http://ips.sagepub.com/ReviewInternational Political Sciencehttp://ips.sagepub.com/content/9/4/247The online version of this article can be found at:DOI: 10.1177/019251218800900401 1988 9: 247 International Political Science ReviewFred W. RiggsThe Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional PracticesPublished by:http://www.sagepublications.comOn behalf of:International Political Science Association (IPSA) can be found at: International Political Science Review Additional services and information for http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://ips.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: http://ips.sagepub.com/content/9/4/247.refs.html Citations: What is This?- Jan 1, 1988 Version of Record>> at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 247-The Survival of Presidentialism in America:Para-constitutional PracticesFRED W. RIGGSABSTRACT. Ubiquitous episodes of military rule in some 33 presidentialistregimes modeled on that of the United States suggest that it may not be thecontext but rather faults in this type of constitution that predispose ittobreakdowns. If this premise is correct then we need to explain why, despiteits fragility, theAmericanConstitutionhassurvivedfor200 years.Separatingsystemic fromcontextual factors, welookfor "para-constitutional" practices, i.e.thosethatarea prerequisite to systemsurvival, even if they are not included in the written Constitution.Presidentialism: A Problematic Regime TypeOn 25 May, 1787 a quorum of seven states (out of 13)having been obtained, theConstitutional Convention started100 days of debate, in Philadelphia, producingagreements on an American Constitution that remains in effectsto this day. On 25May, 1987 the city of Philadelphia opened a six-month celebration of this historicevent.Thomas Ferraro of United Press International reported from that city thatevery state in the USA would celebrate &dquo;tosalute the enduring document, which hasserved as a model for national constitutions around the world&dquo; (Honolulu Advertiser, 25May 1987: A-8).Ferraros journalistic euphoria mirrors the complacency of most American politicalscientistswho tend,similarly, while analyzing the experience and problems ofgovernance in America, to take for granted the essential viability of its constitutionaldesign. They sometimes complain about the racism and sexism supported by theFounders, but they regard the longevity of the system as irrefutable evidence of itssuperiority and its export value as a model for emulation by would-be democracies. IfAmerican politics were tobe studied within the context of comparative politics,however, such complacency could not be defended.A Parochial AgendaSadto say, mostAmericanistsknow little, in depth, aboutother systems ofgovernment, andAmerican comparativiststypicallyignore American politics.Without further inquiry Idare not say that this limitation applies to compantivistsworking outside the United States. However, I submit that comparisons based on thehigher survival rate of Third World regimes which emulate &dquo;parliamentary&dquo; and at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 248&dquo;one-party&dquo; models as compared with the disasters universally experienced by thosewho followthe American model do raise fundamental questions thatare almostalways ignored. American political scientists usually start their inquiries by studyingissues that appear on the agenda of the American Congress, President, courts andpoliticalparties.Although this agenda sometimes includes complaints about theConstitution, it rarelychallenges thebasic viability of the system, or itdirectsattention to marginal changes-e.g. amendments (the 14th and 15th) designed toovercome its original blindness to slavery and current proposals to enhance the statusof women by adopting an &dquo;EqualRights Amendment.&dquo;When Americanists analyze the Constitution, as they do in the opening chapters ofany textbook on American government (e.g. Burns and Peltason,1960; Greenberg,1980;Harris,1986;Lowi,1976;Pious,1986;Rodgers and Harrington,1985;Weissberg, 1980), they focus on issues debated by the &dquo;foundingfathers,&dquo; or theyanalyze the class, racial and sexist biases inherent in the design. Although they oftentake up problems of interpretation, they ignore fundamental constitutional questionsthat contemporary comparative studies might raise.When they do compare theAmerican regime with alternative models, they seek to explain the differences-ourperhaps to register a preference fortheBritish system-but never, I believe, toexplain why the American Constitution survives.A Terminological ObstacleOne apparent reason for this blindness may be terminological. We lack a simple termto characterize the most basic feature of the American Constitution; it has been calleda &dquo;federal&dquo; system, a &dquo;republic,&dquo; a &dquo;democracy,&dquo; a &dquo;presidential&dquo;regime. Theseterms name properties of the American system that it shares with some other regimes,but none of them identifies the key property that comparative analysis highlights. Theclosest, forour purposes, is presidential, butthiswordhasseveral possibleconnotations.&dquo;Presidential&dquo;is used,simplistically, for any regime whose head iscalledapresident. Some parliamentaryconstitutions, suchasthoseof most Europeanrepublics, are &dquo;presidential&dquo; in this sense as distinct from constitutional monarchies.&dquo;Presidential&dquo; may referto regimes inwhichthe president is popularly, notindirectly, elected. France under the Fifth Republic is presidential in this sense, but asitsrecent historyshows, itremains essentiallyparliamentary. A thirdsenseof&dquo;presidential&dquo; isa regime in which the president plays a strong leadership role,serving as the &dquo;keystone&dquo; of the polity. However, since there have been many weakAmerican presidents, the United States has only intermittently been presidential in thissense.A fourth sense of &dquo;presidential&dquo; is the only one relevant to this discourse, namely:the notion of a regime-type (constitution) which provides for the power of the head(president) tobe exercised independently of the elected assembly (congress). Theexpression &dquo;separation of powers&dquo; is distinctive: the independence of the president isbased on a constitutionally stipulated term of office, and the congress has an equallyautonomous term.Neither can,therefore,constitutionally remove or dissolve theother. (The impeachment of a president does not contradict this rule since it is onlyfor misconduct, not reasons of public policy and, of course, itdoes not bring theopposition party to power.) To be clear, Iuse presidentialist to mean a presidentialsystem of this type. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 249A Flawed PrescriptionOne starting-point for analysis might be the proposition that some 33 Third Worldcountries (butonly oneintheFirstor Second!) have adoptedpresidentialistconstitutions. Almost universally these polities have endured disruptive catastrophes,usually inthe form of one or more coups d6tat whereby conspiratorial groups ofmilitary officersseize power,suspend the constitution,displace elected officials,impose martial law and promote authoritarian rule: recent examples in Korea, SouthVietnam, Liberia and many Latin American countries come to mind. Sometimes anelected president dissolves congress and rules by martial law, as Ferdinand Marcosdidinthe Philippines.Veryexceptionally, a popular revolutionterminatesapresidentialist regime, as in Nicaragua. No country following a presidentialist model,except the USA, has been able to avoid at least one such disruptive experience. Inmany, the disruptions are frequent (Riggs, 1985: 34). 2By contrast, almosttwo-thirdsof theThird World countrieswhich adoptedparliamentary constitutions,usually basedonBritishorFrench models, havemaintained their regimes and avoided the disruptions typical of all American-typesystems (Riggs, 1985: 32).3 This does not mean that they were well governed but onlythatsomehow they were abletoavoid military domination.Italsomeans thatone-third of these polities did experience military interventions.No doubt otherfactors were also important. However, Idoubt that cultural pecularities explain whysome parliamentary regimes survive and others collapse. A more significant factor isthe relatively great power of career bureaucracies (military and civil) in many newstates by contrast with the weakness of their institutions for self-government.Incidentally, the democratic constitutions found in Western Europe, all of whichwere established after the American Revolution, uniformly rejected presidentialism infavor of some kind of parliamentarism. No doubt parliamentary systems have theirown inherent weaknesses,especially when they become highly polarizedby themultiplication of parties. The purpose of this inquiry, however, isnot to comparepresidentialist with parliamentary regimes, but only touse such comparisons tohighlight features of the American system that have contributed to the survival of itsconstitution.Third World polities which opted for one-partyregimes,following theSovietmodel, have perpetuated their systems evenmore successfully thanhavetheparliamentary types(Riggs, 1985: 37).4 Mere survival, of course, isnot the onlyimportant consideration and we much prefer multi-party competition to one-partyconformity. Nonetheless, itis important to understand why one type of democraticconstitution works so much better than another in Third World countries-and whya system that works so wretchedly elsewhere has nevertheless survived in the UnitedStates.Explaining Failures and SuccessesAlthough American political scientistsarewellaware of the many catastrophesexperiencedby other presidentialistregimes,especially inLatin America,theyusually look for external variables to explain them-cultural or religious differences,educational and economic levels, ethnic problems, imperialism or dependency. Theyscarcely consider the relative success of parliamentary regimes, or even of single-partyregimes, asevidence of the basic fragility of presidentialist systems based on theAmerican model. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 250Insofar as similar contextual and environmental conditions prevail in allThirdWorld countries, students of comparative politics might have asked why some regimetypes are much more unsuccessful than others. This question might also have ledthem to ask: &dquo;If presidentialism works so badly elsewhere, why has itneverthelesssurvived in the United States for 200 years?&dquo;Moreover, if we could discover thereasons for the American &dquo;success,&dquo; this might help us identify some variables thataccount for the failures in other presidentialist countries.Two general kinds of explanation are needed. One is environmental, or contextual,and the other is systemic. A good example of a contextual variable is the legal cultureof a society-thus common law prevails in the USA, whereas codified civil law isnormal in Latin America. Some say that North American culture is more conducivetoconflict management andLatinculturemore likely toaccentuateconfrontations-butthisis surely an oversimplification. The Roman CatholicChurch was established in most Latin American countries, whereas Protestantismand the separation of Church and State became the norm in the United States. Theopen frontier and opportunities for social mobility available to Americans contrastwiththemorearistocraticor quasi-feudal socialstructurefoundinotherpresidentialistregimes. Do such differences explain success or failure?No doubtmany contextual/environmental variables and historical accidents helped the fragileAmerican presidentialist constitutionsurvive.But can we prove that they werenecessary-even ifnotsuflicient-conditionsforthesurvivalof theAmericanconstitution?A more fruitfullineof inquiry, especially ina short article,may evolve if thisanalysis islimitedto systemic variablesbecause they might be substantiated bycomparative inquiry. By investigating the failures of presidentialist regimes it may bepossible to discover if their breakdowns were linked with the lack of systemic featureswhose presence may be viewed as part of the explanation for the survival of theAmerican system.Although the focus of this article is on the American Constitution, its real goal is topromote a new (institutionalist) mode of comparative government that explicitlyincludesboth American and non-American systems. We needtotranscendtheexistingdichotomy betweenresearchontheThirdWorld andstudiesoftheindustrialized countries, and we must overcome the ethnocentric assumption that theAmerican formulafordemocratic self-governance canand shouldbeemulatedelsewhere; but we must alsoremain humble, foreven thebest predictions arenecessarily flawed by chance happenings. Let us hope that we can establish someprobabilities even if we cannot demonstrate any certainties.Systemic VariablesThe variables in any regime that belong to its constitution are systemic. Iuse this wordin itsminimal sense of a set of interacting and interdependent parts. These partsinclude the basic rules governing political behavior and the authoritative allocation ofvalues, whether or not they are written out in a charter.When one speaks of an unwritten &dquo;constitution,&dquo; as in the British case, this is whatonemeans. However, becausewrittenConstitutions (charters)play suchanimportant part in the design of contemporary regimes, we are easily confused. Tokeep the two concepts distinct, I use &dquo;Constitution&dquo;or &dquo;charter&dquo;to mean a writtendocument, as formally amended and interpreted by judges; whereas &dquo;constitution&dquo; at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 251willbe used for any setof basic rules and practices governing political conduct,whether written or not. I also use &dquo;regime&dquo; in a special sense, to designate a politicalsystem characterized by a constitution, i.e.&dquo;thestructureof political forms&dquo;(Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 130). The actual practices of those who rule may or maynot conform to constitutional prescriptions;regime collapse in most Third Worldcountries results from the seizure of power by military groups.5The survival of a regime depends not only on the viability of its written charter butalso on the force of its unwritten prescriptions. I argue that some necessary features ofthe American constitution are not prescribed in its Constitution. Thus the survival ofa presidentialist regime may be possible only if some rules not expressed in its charterare followed. Most writers on the American government, I believe, tend to think ofthese rules as optional practices or historical accidents rather than as necessary partsof theconstitution. However, if these norms areessentialtothe survival of theAmerican constitution, then they should be viewed as part of it, not as incidentalpractices.In my &dquo;systemic&dquo;analysis, I speak of allthe necessary features of Americanpresidentialism, whetherornot they are formally embodiedinitswrittenConstitution, as its para-constitutional rules. Some para-constitutional features areprescribed inthe Constitution, buttheir importance forthesurvivalofpresidentialism isnot well recognized. I cannot, therefore, use the term &dquo;unwrittenconstitution,&dquo; since parts of the American para-constitution can be found initswritten Constitution. After considering several possible synonyms, Idecided to usepara-constitution.6 6Para-Constitutional featuresThose who write presidentialist Constitutionsarewellaware of allthe featuresexplicitly prescribed in the American Constitution but, like Americans, they failtorecognize its (invisible) para-constitutional features and, like Americans, they mayview them as historical accidents or undesirable options. Some of these features areadmittedly costly since they violate some fundamental democratic values, as we seelater. However, if they are necessary survival costs, omitting themcondemnswould-be presidentialist regimes to failure.Two kinds of comparisons help uncover the para-constitutional features of theAmerican constitution. First, one can discover through case studies when the absenceof a para-constitutional norm contributes to the collapse of a presidentialist system.At this stage I can offer only reasonable suspicions, and cannot be sure which featuresof American politics are really para-constitutional.Empirical research outside theUnited States should,however, strengthen or disconfirmthese guesses.Second,comparisons with parliamentary systems will reveal what makes them work betterthan presidentialist ones. One can discover, thereby, some of the main pitfalls in anypresidentialistregime, and also highlight,by contrast, the compensatory (para-constitutional) features that permit itto survive in the USA.InthenextsectionIfirstdiscusstheessentialdistinctionsbetweena&dquo;presidentialist&dquo; and a &dquo;parliamentary&dquo;constitution, from which Ithen identify themost important problems or difficulties confronted by any country that emulates theAmerican presidentialist model. The remaining sectionsof thisarticle speculateabout the para-constitutional (systemic) features of the American constitution thatmay help explain itssurvival. Ishould emphasize that this approach by no means at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 252condemns presidentialism as a &dquo;bad&dquo; system. Like a piece of intricate machinery, itmay be hard tomaintain but wonderful when itworks.The system surely hastrade-offs:itsbest features produce exciting rewards but itsworst features entailseverecosts. (Non-systemic contextualandenvironmentalfeaturesofNorthAmerican geography, history and culture are needed for a fuller explanation, as notedabove, but lack of space prohibits their discussion here.)The Comparative FrameworkA state qualifies as a &dquo;modern polity&dquo;only if it institutionalizes elected assemblies inaddition to itsexecutive institutions.7 Moreover, modern polities can maintain anopen political system, only if their elected assemblies exercise genuine power. Suchpower bothresultsfromand supports a competitivepartysystem. Bothparliamentary and presidentialist constitutions prevail inmodern open regimes.Their survival depends on maintaining a balance between: ( 1 ) a politically powerfulelected assembly, and (2) an executive power (head) that is capable of governing.Structurally, the former must consistof a plurality of individualsabletomakeunpredictable decisions, after debate, by taking votes. The latter requires that oneperson have the capacity and administrative support needed tomake importantpolitical decisions promptly and clearly, after takingcompeting forcesandconsiderations into account.&dquo;Presidentialist&dquo; vs. &dquo;Parliamentary&dquo; ConstitutionsThe coexistence of two such complementary but potentially contradictory institutionsin the same polity generates a serious problem: how to accommodate them to eachother. Single-party regimes do not have this problem because the elected assemblycan only support the head and hence lacks autonomous power.Where assemblies have power, two solutions are found: the &dquo;parliamentary&dquo; andthe &dquo;presidentialist.&dquo; The crucial difference is whether or not the head of governmentcan be replaced by an assembly vote.When the head of government must followpoliciesapproved by parliament and cannot remain in officeaftera vote of noconfidence, we have a parliamentary regime. By contrast, when the head retains officedespite congressional opposition, the regime is presidentialist. Such heads can blockthe enactments of congress (as by a veto) and often execute policies not endorsed bythe assembly:although not the essence of presidentialism, theseareitsnaturalconsequences and they pose severe problems that are not easily solved. However, thepara-constitutional norms found inAmerica permit solutionstothese problems,though never without strain.Dilemmas of PresidentialismIn any presidentialist constitutionthe separation of the powers of thePresident(head) and the Congress (assembly)generates atleastfour basic problems:(1)executive/legislative confrontations; (2) paralysis of the assembly; (3) weaknesses ofthe party system; and (4) the politics of the court. Comparative analysis will show, Ibelieve, that one or all of these difficulties has led to the collapse, especially by coupd6tat and martial law, of more than 30 presidentialist regimes outside the USA. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 253Moreover, these four key obstacles to the survival of presidentialist regimes scarcelyarise as major issues in parliamentary systems.We need to distinguish between those parts of the American Constitution that arenecessary for its survival as a presidentialist regime, and others that could be changedwithout significance for the regime type. For example, its rule for the indirect electionof presidents via an electoral college reflects a political compromise that has little orno meaningtoday, norhasit anyapparentpara-constitutional value. Toughprovisions for amending the Constitution may hamper its adaptability to changingconditions, and one might argue that easier rulesfor revising the charter wouldfacilitate the survival of presidentialism.A presidentialist system may be federal or unitary. The American Constitutionprovides for a federal distribution of power, and although this provision appears tohave no para-constitutional significance, I try to show that a federal-presidentialistsystem has a much greater survival potential than a unitary-presidentialist system. Icannot analyze allthe interesting featuresof theAmerican Constitution here,however; instead I focus on some para-constitutional features that contribute to thesurvival of presidentialism in America, whether or not they are stipulated inthewritten Constitution. No doubt there are others.Exemtive/Legislative ConfrontationThe most critical contradiction found in a presidentialist regime, by definition, is thestructural antagonism between itshead and itselected assembly, since each has afixed term of office and neither can suspend the other for political reasons withoutviolating theconstitution.The impeachment power granted to Congress intheAmerican Constitution does not violatethisrule since itinvolves only illegal orunconstitutional acts rather than public policies disapproved by the congress, andeven a successful impeachment would only replace the president by another memberof the same political party. Although the president can veto acts of congress, such aveto stands only when at least a third of the members of congress vote to sustain it,and the loss of a veto does not compel the head to resign, as no-confidence votes do inparliamentary systems. Although the American Constitution stipulates a distinctionbetween &dquo;Legislative&dquo; and &dquo;Executive&dquo; powers, these functions overlap so much thatgovernance is feasible only when both the president (head) and congress (assembly)can agree on important political issues.~ 9By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the head (prime minister) and the cabinet(i.e. the &dquo;government&dquo;) can be discharged by a vote of no confidence, or the headmay dissolvethe assembly(parliament) andconductnew elections.Asinapresidentialist system, there is continual tension between head and assembly, but thistension does not paralyze the regime because, when itbecomes acute, itcan beresolved by a &dquo;cabinetcrisis.&dquo;In a parliamentary system, therefore, the terms ofoflice of head and assembly cannot be fixed, but have to be held indeterminately,always subject to termination on short notice.No doubt these ground rulesarefamiliartoall political scientists, buttheirimplications for the survival of presidentialism in the United States have not beenexamined by American political scientists.At least they have not explained howhead/assembly (executive/legislative) confrontations are resolved inthe Americansystem when, by contrast, they so often destroy other presidentialist polities. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 254Paralysis of the AssemblyThe responsibilities thrust upon &dquo;congress&dquo; in a presidentialist system far exceedthose that burden &dquo;parliament&dquo; in a parliamentary system. A congress must make upits own collective mind on all major issues, independently of the recommendations ofthe president. Moreover, members of congress who reject a presidents recommen-dations may not suffer much, but they may lose their seats if they flout the preferencesof their electoral constituencies or those who fund their campaigns. Consequently theagenda of a congress becomes both vast and highly controversial, often leading toparalysis.By contrast, the agenda of a parliament is quite restricted.Since rejecting thegovernments recommendations (in a vote of no confidence) can cause a cabinetcrisis, there are serious political costs for voting against ones party. Members of themajority party (or coalition) need to accept government policy and minority membershave to reject it.No doubt serious parliamentary debates on major policies occur and,inthefinal test, votesofnoconfidenceare possible. The point isthattheparliamentary agenda is relativelysimple and manageable by contrast with theagenda of a congress, and there islittle danger of paralysis.Dissolution of Political PartiesTo be successful in a presidentialist polity, a political party must win a nationalmajority of all votes cast in presidential elections. (Insofar as members of congress areelected in single-member districts, the normal situation, winning parties must alsocommand a majority in these elections.) In view of the great heterogeneity of popularinterests and passions in any society, it is always difficult to win an electoral majorityfor any one candidate. That candidate (and his or her party) must straddle most ofthe controversial issues of the day, and must have a personal style and character thatappeals to a popular majority-the appearance, charm, inoffensiveness, voice, moralcharacter and ethnicity of candidates may be more important than the issues theychoose to debate.Because of theresourcesavailableto incumbents, itis always easiertowinre-election campaigns than it is to mobilize opposition votes. Consequently one of themost serious obstacles tothe perpetuation of an open presidentialist system arisesfrom the problem of how to sustain a viable opposition party. Normally the opponentsof any existing government form splinter parties representing a wide spectrum ofpositions and personal followings. They cannot coalesce intothe kind of centristcoalition capable of winning a popular majority. Although the difficulties inherent inthe organization of opposition parties in presidentialist polities are very noticeable,even government partiesexperience many problems; their leadership isdividedbetween the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and their need to straddlemajor issues dilutes their appeal, not only to ordinary voters but also to potentialactivists.These problems become more obviouswhen one considers,bycontrast, thedynamics of political parties in parliamentary systems. First,they do not need towin a national majority insofar as only members of parliament from the electiondistricts have to be chosen. Moreover, if multi-member districts are used, parties maysucceed politically even when they never command a popular majority. Israel isanextreme case, with only one national constituency forKnesset elections.Because at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 255parliamentary parties can adhere to well-defined policies and socially articulatedconstituencies, they can also enjoy the sustained loyalty of regular party members andvoting blocs.Put differently, political coalitions may occur in a parliament after elections havebeen held, whereas in a presidentialist system they must be formed prior to electionsinordertoassurea majority vote.This makes itmuch easierto organize andperpetuate political parties, including opposition parties, under parliamentary rulesthanunder presidentialist ones.Thisdifferencealsoenables parties inaparliamentary regime to perform many more functions than those that are viable forparties in a presidentialist system, including services specifically designed to sustainmembership and voter loyalties.The Politics of the CourtBecause of the inherent conflict between the powers of the president and the congress,itisdifficult to maintain presidentialist ground rules.Both the president and thecongress will try to shift the balance of power and decision-making. To maintain thesystem, therefore, a kind of political&dquo;umpire&dquo; isneeded. Such an umpire intheAmerican system isembodied inthe Supreme Court and,indeed, inthe wholejudicialsystem of subordinatecourts.For thecourtstoexercisethis umpiringfunction they must be politically shrewd enough not to discredit their authority or toimpose onerousdutiesonthe president or congress, and they must commandexceptionally broad popular support. In effect, they truly must form a &dquo;thirdbranch&dquo;of government, as prescribed in the American Constitution. In many presidentialistregimes the courts are not able to exercise this umpiring function effectively.By contrast, great judicial power is scarcely needed in other types of regime. In asingle-party regime, of course, the ruling party not only governs but itcan easilychange the constitution and so no umpire isneeded. No doubt, in parliamentarysystems,especially whenthereisawritten Constitution, acourt capable ofconstitutionalreview is necessary.10However, since parliament can discharge agovernment, and the electorate can reconstitute the assembly, the ultimate judge oftheconstitutionisthe people rather than a court. Moreover, the assembly inaparliamentarysystem-especially withanunwritten constitution, asinEngland-can amend the constitution by the same majority used to enact ordinarylaws. Hence there is little need for judicial review. No such authority can be given tothe congress in a presidentialist system. If congress were to be given the authority toamend the constitution, could presidentialism survive?Para-constitutional SolutionsIfthesefour problemsdo,indeed,posesystemic threatstothesurvivalofpresidentialist polities, then must we not ask how they have been solved in America?To the degree that para-constitutional ratherthan environmental or contextualfactorscan be found, they willinterest political scientistsinother presidentialistpolitiessimply because it may prove easier forthem to adopt such rules than toaccomplish ecological transformations. Moreover, explanations of thefailuresofpresidentialistregimes aremore persuasive when theydepend onverifiablepara-constitutional practices rather than on vague environmental conditions.Such considerations lead me, at least, to believe that it is important, when viewing at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 256American government in a comparativist perspective, to investigate the systemic(para-constitutional) features before considering explanations based on the cultural,geographic andhistoricalfactorswhichhave already receiveda good dealofattention,especially intheliteratureon Latin American politics.Moreover, thisapproach explicitly reverses the paradigm that blames other countries for their failureto make the American type of constitution work. Instead, it focuses attention on theintrinsic features of the constitution that make itmore or less viable.The President and CongressWhen serious tensions between president and congress arise in countries following theUS model, constitutionalism typically loses out. Since coercive weapons are availableto presidents, both ascommander-in-chief and as head of government, they candissolve the assembly and even, if it resists,have itsmembers arrested or executed.They then formally dissolve the Constitution and rule by martial law.More frequently, however, presidents also lose.When governments failto solvemajor issues,popular dissatisfactionleadsto uprisings orrevolutions. Althoughpopular revolutionary movements are not uncommon, much more frequently smallgroups of bureaucratic conspirators, headed by a few military officers, stage a coupdEtat,suspend congress, depose the president and set up new (unconstitutional)governments.1 IThe Presidents RoleTo explain the American success-its continued capacity to avoid the dissolution ofcongress or the replacement of the president by a coup group-we can look first at theway the presidents rolehasbeen played. Laterwe lookmore closely atthecongressional role.An underlying issue involves respect for constitutionally prescribed rules of thegame; a special sense of &dquo;constitutionalism&dquo;identifies it with respect for rules whichlimit the exercise of power. To distinguish this special meaning of &dquo;constitutionalism&dquo;from itsbroader sense of following any rules prescribed ina charter, one mightsubstitute &dquo;civility.&dquo;12 Any strong president, especially in times of war and other greatemergencies, is urgently motivated to defy a congress that refuses to support hispolicies.Reacting to negativepublic opinion, adversecourt decisionsand otherfrustrations, he may aggressivelyexpand the presidentspower and suppressopponents. Tempted by personal ambition, he may also dissolve congress and rule bymartiallaw. Ultimately, he may extendhistermin office,becoming a&dquo;president-for-life.&dquo;Fortunately for the American Constitution, although &dquo;imperial&dquo;presidents have pressed hard against thenorms of civility, inthelast analysisconstitutionalism, in this sense, ultimately has prevailed.The opposite of a strong presidency may, historically, have proven a greater threatto the American constitution. A presidents conduct may be unconstitutional in anegative aswellasa positive sense.Thus a weak president cannot provide theleadership needed to cope with difficult issues as they arise. When this happens in theThird World, as it frequently does, it often leads to a military coup.Although therehasbeenmuch variationbetweenthe stronger andweakerAmerican presidents, on the whole they have taken a middle way, avoiding bothexcessive weakness and overpowering strength. Even the weakest presidents were at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 257able to carry on the administration of government until their successors could beelected, and the stronger ones,especially wartime presidents, while they severelystrained relations with congress and court, ultimately respected these institutions andbacked away from trying to rule alone with military sanctions.The model set by George Washington as first president was especially important.As commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, he had a great deal of popularsupport, but he was not personally ambitious and he was even reluctant to serve aspresident or to seek a second term. By contrast in other presidentialist systems, themilitary leader responsible for independence, after being elected president, oftenbecomes the first to undermine the constitution through a personal dictatorship.Abraham Lincoln exceeded his authorized powers when confronting the Civil War,but his successor, Andrew Johnson, was impeached when he attempted to continueLincolns policies inthedefeatedSouth.Woodrow Wilson,writing in 1883/4,lamented the dangers involved in excessive congressional power at the expense ofcomplaisantpresidents. 1 Later, asa strong wartime president, he personallyexperienced the frustrations caused by profound disagreements with congress.Since Wilsons administration, and more recently those of Franklin D. Roosevelt,Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon, more has been written about the dangers ofan &dquo;imperial&dquo; than of a &dquo;complaisant&dquo;presidency. Current tensions between theadministration of Ronald Reagan and congress, as manifested in the Iran-Contrascandal and the subsequent &dquo;Gulf War&dquo;shows how difficult itstill isto maintain astablebalancebetween presidential and congressionalpower. To reversethequestion, we may ask how the unstable balance that has been maintained was kept.Election of presidentIt might be argued that American presidents have never faced such acute problems asthose that confront the presidents of similar regimes in other countries, but it wouldbe hard to prove such a proposition. Perhaps more testable propositions could bebased on the way American presidents are elected.The success of the American Constitution appears to require that its presidentswalk a narrow path between excessive dynamism and passivity. Since presidents areelected, we must investigate the electoral and party systems that select them. In theAmerican case, leaders strongly committed to a controversial position are unlikely togain the support of allthediversefactionswhose support isneededtowin apresidential election, provided there is a vigorous opposition party that can mobilizeopponents ofthecontroversial position. This argumentmay notholdinpresidentialist regimes with a hegemonic party since, in these countries, a presidentneeds only towin that partyssupport. If thisbe true, thenmaintenance of atwo-party system (see the &dquo;OppositionParty&dquo;section) isalso crucial to avoid theselection of immoderate presidents.The two-party system also prevents the nomination of an excessively complaisantperson since he would, assuredly, lose the election. Given the need for moderationattributable tothe two-party system, presidential candidates must avoid the mostdivisive issues, and their campaigns tendtofocusinsteadon personalities. Thewinner has to be a moderately able but compromising politician, one who can avoidboth activist and complaisant extremes.The American para-constitution includesafossilizedElectoral College which,whileitdoesnot operate asthefounders intended, does multiply a winning at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 258presidents electoral votes, thereby often creating the impression that he has won by alandslide.A constitutional reform that would directly measure popular votes forpresidential candidates, however desirable as a matter of democratic ideals, mightadversely affect the viability of the presidential office. By creating the illusion of agreat victory when the popular majority is very slim, the electoral college may reallystrengthen the position of otherwise weak presidents.Role of Cabinet MembersOne may also argue that the systemic constraints imposed on a president keep anyincumbent from straying far from the narrow path. The most important of theseconstraints is surely the congress itself.It is, after all, the congress which not onlyauthorizes the president to implement the policies enacted into law, but also deniespresidents the resources to move far beyond them. To explore this proposition Ilookmore closely(in the sectionon &dquo;CongressionalRole&dquo;) at the way the AmericanCongress works. But before doing that let us consider the role of &dquo;cabinet&dquo;as a linkbetween the head and assembly.In parliamentary systems this role is quite clear. Cabinet members are members ofparliament, and the cabinet istherefore a committee of the elected assembly (thereare exceptions such as the French Fifth Republic which, though parliamentary, hasborrowed presidentialist features). Parliamentary cabinets stand or fall together sincea vote of no confidence forces the government as a whole to resign, or it precipitatesnew elections. Not only does this compel cabinet members to reach policy agreementsamong themselves, but itforcesthe prime minister toaccommodate hisor herpersonal preferences to those of cabinet members. Failure to do so could precipitatethe resignation of one or more members (or parties) and a crisis of confidence thatwould overthrow the cabinet. A parliamentary cabinet also strengthens the hands ofthe prime minister insofar as he or she can count on the support of all its members,but italso compels the prime minister to defer to positions taken by anyone in thecabinet. In this sense a &dquo;prime minister&dquo;is literally only the first among equals.The cabinet in a presidentialist system cannot serve the same functions-to call it a&dquo;cabinet&dquo;is actually a misnomer, it might more precisely be called an &dquo;entourage.&dquo;Although itsmembers are nominated by the president and endorsed by the Senate,they do not stand or fall together as a real cabinet does.The authority of each&dquo;cabinet&dquo;member isthat of a department head necessarily selected from outsideCongress by the president. The president may discharge any such member at will andisnot obliged tofollowthe advice of thecabinet.This seems to strengthen thepresident but, in fact, it seriously weakens him: no doubt he has more personal powerthan a prime minister, but he has lessstructural capacity tocontrolthe electedassembly (Congress).Actually, cabinet members often follow departmental policies that conflict withthose of other members and even of the president. Reformers at various times haveciticizedthisloosecabinet structure,recommending thatlawsorconstitutionalamendments be adopted which would move the American system toward a tightcabinetstructurelikethatfound in England and other parliamentarysystems,thinking thereby to strengthen the presidency.However, a loose cabinet may, para-constitutionally, help to sustain the Americanpresidentialist system. Quite often department secretaries speak for powerful intereststhat restrain a president, and at the same time they, rather than the president, may at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 259spearhead projects designed to secure congressional endorsement for policies that arealso acceptable tothe president. Instead of working as a coalition to support thepolicies of the government in congress, they become autonomous actors in a dynamicpolitical arena, making bargains, winning some points and losing others. Since theirpersonal reputations will stand or fall with that of the president, they are motivated toshore up a weak president and constrain one who istoo dynamic.What arguments can be made to support this interpretation? Note first that poweris radically dispersed in the American political system, both within congress (see thesectionon&dquo;Committee Structure&dquo;) andalso among careerbureaucratswhoseinterests rise and fall with the autonomy of their bureau or department. Nominateddepartment heads are apt to secure senate endorsement only when and if they havethe support of powerful interest groups, committeesand public officialslinkedtogether in relatively autonomous &dquo;subgovernments&dquo; or &dquo;iron triangles.&dquo; But afterwinning congressional approval, cabinet members enable a president to take creditfor the successes won by his departmental secretaries and their staffs.So loose,indeed, isthe American cabinet structure that itseems tounderminepresidential leadership. The president must not only bargain with Congress, he hasalsotoaccommodatenumerous subgovernments foundwithintheexecutivebureaucracy. To overcome this essential weakness, American presidents increasinglyrely on a growing &dquo;executive office&dquo;of staff assistants accountable directly to them. Ittis formally organizedthrough such agencies astheOfficeof Management andBudget, and various advisory councils.At itscore isa small group of personalassistants, the White House Office,appointed without congressional review, whomust be highly sensitive to the personal preferences and style of their leader.The American &dquo;cabinet&dquo;isthus both a basic asset and a liability for Americanpresidents. The support of itsmembers makes success possible and they keep apresident from making fatal blunders. They are simultaneously a presidents alliesand enemies. They are as necessary as the cabinets in parliamentary government, butthe two institutionsare fundamentally different-it isunfortunate that we do nothave two terms for them. At least let us recognize that the organizational dynamics ofa parliamentary (tight) cabinet are quite different from those of a presidentialist(loose) cabinet.False analogies mislead some critics to think that the American system might workbetter if itscabinet were disciplined. However, its very looseness and the presidentsneed to bargain with each member may constitute an essential ingredient of thepara-constitutional formulathat permits theAmerican presidentialistsystem tosurvive.l4Congressional RoleA congress totallyunwilling toaccommodate itself toa presidents leadership orcontinuously insistent on policies repugnant to the president would create seriousimpasses regardless of who the president was. To sustain its authority, congress needsa power base that can protect itfrom attack by a frustrated president. Moreover, ifcongress could not handle the host of policy issues placed on its agenda, itwould beparalyzed by the sheer burden of legislating. Failures on any of these counts couldlead to collapse and military dictatorship. The American Congress has avoided thesepitfallsby means of three para-constitutional featuresthatenableittoavoidself-destructive battles with an unyielding president, to protect its authority and to do at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 260its work: ( 1 )party indiscipline and the presidents lead; (2) constituency orientation;and (3) committee structure.Party Indiscipline and the Presidents LeadA basic feature of the American &dquo;presidentialist&dquo; system is the lack of party disciplinein Congress. Of course indiscipline does not mean indifference. On some issues, suchas how the assembly istobe organized and who willreceivechoice committeeassignments, party discipline is actually strong. But on substantive policy issues, evenwhen party positions are clearly enunciated and carefully weighed, members oftenvote against theirown party,usually because of competing localorcommitteecommitments. Some observers criticize this behavior. Citing the high levels of partyobedience normally found in parliamentary regimes, they argue that indisciplineleadsto legislativeanarchy.However,partyindisciplinemay bea necessarycondition for the success of a presidentialist regime where, if party discipline wereenforced, the capacity of government to govern would be severely impaired wheneverthe president belonged to one party and the opposition party had a congressionalmajority. &dquo;Most of the laws approved by Congress come from the Executive Branch eventhough, as mandated by the Constitution, legislation should originate in Congress.However, the passage of administration measures requires the support of someoppositionparty members whenever that party has a majority. Otherwise therewould be relentless stalemate in Congress or the opposition would continuously passlaws unacceptable to the president and subject to his vetoes. Such a governmentalimpasse creates the very conditions that lead to coups or the usurpation of power by apresident. Some party indiscipline, therefore, is a para-constitutional necessity so thatCongress can endorse a more-or-less coherent array of public policies supported bythe president. The structural reasons for party indiscipline are apparent-above allthe inability of Congress to discharge the government.The ability of a president to win support from opposition members of Congressobviously needsmorethan personal charm and persuasiveness, or appeals topatriotism. Typically it requires offers of a quid pro quo, for example quite tangiblebenefits in exchange for cooperation on specific bills. In short, patronage and &dquo;pork&dquo;support for projects demanded by a members constituents are needed in order tosecure enough votes to pass many measures sought by the chief executive.Constituency OrientationBut why should members of Congress be willing to give priority to local constituencyinterests and reject their own partys leadership? This behavior is possible only in thecontext of a highly decentralized pattern of party organization.In parliamentary regimes, political parties need enough control over nominationsto assure party discipline in assembly votes.To maintain that discipline,partiessupport only candidates willing to follow party guidelines. When loyal candidatescannot be found ina given district, the party may even parachute in outsiders,something completely unacceptable in American political practice. In parliamentarysystems, however, strong party organization armed with a coherent set of policies andguidelines can be achieved.By contrast, inthe American presidentialistregime, the party system rewards at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 261sensitivity to localinterests.This necessity arises fundamentally from the need tosecure electoral majorities in every election, at every level.The national majorityneeded to elect a president is replicated in every electoral district where majorities arealso needed to elect members of Congress, governors, state legislators, mayors andmembers of city councils. No national party can select candidates capable of winningsuch local majorities. This fundamental dynamic has been reinforced by the system ofelectoral primaries, which enablescandidatestosecure party endorsement evenagainst the preferences of a partys leadership.IntheAmerican system,therefore, candidatesneedtoestablish strong localfollowings before they can secure their partys endorsement, and electoral victorythereafter requires enhancedlocal support. Butsuch supportalways carriesobligations. As a result, a congressional party caucus cannot control the votes of itsown members except on clearly partisan issues. Instead, the indebtedness of membersto local constituents impels them to trade votes for favors from the executive branchwhen itcan help their supporters.Committee StructureA third para-constitutional feature of the American Congress derives from a differentsource, namely the extremely heavy workload or agenda that must be carried by anyassembly obliged to review and vote on an extraordinarily large number of bills. Bycontrast, members of a parliament are routinely called upon to endorse (or reject) themeasures sponsored by their cabinet, but they have to think seriously about theircontent only when major questions arise where a vote of no confidence may occur. Ofcourse they are free to heckle the government in question periods and the oppostionmay debate policies whenever they think public interest might enhancetheirprospects in future elections. But such debates are not really expected to influencevotes on most measures.Members of Congress, whose terms of office are as fixed as those of the president,are compelledby theConstitutiontoreachautonomous legislativedecisions,regardless of where bills originate. No doubt they can simplify their task by refusingtoconsidermost of thebillsthataretabled. However, since many importantmeasures do need careful attention, responsibility has to be delegated to committeesor, in the contemporary American Congress, to a host of subcommittees. 16This arrangement is para-constitutional: it is a necessary condition for the survivalof the system. By devolving responsibility for the bulk of legislation to its subsystems,congress reduces its plenary debate agenda to a manageable level. Members can limittheir span of attention in plenary sessionstoa few special issues by giving theirapproval, after cursory review, to most committee recommendations. Nevertheless,everyone has the opportunity, when hard-pressed, to raise any question to the level ofa general debate.A fundamental consequence ofthis compartmentalization of congressionaldecision-making, of course, is an extreme dispersal of power. Autonomous &dquo;empires&dquo;or &dquo;subgovernments&dquo; appear, sometimes referred to as &dquo;iron triangles&dquo; because theylink the interests of bureaucratic agencies and private interest groups with those ofcongressional subcommittees. The iron triangles, in turn, compromise the ability of apresident tocommand the publicbureaucracy, each of whose many componentbureaux and divisions acquires a great deal of autonomy. Responding lesstotheauthority of the president than to congressional committees, they can pursue their at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 262own purposes ina sustained way regardless of who comes and goes in the WhiteHouse. Although this obviously hampers presidential leadership, itresults from apara-constitutional feature of the system, and may provide a kind of systemic stabilitythat could be jeopardized by the sweeping reforms of a strong president.Paradoxically, thisalsomeans thatbureaucratic power, which is great inallcontemporarypolities, ismore conspicuous butless potent intheAmericanpresidentialist system than it is in most parliamentary systems. Because parliamentshave little need for specialist committees, bureaucrats typically have no incentive tolobby publicly (indeed, they are typically forbidden to do so) nor to mobilize citizensgroups to support their projects. Instead, they can quietly and secretly exercise powerby meansof policy &dquo;advice&dquo;tocabinetministers. Appointed officialsinapresidentialist system lack such insider power and they must, therefore, not only seekoutside support for their programs, but remain sensitive to constituency interests inorder to survive.Even atthe cabinet level (as noted inthe &dquo;Roleof Cabinet Members&dquo;sectionearlier) departmental secretaries are torn between loyalty to the president and theirneed to accommodate both their official subordinates and congressional committees.In fact, the most serious political problem faced by an American president isnot somuch tension with Congress as the need, somehow, to achieve more coherence andorder among dispersed and effectively autonomous bureaucratic subsystems in theexecutive branch of government.Members of Congress,individually, findthemselves cross-pressured on threedimensions: partisan,geographic and sectoral.The most conspicuous and publicdimension is, no doubt, the partisan insofar as members are expected to follow theleadership of their own party. However, much of their power is expressed throughcommittee membership in which sectoral interests, notably those associated with the&dquo;iron triangles,&dquo;prevail. The availability of &dquo;special interest&dquo; campaign funds-especially through &dquo;PoliticalAction Committees&dquo;-has become an increasinglydecisiveconstrainton legislative action.But equallyimportant, the geographicinterestsof theirhome constituenciesalso play a major part inthe decisionsoflegislators, who must necessarily support activities which have visible appeal to thepeople (or groups) in their home districts. Obviously these geographic, sectoral andpartisan obligations intersect and often compete with each other. They promote partyindiscipline and a fragmented, uncoordinated political style: the trade-offs needed tomaintain the system.Although various geographic and culturalfactorsalsoaffectthe capacity ofAmerican legislatures to survive,they are essentially contextualor ecological incharacter and may therefore be treated as historical accidents. However, the systemicfeatures explained abovearenotrandomaccidentsbut may be regarded aspara-constitutional necessities for the survival of any presidentialist system.Party SystemSeveralfeaturesofthe politicalparty andelectoral systemappear tohavepara-constitutional implications: the low level of turnout at elections, high campaigncosts, propensity to vote, maintenance of an effective opposition party, the presence offederalism, ballot length and privatization. A few remarks about each are in order. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 263Voter ApathyOne of the paradoxes and limitationsof a presidentialistsystem of governmentappears to be voter apathy. Despite its long history and the apparent commitment ofAmericans to representative democracy, voting turnout is notably lessin the USAthan in virtually all parliamentary governments. I? We normally assume, of course,that popular participation inelectionsis necessary forthe healthof democraticinstitutions. However, sad to say, a low voter turnout seems to be a cost entailed byvarious para-constitutional aspects of a presidentialist system. In addition, itcouldevenbea para-constitutional feature.No doubtthis hypothesis willbe hotlycontested, and certainly American reformers, commentators, politicians and civicsteachers uniformly advocate higher electoral participation. Nevertheless, thereisreasontobelievethatifturnoutlevelsweremuch higher, the capacity of apresidentialist regime to survive would be sorely taxed. To explain this conclusion, Iconsider all the interdependent features listed below.Campaign CostsFor a political campaign to succeed in a presidentialist system, it must win a nationalmajority vote. To finance such a campaign, enormous expenses are involved. Untilthe 1880s these costs were moderated by reliance on volunteers who campaigned inthe expectation that victory would win them jobs, under the &dquo;spoils&dquo;system. Theexpansion of the merit system, while it undoubtedly improved the quality of publicadministration, alsomadeAmerican parties more dependent onfinancialcontributions by those who expected to benefit, for the most part, from conservative,property-oriented public policies.Inrecentdecades campaign costshaveescalated fantastically withthedevelopment of television. Individual candidates for president must now raise hugesums to pay for media blitzes in order to secure their partys nomination and then theelection. Candidates for congressional seats and gubernatorial office have to do thesame thing,though on a smaller scale.In addition to radio and TV advertising,substantialadditional expenditures areneeded for consultants,polling,money-raising, travel and countless related costs.&dquo;Politicalaction committees&dquo; (PACs),oriented to special interests,increasingly play a dominant role inthe financing ofcontemporary American political campaigns. Admittedly, candidates for uncontestedoffices (usually local) can often win with quite modest budgets. ~8Successful candidates, not surprisingly, are deeply beholdentotheinterestsbacking their campaigns. Such interestsare usually seenas antagonistic totheinterests of the poor, who constitute a majority of the population. Although lip-serviceis typically given in party platforms to social policies that would help poor people,such policies compete with those favored by much more powerful interests committedto the free-enterprise system and the property rights on which itrests.Propensity toVotePolling results tell us that active voters are mainly the better educated (and hence alsothe more comfortable) segments of the population. 19 The higher the level of popularparticipation in voting, the greater would be the contradiction between the intereststhatfinance politicalcampaigns andtheinterestsof the votingmajority. The at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 264presidentialistsystem,therefore, works most smoothly when voting participationremains fairly low, and those able to finance campaigns see that their interests will bewell served. By contrast, of course, in parliamentary systems the more radical parties,advocating socialist, labor or peasant interests, are able to generate much widerparticipation among poorer segments of the population.A conspicuous reason for the skewed distribution of voters can be found in thesubstance of party platforms. In order to secure the support of a majority of voters-a majority required by the arithmetic of a winner-take-all presidential competition-these platforms have to take ambiguous stands on many issues that divide publicopinion. But such issues are also likely to attract the greatest interest, especially thatof poor people. Strong stands for or against the &dquo;right to life,&dquo;&dquo;prayer in publicschools&dquo;or &dquo;equalrights&dquo; for minorities and women, while activating large votingblocs, also create a host of enemies.By contrast, declarationsindefense of &dquo;motherhood,&dquo; of patriotism(nationaldefense), of social justice (in the abstract) and of high levels of employment-accom-panied, of course, by condemnations of &dquo;bureaucracy,&dquo; of excessive &dquo;taxation,&dquo; ofdrug trafficking and crime-are unlikely to offend any large body of voters. But sad tosay, they also fail to generate much enthusiasm, especially among the poor. The pricefor high voter turnout is lively and divisive political controversy, whereas low turnoutislinkedto apathy andindifference. 20Thisisnotto say, of course, thatnon-participation by the poor and deprived isa virtue. Quite the contrary; a livelyand just democracy would surely represent allcitizens.The rules and motivationsfoundin parliamentary democraciesaremore apt tostimulate widespreadinvolvement than are the rules of a presidentialist republic. Or, to put the negativecase, mass participation isless threatening to the survival of parliamentary than ofpresidentialist regimes.Non-voters in America are typically more apathetic than alienated. Having little togain by voting, they assume that government will manage without them and theyprefer to improve their personal lot by non-politicalactivity. Their attentionisfocused, above all, on the quest for money and consumer goods, on sports, onTV-watching, on religion, even on culture and the arts. They prefer to leave the&dquo;nasty business of politics&dquo; to &dquo;politicians&dquo; and &dquo;bureaucrats,&dquo; people who are seenas unavoidably necessary and sometimes oppressive, but also usually as no menace toordinary life and sometimes even as protectors of freedom and human rights. Viewedin this light, the low level of voter turnout in American elections, although a sign offailure fordemocratic values,may also be viewed asa factor contributing tothesurvival of the system.The Opposition PartyFailure to vote does not undermine the openness of presidentialist systems, but amore serious threat in many countries arises from the inability of an opposition partyto win elections. To account for this failure, remember that parties in a presidentialistsystem cannot perform many of the functions typically associated with parliamentaryparties.They cannot formulate coherent and specificpublic policies,they cannotcontrol the votes of their members in congress, they cannot control the nomination ofcandidates for election; they can only ratify and legitimize the campaigns of those whoare most successful in gaining personal support for their candidacy. Moreover, theycannot perform the host of supplementary functions often associated with parties in at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 265parliamentary systems, such as insurance, housing and jobs. Such functions can beperformed by any party that needs only to command the votes of a stable electoralminority, but not by one that has to seek the support of an electoral majority.Because parliamentary parties have many functions,they can readily survivedefeat. They continue to perform non-political functions valued by their members.Voters committed to the specific goals of a parliamentary party continue to support itin defeat. Moreover, such parties can win seats in parliament (perhaps the cabinet)even though they cannot command a popular majority. This also means that everyvoteina parliamentary electioncounts bybuildingsupport for minorityrepresentation.By contrast, in presidential elections, voters for the losing partys candidates mayfeel they have gained nothing and wasted their time.There are few incentivestoinduce them to remain loyal to a defeated party. Party &dquo;membership&dquo; is usually weakor non-existent. Only a small core of party &dquo;activists&dquo;remain faithful in times offailure 21and those who votewith a winning majoritymay even feelthattheirindividual votes do not count since the majority would have won anyhow.Above all, most voterscannotbeenthusiasticabout politicalparties whosegeneralized platforms reflect little but compromises. They see small reason to favorone party above another, and often say that the real choice isbetween two evils, aperception shared with parliamentary systems having single-member constituencies,as inBritain and Canada. Apathy not only keeps citizens from the polls, but inAmerican elections one easily senses the indifference of fellow voters.Financial supporters of a victorious party can, of course, expect various rewards.Generous contributors expect tobe well treated, especially with regard totheimportant policies they favor. Quid pro quo contracts are more likely to be awardedin local rather than national politics, but winning officials find various means to helpsustain and invigorate their own party, especially by patronage. By contrast, thosewho contribute to a losing party can expect few rewards. Without powerful patrons,losing parties in a presidentialist polity typically split into many small parties, eachbased on personal allegiance to a leader and commitment to specific causes that onlysmall parties can espouse.However, themorecommittedtosuchcausesthesupporters of fragmented parties are, the more unwilling they become to cooperate insupport of a middle-of-the-road coalition party that might realistically expect to gainthe support of an electoral majority.Tolerance and FederalismDespite thesenaturalobstaclestothemaintenanceof asuccessful opposition,opposition parties in the United States not only survive but are able to win electionsfrom time to time. Their success is, indeed, one of the essential keys to the long-termsurvival of the US presidentialist system. How do we explain it?One reasonrelatestotolerance.When the parties, asinsome presidentialistsystems, view their opponents with deep hostility, thevictorious party seekstodestroy its defeated opponent. However, in the American system, the rival parties areso bland and similar that while the winners typically denounce their opponents, theydo not try to suppress them. The competing parties are more like rival football teamsor fraternities; each would liketowin but neitherwillbe destroyedby defeat.However, this is only a negative consideration. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 266More importantly, the survival of opposition parties in America is attributable tothe continuing vitality of federalism-and of spoils. Self-governing institutions at thestate level-and in municipalities and rural jurisdictions-enable a party that isdefeated nationally toretain power instateand local government. Such partiesmaintain their organizational vitality because the rewards of success are available tothem locally. Significantly, the spoils system for appointing public officials continuesto prevail inlocal government and isstill widespread nationally.Although thepractice iscondemned as harmful to good administration, itsustains the vitality oflocal party organizations. Thus an administratively inefficient process may be quitefunctional for the continuation of open politics in a presidentialist regime.Since, for reasons explained above (in the section on &dquo;PartyIndiscipline&dquo;), thebasic structure of American party organizations isboth indisciplined and localized,the viability of local parties does not depend on national victories. Indeed, one shouldthink of American national parties as shifting coalitionsbased on the support ofautonomous local parties and diverse socioeconomic interest groups, especially thoseincreasingly represented by &dquo;Political Action Committees,&dquo; or &dquo;PACs.&dquo; Consequent-ly, when national politicalcampaigns are organized, the opposition formsasacoalitionof successfullocal party organizations, and itcan sometimes win thepresidency,especially when theincumbenthasmade conspicuous mistakesorsuffered from humiliating policy defeats, when the economy is foundering, when theruling partys candidate is personally unattractive, or when rampant corruption andinefficiency in government prevails.Party indiscipline in congress is replicated by split voting in the precincts. Just aslegislators often put constituency interests ahead of party loyalty, so electors may votefor the candidates of different parties-one candidate for president but a rival partyscandidate for Congress. Thus the strength of local party organizations, based onfederalism and spoils, helps explain both the ability of an opposition coalition to winthe presidency, and the fact that one party can win the presidency while the oppositeparty gains a majority in Congress. When this happens, the support of members ofCongress also helps to sustain the party that failed to win the presidency.As noted above, strong local party organization also dictates the localist orientationof members of Congress and supports the party indiscipline needed to keep the systemfrom collapsing. We may conclude that federalism is,therefore, not a completelyseparate aspect of the American Constitution but isa para-constitutional featureneeded to assure the survival of an open presidentialist regime. To the degree thatcountries emulating the American presidentialist model are unitary, not federal, thisstructural difference helps to account for their difficulties. This is not to say, of course,thatfederalismand parliamentarism are incompatible. It may wellbethatparliamentary federal systems work better than those that are unitary, but I wouldadd that a unitary parliamentary system has better survival prospects than a unitarypresidentialist system.Long BallotsElectors in a centralized parliamentary government may concentrate on the selectionof members of Parliament. Because they usually have strong party identifications,their choices are further simplified; after deciding which party best expresses theirinterests, they can easily vote for all of its candidates. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 267In the American federal/presidentialist system, by contrast, voters must not onlychoose among candidates for legislative and executive office at three or more levels ofgovernment, but they mustalsoselectfromnumerousnomineesforotheroflices judges, district attorneys, school board members-and they are expected toparticipate in party primaries to help select candidates. Although candidates oftenhave party labels, split voting means that choices based on complex assessments ofpersonal competence and appeal are salient. (In parliamentary systems, by contrast,it is more common for voters to support their party, regardless of candidate-which isnotto say thatthe personalqualities ofacandidateare irrelevant.) Sincepresidentialist voters may also have to make difficult policy choices in a referendum,conscientious citizens must invest a lot of time when preparing to vote. Indeed, thechoices required of American voters are so numerous and problematic that manypotential citizens just want to avoid the trouble of voting. In California, according toHerbert Alexander, director of the Citizens Research Foundation, 200 or more votingdecisions are required of each citizen. Those with less education or free time find sucha responsibility truly onerous. Satisfied that others can make better choices, they mayrationalize their abstention by arguing that it makes little difference who wins (Pious,1986: 140).One of the classic reforms promoted by American political scientists involves thesubstitution of short for long ballots,making many posts appointive rather thanelective.It was argued that this change would greatly increase the level of citizenparticipation inelections.Some claimthatthereismore &dquo;democracy&dquo; intheAmerican electoral system than in others simply because voters make more choices.In this sense, those who vote are, indeed, more involved in the political process. Buttothe degree that fewer citizens vote, the system islessdemocratic.Given thistrade-off, Iwould agreethat, ifshorterballots encourage more people to vote,democratic idealswillbe enhanced. However, interms of system survival, lowturn-outisa positive factor.To put it baldly, one price forthesurvivalof apresidentialist system may be the barriers it puts in the way of popular participationin elections. No doubt this is unpalatable to those who think of the presidentialistsystem as an ideal form of democracy.The inherently elitist character of presidentialist democracy becomes apparent atthelocallevel.The more localelectedofficersthere are, themore one findsincumbents committed to a political party and willing to sustain itinthe face ofwidespread voter apathy. After all, to win an election one only needs a majority ofthose who do vote. Moreover, to maintain an open presidentialist system we need twoviable parties, each capable of winning electoral majorities. Thus it may be that thesurvivalof a presidentialistsystem is incompatible with high levelsof voterparticipation. If a large electoral turnout is desired, the easiest way to achieve it is bycommand, asin single-party dictatorships, or by minority representation, asinparliamentary systems.So long as locally based party organizations can sponsor many office-holders-both by election and by spoils-the resource base needed to support the nationalelectoral campaigns of two major parties can survive. The trade-off is between moredemocratic participation and the survival of an open presidentialistsystem. If agreater voter turnout leads to system collapse and dictatorship, then what is the gainfor democracy? Alternatively, a transformation leading to some kind of parliamentaryregime might produce a system that could be both more popular and more open. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 268Prir~atizationNo doubt many Americans do invest a lot of energy in elections and polls, but morefrequently than not they involve private rather than public organizations. One mightsuppose that experience gained in private elections would enable voters to participatemore actively and intelligently in public elections. However, there may be a kind ofbacklash. Many individualsfind participation in private elections-in churches,trade unions, professional societies, corporate boards and ethnic associations-veryinteresting because their votes count a lot and because they have a personal stake inthe outcome. By contrast, they often find public elections boring and they think theirindividual votes count for little, so why should they bother?Another conclusion-admittedly speculative-might by that the multiple outletsfor private&dquo;political&dquo; action by Americans greatly reducestheirdemands ongovernment. People find so many non-governmental channels for their energies andthe satisfaction of their wants that they downgrade the significance of government.Moreover, to the degree that government itself can privatize public functions, as bytransferring them to corporations and non-profit organizations, it may simplify thetasks of governing. Were it not so, governing a large-scale industrial society by meansof an extremelyclumsy formulafor representativegovernment wouldbecomeunmanageable, provoking the kinds of collapse that occur in all other presidentialistpolities.Admittedlyprivate interestscanalsomobilize support for costlygovernmental policies: thus the net impact of privatization may be indeterminate.More data are needed to support a stronger conclusion.Moreover, reliance on private organizations may be viewed as a contextual ratherthan a systemic (para-constitutional) feature of American governance. No doubt itexists also in parliamentary systems. However, it may have a special importance in apresidentialist system. One way to reward the financial supporters of costly electoralcampaigns isto sponsor thetransfersof many governmental responsibilities tonon-governmental organizations. The current Reagan administration is, of course,strongly committed to such &dquo;privatization&dquo; and it depends on the capitalist(freeenterprise)system to manage many tasksthat might otherwisebehandled bygovernment. Accordingly it may be that the propensity of American government toshirk responsibility for many tasks isa para-constitutional feature that helps ittosurvive.2Does the same argument apply to political parties? As noted above, parliamentaryparties perform many functionsnot performed by American politicalparties. Sodiluted, indeed, have the functions of these parties become that they do littlemorethan ratify nominees for public officeand manage their campaigns. Increasingly,autonomousPACs financethe candidates,especiallyduring the pre-electoral&dquo;primaries.&dquo; The representation of specific political interests is handled by a host ofprivate associationsandtheir lobbyists ratherthan bypoliticalparties. Theprivatization of political parties has stripped them of all but their core function. Thusthe continuation of a two-party system in a presidentialist regime, and hence itssurvival, may also require the privatization of most party functions.A fundamental contextual feature that also helps us explain the resilience of theAmerican presidentialist system isthe common law tradition which permits manyfunctionstobe handled privatelythat, inother countries,place burdens on thegovernment. Even more significantly, the common law helps us understand howAmerican courtscan independently relievean embattled presidentalism of many at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 269burdens, including many tasks of public administration, and also acquire the powerneeded to exercise the functions of judicial review, which we look at next.The Supreme Court and Constitutional ReviewThe maintenanceof aconstitutionwhichinstitutionalizesbothconfrontationsbetween president and Congress and a deeply problematic cleavage between federalandstate governmentsclearly needsa powerfulumpire, the Constitutionallymandated third (judicial) branch of government. The need for such an institution,however, by no means assures itsuccess.This point gains weight from comparative analysis:polities which emulate theAmerican presidentialist system are rarely able to maintain the practice of judicialreview. No doubt courts perform basic functions in all these countries, but when theychallenge the acts of a president or congress, they lack the power to enforce theirjudgments. Without defending this opinion here, letme ask how the AmericanSupreme Court sustains its authority to review acts of congress and the executive.23Atthe systemic levelwe may askwhat Supreme Court practices are para-constitutional. Because the answer to this question may not be persuasive by itself, Ineed also to consider two environmental (ecological) factors, namely the prevalenceof common law in America and the strong political position of the legal profession.Court DiscretionNo specific practices of the Supreme Court appear to explain its political potency, buta long tradition of political sensitivity has led the justices to avoid battles which theywould probably lose. Normally they select cases discreetly,reserving the right toreject not only those that would give them an excessive case load, but also those thatcreateno-win confrontations. 21 Moreover, they scrupulously deny themselves anovertly policy-making role, even when their decisions do, in fact, shape policy.Interestingly, the Constitition itself did not explicitly provide for constitutionalreview: Article 3 merely assigns &dquo;The Judicial Power of the United States&dquo;to theSupreme Court and such inferiorcourtsas Congressmay establish.AlexanderHamilton argued (Federalist Paper No. 78) that it would be the duty of the courts &dquo;todeclare allacts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.&dquo;No doubtothers shared his opinion, but that did not resolve the issue.It remained for the Court itself to set a precedent-a precedent that could be citedas strong evidence under the stare decisis traditions of the common law-in the famouscase of Marbury vs. Madison ( 18Q3). John Marshall, as chief justice, created a model ofcourt behavior that is as important for the survival of the American system as was theconduct of George Washington in creating a model for the presidency. Marshall couldhave destroyed the credibility of the Court by adopting either of the two obviousoptionspresented inthiscase-tocondemnMadisonsconfiscationofthecommissions for would-be justice William Marbury and others, or to accept thishigh-handed executive action.The former option would have placed the Court indirect conflict with the president, whereas the latter would have meant capitulation.In this apparently no-win dilemma, Marshall found a third option, relying on aprocedural question. Although at face value his decision diminished the power of theCourt, his claim that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to grant the Court at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 270primary jurisdiction in cases of this type shrewdly avoided confrontations with eitherthe president or Congress yet established a strong precedent for judicial review. Bothpresident and Congress, by accepting the decision, confirmed the Courts right toreview the constitutionality of their acts. 25It may be argued, however, that even the shrewdest decisions by a court could not,alone, generate enough power to adjudicate successfully the acts of Congress and thepresident. That the American Court could maintain so much power must, instead, beattributable tothe peculiar respect for court decisions entrenched in the commonlaw.26 Significantly, the countries in which presidentialist systems failed generallyhave codified legal systems in the civil law tradition.The Common LawWe need to recall the origins of common law in England as a type of customary lawframed by justices of the peace, typically local notables. When royal justices offeredcommoners a court of appeal against arbitrary actions by local magnates, the powerof the monarchy grew. In the British context royal courts became the guardians ofnew property rights claimed by a growing middle class without thereby destroyingthe vested rights of a landed aristocracy.As transferredto America, the rights of free enterprise became dominant, andaristocratic privilege-except in the Southern plantations-was not institutionalized.Put differently, American history began without feudalism. The &dquo;middleclass&dquo;didnot have to contend with an &dquo;upper class,&dquo; and so its values soon became dominant.Common law provided a well-entrenched basis for the development of capitalism inAmerica without requiring governmental intervention. As it evolved, the courts incommon law were autonomous and were viewed by the middle classes as bastions ofprivate property independent of state policy. In thiscontext the Supreme Courtbecame a great defender of property and contract, rights which were also guaranteedin the Constitution.27 For the Court to sustain the Constitution was also,then, tosafeguard property rights. On this premise the Supreme Court gained strong backingfrom a solid middle (capitalist) class.The importance of this point becomes more apparent when we considerthesituation in Europe, and especially in contemporary France. There feudal privilegespersisted untilthe late18th century, even though a centralizing monarchy cameincreasingly to support bourgeois interests by means of a royal bureaucracy whoseintendants,throughout the realm, facilitatedthesaleof land by impoverishedaristocrats and thereby supported social changes that favored the rising middle class.The French Revolution was directedasmuch against the last vestiges of feudalprivilege as it was against the monarchy, but in the aftermath of the revolution, legalchaos prevailed. To cope with this anarchy, the Napoleonic Code was prepared as acodifiedand state-imposed scheme for rationalizinglegal norms. However, thiscodified civil law had to be interpreted by government oflicials and the administrationof justice became bureaucratized, not politically autonomous as ithad developed inthe common law tradition.These environmental conditions seem to be so important when trying to explain thesuccess of judicial review in the American case that we cannot rely, in this instance,on a para-constitutional (systemic) argument. The point gains further weight whenwe consider the political importance of the legal profession. at St Petersburg State University on December 18, 2013 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from 271The Legal ProfessionIn countries with a civil law tradition, it is not difficult to learn the codes which offerthe basic principles of jurisprudence in a form that isboth relatively compact andsystematic. Law students even have time left over to study a wide range of non-legalsubjects.Moreover, becausetheadministrationof lawis bureaucratized, lawgraduates tend to enter the government service as officials. Lawyers do not form anautonomous professional class with its own power base.The common law tradition, by contrast, imposes on its students a long and difficultlearning process based on the case method, that is on studying precedents found in avast array of previous judgments. This method clearly takes a great deal of time andenergy. It produces a class of private legal practitioners who are not officials but areuniquely qualified to interpret and argue the law. They also have a great vestedinterest in the maintenance of a system which they alone fully understand and fromwhich they derive many benefits.Moreover, the preoccupation of law students with the study of legal cases at theexpense of other subjectsproduces akindof professional biasthatleadstoasingle-minded acceptance of legal precedents, and blindness to non-legal modes ofpolitical analysis and social interpretation. All those who use and benefit from legalservices support both the system and itsinnumerable practitioners.Because of itscommon law tradition, therefore, the United States has a stronglyentrenched legal profession, a well-respected and understood autonomous system ofcourts and judges, and a commitment to the rule of precedent which enables commonlaw to flourish. That tradition sustains the view that when the Supreme Court rendersa &dquo;landmark decision,&dquo; it truly expresses the supreme law of the land. After the Courtunambiguously asserted, in Marbury vs. Madison, its right to declare an act of Congressunconstitutional, that precedent not only became sacrosanct but italso rationalizedand defended the existing powers and privileges of the legal profession.To question the Courts power of judicial review, then, would be tantamount toundermining the whole system of law, justice, private property and sacred contracts.Widespread popular acceptance of the values inherent in the prevailing legal systemtended to turn public opinion against any efforts by the president or the Congress tolimit the Courts power. Moreover, the full financial weight of the ruling circles in acapitalist society could be mobilized to support a protective legal system and its apexorganization, the Supreme Court.No doubt thereareotherhistoricalandstructuralfactorsthatreinforcetheconstitutional powers of the Supreme Court in the American polity. For example,under the federal system each of the fifty states also has a supreme court with thepower of judicial review. Their own authority is buttressed by the authority of the USSupreme Court. Consequently, even when that Court declares a decision by a statecourttobe unconstitutional, thestatecourtcannot object without therebyundermining itsown authority.Hence, in order to reproduce the judicial reviewpowers of the Supreme Court at the state level they must also continuously reaffirmits validity nationally.In concluding, I may observe that the rules for amending the US Constitution areflexible enough tomake amendments possible once there is enough support frompublic opinion, but strict eno