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op-jleo120010 1..58organization of production pol antras* harvard university i survey the influence of grossman and hart’s (1986. “the costs and benefits of ownership:
gh25 final version 05_16_12.dvigrossman-hart (1986) goes global: incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production citation antràs,
grossman-hart (1986) goes global: incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production pol antràs� harvard university september 26,…
nber working paper series grossman-hart (1986) goes global: incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production pol antràs working paper…
grossman-hart (1986) goes global incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production pol antràs (harvard university) june, 25th 2011…
7/30/2019 grossman hart 86 1/30the costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integrationauthor(s): sanford j. grossman and oliver d. hartreviewed…
8/6/2019 grossman hart implicit contracts under asymmetric info 1/358/6/2019 grossman hart implicit contracts under asymmetric info 2/358/6/2019 grossman hart implicit contracts…
timing information flows gabriele gratton richard holden and anton kolotilin∗ 15th october 2015 abstract at an exogenous deadline receiver takes an action the payoff from…
fabrizio casella di testo massimo dantoni fabrizio casella di testo maria alessandra rossi fabrizio casella di testo n510 - agosto 2007 fabrizio casella di testo copyright…
grossman–hart 1986 goes global: incomplete contracts property rights and the international organization of production pol antràs* harvard university i survey the influence…
american economic review 2017, 107(7): 1731–1752 https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.7.1731 1731 incomplete contracts and control† by oliver hart* the work on incomplete…
the effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure and modification samuel kruger∗ june 2013 ∗harvard university department of economics and harvard business school.…
attracting early stage investors: evidence from a randomized field experiment shai bernstein, arthur korteweg, and kevin laws* abstract this paper uses a randomized field…
review of economic studies (1999) 66, 115–138 0034-6527y99y00060115$02.00 1999 the review of economic studies limited foundations of incomplete contracts oliver hart…
relationship-specificity incomplete contracts and the pattern of trade* nathan nunn is a country’s ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of com- parative…
1 corporate control itay goldstein wharton school, university of pennsylvania 2 managerial discipline and takeovers managers often don’t maximize the value of the firm;…
how wide is the firm border? enghin atalay, ali hortaçsu, mary jialin li, chad syverson∗ 14th august 2019 abstract we examine the within- and across-firm shipment decisions…
foundations of incomplete contracts oliver hart; john moore the review of economic studies, vol. 66, no. 1, special issue: contracts. (jan., 1999), pp. 115-138. stable url:…
* mqayyum@cameronedu ** gregnagel@mtsuedu *** contact author po box 9580 mississippi state ms 39762 kdr149@msstateedu 662-325-1979 we acknowledge that portions of this study…
jean tirole stable url: econometrica is currently published by the econometric society. your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor's terms and