rouse on barad agenital realism

7/28/2019 Rouse on Barad Agenital Realism

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Hypaia vl. 19, . 1 (Wi 2004) by Jph Ru

Baad Fmii Naualim

JOSEPH ROUSE

Philosophical naturalism is ambiguous between conjoining philosophy with science orwith nature understood scientifcally. Reconciliation o this ambiguity is necessary

but rarely attempted. Feminist science studies oten endorse the ormer naturalism

but criticize the second. Karen Barads agential realism, however, constructively

reconciles both senses. Barad then challenges traditional metaphysical naturalisms as

not adequately accountable to science. She also contributes distinctively to eminist

reinterpretations o objectivity as agential responsibility, and o agency as embodied,

worldly, and intra-active.

Naualim i w h pdmia maphilphy i h Eglih-pakig

wld. Th hmag aualim d v by i uppd pp a

h b vid i pdmia. H a w illuaiv xampl.

Kaia hii Chii Kgaad ly dibd h mpay

philphial iuai i hi way: Th al i lg h gd. F u,

reality is something hard, something which resists reason and value, something

whih i alia m (1996, 4). Jh Hauglad, wh agu ha h

auhiy i il i iud hugh a xiial mmimmpaabl aih lv, vhl d ha h ulig m

bjiv [mu] b udd i a pii aualim, apppi-

aly ud, [whih i] h hi ha ppl a, hugh diiiv, ill

aually vlvd au mhw implmd i whav phyi ll u

abu (1998, 317, 358, . 15).

Suh hmag aualim f a hiial hi i h lu dba

v aualim. Ealy i h pa uy, wh aiaualim wa phap a

widely entrenched as naturalism is today, philosophers oten sought to place the

authority o empirical scientic knowledge on a securephilosophical basis. Formallgi mai, phmlgial dipi, adal agum,


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Jph Ru 143

or an existential analytic oDasein were among the more prominent alternative

proposals or a philosophical grounding o the authority o scientic knowledge.

Rlaivly w philph day bliv ha h i a i d uhphilphial gudig, hwv; by mpai lgial piivim, ph-

mlgy, -Kaiaim, alm vy day i a auali.

Th piipal iu bw auali ad aiauali waday i

whh i d philphial gudig bu whh ii ud-

adig pvid ui u philphial udadig. M

aiauali ap ha h aual i a gally wll-dd ad

not in need o philosophical legitimation. They believe only that philosophical

pi ( xampl, hugh, laguag, agy, hial am, ligi)

mai ha qui philphial u ha aual i a p-vid. Nauali ii ha philphial wk i h dmai mu b -

iuu wih mpiial i, phap v ipad wihi ii

iquiy.1

Closer examination, however, reveals a undamental ambiguity in naturalists

laim iuiy bw philphy ad h i. Wihi philphy

i ad m pa philphy mid ad pyhlgy, aualim

i ak ma ha philphy mu b lly gagd wih scientifc

practice. Thi ai aualim ha b gly ifud by h dmi

lgial mpiiim, wh au ii m am m ulydivd m wha ii aually ay ad d. I p, uh aual-

i ii ha philphial fi i, li, mid mu gag

h wk big d i h lva ii ld, phap i mpiial

udi h hiy ilgy i. A di ai maphyi-

al auali (piipally i philphy mid, pimlgy, ad hi)

ha ipd h iuiy bw philphy ad i dily.

Thy agu ha philphial udadig iialiy, kwldg,

maliy mu ulimaly ammda hm wihi nature a dild by h

i. I iial , pimi auhiy, mal m a bphilosophically respectable, the latter naturalists argue, these must be explicable

i m h aual law, aual pw, liv mhaim, pdiiv

ham divabl by h i.2

Ra k h w ai philphial aualim

a bviu. A all, h ly plauibl a ii ha m must b

xpliabl i m law, mhaim, aual pw wuld b i ha i

wha h wld i , adig h b ii udadig. Th

bviu a ak philphial iquiy b iuu wih wha sci-

entists d wuld likwi b ha mpiial i a h b availabl way udad h wld. Y , uh jui h w ai

aualim mai uudd pmiy . Pmiy hadwavig ha

mim b qui xplii: Jh Sal (1983, hap. 10) ha blihly ld


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144 Hypaia

u ha mday i will dma ha iialiy i a bilgial

ppy, whil Paiia Chuhlad (1986) ad Paul Chuhlad (1989) hav

each countered that someday very soon, olk psychology will have already beenlimiad by mpuaial ui. Hauglad ly ay ha m

bjiviy a phyially implmd mhw (1998, 317). Y pmiy

dal iliai bw auali pi i ad

au al fuih wh hy a akwldgd. Alxad Rbg

Field Guide to Recent Species o Naturalism (1996), or example, trenchantly

hw hw h philph i appalig Dawiia piipl

have not yet made good upon the naturalistic commitments that he joins them

i dig.

Thi pmiy gap wihi philphial aualim i ju a lalpblm. Alhugh I a agu h pi h, a al hm i my

recent work (see Rouse 2002) is that much o twentieth-century philosophy has

b hapd by a dbiliaig dualim bw au ad h maiviy

thought, language, and action. A dualism in this sense is a distinction whose

mp a [ivd] i m ha mak hi haaii lai

ah ulimaly uilligibl (Badm 1994, 615). I hi x,

scientic practices have been the pineal gland o contemporary philosophy: the

pulad lai h magial iliai wha ha b ivd

m h a a iilabl. Th i a ivd a ihly maig-ul, maivly bidig dilu h maially ad maivly i

ixabiliy au, a aual wld ha vhl ipa h

ii pai.

Fmii i udi hav b ambival wad hi dualiy

between the scientic and metaphysical strains o naturalism and the underlying

dualism between normativity and nature. Most eminist science studies scholars

(, xampl, Nl 1995 ad Wyli 2002) hav huiaially jid

h aualii u wad h udy i a aually paid. A

all, philphial diui bjiviy ii mhd i abairom detailed examination o scientic practices have on the one hand obscuredgendered, racialized, and colonialist themes in scientic work, and on the other

had hav b a pmi u miual mii hlahip

a hil i il.3 Fmii hla hav plad uh diui

wih au ii bjiviy a iuad wihi pi paial,

hiial x, ad a awabl pibilii ah ha

abad piipl. Y may mii hla hav b ah l ym-

pahi wad aualizd pi au. Maphyial aualim

hav had a gly duii b, wih ih phyial law, giconstraints, or adaptationist selection mechanisms playing prominent roles, and

h pi au hav b ud juiy xluiay

hiahial pai. Fmii uh a Kll 1992, Bik 1986, ad Haaway


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Jph Ru 145

1991 hav b gly ad ivly iial uh pi au

ad/ hi idlgial u.

Constructive eminist responses to these criticisms, however, have reinorcedh a -idd allgia h ii ai philphial

aualim: whil mii hla hav mim ddd h maphyi-

al impliai m ii wk ( xampl, Hl Lgi [1990,

13361] diui Gald Edlma wk bai ui, Ly Ha-

ki Nl [1990, 10653] apppiai vaiu alaiv lia,

hierarchical causal models, or Evelyn Fox Kellers [1995, 3235, 11012] appeals

to the work o Christiane Nsslein-Vollhard and other developmental biologists

maal ihia ad yplami u), hy hav b l

inclined to connect these metaphysical commitments to their understanding oh iuad maiviy i. T hi x, mii wk ha al had

m h pmiy haa xmplid by Sal h Chuhlad:

i il i xpd, vually, vidia a avd pi h

aual wld, i hi a a m mplx, iaiv, whlii, ad diui-

d ha ha b uppd by m maphyial auali.

Y m wk i mii i udi d a m ambiiu

appah igaig a pi au wih h ly iuad

maiviy ii pai. R wk by Ka Baad (1996, 1998,

1999, 2000, ad hmig) ha pmily ak up h hallg i-gaig mii philphy i wih a mii lgy. By iuaig

Baad wk i h x dba v philphial aualim, I hall

dd w laim abu h igia Baad amplihm: , h

ppd agial alim (1996, 16589) ak impa p wad a u-

ul iliai h w ai philphial aualim; d,

Baad au pvid a puaiv ii aig ad jig h

aualii dial m adiial maphyial aualim.

O way xp h d h w ai aualim

i ak hw au ii understanding au a pa hnature b udd. Th m l ivd aw hi qui

recent metaphysical naturalists is that scientic understanding involves correct

representations i bj ad hi mdal ppi; h pai

acquire content rom their causal-unctional role within thought and action, and

aqui waa m hi liabiliy, pdiiv u, h b xplaa-

i hi pdiiv u. I hik hi pi imdiabl

pblm, alhugh hi i h ai dd ha laim. I mi h

ivd viw pimaily highligh wh Baad dpa m i.

I ip Baad a dvlpig a vid pi maphyial au-alim. Th uial pi a whih h dpa m h auali i i h

pi au il a dild hugh ii wk. Th amilia

aualim a au i m gulaii, law, aual pw, aual-


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146 Hypaia

unctional roles. Nature so conceived is anormative. The semantic and epistemic

normativity governing how one ought to think and talk about the natural world,

ad h hial pliial maiviy hw ugh a wihi i, mube understood as either arising rom or reducible to an anormative natural world.

Alhugh h d pu h pi i qui hi way, I ak Baad laim

iad ha au as revealed by the sciences i il maivly iud.

Thi laim d aul xpii, hwv, bh laiy h -

mativity being invoked, and to understand Barads argument or it. Barad starts

m a mmim bh ai aualim ( Baad 1996, 1999). O

h had, a adqua lgy mu b auabl h ii wk

hugh whih a udadig au i ahivd; hwi, i wuld b

a abiay philphial impii up i. O h h had, uhii wk mu il b mphdd a pa au b udd.

H pii h dvlp i h dii p. Fi, h agu h

lgial piiy phma v bj (1996, 17073). Sh h

agu ha phma i hi mu ipa pual-diuiv

maiviy (1999, 37; 1996, 17579; 1998, 98112). Cpual-diuiv

m a mhig impd up phma by u, hwv. O h

ay, w ulv ly bm ag/kw a maial mp

h lag pa aual phma (1996, 17989). Thu, Baad ih

reduces conceptual-discursive normativity to anormative causal relations, imp alady-aiulad pual m up h maial wld.

Instead, she is arguing that the natural world only acquires denite boundaries,

ad p ly aqui di , gh. O ha pi i

i pla, Baad g agu ha u paiipai i h phma w

udad iially mak hial ad pliial pibiliy igal

pual-diuiv maiviy a wll (1996, 18389; 1998, 11018).

Baad bgi wih h laim haphenomena a iuiv h aual

wld (aliy). A phm i hi i a pduibl lal maial

aagm -up. Baad idu hi p i m iipractice, or the most obvious examples o phenomena are experimental

aagm bvaial guai.4 I hi p, h p ha

illumiaig paalll i h wk Nay Cawigh (1997, 1999) ad Ia

Hakig (1983, 1965); Cawigh, xampl, haaiz a mlgial

mahi [a] a xd (ugh) aagm mp, a, wih

abl (ugh) apaii ha i h igh abl (ugh) vim

will, wih pad pai, giv i h kid gula bhavi ha w

dib i u ii law (1997, 66). Hakig (1983) p phm-

ena (as mostly, but not exclusively, created within scientic research) is anotherwll-kw aalgu. Bh p hav a impa bu l wll-kw

ad i Hakig (1965) p a ha -up (iludig pi

trials perormed with it), which provides the material basis or making intelligible


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Jph Ru 147

the concept o a long-run requency. In all o these cases, phenomena (or nomo-

lgial mahi, -up ad ial) a maial guai h wld,

whih a quly bu xluivly h pdu ii ah.Nvhl, a uial di xi bw Baad p a ph-

m ad h hwi aalgu p. Th aalgu p

ak phma (mlgial mahi, ha -up, .) a maiv

i h limid ha aig a phm i a ahivm (aual

phma a ju h iuma ha happ m h adad

uh a ahivm wihu dig u ivi). Impliily, hy

contrast phenomena with other situations that do not display the same clarity or

regularity. For example, Hacking insists that there are only so many phenomena

u h i au (1983, 228); i h ab h why, di-ibl pa ha idia phma, h i ju mplxiy (1983, 226).

Similaly, Cawigh diiguih mlgial mahi, ym

[ a pi kid] ha ga pi bhavi ad mak pibl vy

pi ad xa kwldg m h vagu ad impi a vyday

li (1999, 2324). Hauglad mak a lad pi abu h maiviy

scientic phenomena in distinguishing science rom games like chess. In science,

he notes, the interesting challenge . . . is to ascertain whether theres a game at

all or not, and i so, what belongs to it and what doesnt. . . . Finding a [scientic]

game that is playable is thereore a kind oachievement (1998, 33031). Baradspi phma i m iluiv ha hi, ad mu b i ph-

ma a b iuiv aliy. Phma i h , h,

a b maiv by contrast h amaiviy m mplxiy

aagm bj ha d diplay illigibl pa.

Th p i udadig Baad lgy phma i dii-

guih h pduibl pa a phm m a gulaiy Huma

a jui. O way xp h di i ha actual

gulaiy d b ivlvd, wha ma a phm i aual

repetition but repeatability. Thus, the repeatable pattern o a physical phenom-enon is not simply a regularity.5 Under the right circumstances the pattern wouldu, bu h d b aual gulaiy ha i iaia. Mv, h

pa i h lad i h phm il, i h gii

pai a gulaiy.6 I i al Baad p phma

ha hi paabiliy i diial; wha ma i h xa pdu-

i h am qu v, bu h pdui a igia pa-

dpi vaiu di amg ia h am phm. T

pa a xpim, xampl, i d h am hig xaly, bu

y pdu h am pa i di iuma, ad phap bymwha di ma.

The distinctive eature o phenomena as material congurations o the world

i ha hy iu a paial ud u bw a mauig


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148 Hypaia

apparatus and a measured object. No inherent boundary divides an object rom

i uudig, h lai h u dpd up h guai

h appaau.7 T hi pi, Baad ak ha w

id a xpim i whih ligh i ad m a pa-

ticle. The scattered light may be directed towards a photographic

pla igidly xd i h labay ad h ud d

h pii, h ligh may b did wad a pi

quipm wih mvabl pa ud d h mmum

h ad ligh. Th a ially dib h

p akig a piu h pail wih a fah ama.

I ha a, h ligh i pa h mauig appaau. I hla a, h ligh mmum i big maud ad h

i i pa h bj i qui. (1996, 171)

Nhig abu wha happ h ligh ad h pail al x wha

ppy i dd by hi ia-ai, wh a u u bw h

mauig ad h maud mp h phm (Baad i

h m ia-ai [ 1996, 179] akwldg ha h w pl

h phm, h bj ad h mauig appaau, d xi a uh

apa m hi ia-ai).8

A dig au a phm i ha h ia-ai bw abj ad i uudig lav diibl mak h uudig

a iu hm a a measuringappaau. Wha i maud by h

mak, hwv, i a ppy h bj i ilai bu h phm-

a a whl. Th pii makd by h xpu h phgaphi

pla ad ligh mu b gadd a a haaizai h i

aagm, ad ju h aig pail. Th d hi -

ial hlim ha b m laly vid i quaum mhai. O Baad

Bhia ipai, pii i ly a maigul p wihi ai

material arrangements, within which momentum is not meaningully denable.Th pi i mly pimi, uggig a lak a a di bu

ukw pii h pail, bu lgial. Ud iuma ha

mak a laivly di pii a ym, ha ym h has di

mmum. Mv, a Baad (1996, ad hmig) ha iid, ad I

hav labad lwh (Ru 2002, hap. 8), hi lgial hlim

phma i limid miphyi. Mapi phma, uh

a ia-ai a gaim wih i uudig, al diplay mpaabl

tradeos, such that concepts such as gene or adaptation are properly ascribed

whl ia-aiv phma ah ha a pdmid ppi di bj.

Wha a h budai a phm, hwv? Baad ha h

uid buday a phm may m xd bak idily:


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Jph Ru 149

ly a h qui abu hw a h mauig appaau p xd,

bu al ay paiula appaau i alway i h p ia-aig

wih h appaau, ad h ldig phma . . . i ubquiai paiula iuad pai iu impa hi i h

paiula appaau i qui (1998, 102). Thi appa p-dd

o phenomena might then raise the worry that, i properties cannot be ascribed

to preexisting objects, then they cannot be adequately localized at all. A similarproblem has emerged in discussions o causality: J. L. Mackie (1974), or instance,

ha agud ha ly ahpmphi i abl a lalizabl au

ad u agai h bakgud h pply pid al au.

Th i bh mhig uivly iighul i hi bji ad

something undamentally mistaken. The insight is to recognize that a phenom- i Baad i ju a lag, m mplx bj in h wld, bu

a maigul guai oh wld. I h ha iii uid

buday. Th miak i vlk h way i whih a phm a

b gud a di illigibiliy ad m l di

budai up a m lalizd iuai. Thu, a Cawigh i h

diui laivly abl gulaii, h dii ha hild h m-

lgial pa m i a a uial mp wha h all h

mlgial mahi (1999, 50). Whh h hildig dii a

ad by a xpim ha pup, a i h Hz bx ha pa Magi Ra Imagig dvi m h magi ifu, a

already there, as is the relative gravitational isolation o the solar system, they

(and the specic external intererences that they are able to block) arepart o

h aagm ha iu h phm ad h lally illigibl

pa ha i mai.

W a w hw il Baad ii ha phma a

iuiv aliy (1996, 176) wih Hakig, Cawigh, ad Haug-

lad m iiv aalgu h p. Th la ii ha

vy iuai i h wld iu a phm, idd ha vy wiuai d , ad h ly wih ga diuly. O Baad m iluiv

conception, the world is articulated by overlapping, intra-acting phenomena, but

m h ail dil ay pa lal illigibiliy. Th ud

ia-ai ha m mai ly udiiad mplxiy ill mak

h limi a a phm, hwv. Cid a xpimal u ha

ga la igal adig u m bakgud i. W migh ay

such an experiment that nothing was there to be ound. But the unintelligible

mplxiy hby dild ly hw up hugh h intelligible gua-

i h xpim il a a lally pduibl aagm ha wouldhav dild a igia pa had h iuma b di. I i

i hi ha phma a iuiv h wld i i iy, i

hi mplx, ia-aiv play illigibiliy ad uilligibiliy.


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150 Hypaia

Th qui mai, hwv, wha i ma phma iu

pa lal illigibiliy, phma xhibi maigul pa-

. I upakig h lui, w will giz w m Baadibui, amly h ii up h phi pmaiviy h

agi bvai (1998, 98110), ad h au h conceptual-

discursive dimi ii illigibiliy. Cid agai h mauig

appaau wh ia-ai wih a maud bj abl a phm

diplay a pa illigibiliy uh a a di maum a aual

lai. Th mauig appaau a ju ilud a xpimal -up,

hildig dii, ad a ag phyially makd by i ia-ai wih

h bj. By hmlv, h mak uh a ia-ai uh a Uau

deviations rom an elliptical trajectory around the sun in the vicinity oNpu diplay illigibiliy whav. F h b illigibiliy

i h phm, h mauig appaau ha iu wha Rb

Sklwki alld a daiv maiai (1978, 128), ha to which i

i illigibl. I i h ha ai-auali ypially ivk a diiiv l

a kwig ubj a aualiially ixpliabl. Mid, iu, ,

i a valig a, Ba va Faa (1980) appal h huma gaim

a h pivilgd lu bvai, a uppdly ial ay gui

dilu h wld as maigul.

Van Fraassen is especially instructive in this context, because he attempts toincorporate a naturalistic element within his constructive empiricism by insist-

ig ha i il huld dmi wha i bvabl: wha i bvabl

. . . is a unction o acts about us qua organisms in the world (1980, 5758). Yet

wha va Faa hby miakly aum pi ay ii id-

ai i ha h lva budai a ii mauig ym mu b

idividual huma gaim (a pi whih h ad W. V. O. Qui [1960]

ddly ag). F a ii auali, h budai huld b pid

m wihi ii pai ad maum iai hmlv. F

a mii, mv, va Faa idiai kw wih hi up-pdly aual bdi i dply pblmai.

Barad responds to both concerns by asking how the agencies o observation

a hmlv iud a a maial mp a phm (1996,

169173; 1998, 94103). She begins with the whole complex set o arrangements

that make up the material apparatus o an experimental or observational set-up.

Thi appaau ypially ilud h d makd by i ia-ai wih

the object, the preparatory apparatus sometimes needed to congure the object

ia-a i h igh way, h hildig h phm m iuiv

i, ad h ipiv appaau ha abl h mak h d b mai as mauig h bj i m di p. Thi

appaau a b ivd a a gup bj l h ambld


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Jph Ru 151

i a m mplx l, hi uiai i a paabl phm i

a ma hw hy intra-act pmaivly:

Appaau a pxiig xd ii; hy a hm-

selves constituted through particular practices that are per-

petually open to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other

wkig. Thi i pa h aiviy ad diuly dig

science: getting the instrumentation to work in a particular way

a paiula pup (whih i alway p h pibiliy

o being changed during the experiment as dierent insights are

gaid). (Baad 1998, 102)

To the extent that human bodies ft into this perormatively constitutedappaau, hy d a aual bj haaizabl i ilai, bu a

iuiv mp hi dyamially uiig appaau.9 Huma

agy i alway phially xdd ad pmaiv i i ibui

h daiv maiai iud i ii pai.

Thi iaiv, maiv pmaiviy ii pai i idip-

abl hw hy allw h wld b illigibl. Cid agai h xampl

h pa diplayd by h allipial dviai i h bi Uau

ha xhibi i gaviaial ia-ai wih Npu. I ali laimd ha

h hildd w-bdy appaau mpd h u ad Uau i u-cient by itsel to allow the gravitational capacities o Neptune to be intelligible.

Y Baad wuld al j -auali ivai mid, iu,

i, had puppii a ii mmuiy a h di-

maker or intelligibility. So how does the incorporation o material systems suchas planetary orbits within a larger perormative apparatus display them as intelli-

gible without magical invocations o subjectivity? The rst step is to incorporate

wihi h phm h phially mbdid pai giig

pii, akig hm uivly, apig hm i aji, ad

pjig h aji gmially aalyially. Oly wh hpai a i pla i h a mai pa ha diplay h illigibiliy

o orbits as marks o gravitational intra-action. Practices in this sense are thus

gulaii bhavi bu uh pa ia-ai.10

W a w udad, a lg la, h i whih Baad i haa-

izing natural phenomena as irreducibly normative. She is certainly not reverting

pmd pi au a ihly uud by alady-d-

mia m. Naual phma a iad maiv i h ha

pai ig, ig, ahig, ad hwi dierentiating

m i pma a impliily pa h phm. Thpaial ia-ai d v m up m al gulaiy.11

Idd, I agu lwh (Ru 2002, hap. 9) ha guily maiv (ad


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152 Hypaia

hby illigibl) ia-ai qui ha i d . Th pibiliy

uh i i iuiv pa-recognition a ppd m di-

ial-piv (Hauglad 1998, hap. 11, iighully diu hidpd pa ad pa-gii). I hall la u h

qui wha uh p i amu .

B dig , hwv, w d u m h phially xdd

embodiment o the agencies o observation to their conceptual and discursive

character. Barad argues that phenomena are always material-discursive (1998,

104110). I ak ha ma ha h interpretive ap h agial

id h phm alway implia h phm wihi a ld

diuiv pai. T wha ha ma, id agai Baad xampl

a pail-aig xpim. A mauig appaau wh pa aigidly xd ah i dd i d h ia-aiv makig

ha appaau mau pii, ad uh a appaau a m

pi i idipabl h illigibl u h term pii. Thu, Baad

d Bh ii ha dipiv p bai hi meaningby

a paiula phyial appaau whih i u mak a ud

cut between the object and the agencies o observation. . . . For Bohr, measure-

m ad dipi ail ah (Baad 1996, 172).12

We need to understand this mutual entailment in both directions. Descrip-

i qui maum h a I hav ju id. I i ly wihi aspecic conguration o apparatus that a concept acquires determinate content

ad appliabiliy. Th pi pmaiv guai h appaau,

xampl wih ially xd pa ad u apppia ha aagm,

dmi what i big maud ad dibd, ad i whih p. Ma-

surement in turn requires the discursive practices that would permit appropriate

dipi. Baad pi mai i badly iiali.

Wha allw h mak a ph a phgaphi pla measure pi-

i, xampl, i i (pibl) inerential l i a ubqu hai p-

ma ha a hld maivly auabl apppia ia-aiwih ha mak. Th iially auabl use p lik pii i

a idipabl mp h ipiv appaau blgig a ph-

m, hugh whih h phm bm illigibl. Baad hu

xd Wilid Slla (1997) amilia pi abu ppual idiai

to apply to practical intra-action with an apparatus: a parrot that utters red in

h p d ua ha aually ud h p ah ha ju

h ud, ul i a al u i iially i h x; likwi, a

mak a xpimal appaau i a measurement pii ul i i

ivlvd i a apppia iial xu. Diuiv pai a haa-ized by a pragmatically inerentialist semantics (see Brandom 1994) are thus an

indispensable component o any intelligible phenomenon, and a crucial part o

Baad agi bvai (Ru 2002, hap. 68).


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Jph Ru 153

Thi appal h iial maiviy diuiv pai i

ah ha udmi Baad mmim a badly aualii ia-

tion, because she takes meaning and its interpretation to be thoroughly natural,ha i, maial, phma. O h pi, I agu, Davidia adial

ipai Badm diuiv pai huld al b udd

a measurement ia-ai, mpaabl h pail-aig xampl

alady mid. Smai ipai a ly b udak wad

m maial ym: i mu bgi wih mak bdi, whh h a

movements, vocalizations, or inscriptions. Moreover, these marks on bodies are

ly maigul i lai h publily aibl circumstances ha a-

i hm. Th w alaiv paial u a hw uh pma

b maially illigibl. I h aiig iuma a pa hagi bvai, h p h ua ip hm a

meaningul in a language antecedently understood. This is the amiliar model o

radical interpretation. Alternatively, the utterances can themselves be part o a

measuring apparatus:given a specic interpretation in the home language, those

mak a a mau hi uudig (ughly, d h iuma,

iludig auxiliay aumpi, m aliy this xpi?). Th mak

h xp pa h semantic igia h iuma, amly

their correct description in these words. Thus, rom Barads broadly naturalistic

ppiv, maig ad uh a mpaabl pii ad mmum,gaim ad vim, adapiv ai ad ih: h maig a

xpi ad h laiv uh abu h wld a imulauly

determinate, or the determinacy o each requires mutually incompatible practi-

al guai h wld ( m xiv diui h pi,

Ru 2002, hap. 8).

Th maial ad diuiv ap a phm a hu al m-

paabl i hi iduibl maiviy. Th i hig abu h l

p-o-s-i-t-i-o-n or the sound po-zi-shun that magically (see Wheeler 2000)

hm wha i dild i maum uig appaau wihially xd pa; ly hi aual gig use i uh iuma, i

liably gizabl ad maivly auabl way, a au hi

diuiv igia. Th am i u h mak bdi ha a h

maial idiai a phm. Thu, wh I pk ali abu hw

ua a b maivly auabl h um a maum,

I h qui aully h pha apppia ia-ai wih [a] mak

[ a phgaphi pla]. O a ay ha la iial u h

m pii a auabl h phyial mark il, bau ha lav

unspecied in what respect they are accountable to it. Nor can one say that theya auabl hposition h mak a phgaphi pla, bau

position is only being articulated through these inerential relations. To make

perceptual gii h mak h uial a will d, ha wuld


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154 Hypaia

be a return to an empiricist oundationalism. What one needs instead are mate-

ial ia-ai wih mak bdi (uh a ablihig a am,

makig ad uig qual ui divii, adadizig h ui, ad orth), along withpractices o dierentiating correct and incorrect perormance.

Th paial ia-ai a hby hld auabl wha i a ak

i hi pma.

Thi adig Baad d ubiu a maiv udaialim a

now-discredited empiricist oundationalism, by interpreting measurement prac-

tices in terms o accountability to something at stake in the practice. What is at

stake in the practice need not be articulated or agreed upon in advance in order

i govern h ia-ai ha iu a maum; i a gv

h pai, wihu vig a a maiv giv. Aladai MaIy hahelpully expressed this point in terms o the normative authority o traditions:

Wha iu a adii i a fi ipai ha adii, a

fi whih il ha a hiy upibl ival ipai. I I am a

Jw, I hav giz ha h adii Judaim i paly iud by a

iuu agum v wha i ma b a Jw (1980, 62).

Big a Jw i hi i a maiv au ah ha a dmia

ma a. Th maiv igia hi au i uaid by i

mattering all pai g i igh abu wha i apppialy a ak h

all hm, v hugh hy hav y ahd, may v ah, adi m a may v k agm abu wha ha i. Mv, i

ma ha h ak b bidig vy ivlvd. Th illigibiliy

ay paiipai i a pai u mhig big a ak

vy i gig i igh. Tha d ma ha h illigibiliy pa-

i dpd up h pibiliy ulima agm abu ad miy

to what those stakes are. Rather, it depends upon an implicit mutual recognition

ad by h whm h pai ma, uh ha hy (ugh ) hld

hmlv pibl hi di ipai, ad auabl

ah.Thi appal agial pibiliy xplia h bjiviy aual

phma ad hi ii aiulai i a la w impa

p i whih Baad wk diiivly ibu mii hy ad

mii i udi. Baad pi bjiviy a agial p-

ibiliy blg a adii mii am bjiviy i m

pibiliy kidd i (, xampl, Haaway 1991, hap. 9;

Cd 1991; Lgi 1992; Nl 1993; Wyli 1999). Th d diiivly

mii au ha I hall highligh i h aalyi i h idiai h

locus uh pibiliy a a phially mbdid gagm i ma-ial-diuiv pai.

Barad puts the rst point this way: accountability to the world as material is

abu pai a idpd aliy, bu abu h al -


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Jph Ru 155

quences, interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities o intra-acting

wihi h wld (1996, 188). Kwig h wld by paiipaig i h -

guai phma mak auabl all hi qu.M adiial pi bjiviy limi h pibiliy kw.

Kw h d ly ad h uiig h appaau

immdia pimi pup, apig ad ammdaig h daa (h

pi mak h appaau ha idia h um a xpim

bvai) wihi hi vall my bli ad ah pai.

Barads conception o objective accountability is more encompassing. Scien-

tic practice not only makes the world intelligible in specic ways and in its own

m, bu al ibu h lu h pa illigibiliy,

and to other agential engagements with the world. Moreover, just as the objectsudid d ia i a vauum bu ly wihi a pi guai

appaau, ii pai d u i ilai: i a a ial

pai i pually, mhdlgially, ad pimlgially allid alg

paiula ax pw (Baad 1996, 186). Rpibl (bjiv) i

i auabl ju h awly ii um h phma

i paiipa i bu h pi budai, xlui, ad impii

ha i hby hlp realize i h wld, ha i, h ull ag -

qu ha i hlp big abu. Baad i h mii hi

giz ha pw lai ad hi pliial qu a igal ii udadig ad huld b ak i au a pa h

pliial pibiliy iud hugh ii wk. Bu Baad hw m

laly hw giz ad au h dimi i wihu

reducing or subordinating scientic understanding to predetermined structures

lai pw. Idd, pa Baad al ibui mii

i udi i ha h hw ju hw mii plii a igal

pibl i bu al hw i igally ibu a adqua

mii aalyi ad iiim pw ad dmiai.13

The second distinctively eminist theme in Barads work to which I call atten-tion is her interpretation o the loci o such agential responsibility. Understand-

ig ad agy a adiially lad i h aial, huma ubj ad/

the natural body she inhabits and partly controls. The sel-contained character

h ubj wuld h b dd by ih budai bw l ad

other, whether in the sels inner deliberations or in outer bodily perormances.

F Baad, uh ih budai xi: wha g dd a a ubj

( bj) ad wha g dd a a appaau i ia-aivly iud

wihi pi pai (1998, 105). Th lu pibiliy i hu a p-

hially mbdid, pmaivly iud agy: w a pibl h wld i whih w liv bau i i a abiay ui u

hig, bu bau agial aliy i dimd u paiula pai

ha w hav a l i hapig (Baad 2000, 247). Tha gii lav a


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156 Hypaia

conceptual and practical space or understanding and being accountable to non-

human agy, bau di bw huma ad h agi

xi bu bau agy i a all--hig aai. Th a may m ia-aiv ivlvm i h gig pdui phma, ad

may way i whih w a pibl ad hm. A Baad lud:

laig hw ia-a pibly wihi h wld ma udadig

ha w a h ly aiv bighugh hi i v juiai

dfig ha pibiliy h ii. Th akwldgm

huma agy d l huma auabiliy; h ay, i

ma ha auabiliy qui ha muh m aiv xiig

pw aymmi (1998, 11617). Baad mii, auali au

pibiliy giz ad pd h mbdim huma agyi pi ig ha uai ad am h ag ld pibl

ai. Rpibl agy ivlv gizig w paiipai i h

pdui pw lai, akwldgig i qu, ad hldig

l auabl h whm ai a quial.

I a w lud wih Baad hallg h maphyial aual-

i. Sh ha abadd h mmim m mpay

auali maphyi, amly ha au a dild by h aual i

i amaiv. O h au, i d u a pai

amaiv au bu iad aivly gu h wld a alady -pually aiulad ad pliially quial. Si bh dim a

history o prior intra-action and eectively shapes the eld o possible subsequent

ai by h vaiu huma ad -huma agi i mpa. Baad

gly ummaiz hi agential pi h wld: h w lgy

oered here also makes it possible to take account o the material dimensions o

constraints and exclusions without presuming matter to be a xed ground exist-

ig uid im, hiy, ulu. . . . Reerence to the material constraints

and exclusions and the material dimensions o power is possible within the ramework

o agential realism because materiality reers to agential reality, which is explicitlynot nature-outside-o-culture (1998, 109). She has, however, given up on a tradi-

tional metaphysics o nature so as to retain other core naturalistic commitments

ha h ak b m udamal, bu i fi wih laim au

anormativity. In particular, she gives priority to comprehending human agency

ad udadig a (mp ) aual, maial phma.

In airness to Barad, she has nowhere asserted that her position is naturalistic,

ha h d ay h pi h ha I haaiz a aualii

mmim. I a, hwv, ha i mak gd Baad pgam

ad h mmim a h xp hm hm i hi way h aualii adii i philphy. Amg h aualii mmi-

m ha Baad maiai, mim m igly, a: h iuiy

bw philphy ad i; h ii ha philphial xplia-


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Jph Ru 157

i i b auabl gig ii pai; a hughgig

maialim (albi i h agial maialiy, a m adiial

phyialim); ad h ji ay appal h magial upaual.Phap m impaly, Baad au a uiv igai

h w ai aualim: a ii udadig au hugh

agial gagm i h ui-ad-aiulai phma i

laly ad aighwadly a pa h au i mak illigibl, whih is

iud a phma.

T h wh ill wih ai a m adiially aualii maphy-

i, whih maiviy mu b duibl upvi up phyial

bj ad hi aual iai lawul gulaii, Baad wk h

oers a undamental challenge. Any naturalistic metaphysics must incorporateh understanding au wihi au a udd, ad mu ap ha

ii pai a hi b mbdy (pa ) whav udadig

au ha hu a b aaid. Th hallg i h diplay h -

i bw h p mplyd i hi maphyi (uh a bj,

causes, unctions, or laws), and the material apparatus through which scientic

pai uld hld h p auabl mak bdi. Baad

hl pu h hallg hi way: Ay amp ia maialiy a

aual [i h m adiial ] wuld b xpd a qui biza, i

hi wuld b aig maialiy a pla uid h al, . . . h bjivreerent [o scientic practices] (1998, 109). The suspicion underlying this chal-

lg i ha h maphyial auali illgiimaly hlp hmlv

hi p. Wh auali, xampl, a pual hial

maiviy a upvig up a uppdly -maiv ba bj

and properties or causal or law-governed interactions, they at least tacitly invoke

h auhiy i a udwiig hi pi h aual wld.

Baad ulaim wuld b ha hi u p uh a bj,

au, law, ui a b uppd by h apppia u

material and conceptual apparatus, and thus cannot legitimately claim to refecta badly ii ad -upauali gagm wih h wld.

Notes

Eali vi hi pap w pd a Fmiim ad Naual-

ism at Washington University and the University o Missouri at St. Louis in September

1999, and on Sciences as Social Practices at Carleton University in March 2000. Many

hak h paiipa hlpul mm. I hav al bd m hlpul

mm by Ka Baad, ad by h aymu Hypatia.

1. O a, u, pu aualim i m dmai ad h. Th

idai ha lad aualim may b qui gal, bu h a mu b

mad paaly aualizig h mid, kwldg, hi, ay h dmai.


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158 Hypaia

2. Philosophers have worked out the commitment to explicate semantic, epistemic,

hial m aualiially i maydi way. Fi, h lai bw h

m b aualizd ad au ha b vaiuly ud a limiai,dui, upvi ( m ha kid), pdiiv ham (uh

ha i i apppia a a ym a piv m i i bhavi hby

bm m pdiabl), m mpaibiliy (hi la vaiai xmpli h

hmag aualim d by may philph wh j h ull aimilai

philosophy to natural science). Second, naturalists also appeal to diverse conceptions o

h aual wld, i m aual law, aual pw, Dawiia vlui, mi

phyial ii, pibl wld. Wh upld wih hi paa appliai i

di philphial dmai, h vaiai u maphyial aualim i a

hyda-hadd pii.

3. Elisabeth Lloyd (1996) notes that constructive eminist demystifcations oii wk may miakly m ai-ii i pi i i

abad m amp laiy h gh ad wak aual iquiy.

4. Alhugh Baad bgi wih xpimal aagm, w hall ha h

pi phma i limid hm; h i uig xpimal up

dlibaly aagd pdu a pi pa iai a a mdl ud-

adig aual lai m gally.

5. N a phma i Baad b idid wih gulaii a p-

sible worlds, although I will not address that variation here. I have discussed such modal

gulaii i Ru 2002, hap. 89.

6. Sily pakig, a Baadia phm d incorporate h gii a pa, bu h apaiy gii i il pa h appaau ha blg

h phm, ad h phm i h ju h gulaiy il, bu h

lag guai h wld ha abl h gulaiy b mai ( h

discussion below, and in Rouse 2002, chap. 8). This point also explains why Cartwright

gulaii a ppi omlgial mahi ad Hakig aib lg-u

qui to ha -up.

7. Thi pi idia why Baad ak phma b iuiv al-

iy, ah ha udadig h wld a mpd bj. Sh agu ha h

ablihm di budai a bj pupp i blgig wihi h

lag guai a phm.

8. Barad talks about measurement within the context o scientic practice, but her

haaizai appli aual ia-ai m gally. Ay aual ia-ai

i impliily a maum i Baad : h apaii mp h

ia-aiv phm (h au) a impliily maud by h mak pdud

up ah mp (h ). I akig wha dmi h budai

bj ad appaau i a maum ia-ai, h i al iquiig i hw h

wld ha dmia aual uu m gally.

9. T mau h apaii ad haaii huma bdi i h way ha

van Fraassen suggests would itsel require a dierent apparatus, and the bodies measuredwuld b h h (h bj) id h lva paial u. Th pi i

ha uh maum huma apaii a ilva h ipai

maum um, a Baad : ay paiula appaau i alway i h


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Jph Ru 159

p ia-aig wih h appaau, ad h ldig phma . . .

i ubqu iai paiula iuad pai iu impa hi

i h paiula appaau i qui ad h i h au h ia-aiha ul i h pdui w phma, ad (1998, 102). Rah, h

pi i ha i qui a di phm mau h bdy a bj, ad ill

h h w phma gh.

10. Th diii bw pai (i hi ) ad gulaii bhavi i

dvlpd i Ru 2002, hap. 5.

11. Rb Badm dw a iuiv diii bw maiv ial

pai ad bjiv gulaii, aguig ha w a viag a iuai i whih

every social practice o [a] community has as its generating response a perormance which

mu b i ad wih ah ial pai (1979, 18990), ha uh pai

are irreducible to regularities, and hence are constitutively normative. I am arguing thatBaad au phma llap Badm diii i h h dii:

she is claiming that supposedly objective regularities (including the regular persistence

o objects and properties) acquire their character only as constituents o practices. I you

nd this view initially strange, consider it a response to the central point introduced by

Saul Kipk (1982): i qu v iu a di gulaiy apa

m h m gvig i i iuai. Kipk wa pimaily

addig gvig ul (uh a a mahmaial ui) ah ha xhibid

ul (uh a a aual gulaiy), bu paalll iu ai i h gulai a (

m xiv diui, Ru 2002, hap. 6, 8).

12. Bh pk laial dipiv p, whih h diiguihd mquaum mhaial p. D Hwad (1994) giv a pulaiv bu highly

plauibl ui Bh pi laial p. I mi h m

classical, because I think that Barads account o how descriptive concepts are

impliad i phma d dpd up Bh m abl viw h

ilimiabiliy laial p.

13. Th diiiv au Baad pliial hy a, hwv, byd h

p hi pap ( Baad 1996, 1998, 1999, ad hmig).

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rouse on barad agenital realism

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