F. W. J. SCHELLINGPublished by Spring Publications, Inc.Putnam, Connecticutwww.springpublications.com

Copyright © Spring Publications, Inc. 2010Translation Klaus Ottmann 2010All rights reserved.

First Edition 2010

Originally published in German under the title PhiLmaphie andReligLm (Tubingen: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1804).

Designed by white.room productions, New York

Printed in Canada

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854.[Philosophie and Religion. English]Philosophy and religion : (1804) / Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling ;

translated, annotated, and with an introduction by Klaus Ottmann.—1st ed.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 978-0-88214-593-8 (original pbk. : alk. paper)1. Philosophy and religion. 2. Absolute, The. 3. Eschenmayer, C. A. (CarlAugust), 1768-1852. Philosophie in ihrem Ubergang zur Nichtphilosophie.1. Ottmann, Klaus. II. Title.B2872.E4088 2010193 — dc22

2009050719

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of theAmerican National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence ofPaper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

Philosophy and Religion

(1804)

Translated, annotated, and with an introduction

KLAUS oTrm ANN

SPRING PUBLICATIONSPUTNAM, CONN.

>2.- Spring Publications, Inc.onnecticutgpublications.com

Spring Publications, Inc. 2010C Klaus Ottmann 2010

cserved.

)n 2010

published in German under the title PhihAwbie andibingen: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1804).

yr' white.room productions, New York

Canada

of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854.tie and Religion. English]v and religion : (1804) / Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling ;annotated, and with an introduction by Klaus Ottmann.

oibliographical references.-0-88214-593-8 (original pbk. : alk. paper)phy and religion. 2. Absolute, The. 3. Eschenmayer, C. A. (Carl768-1852. Philosophie in ihrem Ubergang zur Nichtphilosophie.

Klaus. II. Title.088 2010Z

2009050719

used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of theNational Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence ofPrinted Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

F. W. J. SCHELLING

Philosophy and Religion

(1804)

Translated, annotated, and with an introduction by

KLAUS OTTM ANN

SPRING PUBLICATIONSPUTNAM, CONN.

Contents

Translator's Introduction

Philosophy and Reli g ion (1804)

Preliminary Remarks

Introduction

The Idea of the Absolute

Appendix:

On the Eternal Forms of Reli g ion

Selected Correspondence between Schellin g

and C.A. Eschenma yer, 1804 - Jul y 1803'

G lossary

C ontents

Translator's Introduction VII

Philosoph y and Reli g ion (1804)

Preliminar y Remarks

Introduction

The Idea of the Absolutetea o_ _____so_ute

Appendix:

On the Eternal Forms of Reli g ion

Selected Correspondence between Shellin g

and C.A. Eschenma yer, April 1804 - Jul y 1805 57

Glossar y 71

3

7

11

51

7

Translators Introduction

We search everywhere for the Absolute, but all we elfind are things.—Novalis

Regarding the problem of freedom...idealism leavesus rather at a loss.— E W. J. Schelling

When Immanuel Kant's Critique qf Pure Reason fipeared in 1781, its "clearness and evidence" did not talsession of his contemporaries "as with a giant's handdid of Samuel Taylor Coleridge when he first encotit twenty years later.* At the end of the eighteenth cGermany was inundated with publications of practiclosophy that followed the call of the French Enlightelto popularize philosophy; these were for the most pa,alistic discussions on aesthetics and psychology aimeceducation of the masses. At the same time German acphilosophers were embroiled in the debate between FaReason, and Kant's Critique was originally regarded asother contribution to the discussion of the latter. Not upublication of Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Letters on the

Philosophy in 1786-87 did the significance of Kant'sbecome widely noticed.*

° Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Bililnyraphia Literary or Biographnu

of My Literary Life and Opinions, ed. J. Engell and W. J. Bate (PN. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), vol. 1, p. 153. According to C...4marginalia, he first read Kant's Critique in 1801.

t "Flatons-nous de rendre la philosophie populaire (Let us Imake philosophy popular)." Denis Diderot, Penseed jar rinterpret,

Nature (1753), cited in Albert Collignon, Diderot: so vie, des (vivre...,

dpondance (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1895), pp. 231-32. Typical exampleslar philosophy were the essays compiled by Johann Jakob Enfthe title Der Philosoph fur die Welt (The Philosopher for the World(Berlin: In der Myliussischen Buchhandlung, 1801).

Reinhold's Briefe fiber die Kultidebe Philosophie were published aof articles in the Weimar journal Der leutdcbe Merkur between Aue

and September 1787.

Translator ' s Introduction

We search everywhere for the Absolute, but all we everfind are things.— Novalis

Regarding the problem of freedom... idealism leavesus rather at a loss.—F. W. J. Schelling

When Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason first ap-peared in 1781, its "clearness and evidence" did not take pos-session of his contemporaries "as with a giant's hand," as itdid of Samuel Taylor Coleridge when he first encounteredit twenty years later.* At the end of the eighteenth century,Germany was inundated with publications of practical phi-losophy that followed the call of the French Enlightenmenttto popularize philosophy; these were for the most part mor-alistic discussions on aesthetics and psychology aimed at theeducation of the masses. At the same time German academicphilosophers were embroiled in the debate between Faith andReason, and Kant's Critique was originally regarded as yet an-other contribution to the discussion of the latter. Not until thepublication of Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Letters on the Kantti.Philosophy in 1786-87 did the significance of Kant's Critique

become widely noticed.*

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Bibliographin Literaria or Biographical Sketches

of My Literary Life and Opinions, ed. J. Engell and W. J. Bate (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), vol. 1, p. 153. According to Coleridge'smarginalia, he first read Kant's Critique in 1801.

t "Flatons-nous de rendre la philosophie populaire (Let us hasten tomake philosophy popular)." Denis Diderot, Pense'es sur l'inteipretation de la

Nature (1753), cited in Albert Collignon, Diderot: sa vie, des teuvres, sa come-

spondance (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1895), pp. 231-32. Typical examples of popu-lar philosophy were the essays compiled by Johann Jakob Engel underthe title Der Philosoph fur die Welt (The Philosopher for the World), 2 vols.(Berlin: In der Myliussischen Buchhandlung, 1801).

Reinhold's Briefe fiber die Kuitisehe Philosophic' were published as a seriesof articles in the Weimar journal Der Teutsche Merkur between August 1786and September 1787.

— VIII — — Ix —

Kant explained our a priori knowledge of the phenomenalworld and justified the beliefs in that which lies beyond allexperience — God, freedom, and immortality — by distin-guishing between a knowable phenomenal world and thethings-in-themselves, which we cannot know. Understand-ing cannot give us a priori knowledge of the things-in-them-selves, only of appearances. Reason seeks to go beyond whatis sensate but stops short of the intuition of the Absolute: "Allour knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from there tounderstanding, and ends with reason beyond which no high-er faculty is found for elaborating the matter of intuition andbringing it under the highest unity of thought."

Despite Kant's claim of having finally settled the debatebetween Reason and Faith with his Critique, the discussionswere far from over. Kant's Critique led, on the one hand, tothe metaphysical idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), andGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), who sought tocomplete the Kantian program, each on his own idealist path;and, on the other, to a "nonphilosophy" htphilosophieT or"unphilosophy" Wnphilosophie] that claimed that Kant's criti-cal philosophy had made room for a separate Philosophy ofFaith. alongside the Philosophy of Reason, and was discussedmost notably by Johann Georg Hammann (1730-1788),

Immanuel Kant, Kritik der mizzen Vernon ft, A 298, in Kant:i gesammelte

Sehriftem ed. Koniglich PreuSische Akademie der Wissenschaften, ErsteAbtheilung, vol. 4 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), p. 191.

t Not to be confused with the understanding of nonphilosophy as a phi-losophy of life (Lebensphilosophie), attributed to Kierkegaard, Marx, andNietzsche by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which filled the philosophical voidcreated by Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (which Merleau-Ponty consideredthe first work of nonphilosophy); see his "Moglichkeit der Philosophie" and"Philosophie and Nicht-Philosophie seit Hegel," in Maurice Merleau-Pon-ty, Vorlesungen, vol. 1, trans. Alexandre Metraux (Berlin/New York: Walterde Gruyter, 1973), pp. 110 and 237. Cf. also Francois Laruelle's notionof nonphilosophy as an autonomous, non-normative theory of science andphilosophy, which he defines as a "theoretical, practical, and critical dis-course, distinct from philosophy without being a metaphilosophy." Fran-cois Laruelle, Dictionnaire de la non philosophy (Paris: Editions Kime, 1998;English translation by Taylor Adkins, published online, http://nsrnicek.googlepages.corn/DictionaryNonPhilosophy.pdf (accessed November 25,2009). See also Francois Laruelle, Philosophie et iwn-philosophie (Liege andBrussels: Pierre Mardaga, 1989).

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819)," and Carl ,Eschenmayer (1768-1852).

Schelling's path, on which he first trod alongsidebut by 1801 increasingly on his own, was that of a "sitive physics" or Philosophy of Nature that sought to sc"riddle of the world Pas Kithsel der Welt], the questioris the Absolute able to come out of itself and posit aopposite itself?" His path led from the Absolute to thnatural world: "As long as we presuppose matter, thatsume that it precedes our cognizance, it is not evento fully understand what we are talking about. Rathgroping blindly among incomprehensible concepts, insus ask what we understand and can understand origOrig. Manly we only understand ourselves, and because tEonly two conclusions, one that makes matter the primspirit, and the other that makes spirit the principle offor those of us seeking to understand ourselves, there ronly one assertion: not that spirit arises from matter Imatter arises from spirit:* Schelling propagated an intoal intuition that enables us to imagine the infinite orlute within ourselves independent of sensate perceptirational thought.

In 1799 the influential Imelligenzhlatt of the ErLinteratur Zeitung hailed Schelling as "one of our trulythinkers and a true universal genius" for having the "gigenious idea of extending transcendental idealism toof the whole of knowledge, that is, of establishing that sysonly in general but in deed." It designated Schelling al,

It was Jacobi who accused Kantianism of "nihilism" and titfamous quip: "Without the presupposition [of the 'thing in itself`],able to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stayF. H. Jacobi, David Hume fiber den Glauben oder 'dealt:mins and Read

Gespriich (David Hume on Faith or Idealism and Realism: A Cons(Breslau: Gottlieb Loewe, 1787), p. 223.

t F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophisehe Briefe fiber Dognzati .smus and A(Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, 1795), inWilhelm Joseph von Scheiings Siimmliehe Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schellliigart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag 185611., vol. 1, p.hereafter).

F W. J. Schelling, Ahhandliingen zur Erlauterung des Idenlz.,nue e

schaftslehre (Explicatory Essay of the Idealism in the Science of Kr1796-97), S W I: 373-74.

— VIII — — I X —

explained our a priori knowledge of the phenomenalId justified the beliefs in that which lies beyond allIce — God, freedom, and immortality by distin-; between a knowable phenomenal world and the1-themselves, which we cannot know. Understand-lot give us a priori knowledge of the things-in-them-nly of appearances. Reason seeks to go beyond whate but stops short of the intuition of the Absolute: "Allwledge starts with the senses, proceeds from there toaiding, and ends with reason beyond which no high-y is found for elaborating the matter of intuition andit under the highest unity of thought.'

ite Kant's claim of having finally settled the debateReason and Faith with his Critique, the discussions

r from over. Kant's Critique led, on the one hand, toaphysical idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–iiedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), andWilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), who sought toe the Kantian program, each on his own idealist path;the other, to a "nonphilosophy" (Ntc. htphilosophie) t or

c)sophy" [Unphilosophtel that claimed that Kant's criti-osophy had made room for a separate Philosophy ofongside the Philosophy of Reason, and was discussedotably by Johann Georg Hammann (1730-1788),

anuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 298, in Kant:, gesanznzelte

ed. Koniglich Preul,ische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Ersterig. vol. 4 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), p. 191.to be confused with the understanding of nonphilosophy as a phi-of life (I,bensphilarophie), attributed to Kierkegaard, Marx, ande by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which filled the philosophical void

Lv Hegel's Phenomenolryy of Spirit (which Merleau-Ponty consideredcork of nonphilosophy); see his "Moglichkeit der Philosophie" andphie and Nicht-Philosophie seit Hegel," in Maurice Merleau-Pon-uagen, vol. 1, trans. Alexandre Metraux (Berlin/New York: Walterter, 1973), pp. 110 and 237. Cf. also Francois Laruelle's notionLilosophy as an autonomous, non-normative theory of science andhy, which he defines as a "theoretical, practical, and critical dis-listinct from philosophy without being a metaphilosophy." Fran-

uelle. Dietionnaire de la non philosophy (Paris: Editions Kime, 1998;translation by Taylor Adkins, published online, http://nsmicek.iges.com/DictionaryNonPhilosophy.pdf (accessed November 25,

fee also Francois Laruelle, Philosophie et non-philosophie (Liege and

Pierre Mardaga, 1989).

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819),* and Carl AugustEschenmayer (1768-1852).

Schelling's path, on which he first trod alongside Fichtebut by 1801 increasingly on his own, was that of a "specula-tive physics" or Philosophy of Nature that sought to solve the"riddle of the world [das Riithsel der Welt], the question: Howis the Absolute able to come out of itself and posit a worldopposite itself?" His path led from the Absolute to the finitenatural world: "As long as we presuppose matter, that is, as-sume that it precedes our cognizance, it is not even possibleto fully understand what we are talking about. Rather thangroping blindly among incomprehensible concepts, instead letus ask what we understand and can understand originarily.Ortg inarily we only understand ourselves, and because there areonly two conclusions, one that makes matter the principle ofspirit, and the other that makes spirit the principle of matter,for those of us seeking to understand ourselves, there remainsonly one assertion: not that spirit arises from matter but that

matter arises from Schelling propagated an intellectu-al intuition that enables us to imagine the infinite or Abso-lute within ourselves independent of sensate perception andrational thought.

In 1799 the influential Intelkg enzblatt of the Erlanger Lit-

teratur Zeitung hailed Schelling as "one of our truly first-ratethinkers and a true universal genius" for having the "great, in-genious idea of extending transcendental idealism to a system

of the whole of knowledge, that is, of establishing that system notonly in general but in deed." It designated Schelling alongside

It was Jacobi who accused Kantianism of "nihilism" and uttered thefamous quip: "Without the presupposition [of the 'thing in itself'], I was un-able to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stay within it."E H. Jacobi, David Hume fiber den Glauben oder Idealismus and Realismus. Ein

Gesprach (David Hume on Faith or Idealism and Realism: A Conversation)(Breslau: Gottlieb Loewe, 1787), p. 223.

t F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophisehe Briefe fiber Dognzatisnzus and Kriticismus

(Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, 1795), in Friedrich

Wilhelm Joseph von Schell(' Siimnzliehe Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schellling (Stutt-gart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag 1856ff., vol. 1, p. 310 (SW

hereafter).1 E W. J. Schelling, Abhandlungen zur Erlauterung des IdealLnnus der WI'ssen-

schaftslehre (Explicatory Essay of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge,1796-97), SW1:373-74.

— X 7 — XI —

Kant as one of the most important philosophers of nature:"Whoever lays claim to the title of Naturphilosaph must studythe writings of these two scholars [Kant and Schelling]."

Eschenmayer, a philosopher as well as a physician, soughtto ground the natural sciences, especially chemistry (which,still bearing the stain of alchemy, had been singled out byKant as not yet having achieved the status of an apodicticscience) in Kant's theory of dynamics by way of two origi-nary forces attraction and repulsion — that produce vari-ous gradations of matter or potencies.t He was praised earlyon by Schelling for applying the Kantian principles of dy-namics "in genuine philosophical spirit [mit iicht-philosophiS ch-

em Geiste]" to empirical natural sciences.*Eschenmayer, with whom Schelling maintained a lasting

friendship that was uncharacteristically warm and collegial,provided Schelling's philosophical development with crucialimpetus along the way. Each publication by Schelling wascountered with a corresponding article or letter by Eschen-mayer, who carefully dissected Schelling's theories and oftenpointed out inconsistencies in his arguments. The "sharp-witted" (scheufsinninge)* Eschenmayer was Schelling's mostdiligent and constructive critic.

For Schelling, Philosophy and Religion represented a new ap-proach to the goal initially set in 1801 with his Representa -ha' n of My System of Philosophy, the first system of philosophyhe had conceived entirely on his own, independent of Fichte,after having seen "the light in philosophy," which led him tophilosophize, as it were, out of the Absolute itself: "All phi-losophizing begins, and has always begun, with the idea ofthe Absolute come alive." (16) In Philosophy and Religion, hetackled the problem of the manifestation of the finite world

Cited in Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumuni, trans. E. Forster and M.Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 275n89.

t C.A. Eschenmayer, Satze ails der Natur-Metaphysik auf chant:ft-be and

iciniscbe Gegenstande angeu'andt (Propositions from the Metaphysics of Na-ture Applied to Chemical and Medical Topics) (Tubingen: Jakob FriedrichHeerbrandt, 1797).

E W. J. Schelling, Meen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Ideas for a Philoso-phy of Nature, 1797/1802), SW2:313.

§ E W. J. Schelling, Darstelluv meines Systems der Philosophie (Representa-tion of My System of Philosophy, 1801), SW4:108.

and human freedom by evoking Plato and Spinoza, yetown admission he did not reach his goal "with comp)terminateness" until 1809 when he published his PhitaInvestigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. *

While Schelling's System of 1801 was only the firs'merous works to construct an objective idealism, thementals of the System Schelling conceived during hi;mirabilis remained valid until his death. As Horst Fulwrites, ,Fichte's work "challenged him to come into kto draw up his system, which, in all its transformatiwould never again abandon." Schelling regarded hi:sophu. Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom athesis of both his System and Relig in and Philosophy; helater write that it was in the latter work that he finallcame the rigidity [Starrheit] of Fichte's philosophy.*

As Schelling explains in the preliminary remarks toand Philosophy, a second work in the Platonic style ofsophical conversation was to follow the publication cor On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things, § which Ipeared in 1802. "External circumstances," not furtheirated on by Schelling, prohibited the completion of saiand in light of Eschenmayer's publication of Philoodp

Transition to Nonphilosophy 1 in 1803, Schelling decide(

* "The author has confined himself to investigations into thephy of nature ever since the first presentation of his system (in ti

of Speculative Physics), the continuation of which was unfortunatrupted by external circumstances until a new beginning was maybsophy and Religion — which, admittedly, remained unclear due toof its presentation. Therefore, the present essay is the first inauthor puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy withdeterminateness... Up to now the author has nowhere expresseregarding the main points, the freedom of will, good and evil, peetc. (except in Philosophy and Religion)." E W. J. Schelling, Phihi op

tersuchungen &her dos Wesel' der Frei heit (Philosophical InvestigationEssence of Human Freedom, 1809), SW7:333-37.

t E W.I. Schelling: Briefe and Dokiinzente, ed. Horst FuhrmansBouvier u. Co., 1962), vol. 1, p. 231.

F W. J. Schelling, Einlething in die Philosophie der Mythologic (

tion to the Philosophy of Mythology, 1856), SW11:465 n.

§ E W. J. Schelling, Bruno oder fiber dos gOttliche and natiirlkbe

Daige. Ein Gespriich, SW 4.

1 C. A Eschenmayer, Die Philosophic in ibrem Uebergang zur Niclr4

(Erlangen: Walthersche Kunst- and Buchhandlung, 1803).

— X 7 — X I —

; one of the most important philosophers of nature:fer lays claim to the title of Naturphilosaph must studytings of these two scholars [Kant and Schelling]."°enmayer, a philosopher as well as a physician, soughtnd the natural sciences, especially chemistry (which,;ring the stain of alchemy, had been singled out bys not yet having achieved the status of an apodictic) in Kant's theory of dynamics by way of two origi-rces — attraction and repulsion — that produce vali-dations of matter or potencies.* He was praised earlyichelling for applying the Kantian principles of dy-"in genuine philosophical spirit [mit ticht-philosophisch-

]" to empirical natural sciences.*enmayer, with whom Schelling maintained a lastinghip that was uncharacteristically warm and collegial,d Schelling's philosophical development with crucial5 along the way. Each publication by Schelling wased with a corresponding article or letter by Eschen-who carefully dissected Schelling's theories and oftenI out inconsistencies in his arguments. The "sharp-' (zcharfsinninge)* Eschenmayer was Schelling's mostand constructive critic.

;shelling, Philosophy and Religion represented a new ap-to the goal initially set in 1801 with his Representa-

Vy System of Philosophy, the first system of philosophyconceived entirely on his own, independent of Fichte,wing seen "the light in philosophy," which led him tophize, as it were, out of the Absolute itself: "All phi-zing begins, and has always begun, with the idea ofsolute come alive." (16) In Philosophy and Religion, hethe problem of the manifestation of the finite world

in Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumunz, trans. E. Forster and M.:ambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 275n89.Eschenmayer, Satze aim der Natur-Metaphysik auf chenzisehe and ',zed-

;egenshinde angewandt (Propositions from the Metaphysics of Na-lied to Chemical and Medical Topics) (Tubingen: Jakob Friedrichbdt, 1797).J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophic der Natur (Ideas for a Philoso-attire, 1797/1802), SW2:313.J. Schelling, Darstellang menses Systems der Philosophie (Representa-ly System of Philosophy, 1801), SW4:108.

and human freedom by evoking Plato and Spinoza, yet by hisown admission he did not reach his goal "with complete de-terminateness" until 1809 when he published his Philosophical

Investrg atty. ns into the Essence of Human Freedom. *

While Schelling's System of 1801 was only the first of nu-merous works to construct an objective idealism, the funda-mentals of the System Schelling conceived during his annulmirahilis remained valid until his death. As Horst Fuhrmanswrites, ,Fichte's work "challenged him to come into his own,to draw up his system, which, in all its transformations, hewould never again abandon." 1. Schelling regarded his Philo-

sophical Investig atul. ns into the Essence of Hunan Freedom as a syn-thesis of both his System and Religionn and Philosophy; he wouldlater write that it was in the latter work that he finally over-came the rigidity [Starrheit] of Fichte's philosophy.*

As Schelling explains in the preliminary remarks to Religionand Philosophy, a second work in the Platonic style of a philo-sophical conversation was to follow the publication of Bruno

or On the Divine and Natural Principle qf Things, which had ap-peared in 1802. "External circumstances," not further elabo-rated on by Schelling, prohibited the completion of said work,and in light of Eschenmayer's publication of Philosophy in Its

Transition to Nonphilosophyl in 1803, Schelling decided to use

° "The author has confined himself to investigations into the philoso-phy of nature ever since the first presentation of his system (in the Journal

of Speculative Physics), the continuation of which was unfortunately inter-rupted by external circumstances until a new beginning was made in Phi-

hmophy and Religion — which, admittedly, remained unclear due to the faultof its presentation. Therefore, the present essay is the first in which theauthor puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy with completedeterminateness... Up to now the author has nowhere expressed himselfregarding the main points, the freedom of will, good and evil, personality,etc. (except in Philosophy and Religion)." E W. J. Schelling, Phihmophische

tersuchangen ;Vier dad Wesen der Freiheit (Philosophical Investigations into theEssence of Human Freedom, 1809), SW7:333-37.

I' F. W.I. Schelling: Briefs and Dokumente, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn: H.Bouvier u. Co., 1962), vol. 1, p. 231.

t F. W. J. Schelling, Einleitang in die Philosophie der Mythologie (Introduc-tion to the Philosophy of Mythology, 1856), SW 11:465 n.

§ E W. J. Schelling, Bruno oder iiber dud giktliche and natiirliche Princip der

Dinge. Ein Gespriich, SW4.

I C. A Eschenmayer, Die Philosophie is ihrenz Uebeigoaq cam .1■It.chtphiGmophie

(Erlangen: Walthersche Kunst- and Buchhandlung, 1803).

— XII — — X III —

much of the same material for a new work. Because it is theonly work prior to the Philosophic' al Investig atui' ns that discussesthe issue of freedom of will, it is regarded as a precursor toSchelling's 1809 magnum opus on human freedom.

We now know that the abandoned work that was to followBruno is most likely the fragmentary and posthumously pub-lished Clara or On Nature's Connect-co' n to the Spirit World,* alsowritten as a series of conversations, whose "spiritual" naturemay have been prompted not by Karoline Schelling's deathin 1809, as had long been assumed, but rather by the deathof her daughter from a previous marriage, Auguste (Gustel)'lamer, in 1800. 1

With his book, Eschenmayer sought to accomplish fornonphilosophy what Fichte and Schelling did for philosophy.His criticism of Schelling boiled down to the questions of howthe Absolute in Schelling's system can come out of itself andbecome difference. In Eschenmayer's view, this question can-not be answered by philosophical reflection, only by a Phi-losophy of Faith: "That higher act, which encompasses all butthat which to include into philosophical reflection would bea fruitless effort, is faith, and it alone resolves the entire fieldof speculation in the most perfect manner by limiting volitionand cognizance but is itself unlimited and will remain unlim-ited for eternity."t

Schelling responded to Eschenmayer's criticism in Philoso-

phy and Religion by proposing a new theory, that of the falling-away [Abfall] of the finite world from the infinite by way of aqualitative leap: "There is no continuous transition from theAbsolute to the actual; the origin of the phenomenal world isconceivable only as a complete falling-away from absolute-ness by means of a leap [Sprung]." (26)

The theory of a falling-away forms the core of Schelling'sargument: the original sin is not the Fall of Man but rather

° F W J. Schelling, Clara oder Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geioterwelt,

ed. K. E A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1862).t For a summary in English of recent scholarship on the issue of dating

Clara, see Fiona Steinkamp's introduction in Clara or, On Nature:, Connection

to the Spirit World (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2002), xiii—xvii.Eschenmayer, Die Philosophie in ihrenz Uebergang zur Nichtphilosophie, par.

76.

Creation itself, the fall of the finite world from the inor Absolute. (31) The radical approach of Philosophy a,lig' ion consisted in Schelling's redefinition of his Philo:of Nature in terms of a Philosophy of History: "Godabsolute harmony of necessity and freedom, and thi:mony cannot be revealed in individual destinies buthistory as a whole; consequently, only history as a wla revelation of God — and then only a progressivel y

ing revelation ... History is an epic composed in theof God. It has two main parts: one depicting manlegress from its center to its farthest point of displacethe other, its return. The former is, as it were, history':the latter, its Odyssey. In the one, the direction is centriin the other, it becomes centripetal. In this way, thepurpose of the phenomenal world reveals itself in hir(44) The final cause of history is the "reconciliationfa 1 i ng- away. " (50)

But Eschenmayer remained unconvinced of Schenew solution. He wrote to Schelling's friend JohannWagner: "Schelling has saved himself just as little wiidea of a falling-away (in "Philosophie and Religion"as with his other attempts.' Eschenmayer and Schellintinued to be divided on one major point, which Eschensummed up to Wagner: "Here is the point where I parSchelling. For him God is the Absolute, for me the Abs(the after-image [1Vachbild] of reason, and God is beyond

For Schelling there is no need for a separate Philcof Faitht or nonphilosophy in order to discuss the coof God, freedom, and immortality: "Any philosopherbe weary of not gaining a much clearer cognition ofsame subjects through knowledge and in knowledgwhat emerges for Eschenmayer from faith and premor(8-9) Schelling stayed true to Kant's spirit by rejecti

° Letter from Eschenmayer to J. J. Wagner, November 26,F. W J. Schelling: Briefe and Dolcumente, vol. 1, p. 320 n.

t Letter from Eschenmayer to J. J. Wagner, April 5, 1805, in ibHe had already written in 1801 to Fichte, in rather terse to

"you have been forced ...to transfer [the Absolute] into the sphereof which, in my opinion, it can be no more a question in philosoph.

is in geometry." Letter from Schelling to J. G. Fichte, October 3.F. W. Schelling: Briefe and Dokumente, vol. 2, pp. 348-56.

— XII — — XIII —

Creation itself, the fall of the finite world from the infiniteor Absolute. (31) The radical approach of Philosophy and Re-ligion consisted in Schelling's redefinition of his Philosophyof Nature in terms of a Philosophy of History: "God is theabsolute harmony of necessity and freedom, and this har-mony cannot be revealed in individual destinies but only inhistory as a whole; consequently, only history as a whole isa revelation of God — and then only a progressively evolv-ing revelation ... History is an epic composed in the mindof God. It has two main parts: one depicting mankind'segress from its center to its farthest point of displacement;the other, its return. The former is, as it were, history's Iliad;the latter, its Odyssey. In the one, the direction is centrifugal;in the other, it becomes centripetal. In this way, the greatpurpose of the phenomenal world reveals itself in history."(44) The final cause of history is the "reconciliation of thefalling-away." (50)

But Eschenmayer remained unconvinced of Schelling'snew solution. He wrote to Schelling's friend Johann JacobWagner: "Schelling has saved himself just as little with hisidea of a falling-away (in "Philosophie and Religion" 1804)as with his other attempts." Eschenmayer and Schelling con-tinued to be divided on one major point, which Eschenmayersummed up to Wagner: "Here is the point where I part withSchelling. For him God is the Absolute, for me the Absolute isthe after-image [1Vachbild] of reason, and God is beyond it."t

For Schelling there is no need for a separate Philosophyof Faith* or nonphilosophy in order to discuss the conceptsof God, freedom, and immortality: "Any philosopher wouldbe weary of not gaining a much clearer cognition of thosesame subjects through knowledge and in knowledge thanwhat emerges for Eschenmayer from faith and premonition."(8-9) Schelling stayed true to Kant's spirit by rejecting the

Letter from Eschenmayer to J. J. Wagner, November 26, 1804, inF. W. J Scbelling: Briefe and Dokunzente, vol. 1, p. 320n.

t Letter from Eschenmayer to J. J. Wagner, April 5, 1805, in ibid.t He had already written in 1801 to Fichte, in rather terse tone, that

"you have been forced... to transfer [the Absolute] into the sphere of faith,of which, in my opinion, it can be no more a question in philosophy than itis in geometry." Letter from Schelling to J. G. Fichte, October 3, 1801, inF. W. J. Schelling: Briefe and Dokanzente, vol. 2, pp. 348-56.

f the same material for a new work. Because it is theirk prior to the Philosophical Investig attn. ns that discussese of freedom of will, it is regarded as a precursor tokg's 1809 magnum opus on human freedom.bow know that the abandoned work that was to followmost likely the fragmentary and posthumously pub-

:Linz or On Nature's Connection to the Spirit World: alsoas a series of conversations, whose "spiritual" natureve been prompted not by Karoline Schelling's death1, as had long been assumed, but rather by the deathlaughter from a previous marriage, Auguste (Gustel)r, in 1800!

his book, Eschenmayer sought to accomplish forlosophy what Fichte and Schelling did for philosophy.ticism of Schelling boiled down to the questions of howsolute in Schelling's system can come out of itself anddifference. In Eschenmayer's view, this question can-

answered by philosophical reflection, only by a Phi-r of Faith: "That higher act, which encompasses all buthich to include into philosophical reflection would beess effort, is faith, and it alone resolves the entire fieldulation in the most perfect manner by limiting volitiongruza- nce but is itself unlimited and will remain unlim-- eternity."*elling responded to Eschenmayer's criticism in Mom-

►Rtligion by proposing a new theory, that of the falling-41!Lz. Ill of the finite world from the infinite by way of alive leap: "There is no continuous transition from theIte to the actual; the origin of the phenomenal world isvable only as a complete falling-away from absolute-v means of a leap [Sprung]." (26)theory of a falling-away forms the core of Schelling's

ent: the original sin is not the Fall of Man but rather

6r- J. Schelling, Clara oder Zusammenbang der Natar nzit der Geigerwelt,

A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1862).

• a summary in English of recent scholarship on the issue of datingne Fiona Steinkamp's introduction in Clara or, On Nature's Connection

irit World (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2002), xiii—xvii.lenmayer, Die Philosophie in ihrenz Uebergang zur Niebtpbilompbie, par.

— XIV — — XV —

idea of a separate Philosophy of Faith. Kant had argued forjust such a unity of philosophy and religion in the preface tohis 1794 edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason:

"Otherwise one would have two religions within each person,which is absurd, or one religion and one cult... both wouldhave to be shaken up so that they become mixed together fora short period of time, after which they would separate againlike oil and water, with the purely moral (the religion of rea-son) floating on top."

Schelling's Philosophy and Religion was written duringone of the most eventful periods of his life. In June of 1803Schelling finally married his longtime lover, Karoline Schle-gel, who had received permission from Carl August, Dukeof Saxe-Weimar to divorce her second husband, August Wil-helm Schlegel. At the time, Schelling, who was educated at aprestigious Protestant school, the Tubinger Stift (along withhis friends Hegel and Holderlin), was teaching philosophyat the predominantly Catholic university of Wiirzburg thathad attracted many followers of Jacobi and Jacob FriedrichFried, another declared enemy of Schelling. Consequently,Schelling's philosophy became the target of incessant attacks.As Xavier Tilliette writes, "by settling in Wurzburg, Schellingstirred up a hornet's nest." The sharp, polemic tone of Philoso-

phy and Religion, especially manifest in Schelling's preliminaryremarks, was not directed at his friend Eschenmayer but at"the horde of rowdy opponents" (4) led by two influentialhigh-school teachers from Munich, Kajetan Weiller and Ja-cob Salat, who, according to Tilliette, "dedicated their lives topillorying Schelling."* Horst Fuhrmans describes the attacksagainst Schelling in 1803 as a "furious drumfire": "In low-brow reviews and endless polemic commentaries and publica-tions, an assault was launched against the new 'obscurants'and 'mystics,' the 'hierophants of the new Eleusinian mystery

° Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blofSen Vernunft, in Immanuel Kant,Werkaudgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-kamp Verlag, 1982), 8:659-60.

t Xavier Tilliette, Biographie, trans. Susanne Schaper (Stuttgart:Klettt-Cotta, 2004), p. 145.

Ibid., p. 144.

cults' in order to defend against the advance or even vicuthe Romantic mindset."*

Schelling's little book on religion and philosophy, hovwas largely ignored, as Schelling himself noted in obconsternation in 1809. 1 Even today, his book is conside"hastily written and premature" response to EschenmIts reputation may have become tarnished early cSchelling's own admission of its faulty presentation. Inter to Eschenmayer, written shortly after he had sentcopy of his book, Schelling provided Eschenmayer withfications in regard to his definition of the Absolute: "Itbe necessary to improve upon my in many instancesexpressions as far as the main idea is concerned. Woufollowing exposition meet with your approval?"

The cruel judgment delivered in 1887 by Heinrich Iwho has been credited by Adorno with almost single-haly dealing the death blow to the German Romantic sounot help the stature of Schelling's book. In On the HL.tor3

ligwn and Philosophy in Germany, Heine writes, "Anno 180finally appeared to Herr Schelling, full-fledged, in hisentitled: Philosophy and Religion ... Here philosophy stopHerr Schelling, and poetry, that is to say, folly begins.'

Compared to Kant and Hegel, Schelling was pratunknown outside academia until the mid-1950s elGermany, and many of his works remained unread aitranslated for decades. Not until the centennial of hisin 1954 did Schelling receive attention by contemphilosophers, most notably by Karl Jaspers who cons

° F W.J. Briefe and Dokutnetzte, p. 297.t "Perhaps this essay will be granted the same respect and attent

Lung] that [unbidden followers and opponents] showed the earliertext, Phibvopby and Religion, by completely ignoring it." F. W. J. SPhilosophidche Unterduebungen fiber dad Wesen der menschlichen Fretbei

sophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom), SITTilliette, Schelling, p. 178.

§ Letter from Schelling to Eschenmayer, July 10, 1804. IrBriefe find Dokumente, p. 321 and below, p. 60.

I See Theodor W. Adorno, "Heine the Wound," in Nate,' to liten1, trans. S. W. Nicholsen (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991

00 Heinrich Heine, Zur Gedchiebte der Religion and Philodopbie in A(Halle: Otto Handel, 1887), pp. 117-18.

— XIV —

a separate Philosophy of Faith. Kant had argued fork a unity of philosophy and religion in the preface toI edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason:

hise one would have two religions within each person,s absurd, or one religion and one cult...both wouldbe shaken up so that they become mixed together forperiod of time, after which they would separate againand water, with the purely moral (the religion of rea-ating on top."Iling's Philosophy and Religion was written during:he most eventful periods of his life. In June of 1803lg finally married his longtime lover, Karoline Schle-o had received permission from Carl August, Duke-Weimar to divorce her second husband, August Wil-:hlegel. At the time, Schelling, who was educated at a'oous Protestant school, the Tiibinger Stift (along withnds Hegel and HOlderlin), was teaching philosophyxedominantly Catholic university of Wurzburg thatracted many followers of Jacobi and Jacob Friedrichanother declared enemy of Schelling. Consequently,rig's philosophy became the target of incessant attacks.ier Tilliette writes, "by settling in Wurzburg, Schellingup a hornet's nest."t The sharp, polemic tone of Philoso-

Religam, especially manifest in Schelling's preliminarys, was not directed at his friend Eschenmayer but atrde of rowdy opponents" (4) led by two influential!pool teachers from Munich, Kajetan Weiller and Ja-Lat, who, according to Tilliette, "dedicated their lives toing Schelling."t Horst Fuhrmans describes the attacksSchelling in 1803 as a "furious drumfire": "In low-

eviews and endless polemic commentaries and publica-m assault was launched against the new 'obscurants'vstics; the 'hierophants of the new Eleusinian mystery

Religion innerhalh der Grenzen der blofien Vernunft, in Immanuel Kant,

pale, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-trlag, 1982), 8:659-60.'ier Tilliette, Schelling: Biographie, trans. Susanne Schaper (Stuttgart:

otta, 2004), p. 145.I., p. 144.

— XV —

cults' in order to defend against the advance or even victory ofthe Romantic mindset."

Schelling's little book on religion and philosophy, however,was largely ignored, as Schelling himself noted in obviousconsternation in 1809. 1 Even today, his book is considered a"hastily written and premature" response to Eschenmayer.tIts reputation may have become tarnished early on bySchelling's own admission of its faulty presentation. In a let-ter to Eschenmayer, written shortly after he had sent him acopy of his book, Schelling provided Eschenmayer with clari-fications in regard to his definition of the Absolute: "It mightbe necessary to improve upon my in many instances faultyexpressions as far as the main idea is concerned. Would thefollowing exposition meet with your approval?"§

The cruel judgment delivered in 1887 by Heinrich Heine,who has been credited by Adorno with almost single-handed-ly dealing the death blow to the German Romantic soul,' didnot help the stature of Schelling's book. In On the HIStory qf Re-

m and Philosophy in Germany, Heine writes, "Anno 1804 Godfinally appeared to Herr Schelling, full-fledged, in his bookentitled: Philosophy and Religion Religion... Here philosophy stops withHerr Schelling, and poetry, that is to say, folly begins.'

Compared to Kant and Hegel, Schelling was practicallyunknown outside academia until the mid-1950s even inGermany, and many of his works remained unread and un-translated for decades. Not until the centennial of his deathin 1954 did Schelling receive attention by contemporaryphilosophers, most notably by Karl Jaspers who considered

° E W.I. Schelling: Briefe find Dokumente, p. 297.t "Perhaps this essay will be granted the same respect and attention [Ach-

tang] that [unbidden followers and opponents] showed the earlier relatedtext, Philosophy and Religion, by completely ignoring it." E W. J. Schelling,Philosophilche Untersuchungen libel. dad Wesen der menschlichen Freibeit (Philo-sophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom), SW7: 410n.

Tilliette, Schelling, p. 178.§ Letter from Schelling to Eschenmayer, July 10, 1804. In F. W. .1

Schelling: Brief( and Dokumente, p. 321 and below, p. 60.I See Theodor W. Adorno, "Heine the Wound," in Notes to Literature, vol.

1, trans. S.W. Nicholsen (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991)." Heinrich Heine, Zur Gescbichte der Religion iris Philosophie in Deutschland

(Halle: Otto Handel, 1887), pp. 117-18.

— XVI — — XVII —

Schelling an early existentialist. More recently, postmodernphilosophers have reclaimed Schelling° and even begun arehabilitation of the Absolute.t In the 1990s a renewed in-terest in the theological-philosophical disputes that lastedfor more than a decade at the end of the eighteenth- and thebeginning of the nineteenth century* has made Schelling'sPhilosophy and Religion an object of renewed scholarly inter-est, and in 2008 a new German-language critical edition ofthe work was published.* It seems that the time for Schellinghas finally arrived. As Hermann Braun, professor emeri-tus of philosophy at the Kirchliche Hochschule Wuppertal,announced in the Philosophm. che Rundschau in 1990, there is"a need for Schelling." 1

Schelling's works constitute a minor philosophy in the senseof Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's definition of a "mi-nor literature." But a minor literature does not come froma minor language; "it is rather that which minority con-structs within a major language."** According to Deleuze andGuattari, a minor literature is "always connected to its own

0 Most notably Slavoj 2ilek in his The Indivisible Renuzinder: An Essay on

Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996).t See especially Slavoj 2ilek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian

Legacy Wirth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2001); and Main Badiou, Being

and Event, trans. 0. Feltham (London: Continuum, 2006), Appendix 5(Meditation 33): "On Absoluteness."

t The so-called "Streit urn die gottlichen Dinge" (The Conflict Concern-ing Divine Things). See, especially, Der Streit tun die gifttlithen Dinge (1799-

1812), ed. W. Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999).§ E W. J. Schelling, Philosophie and Religion, ed. A. Denker and H. Za-

borowski (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2008), with essays byChristoph Asmuth, Christian Dantz, Alfred Denker, Walter E. Ehrhardt,Oliver Florig, and Holger Zaborowski.

Hermann Braun, "Ein Bediirfnis nach Schelling," Philosophische Rand-

schau 37 (1990).00 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,

trans. D. Polan (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986).if Ibid., p. 16

abolitu. m." It is a language "affected with a high coof deterritorialization ... [that] turns language into sonimpossible."*

Because of Schelling's determination to philaon the edge of the "originary abyss"(anfanglic. he Un,

i.e., in the face of the Absolute, his philosophy is aed — almost by default — with failure, with its own iibility. In wanting to complete Kant's philosophy, Scended up failing philosophy altogpther in an endstheory* by repeatedly tearing down his own achievJust as Kafka introduced the practice of writing asin his story The Penal Colony with the metaphor of a vapparatus, which was designed to inscribe the juonto the skin of the condemned-to-death but ultfailed, so Schelling attempted to philosophize outAbsolute itself in spite of its impossibility.

In his study of Schelling, Slavoj 2iiek describeslosopher as "a kind of 'vanishing mediator' beteIdealism of the Absolute and post-Hegelian universetude-temporality-contingency, that his thought — iomoment, as it were, in a flash — renders visible soithat was invisible beforehand and withdrew into invthereafter." 1 This description echoes Jean-Francois Lfamous definition of the postmodern as that which pt."the Nonrepresentable in presentation itself" by noing the "unrepresentable to be put forward as thecontents" while retaining form for "solace and pleaBy understanding postmodernism as a condition ratlas a historically defined period of time, as Lyotard

Ibid., p. 6.t Ibid., p. 16.

Schelling, Phi losophifehe Untersuehungen fiber das Weden der InFreiheit, SW7:408.

§ On the endgame of Idealism, see Idealism and the Endoame

Three Essays by E W. Schelling, trans. and ed. T. Pfau (Albany:%,ersity of New York Press, 1994.)

2iiek, The Indivisible Remainder, p. 8.00 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on

Theory and History of Literature, vol. 10, trans. G. BenninguMassumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 81.

ti- Ibid., p. 79.

— XVI —

"mg an early existentialist. More recently, postmodernophers have reclaimed Schelling* and even begun alitation of the Absolute.t In the 1990s a renewed in-in the theological-philosophical disputes that lastedre than a decade at the end of the eighteenth- and thering of the nineteenth century* has made Schelling'sphy anti Religion an object of renewed scholarly inter-d in 2008 a new German-language critical edition ofork was published.* It seems that the time for Schellingsally arrived. As Hermann Braun, professor emeri-philosophy at the Kirchliche Hochschule Wuppertal,need in the Philodophidche Rundschan in 1990, there isI for Schelling." 1

ng's works constitute a minor philosophy in the sensees Deleuze and Felix Guattari's definition of a "mi--nature." But a minor literature does not come from3r language; "it is rather that which minority con-within a major language."tt According to Deleuze andxi, a minor literature is "always connected to itd own

it notably Slavoj 2iiek in his The Indivisible Remaimier: An Essay on

and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996).especially Slavoj 2iiek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian'orth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2001); and Alain Badiou, Beingt. trans. 0. Feltham (London: Continuum, 2006), Appendix 5tion 33): "On Absoluteness."so-called "Streit urn die gottlichen Dinge" (The Conflict Concern-s Things). See, especially, Der Streit urn die giittLben Dinge (1799-L \V Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999).:J. Schelling, Philosophic and Religion, ed. A. Denker and H. Za-i (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2008), with essays by

Asmuth, Christian Dantz, Alfred Denker, Walter E. Ehrhardt,lorig, and Holger Zaborowski.mann Braun, "Ein Bediirfnis nach Schelling," Philosophische Rand-

(1990).

les Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,

. Parisi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986).p. 16

— XVII —

abolition."" It is a language "affected with a high coefficentof deterritorialization ... [that] turns language into somethingimpossible."t

Because of Schelling's determination to philosophizeon the edge of the "originary abyss"(anfangliche Ungrund),*

i.e., in the face of the Absolute, his philosophy is associat-ed — almost by default — with failure, with its own impossi-bility. In wanting to complete Kant's philosophy, Schellingended up failing philosophy altogether in an endgame oftheory* by repeatedly tearing down his own achievements.Just as Kafka introduced the practice of writing as failurein his story The Penal Colony with the metaphor of a writing-apparatus, which was designed to inscribe the judgmentonto the skin of the condemned-to-death but ultimatelyfailed, so Schelling attempted to philosophize out of theAbsolute itself in spite of its impossibility.

In his study of Schelling, Slavoj 2iiek describes the phi-losopher as "a kind of 'vanishing mediator' between theIdealism of the Absolute and post-Hegelian universe of fini-tude-temporality-contingency, that his thought — for a briefmoment, as it were, in a flash — renders visible somethingthat was invisible beforehand and withdrew into invisibilitythereafter." 1 This description echoes Jean-Francois Lyotard'sfamous definition of the postmodern as that which puts forth"the Nonrepresentable in presentation itself" by not allow-ing the "unrepresentable to be put forward as the missingcontents" while retaining form for "solace and pleasure.'By understanding postmodernism as a condition rather thanas a historically defined period of time, as Lyotard does,tt

o Ibid., p. 6.

t Ibid., p. 16.Schelling, Phi losophische Untersuchungen fiber dad Wean der menschlichen

Freiheit, SW7:408.

§ On the endgame of Idealism, see Idealism and the Endgame of Theory:

Three Essays by F. W.1. Schelling, trans. and ed. T. Pfau (Albany: State Uni-versity of New York Press, 1994.)

2iiek, The Indivisible Remainder, p. 8.** Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.

Theory and History of Literature, vol. 10, trans. G. Bennington and B.Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 81.

tt Ibid., p. 79.

— XVIII — — XIX —

Schelling could arguable be regarded as a postmodern phi-losopher because he put forward the Absolute as the un-thinkable, as the abyss of that prior to which we cannot think[dad Unvordenkhc. her in philosophy itself: "In presupposing amerely mediated knowledge of the Absolute (irrespective ofhow the mediation occurs), the Absolute in philosophy canonly appear as something that is presumed in order that itcan be philosophized about." (16)

Rather than executing a somersault that would landhim safely on the ground, with one foot on reason and theother on faith, as advocated by Jacobi with his rialto mortale

analogy,t Schelling attempts a reverse (premodern) leap intothe Absolute within philosophy in order to initiate a "reverseformation [Zuriickbildung] of difference into oneness" (33)that, like Kierkegaard's later existential leap to faith, is adecisive leap in the face of certain failure.

As 2isiek notes, the deterritorialized philosophy of Schel-ling speaks with three tongues: "the language of speculativeidealism; the language of anthropomorphic-mystical theoso-phy; the post-idealist language of contingency and finitude.The paradox, of course, is that it was hid very 'regressu. m' from

pure philosophic' al idealism to pre-modern theosophical problematic

which enables him to overtake modernity itself."Schelling resembles Husserl's Selbstdenker, an autono-

mous thinker who does not seek solace in his system butrather reinvents himself at every turn by articulating thelimits of philosophy, its possibilities and its confines: "Onlysecondary thinkers, who in truth should not be calledphilosophers, are consoled by their definitions, beating todeath with their word-concepts the problematic telos of phi-losophizing. In that obscure "knowledge," and in the word-concepts of the formulae, the historical is concealed; it is,

* Cf. E W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung (Philosophy of Revela-tion, 1858), SW14: 347: "The existence prior to which we cannot think Pas

unpordenkliche Existirende] precedes all concepts."t Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Ober die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den

Herrn Moses Mendelsohn (Breslau: Gottlieb Lowe, 1785).t See also my The Genius Decision: The Extriwrdimzry and the Postmodern

Condition (Putnam, Conn.: Spring Publications, 2004), part 2, chap. 3:"Kierkegaard's Leap."

§ 2iiek, The Indivisible Remainder, p. 8.

according to its own proper sense, the spiritual inhof him who philosophizes; and in the same way, ofhe understands the others in whose company, infriendship and enmity, he philosophizes ... His hpicture, in part made by himself and in part takhis 'poetic invention of the history of philosophy.'and does not remain fixed — that he knows; and v'invention' serves him and can serve him in under;himself and his aim."°

Schelling was a thinker who, in the words oflosopher and naturalist Henrik Steffens (1773-18of his most noted students, "boldly and menacingthe entire army of a fainting epoch." For SchellinElosophize meant to abandon all hope, all nostalgia:wants to truly philosophize has to let go of all hopsire, all nostalgia; he must not want anything, 11anything; he must feel simple and poor, give up evein order to gain everything. It is a difficult step, difas it were, depart from the last shore:*

A Note about the Translation

The following translation follows the first editionsophie. and Religum, published in Tubingen in 1804Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, rather than the 1860 veeluded in the sixth volume of Schelling's Siinuntlu. 1

which was edited by his son, Karl Friedrich August S.While there are no textual differences, the newer edsome of the typographical eccentricities of SchellirIn general, the following translation has sought to

* Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and 7tal Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, Ill.: North•esPress, 1970), pp. 394-95.

t Wilhelm Weischedel, Die philosophische Hintertreppe (Munich:Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975), p. 201.

E W. J. Schelling, Ueber die Natur der Philosophic all Wissensch

Nature of Philosophy as Science, 1821), SW9:218.

— XVIII —

ig could arguable be regarded as a postmodern phi-T because he put forward the Absolute as the un-►e, as the abyss of that prior to which we cannot thinkivrdenklic. her in philosophy itself: "In presupposing amediated knowledge of the Absolute (irrespective ofe mediation occurs), the Absolute in philosophy can►pear as something that is presumed in order that itphilosophized about." (16)ler than executing a somersault that would landrely on the ground, with one foot on reason and then faith, as advocated by Jacobi with his salt° mortale

Schelling attempts a reverse (premodern) leap intosolute within philosophy in order to initiate a "reverseion [Zuriickbildung] of difference into oneness" (33)ke Kierkegaard's later existential leap to faith, is ae leap in the face of certain failure.*.tiiek notes, the deterritorialized philosophy of Schel-eaks with three tongues: "the language of speculativen; the language of anthropomorphic-mystical theoso-e post-idealist language of contingency and finitude.radox, of course, is that it was his very `regressu. nz' from

ilomphu:' al idealism to pre-modern theosophical problematic

whit., him to overtake modernity itself."

elling resembles Husserl's Selkudenker, an autono-:hinker who does not seek solace in his system butreinvents himself at every turn by articulating thepf philosophy, its possibilities and its confines: "Onlylary thinkers, who in truth should not be calledThers, are consoled by their definitions, beating toKith their word-concepts the problematic telos of phi-izing. In that obscure "knowledge," and in the word-as of the formulae, the historical is concealed; it is,

F W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung (Philosophy of Revela-i8), SW14:347: "The existence prior to which we cannot think Pas

ache Eaifitirende] precedes all concepts."drich Heinrich Jacobi, Ober die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den

41/4-stlfendetwohn (Breslau: Gottlieb Lowe, 1785).also my The Genius Decision: The Ertraordimzry and the Postmodern

I (Putnam, Conn.: Spring Publications, 2004), part 2, chap. 3:gaard's Leap."ek, The ladieieible Remainder, p. 8.

— XIX —

according to its own proper sense, the spiritual inheritanceof him who philosophizes; and in the same way, obviously,he understands the others in whose company, in criticalfriendship and enmity, he philosophizes... His historicalpicture, in part made by himself and in part taken over,his 'poetic invention of the history of philosophy,' has notand does not remain fixed — that he knows; and yet every'invention' serves him and can serve him in understandinghimself and his aim.'

Schelling was a thinker who, in the words of the phi-losopher and naturalist Henrik Steffens (1773-1845), oneof his most noted students, "boldly and menacingly facedthe entire army of a fainting epoch." For Schelling, to phi-losophize meant to abandon all hope, all nostalgia: "He whowants to truly philosophize has to let go of all hope, all de-sire, all nostalgia; he must not want anything, not knowanything; he must feel simple and poor, give up everythingin order to gain everything. It is a difficult step, difficult to,as it were, depart from the last shore."*

A Note ahout the Translation

The following translation follows the first edition of Philo-

dophte. and Religazn, published in Tubingen in 1804 by J. G.Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, rather than the 1860 version in-cluded in the sixth volume of Schelling's Siimmtltc. he Werke,

which was edited by his son, Karl Friedrich August Schelling.While there are no textual differences, the newer edition lostsome of the typographical eccentricities of Schelling's time.In general, the •following translation has sought to preserve

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcenden-

tal Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ.Press, 1970), pp. 394-95.

f Wilhelm Weischedel, Die philosophische Hintertreppe (Munich: DeutscherTaschenbuch Verlag, 1975), p. 201.

E W. J. Schelling, Heber die Natar der Philosophie at, Wissenschaft (On theNature of Philosophy as Science, 1821), SW9:218.

— XX — — XXI —

Schelling's language, which is considerably richer and morenuanced than today's, without sacrificing readability.

Dealing with a text that is more than two-hundred yearsold presents formidable challenges even to a native reader.For this reason, I regularly consulted Grimms' Deutsches

Warterbuch* to ascertain the historical usage and meanings ofcertain words. For those familiar with Schelling's terminol-ogy I have included a German-English glossary.

Two translated terms require discussion here: Einbildungand Einheit. Einbildung or Ein -Bildung, commonly translated as"imagination," is one of the more challenging of Schelling'sterms to render into English. It combines image (Bild) andeducation (Bildung) with the concept of Ea zheit (oneness oridentity), suggesting an imaginative becoming-one througha process of formation. Thus, at times, Schelling also refersto this as In-Eb zs -Bildung. ± Coleridge, arguably the most dili-gent among Schelling's English readers, noticed Schelling's"unitive" use of Einbildung and its relation to Ea ?bed and ap-propriated it for his Bibliographic Literaru. z, even coining a newword for it: "esemplastic," meaning "to mold into one." I havechosen to translate Einbildung as "imaginative formation."

Schelling's Einheit is to be comprehended as a whole thathas never been divided and will never be united, much likeNietzsche's Ur-Eine (originary oneness).* Neither identitynor difference, it nevertheless is endowed with the powerto create the finite world of differences through the processof Einbilduzw. As Gilles Deleuze has pointed out, Schellingbrought "difference out of the night of the Identical." AlainBadiou's notion of oneness as an operational structure maycome closest to Schelling's notion of Einheit in the Absolute.

Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsche,/ Wifrterbuch, 16 vols.(Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1854-1960).

t Cf. e.g, SW5: 348 and 7:60.tColeridge, Bildiographia Literaria, vol. 1, p. 168. See also the extensive

footnote ad loc. on the prevalent use of this concept throughout GermanIdealism.

§On Nietzsche's Ur-Eine, see my The Genius Decision: The Extraordinary

and the Postmodern Condition, part 2, chap. 4: "Nietzsche's Active Aestheticsand the Ur-Eine."

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York:Columbia Univ. Press, 1995), p. 191.

Badiou defines oneness as an operation. According to Bothere is no one, only the "count-as-one" (compte-pour-un).

a "presentation" and the multiple, the finite world, is arerational result" of the presentation: "[B]eing is what pre(itself). On this basis, it is neither one (because only prtation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one), nor mu(because the multiple is solely the regime of presentatAny presented multiplicity, or in Schelling's words, anycounter-image of the absolute ideas, is a situation, andsituation admits its own particular operator of the couione." It is thus structure. Badiou concludes: "The count-a(the structure) installs the universal pertinence of themultiple couple in any situation." I have thus translateskit in most instances as "oneness" rather than identity.

I have supplemented Schelling's sparse footnotesannotations of my own, which are enclosed in bracketmeant to aid the understanding of references that areasily accessed by contemporary readers. Unless note(erwise, all translations of non-English quotations in thenotes are my own.

I am indebted to my copy editor, Michaelyn Mitchetaking on the challenge of editing a text on such an unlaiable topic as the Absolute.

° Badiou, Being and Event, p. 24.t Ibid.

— XX —

rtg's language, which is considerably richer and mored than today's, without sacrificing readability.ling with a text that is more than two-hundred yearssents formidable challenges even to a native reader.is reason, I regularly consulted Grimms' Deutschedweb ° to ascertain the historical usage and meanings ofwords. For those familiar with Schelling's terminol-

ave included a German-English glossary.translated terms require discussion here: EU ?bit -dung

!kit. Einbildung or Ein -Bildung, commonly translated asnation," is one of the more challenging of Schelling's:o render into English. It combines image (Bild) and

on (Bildung) with the concept of Einheit (oneness or

(). suggesting an imaginative becoming-one throughss of formation. Thus, at times, Schelling also refersas In-EU Li-Bildung.t Coleridge, arguably the most dili-nong Schelling's English readers, noticed Schelling'se" use of EU zbildung and its relation to Einheit and ap-

ited it for his Blida' gra** z Literaria, even coining a newcor it: "esemplastic," meaning "to mold into one."* I have

to translate Einbildung as "imaginative formation."

elling's Einheit is to be comprehended as a whole thatver been divided and will never be united, much likeche's Ur-Eine (originary oneness). 1 Neither identityfference, it nevertheless is endowed with the powerae the finite world of differences through the processkldung. As Gilles Deleuze has pointed out, Schellingtt "difference out of the night of the Identical." AlainI's notion of oneness as an operational structure may:losest to Schelling's notion of Einheit in the Absolute.

ob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutdched Wiirterhuch, 16 vols.S. Hirzel 1854-1960).

r_g. SW5: 348 and 7:60.Bihliographia Literaria, vol. 1, p. 168. See also the extensive

ad loc. on the prevalent use of this concept throughout German

Nietzsche's Ur-Eine, see my The Genius Decision: The Extraordinary

Pootmodern Condition, part 2, chap. 4: "Nietzsche's Active Aesthetics

les Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York:Pia Univ. Press, 1995), p. 191.

— XXI —

Badiou defines oneness as an operatu. uz. According to Badiou,there is no one, only the "count-as-one" (compte-pour-un).* It isa "presentation" and the multiple, the finite world, is an "op-erational result" of the presentation: "[B]eing is what presents(itself). On this basis, it is neither one (because only presen-tation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one), nor multiple(because the multiple is dolely the regime of presentation)."Any presented multiplicity, or in Schelling's words, any finitecounter-image of the absolute ideas, is a situation, and "everysituation admits its own particular operator of the count-as-one." It is thus dtructure. Badiou concludes: "The count-as-one(the structure) installs the universal pertinence of the one/multiple couple in any situation." I have thus translated Ein-belt in most instances as "oneness" rather than identity.

I have supplemented Schelling's sparse footnotes withannotations of my own, which are enclosed in brackets andmeant to aid the understanding of references that are noteasily accessed by contemporary readers. Unless noted oth-erwise, all translations of non-English quotations in the foot-notes are my own.

I am indebted to my copy editor, Michaelyn Mitchell, fortaking on the challenge of editing a text on such an unfathom-able topic as the Absolute.

° Badiou, Being and Event, p. 24.t Ibid.

Philosophy and Relig ion

(1804)

Preliminary Remarks

when I published Bruno or On the Divine and Natural

ell,' le of Things in 1802: it was meant to be the beginningseries of publications in the form of philosophical conytions whose topics were already proposed therein.' Fortime now, a second conversation has been lacking onlynal redaction; however, external circumstances have notmitted its completion.* The following pages contain muthe same material as that second conversation, albeit nconversational style. If the various parts of this text mayto the attentive reader ripped from a higher, organic wit is because of the foregoing reason. The decision to ccthese ideas in the present form was prompted by severallic remarks, notably by Eschenmayer's latest book* (whhe seeks once again to complement philosophy withPublication of these ideas in the form of a conversation vundoubtedly have been preferable, but the nobler conytional form — the only one that can embrace an autonoiphilosophy in an independent and free-spirited way — inecessarily called for when a purpose is to be effectedthe end of the philosophical dialogue lies in itself; it caner serve a purpose outside of itself. Just as a sculpturenot cease to be a work of art even if it lies at the bowthe sea, so indeed every work of philosophy endures.

o [F. W. J. Schelling, Bruno oder fiber dad 011ie& and natiirliebe PryDinge. Etn Gesprdcb, SW4. English translation by Michael G. VaterState Univ. of New York Press, 1984).]

t Bruno, p. 35 [It seems to me that we should further discussstitution of the mystery cults and the nature of mythology. And itperfectly appropriate that Bruno... speak about the kind of philosothinks the mystery cults must have taught...And then ...spell outlegories and actions that might be used to represent a mystery. Andlet one of us, or all of us together...tackle the discussion of poetmythology." SW4: 234.]

[See above, "Translator's Introduction."]§ [C. A. Eschenmayer, Die Philodophie at i bran Uebergang zur Nicbtphi

(Philosophy in Its Transition to Nonphilosophy) (Erlangen: WahlKunst- and Buchhandlung, 1803).]

Preliminary Remarks

when I published Bruno or On the Divine and Natural Prin-

ciple of Things in I802,* it was meant to be the beginning of aseries of publications in the form of philosophical conversa-tions whose topics were already proposed therein.t For sometime now, a second conversation has been lacking only its fi-nal redaction; however, external circumstances have not per-mitted its completion.* The following pages contain much ofthe same material as that second conversation, albeit not inconversational style. If the various parts of this text may seemto the attentive reader ripped from a higher, organic whole,it is because of the foregoing reason. The decision to conveythese ideas in the present form was prompted by several pub-lic remarks, notably by Eschenmayer's latest bool0 (whereinhe seeks once again to complement philosophy with faith).Publication of these ideas in the form of a conversation wouldundoubtedly have been preferable, but the nobler conversa-tional form — the only one that can embrace an autonomousphilosophy in an independent and free-spirited way — is notnecessarily called for when a purpose is to be effected. Forthe end of the philosophical dialogue lies in itself; it can nev-er serve a purpose outside of itself. Just as a sculpture doesnot cease to be a work of art even if it lies at the bottom ofthe sea, so indeed every work of philosophy endures, even

° [E W. J. Schelling, Bruno oder fiber Sas glittfiche cued natiirliehe PrineiP der

binge. Ern Gesprizeh, SW4. English translation by Michael G. Vater (Albany:State Univ. of New York Press, 1984).]

t Bruno, p. 35 ["It seems to me that we should further discuss the in-stitution of the mystery cults and the nature of mythology. And it seemsperfectly appropriate that Bruno... speak about the kind of philosophy hethinks the mystery cults must have taught... And then...spell out the al-legories and actions that might be used to represent a mystery. And finallylet one of us, or all of us together... tackle the discussion of poetry andmythology." SW4: 234.]

[See above, "Translator's Introduction."]§ [C. A. Eschenmayer, Die Philosophic in ihrent Uebergang zur Nichtphiloswhie

(Philosophy in Its Transition to Nonphilosophy) (Erlangen: WaltherscheKunst- and Buchhandlung, 1803).]

-4—

if uncomprehended in its own time. One would be gratefulif it were merely a matter of incomprehension. Instead, thework is usually refitted and appropriated by various enti-ties — some playing the part of the opponent; others, that ofthe proponent. The misinterpretations and deformations cre-ated by such methods merit no consideration. It is a differentcase altogether with the contrarianism [Widerstreit] of noble

minds and their demands on science as a whole, as these de-serve much respect for what they contribute to the enlight-enment of the world, regardless of whether or not those de-

mands are met. .We nevertheless do not doubt that the philosophers of

our time will take offense to the philosophical tenor of oldthat we have sought to resound. But we also know that thesethings nevertheless cannot be profaned, that they must sub-sist through themselves, and that those who do not possessthem already ought not to and cannot possess them at all. Wewill therefore keep silent about the uncouth misinterpreta-tions of our opponents; they may yet learn of the principles ofthese teachings and their consequences on this occasion. Weseek all the more to repel the officiousness of our expound-ers and parroting followers and urge them to consider thatsome minds do not produce solely for the purpose of publish-ing books to degrade and bring into contempt a noble subjectthrough gross applications and mindless yarn-spinning. Thehorde of rowdy opponents will eventually trail off when itrealizes that it has exhausted itself to no avail. In Germanywe are less likely to see the dwindling of those who, withoutvocation, make themselves into followers of a doctrine andwho, without being inspirited, bear the thyrsus ° to the nui-

sance of both the wise and the simple-minded. Those inca-pable of understanding science's mysteries distend the massof borrowed thoughts, which they deposit into it, into a cari-cature. They express the truth, whose meaning is groundedin depth, in superficial sentences that have no meaning andmerely amaze the canaille, or abuse language, albeit uninten-tionally, by clothing a hollow disposition in words that havestirred up their weak imagination. Germans rhapsodize about

° [Plato, Phaedo 69d: "Many are thyrsus-bearers, but few are mystics."]

—5—

almost everything; like bees, they busily carry off arcess that which blossoms and is produced independethem. And when they do make the effort to have thof their own, for which they themselves can be held rsible — and abstain from borrowing the thoughts ofto whom they would then offload any responsibilityare held back by cheap concerns for themselves; alreinflated with the property of others, they would bursthad any thoughts of their own. They may be satisfietheir superficial understanding of these mysteries, bugards their deeper meaning:

Don't move, goat! Or you'll get burned.*

* l"Ruhre nicht, Bock! denn es brennt." Here Schelling repeatsWilhelm Schlegel's translation of the only surviving line of Aeslost Satyric play Prinnetheud the Fire-Bearer ("Goat, you will grievebeard," Nauck, Trag. Grace. "'rag. Aedehylud 207), published in S4

elegy, Die Kundt der Griechen (The Art of the Greeks, 1799).Aeschylus's line was first interpreted as a warning of the danger

ence to the common man by Rousseau in his 1752 Lettre a Leeat: –111of Prometheus is the torch of the sciences, which is made for theof inspiring the great minds...the satyr who, seeing fire for the furuns to it and wants to embrace it represents the vulgar men who,by the brilliance of its knowledge, unwisely engage in its study.Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvre,' conzplited, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Rayvols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-69), 3.102.]

—4—

weekended in its own time. One would be gratefule merely a matter of incomprehension. Instead, theusually refitted and appropriated by various enti-ine playing the part of the opponent; others, that ofonent. The misinterpretations and deformations cre-mch methods merit no consideration. It is a differentgether with the contrarianism [Widerareit] of noblerid their demands on science as a whole, as these de-uch respect for what they contribute to the enlight-of the world, regardless of whether or not those de-re met. .ievertheless do not doubt that the philosophers of! will take offense to the philosophical tenor of oldhave sought to resound. But we also know that theseevertheless cannot be profaned, that they must sub-ugh themselves, and that those who do not possessready ought not to and cannot possess them at all. Werefore keep silent about the uncouth misinterpreta-our opponents; they may yet learn of the principles ofachings and their consequences on this occasion. Wethe more to repel the officiousness of our expound-parroting followers and urge them to consider thatinds do not produce solely for the purpose of publish-ks degrade and bring into contempt a noble subjectt gross applications and mindless yarn-spinning. Theof rowdy opponents will eventually trail off when itthat it has exhausted itself to no avail. In Germanyless likely to see the dwindling of those who, withoutr), make themselves into followers of a doctrine andithout being inspirited, bear the thyrsus ° to the nui-f both the wise and the simple-minded. Those inca-f understanding science's mysteries distend the mass)wed thoughts, which they deposit into it, into a cari-They express the truth, whose meaning is groundedh, in superficial sentences that have no meaning andamaze the canaille, or abuse language, albeit uninten-, by clothing a hollow disposition in words that haveup their weak imagination. Germans rhapsodize about

o. "'hard° 69d: "Many are thyrsus-bearers, but few are mystics."]

—5—

almost everything; like bees, they busily carry off and pro-cess that which blossoms and is produced independently ofthem. And when they do make the effort to have thoughtsof their own, for which they themselves can be held respon-sible — and abstain from borrowing the thoughts of othersto whom they would then offload any responsibility — theyare held back by cheap concerns for themselves; already soinflated with the property of others, they would burst if theyhad any thoughts of their own. They may be satisfied withtheir superficial understanding of these mysteries, but as re-gards their deeper meaning:

Don't move, goat! Or you'll get burned.*

0 1"Riihre nicht, Bock! denn es brennt." Here Schelling repeats AugustWilhelm Schlegel's translation of the only surviving line of Aeschylus'slost Satyric play Prometheus the Fire-Bearer ("Goat, you will grieve for yourbeard," Nauck, Trag. Grace. Frog. Aeschylus 207), published in Schlegel'selegy, Die Kunst der Griechen (The Art of the Greeks, 1799).

Aeschylus's line was first interpreted as a warning of the dangers of sci-ence to the common man by Rousseau in his 1752 Lettre a Lecat: "The torchof Prometheus is the torch of the sciences, which is made for the purposeof inspiring the great minds... the satyr who, seeing fire for the first time,runs to it and wants to embrace it represents the vulgar men who, seducedby the brilliance of its knowledge, unwisely engage in its study." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres complites, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, 4vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-69), 3.102.]

Introduction

There was a time when religion was kept separapopular belief within mystery cults like a holy fire, slcommon sanctuary with philosophy. The legends ofname the earliest philosophers as the originators of thetery cults, from which the most enlightened among tphilosophers, notably Plato, liked to educe their divirtings. At that time philosophers still had the courageright to discuss the singly great themes, the only onesof philosophizing and rising above common knowledi

Later the once-secret mystery cults became putcontaminated with foreign elements from popularorder to keep itself pure, philosophy retreated fromand became, in contrast to it, esoteric. Religion, whichits originary nature had intermingled with the real, sebecome an outward power, and since it lost any momereach the well of truth, it also sought to stifle any truthof itself.

Thus religion gradually dispossessed philosophythemes it had dealt with since antiquity, and philosoph,itself confined to that which had no value for reason.

On the other hand, the sublime teachings, claimsidedly by religion for itself from the shared propertylosophy, lost their significance and, having been replya completely different soil than the one they sproutebecame altogether transformed.

This opposition resulted in a false accordance ofphy with religion, one that arose from philosopherslowered themselves to treat the origins of reason and iconcepts. This is exemplified by the dogmatism witlphilosophy gained broad and considerable recognitiocompletely sacrificing its true character.

As this dogmatic knowledge was questioned mecisely and subjected to critique, it became evident thzit was applicable to objects of perception and finite tiwas only a bystander or, in fact, outright blind towaters of reason. Because philosophy was acknowledE

-^00■1--

Introduction

There was a time when religion was kept separate frompopular belief within mystery cults like a holy fire, sharing acommon sanctuary with philosophy. The legends of antiquityname the earliest philosophers as the originators of these mys-tery cults, from which the most enlightened among the laterphilosophers, notably Plato, liked to educe their divine teach-ings. At that time philosophers still had the courage and theright to discuss the singly great themes, the only ones worthyof philosophizing and rising above common knowledge.

Later the once-secret mystery cults became public andcontaminated with foreign elements from popular belief. Inorder to keep itself pure, philosophy retreated from religionand became, in contrast to it, esoteric. Religion, which againstits originary nature had intermingled with the real, sought tobecome an outward power, and since it lost any momentum toreach the well of truth, it also sought to stifle any truth outsideof itself.

Thus religion gradually dispossessed philosophy of thosethemes it had dealt with since antiquity, and philosophy founditself confined to that which had no value for reason.

On the other hand, the sublime teachings, claimed one-sidedly by religion for itself from the shared property of phi-losophy, lost their significance and, having been replanted toa completely different soil than the one they sprouted from,became altogether transformed.

This opposition resulted in a false accordance of philoso-phy with religion, one that arose from philosophers havinglowered themselves to treat the origins of reason and ideas asconcepts. This is exemplified by the dogmatism with whichphilosophy gained broad and considerable recognition whilecompletely sacrificing its true character.

As this dogmatic knowledge was questioned more pre-cisely and subjected to critique, it became evident that whileit was applicable to objects of perception and finite things, itwas only a bystander or, in fact, outright blind toward mat-ters of reason. Because philosophy was acknowledged and

-8—

accredited now more than ever as the only possible knowl-edge, the increasingly thorough self-awareness of its invalid-ity ran parallel to the rising value of its opposite, i.e., faith, sothat ultimately all that is essentially philosophical in philoso-phy was completely given over to religion.

It would not be hard to cite evidence: I simply call to mindthat this period in general was sufficiently defined by Kant.

The last echoes of the old, true philosophy were heardfrom Spinoza. He led philosophy back to its proper subjectsalthough he did not steer clear of the pretense and tawdrinessof another, albeit different, kind of dogmatism.

Aside from the teachings on the Absolute, the true myster-ies of philosophy have as their most noble and indeed theirsole content the eternal birth of all things and their relation-ship to God. All of ethics, as a directive for a beatific life, isbuilt upon this and is a consequence of it, as it is found in theambit of sacred teachings.

Those teachings, detached from the whole of philosophy,are called, not without reason, Philosophy of Nature.

That such teachings, which by definition are nothing if notspeculative, are met with the most contradictory and abrogat-ing judgments is to be expected; just as every partial viewcan be opposed by another partial view, so a comprehensiveview, which encompasses the entire universe, can be opposedby all possible partial views. But it is quite impossible, on theone hand, to accredit a doctrine with being a philosophy, anda complete one at that, and on the other, to declare it in needof being complemented by faith; this contradicts and nulli-fies its concept because its essence consists in possessing clearknowledge and intuitive cognition of that which nonphiloso-phy means to grasp in faith.

Such a intention lies before our very eyes in C. A. Eschen-mayer's book Philomphy in Its Transition to Nonphilosophy, whichwould be entirely incomprehensible if it did not throw lightupon the fact that its astute, speculative author barely ad-dresses the issues that cause him to refer to faith, and thatit is for this reason only that he takes refuge in the latter. Togive only one example: any philosopher would be weary ofnot gaining a much clearer cognition of those same subjectsthrough knowledge and in knowledge than what emerges for

—9—

Eschenmayer from faith and premonition [Ahndung]. Ver positives he cites as justification for his faith — asicthe impossibility of finding in philosophy satisfactory ato certain questions — cannot be regarded as evidencfaith by definition will cease being faith if it can be evi(It is in contradiction with what he himself admits. Becognizance [Erkennen], as he says,* becomes extingui!the Absolute, then any ideal relationship to it, whichyond that point, is possible only through the reawakedifference. Either this extinction is truly complete, anczance is therefore an absolute in which all desire thatfrom the conflict between subject and object is dissolthe opposite is true. In the latter case, cognizance is ncachieved by reason, and thus one cannot infer from ittrue Absolute is unsatisfactory. In the former case, nopotency, be it faith or premonition, yields anything 6more perfect than what is already embodied in saidzance. Rather, what is set in opposition to it under thisname is either only a particular view of that general nship to the Absolute or, on the contrary and far fromtrue elevation and higher potency, a lowering from theunity of cognizance to a cognizance of a new differenc

Indeed, the particular, that which premonition or nintuition is said to have the advantage over rationaltion is, according to most accounts, nothing other thatover from the difference that remains in the former Icompletely disappeared in the latter. Each of us is COf

by nature to seek an Absolute, even those still wrappefinite things, but if we want to fix one's thoughts on it,us. It hovers around us eternally, but, as Fichte has saonly there if one does not have it; as soon as one possesvanishes. It appears before the soul only at the momensubjective activity joins the objective in unexpected hawhich because it is unexpected has an advantage ovadesireless rational cognition to manifest itself as hapas illumination, or as revelation. But as soon as this hais brought about, reasoning sets in, and the apparitioiflight. In this fleeting form, religion — inasmuch as it

* Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 33.

—9—

Eschenmayer from faith and premonition [Ahndung]. Whatev-er positives he cites as justification for his faith aside fromthe impossibility of finding in philosophy satisfactory answersto certain questions — cannot be regarded as evidence sincefaith by definition will cease being faith if it can be evidenced.It is in contradiction with what he himself admits. Because ifcognizance [Erkennen], as he says,* becomes extinguished inthe Absolute, then any ideal relationship to it, which lies be-yond that point, is possible only through the reawakening ofdifference. Either this extinction is truly complete, and cogni-zance is therefore an absolute in which all desire that springsfrom the conflict between subject and object is dissolved, orthe opposite is true. In the latter case, cognizance is not reallyachieved by reason, and thus one cannot infer from it that thetrue Absolute is unsatisfactory. In the former case, no higherpotency, be it faith or premonition, yields anything better ormore perfect than what is already embodied in said cogni-zance. Rather, what is set in opposition to it under this or thatname is either only a particular view of that general relation-ship to the Absolute or, on the contrary and far from being atrue elevation and higher potency, a lowering from the highestunity of cognizance to a cognizance of a new difference.

Indeed, the particular, that which premonition or religiousintuition is said to have the advantage over rational cogni-tion is, according to most accounts, nothing other than a left-over from the difference that remains in the former but hascompletely disappeared in the latter. Each of us is compelledby nature to seek an Absolute, even those still wrapped up infinite things, but if we want to fix one's thoughts on it, it eludesus. It hovers around us eternally, but, as Fichte has said, it isonly there if one does not have it; as soon as one possesses it, itvanishes. It appears before the soul only at the moment whensubjective activity joins the objective in unexpected harmony,which because it is unexpected has an advantage over free,desireless rational cognition to manifest itself as happiness,as illumination, or as revelation. But as soon as this harmonyis brought about, reasoning sets in, and the apparition takesflight. In this fleeting form, religion — inasmuch as it is also

* Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 33.

— 8 —

Id now more than ever as the only possible know!-increasingly thorough self-awareness of its invalid-

arallel to the rising value of its opposite, i.e., faith, sonately all that is essentially philosophical in philoso-completely given over to religion.'Id not be hard to cite evidence: I simply call to mindperiod in general was sufficiently defined by Kant.

1st echoes of the old, true philosophy were heardnoza. He led philosophy back to its proper subjectshe did not steer clear of the pretense and tawdriness

.tr, albeit different, kind of dogmatism.from the teachings on the Absolute, the true myster-ilosophy have as their most noble and indeed theirent the eternal birth of all things and their relation-iod. All of ethics, as a directive for a beatific life, ism this and is a consequence of it, as it is found in thesacred teachings.teachings, detached from the whole of philosophy,

1, not without reason, Philosophy of Nature.arch teachings, which by definition are nothing if not'me, are met with the most contradictory and abrogat-ments is to be expected; just as every partial viewpposed by another partial view, so a comprehensiveLich encompasses the entire universe, can be opposedissible partial views. But it is quite impossible, on the1. to accredit a doctrine with being a philosophy, andto one at that, and on the other, to declare it in needcomplemented by faith; this contradicts and nulli-

mcept because its essence consists in possessing clearge and intuitive cognition of that which nonphiloso-ns to grasp in faith.a intention lies before our very eyes in C. A. Eschen-)ook Philosophy in Its Tr, to bilosophy, whichTransition _o_ .onp

e entirely incomprehensible if it did not throw lightfact that its astute, speculative author barely ad-

the issues that cause him to refer to faith, and thathis reason only that he takes refuge in the latter. Toy one example: any philosopher would be weary ofing a much clearer cognition of those same subjectsknowledge and in knowledge than what emerges for

— 10 —

still in the domain of reflective cognition and dividedness --- isa mere apparition of God within the soul. In contrast, philoso-phy is necessarily a higher and, as it were, a more tranquilperfection of the spirit; it is always within the Absolute, withno danger of the Absolute running away from it because phi-losophy itself has withdrawn into a territory above reason.

I will therefore leave faith, the premonition of beatitude,etc. — which are described by Eschenmayer and which Iregard as beneath philosophy rather than above it — in itsrealm. I will return, as per my original intention, to reclaim-ing those topics that have been appropriated by the dog-matism of religion and nonphilosophy on behalf of reason

and philosophy.What these are will unfold in the following.

The Idea of the Absolute

It would be entirely in accordance with the objmaintaining an empty space outside of philosophy –the soul can fill up through faith and devotion — toabove the Absolute and eternal as the infinitely htency of the latter.° However, it is quite self-evident Ican be nothing above the Absolute and that this ideaany kind of limitation — and not accidentally but ratvery nature. Because God would again be absolutenal; but the Absolute cannot be different from absiand the eternal cannot be different from eternalnthese are not generic concepts. It necessarily folwhoever places anything above the rational Absohdoes not truly perceive it as such and that it is thenan illusion.

How is it that this view recognizes the Absolutesolute but does not regard it as God?

This error is almost inevitably made by thoseat the idea of the Absolute through the descriptionlosophy provides, as they never achieve more tha,tional knowledge of it; but it is not possible to gainditional knowledge from a conditional one. All deof the Absolute come about as an antithesis of tlsolute; namely, the complete opposite of all that cthe nature of the latter is ascribed to the former.the description is merely negative and never puts tlitself before the soul.

Thus the nonabsolute, e.g., is recognized as sorwhich the concept is not adequate to being, since kii.e., reality, does not result from thought; rather, tlneeds something added for it to become being. It isditional, nonabsolute.

Furthermore, nonabsoluteness is perceived by thethe particular is determined, not by the general buyan external entity, and thus has an irrational relatio

* See Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 40f

The Ide a f the AL 1ea o_ t_e _so_ute

It would be entirely in accordance with the objective ofmaintaining an empty space outside of philosophy — one thatthe soul can fill up through faith and devotion — to place God

above the Absolute and eternal as the infinitely higher po-tency of the latter.° However, it is quite self-evident that therecan be nothing above the Absolute and that this idea excludesany kind of limitation — and not accidentally but rather by itsvery nature. Because God would again be absolute and eter-nal; but the Absolute cannot be different from absoluteness,and the eternal cannot be different from eternalness, sincethese are not generic concepts. It necessarily follows thatwhoever places anything above the rational Absolute as God

does not truly perceive it as such and that it is therefore onlyan illusion.

How is it that this view recognizes the Absolute as an ab-solute but does not regard it as God?

This error is almost inevitably made by those who arriveat the idea of the Absolute through the description that phi-losophy provides, as they never achieve more than a condi-tional knowledge of it; but it is not possible to gain an uncon-ditional knowledge from a conditional one. All descriptionsof the Absolute come about as an antithesis of the nonab-solute; namely, the complete opposite of all that constitutesthe nature of the latter is ascribed to the former. In short,the description is merely negative and never puts the Abdolate

itself before the soul.Thus the nonabsolute, e.g., is recognized as something of

which the concept is not adequate to being, since here being,i.e., reality, does not result from thought; rather, the conceptneeds something added for it to become being. It is thus con-ditional, nonabsolute.

Furthermore, nonabsoluteness is perceived by that in whichthe particular is determined, not by the general but rather byan external entity, and thus has an irrational relationship to it.

— 10 —

domain of reflective cognition and dividedness is>parition of God within the soul. In contrast, philoso-!cessarily a higher and, as it were, a more tranquiln of the spirit; it is always within the Absolute, withr of the Absolute running away from it because phi-tself has withdrawn into a territory above reason.therefore leave faith, the premonition of beatitude,rich are described by Eschenmayer and which Is beneath philosophy rather than above it — in itswill return, as per my original intention, to reclaim-! topics that have been appropriated by the dog->f religion and nonphilosophy on behalf of reasonwsophy.these are will unfold in the following.

* See Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 40f.

— 12 —

The same opposition can be found in other concepts of re-flective cognition. Now, if the philosopher describes the ideaof the Absolute so that all difference contained in the non-absolute has to be negated, then those who want to arrive atthe idea of the Absolute from the outside understand it in theabove manner — namely, by taking the opposite of reflectivecognition and all possible differences of the world of appear-ances for the point of departure of philosophy — and regardthe Absolute as the product that brings about the unificationof opposites, whereby the Absolute is defined by them in noway in and by itself but through identification or indifferen-tiation [Indifferenztr. zing]. Or even more crudely, they think ofthe philosopher as holding the ideal or subjective in one handand the real or objective in the other and then have him strikethe palms of his hands together so that one abrades the other.The product of this abrasion [Aufreibung] is the Absolute. Onemay tell them hundreds of times that there is no subjective orobjective for us and that the Absolute is the absolute identityof both only as a negation of those opposites; yet they still donot understand and instead stick with the only idea they dounderstand, namely that which is constructed into a composite.

Little do they realize that the description of the Absolute asidentity of opposites is merely negative and that the philoso-pher demands something entirely different for the cognition ofthe Absolute, thus declaring said description as altogether in-sufficient. Even intellectual intuition [intellectuelle Anschattung]

is according to their psychological concepts a mere intuitionof this self-created identity by way of the inner sense andtherefore entirely empirical since it is in fact a cognition thatperceives the in-itself [An-rich] of the soul. It is called intuitiononly because the essence of the soul, which is one and thesame [Ems and es selbst] with the Absolute, can have no otherthan an unmediated relation to the latter.

It escapes them no less that all the forms in which the Ab-solute is articulated through reflective cognition can be re-duced to just three possible ones, which correspond to thethree types of syllogisms ° and that only the anmedLted intuitive

cognition exceeds any conceptual determination.

° Cf. Bruno, p. 166 [SW4:3001.

— 13 —

The first form of positing absoluteness is the witscan be expressed through reflective cognition negatineither-nor; it is clear that no positive cognition by atlies herein and that only the eventual productive intufill this void and grant positivity in said neither-nor.

The second form of manifestation of the Absolutetive cognition is the hypothetic' al Whenever there isand an object, the Absolute is the equal essence of betity is predicated merely and simply upon the same ein-itself of the one or the other — neither of which itive or objective — namely, upon itself and not insolthat which binds together [Verkniiplende] or indeed Aiis bound together [Verkmipfte]. In this case, the identibe merely a relational notion from which the formto be distinguished precisely because it is an absolute

i.e., its essence lies in itself and not in relation to ccopposites. The identity, which in the first, categoric;a mere negative and defines the Absolute only formbecomes a positive in this hypothetical form andqualitatively. To say that this definition has a relationtive cognition — insofar as it dissolves [aufbebt] theonly through the affirmation of its opposite, as thethrough its negation — is quite correct; but are therepossible definitions for which the same holds true?let his notion of substance come to the fore all too itwhich stamped him as a dogmatist because the ofble unmediated cognition of the Absolute in Spino2aside — which he described clearly with the senteiImam quatenus se et corpus ollb aeternitatis specie copra.,

Dei cognitzo. nem necessaru. , babet, scitque se in Deo &ode el

.onctp. i.* It was understood that by way of the internhis definitions and descriptions one could arrive at 1tion of things that can only be perceived without riIs it any different with the notions of infinity, indivisimplicity than with that of substance, or any other

* ["Our mind, as far as it knows itself and the body sub sptatis, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, anditself to be in God and conceived through God." Ethica, part VB. de Spinoza, Opera, ed. J. Van Vloten and J. P. N. LandMartinus Nijhoff, 1914), vol. 2.1

— 12 —

opposition can be found in other concepts of re-gnition. Now, if the philosopher describes the ideasolute so that all difference contained in the non-las to be negated, then those who want to arrive atF the Absolute from the outside understand it in thenner — namely, by taking the opposite of reflectiveand all possible differences of the world of appear-the point of departure of philosophy — and regardute as the product that brings about the unificationes, whereby the Absolute is defined by them in noa by itself but through identification or indifferen-dOrenzw. !tag]. Or even more crudely, they think ofopher as holding the ideal or subjective in one handal or objective in the other and then have him strikeof his hands together so that one abrades the other.uct of this abrasion [Aufreibung] is the Absolute. Onehem hundreds of times that there is no subjective orfor us and that the Absolute is the absolute identitymy as a negatu'm of those opposites; yet they still dostand and instead stick with the only idea they doid. namely that which is constructed into a composite.

they realize that the description of the Absolute asf opposites is merely negative and that the philoso-ands something entirely different for the cognition ofute, thus declaring said description as altogether in-. Even intellectual intuition [intellectuelle Anschauung]

irig to their psychological concepts a mere intuitionIf-created identity by way of the inner sense andentirely empirical since it is in fact a cognition thatthe in-itself [An-sick] of the soul. It is called intuitionLuse the essence of the soul, which is one and theo and es selbst] with the Absolute, can have no othernmediated relation to the latter.pes them no less that all the forms in which the Ab-articulated through reflective cognition can be re-just three possible ones, which correspond to the

es of syllogisms* and that only the anmeduz. ted intuitive

!xceeds any conceptual determination.

p. 166 [SW4: 3001.

— 13 —

The first form of positing absoluteness is the categoric' al; itcan be expressed through reflective cognition negatively by aneither-nor; it is clear that no positive cognition by any meanslies herein and that only the eventual productive intuition willfill this void and grant positivity in said neither-nor.

The second form of manifestation of the Absolute in reflec-tive cognition is the hypothetical. Whenever there is a subjectand an object, the Absolute is the equal essence of both. Iden-tity is predicated merely and simply upon the same essence or/J. i-itself of the one or the other — neither of which is subjec-tive or objective — namely, upon itself and not insofar as it isthat which binds together [Verknüpfende] or indeed that which

is bound together [Verkniipfte]. In this case, the identity wouldbe merely a relational notion from which the former oughtto be distinguished precisely because it is an absolute identity;

i.e., its essence lies in itself and not in relation to conditionalopposites. The identity, which in the first, categorical form isa mere negative and defines the Absolute only formally, thusbecomes a positive in this hypothetical form and defines itqualitatively. To say that this definition has a relation to reflec-tive cognition — insofar as it dissolves [aufhebt] the antithesisonly through the affirmation of its opposite, as the first doesthrough its negation — is quite correct; but are there not otherpossible definitions for which the same holds true? Spinozalet his notion of substance come to the fore all too frequently,which stamped him as a dogmatist because the only possi-ble unmediated cognition of the Absolute in Spinoza was setaside — which he described clearly with the sentence: Mend

rostra quatenus se et corpus sub aeternitatis specie cognoscit, eatenus

Dei cognitth nem necessary habet, sciigue se in Deo esse et per Deum

concipi. It was understood that by way of the intermediary ofhis definitions and descriptions one could arrive at the cogni-tion of things that can only be perceived without mediation.Is it any different with the notions of infinity, indivisibility, orsimplicity than with that of substance, or any other notion at

° ["Our mind, as far as it knows itself and the body sub specie aeterni-tatis, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and understandsitself to be in God and conceived through God." Ethica, part V, prop. XXX.

B. de Spinoza, Opera, ed. J. Van Vloten and J. P. N. Land (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1914), vol. 2.1

— 14 —

hand,, since most of them, by the mere fact of being compos-ites, express that what they are meant to denote is to reflectivecognition but a negative?

The third form by which reflective cognition tends tochoose to express the Absolute is the disjunctive. This is knownprimarily through Spinoza. It is only One Wines], but in thesame manner this One can be regarded now as all-ideal, nowas all-real; it arises from the combination of the categoricaland the hypothetical. This one and the same — not at once butin like manner — can be regarded now as the one, now as theother; it is therefore in itself neither the one nor the other (ac-cording to the first form). Rather, it can be considered thecombined essence or identity of both (according to the secondform) and, in its independence from both, likewise under thisattribute, now under that attribute.

This third form of expressing the Absolute has been themost prevalent in philosophy. The inventors of the so-calledontological proof of God's existence state that He is One — inconsideration of the fact that thought also involves being,idea, and reality — but they do not mean to imply that in Himthe ideal and the real are bound together[verkniipft] in such a waythat He is both at once. God is the ideal par excellence, andwithout further mediation God is also the real par excellence.Rather than let God arise from the mixture of the ideal andthe real, they let Him be each separately and wholly.

The identity of the ideal and the real that is not mediatedbut wholly unmediated, not external but internal, necessar-ily remains concealed from those lacking advanced scientificrigor since the real presupposes the realization that the abso-lute ideal, without being assimilated into the real, is in-itself also theabsolute real.

Most curious, however, is the polemic against the abso-lute identity of thought and being as an expression of abso-luteness by those who have made no advances in philosophyand indeed can only express themselves through notionsof reflective cognition. If they mean to give a descriptionof the Absolute, however, they can do no better than Spi-noza who has written that the Absolute is that which ex-ists only through itself and whose cause of being lies solely initself, etc. This alone elucidates that the quarrel about the

— 15 —

definitions of the Absolute is but idle shadow-fencin1fechterei] with a blunted epee that can strike the simplbut has no effect on the heart of the matter.

As manifestations of the Absolute through rale<nition, all the possible forms of expressing the Alasafter all completely equal. The essence itself of tllute, which as the ideal is also immediately real, cknown through explanations, only through intuitia composite can be known through description. TIis simple demands to be intuited. Just as light conscribed as ideal in relation to nature even to thoseblind from birth and have no knowledge of trueabsoluteness as opposed to finiteness can be deslike manner and none other (without inferring,that the mentally blind could ever gain intuition onature of absoluteness).

Insofar as this intuition cannot be compared to ageometrical figure but is particular to each soul likception of light in each eye, it is here a merely indivelation; however, in this individuality there is alsorevelation, just as light is for the empirical senses.be the point where, for the benefit of mutual furthement, one might be able to unite Eschenmayer's prwith the assertions of philosophy.

The only instrument befitting a subject such aslute is a kind of cognition that is not added to the soinstruction, teaching, etc. but is its true and eternalFor as the essence of God consists of absolute, sole)ated reality, so the nature of the soul consists in cogis one with the real, ergo with God; hence it is alsotion of philosophy in relation to man not to add anto remove from him, as thoroughly as possible, titals that the body, the world of appearances, andlife have added and to lead him back to the orig[Urspriinglic' he]. Furthermore, all instruction in phikprecedes this cognition can only be negative; it sholity of all finite opposites and leads the soul indinperception of the infinite. Once there, it is no lon gof those makeshift devices [Behelfe] of negative desabsoluteness and sets itself free from them.

— 14 —

:e most of them, by the mere fact of being compos-ss that what they are meant to denote is to reflectivebut a negative?drd form by which reflective cognition tends toexpress the Absolute is the disjunctive. This is knownthrough Spinoza. It is only One [Etne.i], but in thener this One can be regarded now as all-ideal, now; it arises from the combination of the categoricalpothetical. This one and the same — not at once butnner — can be regarded now as the one, now as thetherefore in itself neither the one nor the other (ac-

3 the first form). Rather, it can be considered the4.45ence or identity of both (according to the secondI, in its independence from both, likewise under thisnow under that attribute.urd form of expressing the Absolute has been theTalent in philosophy. The inventors of the so-calledLI proof of God's existence state that He is One — inLion of the fact that thought also involves being,reality — but they do not mean to imply that in HimLnd the real are bound together[verkniipft] in such a ways both at once. God is the ideal par excellence, andirther mediation God is also the real par excellence.an let God arise from the mixture of the ideal andhey let Him be each separately and wholly.entity of the ideal and the real that is not mediatedy unmediated, not external but internal, necessar-is concealed from those lacking advanced scientifice the real presupposes the realization that the abso-without being assimilated into the real, is in-itself also theeal.:urious, however, is the polemic against the abso-ity of thought and being as an expression of abso-v those who have made no advances in philosophyed can only express themselves through notionsive cognition. If they mean to give a description►solute, however, they can do no better than Spi-) has written that the Absolute is that which ex-through itself and whose cause of being lies solely inThis alone elucidates that the quarrel about the

— 15 —

definitions of the Absolute is but idle shadow-fencing [Spiegel-

fechtered with a blunted epee that can strike the simplemindedbut has no effect on the heart of the matter.

As manifestations of the Absolute through reflective cog-nition, all the possible forms of expressing the Absolute areafter all completely equal. The essence itself of the Abso-lute, which as the ideal is also immediately real, cannot beknown through explanations, only through intuition. Onlya composite can be known through description. That whichis simple demands to be intuited. Just as light could be de-scribed as ideal in relation to nature even to those who areblind from birth and have no knowledge of true light, soabsoluteness as opposed to finiteness can be described inlike manner and none other (without inferring, however,that the mentally blind could ever gain intuition of the truenature of absoluteness).

Insofar as this intuition cannot be compared to a universalgeometrical figure but is particular to each soul like the per-ception of light in each eye, it is here a merely individual rev-elation; however, in this individuality there is also a univerdal

revelation, just as light is for the empirical senses. This couldbe the point where, for the benefit of mutual further develop-ment, one might be able to unite Eschenmayer's propositionswith the assertions of philosophy.

The only instrument befitting a subject such as the Abso-lute is a kind of cognition that is not added to the soul throughinstruction, teaching, etc. but is its true and eternal substance.For as the essence of God consists of absolute, solely unmedi-ated reality, so the nature of the soul consists in cognition thatis one with the real, ergo with God; hence it is also the inten-tion of philosophy in relation to man not to add anything butto remove from him, as thoroughly as possible, the acciden-tals that the body, the world of appearances, and the sensatelife have added and to lead him back to the originary state[Urdpranglic' he]. Furthermore, all instruction in philosophy thatprecedes this cognition can only be negative; it shows the nul-lity of all finite opposites and leads the soul indirectly to theperception of the infinite. Once there, it is no longer in needof those makeshift devices [Behelfe] of negative descriptions ofabsoluteness and sets itself free from them.

— 16 —

In all dogmatic systems, as well as in the criticism and ide-alism of the theory of scientific knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre],

there is talk of a reality of the Absolute that would be outside

of and independent from ideality. In all these, unmediated cogni-tion is therefore impossible because the in-itself, by way of theprocess of cognizance, becomes a product of the soul, a mere

noumenon, and ceases to be in-itself.In presupposing a merely mediated knowledge of the Ab-

solute (irrespective of how the mediation occurs), the Abso-lute in philosophy can only appear as something that is pre-sumed in order that it can be philosophized about; in fact, theopposite takes place, and all philosophizing begins, and hasalways begun, with the idea of the Absolute come alive. Thatwhich is true can only be recognized in truth; that whichis evident, in evidence. But truth and evidence are clear inthemselves and must therefore be absolute and of the essenceof God. Until this was recognized, it was not even possible toconceive of the idea of that higher evidence, which is soughtin philosophy. When, by way of tradition, the word and thename of philosophy reached those who lacked the inner im-petus for such recognition — a recognition whose first be-ginnings were identical to those of philosophy itself—theyattempted to philosophize without it.

Those who have experienced that evidence — which liesin and only in the idea of the Absolute and which any humanlanguage is too weak to describe — will regard as entirely in-commensurate any attempts to reduce and confine it to theindividuality of the individual [dad Individuelle des Individuums]

by way of faith, premonition, sentiment, or whatever one maycall it. Not only will it not reach this evidence, but it will ne-gate its very nature in the process.

— 17 —

The Origin of the Finite Things from the Al),

and Their Relationship to It

Here one might want to avail oneself of what Platothe tyrant of Syracuse: "But what kind of questiorof Dionysius and Doris, is the one you brought titthe aurae of all evil? In fact, we are born with the thoquestion stuck in our soul and he who does not pwill never genuinely desire to partake in truth. Hethe garden, under the laurels, you told me that youanswer and that it was a discovery of your own. I reif this were so, you would have saved me from manyalso, I added, I had never met with any other persormade this discovery; on the contrary, most of thehad was about this very problem. That means thaeither, as is probable, overheard it from someone elarrived at it by an act of the gods."

In the aforementioned book Eschenmayer citpassages from the Zeitdchrift: and, among others. orpassage from Bruno, where the question is postuldecidedly in the following words: "You seem to be oion, my dear fellow, that I arrive, sub specie aeternitorigin of actual consciousness, along with its detaclseparation, without presupposing anything othersupreme idea. ,p+t

Of course, Eschenmayer cannot see a satisfyingthe immediately following passages; but why doesthe resolution laid down clearly and distinctly forfurther down in various places? We will single outthem here: "First off, let us hold fast to what enduwhat we must posit to be immovable as against wsume to be movable and changeable, for the soulof returning to the contemplation of what is mostAnd then let us recall how everything that seems to conu

oneness, or to tear itself away from it, has the POSSIBILITI

0 [PLto,]Ep. II (313aftt [Zeibehriftffir dpeculative Physik (Journal of Speculative Ph

by Schelling between 1800 and 1801 and continued as Newspeculative Physik (New Journal of Speculative Physics) in 18(

[Bruno, SW4: 257.1

— 17 —

The Origin of the Finite Things from the Absolute

ancl Their Relationship to It

Here one might want to avail oneself of what Plato wrote tothe tyrant of Syracuse: "But what kind of questions, 0 sonof Dionysius and Doris, is the one you brought up: What is

the cause of all evil.? In fact, we are born with the thorn of thisquestion stuck in our soul and he who does not pull it out,will never genuinely desire to partake in truth. However, inthe garden, under the laurels, you told me that you found theanswer and that it was a discovery of your own. I replied thatif this were so, you would have saved me from many inquiries;also, I added, I had never met with any other person who hadmade this discovery; on the contrary, most of the trouble Ihad was about this very problem. That means that you hadeither, as is probable, overheard it from someone else, or hadarrived at it by an act of the gods."

In the aforementioned book Eschenmayer cites severalpassages from the Zeitschriftt and, among others, one specific

passage from Bruno, where the question is postulated mostdecidedly in the following words: "You seem to be of the opin-ion, my dear fellow, that I arrive, sub specie aeternitatis, at theorigin of actual consciousness, along with its detachment andseparation, without presupposing anything other than thesupreme idea."t

Of course, Eschenmayer cannot see a satisfying answer inthe immediately following passages; but why does he not citethe resolution laid down clearly and distinctly for the adeptfurther down in various places? We will single out just one ofthem here: "First off, let us hold fast to what endures and towhat we must posit to be immovable as against what we as-sume to be movable and changeable, for the soul never tiresof returning to the contemplation of what is most excellent.And then let us recall how everything that seems to come out of that

oneness, or to tear itself away from it, has the POSSIBIL17Y qf been for

* [131,a0,]Ep. 11[3134].

t tZeitschrift fiirspeculative Physik (Journal of Speculative Physics), editedby Schelling between 1800 and 1801 and continued as Nate Zeitschrtft

speculative Physik (New Journal of Speculative Physics) in 1802.]1 [Bruno, SW4:257.]

— 16 —

)gmatic systems, as well as in the criticism and ide-e theory of scientific knowledge fEr4;isenschaftslehre],k of a reality of the Absolute that would be outsidelendent from ideality. In all these, unmediated cogni-efore impossible because the in-itself, by way of thecognizance, becomes a product of the soul, a mere, and ceases to be in-itself.ipposing a merely mediated knowledge of the Ab-

pective of how the mediation occurs), the Abso-losophy can only appear as something that is pre-rder that it can be philosophized about; in fact, theekes place, and all philosophizing begins, and haspin, with the idea of the Absolute come alive. Thatrue can only be recognized in truth; that whichin evidence. But truth and evidence are clear inand must therefore be absolute and of the essence

this was recognized, it was not even possible tof the idea of that higher evidence, which is soughtAy. When, by way of tradition, the word and thehilosophy reached those who lacked the inner im-such recognition — a recognition whose first be-vere identical to those of philosophy itself theyto philosophize without it.x ho have experienced that evidence — which lies0. in the idea of the Absolute and which any humans too weak to describe will regard as entirely in-irate any attempts to reduce and confine it to theity of the individual [c)as Individuelle des Individuumsj

Faith, premonition, sentiment, or whatever one mayt only will it not reach this evidence, but it will ne-ry nature in the process.

— 18 —

itself predetermined in this very oneness, and that the ACTUALITY of it

having a separate existence resides only IN THE THING ITSELF. This is

merely an ideal circumstance, and even here it occurs only to the extent

that any thing is capable of BEING ONE WITH ITSELF due to it having

once been inside the Absolute."

I will now attempt to fully lift the veil on this question,since even the recent expositions in the Zedschrift have notyet pursued it into the only realm where its resolution can begiven completely (that of Practical Philosophy).

We cannot yet move on to properly answer said question,however; doubts whose resolution must take precedence stillstand in our way.

For the time being we presuppose only that withoutwhich everything that follows would remain uncomprehend-ed: intellectual intuition. We posit this with certainty becausethere can be no dissimilarity or manifoldness inside it. Any-one who had to describe what he perceived in it could onlydescribe it as pure absoluteness, without any furtherdeterminatio. n.

We ask that the presence of this pure absoluteness withoutany other determination be preserved forever and is neveragain lost sight of.

Any further cognition is a result of this orig. diary cognition

and therefore separate from it.Just as the nature of intellectual intuition — which is simple

by definition and for which no other expression is available tous than that of absoluteness — is absoluteness, it cannot havebeing other than by its very notion (because if this were notthe case, it would have to be determined by something other,outside of itself, which is impossible). It is therefore not real

at all; rather, it is in itself only ideal. Equally eternal as the

ideal-per-se [schlechthin-Ideale] is the eternal form: the ideal-per-se is not subjected to this form, for it is itself' without all form,as surely as it is absolute; rather, this form is subjected to theeternal form, for it precedes it, not temporally but notionally.

* Bruno, p. 131 [SW4: 2821

— 19 —

This form is such that the ideal-per-se is tn :media- ireal without egressul. g from its ideality.

This real is now only a mere effect of the fortthe form is an unmoving and calm [stille rind ruhiqethe ideal, the simple-per-se. It does not intermixreal, for while the latter is the same by its inherentis eternally another by its ideal determination. Itsimple in the sense of the ideal, for it is the ideal rein the real, although in it both are one, without dif

The simple or inherent nature is neither the elf' e[Bewirkende] nor the real-ground [Realgrund] of thethere is as little progression from one to the otheis from the idea of a circle to its form (the equal dall points from its center). Here, nothing at all takesuccession [1Vacheinander]; rather, it happens as ifblow, all at once, even though, according to the idone flows out of the other. The basic truth is this: thereal by itself insofar as it is determined by the idealthe ideal is the first per se. As certain as it is that tthe first, the form qf the determination of the real by thesecond, and the real is the third.

There could be little objection to calling sheer al:*in its simple-per-se nature, God or the Absolute.in contrast, absoluteness, since absoluteness, in itsmeaning, relates to form and is form. And since thiassumed to be the purport of, among others, Escwe might easily be in consensus about this. Howthis understanding, God could not be described as 1one can grasp only by premonition, sentiment, etc.form of the determination of the real enters the sothe ideal as knowledge, then the essence enters as thethe soul and is one with it so that the soul, sub specietis, beholds the essence itself.

According to the aforementioned, we have toate between the ideal-per-se, which hovers eternallthat is real and never egresses from its eternalnessaccording to the just proposed designation; thewhich cannot be the true real of the former withouanother absolute, only under a different guise; andacts as an intermediary between absoluteness and f

— 18 — — 19 —

rimmed in this very oneness, and that the ACTUALITY of it

parate existence resides only IN THE THING ITSELF. This is

Oral circumstance, and even here it occurs only to the extent

ing is capable of BEING ONE WITH ITSELF due to it having

vide the Absolute. "°

low attempt to fully lift the veil on this question,the recent expositions in the Zeitschrift have not

Kt it into the only realm where its resolution can be,pletely (that of Practical Philosophy).

This form is such that the ideal-per-se is immediately also a

real — without egressing from its ideality.

This real is now only a mere effect of the form, just asthe form is an unmoving and calm [stifle and ruhtg e] effect of

the ideal, the simple-per-se. It does not intermix with thereal, for while the latter is the same by its inherent nature, it

is eternally another by its ideal determination. It is also notsimple in the sense of the ideal, for it is the ideal representedin the real, although in it both are one, without difference.

The simple or inherent nature is neither the effecting agent

[Bewirkende] nor the real-ground [Realgrund] of the form, and

there is as little progression from one to the other as thereis from the idea of a circle to its form (the equal distance ofall points from its center). Here, nothing at all takes place in

succession [Nacheinander]; rather, it happens as if by a singleblow, all at once, even though, according to the ideal effect,one flows out of the other. The basic truth is this: the real is notreal by itself insofar as it is determined by the ideal. Thereforethe ideal is the first per se. As certain as it is that the ideal is

the first, the form of the determination of the real by the ideal is the

second, and the real is the third.

There could be little objection to calling sheer absoluteness,in its simple-per-se nature, God or the Absolute, and form,

in contrast, absoluteness, since absoluteness, in its originarymeaning, relates to form and is form. And since this could beassumed to be the purport of, among others, Eschenmayer,we might easily be in consensus about this. However, withthis understanding, God could not be described as that whichone can grasp only by premonition, sentiment, etc. For if theform of the determination of the real enters the soul through

the ideal as knowledge, then the essence enters as the in-itself'of

the soul and is one with it so that the soul, sub specie aeternita-tis, beholds the essence itself.

According to the aforementioned, we have to differenti-ate between the ideal-per-se, which hovers eternally above allthat is real and never egresses from its eternalness, e.g., God,

according to the just proposed designation; the red-per-se,which cannot be the true real of the former without becominganother absolute, only under a different guise; and that which

acts as an intermediary between absoluteness and form. Form

A yet move on to properly answer said question,doubts whose resolution must take precedence still ur way.e time being we presuppose only that withoutzything that follows would remain uncomprehend-crual intuition. We posit this with certainty becausebe no dissimilarity or manifoldness inside it. Any-had to describe what he perceived in it could onlyt as pure absoluteness, without anyfitrther determination.

Lat the presence of this pure absoluteness withoutdetermination be preserved forever and is neversight of.rther cognition is a result of this orig. inaty cognitionFore separate from it.the nature of intellectual intuition — which is simpleon and for which no other expression is available toat of absoluteness — is absoluteness, it cannot haveer than by its very notion (because if this were nott would have to be determined by something other,' itself, which is impossible). It is therefore not real

her, it is in itself only ideal. Equally eternal as these [schlechthin-Ideale] is the eternal form: the ideal-per-ubjected to this form, for it is itself without all form,as it is absolute; rather, this form is subjected to therm, for it precedes it, not temporally but notionally.

o. 131 [SW4:282].

— 20 —

can be described as a self-recognith m[Selkterkennen] insofar asthe ideal becomes objectified in the real as an autonomouscounter-image by virtue of the absoluteness; however, thisself-recognition must not be regarded as a mere accident orattribute of the absolute-ideal but rather as a self-dependentabsolute. For the Absolute cannot be the ideal-ground [Ideal-

grand] of anything that is not, like itself, absolute; just as, there-fore, the real — wherein the ideal recognizes itself — must alsobe an independent absolute and does not mix with the ideal,which in its purity and sheer ideality subsists for itself.

This self-recognition of absoluteness has been under-stood as a coming out of itself, a splitting of itself into dif-ference — a misinterpretation that must be corrected in or-der to answer the original question without creating furthermisunderstandings.

"Undoubtedly," says Eschenmayer, "all that is finite andinfinite is merely a modification of the eternal. But what thendetermines these modifications, the splitting of itself intothese differences? If this determining agent [Beotimmende] liesinside absolute identity, then it will apparently be cloudedby that fact; if it lies outside of it, then self-recognition, thecoming-out-of-itself, the splitting itself into difference, is forabsolute identity one and the same." °

Setting aside this commixture of two entirely separatequestions — whether it is possible for absoluteness to haveself-recognition and how actual differences can originatefrom it (the cognizance of which would require somethingcompletely different) — we confine ourselves to the follow-ing question: In what way is this self-recognition to be un-derstood as identity coming out of itself? Is it to be under-stood as difference posited between the subjective and theobjective of this recognition whereby, therefore, the identitypredicated upon the Absolute is sublated? However, theidentity is only predicated upon the ideal-per-se, which inits pure identity is not sublated by becoming objectified in areal counter-image, just as the ideal-per-se cannot be in op-position to the latter since, according to the aforementioned,it does not mix with it and is not at once subject and object.

* Eschenmayer, op. cit., p. 70.

— 21 —

Or does this coming-out-of-itself of identity lie in the fathis self-recognition is to be thought of as an actionlung], which implies modification? Or as a transition frsence to form? The latter is not the case because forteternal as essence and as inseparable from it as absokis from the idea of God. The former is not the case 6form is an entirely unmediated expression of the ideal.without any action or activity [Thattg keit] on the partlatter (when we call it an act [Akt], we speak of it in 1terms); just as light emanates from the sun without tmoving, so form emanates from essence, whose natuonly be expressed in terms of an activity that is its(tionless at the deepest rest [eine Thatig keit, die die tie 4.4del& t t].° A misunderstanding occurs when a real suet[Faige], which modifies that from which it egresses, ifused with an ideal succession, which by definition cabe the case in the circumstances under discussion.

Furthermore, how is this self-recognition as a spof the Absolute into itself [rich-selbst-Theilen] to be reg:Are we to envision the Absolute as a plant that propthrough offshoots? As one part of its essence becomirject, another becoming object? Whoever understancthis way must not have read or grasped the propomade by the first philosophers on these matters. WIthis division supposed to take place? In the subject?ideal-per-se, the subject remains whole and undividthe object? But that is also the whole Absolute. Or, toa frequently used example, does a thing divide by ere:

* Bruno, p. 175 ISW4: 305: "Whoever could find an expressioactivity that is as motionless at the deepest rest, for a rest that isas the greatest activity, would somewhat approximate notionally thof supreme perfection." Cf. the notion of "at rest yet in motion" iiParmeniA0146a: "Being of this nature, must the One then not berest and in motion? — How? — The One is at rest because it isFor by being in the One and by not passing out of it, it is in tlin itself. — So it is indeed. — And that which is always in the satalways be at rest. — Certainly. — But how? Must not, what is athe Other, in contrast, never be in the same? And if it is never in tnever be at rest, and if not at rest, be in motion? — So it is. — ThenOne, being always both in itself and in the Other, must always 6rest and in motion."]

——20—

scribed as a dell-recog nit& [Selbsterkennen] insofar asbecomes objectified in the real as an autonomousnage by virtue of the absoluteness; however, thisnition must not be regarded as a mere accident or3f the absolute-ideal but rather as a self-dependentFor the Absolute cannot be the ideal-ground [Ideal-nvthing that is not, like itself, absolute; just as, there-eal — wherein the ideal recognizes itself must also!pendent absolute and does not mix with the ideal,is purity and sheer ideality subsists for itself.elf-recognition of absoluteness has been under-

coming out of itself, a splitting of itself into dif-, a misinterpretation that must be corrected in or-;wer the original question without creating furtherstandings.ubtedly," says Eschenmayer, "all that is finite andmerely a modification of the eternal. But what thens these modifications, the splitting of itself into!rences? If this determining agent [Bedtimmende] liessolute identity, then it will apparently be cloudedpct; if it lies outside of it, then self-recognition, theut-of-itself, the splitting itself into difference, is fordentity one and the dame."'

; aside this commixture of two entirely separate— whether it is possible for absoluteness to havenition and how actual differences can originatehe cognizance of which would require somethingv different) —we confine ourselves to the follow-ion: In what way is this self-recognition to be un-as identity coming out of itself? Is it to be under-difference posited between the subjective and theof this recognition whereby, therefore, the identityI upon the Absolute is sublated? However, the; only predicated upon the ideal-per-se, which inlentity is not sublated by becoming objectified in ater-image, just as the ideal-per-se cannot be in op-D the latter since, according to the aforementioned,t mix with it and is not at once subject and object.

mayer, op. cit., p. 70.

—21—

O does this coming-out-of-itself of identity lie in the fact thatthis self-recognition is to be thought of as an action [Hand-

lung], which implies modification? Or as a transition from es-sence to form? The latter is not the case because form is aseternal as essence and as inseparable from it as absolutenessis from the idea of God. The former is not the case becauseform is an entirely unmedLted expression of the ideal-per-sewithout any action or activity [Thiittg keit] on the part of thelatter (when we call it an act [Akt], we speak of it in humanterms); just as light emanates from the sun without the sunmoving, so form emanates from essence, whose nature canonly be expressed in terms of an activity that is itself mo-tionless at the deepest rest [eine Thatig. keit, die die tie. fite Rube

delbg t].' A misunderstanding occurs when a real succession

[Folge], which modifies that from which it egresses, is con-fused with an ideal succession, which by definition can onlybe the case in the circumstances under discussion.

Furthermore, how is this self-recognition as a splittingof the Absolute into itself [dish-delbdt-Theilen] to be regarded?Are we to envision the Absolute as a plant that propagatesthrough offshoots? As one part of its essence becoming sub-ject, another becoming object? Whoever understands it inthis way must not have read or grasped the propositionsmade by the first philosophers on these matters. Where isthis division supposed to take place? In the subject? But asideal-per-se, the subject remains whole and undivided. Inthe object? But that is also the whole Absolute. Or, to repeata frequently used example, does a thing divide by creating a

*Bruno, p. 175 1SW4: 305: "Whoever could find an expression for anactivity that is as motionless at the deepest rest, for a rest that is as activeas the greatest activity, would somewhat approximate notionally the natureof supreme perfection." Cf. the notion of at rest yet in motion" in Plato'sParmenided146a: "Being of this nature, must the One then not be both atrest and in motion? — How? — The One is at rest because it is in itself.For by being in the One and by not passing out of it, it is in the same,in itself. — So it is indeed. — And that which is always in the same, mustalways be at rest. — Certainly. — But how? Must not, what is always inthe Other, in contrast, never be in the same? And if it is never in the same,never be at rest, and if not at rest, be in motion? — So it is. — Therefore theOne, being always both in itself and in the Other, must always be both atrest and in motion."'

— 22 — — 23 —

mirror-image of itself? Is then one part of it in itself and an-other in the reflected image? Or is it not, in fact, impossibleto think of a more perfect identity than the one betweena thing and its reflected image, even though the two cannever mix?*

Finally, to render proof of this becoming-difference ofabsolute identity in self-recognition, one could conclude:'Thought of as the subjective, absolute identity is pure sim-plicity without any difference; in the objective or real, as itsopposite, it therefore becomes necessarily nonidentity or dif-ference.' Granting that this is true, the in-itself remains freeof all difference, for only that wherein it becomes objective isdifference, not it itself. As to this difference, it could only con-sist in the one and same identity becoming objective withinparticular forms; but these forms could only be the ideas sincein them the universal, i.e., absoluteness, becomes one withthe particular in such a way that neither the latter is can-celled by the former nor the former by the latter. However,the differences exist in the ideas only as possibilities, not asactual differences, for each idea is a universe in itself, andall ideas are but one Idea. Thus were one to understand thisbecoming-difference of the Absolute through self-recognitionas an actual process, then it would not even take place in thecounter-image of the Absolute and therefore even less in theAbsolute itself; because if it differentiates, then it differenti-ates not in itself but in another, which is its real, and then notthrough itself but through the form that flows independentlyout of the abundance [Fillie] of its absoluteness without any

effort on its part.Having rendered these explanations, which undoubtedly

will prove to anyone who is able to grasp absolute matters atall that the ideal-per-se subsists in pure identity in relation toform, we will turn to answering the question put forward atthe outset.

The independent self-recognition of the ideal-per-se is aneternal transformation of pure ideality into reality: in thissense, and in no other, we will now approach this self-repre-sentation of the Absolute.

All merely finite imagination [Vorstellen] is by natuideal; however, the representations of the Absolutenature real for it is that in view of which the ideal is nse. Thus the Absolute does not become objectified tform in a merely ideal image of itself but rather in a cimage that is itself a truly other absolute. It transfers itessentiality [Iresenheit] into the form by which it beccobject. The autonomous producing [Produciren] of thiabsolute is an imaginative forming [Hineinbilden] anding [Hineinschauen] of itself in the real, whereby it is iident and, like the first Absolute, subsists in itself. TIone side: the oneness that, with respect to the ideas. Idenoted as the imaginative formation [Einbildung] ofnite into the finite.*

Yet it is only absolute and autonomous in the self-ccation of the Absolute and therefore truly onkas it is simultaneously in the absolute form and theretAbsolute: this is its other, ideal or subjective, side.

Thus it is entirely real only to the extent that it isideal, and it is in its absoluteness one and the same —which can be regarded formally in exactly the same

The Absolute would not be truly objective in thedid not impart to it its power to transform idealityity and to objectify itself into particular forms. Thiproducing is that of the ideas, or rather this producinEfirst kind (the producing through the absolute form)are one producing [Ein Producfrenj. The ideas, too, areto their originary oneness [Uranheit] in thenzselves becabsoluteness of the first has passed into them, but ththemselves or real only insofar as they are simultarmthe originary oneness; ergo, as fizr as they are ideal. Since Inot therefore appear in particularity and differenceceasing to be absolute, they all coincide with theoneness, just as the latter coincides with the Absolut

The ideas, too, are necessarily productive in Iway; they, too, bring forth only absoluteness, only iseach oneness that emerges from them relates to the

* [On the considerable difficulties of rendering Schelling's noWang into the English language, see above, p. xxn.] Bruno, p. 44 [SW4: 238].

* [On the considerable difficulties of rendering Schelling's notion of &a-Ir./Swig into the English language, see above, p. xxu.]

— 23 —

All merely finite imagination IVorgellenlis by nature onlyideal; however, the representations of the Absolute are bynature real for it is that in view of which the ideal is real-per-se. Thus the Absolute does not become objectified throughform in a merely ideal image of itself but rather in a counter-image that is itself a truly other absolute. It transfers its entireessentiality [Wesenheit] into the form by which it becomes anobject. The autonomous producing [Produciren] of this otherabsolute is an imaginative forming [Hineinbilden] and behold-ing [Hineinschauen] of itself in the real, whereby it is indepen-dent and, like the first Absolute, subsists in itself. This is itsone side: the oneness that, with respect to the ideas, we havedenoted as the imaginative formation [Einbildung] of the infi-nite into the finite.°

Yet it is only absolute and autonomous in the self-objectifi-cation of the Absolute and therefore truly in-itself only insofaras it is simultaneously in the absolute form and thereby in theAbsolute: this is its other, ideal or subjective, side.

Thus it is entirely real only to the extent that it is entirelyideal, and it is in its absoluteness one and the same — both ofwhich can be regarded formally in exactly the same way.

The Absolute would not be truly objective in the real if itdid not impart to it its power to transform ideality into real-ity and to objectify itself into particular forms. This secondproducing is that of the ideas, or rather this producing and thefirst kind (the producing through the absolute form) togetherare one producing [Ein Produciren]. The ideas, too, are relativeto their originary oneness [Ureinheit] in themselves because theabsoluteness of the first has passed into them, but they are inthemselves or real only insofar as they are simultaneously inthe °rig' ituuy oneness; ergo, as far as they are ideal. Since they can-not therefore appear in particularity and difference withoutceasing to be absolute, they all coincide with the originaryoneness, just as the latter coincides with the Absolute.

The ideas, too, are necessarily productive in the sameway; they, too, bring forth only absoluteness, only ideas, andeach oneness that emerges from them relates to them in the

— 22 —

ige of itself? Is then one part of it in itself and an-e reflected image? Or is it not, in fact, impossiblef a more perfect identity than the one betweenK1 its reflected image, even though the two can

to render proof of this becoming-difference ofdentity in self-recognition, one could conclude:

as the subjective, absolute identity is pure sim-hout any difference; in the objective or real, as itst therefore becomes necessarily nonidentity or dif-;ranting that this is true, the in-itself remains freerence, for only that wherein it becomes objective is, not it itself. As to this difference, it could only con-one and same identity becoming objective withinforms; but these forms could only be the ideas sincehe universal, i.e., absoluteness, becomes one withular in such a way that neither the latter is can-the former nor the former by the latter. However,races exist in the ideas only as possibilities, not asFerences, for each idea is a universe in itself, andre but one Idea. Thus were one to understand this-difference of the Absolute through self-recognitiona/ process, then it would not even take place in thenage of the Absolute and therefore even less in theitself; because if it differentiates, then it differenti-itself but in another, which is its real, and then not

tself but through the form that flows independently! abundance [Rifle] of its absoluteness without anyits part.g rendered these explanations, which undoubtedly

to anyone who is able to grasp absolute matters atke ideal-per-se subsists in pure identity in relation towill turn to answering the question put forward at

t.'dependent self-recognition of the ideal-per-se is anransformation of pure ideality into reality: in thisd in no other, we will now approach this self-repre-of the Absolute.

p. 44 [SW4: 2381.

- 24 -

same manner as they themselves relate to the originary one-ness. This is the true transcendental theogony: there is no re-lation other than an absolute one in this realm, which the OldWorld knew to express only sensually through the image ofprocreation [Zeugutzg], whereby the procreated is dependenton the procreating but is otherwise independent.

The result of this continuous subject-objectification,which according to the one first law of the form of absolute-ness stretches into infinity, is this: the absolute world withall its gradations of essence reduces itself to the absoluteoneness of God so that in the former there is nothing trulyparticular and nothing that until now is not absolute, ideal,all soul, pure natura naturans.

Countless attempts have been made to no avail to con-struct a continuity from the supreme principle of the intel-lectual world [Intellekhuzlwelt] to the finite world. The oldestand most frequent of these attempts is well known: the prin-ciple of emanation, according to which the outflowings fromthe godhood, in gradual increments and detachment from theoriginary source, lose their divine perfection until, in the end,they pass into the opposite (matter, privation), just as light isfinally confined by darkness. But in the absolute world, thereare no confines anywhere, and just as God can only bringforth the real-per-se and absolute, so any ensuing effulgence isagain absolute and can itself only bring forth something akinto it. There can be no continuous passage into the exact op-posite, the absolute privation of all ideality, nor can the finitearise from the infinite by decrements. This attempt to let thephenomenal world [Sinnenweld spring from God negativelythrough mediation and gradual detachment is nonetheless farsuperior to one that assumes a direct relation of the divineessence or its form to the substrate of the phenomenal world,in whatever way this might actually happen. Only those canpull the thorn of that question out of the soul who, as Platosays, abandon the idea of a continuity between the phenom-enal universe and divine perfection, for only then will the lat-ter manifest itself in its true nonbeing [Nu'," htseyn].

The crudest explanation is arguably the one that attri-butes to the godhood an underlying random and disorderlymatter, which, having been impregnated by the outgoing

- 25 -

effectuality with originary images of all things, gto them and thereby attains an orderly constitution.father of true philosophy, is named as one of the aof said doctrine, which is a desecration of his name.examination shows that this entire idea, like most omon conceptions of Platonic philosophy, is drawn efrom the Timaens, a work that because of its affiniiern thinking is much easier to become familiar wittrue Platonic works, which are characterized by aspirit, such as the Phaedo or the Repuhlu,' ; and opposistic ideas about the origin of the phenomenal wortthe Tu. miens is nothing but a marrying of the Platoniof intellectualism [IntellektualimL] with cosmogorthat prevailed prior to Plato and Socrates, whose crable works are praised precisely for having divoriophy forever from these cruder notions.

The inappropriateness of said combination i$.minated by the works of the Neoplatonists, v4.4strated — by having purged entirely from their s)alleged Platonic idea — that they had grasped titheir forefather more purely and deeply than acoming after them. They explained matter as n ∎and called it that which ie not (o-k 6v), not allowingrelation or behavior between matter and the godhoutflowing of the same, such as the light of thesence being diffracted by or reflected in nothingniphenomenal world emerging from it. Such a armtic imagination would have been as alien to theiwhich was illumined by the light of idealism, as adualism. Just as the Parsi system of religion e:mixture of the infinite and finite principles in thenal world by assuming an incessant state of conflitwo primeval beings who only become separatedother and into their own during the dissolution cconcrete (at the end of the world), so the primevaposed to the real is not a mere privation, a pure Israther a principle of nothingness and darkness, eqer to the principle that in nature' affects nothingrefraction beclouds light. However, nothing can Iin nothingness or beclouded by the same, and tl

- 24 -

finer as they themselves relate to the originary one-is the true transcendental theogony: there is no re-

m- than an absolute one in this realm, which the Oldems- to express only sensually through the image of

[Zeugung], whereby the procreated is dependentcreating but is otherwise independent.esult of this continuous subject-objectification,:ording to the one first law of the form of absolute-ches into infinity, is this: the absolute world withidations of essence reduces itself to the absolutef God so that in the former there is nothing truly- and nothing that until now is not absolute, ideal,u re natura naturans.

ess attempts have been made to no avail to con-ontinuity from the supreme principle of the intel-xid [Intellektutzlwelt] to the finite world. The oldestfrequent of these attempts is well known: the prin-nanation, according to which the outflowings fromod, in gradual increments and detachment from thesource, lose their divine perfection until, in the end,into the opposite (matter, privation), just as light is'fined by darkness. But in the absolute world, therenfines anywhere, and just as God can only bringeal-per-se and absolute, so any ensuing effulgence isnlute and can itself only bring forth something akin-e can be no continuous passage into the exact op-! absolute privation of all ideality, nor can the finite11. the infinite by decrements. This attempt to let the'al world [Sinnenwelt] spring from God negativelylediation and gradual detachment is nonetheless faro one that assumes a direct relation of the divine- its form to the substrate of the phenomenal world,er way this might actually happen. Only those canhorn of that question out of the soul who, as Plato'don the idea of a continuity between the phenom-m-se and divine perfection, for only then will the lat-est itself in its true nonbeing [Nu4teeyn].

udest explanation is arguably the one that attri-he godhood an underlying random and disorderly-hick, having been impregnated by the outgoing

- 25 -

effectuality with originary images of all things, gives birthto them and thereby attains an orderly constitution. Plato, thefather of true philosophy, is named as one of the originatorsof said doctrine, which is a desecration of his name. A properexamination shows that this entire idea, like most of the com-mon conceptions of Platonic philosophy, is drawn exclusively

from the TM. UMW, a work that because of its affinity to mod-ern thinking is much easier to become familiar with than thetrue Platonic works, which are characterized by a high moral

spirit, such as the Phaedo or the Republic, and opposed to real-

istic ideas about the origin of the phenomenal world. Indeed,

the Tu. naeus is nothing but a marrying of the Platonic doctrine

of intellectualism [Intellektualinnuo] with cosmogonic notions

that prevailed prior to Plato and Socrates, whose commemo-rable works are praised precisely for having divorced philos-ophy forever from these cruder notions.

The inappropriateness of said combination is also illu-minated by the works of the Neoplatonists, who demon-strated — by having purged entirely from their systems thisalleged Platonic idea — that they had grasped the spirit oftheir forefather more purely and deeply than all of thosecoming after them. They explained matter as nothingness

and called it that which is not (ak Ov), not allowing any direct

relation or behavior between matter and the godhood or anyoutflowing of the same, such as the light of the divine es-sence being diffracted by or reflected in nothingness and thephenomenal world emerging from it. Such a crudely realis-tic imagination would have been as alien to their thinking,which was illumined by the light of idealism, as any kind ofdualism. Just as the Parsi system of religion explains themixture of the infinite and finite principles in the phenome-nal world by assuming an incessant state of conflict betweentwo primeval beings who only become separated from eachother and into their own during the dissolution of all that isconcrete (at the end of the world), so the primeval being op-posed to the real is not a mere privation, a pure Nothing but

rather a principle of nothingness and darkness, equal in pow-er to the principle that in nature' affects nothingness and inrefraction beclouds light. However, nothing can be reflectedin nothingness or beclouded by the same, and there can be

— 26 —

no evil principle or principle of nothingness before the highestgood [Alitt], or everlasting with it, because the former is onlya second-born, never a first-born.

Generally speaking, should not the many who, withoutvocation and driven by vain arrogance, venture to addressthis lofty question have already learned by the simplest ofreflections that they are equally ignorant when they makethe Absolute into a force that positively brings forth the finiteworld, or attribute to it an underlying negative aspect, irre-spective of whether it is posited first as matter with infinitemanifoldness of qualities, as mere empty indeterminatenessafter the manifoldness has been scrubbed [abgebleic' ht] out ofit, or even as mere nothingness? Here, as in the first case,God is made the originator of evil. Matter as nothingness byno means possesses a positive character; it only takes it on,prior to becoming an evil principle, after the resplendenceof that which is good comes into conflict with it. Some willsurely argue that this conflict is not imposed by God yet ac-knowledge an originary effect or outflowing of God that isconfined by an independent principle, hereby falling back onthe most complete dualism.

In a word, there is no continuous transition from the Abso-lute to the actual; the origin of the phenomenal world is con-ceivable only as a complete falling-away from absolutenessby means of a leap [Sprung]. If philosophy were able to derivethe origin of the actual world in a positive manner from theAbsolute, then the Absolute would have its positive cause inthe same; however, in God resides only the cause of the ideas,and only those produce other ideas. There is no positive effectcoming out of the Absolute that creates a conduit or bridgebetween the infinite and the finite. Furthermore: philosophyhas only a negative relation to phenomenal objects; since itdemonstrates less the truth of their being than their nonbeing,how could it therefore ascribe to them a positive relationshipto God? The absolute is the only actual; the finite world, bycontrast, is not real. Its cause, therefore, cannot lie in an im-

partatu m[Mittbeilang] of reality from the Absolute to the finiteworld or its substrate; it can only lie in a renzove[Enffernang], in

afalling-away[Alfall] from the Absolute.

— 27 —

This view, which is as evident as it is noble, alsents the true Platonic doctrine put forward in the ationed writings and carries most purely and distincimprint of its founder's spirit. According to Platocan descend from its original state of beatitude andinto the temporal universe and thereby torn awaytruth only by means of a falling-away from the ori€age [Urbild]. This was the tenet of the Greek mvstsecret teachings, to which Plato alluded quite explithe origin of the phenomenal world should not beas popular religion does, as a creation, as a positivefrom the Absolute, but as a falling-away from it. Iwas founded its practical doctrine that the soul, thevine essence in man, must be withdrawn from anyof its relation and association with the flesh as mu4sible so that by mortifying the sensate life the soulabsoluteness and again partake of the intuition ofnary image. This doctrine is inscribed on every INPhaedo* and appears to have been symbolically prethe Eleusinian mystery cults with the myth of Delthe Rape of Persephone. t

We now return to where we left off: that Josame steady and eternal effect of the form — throethe essentiality [Wesenheit] of the Absolute depictthe object and forms itself imaginatively into it [die,ab-und ihm einbildet] — the latter is, like the former,ly in itself "He who formed the universe was gooenvy can ever come out of goodness; being free fhe desired that all things should be like himsellas possible," as it is written in the figurative laithe Timaetts.t — The exclusive particularity of the

[Cf. Plato, Phaeda 66b--67d.]I' SeeKritidebed.lournalderPhdosophie, vol. 1, no. 3 [18021, pp. 2 ,

das Verhaltnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophy iiberhaRelationship of the Philosophy of Nature to PhilosophySW5: 123): "The purification, says Plato (Phaedo, p. 152 [677in the most completely attainable separation of soul from the 1habituation of it to collect and withdraw itself out of every parand dwell as far as possible by itself. Such a release of the sbody is called death."]

[PL., Tinuietto 29e.]

— 26 —

Iciple or pal' zap' le of nothingness before the highestft or everlasting with it, because the former is onlyDrn, never a first-born.ly speaking, should not the many who, withoutrid driven by vain arrogance, venture to addressluestion have already learned by the simplest ofthat they are equally ignorant when they maketo into a force that positively brings forth the finiteatribute to it an underlying negative aspect, irre-whether it is posited first as matter with infinite

:ss of qualities, as mere empty indeterminatenessianifoldness has been scrubbed [abgeblek bt] out ofas mere nothingness? Here, as in the first case,ie the originator of evil. Matter as nothingness bypossesses a positive character; it only takes it on,!coming an evil principle, after the resplendenceich is good comes into conflict with it. Some willle that this conflict is not imposed by God yet ac-: an originary effect or outflowing of God that isv an independent principle, hereby falling back onpmplete dualism.rd, there is no continuous transition from the Abso-actual; the origin of the phenomenal world is con-nly as a complete falling-away from absolutenessal a leap [Sprung]. If philosophy were able to deriveof the actual world in a positive manner from thethen the Absolute would have its positive cause intow-ever, in God resides only the cause of the ideas,lose produce other ideas. There is no positive effectit of the Absolute that creates a conduit or bridgele infinite and the finite. Furthermore: philosophynegative relation to phenomenal objects; since it

.tes less the truth of their being than their nonbeing,it therefore ascribe to them a positive relationship

'he absolute is the only actual; the finite world, bys not real. Its cause, therefore, cannot lie in an im-Vittbeilung] of reality from the Absolute to the finites substrate; it can only lie in a remove[Entfernung],ink.ay ['Wall] from the Absolute.

— 27 —

This view, which is as evident as it is noble, also repre-sents the true Platonic doctrine put forward in the aforemen-tioned writings and carries most purely and distinctively theimprint of its founder's spirit. According to Plato, the soulcan descend from its original state of beatitude and be borneinto the temporal universe and thereby torn away from thetruth only by means of a falling-away from the originary im-age [Urbild]. This was the tenet of the Greek mystery cult'ssecret teachings, to which Plato alluded quite explicitly: thatthe origin of the phenomenal world should not be imagined,as popular religion does, as a creation, as a positive emersionfrom the Absolute, but as a falling-away from it. Hereuponwas founded its practical doctrine that the soul, the fallen di-vine essence in man, must be withdrawn from and purifiedof its relation and association with the flesh as much as pos-sible so that by mortifying the sensate life the soul can regainabsoluteness and again partake of the intuition of the origi-nary image. This doctrine is inscribed on every page of thePbaedo* and appears to have been symbolically prefigured inthe Eleusinian mystery cults with the myth of Demeter andthe Rape of Persephone.t

We now return to where we left off: that through thesame steady and eternal effect of the form — through whichthe essentiality [Wesenheit] of the Absolute depicts itself inthe object and forms itself imaginatively into it [sicb im Object

ab-und ibm einbilded— the latter is, like the former, absolute-ly in itself. "He who formed the universe was good, and noenvy can ever come out of goodness; being free from envyhe desired that all things should be like himself as muchas possible," as it is written in the figurative language ofthe Tu. naeus.t — The exclusive particularity of the Absolute

[Cf. Plato, Phaedo 661,-67S.]4. See Kritisches Journal der Phitodophie, vol. 1, no. 3 [1802], pp. 24-25 r Ueber

das Verhaltnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophic uberhaupt (On theRelationship of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General),"SW5: 123): "The purification, says Plato (Phaedo, p. 152 [67e—d1) consistsin the most completely attainable separation of soul from the body and thehabituation of it to collect and withdraw itself out of every part of the bodyand dwell as far as possible by itself. Such a release of the soul from thebody is called death."]

[PL., Tinzaeus 29e.]

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lies in the fact that when it bestows its essentiality upon itscounter-image, it also bestows upon it its self-dependence.This being-in-and-for-itself, this particular and true real-ity of the first-intuited, is freedom, and from that first self-dependence outflOws what in the phenomenal world ap-pears as freedom, which represents the last trace and theseal [Siegel], as it were, of divinity in the fallen-away world.The counter-image, as an absolute entity and having all itsattributes in common with the originary image, would nottruly be in itself and absolute if it could not grasp itself inits selfhood [Sellytheit], in order to have true being as theother absolute. But it cannot be as the other absolute unless itseparates itself or falls away from the true Absolute. For it istruly in itself and absolute only in the self-objectification ofthe Absolute, i.e., only insofar as it is simultaneously in thelatter; this very relationship to the Absolute is one of neces-

sity. It is free of the Absolute only in its absolute necessity.Therefore, by being its own, as a free entity, separate fromnecessity, it ceases to be free and becomes entangled in thatnecessity, which is the negation of absolute necessity, ergopurely finite.

What applies to the counter-image in this relationshipnecessarily applies to its immanent ideas: in its renuncia-tion of necessity, freedom is the true Nothing and thereforecannot produce images of its own nullity, i.e., the phenom-enal and actual world. The cause of the falling-away, andtherefore also its activity of production, lies not in the Absolute

but merely in the real, in the intuited itself, which must beregarded as fully autonomous and free. The cause of the pos-

sibility of the falling-away lies in freedom, and insofar as it isposited by the imaginative formation [Einbildung] of the ab-solute-ideal into the real, it also lies in the forms and therebyin the Absolute; but the cause of its actuality lies solely in

the fallen-away itself, which produces the nothingness of thesensate world only through andfor itself.

Since the unmediated real, in the Absolute, is also idealand therefore idea, it necessarily, being purely as such withinitself, can produce nothing but negations of absoluteness ornegations of the idea once it is separated from the Absolute.Since as unmediated reality it is also ideality, what is pro-duced is a reality that, separated from ideality, is not directly

- 29 -

determined by it. It is a reality that does not haNplete possibility of its being in itself but rather ourthus it is a sensate, conditional actuality.

The prodzwing agent [Producirende] continues towhich is the soul insofar as it is destined to producand to intuit itself in it. That wherein it becomesno longer the real but rather a pseudo-image [Scproduced reality that is not in itself real but real itthe soul and even then only insofar as it has fallenthe originary image [Urbil.d].

To the extent that the sensate world is the secation of the Absolute in the form — whereby tlimage can exist in itself and remove itself frorinary image — it has a relation to the Absoluteindirect one. Thus the origin of the finite worldtraced directly to the infinite world but must bewithin the principle of causation, which itself is itherefore has only a negative significance: nodirectly orig. Mate from the Absolute or be traced back Lby the cause of the finite world is expressed asbreaking-away from the infinite world.

This falling-away is as eternal (outside of time)solute and the world of ideas Vdeenwe/d. The latter,is eternally being borne into another absolute asas this other absolute, as originary idea [Undee],sarily double-sided (whereby it is both in itselfand in the in-itself [im An-sich]). Likewise, the orifand all of its innate ideas, is given a double life: onyet bound to finitude and is, insofar as it is sepathe other life, a pseudo-life [Scheinleben]; the oth4Absolute, which is its true life. Irrespective ofcharacter of the falling-away and the sensate unfollows from it, both are merely accidental withthe Absolute, for the cause of the falling-awa y Iin the one nor the other but rather in the ideathe aspect of its selfhood. The falling-away is extra[attfierwesentlic. h] for the Absolute as well as for titimage because it does not affect either one sinceworld is thereby immediately brought into nothiview of the Absolute and the originary image, itNothing and is only for

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fact that when it bestows its essentiality upon itsrnage, it also bestows upon it its self-dependence.Lg-in-and-for-itself, this particular and true real-first-intuited, is freedom, and from that first self-

ce outflOws what in the phenomenal world ap-freedom, which represents the last trace and the'I], as it were, of divinity in the fallen-away world.ter-image, as an absolute entity and having all itsin common with the originary image, would not

in itself and absolute if it could not grasp itself inod [Se/bstheid, in order to have true being as theJute. But it cannot be as the other absolute unless ititself or falls away from the true Absolute. For it is

self and absolute only in the self-objectification oflute, i.e., only insofar as it is simultaneously in theis very relationship to the Absolute is one of neces-free of the Absolute only in its absolute necessity.!, by being its own, as a free entity, separate from, it ceases to be free and becomes entangled in that, which is the negation of absolute necessity, ergoute.applies to the counter-image in this relationshiply applies to its immanent ideas: in its renuncia-!cessity, freedom is the true Nothing and thereforeroduce images of its own nullity, i.e., the phenom-actual world. The cause of the falling-away, andalso its activity of production, lies not in the Absolute.ly in the real, in the intuited itself, which must beas fully autonomous and free. The cause of the pm-the falling-away lies in freedom, and insofar as it isty the imaginative formation [Einbildung] of the ab-!al into the real, it also lies in the forms and therebybsolute; but the cause of its actuality lies solely in-away itself, which produces the nothingness of theworld only through and for itself.

the unmediated real, in the Absolute, is also ideal!fore idea, it necessarily, being purely as such withint produce nothing but negations of absoluteness or; of the idea once it is separated from the Absolute.unmediated reality it is also ideality, what is pro-

a reality that, separated from ideality, is not directly

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determined by it. It is a reality that does not have the com-plete possibility of its being in itself but rather outside of itself;

thus it is a sensate, conditional actuality.The producing agent [Producirende] continues to be the idea,

which is the soul insofar as it is destined to produce finitenessand to intuit itself in it. That wherein it becomes objective isno longer the real but rather a pseudo-image [ScheMbild]— aproduced reality that is not in itself real but real in relation tothe soul and even then only insofar as it has fallen away fromthe originary image [Urbild].

To the extent that the sensate world is the self-objectifi-cation of the Absolute in the form — whereby the counter-image can exist in itself and remove itself from the orig-inary image it has a relation to the Absolute, albeit anindirect one. Thus the origin of the finite world cannot betraced directly to the infinite world but must be understoodwithin the principle of causation, which itself is infinite andtherefore has only a negative significance: no finite thing can

directly originate from the Absolute or be traced back to it, where-by the cause of the finite world is expressed as an absolutebreaking-away from the infinite world.

This falling-away is as eternal (outside of time) as the Ab-solute and the world of ideas [Ideenwelt]. The latter, as ideality,is eternally being borne into another absolute as reality, andas this other absolute, as originary idea [Uridee], it is neces-sarily double-sided (whereby it is both in itself [in sich selbst]

and in the in-itself [inz An-su. 'h]). Likewise, the originary idea,and all of its innate ideas, is given a double life: one is in itselfyet bound to finitude and is, insofar as it is separated fromthe other life, a pseudo-life [Scheinlebetz]; the other is in theAbsolute, which is its true life. Irrespective of this eternalcharacter of the falling-away and the sensate universe thatfollows from it, both are merely accidental with regards tothe Absolute, for the cause of the falling-away lies neitherin the one nor the other but rather in the idea seen underthe aspect of its selfhood. The falling-away is extra-essential[au1Serwesentlic. h] for the Absolute as well as for the originaryimage because it does not affect either one since the fallenworld is thereby immediately brought into nothingness. Inview of the Absolute and the originary image, it is the trueNothing and is only for

— 30 —

Neither can the falling-away be explained (so to speak)because it is absolute and descends from absoluteness, eventhough its consequence and its necessarily entrained pre-dicament [Verkingnis] is nonabsoluteness. For the self-depen-dence, which the other absolute gains in the self-intuition ofthe first, the form, only goes as far as the possibility of thereal being-within-itself but no further; beyond that bound-ary lies the penalty, which consists in becoming entangledwith finitude.

Of the newer philosophers, no one argues this point moreclearly than Fichte, when he posits the principle of finite con-sciousness in an active deed [That-Handlung] rather than a mat-ter of fact [That-Sache].° Few of his contemporaries have beenable to use this insight for their own enlightenment.

On its pass through finitude, the being-for-itself of thecounter-image expresses itself most potently as "I-ness" [kb-

hell], as self-identical individuality. Just as a planet in its orbitno sooner reaches its farthest distance from the center thanit returns to its closest proximity, so the point of the farthestdistance from God, the I-ness, is also the moment of its re-turn to the Absolute, of the re-absorption into the ideal.i . TheI-ness is the general principle of finitude. The soul discernsin all things an impression of this principle. The being-with-in-itself is expressed in inorganic bodies as rigidity, and theimaginative formation of identity into difference or ensoul-ment as magnetism. The celestial bodies, the unmediatedpseudo-images of the idea, have their I-ness in the centrifugalforce. Where the originary oneness, the first counter-image,

o [Fichte's term That-Handling combines Thatsache (matter of fact) andHandlung (action) to convey an originary productive deed that is directedat itself rather than outside.]

t [Cf. Schelling's use of the periapsis and apoapsis in a planetary orbitas an analogy for the continuous receding of all things from absolute one-ness into difference and returning to it in Bruno, SW4.271: In this wayit happens that the planets move within self-reverting lines that are likecircles, yet are not described around one center but two separate, recipro-cally balanced focal points: one is the shining image of absolute oneness andidentity; the other, the idea of it insofar as it expresses the absolute and self-dependent universe, so that in this difference can be recognized the onenessand identity and the individual fate of each planet as particular beings to beabsolute, and as absolute beings to be particular. "]

— 31 —

falls into the imaged world, it appears as reason, fathe essence of knowledge, is originary knowledgeoriginary reason [Urvernunft] (AOyos); however, theproduct, is identical with the producing agent; it L'■son, and, as fallen reason, it is common sense [Versta4Just as the originary oneness begets all of its innateof itself, so common sense produces that which oto those ideas merely out of itself. Reason and l-neetrue absoluteness, are one and the same, and if for thiworld this is the pinnacle of its being-for-itself, thethe point where the fallen world restores itself tonal — where those otherworldly powers, the ideareconciled and descend into temporality through s(and the moral actions of men. The ultimate goalverse and its history is nothing other than the compciliation [Versiihnung] with and re-absorption Urge' diinto the Absolute.

The importance of a philosophy that makesple of the Fall of Man, in its most universal articiown principle, albeit unconsciously, cannot be eienough in the context of the aforementioned dogmixture of ideas with concepts of finitude. It is toprinciple of all science, it can only result in a negatophy, but much is already gained by having the nerealm of nothingness, separated from the positivreality by an incisive boundary since the formeremanate from it after this separation. Whoevergood can be recognized without evil commits tiof all errors, for in philosophy, as in Dante's poettoward heaven leads through the abyss [Abgrand].

Fichte says that the I-ness is its own deed [Thad, i

tion [Handeln]; it is nothing apart from this activirmerely for-itielf, not in-itself. That the cause of a

[On the relationship between Vernunft (reason) and lirstanding or common sense), see Schelling's 1810 Stuttgarter r,(Stuttgart Private Lectures):"Usually, a distinction is postulcommon sense and reason. Yet this is entirely erroneous, for cand reason are the same thing, albeit considered from ditietives ... Common sense appears to be more active, more pracreason seems more passive, more yielding... Reason is noshmon sense yielding to the highest principle, the soul" (S 7: -

— 30 —

r can the falling-away be explained (so to speak)t is absolute and descends from absoluteness, evens consequence and its necessarily entrained pre-Prbiingnidl is nonabsoluteness. For the self-depen-itch the other absolute gains in the self-intuition ofthe form, only goes as far as the possibility of the;-within-itself but no further; beyond that bound-be penalty, which consists in becoming entangledude.newer philosophers, no one argues this point morein Fichte, when he posits the principle of finite con-s in an active deed [That-Handlung] rather than a mat-IThat-Sacher Few of his contemporaries have beene this insight for their own enlightenment.pass through finitude, the being-for-itself of the

nage expresses itself most potently as "I-ness" [kb-1f-identical individuality. Just as a planet in its orbit• reaches its farthest distance from the center thanto its closest proximity, so the point of the farthestTom God, the I-ness, is also the moment of its re-e Absolute, of the re-absorption into the ideal! Thehe general principle of finitude. The soul discernsigs an impression of this principle. The being-with-; expressed in inorganic bodies as rigidity, and theye formation of identity into difference or ensoul-magnetism. The celestial bodies, the unmediatediages of the idea, have their I-ness in the centrifugalhere the originary oneness, the first counter-image,

s term That-Handltuw combines Maim( be (matter of fact) andcoon) to convey an originary productive deed that is directeder than outside.]selling's use of the periapsis and apoapsis in a planetary orbitK• for the continuous receding of all things from absolute one-fference and returning to it in Bruno, SW4. 271: "In this waythat the planets move within self-reverting lines that are likeire not described around one center but two separate, recipro-ed focal points: one is the shining image of absolute oneness andother, the idea of it insofar as it expresses the absolute and self-

iniverse, so that in this difference can be recognized the onenessand the individual fate of each planet as particular beings to bed as absolute beings to be particular."]

— 31 —

falls into the imaged world, it appears as reason, for form, asthe essence of knowledge, is originary knowledge [Urwissen],

originary reason [Urvernutzft] (Adyos); however, the real, as itsproduct, is identical with the producing agent; it is real rea-son, and, as fallen reason, it is common sense [Verstand] (voiSis).*Just as the originary oneness begets all of its innate ideas outof itself, so common sense produces that which correspondto those ideas merely out of itself. Reason and I-ness, in their

true absoluteness, are one and the same, and if for the reflectedworld this is the pinnacle of its being-for-itself, then it is alsothe point where the fallen world restores itself to the origi-nal — where those otherworldly powers, the ideas, becomereconciled and descend into temporality through science, art,and the moral actions of men. The ultimate goal of the uni-verse and its history is nothing other than the complete recon-ciliation [Versohnung] with and re-absorption [Wiz' derauflaiung]

into the Absolute.The importance of a philosophy that makes the princi-

ple of the Fall of Man, in its most universal articulation, itsown principle, albeit unconsciously, cannot be emphasizedenough in the context of the aforementioned dogmatic ad-mixture of ideas with concepts of finitude. It is true that as aprinciple of all science, it can only result in a negative philos-ophy, but much is already gained by having the negative, therealm of nothingness, separated from the positive realm ofreality by an incisive boundary since the former could onlyemanate from it after this separation. Whoever holds thatgood can be recognized without evil commits the greatestof all errors, for in philosophy, as in Dante's poem, the pathtoward heaven leads through the abyss [Abgrund].

Fichte says that the I-ness is its own deed [That], its own ac-

tion [Handein]; it is nothing apart from this activity, and it is

merely for-itself, not in-itself. That the cause of all of finite

° [On the relationship between Verntrqft (reason) and Verdant) (under-

standing or common sense), see Schelling's 1810 Stattgarter Pripatvorledungen(Stuttgart Private Lectures):"Usually, a distinction is postulated betweencommon sense and reason. Yet this is entirely erroneous, for common senseand reason are the same thing, albeit considered from different perspec-tives... Common sense appears to be more active, more practical, whereasreason seems more passive, more yielding... Reason is nothing but com-mon sense yielding to the highest principle, the soul" (SW 7: 472)1

— 32 —

things is merely residing in finitude and not in the Absolutecould not have been expressed in clearer words. How purelythe ancient doctrine of true philosophy argues for the noth-ingness of the I-ness as the principle of the world, and whata contrast to unphilosophy [Unphilosophiel,* which shudders atthe thought of this nothingness and strives to locate its realitywithin a substrate that is affected by infinite intellect, withinformless matter, or substance!

Let us pursue — without claiming to be exhaustive —some of the ramifications of this principle as it extends intonature.

The visible universe is not dependent because it has a be-ginning in time but rather by virtue of its nature or concept.

It genuinely has neither begun nor not begun, for it is a merenonbeing, and a nonbeing can no more come into being as notcome into being.

The soul, becoming aware of its falling-away, nonethelessstrives to become another absolute and thus to produce abso-luteness. But its predicament is that it can only produce thatwhich was (as idea) ideal within it, as real — that is, as nega-tion of the ideal. The soul therefore produces particular andfinite things. It strives to express the complete idea accord-ing to both of its unitive modes [Einheiten]— and even all ofthe various degrees of ideas, as much as possible in each ofthese pseudo-images — by taking this attribute from one ideaand that from another so that the sum of all that is producedequals a complete reproduction of the true universe. In thisway, the soul also brings about the various potencies of thingsby gradually (now expressing the whole idea in the real, now

* [The term unphilosophy, while awkward, conveys best a sense of activeopposition. G. the introduction to the first volume of the KJ-di:oche,/ Journal

authored jointly by Schelling and Hegel: "Criticism parts unphilosophyfrom philosophy; it stands on the one side and has unphilosophy on the op-posite side. Since unphilosophy takes up a negative attitude to philosophy,there can be no talk of discussing it as philosophy. There is nothing to bedone but to recount how this negative side expresses itself and confessesits nonbeing, which appears as platitude." "Ueber das Wesen der philoso-phischen Kritik tiberhaupt, and ihr Verhaltnis zum gegenwdrtigen Zustandder Philosophie insbesondere (On the Essence of Philosophical CriticismGenerally, and its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Par-ticular)," Krill:A:bed Journal der Phil000phie, vol. 1, no. 1 (1802), pp. vi–vii.]

— 33 —

in the ideal) raising itself up to the originary onefrom the perspective of the soul's selfness, the entawith necessity — which unfurls in thet1111,11ra nata

general scene of the birth of' finite and sensate thinkdissoluble. Only by surrendering its selfness andto its ideal oneness will it once again arrive at int-divine and producing absoluteness.

In their ideality, the two unitive modes of the irking-within-itself and the being-within-the-Absoluteunity [Eiize Einheit], and the idea is therefore absolutIn falling-away, it becomes two, i.e., difference, and (process of production, the one unity necessarily becifor an image of the in-itself can be produced only bnating the two unitive modes as mere attributes. '1within-itself, separated from the other unitive modbeing immediately in the difference between real'possibility (the negation of true being); the generthis difference is time, since any thing that has th■possibility of being in an other rather than in itsellral, and therefore time is the principle and necessaall that is nonessential. The producing agent, whitintegrate the form of selfness with the other form. rinto an attribute, a form of the substance (of thereal), and expresses it through the first dimensilength. For the line is time extinct in space.' Like titive mode — the imaginative formation [Ebibildurig]

into difference — the other is necessarily a reverse[Zuriickbi Mang] of difference into identity, with di

[For Spinoza, the natura naturata, natured nature, signifieor creations that depend on or have been created directly byVerbandlung van God, part I, chap. 9, in B. de Spinoza, Opera...,

I" [Cf. the more elaborate exposition in Schelling's SydenzPhilaaophie and der Naturphilosophie indhedondere (System of 1General and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular, 18(line is time as it is formed into space, quasi time extinct in Sigleichdam erbAiebene Zeit], is evident already from the follow-inimaginative formation [Einbildung] of' identity into differenclooses its own life and is subjugated under the whole, but dithe case with the line, where a difference, a being-apart myet this difference is penetrated by a dominating, singularity.]tity." (SW6: 223)]

— 32 —

nerely residing in finitude and not in the Absolutehave been expressed in clearer words. How purelyI doctrine of true philosophy argues for the noth-' the I-ness as the principle of the world, and whatto unphilosophy [Unphilompbtel° which shudders atit of this nothingness and strives to locate its realityubstrate that is affected by infinite intellect, withinlatter, or substance!pursue — without claiming to be exhaustive —

;e ramifications of this principle as it extends into

ible universe is not dependent because it has a be-time but rather by virtue of its nature or concept.

lv has neither begun nor not begun, for it is a mereand a nonbeing can no more come into being as notbeing.

ii, becoming aware of its falling-away, nonetheless>ecome another absolute and thus to produce abso-lut its predicament is that it can only produce that; (as idea) ideal within it, as real — that is, as nega-ideal. The soul therefore produces particular and

gs. It strives to express the complete idea accord-h of its unitive modes [Eb zheiten]— and even all ofs degrees of ideas, as much as possible in each ofdo-images — by taking this attribute from one idea.om another so that the sum of all that is producedDmplete reproduction of the true universe. In thisout also brings about the various potencies of thingsIly (now expressing the whole idea in the real, now

n unphiladophy, while awkward, conveys best a sense of activet1 the introduction to the first volume of the KritLiched Journalatly by Schelling and Hegel: "Criticism parts unphilosophyphy; it stands on the one side and has unphilosophy on the op-ince unphilosophy takes up a negative attitude to philosophy,no talk of discussing it as philosophy. There is nothing to berecount how this negative side expresses itself and confesseswhich appears as platitude." "Ueber das Wesen der philoso-fik tiberhaupt, and ihr Verhaltnis zum gegenwartigen Zustandhie insbesondere (On the Essence of Philosophical Criticismid its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Par-iwbes Journal der Philosophie, vol. 1, no. 1 (1802), pp. vi–vii.]

— 33 —

in the ideal) raising itself up to the originary oneness. Butfrom the perspective of the soul's selfness, the entanglementwith necessity — which unfurls in the natura naturata,* thegeneral scene of the birth of finite and sensate things — is in-dissoluble. Only by surrendering its selfness and returningto its ideal oneness will it once again arrive at intuiting thedivine and producing absoluteness.

In their ideality, the two unitive modes of the idea (the be-ing-within-itself and the being-within-the-Absolute) form one

unity [Eine Euz' belt], and the idea is therefore absolute oneness.In falling-away, it becomes two, i.e., difference, and during theprocess of production, the one unity necessarily becomes three,

for an image of the in-itself can be produced only by subordi-nating the two unitive modes as mere attributes. The being-within-itself, separated from the other unitive mode, involvesbeing immediately in the difference between reality and itspossibility (the negation of true being); the general form ofthis difference is tune, since any thing that has the completepossibility of being in an other rather than in itself is tempo-ral, and therefore time is the principle and necessary form ofall that is nonessential. The producing agent, which seeks tointegrate the form of selfness with the other form, makes timeinto an attribute, a form of the substance (of the producedreal), and expresses it through the first dimension, that oflength. For the line is time extinct in space. t Like the first uni-tive mode — the imaginative formation [Einhildung] of identityinto difference — the other is necessarily a reverse formation[Zuriickhildung] of difference into identity, with difference as

[For Spinoza, the natura naturata, natured nature, signified the modesor creations that depend on or have been created directly by God." (Katie

Verbandlung van Gad, part I, chap. 9, in B. de Spinoza, Opera, vol.4 )]t [Cf. the more elaborate exposition in Schelling's Sydtenz der gedanunten

Philodaphie and der Naturphiladophie inebe.iozzdere (System of Philosophy inGeneral and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular, 1804): "That theline is time as it is formed into space, quasi time extinct in space [inz Ratan

gleiehdanz erlaschene Zeit], is evident already from the following: Time is theimaginative formation [Ebibildung] of identity into difference, whereby itlooses its own life and is subjugated under the whole, but this is preciselythe case with the line, where a difference, a being-apart may be posited,yet this difference is penetrated by a dominating, singularity-negating iden-tity." (S W6: 223)]

— 34 --

its starting point. The latter, which in contrast to identitycan manifest itself only as pure negation, is represented bythe point, for it is the negation of all reality. The dissolution ofidentity into difference — which expresses itself for the soulin an absolute disparateness wherein nothing is one with anyother — can only be lifted by positing difference as pure nega-

tion. Identity is then posited so that in its absolute disparate-ness no point is essentially different from any other. Each iscompletely similar and equal to the next; one is contingenton all and all on one, as is the case in absolute space.

Space subsumes time; this occurs in the first dimensionjust as time also subsumes space and, albeit subordinated toits dominant dimension (the first), subsumes all the others.The dominant dimension of space is the second dimension,the image of ideal oneness; it is in time as the past, which likespace, is for the soul a completed image wherein it intuitsdifferences as having receded, having been re-absorbed intoidentity. The real oneness, as such, intuits them in the futurebecause through the future all things are projected for it andassume their selfness. Indifference [Indifferenz], or the thirdunitive mode, is shared by both counter-images, for the pres-ent time is to them a similar likeness of the absolute nothing-ness of finite things (since, like the calm depth of space, thesoul is never aware of it).

Meanwhile, as said before, the producing agent seeks tomake the produced as similar to the idea as possible. Just asthe absolute universe has all of time within itself as possibil-ity (but none outside), the producing agent strives to subju-gate time to the third unitive mode and to tether it to thatother mode. But since the soul cannot return to the absolutethesis, the absolute firstness, it produces only a synthesis, orthirdness, whereby both modes do not stand in the Abso-lute unclouded lungetriibtl, as one and the same, as a nonad-dition, but rather as an insurmountable secondness. ° The

produced is therefore an intermediary [Alittelwesen] that takes

*Cf. Charles Sanders Peirce's notion of secondness as baecceitas, which hedescribed as the "shock" of experiencing the "brutal fact" of the Other: "Weare constantly bumping against hard fact." Collected Papers of Charles Sanders

Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: The BelknapPress of Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), 1:324.

— 35 —

part equally in the nature of firstness and seconprinciples of good and evil, wherein both unitiverunning into each other [du:* h durch-kreuzend], beconand bring about an impenetrable pseudo-image orone true reality.

Matter belongs altogether to the category of nosofar as it is nothing other than the negation of elthe complete absorption of reality in ideality. Viewand independent from the soul, of which it is a menulacrum), matter is complete nothingness. In itsness from the soul, it resembles the shadow-imageas described by the wisdom of the Greeks, whermighty Heracles hovers only as a phantom (aoAco&modlf tarries among the immortal gods.*

To the extent that the soul, with regard to itsfinitude, cognizes true nature only through thisary, as if through a clouded mirror, all finite co€necessarily irrational; to the objects in themselveindirect relationship that cannot be dissolved by s

The question of the origin of matter is one cmysterious in philosophy. So far, no dogmatic philiovercome the alternatives of considering it as eithedent from God, as another elementary being [Gnuposed to Him, or as dependent from God and theing God Himself the originator of privation, limitits resulting evils. Even Leihniz. — who, understoo■deduced matter merely from the concept of monacthey are adequate, involve only God and if they ai[verworren], involve the sensate things — could not 6tify and, as it were, defend God's supposed sanctiobecause he could not explain these muddled ideaassociated deprivations and moral evils.

The old, sacred doctrine puts an end to all thoKnots [Zweifelsknoten] that have exhausted reasonnia. It says that souls descend from the world ofthe sensate world, where they find themselves tophysical body, as if incarcerated, as a penalty for tland for offenses committed prior (ideally, not ten

* [Homer,] Odyssey9.601-3.

— 34 —

point. The latter, which in contrast to identityest itself only as pure negation, is represented byor it is the negation of all reality. The dissolution ofto difference — which expresses itself for the soullute disparateness wherein nothing is one with anyin only be lifted by positing difference as pure nega-

ity is then posited so that in its absolute disparate-tint is essentially different from any other. Each is,r similar and equal to the next; one is contingentall on one, as is the case in absolute space.subsumes time; this occurs in the first dimensione also subsumes space and, albeit subordinated toint dimension (the first), subsumes all the others.nant dimension of space is the second dimension,of ideal oneness; it is in time as the past, which likeOr the soul a completed image wherein it intuitss as having receded, having been re-absorbed intohe real oneness, as such, intuits them in the futuretrough the future all things are projected for it andeir selfness. Indifference [Indifferent], or the thirdxle, is shared by both counter-images, for the pres-. to them a similar likeness of the absolute nothing-Lite things (since, like the calm depth of space, the'Cr aware of it).chile, as said before, the producing agent seeks toproduced as similar to the idea as possible. Just asto universe has all of time within itself as possibil-one outside), the producing agent strives to subju-to the third unitive mode and to tether it to thatle. But since the soul cannot return to the absoluteabsolute firstness, it produces only a synthesis, orwhereby both modes do not stand in the Abso-

uded Fungal-17k], as one and the same, as a nonad-t rather as an insurmountable secondness. ° Theis therefore an intermediary [Mittelwesen] that takes

les Sanders Peirce's notion of secondness as baecceitas, which he

the "shock" of experiencing the "brutal fact" of the Other: "We

ly bumping against hard fact." Collected Paper, of Charted Sander,"

- Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap

yard Univ. Press, 1960), 1:324.

— 35 —

part equally in the nature of firstness and secondness, theprinciples of good and evil, wherein both unitive modes, byrunning into each other [sic' h durch-kreuzend], become cloudedand bring about an impenetrable pseudo-image or idol of theone true reality.

Matter belongs altogether to the category of nonbeing in-sofar as it is nothing other than the negation of evidence, ofthe complete absorption of reality in ideality. Viewed in itselfand independent from the soul, of which it is a mere idol (sim-ulacrum), matter is complete nothingness. In its disparate-ness from the soul, it resembles the shadow-images of Hadesas described by the wisdom of the Greeks, where even themighty Heracles hovers only as a phantom (EiNoAov) while he

hal. tall tarries among the immortal gods.*To the extent that the soul, with regard to its selfness or

finitude, cognizes true nature only through this intermedi-ary, as if through a clouded mirror, all finite cognizance isnecessarily irrational; to the objects in themselves, it has anindirect relationship that cannot be dissolved by sameness.

The question of the origin of matter is one of the mostmysterious in philosophy. So far, no dogmatic philosophy hasovercome the alternatives of considering it as either indepen-dent from God, as another elementary being [Grundwesetz] op-posed to Him, or as dependent from God and thereby mak-ing God Himself the originator of privation, limitations, andits resulting evils. Even Leihniz. —who, understood correctly,deduced matter merely from the concept of monads, which ifthey are adequate, involve only God and if they are muddled[verworren], involve the sensate things — could not help but jus-tify and, as it were, defend God's supposed sanctioning of evilbecause he could not explain these muddled ideas and theirassociated deprivations and moral evils.

The old, sacred doctrine puts an end to all those GordianKnots [Zweifeloknoten] that have exhausted reason for millen-nia. It says that souls descend from the world of intellect intothe sensate world, where they find themselves tethered to aphysical body, as if incarcerated, as a penalty for their selfnessand for offenses committed prior (ideally, not temporally) to

[Homer,] Odymey9.601-3.

— 36 —

this life. While they bring along the memory of the unisonand harmony of the one true universe, their apprehension ofit is distorted by the cacophony and dissonance of the sensesjust as they are unable to recognize truth in what is, or what

appears to be, but only in what (for them) was and in that towhich they strive to return — the life of the intellect.

But the contradictions in which reason and realist think-ing become necessarily entangled are no less resolved bythis doctrine. For if we ask, for example, whether the uni-verse expands infinitely or is finite, the answer is neitherbecause just as nonbeing cannot be limited, it cannot beunlimited since nonbeing can have no predicates. But if thequestion is whether the universe is this or that insofar as ithas an apparent reality, then the question really is whetherone or the other of two predicates can be assigned to it inthe same sense in which reality is assigned to it, namely inconcept and idea only, whereby one again cannot be at a

loss for the answer.We will now briefly outline the further consequences of

this doctrine for the Philosophy of Nature.After it is plunged into finitude, the soul can no longer be-

hold the originary images in their true form, only in a formclouded by matter. Nonetheless, it still sees in them their orig-inal nature and recognizes them as universals [Universa], and

while it sees them differentiated and apart from each other, itdoes not see them merely as independent from each other butalso as self-dependent. Just as for the finite souls, the ideasappear in the celestial bodies as their unmediated reflections

[Abbilder], so the ideas that preside over their correspondingcelestial bodies are linked to organic bodies whereby theharmony between both is apprehended. As reflections of theoriginary ideas, and thus the first fallen-away beings, thestars represent the principle of good more directly becausethey create their own light in the darkness of the fallen-awayworld, and they disseminate this light, the outflowing of eter-nal beauty, in nature. For they are the least removed fromthe originary images and take on the least corporeality, andthey relate to the dark celestial bodies [the planets] as theideas relate to the stars, namely, like orbital centers whereinthey inhere as the other and at the same time as themselves.

— 37 —

Motion ensues from the concordance between thenbeen discussed elsewhere.°

As God passes into objectivity in the first count,by an act of self-intuition, by way of the form, thereling a complete simile of Himself, so the soul, too.itself by an act of self-intuition into nature, in the kg'is the spirit that resides in nature merely in a ruincFor even though it is completely separated fromprinciples, the world of appearances is for the soulrelics of the divine or absolute world; it is absolute'in its intuited form, not the ideal-per-se, and then ckdifference and finitude. From this is to be understSpinoza arrives at the strict dictum that Deus &itsa.l. He does not, however, go as far as to considerextension only insofar as He is the same essence oof thinking and extension whereby that whichin extension and negated in negation is the essenceBut which philosopher would want to contradict thewhat is negated in the sensate and extended world isthe in-itself and divine?

Only complete ignorance and imbecility couldfor the fact that the Philosophy of Nature has beenfirst of materialism, then of the identification of (the phenomenal world, and subsequently of panthewhatever other names the simple-minded, withccontemplation, avail themselves of for their attacks)some of the same accusers themselves belonged to cother category. For (1) it is the Philosophy of Natun

° [Cf. Bruno, SW4: 269-70: "In the celestial spheres, that wheseparate and distance themselves from the reflection (AMt7) oness is not divorced from that whereby they are assimilated intoconcept. They are not split up into contending forces but are haentangled, so that they alone enjoy the blessed state of the uniin the state of separate existence... I think of the motion of eelsas something whole and simple, not as a composite but as absoltOne aspect of this oneness causes a thing to inhere within this alness as a whole; it is commonly called gravity. The other causesin itself as individual; we commonly view this as the opposite ofboth completely equivalent aspects of the same oneness; theythe same: One."]

f [" God is a thinking and extended thing," Spinoza, Ethic a, pI and II: in Opera, vol. 2.]

— 37 —

Motion ensues from the concordance between them, as hasbeen discussed elsewhere.*

As God passes into objectivity in the first counter-imageby an act of self-intuition, by way of the form, thereby creat-ing a complete simile of Himself, so the soul, too, projectsitself by an act of self-intuition into nature, in the light, which

is the spirit that resides in nature merely in a ruinous state.For even though it is completely separated from the idealprinciples, the world of appearances is for the soul just therelics of the divine or absolute world; it is absoluteness onlyin its intuited form, not the ideal-per-se, and then clouded bydifference and finitude. From this is to be understood howSpinoza arrives at the strict dictum that Deus est red exten-

sa.l . He does not, however, go as far as to consider God anextension only insofar as He is the same essence or in- itself

of thinking and extension whereby that which L, extended

in extension and negated in negation is the essence of God.But which philosopher would want to contradict the fact that

what is negated in the sensate and extended world is thereforethe in-itself and divine?

Only complete ignorance and imbecility could account

for the fact that the Philosophy of Nature has been accused

first of materialism, then of the identification of God withthe phenomenal world, and subsequently of pantheism (andwhatever other names the simple-minded, without muchcontemplation, avail themselves of for their attacks), had notsome of the same accusers themselves belonged to one or theother category. For (1) it is the Philosophy of Nature that has

*[Cf. Bruin), SW4:269-70: "In the celestial spheres, that whereby thingsseparate and distance themselves from the reflection (Abhild) of their one-

ness is not divorced from that whereby they are assimilated into the infiniteconcept. They are not split up into contending forces but are harmoniouslyentangled, so that they alone enjoy the blessed state of the universe, evenin the state of separate existence... I think of the motion of celestial bodiesas something whole and simple, not as a composite but as absolute oneness.One aspect of this oneness causes a thing to inhere within this absolute one-ness as a whole; it is commonly called gravity. The other causes it to inherein itself as individual; we commonly view this as the opposite of gravity. Butboth completely equivalent aspects of the same oneness; they are, in fact,the same: Onel

t ["God is a thinking and extended thing," Spinoza, Ethiea, part II, prop.

I and II: in Opera, vol. 2.]

— 36 —

While they bring along the memory of the unisonnony of the one true universe, their apprehension of3rted by the cacophony and dissonance of the sensesley are unable to recognize truth in what is, or whatto be, but only in what (for them) was and in that toley strive to return — the life of the intellect.he contradictions in which reason and realist think-3me necessarily entangled are no less resolved bytrine. For if we ask, for example, whether the uni-Epands infinitely or is finite, the answer is neitherjust as nonbeing cannot be limited, it cannot be

KI since nonbeing can have no predicates. But if theis whether the universe is this or that insofar as it

ipparent reality, then the question really is whether:he other of two predicates can be assigned to it ine sense in which reality is assigned to it, namely inand idea only, whereby one again cannot be at a

the answer.vill now briefly outline the further consequences of:trine for the Philosophy of Nature.r it is plunged into finitude, the soul can no longer be-e originary images in their true form, only in a formby matter. Nonetheless, it still sees in them their orig-

tire and recognizes them as universals [Universat andsees them differentiated and apart from each other, itt see them merely as independent from each other butself-dependent. Just as for the finite souls, the ideasin the celestial bodies as their unmediated reflectionsr], so the ideas that preside over their correspondingI bodies are linked to organic bodies whereby theiy between both is apprehended. As reflections of thery ideas, and thus the first fallen-away beings, thepresent the principle of good more directly because!ate their own light in the darkness of the fallen-awayand they disseminate this light, the outflowing of eter-iuty, in nature. For they are the least removed fromOnary images and take on the least corporeality, andlate to the dark celestial bodies [the planets] as theelate to the stars, namely, like orbital centers whereinhere as the other and at the same time as themselves.

— 38 —

demonstrated most clearly the absolute nonreality of all ap-paritions [Erscheinungenj and stated the laws that, according toKant, articulate its possibility "that they are instead genu-ine expressions of their absolute nullity and nonessentialityby testifying to a being outside of absolute oneness, a beingthat is in itself a nothing";* (2) it has demanded "the absoluteseparation of the phenomenal world from reality-per-se" as anessential condition for the cognition of true philosophy "be-cause only thereby is the former posited as absolute nonreality;

any other relationship, however, to the Absolute would be-stow upon it some form of reality"; t (3) the I-ness, as the actualpoint of separation and transition of the particular forms fromoneness, has been posited as the true principle of finitude andshown to be only its own deed [erg ne That] and independent from

its action [Handeln] to be truly nothingness, just as finitude,which is separated from the whole with the I-ness and only for

it — a nothingness, by the way, that has been asserted consis-tently by the true philosophers throughout history, albeit invarious forms.

Note Zeit-schrift far spekulative Physik, vol. 1, no. 2[1802], p. 11["Ferne-re Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie (Further Presentationsfrom the System of Philosophy)," SW4: 397. Schelling's is paraphrasinghimself here].

t Nate Zed-schrift far spekulative Physik, vol. 1, no. 1 [1802], p. 73 ["FernereDarstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie," SW4: 388].

t See, apart from numerous passages in Bruno, the [Nate] Zeit-schrift, vol.1, no. 2 [1802], p. 13 ["Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philoso-phie," SW4:398] and Kritisches Journal der Philosophic, vol. 1, no. 1 [1802],p. 13 ["Ober das absolute Identitats-System and sein Verhdltnis zu demneuesten (Reinholdischen) Dualismus (On the Absolute System of Iden-tity and its Relation to the Newest (Reinholdian) Dualism), SW5:261.

— 39 —

Freedom, Morality, and Beatitude: The Final

and the Beginning of History

"It always seemed to me an irresolvable problem t,free will, which carries in it all the traces of having 01

from beyond the Absolute, out of absolute identity,absolute cognizance," says Eschenmayer.* Andmuch as it is true that all oppositions of the cognitiare abolished in the absolute identity, as little it is ptranscend the main opposition of this world to the bey,

If by "this world" is meant the phenomenal workrealm of finite cognizance, then Eschenmayer can firplete confirmation of his opposition in our aforerrproposition regarding the absolute differentiation ofworld of apparitions and the absolute world. If, how(implying here that the Absolute itself has a beyondthis world can be described as the "gravitational forwill, which during cognizance is fettered to finitu<Eschenmayer clearly has a completely different coneAbsolute. What this might be, I do not know sine,before, it strikes me as an immediate contradiction tianything at all beyond the Absolute.

Were this high-spirited explorer to make clear t,for what reason in his imagination the Absoluteinto insignificance, perhaps he would realize that tiprinciple — to which he wants to hold fast throughbeyond he calls the Absolute — is the same absolutewe possess in clear knowledge and in the equallysciousness of this knowledge.

Or, did he not ignite with this absoluteness theseems to want to break through in his concept whethat the divine spark of freedom, which impartsthe invisible world onto ours, breaks through absoluteonly then — in accordance with its distribution —

° Eschenmayer, op. cit., p. 51Et Ibid., p. 54.t Ibid.

— 38 —

ted most clearly the absolute nonreality of all ap-'2rocheu'itingenj and stated the laws that, according toulate its possibility — "that they are instead genu-sions of their absolute nullity and nonessentialityrig to a being outside of absolute oneness, a beingself a nothing";* (2) it has demanded "the absoluteof the phenomenal world from reality-per-se" as arimidition for the cognition of true philosophy "be-thereby is the former posited as almolute nonreality;relationship, however, to the Absolute would be-it some form of reality";t (3) the 1-ness, as the actualmration and transition of the particular forms fromLS been posited as the true principle of finitude ande only its own deed[sign That] and independent fromliandeln] to be truly nothingness,t just as finitude,parated from the whole with the I-ness and only foringness, by the way, that has been asserted consis-he true philosophers throughout history, albeit inTns.

'oebrift ffir spekulative Physik, vol. 1, no. 2 [1802], p. 11 E"Ferne-kgen aus dem System der Philosophie (Further Presentationsstem of Philosophy)," SW4:397. Schelling's is paraphrasing

Kbrift fur spekulative Physik, vol. 1, no. 1 [1802], p. 73 ["Ferneren aus dem System der Philosophie," SW4: 388].rt from numerous passages in Bruno, the [Neuf] Zeit-schrift, vol.

p. 13 ["Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philoso-398] and Kritisehes Journal der Philosophic, vol. 1, no. 1 [1802],das absolute Identitats-System and sein Verhaltnis zu demin holdischen) Dualismus (On the Absolute System of Iden-.elation to the Newest (Reinholdian) Dualism), SW5:261.

— 39 —

Freedom, Morality, and Beatitude: The Final Cause

and the Besinnins of History

"It always seemed to me an irresolvable problem to deducefree will, which carries in it all the traces of having originatedfrom beyond the Absolute, out of absolute identity, or evenabsolute cognizance," says Eschenmayer.° And again: "Asmuch as it is true that all oppositions of the cognitive realmare abolished in the absolute identity, as little it is possible totranscend the main opposition of this world to the beyond."

If by "this world" is meant the phenomenal world and therealm of finite cognizance, then Eschenmayer can find a com-plete confirmation of his opposition in our aforementionedproposition regarding the absolute differentiation of both, theworld of apparitions and the absolute world. If, however, he isimplying here that the Absolute itself has a beyond and thatthis world can be described as the "gravitational force of freewill, which during cognizance is fettered to finitude,"t thenEschenmayer clearly has a completely different concept of theAbsolute. What this might be, I do not know since, as saidbefore, it strikes me as an immediate contradiction to look foranything at all beyond the Absolute.

Were this high-spirited explorer to make clear to himselffor what reason in his imagination the Absolute has sunkinto insignificance, perhaps he would realize that this higherprinciple — to which he wants to hold fast through faith in abeyond he calls the Absolute — is the same absoluteness thatwe possess in clear knowledge and in the equally clear con-sciousness of this knowledge.

Or, did he not ignite with this absoluteness the light thatseems to want to break through in his concept when he saysthat the divine spark of freedom, which imparts itself fromthe invisible world onto ours, breaks through absolute identity andonly then — in accordance with its distribution — originates

° Eschenmayer, op. cit., p. 51f.

I- Ibid., p. 54.Ibid.

— 40 —

thinking and being on the one side and free will and actionon the other?*

We conceive of knowledge as an imaginative formation ofinfinitude into the soul as a finite or object, which therebyis autonomous and relates to it in the same way as the firstcounter-image relates to divine intuition. In reason the souldissolves into originary oneness and becomes equal to it. It ishereby given the possibility to become fully in itself as well asfully in the Absolute.

The cause of the actuality of one thing or another no longerlies in the originary oneness (to which the soul relates in thesame way as the latter relates to the Absolute) but entirelyin the soul itself, which therefore gains the possibility of eitherrestoring itself into absoluteness or of falling anew into non-absoluteness and separating itself from the originary image.

This relationship of possibility and actuality is the causeof the manifestation of freedom; however, it is atm-pile' able be-cause it is notionally determined only by itself: yet its firstpoint of departure, from which it flows into the phenomenalworld, can and must be revealed all the same.

Just as the soul's being in the originary oneness, andtherefore in God, is for it not a real necessity but rather can-not reside in it without being at once truly within-itself andabsolute, so it is in turn incapable of being truly free withoutalso being in infinitude, that is, without also being necessary.The soul, which subordinates its infinite part to finitude byapprehending itself in selfhood, thereby falls away from theoriginary image. The immediate penalty, which follows asits predicament, is that the positive aspect of being-within-itself becomes negative; it is no longer capable of producinganything absolute and eternal but rather can only producenonabsolute and temporal things. Just as freedom atteststo the first absoluteness of all things, and hence becomesthe repeated possibility of the falling-away, so empirical ne-cessity is precisely the fallen side of freedom, the compul-sion into which it finds itself through its distancing fromthe original image.

* Ibid., p. 90.

— 41 —

How the soul, on the other hand, evades finisthrough identity with infinitude will be illuminatelationship of finite necessity to absolute necessity.

In its finite producing, the soul is merely an in:eternal necessity, just as the produced things arestruments of the ideas. But the Absolute's relatioifinite soul is now only an indirect and irrationalthings do not spring directly from the eternal buteach other, and the soul, being identical with thproduced, is therefore in the very same state of u.ening [bocbster Verfinsterung] as that of nature. Inwith infinity, on the other hand, the soul rises alsity (which strives against freedom) toward absoliwherein the real, which in the cycle of nature arpendent from freedom, is also posited in harmony

Religion, as cognition of the ideal-per-se, doethese notions but rather precedes them and isFor to cognize absolute identity, which is only ito cognize that it is independent of acting [Hatessence or in-itself of all acting, is the first cawity. To those whom the identity of necessity aappears according to their indirect yet sublimeto the world, absolute identity appears as fate [Secognition of which is therefore the first step toyity. In the conscious reconciliation with absolutesoul recognizes it as providence [VordebunA— no Ithe standpoint of its appearance as an uncompreincomprehensible identity but as God whose Ilanmediately visible and apparent to the spiritual elto the sensate eye.

The reality of God is not just a postulation IT

rality; rather, only he who recognizes God —way — is a truly moral person. Moral laws ought 1not because they are related to God as the lawmalever other relationship the finite mind is able to cbecause the essence of God and that of moralitythe same and because by acting morally we areessence of God. A moral world exists only if Goto postulate His existence in order for a moral woia complete reversal of the true and necessary reL

— 40 — — 41 —

nd being on the one side and free will and action9r °.

ceive of knowledge as an imaginative formation ofinto the soul as a finite or object, which therebysous and relates to it in the same way as the firstage relates to divine intuition. In reason the soulAo originary oneness and becomes equal to it. It isen the possibility to become fully in itself as well asAbsolute.

se of the actuality of one thing or another no longeroriginary oneness (to which the soul relates in theas the latter relates to the Absolute) but entirelyitself,' which therefore gains the possibility of either[self into absoluteness or of falling anew into non-ss and separating itself from the originary image.lationship of possibility and actuality is the causeiifestation of freedom; however, it is inexplicable be-notionally determined only by itself: yet its first

Torture, from which it flows into the phenomenaland must be revealed all the same.the soul's being in the originary oneness, and

n God, is for it not a real necessity but rather can-in it without being at once truly within-itself andio it is in turn incapable of being truly free withoutin infinitude, that is, without also being necessary.which subordinates its infinite part to finitude byling itself in selfhood, thereby falls away from theimage. The immediate penalty, which follows asiment, is that the positive aspect of being-within-pines negative; it is no longer capable of producingabsolute and eternal but rather can only produceme and temporal things. Just as freedom attestsA absoluteness of all things, and hence becomes:ed possibility of the falling-away, so empirical ne-precisely the fallen side of freedom, the compul-which it finds itself through its distancing fromal image.

How the soul, on the other hand, evades finite necessitythrough identity with infinitude will be illuminated by the re-lationship of finite necessity to absolute necessity.

In its finite producing, the soul is merely an instrument ofeternal necessity, just as the produced things are merely in-struments of the ideas. But the Absolute's relationship to thefinite soul is now only an indirect and irrational one, so thethings do not spring directly from the eternal but rather fromeach other, and the soul, being identical with that which isproduced, is therefore in the very same state of utmost dark-ening [biicbster Verfinsterung] as that of nature. In its identitywith infinity, on the other hand, the soul rises above neces-sity (which strives against freedom) toward absolute freedomwherein the real, which in the cycle of nature appears inde-pendent from freedom, is also posited in harmony with it.

Religion, as cognition of the ideal-per-se, does not followthese notions but rather precedes them and is their cause.For to cognize absolute identity, which is only in God, andto cognize that it is independent of acting [Handel/] as theessence or in-itself of all acting, is the first cause of moral-ity. To those whom the identity of necessity and freedomappears according to their indirect yet sublime relationshipto the world, absolute identity appears as fate [Schu,' .ksal], thecognition of which is therefore the first step toward moral-ity. In the conscious reconciliation with absolute identity thesoul recognizes it as providence Worsebung1— no longer fromthe standpoint of its appearance as an uncomprehended andincomprehensible identity but as God whose nature is as im-mediately visible and apparent to the spiritual eye as light isto the sensate eye.

The reality of God is not just a postulation made by mo-rality; rather, only he who recognizes God — in whateverway — is a truly moral person. Moral laws ought to be obeyednot because they are related to God as the lawmaker (or what-ever other relationship the finite mind is able to conceive) butbecause the essence of God and that of morality are one andthe same and because by acting morally we are revealing theessence of God. A moral world exists only if God exists, andto postulate His existence in order for a moral world to exist isa complete reversal of the true and necessary relations.

90.

— 42 —

It is one and the same spirit that teaches us to sacrificefinite freedom in order to attain infinite freedom and to dieto the sensate world in order to make the spiritual world ourhome. A philosophy that excludes the essence of moralitywould thus be as impossible as morality or a moral doctrinewithout the intuition of ideas.

Eschenmayer writes: "Schelling did not clearly and explicitlytouch upon the intelligible pole or the community of rationalbeings that constitutes a necessary component of our rationalsystem in any of his writings and has THEREBY EXCLUDED from

reason virtue as one of the principle ideas[Grundideen]."It is one thing when nonscientific platitude, because of its

own nullity, takes revenge on philosophy by accusing it, withheartbreaking utterances, of not being moral, or when an-other, in preachy malicious manner, tries to vent his narrow-mindedness with easy judgments. But when Eschenmayer isunfortunate to lapse into adopting the same tone, he only con-tradicts himself. For how can he accuse Fichte's system andthen concede to the very system that it is a philosophy thatnow leaves nothing to be desired for, that with it the brightday of science has dawned, and so ouTr Or does the idea ofvirtue, according to him, belong in the realm of nonphiloso-phy? And does a system of philosophy that excludes virtuedownright not leave something to be desired? And now tothe reasoning! Because the author does not explicitly andclearly touch upon the moral community of rational beingsin his writings (that is, not touch upon them in this manner),

he positively excludes the idea of virtue (there is no other way toexplain this passage) — excludes it in a system that treats allideas as one, that peculiarly represents everything within thepotency of the eternal,t wherein, according to Eschenmayer,

"virtue alone is also true and beautiful, truth is virtuous andbeautiful, and beauty is wedded to virtue and truth."° Wherenow is in this identity the exclusion of any one idea supposedto come from?

° Eschenmayer, op. cit, par. 86.t Ibid., preliminary remarks and p. 17.t Ibid., p. 17.§ Ibid., p. 92.

— 43 —

`This all sounds splendid,' some may now say, 'wting more or less the same (they say it because it is aformula that is familiar to them), but we are thinkthg adthing altogether different.'

We will therefore openly admit and say in no tterms: Yes! We believe in a higher principle than y,1and the kind of morality you speak of so paltrily an(much conviction. We believe that there is no impereward for virtue for the soul because it simply acting to the necessity of its inherent nature. The morestive expresses itself in an ought [Salim] and presupiconcept of evil next to that of the good. To preservethis is, according to the preceding, the cause of youexistence), you would rather conceive of virtue as ation than as absolute freedom. You can see that maderstood in this sense cannot be the highest principifrom that which for you accompanies morality as itsbeatitude [Selig keit]. It cannot be the destiny of rationto succumb to moral laws like single bodies succumlity because of the following difference: the soul is amoral if it is so with absolute freedom, e.g., if for it.is also absolute beatitude. Just as true immorality isfeeling unhappy, so beatitude is not accidental to vis virtue itself. Absolute morality is not a dependent;to live freely within lawfulness. Just as an idea — aflection, the celestial body — absorbs its center, ideaat once resides within it, and vice versa, so also th■inclination toward the center, to be one with God, isThis would only be a negative difference, were it nfact that this resumption of finitude into infinitudepassage of the infinite into the finite, e.g., a complewithin-itself of the latter. Thus morality and beatittxtwo different sides of the same oneness; in no needcomplemented by the other, each is absolute and cornthe other. The originary image of this being-one [Ewhich is that of both truth and beauty, is in God.

God is absolute beatitude and absolute moralitypletely equivalent manner — both are equally infilbutes of God — for a morality that is not necessarilling from the eternal laws of His nature (e.g., that

— 42 —

e and the same spirit that teaches us to sacrificekm in order to attain infinite freedom and to die;ate world in order to make the spiritual world ourphilosophy that excludes the essence of moralitys be as impossible as morality or a moral doctrinee intuition of ideas.'layer writes: "Schelling did not clearly and explicitly,n the intelligible pole or the community of rationalit constitutes a necessary component of our rationalany of his writings and has THEREBY EXCLUDED from

le as one of the principlele ideas [Grwzdideen]."

e thing when nonscientific platitude, because of itsty, takes revenge on philosophy by accusing it, withking utterances, of not being moral, or when an-weachy malicious manner, tries to vent his narrow-ss with easy judgments. But when Eschenmayer isue to lapse into adopting the same tone, he only con-.imself. For how can he accuse Fichte's system andede to the very system that it is a philosophy that

nothing to be desired for, that with it the bright'ence has dawned, and so on?t Or does the idea of!cording to him, belong in the realm of nonphiloso-I does a system of philosophy that excludes virtueit not leave something to be desired? And now to.ning! Because the author does not explicitly andRich upon the moral community of rational beingsitings (that is, not touch upon them in this manner),&excludes the idea of virtue (there is no other way tohis passage) — excludes it in a system that treats allme, that peculiarly represents everything within theof the eternal,t wherein, according to Eschenmayer,lone is also true and beautiful, truth is virtuous and, and beauty is wedded to virtue and truth." Wherethis identity the exclusion of any one idea supposed

Tom?

Imayer, op. cit, par. 86.weliminary remarks and p. 17.). 17.D. 92.

— 43 —

'This all sounds splendid,' some may now say, 'we are say-ing more or less the same (they say it because it is a prevalentformula that is familiar to them), but we are thinking about some-

thing altogether different.'We will therefore openly admit and say in no uncertain

terms: Yes! We believe in a higher principle than your virtueand the kind of morality you speak of so paltrily and withoutmuch conviction. We believe that there is no imperative orreward for virtue for the soul because it simply acts accord-ing to the necessity of its inherent nature. The moral impera-tive expresses itself in an ought [Sollen] and presupposes theconcept of evil next to that of the good. To preserve evil (forthis is, according to the preceding, the cause of your sensateexistence), you would rather conceive of virtue as a subjuga-tion than as absolute freedom. You can see that morality un-derstood in this sense cannot be the highest principle alreadyfrom that which for you accompanies morality as its opposite:beatitude [Selig keit]. It cannot be the destiny of rational beingsto succumb to moral laws like single bodies succumb to grav-ity because of the following difference: the soul is only trulymoral if it is so with absolute freedom, e.g., if, for it, moralityis also absolute beatitude. Just as true immorality is being orfeeling unhappy, so beatitude is not accidental to virtue butis virtue itself. Absolute morality is not a dependent; it meansto live freely within lawfulness. Just as an idea — and its re-flection, the celestial body — absorbs its center, identity, andat once resides within it, and vice versa, so also the soul; itsinclination toward the center, to be one with God, is morality.This would only be a negative difference, were it not for thefact that this resumption of finitude into infinitude is also apassage of the infinite into the finite, e.g., a complete being-within-itself of the latter. Thus morality and beatitude are buttwo different sides of the same oneness; in no need of beingcomplemented by the other, each is absolute and comprehendsthe other. The originary image of this being-one [Eins-Seins],

which is that of both truth and beauty, is in God.

God is absolute beatitude and absolute morality in a com-pletely equivalent manner — both are equally infinite attri-butes of God — for a morality that is not necessarily emanat-ing from the eternal laws of His nature (e.g., that is not also

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absolute happiness) is unthinkable. And beatitude, in turn,is founded in view of God in absolute necessity and, in thisrespect, in absolute morality. In Him, subject and object, theparticular and the universal, are identical. He is one and thesame, whether viewed from the aspect of necessity or fromthat of freedom.

Nature is the image of God's beatitude, and the ideal worldthat of God's holiness, albeit an incomplete image disruptedby difference.

God is the selfsame in-itself of necessity and freedom; forthe negation whereby necessity appears to the infinite soulindependent from and counter to freedom disappears in Him.But He is the selfsame essence of freedom and necessity, theseparation into individual rational beings, and the unificationof all into a whole not only in relation to each individual soulthat arrives through morality — wherein it expresses the sameharmony — at a reunification with Him but also categori-cally. God is therefore the unmediated in-itself of history sinceHe is the in-itself of nature only through the mediation of thesoul. Since in action Viandebit the real — necessity — appearsindependent from the soul, its accord and discord with free-dom is not to be understood out of the soul itself but appearsat all times as an unmediated manifestation or reaction of theinvisible world. Since God is the abdolute harmony of necessityand freedom, and this harmony cannot be revealed in indi-vidual destinies but only in history as a whole, only history asa whole is a revelation of God — and then only a progressivelyevolving revelation.

Although history represents only one side of the destiniesof the universe, it is not to be conceived of as partial but ratheras symbolic of those destinies that repeat themselves in theirentirety and are clearly reflected in it.

History is an epic composed in the mind of God. It has twomain parts: one depicting mankind's egress from its center toits farthest point of displacement; the other, its return. Theformer is, as it were, history's Ilia' d; the latter, its Odymey. Inthe one, the direction is centrifugal; in the other, it becomescentripetal. In this way, the grand purpose of the phenom-enal world reveals itself in history. The ideas, the spirits, mustfall away from their center and insert themselves into the

- 45 -

particularity of nature, the general realm of the fso that afterward, and as a particularities, they mindifference and, reconciled with it, may be ablewithout disturbing it.

Before we expand on this final cause of histoithe phenomenal world, we must look back to atraditionally only religion has taught and that somankind — the question of the first beginnings[Erziehung]: the origin of the arts, sciences, and cia whole. Philosophy seeks to disperse the light (in the boundless dark space that mythology and nwith poetic fabulations [Mc' kungen]. Experience siof the need of the human race for edification 1,habituation [Gewithnung] in order to wake up toof how the lack thereof allows only animal dispiinstincts to develop. Consequently, it does not sethat the human race could have risen above besti,stinct to reason and freedom on its own accord. Lto chance, edification would have parted into dilltions and that which one encounters in the orig[Urwelt], the probable birthplace of humanity, wotcome completely incomprehensible. All of histoncommon origin of the arts, science, religion, andthe glimpses of the furthest boundary of our knishow a civilization that has fallen from its erstvithe garbled remains of its science have long silmeaningless symbols.

According to these premises, it can safely be athe present human race — wherein reason existssibility, not as actuality (unless it is educated) —the teachings of a higher order of beings and Iculture and science through tradition and the teaearlier race. It is the deeper potential or residue orace, which partook of reason unmediated and tiand — after having sown the divine seed of ideas,the sciences has disappeared from earth. If, athe gradated character of the world of ideas, thewas preceded by a higher order from which thbrought into being, then, according to the harm(the visible and the invisible worlds, these san

— 44 —

appiness) is unthinkable. And beatitude, in turn,in view of God in absolute necessity and, in thisabsolute morality. In Him, subject and object, theand the universal, are identical. He is one and thether viewed from the aspect of necessity or from.dom.is the image of God's beatitude, and the ideal worldd's holiness, albeit an incomplete image disruptedice.the selfsame in-itself of necessity and freedom; foran whereby necessity appears to the infinite soulnt from and counter to freedom disappears in Him.the selfsame essence of freedom and necessity, theinto individual rational beings, and the unification

a whole not only in relation to each individual souls through morality — wherein it expresses the same–at a reunification with Him but also categori-I is therefore the unmedu' zted in-itself of history sincen-itself of nature only through the mediation of thein action Viandebd, the real — necessity — appears

'nt from the soul, its accord and discord with free-[ to be understood out of the soul itself but appearss as an unmediated manifestation or reaction of the.-orld. Since God is the absolute harmony of necessityom, and this harmony cannot be revealed in indi-:tinies but only in history as a whole, only history asa revelation of God — and then only a progressively'evelation.gh history represents only one side of the destiniesverse, it is not to be conceived of as partial but ratheris of those destinies that repeat themselves in theirnd are clearly reflected in it.y is an epic composed in the mind of God. It has twos: one depicting mankind's egress from its center tost point of displacement; the other, its return. The•as it were, history's Ma' d; the latter, its Odyssey. In:he direction is centrifugal; in the other, it becomesii. In this way, the grand purpose of the phenom-d reveals itself in history. The ideas, the spirits, must• from their center and insert themselves into the

— 45 —

particularity of nature, the general realm of the falling-away,so that afterward, and as a particularities, they may return toindifference and, reconciled with it, may be able to abide in itwithout disturbing it.

Before we expand on this final cause of history and all ofthe phenomenal world, we must look back to an issue thattraditionally only religion has taught and that so absorbs hu-mankind — the question of the first beginnings of education[Erzte. bung]: the origin of the arts, sciences, and civilization asa whole. Philosophy seeks to disperse the light of truth alsoin the boundless dark space that mythology and religion filledwith poetic fabulations [DU...kungen]. Experience speaks loudlyof the need of the human race for edification [Bildung] andhabituation [Gewiihnung] in order to wake up to reason andof how the lack thereof allows only animal dispositions andinstincts to develop. Consequently, it does not seem possiblethat the human race could have risen above bestiality and in-stinct to reason and freedom on its own accord. Likewise, leftto chance, edification would have parted into different direc-tions and that which one encounters in the originary worldtUrwe/d, the probable birthplace of humanity, would have be-come completely incomprehensible. All of history points to acommon origin of the arts, science, religion, and legislation:the glimpses of the furthest boundary of our known historyshow a civilization that has fallen from its erstwhile height;the garbled remains of its science have long since becomemeaningless symbols.

According to these premises, it can safely be assumed thatthe present human race — wherein reason exists only as pos-sibility, not as actuality (unless it is educated) — has enjoyedthe teachings of a higher order of beings and possesses itsculture and science through tradition and the teachings of anearlier race. It is the deeper potential or residue of this earlierrace, which partook of reason unmediated and through itselfand — after having sown the divine seed of ideas, the arts andthe sciences — has disappeared from earth. If, according tothe gradated character of the world of ideas, the idea of Manwas preceded by a higher order from which the latter wasbrought into being, then, according to the harmony betweenthe visible and the invisible worlds, these same originary

— 46 —

beings [Urwe.ietz] — the spiritual progenitors of mankind's firstbirth — became, after its second birth, its first educators andguides toward rational life [Vernittiftleben] whereby mankindrestores itself to a more perfect life.

If we had any doubts about how this spiritual race couldhave descended into earthly bodies, we would become con-vinced that the earth's earlier nature lived in harmony withforms of nobler and higher order than our current ones bythe remains of animal creatures of which equivalents can nolonger be ifound in nature and whose size and structure far,

exceed those existing today — proof of how this earlier naturein the youth of its powers has borne higher specimens andmore perfect species also in other living beings, which mettheir demise in the changing conditions on earth. The gradualdeterioration of earth is not only a myth of the prehistoricworld [Vorive/t] but just as much a physical truth as the incli-nation of the earth's axis, which came to pass later in earth'shistory. The evil principle spread proportionally with earth'sgrowing solidification, and the earlier identity with the sun,which promoted the birth of the more beautiful things onearth, disappeared.

We would like to imagine this higher race — the identityfrom which the human race evolved — as one that unites bynature and in innocent splendor what is refracted into indi-vidual rays and colors and is connected by the second racemerely with consciousness. That state of unconscious, natu-ral happiness, the original placidness of earth, has been pre-served by the legends of all peoples in the myth of the GoldenAge, wherein the second human race immortalized the guard-ian spirits of its childhood in the images of those heroes andgods with whom, according to its earliest and oldest peoples,its history began. These tutelary spirits protected the humanrace when instinct compelled it to walk upright in advanceagainst the future harshness of nature by bestowing upon itthe first practical arts and the seeds of science, religion, andthe principles of law.

— 47 —

The Immortality of the Soul

The history of the universe is the history of tlrealm, and the final cause of the former can onlyin that of the latter.

The soul, as it relates directly to the body or ising agent, is necessarily subjected to the same ntbody. The same is true for the indirect, finite relsoul to reason as its principle. The true in-itself [Asence of the soul, as it is merely appearing, is theeternal notion of it, which abides in God and, unis the principle of the eternal cognitions. That itmerely a statement of identity. Its temporal beingter the originary image; and just as it does not 6real by the existence of its corresponding finite itcannot become less real or cease to be real altopobliteration of the same.

However, the soul is not eternal because itswithout beginning or end but rather because ittionship to time at all. Therefore, it cannot be catal in a sense that would include an individualSince this could not be conceived of independenand the body, immortality would only be a contality and an ongoing imprisonment of the soula liberation. Therefore, the desire for immortalitdirectly out of finitude, and it would be the leafor those who strive to release the soul from ththose who according to Socrates are the true phi

It is therefore a misconception of the real spiriphy to posit immortality of the soul above its eteiits being within the Ideat and a clear misundeseems, to strip the soul in death of its sensuousniit to continue individually.*

If the entanglement of the soul with the bo,called individuality) is the consequence of athe soul itself and a penalty, then the soul betsarily eternal — that is, truly immortal — in p

* Plato, Phaedo, p. 153 [674t Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 67.t Ibid., par. 68.

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The Immortality f Sou lmorta__ty the _ou_

The history of the universe is the history of the spiritualrealm, and the final cause of the former can only be cognizedin that of the latter.

The soul, as it relates directly to the body or is its produc-ing agent, is necessarily subjected to the same nullity as thebody. The same is true for the indirect, finite relation of thesoul to reason as its principle. The true in-itself [An-or€4] or es-sence of the soul, as it is merely appearing, is the idea, or theeternal notion of it, which abides in God and, united with it,is the principle of the eternal cognitions. That it is eternal ismerely a statement of identity. Its temporal being does not al-ter the originary image; and just as it does not become morereal by the existence of its corresponding finite image, it alsocannot become less real or cease to be real altogether by theobliteration of the same.

However, the soul is not eternal because its duration iswithout beginning or end but rather because it has no rela-tionship to time at all. Therefore, it cannot be called immor-tal in a sense that would include an individual continuity.Since this could not be conceived of independent of finitudeand the body, immortality would only be a continued mor-tality and an ongoing imprisonment of the soul rather thana liberation. Therefore, the desire for immortality originatesdirectly out of finitude, and it would be the least appealingfor those who strive to release the soul from the body, i.e.,those who according to Socrates are the true philodopherd.*

It is therefore a misconception of the real spirit of philoso-phy to posit immortality of the soul above its eternalness andits being within the Ideas and a clear misunderstanding, itseems, to strip the soul in death of its sensuousness yet allowit to continue individually.*

If the entanglement of the soul with the body (which iscalled individuality) is the consequence of a negation ofthe soul itself and a penalty, then the soul becomes neces-sarily eternal — that is, truly immortal — in proportion to

Plato, Phaedo, p. 153 [6761.t Eschenmayer, op. cit., par. 67.

Ibid., par. 68.

— 46 —

csen] — the spiritual progenitors of mankind's firstame, after its second birth, its first educators andand rational life [Vernunftleben] whereby mankind11 to a more perfect life.d any doubts about how this spiritual race couldided into earthly bodies, we would become con-the earth's earlier nature lived in harmony with

)bier and higher order than our current ones by; of animal creatures of which equivalents can nomind in nature and whose size and structure fare existing today — proof of how this earlier natureh of its powers has borne higher specimens andct species also in other living beings, which mete in the changing conditions on earth. The gradual■ri of earth is not only a myth of the prehistoric.eitl but just as much a physical truth as the incli-ie earth's axis, which came to pass later in earth'se evil principle spread proportionally with earth'sEdification, and the earlier identity with the sun,noted the birth of the more beautiful things on)geared.Id like to imagine this higher race — the identityi the human race evolved — as one that unites byin innocent splendor what is refracted into indi-

, and colors and is connected by the second raceh consciousness. That state of unconscious, natu-ss, the original placidness of earth, has been pre-he legends of all peoples in the myth of the Goldenin the second human race immortalized the guard-3f its childhood in the images of those heroes andwhom, according to its earliest and oldest peoples,began. These tutelary spirits protected the humaninstinct compelled it to walk upright in advancefuture harshness of nature by bestowing upon it

actical arts and the seeds of science, religion, andles of law.

— 48 —

the degree to which it has freed itself from this negation.Those whose souls are inflated only with temporal and tran-sient things necessarily pass over into a state that resemblesnothingness and are, in a true sense, the most mortal; thustheir necessary and involuntary fear of obliteration. On theother hand, a certitude of eternalness love of rather thancontempt for death arises for those who are already im-bued with eternalness and have set free the most the daemonwithin themselves.

If, however, finiteness is posited as true positivity and theentanglement with it as true reality and existence, then theformer, those who most seek to free themselves of it as if itwere a disease, necessarily become (in this sense) the leastimmortal while those who restrict themselves to smelling,tasting, seeing, feeling, and the like and enjoy their desiredreality to the full continue on (in their sense) in their lowerway of living, drunk on material things.

Just as the original finiteness of the soul already has arelationship to freedom and is a consequence of selfhood,any future state of the soul can only have the same relation-ship to its present state, and the necessary notion by whichthe present is linked with the future is that of guilt or purityfrom guilt.

Finiteness is itself the penalty, which is not the result offreely chosen destiny but the fated consequence of the falling-away (herein lies the reason for the incomprehetwihle barrier de-scribed by Fichte .): those, then, whose life has been nothingbut a continuous withdrawal from the originary image neces-sarily awaits a state of negation. In contrast, those who haveregarded life as a return to it will arrive in many fewer in-termediary steps to the point where they will be fully unitedwith their idea and cease to be mortal — just as Plato morefiguratively described it in the Phaedo: how the first who got

° ["This mutual recognition and reciprocal action of free beings in thisworld, is perfectly inexplicable by the laws of nature or of thought and canbe explained only by the One in whom they are united, although to eachother they are separate... Not immediately from thee to me, nor from meto thee, flows forth the knowledge which we have of each other; — we areseparated by an insurmountable barrier." The Vocation of Man (Die Bestim-mung des Menschen, 1800), in Johann Gottlieb Fichte:, Popular Works, trans.W. Smith (London: Trubner & Co., 1873), p. 363.]

— 49 —

bogged down in the mud of matter are hid awayworld while the others, those who lived outstandinglives, are liberated from this earth and let loose, aldungeon, to arrive at and live in a higher, purer re,the earth. Those, however, who are sufficiently Ilove and wisdom live the future altogether withoutand reach even more beautiful abodes.

This sequential order may prove itself with t6observation: the finite is nothing positive but mereof the selfhood of the ideas that turns into negatthe separation from the originary image. The hof all spirits is not to cease to be within oneselfthem this being-within-oneself ceases to be a netransforms itself into the opposite, that is, to INpletely liberated from corporeality and from any relaiter. What then is this nature, this muddled pseucthe fallen spirits, other than a process of reincarn,ideas across all levels of finiteness until their selfshedding all difference, purges itself into an identiinfinite and all arrive as reality also at their highSince the selfhood is that which produces the 63intuits itself anew in the pseudo-image to the degrit, afflicted with selfhood, forsakes the present sttermines its own place of palingenesis by either Isecond life — in the higher spheres and on betteris less subordinate to matter or by being banisherregions. Similarly, the soul, if it has broken away Iin the previous state and discharged anythingmerely to the body, returns straightaway to the idteternally and purely for itself in the intelligible wohaving another side to itself.

Just as the phenomenal world consists onlyition of spirits [Anschattung der Geister], this returnto their origin and their separation from concretethe resolve of the phenomenal world itself, whichstep disappears in the spirit world [GeWterwelt].extent to which the former approaches its centtalso moves toward its goal, for even the celestiapredestined to be transformed and gradually dischigher order.

— 48 —

to which it has freed itself from this negation.;e souls are inflated only with temporal and tran-s necessarily pass over into a state that resembless and are, in a true sense, the most mortal; thus;ary and involuntary fear of obliteration. On thea certitude of eternalness — love of rather than

Pr death arises for those who are already im-Aernalness and have set free the most the daemonpselves.ver, finiteness is posited as true positivity and thent with it as true reality and existence, then these who most seek to free themselves of it as if itease, necessarily become (in this sense) the leastvhile those who restrict themselves to smelling,ing, feeling, and the like and enjoy their desiredhe full continue on (in their sense) in their lower

drunk on material things.the original finiteness of the soul already has ap to freedom and is a consequence of selfhood,state of the soul can only have the same relation-present state, and the necessary notion by whichis li nked with the future is that of guilt or purity

ss is itself the penalty, which is not the result ofm destiny but the fated consequence of the falling-

lies the reason for the incomprehensible barrier de-Fichte*): those, then, whose life has been nothingiluous withdrawal from the originary image neces-ts a state of negation. In contrast, those who havefe as a return to it will arrive in many fewer in-steps to the point where they will be fully united

idea and cease to be mortal — just as Plato morer described it in the Phaedo: how the first who got

itual recognition and reciprocal action of free beings in thisectly inexplicable by the laws of nature or of thought and canonly by the One in whom they are united, although to eache separate ...Not immediately from thee to me, nor from meforth the knowledge which we have of each other; — we are

an insurmountable barrier." The Vocation of Man (Die Bestim-mschen, 1800), in Johann Gottlieb Fichte:i Popular Works, trans.indon: Trubner & Co., 1873), p. 363.]

— 49 —

bogged down in the mud of matter are hid away in the lowerworld while the others, those who lived outstanding and piouslives, are liberated from this earth and let loose, as if out of adungeon, to arrive at and live in a higher, purer region abovethe earth. Those, however, who are sufficiently purified bylove and wisdom live the future altogether without corporeality

and reach even more beautiful abodes.This sequential order may prove itself with the following

observation: the finite is nothing positive but merely that sideof the selfhood of the ideas that turns into negation duringthe separation from the originary image. The highest goalof all spirits is not to cease to be within oneself but that forthem this being-within-oneself ceases to be a negation andtransforms itself into the opposite, that is, to become com-

pletely liberated from corporeality and from any relation to mat-ter. What then is this nature, this muddled pseudo-image ofthe fallen spirits, other than a process of reincarnation of theideas across all levels of finiteness until their selfhood, aftershedding all difference, purges itself into an identity with theinfinite and all arrive as reality also at their highest ideality?Since the selfhood is that which produces the body, the soulintuits itself anew in the pseudo-image to the degree to whichit, afflicted with selfhood, forsakes the present state and de-termines its own place of palingenesis by either beginning asecond life — in the higher spheres and on better stars — thatis less subordinate to matter or by being banished into lowerregions. Similarly, the soul, if it has broken away from its idolin the previous state and discharged anything that relatesmerely to the body, returns straightaway to the ideas and liveseternally and purely for itself in the intelligible world, withouthaving another side to itself.

Just as the phenomenal world consists only in the intu-ition of spirits [Anschauung der Geister], this return of the soulsto their origin and their separation from concreteness is alsothe resolve of the phenomenal world itself, which in the finalstep disappears in the spirit world [Get; iterwelt]. To the sameextent to which the former approaches its center, the latteralso moves toward its goal, for even the celestial bodies arepredestined to be transformed and gradually dissolved into ahigher order.

— 50 —

In light of the final cause of history, which is the reconcili-ation of the falling-away, the latter itself can be regarded ina more positive way. For the original selfhood of the ideasemanated from the unmediated effect of God: the selfhoodand absoluteness, however, into which the ideas enter is self-

determined so that they are there as truly autonomous beings,irrespective of the absoluteness whereby the falling-awaybecomes the means of the complete revelation of God. By be-stowing selfhood upon that which is intuited, on the strengthof the necessity of His nature, God Himself hands it over tofiniteness and, as it were, sacrifices it in order that the ideas,which were in Him without self-determination, are able toexist independently once again in absoluteness — which is ac-complished through absolute and complete morality.

Only then the image of the Absolute's indifference or itslack of envy for the counter-image is completed, which Spi-

noza aptly expressed with the following sentence: God loves

Himself' with infinite intellectual love. ° Hence the origin of theuniverse out of God and His relationship to said universehas been described by all those religions whose spirit isfounded upon the true essence of morality under this im-age of God's love of Himself (the most beautiful concept ofsubject-objectification).

In our view, eternity begins here, or rather is alreadyhere. If, as Eschenmayer writes, there is to be a future statein which what is revealed only by faith becomes the subjectof cognizance,t then one fails to see why this state could notequally come to pass under the same conditions as thosethat allow this state to begin in the beyond, namely, thatthe soul free itself as much as possible from the shackles ofsensuality: to deny this means to fetter the soul completelyto the body.

Spinoza, Etbka, part V, prop. XXXV ["Deus se ipsum amore intellec-tuali infinito amat." Opera, vol. 21.

t Eschenmayer, op. cit., p. 60.

Appendix

On the External Forms of Rcl is ion

I f the State, modeled after the universe, is splspheres or classes of beings — wherein the free reideas and the unfree the concrete and sensate ththe ultimate and uppermost order remains uniboth. By using sensate things as tools or organobtain a direct relationship to the apparitions anthem as souls. God, however, as identity of the hiremains above all reality and eternally has merelyrelationship. If then in the higher moral order thesents a second nature, then the divine can never haother than an indirect relationship to it; never carreal relationship to it, and religion, if it seeks to prin unscathed pure ideality, can therefore neverin the most perfect State — other than esotericall y

of mystery cults.

If one desires that religion have also an exoteriside, then one presents religion to a nation throuEand its art. Mindful of its ideal character, howreligion relinquishes the public and withdraws inidarkness of secrecy. No harm will come to eitheis or the exoteric form of religion from being aleach other; rather, it is for the better if they alto,to exist in their respective purity and indepenctlittle that we know of the Greek mystery cults,undoubtedly that their doctrine was antitheticalligion in the most direct and striking way. Th•of the Greeks manifests itself likewise in the fipreserved that which by nature could not be puin its ideality and seclusion. One should not conantithesis between the mystery cults and public ronly exist because the former was only imparteFor the mystery cults, which spread far beyonc

— 50 —

)f the final cause of history, which is the reconcili-! falling-away, the latter itself can be regarded initive way. For the original selfhood of the ideasrom the unmediated effect of God: the selfhoodteness, however, into which the ideas enter is dell-o that they are there as truly autonomous beings,

of the absoluteness whereby the falling-awaye means of the complete revelation of God. By be-fhood upon that which is intuited, on the strength5sity of His nature, God Himself hands it over tond, as it were, sacrifices it in order that the ideas,

in Him without self-determination, are able tomdently once again in absoluteness — which is ac-through absolute and complete morality.

en the image of the Absolute's indifference or itsy for the counter-image is completed, which Spi-expressed with the following sentence: God loves

infinite intellectual love.* Hence the origin of theut of God and His relationship to said universeiescribed by all those religions whose spirit ision the true essence of morality under this im-''s love of Himself (the most beautiful concept ofecti ficat ion).view, eternity begins here, or rather is alreadyEschenmayer writes, there is to be a future state

'hat is revealed only by faith becomes the subjectrice,' then one fails to see why this state could notme to pass under the same conditions as thosethis state to begin in the beyond, namely, that

itself as much as possible from the shackles ofto deny this means to fetter the soul completely

Etbica, part V, prop. XXXV ["Deus se ipsum amore intellec-imat." Opera, vol. 2].layer, op. cit., p. 60.

Appendix

On the External Forms of R,elision

If the State, modeled after the universe, is split into twospheres or classes of beings — wherein the free represent theideas and the unfree the concrete and sensate things — thenthe ultimate and uppermost order remains unrealized byboth. By using sensate things as tools or organs, the ideasobtain a direct relationship to the apparitions and enter intothem as souls. God, however, as identity of the highest order,remains above all reality and eternally has merely an indirectrelationship. If then in the higher moral order the . State repre-sents a second nature, then the divine can never have anythingother than an indirect relationship to it; never can it bear anyreal relationship to it, and religion, if it seeks to preserve itselfin unscathed pure ideality, can therefore never exist — evenin the most perfect State — other than esoterically in the formof mystery cults.

I f one desires that religion have also an exoteric and publicside, then one presents religion to a nation through its poetryand its art. Mindful of its ideal character, however, properreligion relinquishes the public and withdraws into the sacreddarkness of secrecy. No harm will come to either the esoter-ic or the exoteric form of religion from being antithetical toeach other; rather, it is for the better if they allow each otherto exist in their respective purity and independence. Of thelittle that we know of the Greek mystery cults, we do knowundoubtedly that their doctrine was antithetical to public re-ligion in the most direct and striking way. The pure spiritof the Greeks manifests itself likewise in the fact that theypreserved that which by nature could not be public and realin its ideality and seclusion. One should not counter that thisantithesis between the mystery cults and public religion couldonly exist because the former was only imparted to the few.For the mystery cults, which spread far beyond the borders

— 52 —

of Greece, were not secret because participation in them wasrestricted but because their profanation, i.e., their transfer-ence into public life, was considered a crime and penalized. InGreece nothing was as jealously guarded as the preservationof the mystery cults in their disparity from all that is pub-lic. Those poets who base their poetry entirely on mythologymention the mystery cults as the most salvific and benevolentof institutions. They appear everywhere as the center point ofpublic morality; the high moral beauty of the Greek tragedypoints back to them, and it is not difficult to hear Sophocles'initiation into the mystery cults resonate in his poetry. Ifthe notion of paganism had not been abstracted from pub-lic religion, one would long ago have realized how paganismand Christianity were together all along and how the latteremerged from the former only by making the mystery cultspublic — a truth that can be deduced historically from most ofthe Christian customs, their symbolic rituals and initiations,which were obvious imitations of those prevailing in themystery cults.

The striving of spiritual religion to become truly publicand mythologically objective is as futile as it is contrary toits nature — and desecrates it — to mingle with what is realand sensate.

True mythology is a symbolism of the ideas, which is onlypossible through forms of nature; it represents an absoluteand complete rendering finite [Verendlic. hung] of infiniteness.This would not take place in a religion that relates directlyto the infinite and conceives of a unification of the divine andthe natural only as an abolition of the latter, as is the case inthe concept of the miracle. The miracle is the exoteric mat-ter of such a religion: its forms are not essential but merelyhistorical, not categorical but merely individual, not eternallylasting and undying but merely transient apparitions. If oneseeks a universal mythology, then one ought to seize upon thesymbolic view of nature and let the gods again take posses-sion of it and imbue it; otherwise, the spiritual world remains

° Cicero, 1)e natura deurunz 1:42: "Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et au-gustam, ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimatae." [I shall say nothing of thatsacred and august Eleusina, into whose mystery cults the most distant na-tions were initiated.]

— 53 —

free of religion and completely removed from sensaappearances or at least is only celebrated with sacssongs and an equally abstracted poetry, like thereligious poetry of old,* of which modern poetry isexoteric manifestation — albeit, thus, one of lesser

In regard to the doctrines and the institutiontery cults, I will only mention what can be abstnnally from the ancient sources.

The esoteric religion is necessarily monothei:its exoteric counterpart in any form necessarilypolytheism. Only with the idea of the one-per-seEineni and an absolute-ideal are all other ideas poit follows, albeit immediately, the doctrine of an atof the souls within the ideas and the original ofGod, wherein it partakes in the intuition of thtrue, beautiful, and good in itself a doctrine tlbe symbolized in temporal terms as the pre-exissouls. This cognition is immediately followed byloss of this absolute state, that is, of the falling-,ideas and the ensuing banishment of the souls uity and the sensate world. This doctrine may be cvarious ways corresponding to the views foundter in reason itself. While it seems to have beenmost Greek religions to explain sensate life fromincurred guilt, that same doctrine is illustrated itmystery cults differently, for example, by that 6god who has become mortal. Another purposedoctrine is to reconcile the falling-away from tand to transform the negative relationship of allto it into something positive. Its practical doctrupon the first one, for it attempts to attain thethe soul from the body as its negative side: entrymystery cults was described as both an offerinfice of life, as corporeal death and resurrectionand thus there was one word that described bot

° Friedrich Schlegel, Gedchiehte der Poesie der Grieehen und

of Greek and Roman Poetry) (Berlin: Johann Friedrich6[: "Orgiasticism, festive frenzy in lawful customs, whichsacred meaning, was an essential part of the mystery cults:

— 52 —

were not secret because participation in them wasput because their profanation, i.e., their transfer-iblic life, was considered a crime and penalized. Inling was as jealously guarded as the preservationery cults in their disparity from all that is pub-oets who base their poetry entirely on mythologymystery cults as the most salvific and benevolent

ns. They appear everywhere as the center point ofdity; the high moral beauty of the Greek tragedy. to them, and it is not difficult to hear Sophocles'no the mystery cults resonate in his poetry. Ifof paganism had not been abstracted from pub-one would long ago have realized how paganismianity were together all along and how the latterDM the former only by making the mystery cults:ruth that can be deduced historically from most ofin customs, their symbolic rituals and initiations,e obvious imitations of those prevailing in theIts.ving of spiritual religion to become truly publiclogically objective is as futile as it is contrary to- and desecrates it — to mingle with what is real

'thology is a symbolism of the ideas, which is onlyrough forms of nature; it represents an absoluteete rendering finite [Verendlichang] of infiniteness.I not take place in a religion that relates directlyite and conceives of a unification of the divine andonly as an abolition of the latter, as is the case in

t of the miracle. The miracle is the exoteric mat-a religion: its forms are not essential but merely

lot categorical but merely individual, not eternallyundying but merely transient apparitions. If one

versal mythology, then one ought to seize upon theiew• of nature and let the gods again take posses-xi imbue it; of herwise, the spiritual world remains

natura deorum 1:42: "Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et au-nitiantur gentes orarum ultimatae." shall say nothing of thatigust Eleusina, into whose mystery cults the most distant na-itiated.]

— 53 —

free of religion and completely removed from sensate outwardappearances or at least is only celebrated with sacred, ferventsongs and an equally abstracted poetry, like the secret andreligious poetry of old,* of which modern poetry is merely theexoteric manifestation — albeit, thus, one of lesser purity.

In regard to the doctrines and the institution of the mys-tery cults, I will only mention what can be abstracted ratio-nally from the ancient sources.

The esoteric religion is necessarily monotheistic, just asits exoteric counterpart in any form necessarily lapses intopolytheism. Only with the idea of the one-per-se [eehlechthin

Einen] and an absolute-ideal are all other ideas posited. Fromit follows, albeit immediately, the doctrine of an absolute stateof the souls within the ideas and the original oneness withGod, wherein it partakes in the intuition of that which istrue, beautiful, and good in itself — a doctrine that can alsobe symbolized in temporal terms as the pre-existence of thesouls. This cognition is immediately followed by that of theloss of this absolute state, that is, of the falling-away of theideas and the ensuing banishment of the souls to corporeal-ity and the sensate world. This doctrine may be expressed invarious ways corresponding to the views found on this mat-ter in reason itself. While it seems to have been prevalent inmost Greek religions to explain sensate life from a previouslyincurred guilt, that same doctrine is illustrated in each of themystery cults differently, for example, by that of a sufferinggod who has become mortal. Another purpose for religiousdoctrine is to reconcile the falling-away from the Absoluteand to transform the negative relationship of all that is finiteto it into something positive. Its practical doctrine is basedupon the first one, for it attempts to attain the liberation ofthe soul from the body as its negative side: entry into the oldmystery cults was described as both an offering and sacri-fice of life, as corporeal death and resurrection of the soul,and thus there was one word that described both death and

Friedrich Schlegel, Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen and Reimer [(Historyof Greek and Roman Poetry) (Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1798)], p.6j: "Orgiasticism, festive frenzy in lawful customs, which cloaks a secret,sacred meaning, was an essential part of the mystery cults."]

-54—

initiation.' The primary intent of simplification of the souland withdrawal from the body was the convalescence fromerror, being the original and most profound illness of the soul,through regaining the intellectual intuition of what alone istrue and eternal — the ideas. Its moral purpose was the dis-engagement of the soul from affects, to which it is subjugatedonly as long as it is entangled with the body, and from thelove of sensate life [Sinnenleben], which is the ground and theimpetus for immorality.

Associated by necessity with these doctrines is that of theeternalness of the soul and the moral relationship between thepresent and the future state.

Any spiritual and esoteric religion must be traced backto these doctrines, these eternal pillars of virtue and highertruth.

Regarding the external form and the constitution of thereligious mystery cults, they must be viewed as public insti-tutions that originated from the disposition and mind of theGreek nation itself, founded by the State and their sacralityprotected by it. The State did not allow only one part, in themanner of secret cults, while excluding another; rather, itworked as much toward the inner and moral unification ofall that belonged to the State as it worked toward externaland legal unification. There are necessarily varying degreesto which people succeed in arriving at that which is true initself. For the less successful ones, there needs to be a kind offorecourt [Vorbil], a preparatory realm that, as in Euripides'

plays, relates to full initiation as sleep does to death. Sleep ismerely negative while death is positive; it is the last and abso-lute liberator. The first preparation for attaining the highesttruth can only be negative; it consists in the weakening and,wherever possible, the extinction of sensate affects and any-thing that disturbs the placid and moral organization of thesoul. It is sufficient for most to reach this level of liberation,and the participation in the mystery cults of those who arenot free tends to remain within this limit. Images full of hor-ror, which show the soul the nullity of all that is temporal and

° [Ver4, initiation; TEACIITI'l, end of life. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A

Greek -English &lawn (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).]

— 55 —

make it tremble with foreboding, belong to this ItOnce the relationship to the body has become extithe soul begins to dream, that is, receive images fnreal and ideal world. The second level is thereforhistory and the destiny of the universe are repreratively and especially through action; for just as.is reflected only the finite (the infinite in all itstions is alien to it) — while, in contrast, the exot4is the actual impression of public morality — so tlform is most suitable for the esoteric representagious doctrines. Those who penetrate the shell armeaning of the symbols and have proven themselmoderation, wisdom, self-conquest, and devotiosensate world will pass into a new life and, as adpure truth as it is, without the mediation of imihowever, who arrive at this stage before the oththe leaders, and no one who has not received thecration is allowed to follow them. For the destinyrace will be revealed to them in this last disclosthis group the highest principles of the royal art cand the nobility of mind are practiced, which is mto those who rule.

Thus religion, having a purely moral effect, ithe danger of mixing with the real, the sensate,ing claims to external dominion and violence, vbe contrary to its nature. Philosophy, on the oththose enamored with it [Liebhaber], the naturally imain eternally allied with religion.

— 54 —

The primary intent of simplification of the soulawal from the body was the convalescence from; the original and most profound illness of the soul,gaining the intellectual intuition of what alone isernal — the ideas. Its moral purpose was the dis-t of the soul from affects, to which it is subjugatedg as it is entangled with the body, and from the;ate life [Sinnenleben], which is the ground and theimmorality.

ed by necessity with these doctrines is that of theof the soul and the moral relationship between the1 the future state.ritual and esoteric religion must be traced backctrines, these eternal pillars of virtue and higher

ng the external form and the constitution of theystery cults, they must be viewed as public insti-1 originated from the disposition and mind of theon itself, founded by the State and their sacralityy it. The State did not allow only one part, in thesecret cults, while excluding another; rather, itmuch toward the inner and moral unification ofonged to the State as it worked toward externalnification. There are necessarily varying degreeseople succeed in arriving at that which is true inhe less successful ones, there needs to be a kind ofK7rbof], a preparatory realm that, as in Euripides'

es to full initiation as sleep does to death. Sleep isative while death is positive; it is the last and abso-or. The first preparation for attaining the highestPnly be negative; it consists in the weakening and,Possible, the extinction of sensate affects and any-disturbs the placid and moral organization of theufficient for most to reach this level of liberation,rticipation in the mystery cults of those who arekis to remain within this limit. Images full of hor-;how the soul the nullity of all that is temporal and

nitiation; TAE, end of life. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, ALeocicon (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).]

— 55 —

make it tremble with foreboding, belong to this level as well.Once the relationship to the body has become extinct enough,the soul begins to dream, that is, receive images from the non-real and ideal world. The second level is therefore where thehistory and the destiny of the universe are represented figu-ratively and especially through action; for just as in the epicis reflected only the finite (the infinite in all its manifesta-tions is alien to it) — while, in contrast, the exoteric tragedyis the actual impression of public morality — so the dramaticform is most suitable for the esoteric representation of reli-gious doctrines. Those who penetrate the shell and reach themeaning of the symbols and have proven themselves throughmoderation, wisdom, self-conquest, and devotion to a non-sensate world will pass into a new life and, as adepts, see thepure truth as it is, without the mediation of images. Those,however, who arrive at this stage before the others must bethe leaders, and no one who has not received the last conse-cration is allowed to follow them. For the destiny of the entirerace will be revealed to them in this last disclosure since inthis group the highest principles of the royal art of legislationand the nobility of mind are practiced, which is most commonto those who rule.

Thus religion, having a purely moral effect, is kept fromthe danger of mixing with the real, the sensate, or from lay-ing claims to external dominion and violence, which wouldbe contrary to its nature. Philosophy, on the other hand, andthose enamored with it [Liebhaber], the naturally initiated, re-main eternally allied with religion.

Selected Correspondence hetwee

Schelling and C.A. Eschenma y r

April 1804 - Jul y 1805

Selected Correspondence between

_ns and C.A. Eschenmay erSchell;

April 1804 - July 1805

— 59 —

Letter from Schellins to Eschenm

Wiirzburg,

Your book, 1- which you kindly forwarded to mto be a much appreciated gift, and I have read amany times since Prof. Paulus* alerted me to itsCuriously, your gift arrived just as I was aboutfinal pages of a short treatise, Philosophy and RA

printer. It relates almost entirely to your book, areceive a copy as soon as it is printed. I don't havhow grateful I am to you for your book, the clefhas inspired me greatly. However, in regard to ,standing of my philosophy, I believe that a monstep needs to be taken, one into another realm. Ithis realm is to be found in speculation and moreceived therein, and not in faith. You have attrillatter much of what I am certain lies within the Ithough until now I was unable to articulate thiscause of deficiencies in my representation. I halpreserve the noble rapport established betweenyour criticism of my having excluded virtue, I have Ion you as you were on me. -

I count as one of my most joyous expectatiopect of a reconciliation with a mind such as viI have rejoiced that we are no longer on opposmore or less in agreement in the matter itoelf

Farewell, my noble friend! ...

Your

* [Aus Schellinq Leben. hi Britten, ed. Gustav Leopold PlittVerlag von G. Hirzel, 1870), pp.' 14-15.]

t [Eschenmayer's Die Philimphie in ihrem Uebeigang zur

[Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus (1761-1851), a Ilogian who taught theology and oriental languages at diWtirzburg between 1803 and 18071

— 59 —

Letter from Schelling to Eschenmayer

Wiirzburg, April 1804*

Your book,* which you kindly forwarded to me, continuesto be a much appreciated gift, and I have read and reread itmany times since Prof. Paulus* alerted me to its publication.Curiously, your gift arrived just as I was about to send thefinal pages of a short treatise, Philosophy and Religion,loll, to theprinter. It relates almost entirely to your book, and you willreceive a copy as soon as it is printed. I don't have to tell youhow grateful I am to you for your book, the depth of whichhas inspired me greatly. However, in regard to your under-standing of my philosophy, I believe that a more significantstep needs to be taken, one into another realm. I still believethis realm is to be'found in speculation and more clearly per-ceived therein, and not in faith. You have attributed to thelatter much of what I am certain lies within the former, eventhough until now I was unable to articulate this certainty be-cause of deficiencies in my representation. I have striven topreserve the noble rapport established between us, but as toyour criticism of my having excluded virtue, I have to be as hardon you as you were on me.

I count as one of my most joyous expectations the pros-pect of a reconciliation with a mind such as yours, just asI have rejoiced that we are no longer on opposite sides butmore or less in agreement in the matter itself ...

Farewell, my noble friend! ...

YourSchelling

° [Aim Schellings Lebo:. Briefen, ed. Gustav Leopold Plitt, vol. 2 (Leipzig:Verlag von G. Hirzel, 1870), pp. 14-15.]

t rEschenmayer's Die Philosophic in threat liebergang Nichtpkilosophie.1[Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus (1761-1851), a Protestant theo-

logian who taught theology and oriental languages at the University ofWiirzburg between 1803 and 1807.]

— 60 —

Letter from Schellins to Eschenmayer

Wiirzburg, July 10, 1804*

I hope, my esteemed friend, that you have received the littlebookt I dispatched to you earlier, which could not be accom-panied by a letter for utter lack of time.

The reason for our mutual misunderstandings has onlynow become clear to me.

I posit within the Absolute, as eternally innate, the infiniteor essence — the subject; the finite or form — the object; andthe eternal, or the indifference of both. The latter, however, ispotency [Potent]; in fact, it is potency to the third degree [dritte

Poten4 but the Absolute is not a potency since it comprehendsand dissolves all potencies within itself. — This Absolute iswhat you seem to call God.

Now and then, I may have made out that the Absolute is thethird unitive mode or potency. I have, however, also expresslystated the opposite, e.g., in the introduction to the secondedition of my Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (p. 74): "Onemight be tempted to define the Absolute itself as the unity ofboth unitive modes, but to be exact, it is not so."t — I add tothis that the Absolute for me is precisely that wherein those3rd unitive modes lie in equal measure and absoluteness.

It might be necessary to improve upon my in many in-stances faulty expressions as far as the main idea is concerned.Would the following exposition meet with your approval? —

To call the subject of absoluteness, the ideality (I elsewherehave called this the infinite), which is infinite but compre-hends reality within itself, the Absolute —

To denote the form of absoluteness, the reality (the objec-tive or finite), which is infinite and comprehends all idealitywithin itself, as the form of absoluteness —

To denote the eternal as the absoluteness of absoluteness, oras indifference. Finally, to posit the Absolute — insofar as it

— 61 —

dissolves all potencies into one and, because it call of them and is not a potency itself, is neither rnor simply their unity but all of this, which me:nothing in particular — to posit this Absolute = (

Farewell and preserve in good memoryadmirer and friend

[E W Briefe and Dokunzente, pp. 320-21.]t [Schelling's Religion tend Philoaophied

$[F. W. J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philoaaphie der Natur (Idea for aPhilosophy of Nature, 1797/1802), SW2:63-64.]

ter from Schellins to Eschenmayer

Wiirzburg, July 10, 1804°

esteemed friend, that you have received the littlepatched to you earlier, which could not be accom-a letter for utter lack of time.ison for our mutual misunderstandings has onlyne clear to me.i'ithin the Absolute, as eternally innate, the infinite— the subject; the finite or form the object; andi, or the indifference of both. The latter, however, is',end; in fact, it is potency to the third degree Edrittet the Absolute is not a potency since it comprehendsyes all potencies within itself. — This Absolute isseem to call God.td then, I may have made out that the Absolute is ther mode or potency. I have, however, also expresslyopposite, e.g., in the introduction to the secondmy Ideas Jr a Philosophy of Nature (p. 74): "One

empted to define the Absolute itself as the unity ofye modes, but to be exact, it is not so."t — I add tohe Absolute for me is precisely that wherein thosee modes lie in equal measure and absoluteness.It be necessary to improve upon my in many in-Jlty expressions as far as the main idea is concerned.following exposition meet with your approval? —

the subject of absoluteness, the ideality (I elsewherethis the infinite), which is infinite but compre-

lity within itself, the Absolute —ote the form of absoluteness, the reality (the objec-ite), which is infinite and comprehends all idealityelf, as the form of absoluteness —ote the eternal as the absoluteness of absoluteness, orrence. Finally, to posit the Absolute — insofar as it

Sebelling: Briefs and Dokunzente, pp. 320-21.]nes Religion Lind Philosophied

. Schelling, liken zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Idea for aof Nature, 1797/1802), SW2:63-64.]

— 61 —

dissolves all potencies into one and, because it comprehendsall of them and is not a potency itself, is neither real nor idealnor simply their unity but all of this, which means that it isnothing in particular — to posit this Absolute = God...

Farewell and preserve in good memory youradmirer and friend

Schelling

— 60 —

— 62 — — 63 —

Letter from Eschenmayer to Schellins

Kirchheim unter Tek, July 24, 1804*

With thanks for your latest book, I am sending you somethingnew that I have worked on this spring, but which has yet bepublished! Your latest book has proven to me that a part ofour misunderstanding is not in the main idea but rather inits expression. Furthermore, I find all misunderstandings dis-solved in the schema you included in your last letter to me. Infact, I find therein my ideas more purely intuited than I hadoriginally. Allow me to reiterate your schema below:

The subject of absoluteness, the ideality or theinfinite, which comprehends all reality withinitself; —

the form of absoluteness, the reality or the ob-jective, finite, which comprehends all idealitywithin itself; —

the eternal as the abdolutenem of absoluteness or asindifference; —and finally, the Absolute outside of all potency

and unity = God.

The first, or the subject of absoluteness, is to me under-standing [Verstand] plus all that it concerns — I call this theimage [Bild].

The second, or the form of absoluteness, is to me the uni-verse in its entire manifoldedness — I call this the counter-

image[Gegenbild].The third, or the eternal as indifference of both, is to me

reason [Vertzunft] — I call this the ortg inary image[Urbild].

Therefore, that which I call reason is both image andcounter-image, both understanding (into which all realitygoes) and universe (from which all ideality goes out).

[Aus Leben. In Briefen, pp. 24-281I' [Eschenmayer here refers to his book Der Eranit und der Frondling:

Gespriiebe ither dad Heilige and die Gedcbiebte (The Eremite and the Stranger:Conversations on Sacredness and History), to be published in 1805.]

The opposition to the originary image, bowel. ,

the after-image [Nachbild], and this, considered pb■I call the Absolute. Only philosophy deals with faimages of the originary image, and the Absolutesole basis and the pinnacle of its speculation.

Reason as originary image ought to be equasolute as its after-image — that is the task of phil.

What now leads me beyond the Absolute is athe philosopher desires to form a faithful after-iiessence of reason as the originary image, Nvhictabout through the mediation of intellectual intreason (or the originary image or indifference inmust become fully and entirely his object. But theson as the originary image, where would the eye'which cognizes and beholds the equivalence andof the originary image with the after-image — orthe constructed idea of the Absolute? The eve creason; it therefore must lie beyond it, and this isbeen forced to look for the last anchor [Anker] olabove the Absolute, in the soul or in faith, andpotency of beatitude because it lies truly beyondand desire and only reveals itself in meditationfaith. It is impossible for reason to project itseff,losopher, like the painter of an image, to make a Iof it; this is, however, what is necessary for thefully express the essence of reason.

That higher eye that cognizes and beholds theof the indifference in the eternal or in reason wilute as its faithful after-image is the soul. The bAbsolute is not a reawakening of difference, b■that is different is lost to me in the Absolute, sosolute, as the last remainder of our profane limbis lost to me in this higher element. The bevois set here against this world, but it is an oppcx

[See Fichte's notion, in his Wiioendebaftslebre (Doctrin1801, of the self as an activity into which an eye is implaThis eye lies not outside of [the Absolute] but within it, an

living penetration of the Absolute itself [dad lebendige dieb Dwdolutheit delimi]," in Johann Gottlieb Fiebte'd dinnnaliebe 11-;.rke.(Berlin: Verlag von Veit and Comp. 1845), vol. 2, p. 19.]

— 62 — — 63 —

er from Eschenrnayer to Schelling

Kirchheim unter Tek, July 24, 1804 °

s for your latest book, I am sending you somethinglave worked on this spring, but which has yet beYour latest book has proven to me that a part oferstanding is not in the main idea but rather inm. Furthermore, I find all misunderstandings dis-e schema you included in your last letter to me. Intherein my ideas more purely intuited than I hadknow me to reiterate your schema below:

abject of absoluteness, the ideality or thete, which comprehends all reality within

form of absoluteness, the reality or the ob-e, finite, which comprehends all idealityn itself; —eternal as the absoluteness of absoluteness or aserence; —finally, the Absolute outside of all potencynity = God.

:, or the subject of absoluteness, is to me under-rrotand] plus all that it concerns — I call this the

■nd, or the form of absoluteness, is to me the uni-entire manifoldedness — I call this the counter-

d. or the eternal as indifference of both, is to meumftl — I call this the originary image [Urbild].e, that which I call reason is both image andige, both understanding (into which all realityniverse (from which all ideality goes out).

ing Leben. In Briefen, pp. 24-28.]aver here refers to his book Der Frond und der &mulling:Sa.. Heil,* and die Geschicbte (The Eremite and the Stranger:on Sacredness and History), to be published in 1805.]

The opposition to the originary image, however, is to methe after-image [Nachbi/d], and this, considered philosophically,ally,

I call the Absolute. Only philosophy deals with faithful after-images of the originary image, and the Absolute is thus itssole basis and the pinnacle of its speculation.

Reason as originary image ought to be equal to the Ab-solute as its after-image — that is the task of philosophy.

What now leads me beyond the Absolute is as follows: Ifthe philosopher desires to form a faithful after-image of theessence of reason as the originary image, which is broughtabout through the mediation of intellectual intuition, thenreason (or the originary image or indifference in the eternal)must become fully and entirely his object. But then, with rea-son as the originary image, where would the eye° be located,which cognizes and beholds the equivalence and resemblanceof the originary image with the after-image — or reason, withthe constructed idea of the Absolute? The eye cannot lie inreason; it therefore must lie beyond it, and this is why I havebeen forced to look for the last anchor [Anker] of philosophyabove the Absolute, in the soul or in faith, and express it aspotency of beatitude because it lies truly beyond cognizanceand desire and only reveals itself in meditation [Andacht] or

faith. It is impossible for reason to project itself, for the phi-losopher, like the painter of an image, to make a faithful copyof it; this is, however, what is necessary for the Absolute tofully express the essence of reason.

That higher eye that cognizes and beholds the equivalenceof the indifference in the eternal or in reason with the Abso-lute as its faithful after-image is the soul. The beyond of theAbsolute is not a reawakening of difference, but just as allthat is different is lost to me in the Absolute, so also the Ab-solute, as the last remainder of our profane [uzheillg e] nature,is lost to me in this higher element. The beyond, however,is set here against this world, but it is an opposition that no

o [See Fichte's notion, in his Invenschaftslehre (Doctrine of Science) of1801, of the self as an activity into which an eye is implanted (eingedetzt):

"This eye lies not outside of [the Absolute] but within it, and it is simply theliving penetration of the Absolute itself Pas lebendige sick Dwrhdringen der Al, -

Joluthei t delbstl," in Johann Gottlieb Fichte:, sanuntliche Werke, ed. J. H. Fichte(Berlin: Verlag von Veit and Comp. 1845), vol. 2, p. 19.]

— 64 — — 65 —

longer concerns speculation because here appears the symbolwherein all evincing comes to an end. You have repre-sented this higher element indisputably in the fourth pointof your schema, that which you call the Absolute; insofar asit dissolves all potencies, and since it contains all of them, itis itself no particular potency (but even so the highest andmost all-embracing), neither ideal nor real nor itself merelyits unity. According to the above, this Absolute, which youposit = God, is to me still the soul, about which no speculationtakes place because all speculation originates first within it.A philosopher would need to exist outside of his own existenceif he wanted to project the entire soul as an originary imageor ideal-image PAM in order to represent it within a faith-ful after-image. God is to me the asymptote of the soul, whocannot become a tangent like the previous potencies and assuch can only be the subject of meditation and faith. — WhatI am suggesting here is more immediately contained in thedifference between the following two questions: Is God in usor Are we in God? In the former case God would manifestHimself as a product of speculation, — be it also, as in the Ab-solute, the most supreme, — and hence, because all specula-tion, as part of the soul, is not equal to its totality, God wouldbe lower than the soul. In the latter case, however, God's dig-nity is above the soul, but for that very reason, it is no longera subject of cognition and intuition. In the former case Godwould be below the ideas; in the latter, God is infinitely abovethem. This is the true position of my latest publication, thelinchpin of the entire book. Alas, my dear professor, numer-ous statements in your writings until now support my posi-tion in the clearest manner and, if I may say so, go beyondthe formal representations of the main ideas you have madeheretofore! Only from the standpoint of sacredness and be-atitude [des Heillg. en and en] can the sensate world be trulynothing, as you so often say; in the originary oneness of theideas, however, it is still something, although not much. Ev-erything you say about the mystery cults points to that. Onlyfrom the standpoint of the holy and blest arises a nostalgiafor death, which you have said several times and which in myview surpasses even the splendor of the ideas. — You say inyour latest publication: "The ultimate goal of the universe and

its history is nothing other than the complete INwith and re-absorption into the Absolute. The ina philosophy that makes the principle of the Falits most universal articulation, its own principle. asciously, cannot be emphasized enough."

In this and other statements, I justifiably 134that you have now left behind the speculation I

the Absolute.In a new publication,t Professor Weiller ha

holy and God his Absolute and indeed has.ter, followed your path. But it is rather vexingnot acknowledge this fact and instead imputesyou did not get beyond the opposition of subjecsince you were, in fact, the first to trample thiswith your foot. Herr Weiller wants to resurrect[Begriff] behind what I call devotion and faith bymy premonition did not penetrate all the way intcHow odd!

The task I undertook this spring consistedrepresenting the idea of the original sin and rec(the principle of world history; you be the judge zI succeeded...

Farewell, my dearest Herr Professor, and re<to your wife.

YourEsc hen

[Above, p. 31.]t [Kajetan Weiller, Der Get:it der allerneuesten Phihmapbie

Hegel, und Kompagnie: Eine Uebersetzung nits der SebuLpraebe

Welt (The Spirit of the Newest Philosophy of MM. SchelCompany: A Translation from the Academic Language inof the World) (Munich: Josef Lentner, 1803).]

— 64 — — 65 —

erns speculation because here appears the dymbolevincing comes to an end. —You have repre-

higher element indisputably in the fourth pointema, that which you call the Absolute; insofar asall potencies, and since it contains all of them, itparticular potency (but even so the highest andbracing), neither ideal nor real nor itself merelyccording to the above, this Absolute, which you, is to me still the soul, about which no speculationbecause all speculation originates first within it.

Ner would need to exist outside of his own existenced to project the entire soul as an originary imageIge [I;orbild] in order to represent it within a faith-age. God is to me the asymptote of the soul, whoMme a tangent like the previous potencies and askly be the subject of meditation and faith. — Whatsting here is more immediately contained in the)etween the following two questions: Is God in usin God? In the former case God would manifesta product of speculation, — be it also, as in the Ab-most supreme, — and hence, because all specula-t of the soul, is not equal to its totality, God wouldan the soul. In the latter case, however, God's dig-re the soul, but for that very reason, it is no longerF cognition and intuition. In the former case Godelow the ideas; in the latter, God is infinitely aboveis the true position of my latest publication, thethe entire book. Alas, my dear professor, numer-ents in your writings until now support my posi-clearest manner and, if I may say so, go beyondrepresentations of the main ideas you have madeOnly from the standpoint of sacredness and be-

Heiligeiz rind Seligen] can the sensate world be trulyyou so often say; in the originary oneness of the

ever, it is still something, although not much. Ev-)u say about the mystery cults points to that. Onlytandpoint of the holy and blest arises a nostalgiavhich you have said several times and which in myLsses even the splendor of the ideas. — You say inpublication: "The ultimate goal of the universe and

its history is nothing other than the complete reconciliationwith and re-absorption into the Absolute. The importance ofa philosophy that makes the principle of the Fall of Man, inits most universal articulation, its own principle, albeit uncon-sciously, cannot be emphasized enough."

In this and other statements, I justifiably believe to seethat you have now left behind the speculation contained inthe Absolute.

In a new publication,t Professor Weiller has made theholy and God his Absolute and indeed has, for the bet-ter, followed your path. But it is rather vexing that he didnot acknowledge this fact and instead imputes to you thatyou did not get beyond the opposition of subject and objectsince you were, in fact, the first to trample this onesidednesswith your foot. Herr Weiller wants to resurrect the concept[Begriff] behind what I call devotion and faith by claiming thatmy premonition did not penetrate all the way into the concept.How odd!

The task I undertook this spring consisted precisely inrepresenting the idea of the original sin and reconciliation asthe principle of world history; you be the judge as to whether

I succeeded...Farewell, my dearest Herr Professor, and recommend me

to your wife.

YourEschenmayer

[Above, p. 31.]t [Kajetan Weiller, Der Geist der ullemenesten Phihmophie der HH.

Hegel, und Kornpagnie: Eine Uebersetzung aus der Schulsprache in Si,' Sprach( derWelt (The Spirit of the Newest Philosophy of MM. Schelling, Hegel, andCompany: A Translation from the Academic Language into the Languageof the World) (Munich: Josef Lentner, 1803).]

— 66 — — 67 —

Letter from Eschenmayer to Schelling

Kirchheim unter Tek, March 23, 1805*

I find what you say about potency-free intuition [potenzlosenSchatten] to be quite true, as well as the further conclusionthat the Absolute itself is not a potency, and that it wouldbe erroneous to posit beatitude Pas Selige] as potency, some-thing I was mislead about in the past by dogmatic literal-ism [Schttlform]. I find in the concept of a potency-free intu-ition the following agreement between us: If the Absolute isnothing other than the highest expression for the originaryimage (reason) as articulated by the philosopher, then theformer is a potency-free intuition precisely because it is anintuition of the Absolute, itself outside of the same;t it is thegaze of the soul* that is directed at the resemblance of theafter-image (philosophy) with the originary image (reason).This intuition, as eminent as it is in itself and as much as itprecedes philosophy, is nevertheless not a potency but ratherthe principle and the comprehensiveness of all potencies and,for that very reason, also the totality of all cognizance andvolition. So far, I am in complete agreement with you; andyour enemies, such as B. Wagner and Weiller, who are tryingto construct a disagreement between us in this point, oughtto retract their premature judgments. Alas — this intuitionis only the this-worldly direction of the soul toward cogni-zance and activity on an earthly sphere [Weltsphiire], and Idifferentiate this from the otherworldly direction of the soulwithin faith and meditation, which in itself is uncognizable[unerkennbar] and undemonstratable kindernonstrabell, and forthat very reason possible only through revelation. To me,

* [Ails Schelhnq. Leben. In Briefen, pp. 57-59.]t [Schelling's marginalia: "As is any thing outside the Absolute. "]t[Cf. Ignatius of Loyola's vista de la inzaginacain (Esx. 47): "Where the

object is an invisible one, ... the composition will be to see with the gaze ofthe imagination, and to consider, that my soul is imprisoned in this bodywhich will one day disintegrate, and also my whole composite self (by thisI mean the soul joined with the body), as if exiled in this valley amongbrute beasts."]

religion is not the consumption of said totality, wcognized through philosophy, but rather is outsitality; it has nothing in common with the profaniand philosophy. That which is given by revelatm-

fenbarte] is neither cognized* nor demonstrated norspoken anywhere but rather felt by intellectua[Empfindung] only, and for that very reason it is tthat is unmediated, to which all that is medialitself. I would like to call this the religious senindeed active in all peoples and at all times butitself be known quietly. It is alive in Christ andthe martyrs. It may be that you would push thbetween philosophy and religion, which to memuch pondering, up even higher and count thethe soul in which it senses the destruction of allin itself, as it were, itself to philosophy. In thaiever, philosophy deprives itself of its most essetter, which consists in a constant objectifying of roriginary image and is called speculation.

You proceed from intuition. — Is it perhapsthat I described in a passage of my first book? "Fably also a form of cognizance or rather intuitionits an invisible world whose negative pole is direreason. Revelation is to the invisible world whthe visible world."t

If this is what you are saying, then there is ndifference between what you call intuition ancfaith, except that this intuition is not a phi losophbut is rather blind and thus faith...

Esteem and friendship from your devoted

Eschen

* [Schelling's marginalia: "As if there were such a thine it [Eschenmayer, Die Philvsaphie in ihrenz Uehergang zur

par. 501

— 66 — — 67 —

er from Eschenmayer to Schellin3

Kirchheim unter Tek, March 23, 1805'

you say about potency-free intuition [potenzlosenbe quite true, as well as the further conclusionsolute itself is not a potency, and that it wouldis to posit beatitude Pao Selig e] as potency, some-; mislead about in the past by dogmatic literal-rm]. I find in the concept of a potency-free intu-lowing agreement between us: If the Absolute isier than the highest expression for the originaryion) as articulated by the philosopher, then thepotency-free intuition precisely because it is anthe Absolute, itself outside of the same;t it is thesoul* that is directed at the resemblance of the(philosophy) with the originary image (reason).

on, as eminent as it is in itself and as much as itkilosophy, is nevertheless not a potency but rathere and the comprehensiveness of all potencies and,y reason, also the totality of all cognizance andfar, I am in complete agreement with you; and

,ts, such as B. Wagner and Weiller, who are tryingt a disagreement between us in this point, oughtheir premature judgments. Alas — this intuitionthis-worldly direction of the soul toward cogni-activity on an earthly sphere [Weltdphare], and Ie this from the otherworldly direction of the soul

and meditation, which in itself is uncognizable1 and undemonstratable [inden-umstrahel], and foreason possible only through revelation. To me,

religion is not the consumption of said totality, which can becognized through philosophy, but rather is outside of all to-tality; it has nothing in common with the profanity of reasonand philosophy. That which is given by revelation Pas Genf-

fenbartd is neither cognized* nor demonstrated nor intuited norspoken anywhere but rather felt by intellectual sentiment[Empfindung] only, and for that very reason it is the only onethat is unmediated, to which all that is mediated attachesitself. I would like to call this the religious sense, which isindeed active in all peoples and at all times but mostly letsitself be known quietly. It is alive in Christ and especially inthe martyrs. It may be that you would push the boundarybetween philosophy and religion, which to me is the fruit ofmuch pondering, up even higher and count the very act ofthe soul in which it senses the destruction of all speculationin itself, as it were, itself to philosophy. In that case, how-ever, philosophy deprives itself of its most essential charac-ter, which consists in a constant objectifying of reason or theoriginary image and is called speculation.

You proceed from intuition. — Is it perhaps of the kindthat I described in a passage of my first book? "Faith is prob-ably also a form of cognizance or rather intuition, but it intu-its an invisible world whose negative pole is directed againstreason. Revelation is to the invisible world what light is tothe visible world."

If this is what you are saying, then there is no longer anydifference between what you call intuition and what I callfaith, except that this intuition is not a philosophical intuitionbut is rather blind and thus faith...

Esteem and friendship from your devoted

Eschenmayer

Leben. In Briefen, pp. 57-59.]'s marginalia: "As is any thing outside the Absolute."]ius of Loyola's vista de In inuzginaeitin (Exx. 47): "Where thevisible one,... the composition will be to see with the gaze of>n, and to consider, that my soul is imprisoned in this bodye day disintegrate, and also my whole composite self (by thismil joined with the body), as if exiled in this valley among

° [Schelling's marginalia: "As if there were such a thing in philosophy.'!.t [Eschenmayer, Die Philodophie in ihrenz (Jebel:gang zur Nichtphihmopbse.

par. 50.]

Letter from Schellin3 to Eschenmayer

Wijrzburg, July 30, 1805*

This letter is a very late reply to your letter from March 23rdof this year. I will not bother with the customary excuse ofhaving been too busy but confess in all honesty that yourletter surprised me with insight that your previous writingsdid not contain, so that it indeed made in impossible for meto answer you right away.

You posit the essential character of philosophy in "a con-stant objectifying of the originary image" (which further-more you presume = reason) and insofar, you say, is calledspeculation. Now, ever since I saw the light in philosophyPas Licht in der Philosophie] in 1801, when I published the well-known aphorisms, and even before, toward the end of mysystem of idealism,t I have asserted with all possible clar-ity that philosophy in no way consists of an objectifying ofthe originary image, i.e., in a (insofar subjective) positing ofthe originary image or Absolute as an object; that a positingwithin reason is not a positing of man (as subject), and likethat of which reason is the positing, it is neither subjectivenor objective but rather absolute.

You, on the other hand, are saying that the Absolute isnone other than the highest expression for the imaginary im-age as articulated by the philosopher! Contrary to philoso-phy, you are declaring: that which is given in revelation isneither cognized nor demonstrated nor intuited . Quasi as ifthis were for philosophy the divine; as if the Absolute shouldrather not be regarded as as an object —which is what gavemy entire philosophy its current direction and distinguishesit from dogmatism or unphilosophy as well as nonphiloso-phy —; as if I ever admitted to this particular (subjective)sphere of cognizance, which the Absolute could be pulledinto; as if according to the fundamental view, without whichmy philosophical doctrine could not even have developed,

° Leben. In Briefen, pp. 60-62.]t [System des transcendentalen Penh:films (System of Transcendental Ideal-

ism, 1800).]

— 69 —

all cognizance of the Absolute, objectively spe;necessarily also in turn a cognizance of the Aljectively speaking, and within the Absolute, anditself divine but on the part of the subject is anoblivion [Selbstvergessen], etc.

These comments seem to show an understarlosophy on your part that I did not dare presumSince I did not want to form an opinion baseyour letter, I had to postpone my reply until Ithoroughly study your book at leisure with redifference between us. Since I now am convincletter does indeed express the spirit of your writo declare my position categorically in order tofurther misunderstandings as to whether the Inonphilosophy could really be the boundary ofphy, for which you will surely not resent me befriendship, which is based on a mutual love of t]

Farewell and be assured of my profound este

Schellii

— 68 —

— 68 — — 69 —

er from Schellins to Eschenmayer

Wiirzburg, July 30, 1805'

s a very late reply to your letter from March 23rdI will not bother with the customary excuse of

n too busy but confess in all honesty that yourised me with insight that your previous writingstain, so that it indeed made in impossible for me-ou right away.it the essential character of philosophy in "a con-tifying of the originary image" (which further-wesume = reason) and insofar, you say, is calledL. Now, ever since I saw the light in philosophyder Philosophic' ] in 1801, when I published the well-borisms, and even before, toward the end of mydealism,t I have asserted with all possible clar-ilosophy in no way consists of an objectifying ofry image, i.e., in a (insofar subjective) positing ofry image or Absolute as an object; that a positing:on is not a positing of man (as subject), and likeich reason is the positing, it is neither subjectiveye but rather absolute.

the other hand, are saying that the Absolute isthan the highest expression for the imaginary im-culated by the philosopher! Contrary to philoso-re declaring: that which is given in revelation ispized nor demonstrated nor intuited . Ouasi as if3r- philosophy the divine; as if the Absolute shouldbe regarded as as an object — which is what gavethilosophy its current direction and distinguishes. matism or unphilosophy as well as nonphiloso-if I ever admitted to this particular (subjective)cognizance, which the Absolute could be pulledccording to the fundamental view, without which>phical doctrine could not even have developed,

Lehen. In Briefen, pp. 60-62.]ra tranocendentalen Idealismus (System of Transcendental Ideal-

all cognizance of the Absolute, objectively speaking, is notnecessarily also in turn a cognizance of the Absolute, sub-jectively speaking, and within the Absolute, and therefore isitself divine but on the part of the subject is an absolute self-oblivion [Selbstvergessen], etc.

These comments seem to show an understanding of phi-losophy on your part that I did not dare presume previously.Since I did not want to form an opinion based simply onyour letter, I had to postpone my reply until I was able tothoroughly study your book at leisure with respect to thisdifference between us. Since I now am convinced that yourletter does indeed express the spirit of your writings, I haveto declare my position categorically in order to cut short anyfurther misunderstandings as to whether the faith of yournonphilosophy could really be the boundary of my philoso-phy, for which you will surely not resent me because of ourfriendship, which is based on a mutual love of truth...

Farewell and be assured of my profound esteem

Schelling

G lossary

Abbild imageAbfall falling-awayAhndung premonitionAlIglu highest goodAnochauung intuitionan du!' h in itselfAnsa:* h in-itselftuffheben lift, dissolveauflerwesentlic4 extra-essentialBeau* nmende determining agentBewirkende effecting agentBildung edificationEinbildung imaginative formatioEa 'hell oneness, identity, uniErkennen cognizanceErkenntm.y. cognition

Erschen ?wig apparitionErzie. hung educationfur sick for itselfGegenbild counter-imageGeisterwelt spirit worldGotthei t godhoodHandeln action, actingIchheit I -nessIdealgrund ideal-groundIdentitdt identityin suchh within itself

aellectuelle Anschauung intellectual intuitionntellektualwelt intellectual world

Mittheilang impartation

Meglichked possibility1Vachbild after-imagePotenz potencyProdueirezide producing agentRedd& realityReflexion reflective cognition.

Glossary

AbbildAbfizIl

Ahndung

AlutAndchauung

an Bich

Amite' h

aufheben

aufSerweoentlich

Beotimmende

BewirkendeBitching

Einbildung

EinheitErkennen

Erkenntmo.

EnicheU lung

Erziehunq

fiir BichGegenbild

Geisterwelt

Gottheit

Handeln

le h heit

Idea&rund

Identitiit

in su4

intellectuelle Anschauwzg

Intellektwzlwelt

Mittheilung

MOglichkeit

Nachbi Id

Potenz

Producirende

Realittit

Reflexion

imagefalling-awaypremonitionhighest goodintuitionin itselfin-itselflift, dissolveextra-essentialdetermining agenteffecting agentedificationimaginative formationoneness, identity, unitive modecognizancecognitionapparitioneducationfor itselfcounter-imagespirit worldgodhoodaction, actingI-nessideal-groundidentitywithin itselfintellectual intuitionintellectual worldimpartationpossibilityafter-imagepotencyproducing agentrealityreflective cognition, reasoning

— 72 —

Scheinbild pseudo-imageScheinleben pseudo-lifeSchickda/ fateschlechthin Eine one-per-sedchlechthin Ideate ideal-per-sedchlechthin Reale real-per-seSe!babe& selfhoodSeligkeit beatitudeSinnenwelt sensate worldSprung leapThat deedThatigkeit activityVerendltc. hung rendering finiteVerkiltnis circumstance, conditionVerhiingnLi fate, predicamentVernunfterkenntnt:i rational cognitionVernunftleben rational lifeVorbild ideal-imageVorsehung providenceVorwelt prehistoric worldwater, wahrhaft true, trulyWesen inherent nature, essenceWirklichkeit actualityUnphilosophie unphilosophyUndeligkeit unhappinessUr- originaryUrbild originary image