russia's reflexive control theory and the military

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17: 237–256, 2004Copyright © 2004 Taylor & FrancisISSN:1351-8046DOI:10.1080/13518040490450529

237

Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military

TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

Reflexive control is a subject that has been studied in the Soviet Union and Russiafor nearly 40 years. The theory has both military and civilian uses. This articledescribes both the theory and practice of reflexive control, focusing on recentdevelopments. The concept is close in meaning to the US concept of perceptionmanagement.

INTRODUCTION

One of the prime goals for a commander in warfare is to inter-fere with the decision-making process of an enemy commander.This goal is often accomplished by the use of disinformation,camouflage, or some other stratagem. For Russia, one of the primarymethods is through the use of the theory of reflexive control (RC).This principle can be used against either human-mental or com-puter-based decision-making processors. The theory is similar to theidea of perception management, except that it attempts to controlmore than manage a subject.

Reflexive control is defined as a means of conveying to a partneror an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to volun-tarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of theaction. Even though the theory was developed long ago in Russia, it isstill undergoing further refinement. Recent proof of this is the develop-ment in February 2001, of a new Russian journal known as ReflexiveProcesses and Control. The journal is not simply the product of agroup of scientists but, as the editorial council suggests, the product ofsome of Russia’s leading national security institutes, and boasts a fewforeign members as well. The editorial council (which is different thanthe editorial board) includes a member of the Federal Agency forGovernment Communications and Information (FAPSI), a diplomat, a

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238 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

Canadian, and two Americans, and the deputy head of the InformationSecurity Committee of the Russian Security Council, among others.

There are many examples, from a Russian perspective, of the useof reflexive control theory during conflicts. One of the most recent andmemorable was the bombing of the market square in Sarejevo in 1995.Within minutes of the bombing, CNN and other news outlets werereporting that a Serbian mortar attack had killed many innocent peoplein the square. Later, crater analysis of the shells that impacted in thesquare, along with other supporting evidence, indicated that the inci-dent did not happen as originally reported. This evidence also threwinto doubt the identities of the perpetrators of the attack. One indivi-dual close to the investigation, Russian Colonel Andrei Demurenko,Chief of Staff of Sector Sarejevo at the time, stated, “I am not sayingthe Serbs didn’t commit this atrocity. I am saying that it didn’t happenthe way it was originally reported.” A US and Canadian officer soonbacked this position. Demurenko believed that the incident was anexcellent example of reflexive control, in that the incident was made tolook like it had happened in a certain way to confuse decision-makers.

This article will discuss the military aspect of Russia’s conceptof reflexive control in some detail, and its role as an informationwarfare weapon. It will also briefly examine how US writers inter-pret RC theory.

NATURE OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL

The concept of reflexive control (RC) has existed much longerthan the concepts of information warfare and information opera-tions; in fact, it appeared in Soviet military literature 30 years ago.At that time, V. A. Lefebvre, who was working within the contextand logic of a reflexive game, defined reflexive control as “a processby which one enemy transmits the reasons or bases for making deci-sions to another.”1 The development of reflexive control theoryencompasses four distinct periods:

• research (from the early 1960s to the late 1970s); • practical-orientation (from the late 1970s to the early 1990s); • psychological-pedagogical (from the early to the mid 1990s); and• psycho-social (from the late 1990s).

The concept of reflexive control is still somewhat alien to USaudiences. However, the Russians employ it not only on the strategic

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RUSSIA’S REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY 239

and tactical levels in war but also on the strategic level in associationwith internal and external politics. Equally significant, the concept hasnot always benefited the Soviet Union and Russia. For example, someRussians consider that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a clas-sic example of US use of reflexive control. In this case, the US “com-pelled the enemy to act according to a plan favorable to the US.” Bydoing so, it forced the Soviet Union to try to keep pace with America’sachievements in the SDI arena (or at least what we said were ourachievements) and ultimately exhausted the Soviet Union economic-ally as it spent money to develop corresponding equipment. As aresult, some Russians are now asking themselves whether the conceptof information warfare is yet another US attempt to control them“reflexively” and to force them to invest vast sums of money in a realmthat is simply beyond their technological reach in the near future.

The Soviet and Russian Armed Forces have long studied the useof reflexive control theory, particularly at the tactical and opera-tional levels, both for maskirovka (deception) and disinformationpurposes and, potentially, to control the enemy’s decision-makingprocesses.2 For example, the Russian Army had a military maskirovkaschool as early as 1904 that was later disbanded in 1929. Thisschool, the Higher School of Maskirovka, provided the bases formaskirovka concepts and created manuals for future generations.3

Since the early 1960s, there have been many Russian intellectual“giants” who have emerged in the field of reflexive theory. In thecivilian sector, these include G. P. Schedrovitsky, V. E. Lepsky,V. A. Lefebvre (who now lives in the West), D. A. Pospelov,V. N. Burkov, and many others. The foremost theorists in the mili-tary sector include V. V. Druzhinin, M. D. Ionov, D. S. Kontorov,S. Leonenko, and several others. One of the civilian theorists, Lepsky,who also is the editor of the new RC journal, hopes that the currentUS-Russian cooperation in the realm of reflexive control will moveRusso-American relations from the paradigm of IW/IO (confrontation,struggle) to a paradigm of partnership (the control of confrontation).His is a noble cause and one that must be taken seriously.

There is a growing realization on both sides that Lepsky’s twoparadigms will evolve in parallel. US and Russian theorists areengaged in joint work regarding conflict prevention theory and areworking together in Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, bothcountries are carrying out reflexive control work independently inthe military sector.

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RC is also considered as an information warfare means. Forexample, Major General N. I. Turko, an instructor at the RussianFederation’s General Staff Academy, has established a direct con-nection between IW/IO and reflexive control. He noted:

The most dangerous manifestation in the tendency to rely on military power relatesmore to the possible impact of the use of reflexive control by the opposing sidethrough developments in the theory and practice of information war rather than tothe direct use of the means of armed combat.4

In Turko’s judgment, RC is an information weapon that is moreimportant in achieving military objectives than traditional firepower.In this regard, Turko’s understanding is most likely influenced by hisbelief that American use of information weapons during the Cold Wardid more to defeat the Soviet Union and cause its demise than anyother weapon. An excellent example was the Strategic Defense Initia-tive. Finally, Turko has mentioned reflexive control as a method forachieving geopolitical superiority and as a means for arms controlnegotiations. The latter area should be one of heightened awarenessfor countries entering such negotiations with the Russians.

Reflexive Control theory does indeed have geopolitical signifi-cance, according to Turko. For example, he and a colleague describeda new containment theory under development that portrayed newmeans for coping with confrontation between new large-scale geo-political groupings.5 This theory involves information warfare means;specifically, the threat of inflicting unacceptable levels of damageagainst a state or group of states by attacking their informationresources.

One of the most complex ways to influence a state’s informationresources is by use of reflexive control measures against the state’sdecision-making processes. This aim is best accomplished by for-mulating certain information or disinformation designed to affect aspecific information resource best. In this context an informationresource is defined as:

• information and transmitters of information, to include themethod or technology of obtaining, conveying, gathering, accu-mulating, processing, storing, and exploiting that information;

• infrastructure, including information centers, means for automatinginformation processes, switchboard communications, and datatransfer networks;

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• programming and mathematical means for managing infor-mation; and

• administrative and organizational bodies that manage informa-tion processes, scientific personnel, creators of data bases andknowledge, as well as personnel who service the means of inform-atizatsiya [informatization].6

Russia’s political elite also employs RC in analytical method-ologies used to assess contemporary situations. For example, duringa recent conference in Moscow, a representative from PresidentYeltsin’s administration noted that, when making decisions, theKremlin pays attention to reflexive processes. Thus, Turko’s revel-ation about the central role of Reflexive Control in Russian concep-tions of information warfare, and RC’s potential use againstinformation resources to destabilize the geopolitical balance. Theseare two important points to consider when analyzing intent.

By definition, reflexive control occurs when the controllingorgan conveys (to the objective system) motives and reasons thatcause it to reach the desired decision,7 the nature of which is main-tained in strict secrecy. The decision itself must be made indepen-dently. A “reflex” itself involves the specific process of imitating theenemy’s reasoning or imitating the enemy’s possible behavior andcauses him to make a decision unfavorable to himself.

In fact, the enemy comes up with a decision based on the idea of the situation whichhe has formed, to include the disposition of our troops and installations and thecommand element’s intentions known to him. Such an idea is shaped above all byintelligence and other factors, which rest on a stable set of concepts, knowledge, ideasand, finally, experience. This set usually is called the “filter,” which helps a com-mander separate necessary from useless information, true data from false and so on.8

The chief task of reflexive control is to locate the weak link of thefilter, and exploit it.

According to the concept of reflexive control, during a seriousconflict, the two opposing actors (countries) analyze their own and per-ceived enemy ideas and then attempt to influence one another bymeans of reflexive control. A reflex refers to the creation of certainmodel behavioral in the system it seeks to control (the objectivesystem). It takes into account the fact that the objective system hasa model of the situation and assumes that it will also attempt to influ-ence the controlling organ or system. Reflexive control exploits moral,

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psychological, and other factors, as well as the personal characteris-tics of commanders. In the latter case, biographical data, habits, andpsychological deficiencies could be used in deception operations.9

In a war in which reflexive control is being employed, the sidewith the highest degree of reflex (the side best able to imitate theother side’s thoughts or predict its behavior) will have the best chancesof winning. The degree of reflex depends on many factors, the mostimportant of which are analytical capability, general erudition andexperience, and the scope of knowledge about the enemy. Militaryauthor Colonel S. Leonenko added that, in the past, stratagems werethe principal tool of reflexive control, but today camouflage anddeception (maskirovka) have replaced strategems, a conclusion dis-puted by many. For example, the Chinese have demonstrated thatelectrons can be used as stratagems and operate as effectively ascamouflage and deception in the traditional sense.

Although no formal or official reflexive control terminologyexisted in the past, opposing sides actually employed it intuitively asthey attempted to identify and interfere with each other’s thoughtsand plans and alter impressions of one, thereby prompting an erron-eous decision.10 Leonenko’s theories about varying degrees ofreflexive control can be explained as follows. If two sides in a seriousconflict—A and B—have opposing goals, one will seek to destroythe other’s goals. Accordingly, if side A acts independently of thebehavior of side B, then his degree of reflex relative to side B is equalto zero (0). On the other hand, if side A makes assumptions aboutside B’s behavior (that is, he models side B) based on the thesis thatside B is not taking side A’s behavior into account, then side A’sdegree of reflex is one (1). If side B also has a first degree reflex,and side A takes this fact into account, then side A’s reflex is two(2), and so on.

If successfully achieved, reflexive control over the enemymakes it possible to influence his combat plans, his view of the situ-ation, and how he fights. In other words, one side can impose its willon the enemy and cause him to make a decision inappropriate to agiven situation. Reflexive control methods are varied and includecamouflage (at all levels), disinformation, encouragement, black-mail by force, and the compromising of various officials and officers.Thus, the central focus of reflexive control is on the less tangibleelement of “military art” rather than more objective “military science.”Achieving successful reflexive control requires in-depth study of the

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enemy’s inner nature, his ideas, and concepts, which Leonenkoreferred to as the filter through which passes all data about the externalworld. Successful RC represents the culmination point of an infor-mation operation.

So defined, a filter is a collective image (termed “set”) of theenemy’s favorite combat techniques and methods for organizingcombat actions, plus a psychological portrait of the enemy. Thus,reflex requires study of someone else’s filter and the exploitation of itfor one’s own ends. In the information age, this filter is representedby human and machine (computer) data processors. The most import-ant question then becomes, How does one side achieve this higherdegree of reflex and, hence, more effective reflexive control over theenemy? It does so primarily by employing a broader range of meansfor achieving surprise. In turn, it achieves surprise by means ofstealth, disinformation, and avoidance of stereotypes [shablon].11

THE MILITARY EXPERTS SPEAK: IONOV, LEONENKO, KOMOV, CHAUSOV

Major General (ret.) M. D. Ionov, one of the military specialistsmentioned earlier, wrote several articles on the subject of reflexivecontrol in Voennia mysl’ (Military thought). He was one of the firstmilitary theorists to appreciate the value of reflexive control,although, at first, no one was inclined to listen to him. The termreflexive control was simply not listed in any Soviet military encyclo-pedia when he began writing in the 1970s and, thus, could not exist!Therefore, in many of his initial articles, Ionov simply spoke aboutcontrol of the enemy rather than reflexive control. At the same time,Ionov also realized the close link between advertising and reflexivecontrol (“sell the holes, not the drill” and “temptation by benefit”were two of the techniques he recognized) and the combined use ofvarious reflexive methods for waging different types of conflicts(low-intensity, etc.).12

Given his advanced thinking about reflexive control, it is ins-tructive to analyze one of his articles from 1995. In it Ionov notedthat the objective of reflexive control is to force an enemy into makingobjective decisions that lead to his defeat by influencing or controllinghis decision-making process. Ionov considers this a form of highart founded of necessity on an intimate knowledge of human think-ing and psychology, military history, the roots of the particular

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conflict, and the capabilities of competing combat assets. In thisinstance, control over the enemy is realized by undertaking a seriesof measures, related by time, aim, and place, which force enemydecision-makers to abandon their original plan, make disadvant-ageous decisions, or react incorrectly to their ultimate disadvantage(for example, when facing a counter-offensive). The successful useof reflexive control becomes all the more likely if the enemy’s origi-nal plan is known. This makes it easier for the “controlling side” toforce the enemy into making wrong decisions by employing reflex-ive control techniques such as intimidation, enticement, disinforma-tion, deception, and concealment and other measures designed toshorten his decision-making time by surprising his decision-makingalgorithms.13

Ionov also stated that the content and methods employed mustaccord with the interrelationship between the enemy’s thought pro-cesses and basic psychology. They also had to be realistic, andnewly created methods had be considered within the context of newtechnologies. Furthermore, he recognized that any coalition of enemyforces represents a far more complex system, the stability of whichchanges depending upon the nature of the situation in each individualstate and the condition of the coalition. Finally, because sharp dif-ferences exist in thinking, aims, politics, and ethical approaches ofeach state, each side must conduct an internal appraisal to determinethe possible results of any action conducted in accordance with com-plex criteria reflecting the nature of the confrontation.14

Ionov identified four basic methods for assisting in the transferof information to the enemy to promote control over him. Thesemethods, which serve as a checklist for commanders at all levels,include:

• Power pressure, which includes: the use of superior force, forcedemonstrations, psychological attacks, ultimatums, threats ofsanctions, threats of risk (developed by focusing attention onirrational behavior or conduct, or delegating powers to an irres-ponsible person), combat reconnaissance, provocative maneuvers,weapons tests, denying enemy access to or isolating certainareas, increasing the alert status of forces, forming coalitions,officially declaring war, support for internal forces destabilizingthe situation in the enemy rear, limited strikes to put some forcesout of action, exploiting and playing up victory, demonstrating

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ruthless actions, and showing mercy toward an enemy ally thathas stopped fighting.15

• Measures to present false information about the situation,which include: concealment (displaying weakness in a strongplace), creation of mock installations (to show force in a weak place),abandoning one position to reinforce another, leaving dangerousobjects at a given position (the Trojan Horse), concealing truerelationships between units or creating false ones, maintainingthe secrecy of new weapons, weapons bluffing, changing a modeof operation, or deliberately losing critical documents. The enemycan be forced to find a new target by conflict escalation orde-escalation, deliberate demonstration of a particular chain ofactions, striking an enemy base when the enemy is not there, actsof subversion and provocation, leaving a route open for an enemyto withdraw from encirclement, and forcing the enemy to take retal-iatory actions involving an expenditure of forces, assets, and time.16

• Influencing the enemy’s decision-making algorithm, whichincludes the systematic conduct of games according to what isperceived as routine plans, publishing a deliberately distorteddoctrine, striking control system elements and key figures, trans-mitting false background data, operating in a standby mode, andtaking actions to neutralize the enemy’s operational thinking.17

• Altering the decision-making time, which can be done byunexpectedly starting combat actions, transferring informationabout the background of an analogous conflict so that the enemy,when working out what seems feasible and predictable, makesa hasty decision that changes the mode and character of itsoperation.18

According to Ionov, one can assess human targets of reflexivecontrol either by personality or group depending on the specific indi-vidual’s or group’s psychology, way of thinking, and professionallevel of training. Both universal and role-based characteristics applyto individuals and groups. Universal characteristics include rejectionor fear of danger, unwillingness to do someone else’s work, or anarbitrary and uncompromising orientation toward confrontation.Reflexive control focuses on the role played by a particular person orgroup of persons (history, leadership, subordination, etc.).19

In another article entitled “Control of the Enemy,” whichappeared in the Navy journal, Morskoi sbornik (Naval collection) in

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July 1995, Ionov argued that information is needed on the status ofenemy forces, the nature of their actions, and their capabilities inorder to control him and, simultaneously, to halt or to retard hiscounter-control efforts.20 Ionov advanced several distinct principlesnecessary for “control of the enemy.” First, he underscored thereflexive nature of the desired response, stating that commandersmust visualize the possible enemy response to the conditions onedesires to impose. Second, the response will be problematic, sincethe enemy may discover the activity and undertake his own counter-control measures. Third, the level of technical development of combatweapons, and especially reconnaissance, is of growing importance.This makes the exposure of an action aimed at misinforming theenemy more likely. The final principle is the use of harsh forms ofpressure on the enemy, specifically those that consider social ele-ments and intellectual, psychological, ethical and ideological factors.Deliberate cruelty toward the civilian population or prisoners of warin a combat region, a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare(to sink any vessels to include those of neutral countries), and soon serve as excellent examples of the latter.21 In short, in Ionov’sview, reflexive control is a specific, yet traditional, Soviet—and nowRussian—form of an informational or psychological (psyop) attack.

Colonel S. Leonenko integrated information technologies andreflexive control theory in his writings. He noted that the use ofcomputers could hinder the use of reflexive control by making iteasier to process data and calculate options. This is so since anopponent can more easily “see through” a reflexive control measureby an opposing force by simply using a computer. The computer’sspeed and accuracy in processing information can detect the reflex-ive control measure. On the other hand, in some cases, this mayactually improve the chances for successful reflexive control, sincea computer lacks the intuitive reasoning of a human being.22

Computer technology increases the effectiveness of reflexivecontrol by offering new methods adaptable to the modern era thatcan serve the same ends. Writing in 1995 from a military perspec-tive, Colonel S. Leonenko defined reflexive control as follows:

RC [reflexive control] consists of transmitting motives and grounds from the con-trolling entity to the controlled system that stimulate the desired decision. The goalof RC is to prompt the enemy to make a decision unfavorable to him. Naturally, onemust have an idea about how he thinks.23

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Leonenko then assessed the new opportunities that the use of com-puter technology afforded to reflexive control, stating:

In present conditions, there is a need to act not only against people but also againsttechnical reconnaissance assets and especially weapons guidance systems, which areimpassive in assessing what is occurring and do not perceive to what a person reacts.24

If an IW or IO operation system cannot perceive what a personreacts to and is unable to assess what is occurring, does this meanthat it provides only insignificant data? Or does it mean that thereare two layers to reflexively control? The first layer consists of the“eyes, nose, and ears” of sensors, satellites, and radars. The secondlayer is the “brain software” of humans, which gathers, processes,and produces knowledge from the information or makes decisionsbased on it. But what happens if the “eyes, ears, and nose” aremanipulated? How does that affect the input into decisions andknowledge? The recent use of such military activity by Yugoslavforces in the Balkans fooled NATO sensors over Kosovo andresulted in NATO shooting at targets that were fakes.

Yet, in the end, we do leave some decisions to computers. Thisindicates to Leonenko that we live in a much more frightening exist-ence than we care to believe if, in fact, decisions are in the hands ofmachines that are “incapable of assessing what is occurring and donot perceive what a person reacts to.”25

Further, Leonenko noted that “how the enemy thinks” is shapedby combat intelligence and a collective image (set) made up of con-cepts, knowledge, ideas, and experience. This “set,” which he calls a“filter,” helps a commander separate necessary from useless inform-ation. Then, the chief task of reflexive control is to locate the weaklink in the filter and find an opportunity to exploit it.

Leonenko’s definition of reflexive control fits well with RussianMajor Sergei Markov’s understanding of an information weapon.Like Markov Leonenko defines an information weapon as a “speciallyselected piece of information capable of causing changes in theinformation processes of information systems (physical, biological,social, etc., in this case, decision-making information) in accordancewith the intent of the entity using the weapon.” Accordingly, it causeschange in the information processes of an opponent by persuadingthem to make decisions according to the design of the controller,and it affords the information weapon a methodology for controlling

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an opponent. So defined, reflexive control can be applied in themodeling and decision-making contexts of various types of conflicts(international, military, etc.). It can also be used in social processesand systems.

At the present time, there is a reflexive control movement under-way in Russia that is influencing approaches to various branches ofknowledge. This embraces philosophy, sociology, psychology, ped-agogy, problems of artificial intelligence and computer science ingeneral, computer “control” influence, military affairs, intelligence,counterintelligence, and a number of other areas.26 For example, TheApplied Ergonomics Association devoted a special edition of itsjournal (No. 1, 1994) to reflexive control processes.

Another Russian military theorist who wrote on the informationimpact on RC was Colonel S. A. Komov, who was perhaps the mostprolific Russian military writer on information warfare topics in the1990s. Writing in the journal Voennaia mysl’ [Military Thought],Komov supported Ionov’s emphasis on reflexive control. He renamedreflexive control over the enemy as “intellectual” methods of infor-mation warfare. He then listed the basic elements of an intellectualapproach to information warfare, which he described as:

• Distraction, by creating a real or imaginary threat to one of theenemy’s most vital locations (flanks, rear, etc.) during the prepa-ratory stages of combat operations, thereby forcing him to recon-sider the wisdom of his decisions to operate along this or thataxis;

• Overload, by frequently sending the enemy a large amount ofconflicting information;

• Paralysis, by creating the perception of a specific threat to avital interest or weak spot;

• Exhaustion, by compelling the enemy to carry out useless oper-ations, thereby entering combat with reduced resources;

• Deception, by forcing the enemy to reallocate forces to a threat-ened region during the preparatory stages of combat operations;

• Division, by convincing the enemy that he must operate in oppo-sition to coalition interests;

• Pacification, by leading the enemy to believe that pre-plannedoperational training is occurring rather than offensive preparations,thus reducing his vigilance;

• Deterrence, by creating the perception of insurmountablesuperiority;

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• Provocation, by force him into taking action advantageous toyour side;

• Overload, by dispatching an excessively large number of mes-sages to the enemy during the preparatory period;

• Suggestion, by offering information that affects the enemylegally, morally, ideologically, or in other areas; and

• Pressure, by offering information that discredits the governmentin the eyes of its population.27

Finally, an article by Russian Captain First Rank F. Chausovcontinued the discussion of reflexive control. He defined RC as “theprocess of intentionally conveying to an opposing side of a certainaggregate information (attributes) which will cause that side to makea decision appropriate to that information.”28 More important,Chausov discussed the risk involved with using RC:

To justify the methods of using force while taking risk into account, the numericalmeasure R0 is introduced as the difference between the assessments of guaranteedeffectiveness, or Eg, and the projected (situational) effectiveness, Es. The estimateof the guaranteed effectiveness represents the lower limit of the effectiveness indi-cator, given any type of enemy action and fixed actions by our own forces. Situa-tional effectiveness refers to the effectiveness of a force’s action which is achievedthrough a certain type of action based on a commander’s decision. Ordering orestablishing preference among the values of the risk looks like this: R0,1 > R0,1 +1.

29

Chausov listed the principles of RC as:

1. a goal-oriented process requiring a complete picture of all RCmeasures needed;

2. an “actualization” of plans, that is providing a sufficiently com-plete picture of the intellectual potential of commanders andstaff officers (based on their reality), especially when conditionsare determined by global information space;

3. the conformity of goals, missions, place, time and methods forRC’s conduct;

4. the modeling or forecasting of the condition of a side at the timeactions are being implemented; and

5. the anticipation of events.

US INTERPRETATION OF RUSSIA’S RC THEORY

While V. A. Lefebvre remains the premier authority on RC issuesin the US, and perhaps in the world, other US analysts have tried to

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decipher the principles of RC. Several years ago, American CliffordReid demonstrated a thorough understanding of reflexive controltheory in a chapter he wrote for the book Soviet Strategic Deception.By using only Soviet sources, Reid distilled Russian reflexivecontrol mechanisms into the following categories of reflexive inter-actions:

1. transfer of an image of the situation: providing an opponent withan erroneous or incomplete image of the situation.

2. creation of a goal for the opponent: putting an opponent in aposition in which he must select a goal in our favor (for example,provoking an enemy with a threat to which he must rationallyrespond).

3. form a goal by transferring an image of the situation: feigningweakness or creating a false picture.

4. transfer of an image of one’s own perception of the situation:providing an opponent with false information or portions of thetruth based on one’s own perception of the situation.

5. transfer of an image of one’s own goal: a feint by a basketballplayer is a classic example where you change the enemies per-ception of where he thinks you are or are going.

6. transfer of an image of one’s own doctrine: giving a false viewof one’s procedures and algorithms for decision-making.

7. transfer of one’s own image of a situation to make the opponentdeduce his own goal: presenting a false image of one’s own per-ception of the situation, with the accepted additional level of risk.

8. control of a bilateral engagement by a third party. 9. control over an opponent who is using RC: exploiting opportu-

nities identified as imitation of the initiators own process of RC.10. control over an opponent whose doctrine is game theory.30

Most analysts consider the US term most closely associatedwith RC to be perception management, the difference being in thequantifiable differences in the terms manage and control. Much hasbeen written in the US on perception management. Lockheed MartinAeronautics analyst E. T. Nozawa took a different perspective onRC, however, comparing and contrasting the theory with that of thescientific philosophy of Charles Sander Peirce (1839–1914). Thisterm is not as well known to the US public as perception manage-ment, although it is gaining a lively following of late. PeirceanSemiotic, a subset of scientific philosophy, refers to the totality of

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scientific Peircean knowledge. Semiotic (pronounced See-My-Oh-Tick) is the science of signs. For Peirce this meant a higher logic thatincluded speculative grammar, critique (lower logic), and speculativerhetoric.

Nozawa has noted that Russian specialists discuss two differenttypes of reflexive schools of thought. One is the school of ReflexiveProcesses, and the other is a subset of those processes, reflexivecontrol, the idea under consideration here. Most Americans havedifficulty making this distinction. Nozawa notes that a comparisonof the Russian scientific paradigm of Reflexive Processes as describedby Vladimir Lepsky and Vladimir LeFebvre with Peirce’s conceptsshows that they are very similar in their subject content and goals.31

It may be said that Peircean Semeiotic is more advanced in its theo-retical conceptual development, whereas Reflexive Processes is moreadvanced in having developed practical applications.

There is nothing equivalent in the Peircean domain (or any otherWestern school of thought) to the reflexive control equations devel-oped by Lefebvre and Lepsky with the supporting developments incharacterizing free will. Lefebvre, according to Nozawa, combinedthe integrated concepts of feelings, free will, and thinking with theconcepts of situational awareness and reality. The integrated pro-cesses became known as reflexive processes, filling the void inmentalistic sciences created by behaviorism. A study of the proceed-ings of the October 2000 Reflexive Control Symposium held inMoscow would probably reveal additional areas of development.It may be said that reflexive processes is a form of Peirce’s highlydeveloped scientific philosophy and that it could easily be replacedby Peirce’s Scientific Philosophy. The following table shows reflexiveprocesses and the corresponding elements of Peircean ScientificPhilosophy:

Reflexive Processes Scientific Philosophy

Situational Awareness Phaneroscopy (Situational Awareness)Reflexive Control Normative Science

Feelings Esthetics Free Will Ethics Thinking Semeiotic

Reality Metaphysics (Reality)

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Although the terminology is different, the words describingPeirce’s categories have the same general meaning as those of reflex-ive processes. Peirce, however, was more precise in his definitions,and the underlying construct of his theoretical knowledge is betterdeveloped, according to Nozawa. The Peircean categories should beinterpreted as scientific categories and not metaphysical or theological.

RECENT EXAMPLES OF RC

The Russian military has actively attempted to exploit the con-cept of reflexive control during the recent past. For example, duringthe temporary occupation of the Russian White House by membersof Parliament in October 1993, the Russian military reputedlyemployed reflexive control to remove the parliamentarians and theirsupporters from the building, albeit against the explicit orders ofRussian President Boris Yeltsin. How they did so is quite interest-ing. For days, President Yeltsin had not been able to make the WhiteHouse’s occupiers budge. Additionally, the occupiers even refusedto come out to address their supporters who had surrounded thebuilding, probably because the Russian security police (MVD) orregular police were also in the crowd and might try to overpowerthem.32

Therefore, the security services developed a reflexive controlplan. According to the plan, on the day of an immense demonstra-tion in support of the White House’s occupiers, the police permittedone of its communication posts to be overrun by the protestors.At the same time, the military authorities broadcast deceptive mes-sages over an inactive frequency, while making it appear that themessages were actually a conversation between two high rankingMinistry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officers, who were discussingthe imminent storming of the White House. The two officers dis-cussed details of the “operation,” which they implied was an attackdesigned to clear the occupants out of the building. One of theofficers said repeatedly, “No matter what, get the Chechen. Kill himif you have to.” In fact, the reference was to Ruslan Khasbulatov,the speaker of the Parliament, who was a Chechen and one of twokey figures in the occupation (the other being former Vice PresidentAlexander Rutskoi). Within a few minutes of receiving this informa-tion, both Khasbulatov and Rutskoi emerged on the White House’sbalcony and asked the crowd to go instead to the Ostankino TV station

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and capture it. The reflexive control operation had indeed worked.As a result, Yeltsin now had a raison d’être to act against bothKhasbulatov and Rutskoi based on the latter’s call for civil disobedi-ence.33 In effect, the two MVD officers had effected both leader’sactions and put ideas into their heads that provided grounds for thedemise of this plan. They did so by literally “getting into” the leaders’minds.

Another excellent example of Soviet use of reflexive controltheory occurred during the Cold War when the Soviet Union attemptedto alter US perceptions of the nuclear balance. The aim of thisreflexive control operation was to convince the West that its missilecapabilities were far more formidable than they actually were. To doso, Soviet military authorities paraded fake ICBMs to deceive theWest. The Soviets developed the fake missiles so as to make thewarheads appear huge and to imply that the missile carried multiplewarheads. In this case, the Soviets understood their opponent’sreflexes. Soviet authorities realized that foreign attachés regularlyattended these shows, since this was one of the few opportunities toobtain military information legally. Moreover, since the SovietUnion did not even participate in arms control fairs, the parade heldspecial significance for intelligence officers. After observing theparade, the Soviets knew that the attachés would then report theirfindings in great detail to Western intelligence organs. In addition,the Soviets knew that members of the Western military-industrialcomplex also studied the parades closely.

However, the deception did not end here. The Soviets alsoprepared other disinformation measures so that when Westernintelligence services began to investigate the fake ICBMs, theywould find collateral proof of their existence and would be ledfurther astray. Ultimately, the aim was to prompt foreign scientists,who desired to copy the advanced technology, down a dead-endstreet, thereby wasting precious time and money.34

FINAL THOUGHTS ON RC

Russian civilian and military theorists will undoubtedly continueto study the problem of reflexive control and the associated tools ofmanipulation and deception. For example, the Russian Academy ofScience’s Institute of Psychology has a Psychology of ReflexiveProcesses Laboratory that studies elements and applications of the

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reflex in considerable detail. It is studying not only ways to use theconcept, but ways to keep the concept under control through inter-national discussions and awareness. The institute is playing a verypositive role in that regard that should not be overlooked. In theInformation Age, however, military analysts will continue to use theconcept to manipulate an adversary on the field of battle. The mostcomplex and dangerous application of reflexive control will remainits employment to affect a state’s decision-making process by use ofcarefully tailored information or disinformation.

A detailed information security doctrine is one of the mostimportant deterrents or defenses against an enemy’s use of reflexivecontrol or similar processes against Russia, according to manyRussian scientists. Russia’s September 2000 Information SecurityDoctrine is a step in this direction. According to Turko andProkhozhev, information security means the degree to which a stateis protected against both deliberate and unintentional actions thatcan lead to the disruption in the functioning of state and militarycommand-and-control. The most significant of those threateningactions is disinformation that seeks to exert a goal-oriented effect onpublic opinion or on decision-makers for the purposes of reflexivecontrol.35 The dialectical interaction of reflexive control against astate, and information security countermeasures within a state, willinevitably have a significant geo-political impact on that state as well.Thus RC theory will remain a most important area of study for theimmediate and long-term future for Russian and other internationalgroups alike.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US government.

NOTES

1. Vladimir E. Lepsky, ‘Refleksivnoe upravlenie v polisubektnikh i mnogoagent-nikh sistemakh (Reflexive Control in Multi-Object and Multi-Agent Systems),’an article given to the author, p. 1. Manuscript presented to the author byDr. Lepsky.

2. Disinformation is a Russian technique that manipulates perceptions and informa-tion and misinforms people or groups of people. Some disinformation procedures

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are quite obvious, some are unconvincing, and others work through delayedperceptions, rumors, repetition, or arguments. Specific persons or particularsocial groups can serve as disinformation targets. The purpose of a disinforma-tion campaign is to influence the consciousness and minds of people. In Russiatoday, where an unstable public-political and socio-economic situation exists,the entire population could serve as the target of influence for an enemy disin-formation campaign. This is a major Russian fear.

3. Major General Evgenii Korotchenko and Colonel Nikolai Plotnikov, ‘Inform-atsiia—tozhe oruzhie: O chem nel’zia zabyvat’ v rabote s lichnym sostavom”[Information is also a weapon: About which we cannot forget in working withpersonnel].’ Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), February 17, 1994, p. 2.

4. A. A. Prokhozhev and N. I. Turko, ‘Osnovi informatsionnoi voini (The Basics ofInformation Warfare),’ report at a conference on “Systems Analysis on the Thres-hold of the 21st Century: Theory and Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 251.

5. See N. I. Turko and S. A. Modestov, ‘Refleksivnoe upravlenie razvitiem strate-gicheskikh sil gosudarstva kak mekhanizm sovremennoi geopolitiki (ReflexiveControl in the Development of Strategic Forces of States as a Mechanism ofGeopolitics),’ report at the conference on “Systems Analysis on the Thresholdof the 21st Century: Theory and Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 366.

6. Prokhozhev and Turko, ibid., pp. 257, 258. 7. S. Leonenko, ‘Refleksivnoe upravlenie protivnikom [Reflexive control of the

enemy],’ Armeiskii sbornik (Army Collection), No. 8, 1995, p. 28. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., pp. 29, 30.

10. Ibid., p. 30. 11. Discussion with a Russian military officer in Moscow, September 1998. 12. M. D. Ionov, ‘Psikhologicheskie aspekty upravleniia protivnikom v antagonis-

ticheskikh konfliktakh (refleksivnoe upravlenie) (Psychological aspects ofcontrolling the enemy during antagonistic conflicts [reflexive control]),’Prikladnaia ergonomika (Applied Ergonomics), No. 1 (January 1994), SpecialIssue, pp. 44, 45.

13. M. D. Ionov, ‘On Reflexive Control of the Enemy in Combat,’ MilitaryThought (English edition), No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 46, 47.

14. Ibid., pp. 49, 50. 15. Ibid., p. 47. 16. Ibid., pp. 47, 48. 17. Ibid., p. 48. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. M. Ionov, ‘Control of the Enemy,’ Morskoy sbornik (Naval collection) No. 7

(July 1995), pp. 29–31, as reported in FBIS-UMA-95–172-S, September 6,1995, pp. 24–27.

21. Ibid., p 25. 22. Leonenko, p. 29. Who can say, however, what powers computers might assume

in the future? 23. Leonenko, p. 28. This is akin to how British and American perception manage-

ment theorists view the purpose of deception.

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24. Ibid. 25. Leonenko, p. 30.26. Lepsky, p. 2. 27. S. A. Komov, ‘About Methods and Forms of Conducting Information War-

fare,’ Military Thought (English edition), No. 4 (July–August 1997), pp. 18–22. 28. F. Chausov, ‘Osnovi refleksivnogo upravleniya protivnikom,’ Morskoi sbornik

(Navy collection), No. 9, 1999, p. 12. The author would like to thank Mr. RobertLove of the Foreign Military Studies Office for his help in translating this andother segments of Chausov’s article.

29. Ibid., p. 14. 30. Clifford Reid, “Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning,” Soviet Strategic

Deception, edited by Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker, (Stanford, CA: TheHoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 293–312. Essentially, the first seven prin-ciples are those of deception.

31. Nozawa, E. T., private communication with the author, October 11, 2001. 32. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has no counterpart in the United

States. In addition to the Russian regular police force, it also consists of policeelements tasked with containing ethnic conflict or riots throughout the country,a mission somewhat familiar to our National Guard.

33. As related by an MVD lieutenant to the author in Moscow in 1994. 34. Aleksei Baranov, ‘Parade of Fakes,’ Moskovskii komsomolets (Moscow

Komsomol), May 8, 1999, p. 6 as translated and entered on the FBIS web page,May 11, 1999.

35. Prokhozhev and Turko, p. 259.

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russia's reflexive control theory and the military

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