sacred and secular

Sacred and SecularRELIGION AND POLITICS WORLDWIDE

Pippa NorrisHat'uanl Uniaersit_y

Ronald InglehartUniaersitl of Mihi.qut

ffiCavBRTDGEQjP uurvERSrrY PRESs

r10

PraY dai lY

- Linear (Pray dai ly)

CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

Religion "very" lmPortant

- - - Linear (Beligion "very" important)

o.75

0.70

0.65

0.60

0.55

0.50

0.45

0.40

^q-

6$v-

a\

i'O""-

Figure 4.9. Religiosity by Income in the united states. Note: Linear trends in the

percentage of the American public who pray daily and who regard religion as

very important by decile household income group (counting all wages, salaries'

pensioni and other incomes, before taxes and other deductions) ' Source: World

Values Study, Pooled 1981-2001.

patrerns of denominational and church competition, the levels of societal

and individual securiry in any sociery seem to provide the most persuasive

and parsimonious explanation. But does this explanation continue to hold

elsewhere, even in rhe Muslim v.orld? we go on to test this thesis.

{ilr$

A Religious Revival in Post-CommunistEurope?

HAs A srEADv erosion of religion taken place in post-Communist nations,similar to the secularization process experienced in Western Europe? Or,as suppl,v-side theory in-rplies, has the last decade brought a resurgence ofreligiositv in this region, follov'ing the fall of communism? The literatureremains dirided about these issues in part because the l imitations of theavailable evidence make it dif6cult to resolve this debate. As one corn-mentator rernarked, the former Communist states vr'ere uninterested incollecting any offrcial statistics concerning religious affiliation and churchattendance apart fron.r inteiligence to be used in its dismanding.' The oc-casional surv-evs that rvere conducted during the Soviet era were not basedon representative national samples. During this period, responses to surveyquestions about religiosiq'mav also have been constrained by fear oI gor-ernmentai sanctions. As a result, prior to the early r99os, we lackreliablecross-national sun'evs allowing us to compare long-term trends in religiousattitudes and behavior. Among the twenty-seven post-Communist Euro-pean nations that exist todal', Hungary was the only one included in ther98r World Values Srudy, although Wave z conducted during the earlyr99os covered a dozen post-Conmunist states, Wave 3 during the mid-r99os erpanded to twenry-two countries, and fourteen u'ere surveyed inWave 4 during rggg-zoor.In the absence of reliable representative sur-vevs conducted durins the Communist era tlat would enable us to examirre

ln

tt2 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

a long time-series, we think that the best alternarive way to probe intolong-term trends is to examine surveys carried out during the rggos usinggenerational comparisons, based on the assumption that the artitudes to-ward religion that were instilled during a given generation's formative yearswill leave lasting traces in subsequent years. If we find substantial intergen-erational differences within given countries, they suggest (although theydo not prove) the direction in which prevailing rends are moving. \4rhereimportant cross-national differences are evident, such as contTasts betweena relatively religious Romania and a reladvely secular Estonia, then we needto explore their causes at the societal level, examining the role of such fac-tors as state reguladon of religious insdrutions, and the impact of humandevelopment indicators.

The Secularization versus Supply-Side Debate

Theories of demand-side secularization and of supply-side religious mar-kets have both been used to explain developments in the region, but previousstudies have been unable to resolve which is most clearly supported. On onehand, the tradidonal secularization thesis implies that religiosity has gradu-ally decayed in Central and Eastern Europe over successive decades, for thesame reasons that operate in other industrialized societies. [n particular, thesalience ofreligious values and habituai churchgoing would be expected toerode as a society experiences the long-term transition from poorer agrar-ian to more affluent industrial states. Social policies in the Soviet Unionemphasized the expansion of ttre welfare state, emplo),rnent securiry andwidespread access to public services in healthcare, housing, unempiol'rnentbenefits, childcare, and pensions. The state invested heavily in broadeningaccess to schools and universities, so that by the early r98os levels ofpartic-ipation in higher education in Soviet bloc nations r,r'ere only slighdy behindthose in the West.' Oflicial repression of religion u'ould be expected to havereinforced these factors, although its impact varied videly from one coun-try to anottrer: in Poland, for example, Sor-iet-led attempts at repression ofreligion \{'ere counter-productive, Ieading the Polish people to emphasizetheir attachment to religion as a way to preserl'e their Polish identity. Afterthe collapse of communism, the tendency toq'ard secularization linked withdevelopment should have accelerated in counffies that experienced a suc-cessful uansition to democracv, such as Poland, Hungary and the CzechRepublic, and more secure external relationships rvhere states are becomingintegrated into the European lJnion and NATO. ln those post-Communistsocieties where people's lives gradually became more secure during the late

A RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN POST.COMMUNIST EUROPE?

rwentieth century', a simple version of the modernization thesis would leadus to expect a linear relationship between age and religious values (such asthe importance anached to religion), as well as berween age and religiousparticipation (such as aftendance at religious services and daily prayer): inboth cases, we would expect to find that the young were less religious thanthe old. Conversely, religion would be expected to remain sftong amongboth young and old in post-Communist agrarian societies that remain poorand underdeveloped (such as Albania, Moldova, and Azerbaijan), for thesame reasons rhat apply to other low-income sociedes around t}le world.Countries such as Turlrnenistan, Kazakhsran, and lJzbekistan in CentralAsia lost ground markedly during the r99os, with economies characterizedbv large numbers of peasant farmers, faltering healy manufacruring indus-try, structural underemplolmlent, negative growth, poor basic healthcare,shrinking average life spans, social inequality, and widespread poverty (withper capita Gross National Incomes in zooo below $5,ooo).

Support for the traditional secularization thesis can be found in the lit-erature. For example, Need and Evans compared pafterns of religiosity int9g3-r994in ten post-Commulist societies that they classified as predomi-nately Catholic (the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia)and Orthodox (Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine). Testedwith both linear and logged age regression models, the study reports thatrates of church participarion usually showed a paftern of linear decline as onemoved from older to younger generations, precisely as secularization the-ory implies.: Qualitative case srudies also support these findings; Borowikargues that the break-up of the Soviet Union brought a radical shift in Cen-tral and Eastern Europe when the legal position of the churches changeddramatically, with the new regimes recognizing freedom of relision as abasic human right.+ In Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, the number of thosewho declared their belief in God and their adherence to t-he Orthodox tra-dition rose in the short-term, immediately after the fall of communism, butthe srudv found that commirment to the Church, and the level of religiouspractice, are as low today as in the most secularized Western Europcansocieties. Borowik concludes that the conremporary picrure of religiosiryin these countries, where atheism was imposed for many ye.ars, remainsquite similar to that in W'estern Europe, where secularization developedspontaneously. Kaariainen also concludes that a brief religious resurgenceoccurred in Russia at the beginning of the r99os, but after that the situationstabilized. By the late r99os, he found, only one-third of the Russian popu-lation considered themselves believers, the majority remaining irrdifferenttoward religion. Furthermore, because of their atheist heritage, most people

l l3

l l4 CASE STUDIES OF RELICION AND POLITICS

have only a cursory knowledge of common Orthodox beliefs and many also

believe in astrologl', magic, reincarnation, and so on. The Russian Orthodox

Church is respected but only a minoriry of the people describe themselves

as Orthodox. Despite the grou.ing number of churches and parishes across

the country Kaariainen found that Russians go to church less often than

other Europeans.S Some have also einphasized that new forms of "indi-vidualized" spiriruaiiq' outside the church are emerging in Cenual and

Eastern Europe.6If the process of secularization is related to human development and exis-

tential securi6', as the evidence presented earlier in this book suggests, then

we might expect the long-term erosion of religiosiq' across a broad range

of post-Communist societies to be more complex than simpler versions of

modernization theory suggest. \\here living standards have gradually risen

in the region, this should tend to erode religiosity gradually over succeed-

ing birth cohorts, as tradidonal secularization theory suggests. On the other

hand, the collapse of liring standrrds and the disappearance of the welfare

state tiat occurred during the past decade would lead us to expect a short-

term rez,iaal of religiosiw in low- to moderate-income societies, especially

for the more mlnerable seg:nents of the population such as the elderly liv-

ing on dwindling state pensions rvhile facing hyperinflation in food and fuel

costs. Widespread feelings of existential insecurity were also engendered by

the sudden inroducdon of neo-liberal free markets, which produced severe

recessions, throwing millions of public sector employees out of work; and

where household savings are threatened by hyperinfladon (as in Azerbaijan

and Belarus); where political stability and government leadership is under-

mined by scandals over corruption or a banking crisis; and where etlrnic con-

flict sharplv worsens or where domestic securiry is threatened by secessionist

movements, as in the Chechnya conflict.7 In the most dramatic case, the dis-

integration of the tbrmer Yugoslar.ian republic led to the outbreak of bloody

civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, heightening ethno-religious identities and

the salience of religiosity among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim com-

munities co-existing in the Balkans. The tieory of secularization based on

existential security therefore predicts tlat the process of societal modern-

ization in post-Communist Europe would tend to generate a long-term lin-

ear decline ofreligiosiry over successive birth cohorts, but that this gradual

ffansformation w'ould tend to be offset by short-term factors linked u'ith the

collapse of communism. Thus (r) itwill onlvoccur in those Cenual and East

European countries that have experienced a long-term process of human

development and economic equaliry (z) it will be clearest among the most

secure and affluent social sectors, and also (3) specific countries in the region

A RELICIOUS REVIVAL IN POST.COMMUNIST EUROPE?

are likely experience a shoft-tenn revival of religiosity if conditions sincethe fall of communism generate widespread feelings of sharply diminishedexistential security.

In conuast to this interprerarion, a very different set of expectationsis generated by theories of supply-side religious markets. The evidenceconsidered eariier threrv serious doubt on the capacity of this theory toexplain variations within Western Europe, but it might be that this ac-count provides a more convincing case under the conditions operating inpost-Communist states. Supply-side theory emphasizes that panerns oF re-ligrosiry in post-Communist srates are determined by the role of religiousorganizations competing activelv for "hearts and minds," and in panicu-lar the degree of state regulation of the church. During the Soviet era,religious organizations were strongly constrained or persecuted through-out most of Central and Eastern Europe, with the "Godless" Communisrparty actively promoting atheist beliefs and practice.E Religion was nor de-stroyed, but it rvas strongly discouraged in most of these societies.e Thedissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of comrnunism broughta radical change in the relationship berween chorch and state, with free-dom of religion becoming officially recognized as a basic human right anda multitude of denominations becoming free to compere for followers. Ifthe poliry of atheism under the Soviet srate discouraged religiosiry, thenwe might expect a curvilinear pattern of age differences in religiosity. Wemight expect to find a U-shaped curve, with religiosity being relativelystrong among the older generation that grew up in pre-Communist soci-eties, and also the youngest cohort that came of age under more liberalconditions, while by contrast the middle-aged generation should prove theleast religious. This can be tested by seeing v'hether age is most closeh.related to indicators of religiosity in either a linear (monotonic) or a logged(curvilinear) fashion.

Some studies have detected support for this thesis; for example, Greeleycornpared public opinion toward religion in nine former Communist coun-tries, mosdy located in the Baltics and Central Europe (Russia, HungarySiovenia, Slovakia, East Germany, Poland, Lan'ia, Bulgaria, and the CzechRepublic), derived from analvsis ofthe r99r and r998 International SocialSurvey Program.'o Greeley found that common Christian beliefs, such asfaith in God and in reincarnation, are quite widespread in this region. Heargues that generational comparisons of these beliefs suggest a curvilinearU-shaped cun'e, with the oldest and the post-r96os generation being morelikely to express faith than the middle-aged. Greeley concludes that a revivalin religious convictions has occurred among the younger generation in the

l l5

r i

tl

iiiI

t ,

t ;

ri

'i1lLI

i . i

rlflilii

.16 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGTON AND POLITICS

, cgion, especially in Russia, although he acknowledges that this has not, as

, ct, been accompanied by a rise in church attendance. Other dimensions

.t'religious behar-ior, including affiliation to the Orthodox Church and

:rgagement in prayer, remain relatively lou'and show clear erosion over

,ccessive birth cohorts.'' Arother study bv Froese also concludes that the

rpply-side theory fits the cases of Hungary Poland, and East Germany,

here a religious resurgence occurred after independence, driven, he be-

eves, by a revival ofchurch organizations."

.lditional Relevant Factors

'he debate between seculzrrization demand-siders and religious market

rpply-siders has been difficult to resolve, in part because of the limited

ine-series sun.ey data that is available, but also because previous studies

rve focused on different periods and compararive frameworks. One clas-

c danger in the case studv approach, focusing on historical studies of the

, ,le of the church in given counfties such as Poland or dre United States,

that specific countries can be selected to fit almost any given theory

he ten-nation comparative study by Need and Evans was more wide-

nging, but it r,l'as based on surveys conducted during the early I99os,

st a few years after independence, when many societies remained in the

idst of democratic and neo-liberal market economic transitions. Gener-

ronal changes emerge too slorvly to be captured so quickly. .{ny gener-

ional shifts in religious values and beiiefs that did occur after indepen-

nce rvould take manl vears to become apparent. Ifost comparative survey

rurk has also analyzed religiosiry among Catholic Central European coun-

res, with less attention given to developments in Eastern Orthodox and in

;uslim societies.This limits the generalizations that can be drawn about post-Communist

.rrope, as dramatic contrasts are er,-ident within this vast region, stretch-

g longitudinally from the Baltic to the Bering Strait and latitudinally

.xn the Arctic to t}re Caucuses. Societies in Central and Eastern Europe

l'f'er significantly in numerous factors that could plausibly act as in-

rvening variables conditioning the relarionship between age and reli-

r.,n. These factors include a society's experiences during the transition

,cl consolidation of democracl', as well as in its historical religious cul-

re, the duration of Soviet rule, the relationship between church and

.rte under Communism, the success of its economrc adfustrnent to t}re':c market during the last decade, its integration into international or-

,nizations such as NATO and the EuroDean Union, as well as in its

A RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE?

degree of ethno-religious homogeneity and fractionalization. Any system-

atic study therefore will need to utilize multivariate analysis controlling

for tle intervening factors that could affect the relationship betu'een agJe

and religiosin'.The most successful post-Communist societies, such as Poland,

Hungary Siovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Repubiic, have developed stablerepresentative democracies with multiparty competition, free elections, and

thriving civic societies. Wtth economies that adjusted relativel,v successfullyto the free market, and positive rates of economic growth, by the end of z ooothcsc nrtions achiei ed per capita incomes ranging from $8,ooo to $r6,ooo.

Just over a decade after achieving independence, these countries entered

dre European Union and NATO. The Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania, andEstonia also engineered a fairlv rapid transition from a Soviet-swle com-mand economl.to the free market and integration with M/estern Europe.By contrast, econornic groilth and progress on human rights and politi-cal liberties proved sluggish, or even failed outright, in many other formerCommunist nations. Russian per capita GDP fell by 6% per year duringthe r99os, while economic inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient)rose to the highest level in the region, and the average life expectanry de-clined sharply. Belarus under President Lukashenko experienced economic

stagnation and decline, experiencing a 3"/o fall in per capita GDP fiomtggo-rggg, together with hyperinflation of consumer prices, and riggedelections. The countries of the South Caucuses and Central Asia are char-acterized by failing economies, repressive regimes rvith no transition to evencompetitive elections, and endemic poverty and hardship. Azerbaijan has

considerable reservoirs of oil and gas, but GDP fell by a massive g.6o/" an-nually during the rg9os, and the ruling regime has often been criticized for

extensive corruption and vote rigging. K)'rgyzstan has experienced flawedparliamentary and presidential elections, the harassment and imprisonment

of opposition leaders, and the closure of dissident newspapers, as well as

negative anlual economic gror.rth during the last decade. In this country

nith average per capita income around $z,4zo, the economy has failed: fac-

tories remain closed, unemployrnent has soared, and malnutrition is rife.

After the breakdoun of Soviet control, Balkan societies within the former

Yugoslavia descended into chaos and the bloody Bosnian war, fueled by

deep-rooted ethnic conflict.In short, post-Communist societies have shown very diverse rates of

progFess toward democratizarion and economic development, and the

historical reladonships between church and srate also differed radically.

Johnston suggests that public religiosity continues to be relatively high

tt7

n8 CASE STUD]ES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

in nations where the church u'as actively involved in resistlnce against the

Soviet regime and the struggle for independence.'l In Poland and the Czech

Republic, for example, t}re role of the Catholic Church in opposing the

Communist state, and the Western orientation and organizational links of

Roman Catholicism, meant that the Church rnaintained or even strength-

ened its roie after independence. Strassbergargues that the Catholic Church

has been involved in politics throughout the history of Poland, and after

1945 it functioned as the main opposition to the Communist party.Ia [n

this regard, Polish Catholicism became associated with nationalism, free-

dom, human rights, and democracy.'s By contrast, in Hungary the state

established a policy of a "church within socialism," where the credibility

of the Catholic Church was eroded by collaboration with the Communist

government. Religious freedoms expanded after Hungarian independence,

but nevertheless peopie did not flock back to the Church.'6 In Croatia,

by contrast, during the Bosnian war religion played a key syrnbolic role

in reinforcing a sense of disdnct national identity, distinguishing between

the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs, and the Islamic groups in Bosnia

and elsev'here.t7Comparisons also need to take account of the historically predominant

religious culture in each nation, since the Soviet Union included Catholic,

Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim societies. In previous chapters we found

that beliefs and values differed in \A/estern Europe by the type of pre-

dominant faith, and Need and Evans also found that Catholics in Cen-

tral and Eastern Iiurope are generally more regrrlar churchg;oers than Or-

thodox Christians.'8 The post-Communist counffies in the World Values

Survey include seven Catholic societies - Croatia, the Czech Republic,

Hungary Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. From 7oo/o to 95o/o of

the population is Catholic in these countries, with a substantial Protestant

minoriqy in Hungary. The survey also covers eleven Eastern Orthodox soci-

eties, including Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova,

Montenegro, Rornania, Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia. Some of these coun-

tries contain more homogeneous populations than others, u'ith substantial

religious minorities (of rcY" or more) coexisting in Belarus (Catholics),

Bulgarian (,Nluslims), Nlacedonia (Muslims), and Montenegro (Muslims

and Catholics), as well as smaller populations of Muslims and Catholics

living elsewhere. The Protestant ex-Communist societies in the survey

include Estonia, East Germany, and Lawia, and there are three Muslim

ex-Communist nations, Nbania, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia-H erzegovina, al-

though both Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina contain substantial Catholic

and Orthodox minorit ies.


Generational Change in Religiosity

Because time-series data covering a reasonably long period of time (such asthe five decades that were used to test secularization in Western countries)are not available from the ex-Communist countries, we will use generationalcomparisons of the nvenw-two post-Communist societies covered in theWorld Values Sun'ey 04"V.S) as a proxy indicator of long-tenn change. Wewill compare linear and logged regression models to see which provides abetter fit to the data. Our revised version of secularization tieory impliesthat we should find a linear relationship between age and religious par-ticipation, with religiosity falling through successive birtl cohorts, in theeconomically more developed societies. If, however, we find no significantage-related differences; or that the young are more religious than the old; ora cun'ilinear relationship between age and religiosity, it wiil tend to refuteour theory (and we will we need to explore further the causes of any appar-ent religious revival among the younger generation). We will also comparepatterns of religiosiry in given societies. to see u-hether post-Communistcountries vary systen-ratically according to their level of human developmentand economic equaliq', as predicted by the theory of secularization and ex-istential securiry - or u'hether state regulation of religious institutions andreligious pluralism proves a more conl'incing explanation, as the supply-sidethesis contends. As in previous chapters, our core dependent variables willbe religious ualues, measured by the importance of religion, and religiousparticiPation, as indicated by frequency of attendance at services of worship,and by frequency of prayer. For comparison with the work of Greeley, wewill also determine rvhether any generational differences exist in a rangeof common religious beliefs.In general we anticipate that generational dif-ferences will be sftongest with religious aalues, although if they exist, thesewill also tend to be linked with one's patterns of religious behaaior-

Thble 5.r presents the results of the fitted regression models for age in

vears, using all the pooled surveys in post-Communist Europe from r995

to 2oor. The results of the models show that for all the dependentvariablesexcept one (belief in life after death) dre linear models provide a slightlybetter fit than the logged ones. Among all post-Communist societies, acrossnearlyall indicators, we find that (r) religiositywas stronger among the oldergeneration than among the young; and (z) the age-related differences tendto be linear, rather than curvilinear.'e This is precisely the pattern that ispredicted by the theory ofsecularization and existential security.

To illustrate these patterns graphically, and to help examine variadonsacross these counries, the trends by birth cohort are shown for religious

l l9

il

t20 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

Table 5.1. Age and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe, Without Controls

Linear Age Effects Logged, Age Effects

srg.slg.RZ

RELIGIOUS PARTICIPAIIONReligious participationFrequency of pr.ryer

RELIGIOUS VALUESImportance of religionr -^^-+-^^^ ^t a^:t t l lPUI tdt tLt u l uuu

RELIGIOUS BELIEFSBelieve in GodBelieve in l i fe after deathBelieve in hel lBel ieve in heavenBelieve in soul

.006

.039

.026

.016

.008

.001

.001

.001

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000N/s

.005

.032

.022

.013

.006

.002

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000N/s.000N/s

NorEs: The models represent the results of individual-level regression analysis models

where age (in ve.rrs) was regressed as a linear or logged variable on indicators of

rel ig iosi ty, wi thout any pr ior controls, using curvef i t . The coeff ic ients represent the

amount of var i . rnce (Rr) in rel ig iosi ty, and the signi f icance of the relat ionship, explained

by age. N : 1S,595; N/s : Not s igni f icant; Sig. : 51gn1i1.ance. Rel ig ious values:"How imporranr rs ref tg lon Ln your l i fe i" Yery [4) , rather [3) . not very (2) or not

at all (t). Religious participation: "Do you attend reliSious selices severol times a

week. once o rpeek, a few times during, the year. onae a year or |ess, or never?" Thepercentage that repoiled attending religious services "several times o week" or "once c

raeek." Frequency of prayer: QI99: 'Hour often do yolt pray to God outside of reLigious

serurces/ t \ /ould you say.. .Euery day (7). more thun once a week (6). once a week(5). at least t>nce a month 14). several t imes a year (J) , less of ten (2). never (1)." Mean

frequency per type of societl'. Importance of God scale: "How important is God in your

life? Please u.se tlzls scole to Lndicate - 10 means uery [mportant ond 1 means not ot aII

important." Mean per nation. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in

God, in heaven, in hel l , in l i fe af ter death, and in whether people have a soul .

Source: World Values Survev, pooled 1995-2001.

values (in l i izure 5.r) and for religious participation (Figure 5.2). Linear

and logged reqression models fbr the effects of age on religious values and

participation ll'ere also run for each nation. Regardless of whether we fo-

cus on religious values or religious participation, the results show two clear

patterns. First, there is a clear overall decline in all indicators ofreligiosity

across successive birth cohorts; the older generations are almost always sig-

nificandy more religious than the young. Second, there are important dif-

ferences in levels of religiosiq'in post-Communist societies today, similar to

tiose we have already observed in Western Europe. Poland, Romania, and

Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, tend to be consistendy more religious

A RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN POST.COMMUNIST EUROPES

gKH""ruNLithuania

ENNRomania Russian Federation Slovakia

r2l

0,4

4.2

0.0

Slovenia

NENKUkraine Yuooslavia

t t t lh | I Il \ l l : :_ ll \ l 1 - lr t t l2.0 4.0 6,0 8.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0Cohort ol birth Cohort of birth

Iigure 5.1. Religious Values by Cohort of Birth. Note: The proportion sayingthat religion was "very important" to their lives, with the regression line of thehend. Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1990-2001.

than East German\', Estonia, and Montenegro. For the moment, we willleave aside t}re causes of these cross-national contrasts (which could be due

. to such factors as the historical relationship between church and state, ori differences in levels of human develop*..r} These cross-national contrasts

. are interesting in themselves: the countries where the older generation is

'most secular generally display relatively flat patterns across successive birthgohorts - while in those countries in which the older generation is rela-tively religious, we find a more dramatic decline in religiosiry among tlreyounger cohorts. In other words, we find much stronger indications of

Macedonia

Poland


osnia & Heueoovin

{-----ll>\ I)l \-=l

Esionian1ll.-= -l

Macedonia

N---l1\ |l-\ II >>l

Russian Federation

nt i]^:-==l

ffil : ' l

Lithuania

[-l1\ lr_- l

Romania

[--l1>1-=l:l

Slovakia

INN

I3

c;ivq)

=

>t=9g3

3Eg8

0.6

0.4

o.2

0.0

06

0.4

o.2

0.0

0.6

f

o 02

0.0

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

'a'J"'. :ir'lon'a'J.'^ :ir'';"Figure 5.2. Religious Participation by Cohort of Birth. Note: Religious participation fthe proportion that attended church at least weekly) by cohort of birth,with the regression line of the trend. Source: World Values Survey, pooledI 990-2001 .

historical change in some countries than in others. The generational con-

trasts are most marked in Hungary Nloldova, and Romania, and less evident

in some otier nations rvith a more secular older generation, such as in East

Germany, Estonia, and Lawia. These trends are strikingly similar whether

the comparisons are based on the importance of religious values, aften-

dance at services of worship, or the frequenry of prayer, which enhances

our confidence that we are dealing v'it}r a robust and reliable phenomenon.

To control for the many other factors that could affect the relationship

between age and religiosity, we will use multivariate analysis to confirm

Slovenis


Table 5.2. Explaining Individual Religious Participation inPost-Communist Europe

il

t

r23

s. e. Beta ( io" .o

Societal level of human derrelopment(HDr 1ee8)

SOCIAL BACKGROUNDAge (linear in yearsJMale gender (0 women/i men)Education (4-point scale low to high)Income (l0-point scale low to high)

RELIGIOUS VALUES AND BELIEFSImportance of religion ( -point scale

Iow to highjReiigious beliefs (5-point scale)

TYPE OF RELIGIOUS FAITHProtestantCatholicOrthodoxMuslim

ConstantR2

3t4 016 .002

.008 .050-.04i .000

.074 .000-.023 .000

.308 .000

.232 .000

.10_s .000

.377 .000

.130 .000-.004 N/s

.001 .001-.164 .0r7

.207 .0\2- .018 .003

.594 .010

.3t2 .006

1.10 .0461.67 .025.56s .023

-.080 .080

-) , .097.453

NorE: Models use ordinary ieast squares regression analysis with religious partici-pation (7-point scale measuring frequency of attendance at services of worshipJ asthe dependent variable measured at individual level in 22 post-Communist societies.The table lists the unstandardized regression coefficient (BJ, the standard error(s.e.) , the standardized regresston coeff ic ient [Beta), and the signi f icance (Sig.1 ofthe coefficients. N : 32,348. Religious participation: "Dct you attend religious serulcesseueral times cL veek, once a veek, a few times dtLing the year, once a year or Less,or neuerl" The percentage that reported attending religious services "several iimes aweek" or "once a rveek." Importance of religion scale: "Hou' important ls rellglon lnyour Ltfe?' 4-point scale. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief inGod, in heaven, in hell, in life after death, and in whether people have a soul. Typeof religious faith: Dummy variables (0/i) for whether the respondent belonged toeach type of major world religion.

Source: World Vaiues Survev. oooled 1990-2001.

whether these patterns hold up - or seem to reflect the influence of specificvariables. The regression models in Table 5.2 control for the society'slevel of human development as well as for the standard social and atti-tudinal variables that Chapter 3 demonstrated tend to influence pafternsof churchgoing, such as gender, education, and income, in addition to theimpact of religious values and beliefs, and belonging to different world

124 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

religions. The pooled World Values Survey r990-2oor is used to analyzepatterns across the twenty-rwo post-Communist societies. The results showthat the linear effects of age continue to be significant even with these mul-tiple controls, with religiosity continuing to be srronger among rhe oldergenerations. A similar regression nlodel was replicated using logged age andthe beta coetficients for age proved slighdy v'eaker and statistically insignif-icant (at the conventional .o5 level). The other social and attitudinal factorsperformed as expected, with religious attendance in post-Communist soci-eties being reladvely strong among women, the less educated, and the lessaffluent, as well as (unsurprisinglv) among those who held religious valuesand beliefs. Catholics vv.ere the most regular churchgoers, u,'ith Protestantsand Orthodox being moderate in attendance, and Muslims in this regionthe least likelv to attend sen-ices of rvorship. The anaiysis of indir"idual reli-giosity in post-Communist Europe therefore largely confirms the patternsfound earlier in Western Europe, meaning that we do not need to resort toparticularistic explanations based on factors distinctive to the history of thechurch under the Soviet state, whether the traditional beliefs and pracricesof the Eastern Orthodo.r church, the repression or persecuuon of Carholicleaders, or the culnrral legary of the Comrnunist Party. Nevertheless thereremain important national contrasts within the region, such as betweenreligious Poland and secular Russia, which require further exploration.

The Impact of Religious Markets versus the Impactof Human Development

To examine the societal-level factors that could be causing the cross-nationaldifferences, we can compare how f-ar religiosiw is systematically relared toreligious markets and societal development. Four indicators are comparedto see how stronglv these correlated with the indicators of religious values,beliefs, and participation that we have used throughout this book.

Religious Pluralism

The supply-side theory of Stark and Finlce suggests that the degree ofcompetition among religious insdrudons plays a crucial role in crearingreligious vigor; and above all, that religious pluralism increases reiigiousparticipation.'o Religious pluralism is gauged here by the Herfindahl Indexused in earlier chapters, as calculated by Alesina and colleagues using thedata on the major religious populations derived from the EnryclopaediaBritannica Book of the Year zoo t ." The religious pluralism index is calculated

A RELIGIOUS REV]VAL IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE' I25

as the standard Herfindahl indicator for each country, ranging from zeroto one.

State Regulation of Religion

A related hypothesis developed by Greeley argues rhat state regulation ofreligion in the Soviet union restricted the churches, but that a religiousrevival occurred after the fall of communism in countries where there isa srong constitutional division between church and state, protecting reli-gious freedom of worship and toleration of different denominations, with-out hindrance to particular sects and faiths (which, of course, would tendto enhance the degree of religious pluralism). In Communist China, for ex-ample, observers suggest thar the state continues to activelv repress, ban, ordeter religious practices, exemplified by the prosecutions, killings, torrure,and arrests practiced since r999 against members of the Falun Gong cult.,'

To examine this argument, we need to make a systematic comparison ofstate-church reladons, and the degree of religious tolerance that now ex-ists. To generate such a comparison, the degree of religious freedorn in thetwenty-seven nation states in post-communist Europe was classified basedon information for each country contained in the U.S. State Departmentreport on lTtter natiznal Religious Freedom, zoo2,

^ comprehensive compari-

son of state regulation and restrictions of all world faiths.'l As discussed inChapter 2,, the Religious Freedom Index that w.e developed focuses uponthe relationship of the state and church, including issues such as whether theconstirudon limits freedom of religion, whether the government restricrssome denominations, cults, or sects, and whether there is an establishedchurch. The index v'as classified according to the rwenq criteria listed inAppendix C, with each item coded o/r. The zo-poinr scale was then reversedso that a higher score represents greater religious freedom.

Societal Development

For comparison, we also examined how far the indicators of reiigiosirycorrelated with the Human Development Index and also with change inper capita GDP from r99o ro zooo (measured in Purchasing Power parity

estimates in u.S. dollars), both of which are regarded as core indicators ofsocietal modernization and human security.

The simple correlarions in Table 5.3, without any prior controls, showthat, despite the legacy of seven decades of Soviet repression of the church,fie Religious Freedom Index was .,ot4[\..nt1y relared (at rhe .o5level) to any of the indicators of religioqity ,rs.d in this srudy, whether of

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t26 CASE STUDIES OF RELICION AND POLITICS

Table 5.3. Explaining Societal-Level Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe

Religious Mcrket Societal DevelopmentIndicators lndicotors

Re&giousFreedom Religious

Scale Pluralism

Hum-an Change in PerDevelopment caPito GDPIndex.1998 1990-2000

R Slg. R Slg. R Slg. R Sig.N.

Nctrons

ITELIGIOUSPARTICIPATION

lieligiousparticipation .011 -.466-I{ow often pray? -.305 -.747--

I{ELIGIOUS VALUESirnportance of religion -.335 -.285irnportance of God -.333 '032

I{ELIGIOUS BELIEFS-.31,3 .035-.275 - .091

-.396 - .098-.356 - .129-.228 .399

- .069-.060

-.467-- .62r-.

- .684"-.070

-.399-.-+u-.595.-

- .118-.r23

-.468--.590..

-.693"- .102

-.489-- .332-.673--

2214

20f1

2l20

21z020

l3elieve in godl lel ieve in l i fe

after deathBelieve in hel li3elieve in heaveniielieve in soul

NSTE: Macro-level regression models of the impact of the reiigious market and societal

development indicators on the dependent variables in 22 posfCommunist societies,

wi thout any pr ior controls. .Correlat ion is s igni f icant (Sig.) at the 0.05 Ievel [2- ta i led).**Correlatior.r is significant at the 0.01 level (Z-tailed). Rehgious Freedom Index, 2002:

see the Technical Appendix at the end of Chapter 6, Table A6.1, and text for details.

This is ar-r expanded and updated version of the Chaves and Cann (1992) scaie. Religiow

plrLralism: The Herfind-altl Ind.ex of religious pluralism or fractionalization, flom Alesina

et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details of its construction. Humon DeveLopment

Index, 1998: Index based on longevity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in

PPP), UNDP Humon Deuelopment Repoft 2002, New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press.

Change in Per Capita Gross Dornestlc Product, i990-2000: world Bank, world Deuelopment

[ndicators. 2002.

Source: World Values Survev, pooied 1990-2001.

participation, values, or beliefs. (Jf course this could be due in part to the

limited number of cases, but even if this conventional testis relaxed, the cor-

relation coefhcients that did emerge rvere usually negatiue, which is in the

opposite direction to that suggested by religrous market theory. The results

suggest that greater religious lieedom in post-Communist nations is asso-

ciated with louet., not higher, levels of religiosiqy. Religious pluralism was

A RELIGIOUS REVI\AL IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE] t27

strongly and signihcantly related to religious participation and frequency otprayer, but aeain, contrary to religious market theory \nanegatiue direction.Post-Communist countries with more heterogeneous religious cultures andinstitutions pro'l'ed to be more secular, not more religious, than those wherereligion is more homogeneous. The other indicators of religiosity showedinsignificant correlations, but all but one was neglttiael! related to pluralism.Our findings not only fail to support supply-side religious markets theory -they have the opposite sign from that which religious market theory wouldpredict: in post-Communist Europe, religious pluralism is linked with rel-anvely low levels of religiosiry.

By contrast, the indicators ofsocietal securiry show that religious valuesare negatively related to both human development and ievels of affluence,as implied by the theory of secularization and existential security. Peopleliving in post-Communist countries that had achieved the most successfultransition, with higher standards of living, longeviry, and education, alsoregarded religion as less important to their lives than the publics living inpoorer and less secure states in the region. Sirnilar pafterns were evidentfor belief in God. The other coefficients proved statisticaliy insignificant,given the limited number of cases, although again their direction usuallypointed in the expected direction.

To explore this further the results ra'ere examined in multivariate mod-els (in Thble 5.4) monitoring the combined effects of human developmentand religious markets on the mean level of religious values (the impor-tance of God scale) measured at societal-level, and some scafter gramsillustrating the relationships under comparison. Figure 5.3 tests the ex-tent to which religious values (the ro-point importance of God scale) canbe predicted in post-Communist Europe using standard indicators of hu-man securiry including the Human Development Index and the rate ofeconomic growth during the last decade. These factors predict the vital-iry of religion in people's lives in this region so successfully that we donot need to resort to institutional explanations based on the history of therelationship berw'een the church and state, the persecution ofreligious au-thorities, levels of rivalrv and competition among religious orpganizations,or whether a particular culture is mainly Catholic or Protestant, Orthodoxor Muslim. The sharp contrast in the scatter grams between the secu-lar values evident in Czech Republic and Estonia, and the spiritual valuesmanifested in Romania and Albania, can larsely be attributed simpl.v todifferent levels of human development and thus the social conditions ofgreater securiw'

rifi!d

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Table 5.4. Explaining Societal Religious Values in Post-Communist Europe

s.e. Beta sig.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENTLevel of human development (HDI 1998)

RELIGIOUS MARKETSReligious Freedom tnde.x (20 points

from low to high)Religious pluralism scale

ConslantR2

-17.99 5.97

-.022 .024

-1.416 1.86

22.2.332

-.602 .008

-.176 .381

- .146 .459

NorE: Models use ordinary least squares regression analysis with mean religious values(the lO-point scale measuring importance of God) as the dependent variable measuredat societal level in 19 post-Communist societies. The table lists the unstandardizedregression coefficient (Bl, the standard error (s.e.), the standardized regressioncoeff ic ient [Beta), and the signi f icance of the coeff ic ients (Sig.) . The smal l numberof cases (19) created problems of multi-collineanty and instability when the type ofreligious culture was introduced (because of the close association between Catholicismand the societies which were highest in human development and in religiosityl, so thisvariable was excluded from the final model. See Figure 5.3. The growth in per capitaGDP was also closely correlated with the Human Development lndex, so this was alsodropped to avoid problems of multi-collineairy. lmportonce of religion scole: "How

important ls God in your lifel" ]0-point scale. Human Deuelopment lndex, 1998'. Indexbased on lon8evity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in PPP); UNDP HumanDeveLopment Report 2002. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press. ReLgious FreedomInd.ex'. 2}-point measure explained in the text and in the Technical Appendix, TableA6.1, at the end of Chapter 6. Relryious pLuroLism: The Herfindahl index of relSiouspLuralism or fractionalizotion, from Alesina et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for detailsof i ts construct ion.

Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1990-2001.

To confirm the finding of negative correlations between religiosiry andreligious markets we can also examine the scatter gram to see what is un-derlying this reladonship. Contrary to religious market theory Figure 5.4shows how the salience of religious values is related to both the Herfindahlmeasure of religious pluralism and the Religious Freedom Index. The mostsecular countries (such as the Czech Republic and Estonia) have the greatestreligious pluralism and fieedom of the church from state regulation. Thisis no accident; the reason, we believe, is that human development generatesmore secular values among the general population - and also greaterreligious freedoms, social tolerance, and democrary. Religion not onlybecomelless important to people's lives in secure societies, but freedom of

tfr;lt129A RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE]

Religious culture

. Musl im

' Orthodox

^ Protestant

r Roman Cathol ic

Rsq = 9.4264o . /

Human Development Index 1998

Religious culture

. Musl im

' Orthodox

" Protestant

. Roman Catholic

Rsq = 0.40400 2000 4000 6000 Sooo 10000Economic Arowth 1990-2000 (Change in per capita GDp in US$)

Figure 5.3. Religious Values and societal Indicators of Human Development.

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130 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

Religious culture

. Musl im

' Orthodox

^ Protestant

. Boman Cathol ic

Rsq = 6.126150 60

Low --70 80 90 100

Religious Freedom Index -- High

Religious culture

. Musl im

' Orthodox

^ Protestant

r Roman Cathol ic

Bsq = 0.0133.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7

Low -- Rel ig ious plural ism -- h igh

Figure 5.4. Religious Values, Religious Pluralism, and the Religious FreedomIndex. NotqiSee the text for details of the 2O-point Religious Freedom Index.Source: Worlih Values Survey, pooled I 981 -2001 .

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worship is also expanded as part of human rights and democratic liberaliza-tion. In poorer and less der.eloped post-communist societies, by conrasr,religion remains a vital force in people's lives, and aurhoritarian states inthe region limit religious liberties, just as they consistentiy resrrict hurnanrights in other spheres.

Conclusions

There are manv reasons whv patterns of secularization in post-CommunistFurope mighr plausiblv be expected to dil1-er from those we have alreadyfound in the west. The role of the state in restricti'g religion under com-munism is u'ell established and rve do not need to documenr its historyhere.'4 But the kev question for us is whether this repression actuallv gen-erated the erosion of mass spirirualiw in the soviet bloc, or whether itmay have exacerbated, but not necessarily caused, a long-term growth ofsecularization in this region which parallels similar developments in othercountries. The fact that \A/estern European democracies have a long his-tory of religious tolerance, human rights, and civic liberties during thetwentieth cenrury means that the comparison of these regions provides anexceptionallv u'ell-designed "narural experiment" to rest the "bottorn-up"and "top-down" claims in the sociology of religion.

The generational comparisons suggest that there has been a rong-termdecline of reiigiosiw across succeeding generations in post-communistEurope, and rve found no convincing evidence of a cun ilinear pattern fromthe generadonal comparisons, suggesting that the younger generarion hasnot experienced a significanr rer.ival of religious r-alues, beliefs, or behanor.r{oreover, the cross-national comparisons indicate that the cross-nationaldifferences that do remain important today can be satisfactorily explainedby levels of human development among post-communist narions, just asthese factors explain pafterns elsewhere. The supplv-side tl-resis that reli-gious markets are crirical, so rhat participadon is determined by reliqiouspiuralism and the lack of state regulation of church institutions, is givenno positive support from the evidence; instead, the opposite position seemsto be the case. It is the more homogenous religious cultures, exemplifiedby the role of catholicism in Poland, which have best-preserved faith inGod and habirual church aftendance, not rhe most plural. And todav thepost-communisr stares with the greatesr regulation of the church *.n or.,to be the most religious, not the least. we argue that this is no accident;

l3 l

r32 CASE STUDIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

it reflects the fact that human security encourages secularization' together

with the political rights and civil liberties associated with religious freedom

in transitional and consolidating democracies. But what about values else-

where in the world in other types of religious culrure, particularly Muslim

states? It is to examine these issues that we now rurn.

Religion and Politics in the MuslimWorld

rN sEEKTNG ro understand the role of religion in the Muslim world, many

popular commentators have rurned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative

and controversial thesis of a "clash of civilizations." This account empha-

sized that the end of the Cold War brought new dangers. Huntington

argued:

In the nez;; uorld,...the most pervasive, important and dangerous conllicts

u'ill not be berween social classes, rich and poor, or other economically de-

6ned groups. but berween people belonging to different culrural entities.

Tiibal s'ars and ethnic conflicts u'ill occur within cir,'ilizations . . . And the

most dangerous culrural conflicts are those along the fault lines betqeen

ciriiizations. . . For forty-five years the Iron Curtain was the central dividing

line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred miles east. It is now

the line separating peoples of \Vestern Christianiry', on the one hand, fiorn

Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the otier.'

For Huntington, Marxist class warfare, and even the disparities between

nch and poor nations, have been overshadowed in the tv!'eni)*-first cenrury

by Weberian culrure.This influential account appeared to offer insights into the causes of

violent ethno-religious conflicts exemplified by Bosnia, the Caucuses, theMiddle East, and Kashmir. It seemed to explain rhe failure of politicai

rjll. ;

l : l i

Ii

133

sacred and secular

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