sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivity

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Sceptical insulation andsceptical objectivityStephen Cade Hetherington aa University of New South WalesPublished online: 02 Jun 2006.

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 72, No. 4; December 1994

SCEPTICAL INSULATION AND SCEPTICAL OBJECTIVITY*

Stephen Cade Hetherington

Epistemic sceptics deny us knowledge? Let us suppose that they are happy to thereby

relinquish all knowledge themselves, including all knowledge of our lack of knowledge.

What they will not willingly give up, though, is the assumption of truth - - and hence at

least one kind of objectivity. Generally, sceptics think it is true - - really true - - that

there is no knowledge.

Not everyone who is sympathetic to scepticism, however, thinks that those of us who

make knowledge-claims must be dismissed by scepticism as being badly-mistaken-and- that-is-all-there-is-to-be-said-on-our-behalf Barry Stroud [8], for example, presents

two versions of the doctrine of sceptical insulation. ~ This is the idea that non-sceptics,

when making knowledge-claims, are not culpable in every way -:- and that this is so,

even if scepticism is true. The basic motivation for this idea is the (sceptic's) intuition

that, although the sceptic's distinctive denials are made from a more objective perspec-

tive on knowledge than non-philosophers enjoy, this does not entail that a person cannot

be doing something meritorious when claiming knowledge, even if he is doing it from a

less objective perspective.

This intuition has both a generous and a non-generous component. I will focus on the

latter part, the one that makes the intuition sceptical - - namely, the assumption that a

sceptic's perspective on epistemic matters is more objective than is her non-sceptical

epistemic subject ' s ) I call this assumption the sceptical objectivity assumption. It

apparently implies that a sceptic's perspective is more likely than her epistemic subject's

to be truth-revelatory.

The sceptical objectivity assumption is essential to all sceptics, not only to those who

are willing to concede some form of sceptical insulation. It is also made by sceptics who

deny any form of sceptical insulation - - sceptics who think that people who make

knowledge-claims are badly mistaken and that there is nothing to be said on their behalf

which might lessen the import of sceptical denials that they have any knowledge.

Comments by anonymous referees for this Journal helped me to improve this paper. Some of them deny us justification. Some of them do not deny us all knowledge/justification, but only some specific kind(s) of knowledge/justification. Taking these qualifications for grant- ed in this paper, I will talk simply of the sceptic's denying us knowledge.

2 For more manifestations of Stroud's sympathy to scepticism, see his [9] and [10]. 3 Is a sceptic's perspective more objective than a non-sceptical philosopher's, though? Is a scepti-

cal epistemologist's knowledge-denial more objective than a non-sceptical epistemologist's knowledge-attribution? I do not think so; I think ([2]; [4]) that the type of difficulty I describe in this paper as afflicting sceptics also affects non-sceptical epistemologists (cf. fn.14 below). For reasons of space, this paper does not discuss that subtlety; I distinguish only between sceptical perspectives and non-sceptical ones, and I talk as if any given sceptical perspective is denying knowledge to (at least) any given non-sceptical perspective.

411

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412 Sceptical Insulation and Sceptical Objectivity

This paper argues against the sceptical objectivity assumption. I argue that a scep-

tic's perspective (regardless of whether or not its knowledge-denials are true) is not more

objective than is that of its epistemic subject. I do not argue that there is knowledge, or

that there is none; I argue only that a sceptic's way of approaching the question is not one that is more likely to reveal the truth about the associated epistemic matters (no matter what that truth might be).

II.

Stroud does not assert that the sceptic's denials are true. But he does try to explain what

it would be for them to be true, and he does try to motivate one or more forms of scepti-

cal insulation. So, he seems to endorse the sceptical objectivity intuition.

He considers two forms of sceptical insulation. Mar ie McGinn calls them weak insu-

lation [5, p.19] and strong insulation [5, pp.19, 30]. Each classifies sceptical knowledge- denials as true. They differ as to what they take that truth to encompass.

Weak insulation [8, ch.2] concedes that when someone claims to know that kanga-

roos are plentiful in Australia, his claim might well be warranted (even if false). It is perfectly appropriate for him - - since he is not thinking epistemologically about kanga-

roos and his knowledge of them - - for him to claim this knowledge, so long as he has engaged in what would generally pass for reasonable inquiry into this matter. If he was being epistemological, arguably he would have to discuss worries like the Cartesian

dreaming argument. But, as a non-epistemologist, he has no such need. Such worries

bear on the truth of his knowledge-claim, not on its (non-epistemologically) warranted assertibility.

Strong insulation [8, ch.7] concedes the non-sceptic more than this. It allows that

there is a sense in which - - a perspective according to which - - his knowledge-claims are true, notwithstanding the truth of the sceptical knowledge-denial. This reconciliation

is effected by a Kantian division between two levels of discourse. First, the sceptic,s denial is taken to be of the truth of knowledge-claims, where these

are being interpreted as if they are being made by someone bringing an epistemological

perspective to bear upon them. In Kantian terms, the sceptic's knowledge-denial is directed at a transcendental understanding of knowledge. Thus, the sceptic, operating

from a perspective that is concerned not just with deciding who has knowledge, but with understanding the very concept of knowledge, thinks that knowledge is present only if

sceptical worries have been disposed of by the epistemic subject. The idea is that if the epistemic subject was concerned with as full an inquiry into his epistemic status as is

(epistemologically) possible, then (according to the sceptic) he would deny himself

knowledge. Hence, relative to a perspective which is concerned with that level of inquiry, he lacks knowledge.

Second, though, the sceptic might acknowledge that not all epistemic subjects have

that kind of inquiry on their mind when they investigate, let alone claim, knowledge.

This, according to strong insulation, reflects the fact that the concept of knowledge admits of being used - - meaningfully, even truly - - in that non-epistemological way. In

Kantian terms, the sceptic can allow that knowledge is possible in a lower-level sense of

knowledge - - in an empirical (Kantian) sense of knowledge. The truth or falsity of a

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Stephen Cade Hetherington 413

knowledge-claim - - understood in that way - - does not stand or fail with whether or not it meets standards considered in a philosophical inquiry. The inquirer is not being philosophical about his chances of having knowledge. And (says the sceptic who is willing to concede either the actual or the possible truth of strong insulation) this means that, as

used by a non-philosopher, a knowledge-claim is or could be true. Strong insulation, then, allows that the truth or falsity of a knowledge-claim depends

upon whether it is being used philosophically. Use it philosophically or transcendental- ly, as the sceptic does, and (according to the sceptic) it is false; use it plainly or empiri-

cally, as the non-sceptic does, and (according to the sceptic who admits strong insulation) it can be true?

III.

The non-concession in the latter 'concession' is the sceptical objectivity assumption - - and hence the sceptics thinking that, from an even higher perspective, she is not really conceding all that much. For she undoubtedly thinks that her transcendental perspective is a more objective guide (in a sense of 'objective' I explain soon) to epistemic reality than any non-sceptical perspective is.

It is clear that the sceptic who admits weak insulation thinks in that way. For she thinks there are epistemic truths (captured by her denials) which a non-sceptic might be warranted in accepting as false, but which are thereby truths that elude his - - the non- sceptics - - perspective on the situation. His perspective is not guided, as the sceptic's supposedly is, only by the quest for truth (as regards epistemic states of affairs); and so

perhaps we should not be surprised at his failure to believe all significant such truths. After all, he can quite properly content himself with meeting standards that, in part, reflect the practical constraints governing most knowledge-quests. If (strictly speaking, and unlike the sceptic) he thereby falls short of truth when claiming knowledge, this does not necessarily reflect poorly upon his inquiry - - not, at any rate, insofar as it is not an epistemologist's.

Something similar is true of a sceptic who accepts strong insulation. This might not be immediately apparent. For, as that sceptic, she thinEs that her perspective is but one possible perspective on the situation, and that the different kinds of perspectives can deliver different verdicts - - and true ones at that - - as to the presence or absence of knowledge. (She thinks this because she thinks that there are two epistemic perspectives - - her transcendental one and her epistemic subject's empirical one - - and that one of

these denies, while the other claims, knowledge.) And so, it might seem, she will not insist on the priority of her transcendental perspective over her epistemic subject 's empirical one.

But, unless she is a full-blooded relativist, that is not so. Rather, she will think that her perspective reveals something true of the epistemic subject's epistemic situation - -

something true, and something of which he is nevertheless unaware. She is willing to concede, by admitting strong insulation, that this does not entail the absolute falsity of

On the historical roots of sceptical insulation - - its practice - - see Bumyeat [1]. He traces it [1, p.250] to Kant's introduction of the transcendental/empirical distinction. (So, Bumyeat interprets insulation as strong insulation.)

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his more optimistic view of his epistemic situation. What she is not thereby conceding is that her perspective on that situation is not more objective than his.

Why on earth would she concede that? After all, her arguments purportedly start by telling us what her epistemic subject thinks about his situation (i.e., what evidence he has, and/or has available to him) - - and then she discusses whether what he thinks about his situation gives him knowledge within it. In short: she sees what he sees - - and more. That is how epistemological arguments in general proceed. 5 They purport to occupy a perspective that is more of a 'God's eye' perspective than their epistemic subject 's is (on his epistemic situation); then they discuss what, from that higher-level, supposedly more privileged perspective, is true of him in that situation.

Why is the sceptic's perspective more privileged, though? (Does 'higher-level' entail

'privileged'?) That is the question I turn to in the next section. In the meantime it is at least clear that (i) the sceptic - - unlike her epistemic subject - - is raising a (philosophical) question about his epistemic situation that he is not raising; and that (ii) the sceptic thinks that the answer to that question is partly constitutive of whether or not (from her perspective) he has knowledge. McGinn puts the issue, as it is shaped by strong insulation, in this way [5, pp.33-34]:

The [sceptic's] philosophical inquiry is concerned with the question whether our knowledge claims can survive the lifting of the restriction to our normal human perspective, which governs our ordinary knowledge claims, and succeed as claims addressed to reality 'objectively conceived'.

The sceptic is investigating aspects of her epistemic subject's epistemic situation, aspects he is ignoring. Apparently, therefore, there is a prima facie case for concluding that her knowledge-denials reflect a more inclusive, more reflective, and maybe better informed perspective on his epistemic situation than his knowledge-claims do.

IV.

It is in this sense, I suggest, that the sceptic (even when conceding a version of sceptical insulation) embraces the sceptical objectivity assumption. I think that the following picture of how the sceptic reaches her sceptical conclusions lies behind this version of the sceptical objectivity assumption. 6

First, she describes herself as reflecting on (1) evidence e bearing on proposition p, as well as on (2) sceptical possibility Y, bearing either on e itself, or on e 's bearing on p.7

(In each case, though, Y is said to bear on K(p), the knowledge-that-p.) For example, e

is some sensory evidence, p says there are many kangaroos in Australia - - and Y is the Cartesian dreaming worry.

5 I explain, and argue for, this generalisation more fully in [2]. 6 Some sceptics might take themselves to be more objective, in even stronger senses of objectivi-

ty. They are not my present concern. (But see sections VIII and IX below.) 7 If Y attacks p's truth, Y is a rebutting defeater of x's inference from e to p. If Y attacks the con-

nection between e and p, Y is an undercutting defeater of that inference. (On this distinction, see Pollock [7, pp.38-39].)

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StePhen Cade Hetherington 415

In contrast, a non-sceptical epistemic subject - - the 'ordinary' inquirer, x - - reflects

only on (1). He thinks about kangaroos, calling on his apparent experiences of them and

of being told about them. He does not think about (2). He has never heard, let us sup-

pose, of the Cartesian dreaming worry (and he would not think any further about it if he

were to hear of it).

According to the sceptic (I hypothesise), this is already sufficient to show why x 's

epistemic perspective on p and on K(p) is less objective than hers. Relative to e, it can

be reasonable (on weak insulation), and might even be true (on strong insulation), to say

that x knows-that-p - - that he has K(p). Nevertheless, if there is anything methodologi-

cally superior about the conclusion reached by the sceptic (especially if she concedes

some form of insulation), it is presumably the fact that it (her denial that x knows-that-p)

is made (i) with the sceptic being aware that x is aware of e, and (ii) with the sceptic

being aware of more besides. Both x and the sceptic reflect on e; 8 the sceptic, however,

also reflects on the pertinent Y.

More fully: (i) the sceptic is aware of what x is aware of. She is at least aware of it

on his behalf, as it were. She need not, like x, accept e. But she accepts that x accepts e,

and she tries to investigate what knowledge someone who accepts e thereby has. And

(ii) the sceptic is supposedly aware of more about x 's situation than x is aware of. For

she is also aware o f - - at least by thinking about - - Y, where (in her view) Y has impli-

cations for e, insofar as the latter has consequences for x 's knowledge.

All of this provides a strong prima facie case for the sceptical objectivity assumption.

The sceptic implicitly thinks that i f x was to become aware of what she is aware of about

him, then he, too, would say that he lacks knowledge-that-p. He lacks her perspective on

him, and since (roughly) hers properly includes his, hers is more objective than his. (So,

in effect, he only lacks some of her perspective on him.) For hers is aware of more of the

pertinent epistemic considerations and/or facts. It is aware of more of them, not neces-

sarily by knowing them to obtain, but at least by including them in its deliberations.

In considering sceptical objectivity, then, there is one sense of objectivity I have in

mind - - and there are at least two I do not. The sort of objectivity I am considering

reflects most immediately on the sceptic's reflectiveness, not necessarily on the success of that reflectiveness. I am concerned with a kind of objectivity whereby the sceptics

perspective is more objective than x ' s in virtue of being broader than his. There are

other senses in which one perspective might be more objective than another. First, a

sceptic might think of her perspective as being more objective than x's, in that her

knowledge-denial, unlike his knowledge-claim, is true. Second, a sceptic might think of

her perspective as being more objective than x's, in that her knowledge-denial, unlike his

knowledge-claim, is justified. But neither of these two senses of objectivity captures

what is common to both weak and strong insulation. For strong insulation rejects the

first interpretation of a sceptics greater objectivity, and weak insulation rejects the sec-

ond interpretation.

What is common to both versions of sceptical insulation is the idea that a sceptic has

at least considered more of the logically related possibilities - - such as Y. The sceptic's

8 Do they reflect on it in similar enough ways? Unlike x, the sceptic thinks about x's thinking about e, and hence seems to think about e only at a remove.. I turn to this point very soon.

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perspective on x 's K(p) is more reflective than x 's is - - in the way described in this sec-

tion. (Otherwise, if all that matters is the number of issues and possibilities considered

by, in turn, x and the sceptic, then the sceptic might not even try to consider the evidence

e which x considers. Their perspectives might be disjoint. That sounds like a recipe

merely for greater activity, not for greater objectivity, on the part of the sceptic:) What is

required, then, is that the sceptic properly include x's perspective on his K(p) within

hers. This is the kind of objectivity I take to be referred to by the sceptical objectivity

assumption (insofar as the latter is meant to coexist with some version of sceptical insu-

lation).

V.

Is the sceptical objectivity assumption true? Is there really something more objective - -

more privileged, more relevantly reflective - - about a sceptic's higher-level perspective?

Section IV outlined what I take to be the most obvious way a sceptic who endorses scep-

tical insulation might argue for the sceptical objectivity assumption. This section rejects

that assumption by undermining section IV's argument for it.

The reason why that argument seems at all plausible, I think, is that it portrays the

sceptic as simply building on what she describes x as doing. She would have us believe

that she, like x, can think about e and about p or K(p) - - but that she carries such think-

ing further than x does. By adding Y to what she considers on x 's behalf, she supposed-

ly just adds new and relevant information to her deliberations.

But is that what the sceptic does? I will argue that it is not. The picture claims that

her knowledge-denial is to be taken seriously, and as possessing significant objectivity,

due to her being able to understand what it is about e that seems (certainly to x) to

ground K(p), and her nevertheless being able to find a further relevant consideration, Y,

one that casts doubt on e 's really grounding K(p). Thus (we are told), the sceptic's epis-

temic subject x uses e, while the sceptic uses eplus Y - - where Y is an extra considera-

tion of pertinence to the epistemic implications of inferring p from e. But (I will now

argue) the sceptic is not able to 'put herself in x 's place' sufficiently to appreciate why e

seems to g round K(p). She th inks she can, but she is mi s t aken about this.

(Consequently, she is equally confused when making the sceptical objectivity assump-

tion.)

The basic reason is that, while x can take e at face value, the sceptic cannot.

(Ironically, though, she thinks that this is part of what makes her perspective more objec-

tive. I will argue that it has a contrary result.) By this, I mean that, as a sceptic, she can

never be thinking about e on its own, in relation to p or to K(p). Yet that is how x uses e.

His putative evidence for p (and hence his putative grounds for claiming K(p)) is e sim-

pliciter, we may assume. But that is not how it is for the sceptic, as she looks on at x,

considering his chances of having K(p). As a sceptic, she can only consider e insofar as

it, or the inference from it to p, is affected by Y. Her sceptical thinking about e - - her

sceptical awareness of e - - is tied up with her thinking about Y. Insofar as she is think-

ing about the situation as a sceptic, she cannot be aware of e without being aware of Y.

In thinking about what knowledge x has via e, therefore, she cannot give herself x's per-

spective on e (i.e., she cannot be aware of what x is aware of) - - and then happen to add

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an independent awareness of Y to her deliberations.

This raises a significant doubt about the claimed superiority of her perspective on x 's

epistemic situation. Whereas x thinks about e on its own, the sceptic thinks about e in

relation to the Y-worry: she thinks about sensory evidence only in conjunction with the

question of how it is affected by the Cartesian worry, say. Thus, it is not clear that her

awareness of e is an awareness of that of which (according to her) x is aware - - and then

more. To put the point more starkly: it is not clear that the sceptic's perspective on x 's

epistemic situation has anything (strictly speaking) in common with x 's perspective on

that situation.

Suppose that (as is usual) the sceptic's story about x portrays him as not thinking

about Y. He thinks about e on its own, independently of Y. On the other hand, the scep-

tic - - insofar as she is being sceptical in that way - - has to be thinking about Y. For

instance, she does not simply have in mind the sensory evidence e pertinent to knowing

about kangaroos in Australia; she reflects on such evidence, evaluating it in light of the

Cartesian dreaming worry. And here is the possibility this raises.

The sceptic can be sceptical about x 's K(p) only by raising Y. Is it not possible that,

even by raising Y, she still fails to be sceptical about x 's K(p)? 9 Specifically, is it not

possible that, by raising Y as a worry, the sceptic implicitly changes the inference she is

discussing? We supposed that she characterises x as not thinking about Y. This means

(I suggest) that x uses e as it is meant to be used if it is to ground K(p). He uses sensory

evidence without letting sceptical doubts disturb his reflections. And presumably, as a

non-sceptic, that is how he should use e. If e is to ground K(p) for the non-sceptical x, x

should use e simpliciter: he should not be doubting e even as he uses it. Yet that is what

the sceptic does. She thinks not only about e, but --simultaneously - - about Y too. For

her, sensory evidence is, in a deep sense, not sensory evidence; it is mere fodder for

sceptical doubt. As a sceptic (that is, insofar as she is being sceptical) about e 's epis-

temic efficacy, she must include Y (or an analogous consideration) in her deliberations

about e. And this threatens the objectivity of her subsequent sceptical conclusion.

For, first, it means that she is not using e as x uses it. She is therefore not simply

adding on to his perspective, bY engaging in his kind of thinking (only more so). His

kind of thinking can take Y or leave it; hers cannot. Second, it means she might be

unable to appreciate e 's evidential power - - when e is taken on its own. Since she can-

not consider it on its own, she is not in a good position to insist that her verdict on the

epistemic power of e itself is the verdict of a particularly objective perspective on e

itself. In short, when - - as a sceptic - - she purports to discuss x 's evidence e, she can-

not really appreciate how e seems to x. Unlike x, she has to be doubting e's epistemic

worth; x can simply accept e at face value.

Thus, the sceptic says that she is considering x 's inference from e to his having K(p).

But she, when thinking about this inference, has to include Y in her deliberations - - as

affecting the presence or absence of K(p). And why does her claim that K(p) is absent

If so, for her to insist that, by raising Y, she argues (scepticaUy) that x lacks K(p), is for the putative sceptic to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Formally:

1 If someone, z, is sceptical about x's K(p), then z raises Y. 2 z raises Y.

So: 3 z is sceptical about x's K(p). [By 1, 2.]

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- - a claim made only once Y is considered by her - - entail that, if Y is never considered

by x, it is nevertheless x who lacks K(p)? One possibility is that it is only the sceptic

herself who lacks K(p). It might be true that, insofar as the sceptic (as a sceptic) cannot

talk about e 's epistemic power, independently of also talking about Y, she is simply

unable to deliver a verdict on the epistemic power of e, considered alone. And if that is

so, she is not really able to tell us whether or not the non-sceptical epistemic subject x

has K(p). She would be able to talk only about whether, insofar as e is considered in

conjunction with the sceptical worry Y, there is K(p). But, since x himself is not consid-

ering e in conjunction with Y, it would not be x ' s K(p) that is threatened. 1°

The sceptic will deny this. But that is due to her picture of herself as simply adding

on to, or supplementing, x 's own epistemic perspective. She thinks that she is aware of

something, Y, of which x is unaware; she thinks that, if x were to become similarly

aware of Y, then he, too, would become sceptical about his having K(p); and she thinks

that this is because, in part, the inference he makes from e to K(p) is the same inference

as that on which he would be reflecting, if he were to become aware of Y.

It is this picture against which I am arguing. My point is that the sceptic is not really

considering Y's effect on x ' s inference from e to K(p). By thinking about Y, and thereby

becoming aware, or at least thinking, that Y is problematic for (at least some cases of)

putative K(p), she concludes that it is objectively problematic for (all cases of) putative

K(p). She thinks that she has become aware of a problem afflicting anyone ' s K(p) - -

rather than that, in becoming aware of the problem she thereby creates, and indeed

implicitly delineates the range of applicability of, the problem. She assumes, in short, a

real ism about the sceptical problem she purportedly describes.

The realism shows up in her description of the target of her conclusion. She thinks

that even someone who focusses on e by itself, and who never considers sceptical wor-

ries like Y, is still in f ac t subject to her sceptical conclusion. But, I am noting, it is not

actually possible for her (as a sceptic) to consider e by itself, and to ignore sceptical wor-

ries. W h e n she thinks about e, therefore, she has to be conjoining it with some such

worry, Y. What then licenses her detaching to a conclusion about how e on its own - -

independently of Y - - will not give K(p)? She simply cannot put herself in the place o f

someone, such as x, who is using e independently of Y. In the sense of objectivity I have

described, therefore, she is unable to put herself into a position to deliver an obviously

m o r e objective verdict on the epistemic limitations of such a perspective than the posses-

sor of the perspective can deliver himself. The sceptic denies this, naturally enough. But what is her evidence? She cannot

Perhaps x does have K(p), and perhaps it is because he does focus full-bloodedly on e by itself, rather than being distracted by sceptical worries. (For example, he attends to what his senses are telling him; he does not dilute, or even alter, their message by asking whether they should be believed, or whether they should be seen as dubious on Cartesian grounds.) The sceptic, who is thus distracted, is not clearly in a position to draw particularly objective conclusions about someone who is not so distracted. (The sceptic, strictly speaking, cannot attend just to what her senses tell her; as a sceptic, she has to also be asking whether they should be believed.) There is a difference between the two perspectives (x's and the sceptic's), and (for all that the sceptic can show, rather than just assume) this difference allows x to have K(p) - - even if it denies the sceptic such knowledge. (The idea that the sceptic lacks the knowledge because of her thinking about it, whereas x could still have it, is a way in which knowledge could be unstable. See fn.17 below.)

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actually supply any. For, as a sceptic about the inference, she must mention Y in the

same breath as she mentions the inference. As used by her, the inference being consid-

ered is (literally) manifestly one that includes Y 's being considered. Now, she says that

she is aware of Y in the course of considering what x is aware of, and that this does not

mean that she cannot consider simply what x is aware of. But again, it is impossible for

her to reflect on x 's evidence, insofar as the latter is x 's evidence, and not simply insofar

as it is his evidence as interpreted through her theoretical, indeed doubting, eyes. Since

the sceptic cannot detach e from Y (in her thinking as a sceptic about e), she is not really

aware of what x is aware of: she is not aware of e as such, but only of e as conjoined

with a sceptical worry Y. She says she adds an independent consideration of Y to her

prior understanding of e - - an understanding meant to understand e as used by x. But

she cannot really do this. To do it, she must see e from x's perspective. She must, in

effect, prove that - - even as a sceptic - - she can discuss and understand evidence as it is

used by a (non-philosophical) non-sceptic. This, she cannot do: for her to see e from x's

perspective is for her to relinquish her sceptical perspective on x. 11

VI.

So, I think that the sceptical objectivity assumption looks tempting only because of a

subtle, yet definite, mistake. It looks tempting only if we forget the basic moral of the transcendental/empirical distinction. 12

That moral tells us that there is not just one inference from e to p. There is the empir-

ical or plain inference - - x's, from an unadorned e to p. And there is the transcendental

or philosophical inference, considered implicitly by the sceptic h e r s e l f - from e-plus-Y

to p. (She considers it implicitly, in that she explicitly considers the epistemic effect of

Y on the inference she considers explicitly - - the inference from e to p.) The latter

inference is considered implicitly by the sceptic, even as she takes herself to be explicitly

considering the former, empirical, inference. I have argued that she confuses the two.

If I am right, her perspective is not more objective than x's. It is simply different to

his. It would (or could) be more objective if (1) its awareness (i) was of e and Y, but (ii)

could simply be of e (without thereby ceasing to be sceptical ) - - while (2) x 's was only

of e. But the situation is not really like that. The sceptic is aware of e only insofar as e's

epistemic power is in question due to Y; so, (1) (ii) is falsified by the sceptic. I have put the correlative worry in the following terms.

How can the sceptic know that it is not e-plus-Y, rather than e alone, that has been

impugne d by her reasoning? She cannot present such reasoning other than by consider-

Elsewhere [2, chs.l-3; 4, ch.4], I enlarge on this problem of a sceptic's empathising with her epistemic subject - - while nevertheless remaining that sceptic. And that distinction, remember, was the moral behind the strong doctrine of sceptical insulation. So, what motivates that doctrine undermines the sceptical objectivity assumption - - which is entailed by that doctrine. Thus, what generates the doctrine of strong insulation als0 entails the doctrine's falsity. At least, it does so, if strong insulation is interpreted standardly - - as according greater objectivity to the sceptic, rather than to her epistemic subject x. Actually, I think that there might well be insulation, but that if there is, it is x whose perspective is more objective. (Unsurprisingly, though, I would argue for this by using epistemology. And its being used in that way - - to reveal just what/s more objective about our standard perspectives - - might be the point of doing epistemology. See my [4].)

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ing Y. How is she to know that her considering Y is not itself what makes it look (but falsely so) as if e by itself does not give knowledge-that-p? Perhaps it is only e as paired

with Y that fails to give knowledge-that-p. She adduces Y, thinking that epistemic trou-

ble is thereby revealed - - and assumes that the problem was always present, albeit unno- ticed. But maybe it is only present when noticed.

My point is that, whatever the facts are about this matter, the sceptic herself is hardly in a position to offer a detached and objective verdict as to what they are. She can only

consider the inference from e to p insofar as she is also considering Y. The fact that she

says she is considering the inference from e to p, as it is effected by someone who is not

necessarily aware of Y, hardly proves the point (i.e., that she /s considering x and his

non-philosophical, non-sceptical, use of e). And if she is not doing so, her perspective is not obviously more objective than x's. It is different, and maybe competing. But it is

not somehow building on, and transcending, x's. It is not more objective. There is, therefore, little need to insulate - - to protect - - the non-sceptic from the

sceptic. '3 There is nothing objectively special - - because there is nothing specially

objective - - about a sceptic's philosophical perspective on anyone else's knowledge?'

VII.

Michael Williams [11] has recently written about such matters, too. But what our dis-

cussions share, they use quite differently. We each highlight what Williams [11, pp.122-125, 127] calls a methodological

necessity of sceptical inquiry. A methodological necessity of an inquiry is an assump-

tion, exempted from doubt in the context of that inquiry, which is integral to the inquiry's being, and continuing to be, the kind of inquiry it is. Williams identifies a

putative methodological necessity of external world scepticism. My goal is more general: section IV describes a kind of methodological necessity, such that in any sceptical

argument some instance of that kind is present. The methodological necessity attributed by Williams to the external world sceptic is

the assumption of epistemological realism. It says that (a) there is a kind of knowledge which is appropriately named external world knowledge; (b) via a fixed relation of epistemic priority, such knowledge is dependent on experiential knowledge; and (c) that relation is determined by the types of propositional content that make a belief about either experience or the external world. This is a substantive, indeed theoretical, assumption by a sceptic - - one which, if Williams is right, reveals scepticism to be Just

More Theory. I attribute a less'substantive methodological necessity to sceptics. I say only that a

sceptic must include some additional thesis in her thinking. And it is rarely, if ever, dif- ficult to decide what that thesis is. (In the Cartesian case, it is the dreaming worry.) In

contrast to Williams' non-trivial attribution (the attributing is as contentious as the epis-

temological realism it attributes), I impute only what is explicit in a case of sceptical rea-

Cf. fn.12 above and fn.18 below. Can other epistemologists - - non-sceptical epistemologists - - do better in this respect? Or are their perspectives, too, no more objective than those of their epistemic subjects.'? 1 think they fare no better in this regard than sceptics do. I argue this elsewhere [2]; [4].

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sorting - - the sceptical consideration Y advanced by that sceptic. 15

Williams aims to make scepticism look less intuitive, and to thereby increase the bur-

den of proof felt by a sceptic. He thus comments on scepticism's epistemic status: to

support a sceptical conclusion, more is needed than mere appeal to intuition.

Williams might be right about that; it coheres with my arguments elsewhere [2, chsl-

3; 4, ch.4] for the conclusion that sceptics must meet at least the standard (the burden) of

proof they seek to impose on others. But in this paper I am asking not about the epis-

temic status of the sceptic's efforts, but about the object of her thinking. In particular,

what inference is the object of her sceptical attention? In Williams' terms, what infer-

ence is being evaluated relative to a commitment to epistemological realism? I think that

Williams, like other epistemologists, would feel no difficulty in answering that question:

the pertinent inference (we will be told) is x's, from e to p. But, I have argued, what is

methodologically necessary to a sceptic's inquiry changes the content of the inference

she studies: a sceptic, by being a sceptic, ~ makes it impossible for her to threaten x's

inference. The sceptic is not thinking about what she thinks she thinks about: thinking

that one is thinking about x 's inference does not entail one's doing so.

My argument is thus anti-realist, and more generally so than Williams'. 16 It is anti-

realist because it says that the presence of the sceptical thinker (the observer, as it were)

affects the content (the nature) of what she thinks about (what she observes). Williams'

main anti-realist question [11, pp.101-111] is whether there is any such kind of knowl-

edge as external world knowledge. Mine is whether, no matter what kinds or what

instances of knowledge there are, a sceptic (qua sceptic) can think about them. Hence,

the realism I deny is logically prior to Williams': no matter whether or not x 's knowl-

edge is categorised in a general way, it is not the real object of the sceptic's thought. 17

Whilst Williams is not denying that a sceptic can think about an inference which some-

one else uses, that is what I dispute. His concern is with the epistemic statuses attending

the one inference's being thought about, or used, in two contexts (sceptical, non-scepti-

cal); mine is with whether there is one inference being thought about, or used, in those

contexts.

VIII.

I suggest that my worry is the more fundamental, in that it denies the sceptic the most

basic kind of objectivity appropriate to her efforts. I say that, to be at all objective, her

argument must be about what it purports to be about - - x 's inference. And, I claim, if a

sceptic cannot satisfy that condition of objectivity, she satisfies none. If her argument is

is In the case of an external world sceptic, Y might be the assumption of epistemological realism. Certainly, if the sceptic has read Williams' book, this could occur. She might replace her ¢olourful Cartesian story about dreaming by the more dour thesis of epistemological realism.

16 On anti-realism and epistemology (both sceptical and anti-sceptical epistemology), see my [2, pp.209-216].

~7 Williams' other main anti-realist move is his arguing [11, eh.8] for the instability of knowledge - - the sensitivity of knowledge (i.e., its presence or its absence) to whether, in a given context, it is being thought about philosophically. A person's thinking philosophically about knowledge, says Williams [11, p.358], 'can be seen as inducing a temporary loss of knowledge.' I agree, having argued for this myself [3]; [4, chs 2-4]. In section V I mentioned it as a possibility, without making my argument depend on it. (For more on the relation between philosophical contexts and non-philosophical ones, see my [2, pp.9-11] and [4, oh.l].)

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not about what it purports to be about, it fails a minimal condition of its being sceptically objective (about x's inference). For it fails a minimal condition of its even being objectively sceptical (about x 's inference). The minimal condition is that it be x's inference

the sceptic is discussing. If (as sections V and VI argue) she fails to satisfy even this condition, she is, in effect, changing the topic of her sceptical inquiry to suit her desired outcome.

So minimal is this condition that, in my view, someone's failing it entails her lacking all sceptical objectivity. If so, I can strengthen my anti-sceptical result, from a denial of her having superior objectivity as a sceptic, to a denial of her having any objectivity as a sceptic. Here is the argument for that strengthening:

1 It is a methodological necessity of a s_ceptic's being sceptical that she reflect on some special consideration Y, along with the inference (from e to p) about which

she is supposedly thinking. [Trivial, by section IV.] 2 Her reflecting on Y while reflecting on the inference from e to p is a necessary

condition of her having the most minimal kind of sceptical objectivity in her sceptical reflection on that inference. [By the minimalist conception of sceptical objectivity, described as such at the start of this section.]

3 Her reflecting on Y while supposedly reflecting on the inference from e to p deprives her of the kind of objectivity referred to in premise 2. [Non-trivial, by sections V and VI.]

4 So, she has no objectivity as a putative sceptical thinker about the inference from e to p. [By 1, 2, 3.]

In response to this argument, one might say that premise 2 overstates what I have shown in sections V and VI. What grounds 2's implication that the kind of sceptical objectivity I have denied the sceptic is a minimal kind?

The answer is that to credit a sceptic with some objectivity independently of whatever objectivity accrues to her as a result of her including Y in her thinking is to make the same mistake as that which sections V and VI attribute to her. It is to say that part of her

thinking has some objectivity regardless, or independently, of whether her use of Y in particular has any. However, the only part of her thinking which could be like this is her thinking about the inference from e to p. (For, by hypothesis, her sceptical thinking just is her using Y while purportedly reflecting on the inference from e to p.) And with this realisation, we again confront my argument in sections V and VI - -which tells us that, insofar as she is being a sceptic, a sceptic never does think about that inference from e to

p as such. Hence, any objectivity present in the thinking being used by someone who is thinking

just about the inference from e to p (e.g., by using it to infer p) is not available to the sceptic qua sceptic. A sceptic qua sceptic must be thinking about the inference plus

some sceptical Y - - and sections V and VI demonstrate the problem with her doing that. So, I repeat 2, and thereby derive 4: sceptics lack all sceptical objectivity. TM Lacking the

is But might sceptical knowledge-denials be true? Could they be objective in that way? Well, what would they be true of?. Given my argument in sections V and VI, they could be true only of themselves. They would therefore be self-refuting - - or so I argue elsewhere [2, chs 1-3]. (Cf. fn.17 above.)

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minimal kind of sceptical objectivity I have described, they lack all other kinds. They

are not reflecting on o u r beliefs and inferences: they are not objectively sceptical.

Hence, no matter what knowledge or cogency their reflections might give them, 19 they

are not thereby making objectively based pronouncements of pertinence to the rest of us.

IX.

Naturally, this result bears on more specific and substantive conceptions of how a sceptic

might seek or attain objectivity. For instance, it is tempting to present scepticism as aris-

ing from a concern with so-called objective knowledge, and to understand this in terms

of an inquirer's seeking a more objective conception of the world. Thomas Nagel [6,

pp.67-68] thinks that

objectivity and skep t i c i sm. . , both develop from the idea that there is a real world in

which we are contained, and that appearances result from our interaction with it.

The development includes our reflecting on ourselves and on whether we can ever

attain real objectivity, by our 'form[ing] a conception of reality which includes ourselves

and our view of things among its objects' - - the consequent problem being that 'whatev-

er forms the conception will not be included by it' and 'this will give grounds for doubt

that we are really getting any closer to reality' [6, p.68].

Still, this does not ground scepticism unless it is true of a l l possible stages of our

reflections. Nagel accepts that it is:

It seems to follow that the most objective view we can achieve will have to rest on an

unexamined subjective base, and that since we can never abandon our own point of

view, but can only alter it, the idea that we are coming closer to the reality outside it

with each successive step has no foundation. [6, p.68]

Consider an inquirer x, supposedly trapped in this perpetual attempt to ascend from

less objective to more objective perspectives. He thinks about some p; on Nagel 's char-

acterisation, p is tantamount to an appearance of how the world is. And x does this in a

way that (whether or not he is aware of it) seeks to appease an overarching idea of o b j e c -

t iv i ty - - an idea of a real world existing independently of all appearances of it.

Now the sceptic enters the story. On Nagel 's version, she is an inquirer who is a w a r e

of (the importance of) that idea of objectivity. She thinks it applies to to all inquirers.

Her role is to think about (and maybe to make others aware of) its doing so. Hence,

whatever else she does, a sceptic is a person who i n c l u d e s the idea of objectivity - - the

idea of a real world to which experiences are answerable - - in her deliberations.

In terms of section IV's schema, this idea of objectivity functions for the sceptic as a

value of Y - - the extra consideration that gives her reasoning its sceptical impetus: call

it yO. X 's views (e.g., his acceptance of p) fall short of satisfying yO, says the sceptic:

x 's views are, and must remain, mere appearances of how the world really is - - and it is

19 None - - according to my [2, chs 1-3] and [4, ch 4].

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the awareness of y O which makes this apparent to the sceptic. The idea of objectivity entails that any view as to how things are can be evaluated, relative to that idea: for any proposition (even an acceptance of y O itself), y O can be brought to bear upon it as part

of an inquirer's asking whether the proposition is really true. So, there is no stage of inquiry at which, while using yO, one can consistently think that one has transcended appearances. Thus, as Nagel claimed, the idea of a real world generates both scepticism and the idea of objectivity.

Nevertheless, it does not generate both objectivity and the idea of scepticism! For the objectivity problem developed in earlier sections returns (as follows).

The sceptic, by including y O in her deliberations (supposedly about x 's inference

from e to p), has changed the object of her deliberations - - in the sense of rendering it other than what she takes i t to be. Once an inquirer is working with the idea, yO, of a

potentially transcendent reality existing beyond all appearances, she no longer has, or uses, those appearances as such. For, ineliminably, she interprets them philosophically. Whereas x might have simply an appearance of a kangaroo, a sceptic thinks about kanga- r••-appearances-ins•far-as-they-d•-•r-d•-n•t-measure-up-t•-a-p•tentia••y-transcendent- real-world. And (I argued in sections V and VI) the latter object of thought does not include the former one.

The sequence of stages of inquiry at which Nagel gestures is therefore not a progression to greater and greater objectivity - - not, at any rate, when it is part of a sceptic's inquiry. There is no such sceptical progression. What a sceptic's inquiry (pursued in the name of an increasingly objective understanding of the world and of inquiry) purportedly adds to other inquiries is not really added to them. It only appears (to her) to be added. She thus falls short of her own idea, yO, of objectivity! Sceptical appearances are - - and must remain - - mere appearances. Nagel is right to say that 'the idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine itself' [6, p~68] - - but wrong about why he is right.

He presents scepticism as involving reflection on other perspectives. It is this picture

of the sceptic which I undermine in this paper. Perhaps there is coherence in a picture of increased objectivity among successive perspectives, each reflecting on a prior one - - perhaps. But, on this paper's argument, there is no coherence in a picture of increased

sceptical objectivity - - an increas e in objectivity by allowing one's reflections on another perspective to take a sceptical turn. For, strictly speaking (and in what other way would a sceptic have us speak?), that cannot occur.

And talk of scepticism as arising from people's quests for a more objective picture of the worm as such is beside the point. Scepticism only arises (as a view held by an actual point of view) once a person is reflecting on inquirers within the world - - on other perspectives. Yet this, I have argued, no one can do as a sceptic. Perhaps unfortunately,

though, by section IV, any would-be sceptic has to try to do so. To not make the attempt is to relinquish the sceptical project? °

University of New South Wales Received May 1993 Revised September 1993

20 What, then, is the point of being sceptical (or entering an epistemological context)? See my [4] (and cf. fn.12 above).

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REFERENCES

1. M.F. Burnyeat, 'The Sceptic in His Place and Time' in Philosophy in History (eds) R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp.225-254.

2. S.C. Hetherington, Epistemology's Paradox (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992). 3. S.C. Hetherington, 'Nozick and Sceptical Realism', PhilosophicalPapers 21 (1992) pp,33-44. 4. S.C. Hetherington, Epistemology'sPoint(manuscript). 5. M. McGinn, Sense and Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 6. T. Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 7. J.L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield,

1986). 8. B. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 9. B. Stroud, 'Skepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984)

pp.545-551. 10. B. Stroud, 'Understanding Human Knowledge in General' in Knowledge and Skepticism (eds)

M. Clay and K. Lehrer (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989) pp.31-50. 11. M. Williams, UnnaturalDoubts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

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sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivity

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