santiago campaign joint operations.pdf

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JOINT OPERATIONS AT THECAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

MICHAEL A. FOX, LCDR, USNB.S., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1994

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LCDR Michael A. FoxThesis Title: Joint Operations at the Campaign of Santiago

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman& William C. ~ockAood, .M.A.S.

, MemberCDR Richard P. ~ e r ~ d o n ,.S.

..., Member

Lawrence A. at$, Ph.D.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of thestudent author and do not necessarily represent the views ofthe U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any othergovernmental agency. (References to this study should includethe foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACT

JOINT OPERATIONST THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO by LCDR MichaelA. Fox, USN, 93 pages.

This study is a historical analysis of the joint operationsbetween the United States Army and Navy during the SantiagoCampaign of the Spanish-American War. The study examines theU.S. military's preparations for the campaign, includingmobilization and development of campaign plans at both thestrategic and operational levels; details the actions of theU.S. military during the campaign, from the landing phase'through the siege of Santiago to the eventual Spanishsurrender; and analyzes the campaign lessons learned as wellas the changes and reforms that took place in both services inthe ten-year period following the Spanish-American War.The study concludes that, lacking doctrine or a unifiedcommand, cooperation between services is imperative toconducting a successful campaign. This cooperation was notevident between the Army and Navy during the SantiagoCampaign. As a direct result, the U.S. military institutedseveral important changes and reforms to help ensure bettercooperation in future joint actions.This study also shows that doctrine can be developed byexamining the lessons learned of a military operation, as wasthe case for the landing operations and naval gunfire supportperformance at Santiago.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would l i k e t o e x p r e s s my a p p r e c i a t i o n t o my r e s e a r c h

co mm ittee f o r t h e i r s u p p o r t a nd a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e d ev elo pm en tof t h i s t h e s i s . LTC Wil l iam C . Lockwood, CDR Richard P .Ferguson, and D r . Lawrence A. Y a t e s p r o v i d e d v a l u a b l e g u i d a n c ea nd encouragem ent i n s e e in g t h i s t h e s i s t o f r u i t i o n .

I am g r e a t l y i n d e b t t o t h e s t a f f o f t h e Combined A r m sR e s e a r c h L i b r a r y (CARL) f o r t h e i r e f f o r t s i n p ro vi din gr e s e a r c h m a t e r i a l an d c o n t i n u a l l y s t e e r i n g me i n t h e r i g h td i r e c t i o n .

I a l s o want t o e x pr es s my s i n c e r e s t g r a t i t u d e t o mywif e, Wendy, a nd o ur c h il d re n , Ryan, Tory, an d Abby, w ith ou twhose sup po r t , encouragement and und ers ta ndin g I would neverh av e co mp le te d t h i s t h e s i s .


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS . . . . .2. PREPARATIONS FOR SANTIAGO . . . . . . .3. THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . .4. CAMPAIGN LESSONS LEARNED AND SUBSEQUENT5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .REFORMS

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. iii

ENDNOTES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6


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LIST OF FIGURESFiaure l 2 s .C

1. Map o f T r a n s i t t o C uba . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 . Map of Sa n t ia go Th ea t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander of the U.S.Fleet, had just completed a successful blockade of Cubanwaters during the initial stages of the Spanish-American War.The U.S. naval forces now contained several Spanish ships,under the command of Admiral Pasqual Cervera, inside thewaters of Santiago Harbor. However, the U.S. fleet was unableto exploit its successes further due to the defensivefortresses that overlooked the bay and the possibility ofmines in the waters. Sampson promptly wired the WarDepartment, requesting the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger,to send U.S. Army assets to the Cuban theater to conduct asiege on the town of Santiago, facilitating his fleet'sdestruction of the Spanish ships. In response to Sampson'srequest the Major-General Commanding the Army, Nelson A.Miles, sent the following instructions (on May 31, 1898) toBrigadier-General William R. Shafter, Commander of the Army'sV Corps, which was being mobilized at Tampa, Florida:

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you aredirected to take your command on transports, proceed underconvoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba,land your force at such place east or west of that pointas your judgment may dictate, under the protection of theNavy, and move it onto the high grounds and bluffsoverlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best


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e n a b l e you t o c a p t u re o r d e s t ro y t h e g a r r i s o n t h e r e , a ndcover t h e Navy a s it s e n d s i t s men i n s m a l l b o a t s t oremove to r p e d o es ; o r , w i t h t h e a i d o f t h e Navy, c a p t u r e o rd e s t r o y t h e S pa nis h f l e e t now r e p o r t e d t o b e i n S a n t i a goHarbor . 1

T he se r a t h e r a mbigu ous o r d e r s p ro v ed t o b e t h es t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r what w ould l a t e r be a n e xam ple o fi n e f f e c t u a l j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s . A lt ho ug h t h e Campaign ofS a n t ia g o h a s t o b e c o n s id e r e d a n o p e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s du e t ot h e s u bs eq ue nt d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e S pa nis h f l e e t a nd t h e f o r t su nd er S p an is h c o n t r o l i n t h e c i t y , it w a s perhaps due moreth roug h luc k and enemy incompe tency th an by any U .S . t a c t i c a le x p e r t i s e .

The l e s s o n s l e a r n e d fro m t h e i n e p t c o n d u ct o f j o i n to p e r a t i o n s a t S a nt ia g o , however, r e s u l t e d i n s i g n i f i c a n tc h a ng e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f b o t h t h e U.S . Army an d Navy; t h e ya l s o i n f l u e n c e d f u t u r e j o i n t d o c t r i n e a nd p r o c e d u re s . Thep urp os e o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o ex am in e t h e c o n du c t of j o i n to p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e o f S a n t i a g o a nd t o d e t e r m i n e whatwent wrong. The i n t e n t i s t o show how t h i s campaign had ad i r e c t b e a r in g on f u t u r e j o i n t o p e r at i o ns , n o t t o a s s i g n blamef o r t h e f a i l u r e s t o any one pe rs on o r s e r v i c e .

One cannot assume t h a t t h e commanders of t h e San t ia goc am paig n c o m p le t e ly i g n o r ed t h e s t a n d i n g p r a c t i c e s o rp r o c e d u re s c o n c e r n in g t h e co n du c t o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s .S e v e r a l f a c t o r s com bined t o h an d ic ap m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s a s t h e yt r i e d t o c on du ct o p e r a t io n s a g a i n s t t h e S p a n is h i n Cuba.For one , it had been o v er t h i r t y y e ar s s i n c e t h e l a s t j o i n t

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op er a t io n inv o lv ing th e Army and Navy had been conduc ted . Fora n o t h e r , d e c r e a s e d l e v e l s o f m anning i n b o t h t h e Army a n d t h eNavy ha d g r e a t l y h in d e r e d t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s , w hic h h ada d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u ni t i e s p r i o r t o t h eca mp aig n. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e l a c k o f a s t r u c t u r e d c h a i n o fcommand fr om t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l down t o t h e f i e l dcommanders p ro v id e d l i t t l e s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e c on du cto f t h e campa ign. I t i s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , h o we ve r, t o ke ep i nmind t h a t p oo r e x ec u ti o n a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l a s w e l l a s al a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n b etw ee n Sampson a n d Sh a f t e r g r e a t l yc o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e o v e r a l l pe rfo rm an ce o f t h e U .S. m i l i t a r y a tS a n t i a g o .

The j o in t a s pe c t o f t h e Campaign o f S an t i a go beganw i t h t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s p ha s e . W hile t e n s i o n s be tw ee n t h eAmericans and t h e Span ish had been on th e r i s e f o r s e v e ra ly e a r s p r i o r t o t h e o u t b re a k of w ar, t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y wascaugh t o f fg ua r d when h o s t i l i t i e s began . The Navy, t h rough i t sNaval War Col leg e , had begun i n i t i a l work on for mu la t in gp o s s i b l e n a v a l a c t i o n s i n r es po ns e t o a w a r wi th Spa in whereast h e Army h ad y e t t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e . T hu s, n o o n e c o h e s i v ewar p l a n u t i l i z i n g j o i n t f o r c e s h ad b ee n de v el op e d t o op po se as e a power w i t h d i v e r s e l a n d h o l d i n g s , s p e c i f i c a l l y Cuba an dt h e P h i l i p p in e s . A s i g n i f i c a n t m o b i l i z a t i o n o f Army t r o o p swas r e q u i r e d b e f o r e e v en t h e most b a s i c o f w ar p l a n s c o u l d bee x e c u t e d . Time s p e n t m o b i l i z i n g t r o o p s d e t r a c t e d fr om t h ej o i n t t r a i n i n g e f f o r t , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e a r e a of am phibious


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o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s f i r s t became a p pa r e n t d u r i n g t h e em b ar ka ti ono p e r a t i o n s a t Tampa and was l a t e r born e o ut when t h e Armya r r i v e d o f f t h e c o a s t o f Cuba i l l - p r e p a r e d t o t r a n s p o r tp e r s o nn e l , m a t e r i e l , a nd s u p p l i e s from s h i p t o s h o r e .

F ur th er mo re , a s a r e s u l t o f n o t h a v in g a u n i f i e dcommander f o r t h e co nd uc t o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e a t e r ,t h e r e w e r e i n e f f i c i e n t c om mu nic atio ns p r o c e d u re s a n d a s e r i o u sl a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n . T h i s would p r ov e t o b e a d e t r i m e n td u r i n g t h e f o l lo w i n g s i e g e o f t h e town o f S a n t i a g o a nd i t ss u r r o u n d i n g w a t e r s .

J o i n t o p e r a t i o n s a l s o s u f f e r e d from i l l - d e f i n e do b j e c t i v e s r e g a r d i n g t h e e nd s t a t e o f t h e S a n t i a g o ca mp aig n.B eg in ni ng w i t h M i l e s ' s o r d e r t o S h a f t e r a nd t h e l a c k o fp r e s i d e n t i a l g ui d an c e t h a t p e r s i s t e d t h r o ug h o u t , Sampson a n dS h a f t e r c o n du c te d o p e r a t i o n s a s t h e y s a w f i t i n o r d e r t oa c c o m p l is h t h e i r own p e r c e i v e d g o a l s . O nly t h e l a c k of al e g i t i m a t e t h r e a t fro m t h e S p an is h i n Cuba p re v e n t ed a U.S.m i l i t a r y d i s a s t e r .

A s t u d y o f t h e C ampaign o f Sa n t i a g o p r o v i d e s a no p p o r t u n i t y t o exam ine t h e c ha ng es t h a t were made i n t h em i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n t h e y e a r s im me dia te ly a f t e r t h e S pa nish -American War. The m i l i t a r y r e co g ni ze d t h e ne ed t o i n s t i t u t ere fo rm s i n o r d e r t o p re c l ud e f u t u r e i n e f f e c t u a l j o i n to p e r a t i o n s . Some o f t h e s e r ef o r m s i n c l u d e d t h e d e ve lo p m en t o ft h e G e n er a l S t a f f i n t h e Army, t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h eG e n e r a l B oa rd i n t h e Navy, a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e J o i n t Army


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and Navy Board. Although many of these changes most likelywould have been made eventually, the conduct of jointoperations at Santiago proved to be the catalyst thataccelerated these reforms and other changes throughout themilitary structure.

This thesis will focus on the conduct of jointoperations at Santiago through the examination of both primaryand secondary sources. Primary sources include officialcorrespondence between the participants at the strategic,operational, and tactical level; official reports from theSecretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; and the reportof the Senate committee that investigated the conduct of theSpanish-American War. First-hand accounts of the Santiagocampaign, such as those by French E. Chadwick and John D.Miley, and newspaper reports from the battlefield are alsovaluable primary sources. Other sources, such as personalpapers, letters, and correspondence, provide excellentinsights into the conduct of joint operations at Santiago.Secondary sources, including comprehensive histories by GrahamCosmas and David Trask, provide excellent background materialfor this study.

This thesis will be limited in its review to thosereforms that were instituted in the military in the ten-yearperiod after the War. This thesis will not address the causesof the Spanish-American War or the conduct of combinedoperations with the Cuban insurgents.

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The following definitions will be used throughout thestudy.

Amphibious Operation: An operation launched from thesea by naval and landing forces against a hostile orpotentially hostile shore.2

Campaign Plan: A plan for a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed to accomplish a common objective,normally within a given time and space.3

Command: The authority that a commander in themilitary Service lawfully exercises over subordinates byvirtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authorityand responsibility for effectively using available resourcesand for planning the employment of, organizing, directing,coordinating, and controlling military forces for theaccomplishment of assigned missions.4

Command and Control: The exercise of authority anddirection by a properly designated commander over assignedforces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command andcontrol functions are performed through an arrangement ofpersonnel, equipment, communications, facilities, andprocedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission.5

Communications: A method or means of conveyinginformation of any kind from one person or place to an~ther..~


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Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which themilitary forces or elements thereof guide their actions insupport of national objectives. It is authorative but

requires judgment in application.7Joint: Activities, operations, organizations, etc.,

in which elements of more than one Service of the same nationparticipate.8

Joint Amphibious Operation: An amphibious operationconducted by significant elements of two or more Services.9

Landing Area: That part of the objective area withinwhich are conducted the landing operations of an amphibiousforce. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach,the transport areas, the fire support areas, and the landincluded in the advance inland to the initial objective.10

Operation: A military action or the carrying out of astrategic, tactical, service, training, or administrativemilitary mission; the process of carrying on combat, includingmovement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gainthe objectives of any battle or campaign.11

Unified Command: A command with a broad continuingmission under a single commander and composed of significantassigned components of two or more Services, and which isestablished and so designated by the President.12

Unified Operation: A broad generic term thatdescribes the wide scope of actions taking place withinunified commands under the overall direction of the commandersof those commands. 3


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CHAPTER 2PREPARATIONS FOR SANTIAGO

As the nineteenth century was coming to a close, theUnited States, spurred on by imperialistic rhetoric fromprominent political, academic, and literary figures, as wellas from the press, began to look abroad to enlarge its role inworld affairs of the day. Tensions had already begun toescalate between the United States and Spain concerning thelatter's treatment of the indigenous people of Cuba. By early1898, it was apparent that military conflict between the twonations was becoming more and more likely.

Since 1895, Cuban insurgents had been waging aguerrilla campaign in order to gain their independence fromthe Spanish government. Most of the guerrilla actionsconsisted of light skirmishes with Spanish regular forces and"scorched-earth" destruction of'sugar' rops. In response, theSpanish enforced a policy of reconcentration, moving Cubancitizens into camps. It was in these camps that over 400,000Cubans perished. The United States, horrified at the Spanishactions as well as having significant economic interests onthe island, found itself forced to respond to the instabilityin Cuba.

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As early as 1894, the Naval War College had begun todevelop war plans to deal with the possibility of militaryaction against the Spanish. Versions of these initial plans

called for a blockade of Cuba while mounting an expeditionaryforce to seize major Cuban ports. In addition to theblockade, the U.S. Navy would be tasked to defeat any Spanishnaval forces sent to protect the island. Consideration wasalso given to conducting an operation simultaneously in thePhilippines in order to prevent the Spanish navy there fromsailing for the Caribbean. Other versions called for a.muchgreater reliance on the naval blockade in conjunction withnaval bombardment, as the invasion force envisioned for Cubawas estimated to require 90,000 men, almost four times theavailable military manpower at the time. All of these plans,however, contained variations that had yet to be coordinatedbetween the services when war was declared in April of 1898.2

The structure of the military leadership was ill-prepared to plan joint operations. Secretary of War RussellA. Alger and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, both chieflyresponsible for the manning and training of their respectiveservices, were also the principal cabinet-level militaryadvisors to the President. Both the Army and the Navy lackedany semblance of a General Staff, which could have greatlyassisted in the planning, preparation, and waging of amilitary campaign. Guidance for military actions during thewar was often worked out between President William McKinley


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and members of his Cabinet and then disseminated down throughthe secretaries directly to the commanders in the field.Under these procedures, the President frequently had to act asthe mediator between Alger and Long.3

The Army, in particular, was hampered by its ownmuddled chain of command. Major-General Miles held the titleof Commanding General of the Army, which was primarily anhonorary role given to the senior officer in the Army. Whilethe position of Commanding General had no legal authority, ithad evolved to where the occupant served as an invaluablemilitary advisor. The problem was that there was nocentralized control of the Army and that frequently theSecretary of War and the Commanding General feuded over theirrespective roles. This situation was further exacerbatedlater during the Santiago campaign when General Miles left forthe field to command troops in the invasion of Puerto Rico,thus leaving the civilian Secretary of War without his chiefArmy advisor.4

This was the situation when war was declared withSpain. It was quickly realized by the strategic leaders inWashington that an advisory board of some sort was necessaryto help devise campaign plans. The Navy, which lacked asenior naval advisor comparable to the Army's CommandingGeneral, had already created its own Naval War Board inresponse to the growing crisis. This board was charged withadvising Secretary Long on matters of naval strategy and with


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a s s i s t i n g i n t h e p r ep a ra t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c war p l an s .Membersh ip on t h i s boa rd i nc l ude d Al f r ed Thaye r Mahan, t h en o t e d se ap ow er t h e o r i s t , a n d A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f t h e NavyT h eo do re R o o s e v el t , b e f o r e h e r e s i g n e d t o j o i n t h e Army.5

P r e s i d e n t M cK inley a n d h i s a d v i s o r s h a d d e t er m i n e dt h a t any w a r a g a i n s t t h e S p a ni s h i n Cuba would r e q u i r e t h ei n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e Army a n d Navy. T h i s l e d t o t h e f o r m a ti o no f t h e J o i n t Bo ard , a n i n f o r m a l g ro u p o r g a n i z e d w i t h t h em u t ua l c o n s e n t o f A l g e r a n d Long. T h i s b o a r d was e s s e n t i a l l yt h e N a v a l W a r B oa rd w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n o f a s i n g l e Armyo f f i c e r . The J o i n t B oard p r i m a r i l y p e rf or m ed a n a d v i s o r y r o l ef o r t h e P r e s i d e n t , A l g er a nd Long, a nd t h e r e m a in i ng c a b i n e tmembers. The campaign p l an t h a t was subm i t t ed by t h e Jo i n tBoard and u l t imate ly agreed upon by McKinley w a s d r a w n l a r g e l yf ro m t h e p l a n s p r e v i o u s l y d e v el o pe d by t h e N av al War C o l l e g e .It c a l l e d f o r a n a v a l b l oc k a de o f Cuba t o b e c o n d uc te d by t h eNor th A t l a n t i c squadron under t h e command of Admiral Wi l l i amT . Sam pson. The f l e e t would a l s o b e p o i s e d t o e n ga g e t h eS p an is h f l e e t i f S p ai n c h os e t o s en d i t s s h i p s t o d e fe ndC uba. I n a d d i t i o n , a s m a l l e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e w ou ld b em o b i l i z e d an d s e n t i n t o Cuba t o s e i z e a m a j o r p o r t . 6

The s i t u a t i o n r emained compl i ca t ed , however, becauset h e pr im a ry o b j e c t i v e an d t h e s i z e o f t h e e x p e d i t io n a r y f o r c ek e p t c h a n g i n g . S a n t i a g o w a s s e l e c t e d a s t h e p rim ary o b j e c t i v eon ly weeks be fo re t h e campaign o f San t i ag o began. A s f o r t h es i z e of t h e f o rc e , i t s r e a s o ns f o r v a r y in g w e r e due t o t h e


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c ha ng in g e s t i m a t e s o f t h e s i z e o f t h e S p a ni sh f o r c e s i n Cubaa n d t h e s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s o f t h e A merican t r o o p s .A d d it io n a ll y , t h e Pr e si d en t f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y an o v e r a l lcampaign commander, who cou ld have used th e a v a i l a b l e t ime t oc on du ct t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s an d d e ve lo p o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s . 7

10nI n t h e two-month i n t e r v a l be tw ee n t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f

war w i t h S p ai n a nd t h e f i r s t Army s o l d i e r t o a r r i v e i n C uba, at remendous mo bi l i za t i o n e f f o r t had t o be conduc ted . The Army,which i n Ap ri l of 1898 numbered 28,000, had di sp er s e d many ofi t s r e g u l a r s a s w e l l a s newly i n d u c t e d v o l u n t e e r s a t s e v e r a lcamps t h r o u g h o u t t h e So u th , b u s i l y p r e p a r i n g them t o go t owar. S in ce t h e r ead ine ss o f t h e Army had been a l l owed t os i g n i f i c a n t l y d e t e r i o r a t e o v er t h e d ecad es s i n c e t h e C i v i lW a r , a l m os t e v e r y m in ut e was s p e n t on o u t f i t t i n g t h e t r o o p sa n d co n d uc t in g ru d im e nt ar y m i l i t a r y d r i l l . 8

On A pr i l 29 th , Br igad ie r -Gen era l W i l li am R . S h a f t e rwas ord ere d t o proceed t o Tampa, Fl or id a , t o assume command oft h e V C orps c u r r e n t l y un de rg oin g t r a i n i n g t h e r e . H e wasc ha rg ed t o p r e p a re h i s t r o o p s t o c o nd uc t a n e x p e d i t io n i nsup por t o f t h e nav a l b lockade c u r r en t l y underway . Ten daysl a t e r , S h a f t e r r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r t o move h i s command, v i at r a n s p o r t s , t o " s e i z e a nd h o l d M a ri e1 o r m ost i m p o r t a n t p o i n ton no r t h p o i n t o f Cuba."g

I t would be over a month, however , b ef or e S h a f t e r andh i s t r oo ps would de pa r t f o r Cuba. Again, confu s ion among t h e

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p l a n n e r s a t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l had d e la ye d a d e c i s i o n a b ou tt h e p r im a r y o b j e c t i v e i n Cuba a l o n g w i t h t h e c o rr e sp o n d in gnumber of r e q u i r e d Army t r o o p s . The S p a n i s h f l e e t , u n d e r t h ecommand o f A d m ir al C e ve ra , a s s i s t e d i n c l e a r i n g u p t h i sc o n fu s io n b y s a i l i n g i t s s h i p s i n t o t h e p o r t o f S a nt ia g o i nmid-May. T h i s f o r c e d t h e m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s t o s h i f t t h e f o cu so f t h e campa ign f rom Havana on t h e no r the rn co as t o f Cuba t ot h e s o u t h e rn c o a s t , t h e o b j e c t i v e now b e i n g t h e p o r t o fS a n t i a g o a n d t h e S p a n is h s h i p s a n c ho r ed t h e r e . The d e p a r t u r eo f t h e Army ex pe d i t i on a ry fo r c e was pu t on ho ld , which al l owedS h a f t e r much needed t i m e t o a ss em b le a n d e q u i p h i s f o r c es . 1 0

However, t h e confus ion and i n de c i s i on a t t h e s t r a t e g i cl e v e l r e g a r d i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e Cuban c am paign h a df o r ce d S h a f t e r i n t o a r e a c t i v e r o l e . He now h ad t o p r e p a r ef o r a n in v as io n i n t o p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e t e r r a i n w i th a f o r cet h a t v a r i e d an yw he re fro m 5 ,0 00 t o 2 5, 00 0 men. I n a d d i t i o n ,t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s of th e Army r e qu i r ed t h a ta l m o s t a l l o f t h e t i m e i n Tampa be sp en t on j u s t movings u p p l i e s from an i n ad e qu a te r a i l r o a d l i n e t o t h e p i e r a ndt h e n p l a c i n g them on bo ar d t h e t r a n s p o r t s . . S h a f t e r was n o ta f f or d e d t h e o p p o r tu n i t y t o u s e t h e t im e a v a i l a b l e t o co ndu ctj o i n t t r a i n i n g , which would l a t e r pr ov e t o b e c r i t i c a l du r in gt h e a m ph ib io u s o p e r a t i o n s ph a s e. 1 1

While t h e Army w a s c o n ti n ui n g t o b u i l d up i t s f o r c e s ,t h e Navy w a s p r o c e e d i n g w i t h i t s blo cka de of Cuba. AdmiralSampson, wan t ing t o beg in t h e s i eg e o f San t i ago , was g rowing


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more impatient each passing day with the delayed arrival ofthe Army troops. On June 7, Sampson sent the followingmessage to Secretary Long, which was relayed to Shafter:

If 10,000 men were here the city and fleet would beours within forty-eight hours. Every considerationdemands immediate army movement. If delayed, city willbe defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.12

Thus, the mobilization phase came to an end with Major-General Miles's order for Shafter to proceed to Santiago.

1 Cam~aian lansShafter's force, numbering almost 17,000 men along

with materiel, supplies, and 2,300 animals, left on 14 Junefor Santiago. The twenty-nine transports and six supportvessels, procured by the Army and captained by civilianmasters, were accompanied by thirteen naval escort ships. Allthe ships arrived off the coast of Santiago six days later.On June 20, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, along withGeneral Calixto Garcia, the leader of the Cuban insurgents,met ashore at Aserrado. The purpose of this meeting was todiscuss the operational objectives of the Santiago campaign aswell as to determine the landing site for Shafter's forces.13

The area surrounding the city of Santiago provided aformidable haven for the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor.The entrance to the harbor was, at best, only 350-feet wide,with bluffs on both sides that towered as high as 200 feet.Moreover, on both sides of the entrance sat forts containinggun batteries - Socapa to the west and the Morro Castle to the


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e a s t - a n d t h e waters a t t h e e n t r a n c e were s tr e w n w i t h c o n t a c ta nd e l e c t r i c a l m in es . A ltho ug h t h e ra n ge an d e f f e c t i v e n e s s o ft h e S p an is h gu ns a g a i n s t t h e U . S . n a v a l v e s s e l s s t a t i o n e do u t s i d e t h e h a r b o r e n t ra n c e were m in im al, t h e i r l o c a t i o np r e c l u d e d p o s s i b l e c o u nt e rm i n e o p e r a t i o n s , . T h er e was a l s o t h er e as o na b le l i k e l i h o o d t h a t an y s h i p at t em p t i n g t o f o r c e i t sway i n t o th e harb or would be damaged and po ss ib ly sunk,b l o c k i n g t h e n ar ro w c h a nn e l f o r b o t h f l e e t s . F or t h e U .S .Navy t o c l e a r t h e m in es f ro m t h e c h a n n e l a nd e n g ag e t h eS p an is h f l e e t from i n s i d e t h e ha r bo r e n t r a n c e , t h e f o r t s h adt o b e c a p t u re d o r d e s tr oy ed .1 4

C o m pl ic at in g t h e i s s u e were t h e g a r r i s o n s l o c a t e di n s i d e t h e c i t y of S a n ti a go , a p pr ox im a te ly t h r e e miles i n l a n d .W hile t h e s e g a r r i s o n s w ere o f l i t t l e s t r a t e g i c i m po rta nc e,t h e i r p r ox im ity t o t h e S pa nish s h i p s i n t h e a d j o in i n g h ar bo ra nd t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m u tu al g u n f i r e s u p p o r t w ould b es i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e d ev el op m en t o f U.S. ca mp aig n p l a n s .

G e n e ra l S h a f t e r h ad a r r i v e d i n Cuba w i t h v e r y l i t t l eg u id a nc e on what h i s a c t u a l o b j e c t i v e s were i n r e g a r d s t o t h el a n d c am pa ig n. The o n l y d i r e c t i v e t h a t ha d b ee n g i v e n was t h evague and ambiguous or d e r of May 31 f rom Gen era l Mi les , whichi n e f f e c t a llo we d S h a f te r t o choose a s h i s o b j e c t i v e t h e f o r t sa t t h e e n t ra n c e , t h e g a r r i s o n s i n Sa n ti ag o , o r b o th . Thus,w i t h no u n i f i e d commander o v e rl o o k in g t h e s i t u a t i o n a tS a n t ia g o , S h a f t e r c o u ld ch os e a ny o f t h e o p t io n s w i th l i t t l ec h an c e o f b e i n g o v e r r u l e d .


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HORROO C A P A C A S T L E


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On t h e t r i p f ro m Tampa t o S a n t ia g o p r i o r t o t h ec am pa ig n, S h a f t e r h ad r e a d a n a c c o u n t o f t h e B r i t i s h c am pa ig na t S a n t i a g o i n 1 74 1. The B r i t i s h h ad l a n d e d a t Guantanamo,l o c a t e d o n l y 40 m i le s t o t h e eas t o f S a n t i a g o , b u t t h e np ro c ee d ed t o l o s e o v e r 3, 00 0 men t o d i s e a s e a n d ha d t o s t o pt h e campaign s i x t e e n m i l es o u t s i d e t h e c i t y , n e ve r h a vi n gf i r e d a s h o t . To S h a f te r , t h i s f a c t s t r e s s e d t h e im po rta nc eo f c o n du c ti n g a q u i c k c am paign u s i n g t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e r o a d sand a t t a c k i n g a t t h e p o i n t s o f l e a s t r e s i s ta n ce . 15

S h a f te r a l s o b e l ie ve d t h a t t h e f o r t s a t t h e e n t ra nc et o t h e h a r b o r w e re more h e a v i l y g u ar de d t h a n t h e S a n t i a g og a r r i s o ns . I n r e a l i t y , t h e r e were 400 t ro op s a t Socapa , 400a t t h e Mo rro C a s t l e , a nd j u s t o v e r 1 0 ,0 00 men s p r e a dt h ro u g h ou t t h e v i c i n i t y o f S a n ti a go . A d d i t i o n a l l y , S h a f t e r ,p o s s i b l y a f t e r s e e i n g t h e h ig h ro ck y b l u f f s a l o n g t h e c o a s t ,r ea so n ed t h a t t h e b e s t av en ue of a pp ro ac h l a y f u r t h e r i n l a n d .The ge ne ra l , a l t houg h neve r hav ing obse rved it p e r s o n a l l y ,l a t e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r o u t e a l on g t h e c o a s t t o w a rd s t h e MorroC a s t l e a s " r ug ge d, d e v o i d o f water, a n d d e n s e l y c o v e r e d w i t h apo i sonous unde rg rowth . " 1 6

W ith t h e s e f a c t o r s i n mind, S h a f t e r f e l t h i s ' b e s tc o u r se o f a c t i o n l a y i n p r o c ee d in g i n l a n d from D a i q u i r i a ndSiboney, t h e Army's secon dary land ing s i t e . The ' Army wouldt h e n a s s a u l t t h e g a r r i so n s l o c a t e d i n S a nt ia g o, w i t h t h e .p o s s i b i l i t y o f u s i n g n a va l g u n f i r e s u pp o rt t o c o ve r h i s s i e g eo f t h e c i t y . T h is p l a n s t r e s s e d r a p i d i t y o f a c t i o n , d en yin g


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t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m a ss in g S pa ni sh t r o o p s a t S a n t i a g o w h i l em oving q u i c k l y b e f o r e d i s e a s e c o u l d s e r i o u s l y i mpede t h eAm erican ad va nc e. S h a f t e r f e l t t h a t t h i s c o u r s e would r e s u l ti n less l o s s o f l i f e f o r h i s own t ro o p s w hi le e n c i r c l i n g t h ec i t y a nd would a l s o n e g at e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p l a c i n g t h e Armyi n a s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e t o t h e N avy.17

A s f o r A d m i r a l Sampson, he was q u i t e su re what h i sp rim ar y o b j e c t i v e was: t o d e s t r o y t h e f l e e t b o t t l e d i n s i d et h e waters o f S a n t i a g o H arb or. I n o r d e r t o a c co m pl is h t h i sm i s si o n , t h e e n t r a n c e h ad t o b e c o m p le t el y c l e a r e d o f m in es s ot h a t U.S. s h i p s c o u l d e ng ag e t h e S p a n i sh f l e e t f ro m a moree f f e c t i v e f i r i n g r a ng e . One o p t i o n would h av e b ee n t o s e ndo ne o r more o f t h e Navy s h i p s i n t o t h e c h a n n e l t o c l e a r t h em i n es . T h i s p l a n , h ow ev er, w ou ld m ost l i k e l y h a ve r e s u l t e d i na s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f damage from e i t h e r min es o r s h o r eg u n f i r e . T h i s would h av e s t r a t e g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i f t h e U.S.Navy were l a t e r t a s k e d t o s a i l an d i n t e r c e p t t h e r em ai nin gS p an is h f l e e t . L oss o f a ny c a p i t a l s h i p f o r t h e Am ericanf l e e t c o u ld hav e g r e a t l y t i p p e d t h e b al a nc e t o wa rd s t h eSp a n i s h . 18

To t h i s end, Sampson chose wha t he f e l t was h i s on lya v a i l a b l e o p t io n - t o h av e t h e Army s t o r m a n d s e i z e t h e f o r t ss o t h a t co un term in e f o r c e s c o ul d b e s e n t i n t o c l e a r t h ec h a n n e l . I t was w i th t h i s i n mind t h a t h e ha d s e n t h i so r i g i n a l r e q u e s t f o r Army a s s i s t a n c e , a n d when t h e Army


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r e s po n d e d b y s e n d i n g S h a f t e r a n d h i s t r o o p s , Sampson mo stl i k e l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s as a s s e n t f o r h i s cam paig n p l a n s .

A t t h e i r i n i t i a l c o nf er e nc e on Ju ne 20, S h a f t e r an dSampson d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s s i b l e a v e n u es o f a p p r o ac h f o r t h eArmy t r o o p s . Al though no formal agreement was reache d betweent h e two, b o t h most l i k e l y f e l t t h a t t h e o t h e r ha d ag re e d w it hh i s r e s p e c t i v e p la n o f a t t a c k . I n h i s r e p o r t of J u l y 15 ,Sampson s t a t e d t h a t " t h e p o s i t i o n s o c cu p ie d by t h e e a s t e r n a n dw es te rn b a t t e r i e s s h ou l d b e c a r r i e d , " t o which G en er al S h a f t e r"g av e m ost c o r d i a l a s s e n t . " S h a f t e r , h owever, s t a t e d i n h i so f f i c i a l r e p o r t t h a t " ap pr oa ch in g S an t ia g o from t h e e a s t . . . ndmaking a t t a c k fro m t h a t q u a r t e r ' ' was " t h e o n l y f e a s i b l e p l a n . "I n f a c t , t h e n o t e s o f t h i s c on f er en c e, which was concernedm o s t l y w i t h t h e i m pe nd in g l a n d i n g o f Army t r o o p s , c o n t a i n o n l yon e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e fo llo w-o n p l a n s : " l an d e x p e d i t i o n a tD a i q u i r i an d m arch on S a n t i a g o . " S i n c e D a i q u i r i l a y d ue e a s to f b o t h t h e c i t y and t h e h a r b o r e nt r an c e , it i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l et h a t t h e r e w ou ld b e m i s c o n c e p t io n s a b o u t . th e ca mp aig n p l a n s . 1 9

Whether by d es ig n o r by s imp le miscommunication, itw ou ld b e s e v e r a l d ay s b e f o r e Sampson w ou ld r e a l i z e t h a t t h eArmy w ou ld n o t s u p p o r t h i s p l a n . S h a f t e r d i d s e nd t h efo l lo wi ng message t o Sampson on June 22:

I t i s my i n t e n t i o n t o p ro ce ed from D a i q u i r i t o S a nt ia g o a sr a p i d ly a s I c a n . . . I r e q u e s t t h a t you k ee p i n t o u c h d u r i n gt h e a dv an ce a nd b e p r e p a r e d t o r e c e i v e a ny m ess ag e I mayw is h t o t r a n s m i t from a l o n g t h e b l u f f s , o r an y o f t h esmal l to wn s, a nd t o r e n d e r a n y a s s i s t a n c e n e ce s sa r y. 20


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Sampson, believing that the reference to the bluffscorresponded to the route towards the harbor entrance, did notseek further clarification regarding Shafter's actualintentions. It was only after Shafter had begun his advancetowards the city of Santiago several days later that Sampsonbecame aware of the difference in plans. By this time,Shafter was already committed to carry out his plan and hisplan only.21

The conduct of joint operations during the remainderof the campaign went steadily downhill. Each commander,believing that his course of action would result in the leastloss of life and material, could not see his way tocompromise. Their lack of cooperation would never be fullyresolved.


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CHAPTER 3THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

a+ S m L u g ~W ith t h e a r r i v a l of Army t r o o p s i n t h e Cuban t h e a t e r ,

it was now a m at te r of de c id in g where t o lan d them. Thei n i t i a l c o nf er en c e o f J un e 20 between Sampson and S ha ft- er , i na d d i t i o n t o d i s c u s s i n g o p e r a t i o n a l c ampaign p l a n s , a l s o was t od e te rm i ne p o s s ib l e l a nd i n g s i t e s .

R e g a rd i n g t h e l a n d i n g a r e a , M i l e s ' s a mb ig uo us o r d e r o fMay 3 1 t o S h a f t e r p ro v id e d l i t t l e d i r e c t i o n c on ce rn in g t h ec h o i c e o f a s i t e , w he th er e a s t o r w e s t of San t i ago , im ply ingt h a t t h e commander i n t h e f i e l d s h ou ld make t h e s e l e c t i o n .A dm ir al Sampson f e l t t h a t S h a f t e r s h o u l d l a n d h i s c o r c e s w e sto f S an t i ag o , l e av in g th e Army in a more advan tageous p os i t io nt o a t t a c k t h e f o r t s l o c a te d a t t h e e n t ra nc e o f S an ta ig oH ar bo r. G e ne ra l S h a f t e r , however, f e l t t h a t t h e b e t t e rt e r r a i n l a y t o t h e e a s t and was a l s o s u b j e c t t o l e s s s ho reo p p o s i t i o n . A f t e r much d i s c u s s i o n , a n d i n a c c o rd a n c e w i t h t h ea d v i c e o f G e n e r a l G a r c i a , it was d e c id e d t h a t t h e l a n d i n gwould be done a t D a i q u i r i , a p o i n t a p p r o x im a t e ly 1 5 m i l e s e a s to f S a n t i a g o .

S h a f t e r h ad come t o Cuba w i th t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h eArmy wo uld c o n du c t t h e a c t u a l o f f l o a d i n g o f t r o o p s f r o m t h e

2 2


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t r a n s p o r t s . S e c r e t a r y Long, w h i l e i n q u i r i n g t h e p r e v i o u sm onth a b o u t t h e Army's c a p a b i l i t y t o c o nd u ct l a n d i n go p e r a t i o n s , n o t i f i e d t h e Army t h a t :

While t h e Navy w i l l b e p r e p a r e d t o f u r n i s h a l l t h ea s s i s t a n c e t h a t may b e i n i t s power, it i s o b v i o u s t h a tt h e c re ws o f t h e ar mo red s h i p s a n d o f s uc h o t h e r s a s w i l lb e c a l l e d upon t o remove t h e S p a ni s h mi ne s a n d t o m eett h e S p a n i s h f l e e t i n a c t i o n c an n o t b e s p a r ed f o r o t h e rp u r p o s e s , a n d o u gh t n o t t o b e f a t i g u e d b y t h e worki n c i d e n t t o la n di n g o f t h e t ro o p s, s t o r e s , e tc .2

Se c r e t a r y of War Alge r re sponded t o Long t h a t t h e Army-w as n o t i n n ee d o f a ny s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f r om t h e Navy. I tcanno t be de te rmined whe the r Gene ra l Sha f t e r ev e r rece iv edt h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e N avy's p la n ne d in vo lv em en t i n t h elan d in g op e r a t i on . However, it was m ost l i k e l y S h a f t e r ' si n t e n t i o n a l l a lo n g t o l i m i t t h e Army's dependence on t h e Navyt o c on du ct t h e l a nd i n g. I t was w i th t h i s i n mind t h a t t h eNavy w a s t a s k e d t o p ro v id e g u n f i r e s u pp o rt t o s u pp r es s anyarmed o p p o s i t i o n a s h o r e w h il e l e a v i n g t h e o f f l o a d t o t h e Armyt r a n s p o r t s t h e m s e l v e s . 3

This quickly changed when it was d i s c ov e r e d t h a t t h eArmy h ad f a i l e d t o b r i n g a l o n g t h e n e c e s s a ry l a u nc h es t ot r a n s p o r t a l l o f i t s t ro op s i n a t i m el y manner . The Navy, i nr e s p o n s e s e n t o v e r a l l t h e s te am l a u nc h e s, w ha le b o a t s , a ndl i f e bo at s t h a t it cou ld spa re f rom i t s f l e e t . The t r a n s p o r tS t . Louis, under command of Captain C . F . Goodrich, wasd i s p a t c h e d f r o m i t s s t a t i o n o u t s i d e o f S a n ti a go H ar bo r t oh e l p l e a d t h e t r a n s p o r t s t ow ar d D a i q u i r i . The Navy a l s oprov ided a beachmas te r , a s th e Army d i d no t have an ind iv id ua l

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q u a l i f i e d t o p er fo rm t h i s f u n c t i o n . A f t e r t h e St. Louis wentt o w i t h i n o ne a nd a h a l f miles from t h e s h o r e t o d e m o n s tr a tet o t h e o t h e r b o a t s t h e d e pt h o f t h e water, t h e l a n d i ngoperation commenced.4

I n c o n d uc t in g n a v al g u n f i r e s u p p o r t o f t h e l a n d i n g ,t h e Navy bom barded s e v e r a l p o i n t s a l o n g t h e c o a s t s u r r o u n d i n gS a n t i a g o . T h i s was do ne a s a d e c e p t i o n maneuver t o h i d e t h er e a l p o i n t o f a t t a c k . I n a n o t h e r move, Navy c o l l i e r s , made u pt o l o ok l i k e t r a n s p o r t s , moved w es tw ar d f ro m D a i q u i r i . T he sec o l l i e r s even went t hr ou gh t h e d r i l l of l ow er in g l i f e b o a t s i no r d e r t o d e ce i v e S p an is h o b s e rv e r s a l on g t h e s h o r e l i n e . T hes ef e i n t movements were s upp or t ed by la nd a t t a c k s f rom Cubani n s u r g e n t s . One d e a t h o c c u r r e d a b o a rd t h e Texas when it wass h e l l e d b y t h e Socapa b a t t e r y a t t h e mouth o f t h e S a n t ia g oHa rb o r . 5

A f t e r t h e p re l i m in a r y n a va l g u n f i r e c l e a r e d t h el a n d i n g a r e a a t D a i q u i r i , l a un c he s were l o a d e d a nd s e n tt o w a r d s t h e s h o r e . Many o f t h e s e l a u n c h e s h a d t o b e l o a d e ds e v e r a l m i le s o u t t o se a , a s t h e c i v i l i a n c a p t a i ns o f t h et r a n s p o r t s d i d n ot want t o ex po se t h e i r s h i p s t o enemy f i r e .T h i s f o r c e d t h e Navy l a u n c h e s t o make l o n g t r i p s b a ck a ndf o r t h , s l o w i n g down t h e o f f l o a d p r oc e d u r e; B y t h e en d o f t h eday, a t o t a l of 6 ,000 p e r s o n n e l ha d b ee n o f f l o a d e d i n t o t h el a nd i ng a r e a a t D a i q u ir i . A l l o f t h e p e r s on n e l an d s u p p l i e sw ere n o t c o m p le t el y o f f l o a d e d u n t i l t h r e e d a ys l a t e r . 6

2 4


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The o f f l o a d i t s e l f d i d n o t p ro c e ed sm oo th ly . With t h efew a v a i l a b l e l i g h t e r s f o r o f fl o ad , p r i o r i t y was g iv en t o

pe r s onne l and then m a te r i e l and s up p l i e s . Combined w i th t h i sf a c t o r was t h a t many o f t h e s m a l l boa t s were no t c apab le off e r r y i n g t h e a n im al s t o t h e s h o re . A s a r e s u l t , an im a l s w erethrown overboard under t h e as sumpt ion t h a t th ey would s w i ma s h o r e . S i n c e t h e r e was n o b o a t a v a i l a b l e t o wa tch t h eani mal s, some o f them swam ou t t o s e a. Over 30 animalsdrowned du r ing t h e l and in g ope r a t i on . A ls o, two s o ld i e r sdrowned when t h e i r bo at w q s smashed aga ins t the rocks . '

Dur ing th e onload op er at io n back a t Tampa, much of t h em a t e r i e l a nd s u p p l i e s had b ee n l o a de d i n t h e o r d e r i n w hich ithad been r ece ived . W hile t h i s was neces s a r y due t o t h e s h o r tamount o f t im e i n wh ich s u pp l i e s had t o be on loaded , t h i sp ro ve d t o b e a d e tr im e n t upon a r r i v a l a t D a i q u i r i. Most oft h e heavy equipment, inc lud ing s i eg e guns , w e r e u na bl e t o b eo f f l o a d e d f o r s e v e r a l da y s . S h a f t e r was f o r c e d t o w a i t a s h o r ew h il e t h e o f f l o a d c o n t i n u e d b e f o r e h e ha d t h e n e c e s s ar yarmament t o procee d in la nd . On 26 J u ne S h a f t e r was f i n a l l yab l e t o beg in t h e g round campaign, hav ing two in f a n t r yd i v i s ion s , a di sm oun ted cav a l r y d iv i s io n , and an independenti n f a n t r y b r i g ad e a t h i s d i sp o s al .8

T ha t t h e l a n d i n g a t D a i q u i r i was done wi t h s o l i t t l el o s s of l i f e i s due m os tly t o l uck and th e l a c k o f arm edre s i s t an ce f rom t h e Spania rd s ash ore . The Spanish commander,u n s ur e w here t h e Am ericans w ould s e l e c t t h e i r l a n d i n g s i t e ,


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h ad d i s p e r s e d h i s t r o o p s a lo n g a 5 0 - k i l o m e t e r f r o n ts u r r o u n d i n g S a n t i a g o H a rb o r. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a p i e ce m e a lr e s p o n s e by t h e S p a n i a r d s t h a t t h e Am eric an s ha d no t r o u b l e i ns u rm o u nt in g . Once t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e b eg an , t h e S p an i s h f o r c e sa t D a i q u i r i , e s t i m a t e d a t 300, q u i c k l y f l e d fro m t h e s h o r e .Had t h e S p a n is h massed t h e i r f o r c e s a t D a i q u i r i o r e m pla ce db a r b ed w i r e a l o n g p o s s i b l e l a n d i n g a r e a s , t h e am p hi bi ou so p e r a t i o n c o u l d h av e had a d i f f e r e n t e n d in g .9

S h a f t e r , from t h e f i r s t da ys of m o b i l i z a t io n back a tTampa, had und eres t im a te d th e am ount o f co or d i na t io n andequipment it would r eq u i r e t o o f f l o a d h i s e n t i r e f o r c e . S in c et h e r e was l i t t l e t im e t o pr e pa re h i s t r o o p s b e fo re t h e t r i p t oCuba, h e d i d n o t c on d uc t a ny t r a i n i n g i n l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n sb e f o r e i t s a r r i v a l a t D a i q ui r i . I na de qu ate t r a n s p o r te qu ip m en t an d p o o r p i e r f a c i l i t i e s would h av e a g r e a t i mp ac ton S h a f t e r ' s l o g i s t i c s l i n e s an d p la gu e t h e Army t h r o u g h o u tthe cam pa ign .

German Rear-Admiral M. Pluddemann, ob se rv in g t h eo p e r a t i o n s a t S a n t i a g o , made t h e f o l l o w i n g comments r e g a r d i n gt h e l an d in g a t D a i qu i r i :

There w a s la ck of management g e n e r a l l y . No one i na u t h o r i t y h a d b e en a p p o i n t e d commander o f t h e l a n d i n gp la ce . 'The comm ander -in-ch ie f, G enera l Sh af t e r , d i d no tt r o u b le h im se l f abou t t h e l an d in g . A dm ira l Sampson hado n l y made a r ra n g em e n ts a s f a r a s t h e w a r sh ip s a nd t h e i rbo a t s were conce rned . 10

Not a l l t h e bla me c a n b e p l a c e d on t h e Army o r t h eNavy f o r t h e c h a o t i c l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s . T h er e w ere no


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e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t w ould d i c t a t e t h e c o nd uc t o f j o i n tl and in g ope r a t i ons . Having no p r eceden t , ne i t he r s e r v i c e waseven s u r e o f i t s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n su c h m a t t e r s . I ft h i s had been t h e e x t e n t o f t h e d i s j o i n t e d o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n gth e S an t i ago cam pa ign, t he n t h e l and in g ope r a t i on would j u s tb e a n i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e b a r t o t h e Spanish-American W a r . Whatwas un f o re s een a t t h e t i m e w a s t h a t t h e l a n d i n g ph a se was ap r e c u r s o r f o r t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s t h a t were t o happen d u r i n gthe fo l lowing campaign .

e towards SBy 2 6 June, Genera l Sha f t e r had ga the red enough

t r o o p s , m a t e r i e l , a nd s u p p l i e s t o b e g i n h i s a dv an ce to w ar dsS an t i ago . The on ly ex i s t i ng r ou t e between D a iq u i r i andS a n t i a g o was more o f a t r a i l t h a n a ro ad , an d movement o fsu pp l i es and heavy equipment qui ck ly became a problem. Therewere i n s u f f i c i e n t p i e r a nd s t o ra g e f a c i l i t i e s a t b o th D a i qu i r ia nd Sib on ey , f o r c i n g t h e Army t o ma i nt a in a l o g i s t i c s t r a i lt h a t r a n from t h e o f fs h o r e t r a n s p o r t s t o t h e t r o o p s i n t h ef i e l d . T hi s would l a t e r p ro ve t o be c r i t i c a l a s t h e d i st a n c ebetween t h e two, combined wi th r a in y wea ther du r in g t h ecampaign, c o n sp i re d a g a i n s t S h a f t e r ' s a b i l i t y t o r e su p p ly h i st r o o p s . 11

While Shaf te r w a s advancing towards Sant iag o, AdmiralSa mp so n's f l e e t c o n t i n ue d t o m a in t a i n i t s s t a t i o n o u t s i d e t h ee n t r a n c e t o t h e ha r bo r . From t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t h e Navy s h i p sw ere c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d in g g u n f i r e s u p p o r t t h a t c o u l d c o v er t h e

27


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e n t i r e a dv an ce o f t h e Army f o r c e s . The s h e l l s a b o a r d t h es h i p s were c a p a b le of r an g es o u t t o s i x o r s e v en m i l e s , b u ts u f f e r e d from a r ed uc ed i mp ac t e f f e c t a t t h e s e g r e a t e r r a n g e s .T h i s w a s compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d i r e c t f i r e would b emost e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e gun b a t t e r i e s em placed i n s i d e , w i t hl i t t l e o r no i mp ac t a g a i n s t t h e f o r t s t he m se lv es . D e s p i t e t h em eag er am ount o f s u p p o r t t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e was a b l e t op ro vi de , t h e i r p o s s i b le c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e a r e a s o fp r e p ar a t o ry f i r e and as a m o r al e b u i l d e r s h o u l d n o t h a ve b ee nove r looke d . 12

I t i s d i f f i c u l t , t h e n , t o com prehend why S h a f t e r d i dn o t c ho os e t o employ n a v a l g u n f i r e s u pp o rt u n t i l h i s t r o o p sw ere on t h e o u t s k i r t s o f S a n t i a g o . Even h i s f i r s t r e q u e st f o rs u ch s u p p o r t was f o r d e c e p t i o n p u r p o s e s o n l y . P e r h a p s h es im ply d i d n o t u n d er s t an d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e n a v al s h i p so r w a s u n w i l l in g t o a sk t h e Navy f o r any s u pp or t a t a l l , b e in g

p r e p a r e d t o c on d uc t h i s a t t a c k o n S a n t i a g o u s i n g Army a s s e t se x c l u s i v e l y . Most l i k e l y , it was p r o b a b l y d ue t o a l a c k o fj o in t t r a i n i n g i n t he s e t a c t i c s t h a t l a y a t t h e r o o t o fS h a f t e r ' s f a i l u r e t o c o n si de r u s in g n av a l g u n f i r e u n t i l muchl a t e r i n t h e c am paign.

A s S h a f t e r c l o s e d i n on S a n t i a g o , h e deem ed itn e c e ss a r y t o c on du ct c o o r d in a t e d a t t a c k s on E l Caney and SanJ ua n H e ig h ts , l o c a t e d t o t h e e a s t o f S a n t i ag o a l o n g v i t a lr o a d s . Though h e p r i v a t e l y d i d n o t h o l d t h e Sp a n is h t r o o p s i nmuch r e g a r d S h a f t e r f e l t it was p r u de n t t o c on d uc t a f e i n t


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towards Aguadores, lo ca te d two m i l e s e a s t o f t h e Morro C a s t l e ,t o de c ei v e t h e enemy a s t o t h e pr im ar y o b j e c t i v e s . I nc on ju nc ti on w it h t h i s f e i n t , S h a f t e r f i n a l l y r e q ue s te d t h ea s s i s t a n c e o f n a v a l g u nf i re . 13

The a s s a u l t s o n E l Caney and San Juan Heights weres c he d ul e d f o r J u l y 1 . On June 30 , Shaf ter cab led Sampsonabou t h i s in te n t io ns , a sk i ng Sampson t o "bombard t h e works a tAguadores ... and a l s o make such demons t r a t ion a s you t h i nkp r o p e r a t t h e mouth of t h e h a r b or , s o as t o keep a s many ofth e enemy th e r e a s p o s s ib l e . " Sampson w i l l i n g l y acced ed t ot h i s r e q ue s t, though t h e a c t i o n ap pe are d t o have l i t t l e e f f e c ton th e s m a l l number o f t r o o p s l o ca t ed a lo n g th e co as t l i n e .A d d i ti o n al l y , Sampson a l s o had h i s f o r c e s s h e l l d i r e c t l y i n t ot h e c i t y t o ke ep t h e S p an i ar d s o cc up ie d. T h i s p ro du ce d t h efo l l owin g message f rom Sh af te r t o Sampson:

A f e w s h e l l s o f l a r g e s i z e f e l l some d i s t a n c e b eh in d o u rl i n e s t o- da y. It i s h a r d ly p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y came f ro my o u r s h ip s , b u t I can no t accoun t f o r them un l ess t he ycame from t h e enemy's navy.

T hi s s u r e l y c o d d no t have h el pe d t h e a l r e ad y d e t e r i o r a t i n gr e l a t i o n s h i p between Sampson and Shaf ter .14

While Sampson was bombarding Aguadores, S h a f t e r andh i s t ro op s were f a c i ng much g r ea te r p rob lems . The gen era l hadex p ec t ed l i t t l e r e s i s t an ce from t h e S p an ia rd s , who h e c l e a r lyf e l t were i n cap ab le o f h o ld in g o f f t h e s u p e r io r Americanf o r ce s . Thus, S h a f t e r was g r ea t l y s u r p r i s ed when h i s t r o o p sr an i n t o s t i f f r e s i s t a n c e du ri ng t h e i r a s s a u l t s e a s t ofS an t i ag o . Though th e Am ericans ev en t u a l l y p r e v a i l ed a f t e r two

29


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d ay s o f i n t e n s e f i g h t i n g , it i s a p p ar e nt t h a t S h a f t e r wasc l e a r l y u n pr ep a re d f o r a ny p r ol on g ed d e l a y i n r e a c h i n gS a n t i a g o .

T he re were o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t a l s o h a d a n im p ac t o nS h a f t e r ' s p l a n o f a c t i o n . D i se a se s su ch a s y e ll ow f e v e r a ndm a l a r i a h a d b eg un t o r e du c e t h e r e a d i n e s s o f t h e A mericant r o o p s . A l s o , t h e te nu ou s l o g i s t i c s t r a i n was i n d an ge r o fl e a v i n g S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e s i l l - e q u i p p e d f o r t h e fo llo w-oni n v e s tm e n t o f t h e c i t y p r o p e r . S h a f t e r , who h i m s e l f wasf e e l i n g t h e e f f e c t s o f d i s e a se , and p er ha ps w i th t h ee x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 1 7 4 1 B r i t i s h c am paig n on h i s mind, s t a r t e dt o lo ok f o r ways t o f i n i s h t h e campaign a s q u i c k l y a sp o s s i b l e . 15

The gen er a l made h i s f e a r s known t o A lge r , ca b l in g himon Ju ly 3 t h a t h i s d e f e n se s were t h i n , t h a t l o s s e s (du e b o t ht o b a t t l e a nd t o d i s e a s e ) were b e gi nn in g t o mount, a nd t h a tr a i n was h a vi ng a n im pa ct on h i s a b i l i t y t o k eep h i s f o r c e ss u p p l i e d . S h a f t e r e ve n c o n si d er e d h a v in g h i s f o r c e s f a l l b ackf i v e m i l e s f ro m S a n t ia g o , a l l o w i n g him t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t ob u i l d up h i s t r o o p s . T h i s s u g g e s ti o n c a us ed g r e a tc o n s t e r n a t i o n among t h e l e a d e r s i n W a sh in gto n, b u t A l g e r , w i t hM cK in le y's a cq u ie sc en c e, l e f t t h e m a tt e r t o S h a f t e r ' sd i s c r e t i o n . 1 6

It was a t t h i s p o i n t, on J u l y 2 , t h a t S h a f t e r began t or e q u e s t o f Sampson t h a t h i s s h i p s f o r c e t h e e n t r a n c e t o t h eh a rb o r . The g e n e ra l f e l t t h a t t h i s would f a c i l i t a t e t h e


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d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Sp an is h f l e e t as w e l l a s prov ide moree f f e c t i v e g u n f i r e su p po rt t o a s s i s t t h e Army's advance . Inr e s p o n s e , Sampson s t a t e d t h a t it was " i m p o s s i b le t o f o r c ee n tr an c e u n t i l we can clear chann e l o f mines, a work of somet im e a f t e r f o r t s a r e t a ke n p o s se s si o n o f b y yo ur t r o o p s ." l 7

L a t e r t h a t same da y, S h a f t e r c a b l e d t h e f o l l o w i n gmessage t o Sampson:

I t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r m e t o s a y when I can t a k e b a t t e r i e sa t e n t ra nc e t o h ar bo r . I f t h ey a re a s d i f f i c u l t t o t a k ea s t h o s e w hic h we h av e b e en p i t t e d a g a i n s t it w i l l be somet i m e and a g r e a t loss o f l i f e . I am a t a loss t o see whyt h e Navy c a n n o t w ork u n de r a d e s t r u c t i v e f i r e a s w e l l a st h e Army.

Th is was fo l lo wed a l i t t l e t im e l a t e r w it h a no t h e r m essage,a g a i n f ro m S h a f t e r t o Sampson:

I u r g e t h a t you make e f f o r t im m ed ia te ly t o f o r c e t h een t r a nc e t o avo id f u tu re l o s se s among my men, which a r ea l r e a d y v e r y h e av y . You ca n now o p e r a t e w i t h l e s s l o s s o fl i f e t h a t I can.18

Sampson, c l e a r l y f e e l i n g t h a t S h a f t e r ha d n o k no wle dg eo f t h e Navy's s i t u a t i o n , f i r e d o f f t h i s re sp on se :

Our t r o u b l e f rom t h e f i r s t h as b ee n t h a t t h e c h an n elt o t h e h ar b or i s w e l l s t r e w n w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n m i ne s, w hic hwould c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n t h e s i n k i n g of o ne o r more ofo u r s h i p s i f w e a t te m p te d t o e n t e r t h e h ar b or , a nd by t h es i n ki n g o f a s h i p t h e o b j e c t o f t h e a t t em p t t o e n t e r t h eh a r b o r would b e d e f e a t e d by t h e p r e v e n t i n g o f f u r t h e rp r o g r e s s on o u r p a r t .It was my hope t h a t an a t t ac k , on your p a r t , o f t h es es h or e b a t t e r i e s from t h e rear would l e a v e u s a t l i b e r t y t od r a g t h e c h a nn e l f o r t o rp e d o e s .I f it i s y ou r e a r n e s t d e s i r e t h a t we s h o u ld f o r c e o u r

e n t r a n c e , I w i l l a t o nc e p r e p a re t o u n d er ta k e it. It h i n k , h ow ev er, t h a t o u r p o s i t i o n a n d y o u r s w ou ld b e mademore d i f f i c u l t i f , as i s p o s s i b l e , w e f a i l i n o u ra t t e m p t . 1 9


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As a result of these exchanges, both commanders,finally recognizing the need to meet face to face to resolvetheir differences and possibly to formulate a coherent plan of

attack, arranged to meet ashore on July 3. Sampson wasprepared to submit a plan in which his fleet would counterminethe harbor entrance, followed by an immediate entrance of hisships. He wanted the Marines encamped at Guantanamo to stormthe Socapa battery in conjunction with an Army assault on theMorro Castle. Though this plan would surely have resulted ina significant loss of life, Sampson most likely felt it wastime to force the issue. As for Shafter, he was prepared todiscuss no plan other than his own.20

However, whatever prospects existed for some semblanceof jointness were dashed when the Spanish fleet, under thecommand of Admiral Cervera, picked the exact moment of theproposed conference to sortie his fleet out of Santiago

Harbor.Destruction of the S~anish leet

As the morning dawned on July 3, the joint forces ofthe United States could best be described as disorganized.There existed no coherent plan of attack that would bestutilize the joint capabilities of the U.S. Navy's ships andthe land forces of the Army's V Corps. Additionally, thetenuous relationship between the two commanders in the fieldhad begun to degenerate into a clash of personalities, as each


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maneuvered h i s forces as h e saw f i t , w i th l i t t l e r eg a rd f o rt h e o t h e r s e r v i c e .

Admiral Sampson 's f l e e t , ove r se ve ra l days , hadconducted a v ig o ro u s s h e l l i n g of t h e e n t i r e r e g i o n s u rr ou n di ngSa n t i a g o a n d i t s har bor wa te r s . . The p roblem w a s t h a t ,a l th o u g h t h e g un s on t h e s h i p s were w e l l w i t h i n r an g e o f t h el an d t a r g e t s , t h e l o c a t i on o f t h e i r s t a t i o n i n g p o i n ts o u t s i d et h e h a r b o r e n tr a n c e s e v e r e l y re d uc e d t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h esh o t . The t r u e va lu e o f t h e Navy 's a rmada would on ly ber e a l i z e d i f t h e s h i ps c o ul d draw c l o s e r t o t h e i r i nt en d edt a r g e t s . Sampson f e l t t h a t t h i s was im p os si bl e u n t i l t h ee n t r a n c e c o u l d b e c o m p l e t e ly c l e a r e d o f m in es .

A s f o r S h a f t e r , h i s f o r c e s h ad r ea ch ed t h e e nd o ft h e i r a dv an ce , en cam pin g on t h e o u t s k i r t s o f S a n t i a g o . W hilet h e e n t r e n c h e d Army f i r m l y h e l d t h e S p a n i s h t r o o p s i n s i d et h e i r g a r r i so n s , it w a s f e a r e d t h a t a n a s s a u l t upon t h ef o r t i f i c a t i o n s would s u r e l y r e s u l t i n t h e l o s s o f many l i v e s .S h a f t e r , f a c i n g t h i s c h o i ce , was u n w i l l i n g t o commit h i st r o o p s a n y f u r t h e r w i th o u t t h e d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f Sam pson'sf l e e t .

I t w a s a l s o S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e s who w e r e b e g in n in g t of e e l t h e e f f e c t s of t h e c o n t i n u i n g cam paign, i n f i n i t e l y moret h a n t h e Navy. W hile t h e N av y's s h i p s c o u l d p e r i o d i c a l l ysteam o v e r t o G uantanamo t o c o n du c t r e s u p p l y o f c o a l a n d o t h e ri t e m s , t h e Army c o n t i n u e d t o be t i e d t o a r a t h e r s h o r tl o g i s t i c s t r a i n . S h a f t e r r e f l e c t e d h i s co n ce rn s l a t e r i n h i s


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o f f i c i a l r e p o r t o f t h e cam paign:Our s up p l i e s had t o be b rough t fo rward by a na r row wagonr oa d , w hich t h e r a i n s mig ht a t a ny t i m e r e n d e r i m p a s s a b l e ;f e a r w a s e n t e r t a in e d t h a t a s to rm m ig ht d r i v e t h e v e s s e l sc o n t a in i n g o ur s t o r e s t o s e a , t h u s s e p a r a t i n g u s f rom o urb a se o f s u p p l i e s ; a nd l a s t l y , it w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t G e ne ra lPando, wi th 8 ,000 re enforc emen ts f o r t h e enemy, was enro u t e f rom Manzan i l lo and migh t be exp ec t ed i n a f ew days .

These f a c to r s , combined wi th t h e g rowing number o f s o ld i e r sa f f l i c t e d w i th d i s ea s e , g r e a t l y i nf l u en c e d S h a f t e r ' s d e c i s i o n -making process .21

E a r l y o n J u l y 3, be fo re Sh af t e r and Sampson were ab l et o c o n f e r a nd a g r e e on a m utu al p l a n of a t t a c k , S h a f t e r s e n t ar e q u e s t f o r s u r r e n d e r t o t h e S p a n i sh commander i n S a n t i a g o ,G e n e ra l T o r a l . W hile q u i t e p o s s i b l y a b l u f f , S h a f t e r r ea so ne dt h a t it m ig ht j u s t b e p o s s i b l e t o av o i d a ny more l o s s of l i f ei f t h e S p an is h s ur re n d er e d, o b v i a ti n g f u r t h e r a c t i o n on t h ep a r t o f t h e A meric an f o r c e s . The Sp a n i s h p r o m pt ly r e f u s e d t os u r re n d e r , r e a s s u r i n g t he ms el ve s t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n d i d no ty e t c a l l f o r s uc h d i r e ac ti on .2 2

I n r e a l i t y , however, f o r t h e S pa n is h f o r c e s i n anda ro un d S a n t ia g o t h e s i t u a t i o n was r e a ch i n g j u s t t h a t p o i n t .The S pa n is h f l e e t , b o t t l e d up i n s i d e t h e h a r b o r w a t e rs f o ro v e r a m onth, h ad b ee n t o l d t o p r e p a r e f o r movement i n c a s et h e c i t y was a b o ut t o f a l l . A pp ro xim ate ly 1, 00 0 s a i l o r s hade ve n b ee n r e de p lo y e d f ro m t h e i r v e s s e l s t o a s s i s t w i t h t h ed e f e n se o f t h e c i t y ' s g a r r i s o n s . But when S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e sr ea ch e d t h e o u t e r l i m i t s of S an t i ago , t h e Span i sh governmentd e ci de d t h a t it was b e t t e r t o r i s k a n e sc ap e of t h e f l e e t ,


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despite having to run past the American fleet stationed justoutside the harbor, than to blow up their own ships. Thus,over Admiral Cervera's objections, who felt it was best to

keep the fleet in support of the town's defense, his shipswere ordered to attempt an escape from Santiago Harbor.23

At 10 o'clock in the morning on 3 July, the Spanishfleet, under the command of Admiral Cervera, filed through thenarrow harbor entrance and proceeded westward in a vainattempt to outrun the superior American fleet. The followingbattle at sea resulted in the complete annihilation ofCervera's fleet of six ships. The Spanish losses in manpowertotaled over several hundred killed due to gunfire anddrowning, and about 1,300 prisoners. American losses totaledone killed and two wounded.24

While the action of Sampson's fleet in defeatingCervera's ships was strictly a naval operation, the impact ofjoint operations, however disorganized, cannot be overlooked.Continuous shelling from the naval vessels and the Army'slight artillery, despite causing little physical damage, wasmost likely beginning to take its toll on the morale ofSantiago's defenders. Though they were stocked to wait out asiege of up to two months, they quickly realized that, with noreinforcements coming from Spain, it was only a matter of timebefore capitulation.

The Spanish commanders evidently had no idea of theconflicts and problems that the Americans were facing. From


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t h e i r p er s p ec t iv e , t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e j o i n t o p e r a t io n s wereo ve rp ow er in g. Fo r a l l p r a c t i c a l p ur po se s, t h e f a l l o fS a n t i a g o a p p e ar e d t o b e i mm in en t.

s i e a e o f SantiaaoThe d e s t r u c t i o n o f C e r v e r a 's f l e e t a cc om p li sh ed t h e

p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e o f t h e S a n t i a g o c am pa ig n. Any f u r t h e ra c t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e Am eric an s would o n l y s e r v e t oa c c o m p l i s h se c o n d a r y o b j e c t i v e s , n on e o f w h ic h were ofs t r a t e g i c i mp o rt an c e. P r e s i d e n t McKinley an d h i s a d v i s o r sback i n Wash ing ton , however, w ere de te rm ined t o con t inu e th ec am pa ig n u n t i l t h e r e m a i n in g S p a n i s h f o r c e s i n Cuba ha ds u r r e n d e re d . N oth in g s h o r t o f a t o t a l s u r r e n d e r i n t h e Cubant h e a t e r would b e s u f f i c i e n t b e f o r e c o n t i n u in g wi th t h e n e x tp h a s e o f t h e war w i t h S p a i n . 25

Though t h e S p a n i s h f l e e t h a d b ee n d e s t r o y e d , t h es i t u a t i o n a r ou n d S a n t i a g o r em a in e d t e n s e . W hile it was mostl i k e l y t h a t t h e c o n t a c t m ines h ad bee n removed p r i o r t o t h es o r t i e of t h e S pa nis h f l e e t , t h e r e rem ain ed t h e p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t e l e c t r i c a l mines, c o n t r o l l e d from t h e s h o r e b a t t e r i e s onb o t h s i d e s o f t h e h a r b or , were s t i l l e m p la c ed . I n e s s e n c e ,U.S. Navy s h i p s c o n t i n u e d t o f a c e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f b e i n gs e v e r e l y d amaged i f t h e y a t t e m p t ed t o n a v i g a t e t h ro u g h t h ec h a n n e l .

G e ne r al S h a f t e r , f i r m l y e n t r en c h e d a ro u n d t h e c i t y an dn o t w a n ti n g t o l o s e a n y more l i v e s t h a n h e a l r e a d y h a d, wasl o a t h t o f o r c e t h e i s s u e . Faced w it h t h e S pa nis h r e f u s a l t o

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s u r r e n d e r a nd t h e r e i n fo r c e m e n t o f S p a n is h t r o o p s i n S a n t i a g o ,o r i g i n a l l y e s t i m a t e d a t 8,000 men b u t a c t u a l l y much c l o s e r t o3 ,5 00 , S h a f t e r beg an t o l oo k f o r a l t e r n a t e ways t o en d t h es t a n d o f f . H av in g m i s s e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o m ee t w i t h Sampsondue t o t h e s e a b a t t l e , what f o l l ow e d w a s a l o n g ser ies o fexchanges be tween the t w o commanders i n t h e hopes ofp e r s u ad i n g t h e o t h e r t o come ar ou n d t o h i s p l a n o f a t ta c k . 2 6

Beg inn ing on Ju ly 4, S h af t e r began t o implo r e Sampsont o f o r c e h i s way i n t o t h e en t r an c e o f t h e h a r b o r . To t h i se n d, h e s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g me ss ag e t o Sampson:

Now, i f you w i l l f o r c e y ou r way i n t o t h a t h a r b o r t h e townw i l l s u r r e n d e r w i th o ut an y f u r t h e r s a c r i f i c e o f l i f e . Mypr es en t p o s i t i o n has c o s t me 1 ,000 men, and I do no t wi sht o l o s e any more . With my fo rc es on one s i d e and your s ont h e o t h e r - and t hey have a g r e a t t e r r o r o f t h e Navy, f o rt hey know they canno t hu r t you - we s h a l l have them.27

To Sampson, t h i s was j u s t a r e p e a t o f t h e p l a n t h a tS h a f t e r h ad p ro po se d e a r l i e r i n t h e c am pa ig n. W ith t h eS p a n is h f l e e t no l o n g e r an c h or e d i n s i d e S a n t i a g o H a rb or , t h ea d m i r al was e v en l e s s w i l l i n g t o s a c r i f i c e men a nd ,e s p e c i a l ly , Navy s h i p s t o a s s i s t i n t h e s i e g e o f S a nt ia go .

What a l t e r e d t h e s i t u a t i o n was t h a t S h a f t e r h ad begunt o i n f o r m S e c r e t a r y o f War A lg e r a b o u t h i s r e q u e s t s f o r Navya s s i s t a n c e . A lm ost e v e r y m es sa ge b et we en S h a f t e r a n d A l g e ro v e r t h e n e x t week c o n ta i ne d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e p o s s i b l e r o l eo f t h e Navy i n f o r c i n g an e n t r a n ce i n t o t h e h a r b o r .A d d i t i o n a l l y , p r e s s c o r r e sp o n d e n t s t h a t ha d b ee n t r a v e l i n gw i t h t h e Army be ga n t o s e n d b ac k S h a f t e r ' s m e s sa g es f o r


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r e p r o d u c t io n i n t h e i r d a i l y n ew sp ap er s. W ith no o p p o s i t eresp onse f rom Sampson 's q ua r t e r , it s t e a d i l y b eg an t o a p p ea rt o t h e l e a d e r s i n W ashington a nd t o t h e p u b l i c i n g e n e r a l t h a tt h e Navy was no t ca r r y i ng i t s e nd o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . 2 8

C o n s id e r t h e f o l l o w i n g m es sa ge s fro m S h a f t e r t o A l g er ,b o t h s e n t . e a r l y on J u l y 5 a nd w i t h i n t w e n t y m i n u t e s o f e a c ho t h e r :

I r e g a r d it a s n e c e s s a ry t h a t t h e navy f o r c e a n e n t ra n c ei n t o t h e h a rb o r of S an ti ag o n o t l a t e r th a n t h e 6 t h i n s t a n ta nd a s s i s t i n t h e c ap t u re o f t h a t p l ac e . I f t h e y do, Ib e l i e v e t h e p l a c e w i l l s u r r e n d er w it ho ut f u r t h e r s a c r i f i c eo f l i f e .and

I f Sampson w i l l f o rc e an e n t ra nc e wi th a l l h i s f l e e t t ot h e up p er b ay o f S a n t i a g o , w e can t a k e t h e c i t y w i t h i n afew h o u r s . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s I b e l i e v e t h e town w i l ls u r r e n d e r . I f t h e army i s t o t a k e t h e p l ac e , I want1 5 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s s p e e d i l y , a nd it i s n o t c e r t a i n t h a t t h eyc a n b e l a n d e d , a s it i s g e t t i n g s to r m y. S u r e a n d s pe ed yway i s t h rough t h e bay .29

T h i s ex ch an ge q u i c k l y g a i n e d t h e a t t e n t i o n o fPres iden t McK in ley . A s t h e Commander i n C h ie f and th e on lype rs on who was i n bo t h t h e Army and Navy c h a in of command, hehad t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d e c id e t h e i s s u e o u t r i g h t by c ho os in g ac o u r s e o f a c t i o n . Though t h e r e was no e q u i v a l e n t t o o u rp r e s e n t d a y S e c r e t a r y o f D e f en s e, M cK inley d i d h a ve a t h i sd i s p o s a l s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s , i n c l u d in g S e c r e t a r y o f WarAl ge r , S e c r e ta ry of Navy Long, and t h e Naval War Board.However, i n s t e a d o f o p t i n g f o r a s p e c i f i c p l a n , M cKinley,b e l i e v i n g i t ' b e s t n o t t o i n t e r f e r e w it h t h e d e c i s io n s o f t h eon-scene comm anders, i n s t r u c te d Sampson and Sh af t e r t o

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" c o n f e r . . . a t o n ce f o r c o o p e r at i on i n t a k i n g S a n t ia g o . A f t e rt h e f u l l e s t ex ch an ge of v i ew s you w i l l a g r e e upon t h e t i m e andmanner of a t t ack ."30

I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , A dm ir al Sampsons e n t w ord t o G e n er al S h a f t e r o n J u l y 5 t h a t h e would l i k e t omeet w i t h him i n o r d e r t o r each an ag reemen t on a p l a n o fa t t a c k . S h a f t e r co nc ur re d w i th t h i s r e q u e st b u t a sk e d t h a tSampson come as ho re f o r t h e meet ing , as he was too ill t o maket h e t r i p ou t t o Sampson 's command sh ip . Ar rangemen ts weremade f o r t h e two t o meet on Ju ly 6.31

Meanwhile , Alge r , s e e i ng t h a t t h e Navy was unw i l l i ngt o f o r ce i t s way i n t o San t i a go Harbor, f o rmu la t ed h i s own p l a ni n w hich t h e Army would c l ea r t h e c h a n n e l t h e m s e l v e s . H eo u t l i n e d h i s p l a n i n a m essage t o S h a f t e r :... a k e a t r a n s p o r t , c o v er t h e p i l o t h ou se i n m ost e x po se dp o i n t s w i th b a l e d h ay , a t t a c h a n a n ch o r t o a t o w l in e , a nd ,i f p o s s i b l e , g r ap p le t h e t or pe d o c a bl es , an d c a l l f o rv o l u n t e e r s f ro m t h e Army - n o t a l a r g e number - t o runi n t o t h e h ar b o r , t h u s making a way f o r t h e Navy ... net h i n g i s c e r t a i n ; t h a t i s , t h e navy must g e t i n t o t h eh a r b o r , a n d m ust s a v e t h e l i v e s o f o u r b r a v e men t h a t w i l lb e s a c r i f i c e d i f w e a s s a u l t t h e enemy i n h i s e n tr en c hm e nt sw i t h o u t a i d .W hile n o t e n t i r e l y i m p l a us i b le , t h i s scheme do es r e f l e c t ont h e mi sapprehens ion by t h e S ec re t a ry o f War, and t h e Army i ng e n e r a l , o f t h e p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e U.S. Navy.32

On J u l y 6, Sampson s e n t word t h a t he w a s ill and wouldn o t be a b l e t o a t t e n d t h e m ee tin g w it h S h a f te r . I n h i s p l a ce ,Sampson s e n t C apta in F . E . C hadw ick, h i s c h i e f o f s t a f fSampson' s p l an , a s re la ye d by Chadwick, was, ag a in , t o employ


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t h e M a r in es on t h e w e s t er n b a t t e r y a t S o ca pa w h i l e t h e Armya s s a u l t e d t h e e a s t e r n b a t t e r y a t t h e M orro C a s t l e . Once d on e,Sampson w ould s e n d i n h i s c ou n te rm i ne a s s e t s t o c l e a r t h ec h an n el . S h a f t e r , q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , o pp osed t h i s p l a n, f e a r i n gt h a t h i s t r o o ps would s u f f e r t h e b ru n t o f t h e c a s u a l t i e s w h il et h e Navy w ould ex p er i en c e v e r y l i t t l e , i f a ny , l o s s of l i f e . 3 3

F i n a l l y , a compromise agreement was worked o ut betweenChadwick a nd S h a f t e r . Under t h i s p l a n , a l e t t e r o f t r u c ew ou ld b e s e n t t o G en e ra l T o r a l , r e q u e s t i n g t h e i m me di at es u r r e n d e r o f a l l S pa ni sh f o r c e s i n t h e S a nt i ag o v i c i n i t y . I ft h e S p a n i s h f a i l e d t o c om ply, t h e n a v a l f l e e t w ould commencef i r i n g 8- t o 1 3- in ch s h e l l s on t h e c i t y f o r a 24-hour p e r i o d ,a t a r a t e o f o ne s h e l l ev e r y f i v e m in ut es , e x ce p t f o r on e h ou rwhen t h e r a t e w ould b e o ne e v e r y tw o m i n u t e s . I f , a t t h e en do f t h i s p e r i o d an d a f t e r s u b m i t t i n g a s e co nd demand f o rs u r r e n d e r , t h e S p an i sh s t i l l d i d not comply, Sampson and h i sf l e e t would t h e n f o r c e i t s way i n t o t h e c h a n n e l e n t r a n c e . Thecommencement f o r t h e n ava l g u n f i re was se t f o r noon on J u ly 9 .Chadwick d r a f t e d t h e s u r r e n d e r n o t i c e , t o w hich S h a f t e ra f f i x e d h i s s i g n a t u r e , and it was t h e n s e n t t o G e n er a l T o r a l .An i nf or m al t r u c e , f o r a l l i n t e n t s , would b e i n p l a c e u n t i lt h e commencement of t h e nav a l g un f i r e .3 4

S h a f t e r w a s l e s s t h an e n t h u s i a s t i c a bo ut t h i s p l an .For one, he was no t convinced t h a t , when t h e t im e came, t h eNavy would a c t u a l l y c a r ry th rough wi th i t s f o r c e d e n t r y . F ora n o t he r , a ny f u r t h e r d e l a y i n e nd in g t h e s i e g e o n l y ad de d t o


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t h e l o g i s t i c woes t h a t c o n ti nu ed t o p la g ue S h a f t e r a nd h i s. t r o o p s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , w h i l e t h e r a t e of d i s e a s e h ad n o tr e a c h e d e p id e m ic p r o p o r t i o n s , t h e r e w ere j u s t t o o manyc a s u a l t i e s t o c o n t i n u e a n ex te n de d i nv e st m en t o f S a n t ia g o .H i s c o n c e r ns were v o i c e d i n t h i s m essa ge, d a t e d J u l y 7, t oA l g e r :

The f a i l u r e t o have t u g s a nd l i g h t e r s f o r u s e i n h a n dl in gt h e f l e e t i s o f s o s e r i o u s a n a t u r e t h a t I mus t aga inr e f e r t o it. T r a n s p o r t s go o f f m i l e s f ro m s h o r e a nd t h e r ei s no way o f r eac h in g them o r compe l l i ng t hem t o come i n .I t i s a c o n s ta n t s t r u g g l e t o k eep them i n h a n d . . . I t i sw i th t h e t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y t h a t one d ay ' s fo od canb e i s su e d a t a t i m e . 35

These l o g i s t i c a l and communica ti ons p rob l ems werel a t e r compounded when t h e t r u c e was extende d a d ay t o a l l o wGenera l T ora l t o communicate w i th t h e S pan i sh government ove rt h e l a t e s t s u r re n d e r o f fe r .3 6

The S p a n i s h , h o p in g t o make t h e b e s t o f a bads i t u a t i o n , a g re ed t o t h e s u r r e n d er o f f e r , w i th c e r t a i ns t i p u l a t i o n s . Most n o t a b ly , t h e s e i n c lu d e d a l l ow i n g t h eS p a n is h f o r c e s t o march o u t o f S a n t ia g o w i th t h e i r g u ns a n dbaggage . When Sh af t e r fo rwarded t h i s i n fo rma t ion back t oW ashington, he i n i t i a l l y s t a t e d t h a t he " d id n o t t h i n k h i s( T o r a l ' s ) t e r m s would b e a c c e p t e d . " S e v e r a l h o u r s l a t e r ,t ho ug h, S h a f t e r w i re d t h a t h e was now i n c l i n e d t o a c c e p t t h eo f f e r . H i s r e as o n f o r t h e c han ge o f h e a r t w a s t h a t a c ce p ta n c eo f t h e t e r m s would op en t h e h a r b o r w h i l e p r e v e n t i n g t h e g r e a td e s t r u c t i o n t h a t a bombardment would e n t a i l . C l ea r ly hop ingt o f o r e s t a l l a n e xte nd ed s i e g e , S h a f t e r ' s w av erin g b ro u gh t

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7/27/2019 Santiago campaign joint op

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