L'orientation de la science cartesienne by Geraud TournadreReview by: Stephen GaukrogerIsis, Vol. 75, No. 1, Sarton, Science, and History (Mar., 1984), p. 231Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/232400 .

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BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 75 : 1 : 276 (1984) BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 75 : 1 : 276 (1984)

fusion of novel scientific ideas. The ap- pendix comprises documents illustrative of the two kinds of Freemasonry and is most valuable for its insights into radical circles in Holland centered on important Dutch publishers. One of the virtues of this book is its ability to relate English debates about religion, natural philosophy, and politics to similar stirrings in the Low Countries and to a lesser extent in France, Germany, and Austria. It concludes with a sketch of the relation of her pantheists, deists, and po- litical radicals to later materialists such as d'Holbach.

Scholars will disagree with many things in this book. English religious historians will find her accounts of Anglicanism and Anglican apologetics somewhat eccentric, just as historians like Michael Hunter have found exaggerated her claims about the po- litical meanings of science. Recent works on Toland and Collins by Robert Sullivan and James O'Higgins have read their ca- reers rather differently. Political theorists may feel that natural law thinkers have been improperly ignored, while others will point out that "possessive individualism" was hardly new in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless this is an interesting, provoc- ative, and useful contribution to the series in which it appears.

ROGER L. EMERSON

Geraud Tournadre. L'orientation de la science cartesienne. (Bibliotheque d'his- toire de la philosophie.) 320 pp., illus., bibl. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1980.

This book, a reworked version of a thesis written some years ago, is princi- pally concerned, first, with Descartes's methodological claims and with the way in which these match his actual procedures in natural philosophy; second, with the meth- odological claims and procedures of a number of prominent seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cartesians; and finally, with a discussion of questions of method and procedure in twentieth-century phys- ics. The general aim is to provide a mea- sure of vindication for certain method- ological aspects of Descartes's work, by construing these in terms of the hypothet- ico-deductive model.

In the first part of the book Tournadre's concern is to rebut those interpetations of Descartes's procedure which take his ex-

fusion of novel scientific ideas. The ap- pendix comprises documents illustrative of the two kinds of Freemasonry and is most valuable for its insights into radical circles in Holland centered on important Dutch publishers. One of the virtues of this book is its ability to relate English debates about religion, natural philosophy, and politics to similar stirrings in the Low Countries and to a lesser extent in France, Germany, and Austria. It concludes with a sketch of the relation of her pantheists, deists, and po- litical radicals to later materialists such as d'Holbach.

Scholars will disagree with many things in this book. English religious historians will find her accounts of Anglicanism and Anglican apologetics somewhat eccentric, just as historians like Michael Hunter have found exaggerated her claims about the po- litical meanings of science. Recent works on Toland and Collins by Robert Sullivan and James O'Higgins have read their ca- reers rather differently. Political theorists may feel that natural law thinkers have been improperly ignored, while others will point out that "possessive individualism" was hardly new in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless this is an interesting, provoc- ative, and useful contribution to the series in which it appears.

ROGER L. EMERSON

Geraud Tournadre. L'orientation de la science cartesienne. (Bibliotheque d'his- toire de la philosophie.) 320 pp., illus., bibl. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1980.

This book, a reworked version of a thesis written some years ago, is princi- pally concerned, first, with Descartes's methodological claims and with the way in which these match his actual procedures in natural philosophy; second, with the meth- odological claims and procedures of a number of prominent seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cartesians; and finally, with a discussion of questions of method and procedure in twentieth-century phys- ics. The general aim is to provide a mea- sure of vindication for certain method- ological aspects of Descartes's work, by construing these in terms of the hypothet- ico-deductive model.

In the first part of the book Tournadre's concern is to rebut those interpetations of Descartes's procedure which take his ex-

plicit methodological pronouncements lit- erally. He has no difficulty in showing that this is not a particularly fruitful approach, and that in practice Descartes makes ex- tensive use of hypothesis and experiment. There is absolutely nothing new in this ar- gument, and it has been defended in ways far more subtle and sophisticated than that developed by Tournadre. What he does do that is relatively new is to argue that the use of hypotheses and experiments is not restricted to natural philosophy, but is cen- tral to Descartes's work in mathematics also. This is an important line of argument, one not taken up in most discussions of Descartes's method, where it is simply supposed that the geometric method is a straightforwardly deductive and axiomatic system. Unfortunately, the author's ac- count remains a sketch, with none of the deeper problems discussed or deeper con- sequences explored.

This rather sketchy approach to the sub- ject also dominates the other sections, where we are given glimpses of a number of issues, none of which is followed up in any depth. The second section consists of an examination of the roles of experiment and observation or deduction in the work of Rohault, Regius, Malebranche, Fonte- nelle, and Borelli. The inclusion of Fonte- nelle is particularly welcome since it pro- vides an opportunity for assessing the question of the Cartesian approach to the traditional areas of humane learning such as history. Little advantage is taken of this opportunity, however, and the discussion is restricted to the usual areas of the nat- ural and biological sciences; it is not clear that the author has achieved any more than Mouy's classic account.

The final section, which covers the merits of the hypothetico-deductive model and conceptions of experiment and obser- vation in mechanics, as well as discussing classical, relativistic, and quantum me- chanics (all in the space of less than sixty pages), is much too superficial to be of value. Since nothing particularly novel is argued in the section, it would have been better to have left it out completely and de- voted more space to developing the issues raised in the first two sections. Finally, the book contains no references later than 1967; given its scope, this is shameful, as so much work has been done since then that is relevant to the questions covered.

STEPHEN GAUKROGER

plicit methodological pronouncements lit- erally. He has no difficulty in showing that this is not a particularly fruitful approach, and that in practice Descartes makes ex- tensive use of hypothesis and experiment. There is absolutely nothing new in this ar- gument, and it has been defended in ways far more subtle and sophisticated than that developed by Tournadre. What he does do that is relatively new is to argue that the use of hypotheses and experiments is not restricted to natural philosophy, but is cen- tral to Descartes's work in mathematics also. This is an important line of argument, one not taken up in most discussions of Descartes's method, where it is simply supposed that the geometric method is a straightforwardly deductive and axiomatic system. Unfortunately, the author's ac- count remains a sketch, with none of the deeper problems discussed or deeper con- sequences explored.

This rather sketchy approach to the sub- ject also dominates the other sections, where we are given glimpses of a number of issues, none of which is followed up in any depth. The second section consists of an examination of the roles of experiment and observation or deduction in the work of Rohault, Regius, Malebranche, Fonte- nelle, and Borelli. The inclusion of Fonte- nelle is particularly welcome since it pro- vides an opportunity for assessing the question of the Cartesian approach to the traditional areas of humane learning such as history. Little advantage is taken of this opportunity, however, and the discussion is restricted to the usual areas of the nat- ural and biological sciences; it is not clear that the author has achieved any more than Mouy's classic account.

The final section, which covers the merits of the hypothetico-deductive model and conceptions of experiment and obser- vation in mechanics, as well as discussing classical, relativistic, and quantum me- chanics (all in the space of less than sixty pages), is much too superficial to be of value. Since nothing particularly novel is argued in the section, it would have been better to have left it out completely and de- voted more space to developing the issues raised in the first two sections. Finally, the book contains no references later than 1967; given its scope, this is shameful, as so much work has been done since then that is relevant to the questions covered.

STEPHEN GAUKROGER

231 231

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