management for NGNs”– Designed to ensure that MM functions can interwork with the

relevant authentication and security protocols.

• Q.1742-series “IMT‑2000 references to ANSI-41 evolved core network with cdma2000 access”– References to 3GPP security specifications

• S.S0078: Common Security Algorithms

• S.R0082: Enhanced Packet Data Air Interface Security

• S.R0083: Broadcast-Multicast Service Security Framework

• S.S0114: Security Mechanisms using GBA

• S.S0110: IP-Based Location Services Security Framework

• S.R0086: IMS Security Framework.

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SG 19 – Major security accomplishments (2)

• Q.1762/Y.2802 “Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements”– Notes need for uniform authorization mechanism– FMC may contain access-specific or -dependent parts but the

procedure for handling these is uniform

• Q.1763 “FMC service using legacy PSTN or ISDN as the fixed access network for mobile network users”– Authentication through a fixed network access provides for same

security mechanism as in the mobile network– Refers to 3GPP TS 33.102 / ETSI TS 133.102 which address

UMTS 3G security and security architecture

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SG 19 – Major security accomplishments (3)

• Working Draft Q.FMC-IMS “Fixed mobile convergence with a common IMS session control domain” as of 14 May 2008– Mobile access in mobile networks faces an increased level of

security threats compared to stationary access in fixed networks

– Nomadic and wireless access in fixed networks utilize the mobile world security framework (TS 33.203) for IMS access, with the IMS Subscriber Identity Module (ISIM) as a key component

– References IMS security (3GPP TR 33.978) and authentication mechanisms (ETSI TS 187.003)

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SG 19 – Security work for next study period

• F/19 : Convergence of existing and evolving IMT and fixed networks– FMC cannot be studied in isolation– Has to take into account the ongoing work on NGN

scenarios, services, architecture, mobility, security and QoS, and on mobile network technologies outside of ITU-T

– Study of specific FMC scenarios and solutions requires a solid understanding of mobile network technologies and close liaison with mobile network SDOs

147

SG 19 – Specific actions member organizations of GSC should take

• Aim for globally consistent end-user security support– Identify FMC security requirements for uniform authentication

and authorization mechanisms (i.e., authentication and authorization combined)

– Network specific requirements for T-SPID

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Supplemental Information

ITU-DTelecommunication Development Sector

149

ITU-D

ITU-D Cybersecurity Activities: Two Main Pillars• ITU-D Study Group 1 Question 22/1: Securing information and communication

networks: Best practices for developing a culture of cybersecurity– Developing a Framework for Organizing National Cybersecurity Efforts

• ITU-D Programme 3 ITU Cybersecurity Work Programme to Assist Developing Countries. Example activities include:– Assistance related to Establishment of National Strategies and Capabilities

for Cybersecurity and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)– Assistance related to Establishment of appropriate Cybercrime Legislation

and Enforcement Mechanisms– Assistance related to establishment of Watch, Warning and Incident

Response (WWIR) Capabilities– Assistance related to Countering Spam and Related Threats, Establishment

of an ITU Cybersecurity/CIIP Directory, Contact Database and Who’s Who Publication

– Cybersecurity Indicators– Fostering Regional Cooperation Activities

150

Supplemental Information

ITU-RRadiocommunication Sector

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ITU-R

ITU-R Cybersecurity Activities

• Radio spectrum global frequency management is increasingly important for building confidence and security and creating an enabling environment in the use of ICTs. ITU-R plays a central role in facilitating complex intergovernmental negotiations needed to develop legally binding agreements between sovereign states in an increasingly ‘unwired’ world.

• ITU-R activities related to cybersecurity

– Recommendation ITU-R M.1457 “Security mechanism incorporated in IMT-2000”– Recommendation ITU-R S.1711 “Performance enhancements of transmissions control

protocol over satellite”– Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 “Framework and overall objectives of the future

development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000” – Recommendation ITU-R M.1223 “Evaluation of security mechanism for IMT-2000”ITU-

R– Recommendation ITU-R S.1250 “Network management architecture for digital satellite

systems forming part of SDH transport networks in the fixed-satellite service”– Recommendation ITU-R M.1078 “Security principles for IMT-2000”

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Some useful web resources

• ITU-T Home page http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/

• Study Group 17 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/index.asp

e-mail: tsbsg17@itu.int

• LSG on Security http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/tel-security.html

• Security Roadmap http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/ict/index.html

• Security Manual http://www.itu.int/publ/T-HDB-SEC.03-2006/en

• Cybersecurity Portal http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/

• Cybersecurity Gateway http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/gateway/index.html

• Recommendations http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html

• ITU-T Lighthouse http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/lighthouse/index.phtml

• ITU-T Workshops http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/worksem/index.html