RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-J-023

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RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-J-023

2009 8 500 1973 2008 35 1980 90 1990 2000

()

1

2009 8

1990 10 1

2

(1992) Miyajima and Kuroki (2007) BIS 1998 2000 10 90 2000 UFJ 2000 1 1990 500 1973 2008 35 (2001) 198097

2008 12 10 12 6 17 11 4.7%

1

3

1990 1990 3 2005 2006 2008 4 23 5

1973 3 2008 3 22 2 NEEDS-Financial-Quest

2

19737880838588909395969798992000010203040506 0708 3 3 07 3 08 3 07 3

4

(2001) 3 450 550 4

5 (2001) 198085 8590 9095 9597 4 95 952000 20002005 20052007 1 1990 1990 19952000 97.8 20002005 94.3%20052008 96.5% 3 4

5

5

198085 8590 9095 952000 5 200005 27 19 19952000 200005 200508 19952000 12 5 95 200005 27 7 2000 UFJ 200005 5.7 95

1973 61.91990 45 2000 2008 3 32.9 1970 1973 58 2008 26 35 197080 1990 69 3 1990 2008 19.2 35 1990 5 4

5

Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) 1990

6

2008 79.8%62000 205 2008 92.2 1 4 9 197080 90

2000 2000 4 2008 2.33 (2001) 1990 10 2000 96.1% 2005 2008 72.8% 10 2000 3 2008 4.80 Miyajima and Kuroki (2007) 2000 10 1 1973 2008 902008 89.5 ) 1990

2008 3 NEEDS-Financial-Quest 257 2007 3 4 2007 82.1 2008 79.8

6

7

0.7 2008 0.48 / 2008 3.78% 1985 1995 50 2008 36.4%

2001 3 2000 2007 3 2006 7 7 136 7 136 105 77.2 11.0 8.1% 3.7 7

8

2001 3 2000 2007 3 2006 7 7 159 10 8 159 110 7 69.2 11.3 8.2

2000 3 1999 2007 3 2006 8 11 9 9 8

9

71.5% 26.6 1.9 79.9 17.1% 3.0% Yasuda (2007) 1990 2000 3 1999 2007 3 2006 12 8 68.0% 63.2 38.8% 39.0 23.8 20.3 1993

(1998) (1999) (2001) 1990 2000 1997 1999 2000

10

1990 2000 2005 1 2005 11 B 1 2 2005 12 5 2006 4 A 2 B 2 2008 10 C 3

2005 12

11

B 2006 4 MA C 2008 10 2006 4 2005 2 1 2 M&A

12

B 2005 11 10 20 BB

2005 2 BIS 1

13

2005 12 BIS 20 30 C 2008 10 2005 12

14

10 C 2008 10 2005 2 appearance 2005 12

15

C 2008 10 2 2000 3 2005 2006 2008 delegated monitor delegated monitor (1987), (1992), Aoki (1994) 1970

16

3 (2001) 1990 2 2000 2 2000 90 90 2000 90 1 7 1990 Osano (1996) 56 3 2000

17

3 910 1112 (1985), Osano and Tsutsui (1985) (1989) (2008) 1990 2000 (1998) (1999) (2001) relational contract 10 2009 2000 11

1011

Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)

2009

18

3 1 6 M&A, 12 Allen and Santomero (1998), Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000) Allen and Santomero (1998), Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000) (2001) 3 12

19

13 500 delegated monitor 2008 2009 2 0.7 1 2 1.7 1 3 14 151613

14

2009 2 21 2009 3 19 2009 3 4 270

1516

20

17 18

17

2008 12 28 14 2008 3 2

18

21

2 1980, 85, 90, 95, 2005, 2007 6 2000 2000 A 400600 B 2007 3 5 90 95 2005 2007 2.892.82 2007 5 5.16% 5 2007 2.61% ROAROE 2005 2007 2

22

(2009)

2009 self-enforcing relational contract

23

Mayer (1988), Aoki (1994), Rajan and Zingales (2003) 2004 Peek and Rosengren (2005)2006 (2004)2007 2008

24

RIETIRIETI DP

(1985), (2007), (1992), 58 1 pp. 2-22 (2004), 2004 5 24 (2008), (1990), 41 3 pp. 155-178 (1998), 2 (1999), 383 pp. 143-168 (2001), 391 pp. 69-103 (2009), WIF-09-003, April 2009 (2001) 17 pp. 90-97 (2001), 1990 ,,No. 10, pp. 35-61 (2004), 70 2 pp. 55-87

25

(2006), 2006 (1987), 6 3 pp. 1-28 (2008), Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000), Comparing Financial Systems, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Allen, F. and A. M. Santomero (1998), The Theory of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 1461-1485. Aoki, M. (1994), Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An Analytical and Developmental View, in Aoki, M. and H. Patrick (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies, Oxford University Press. 1996 Aoki, M., H. Patrick, and P. Sheard (1994), The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in Aoki, M. and H. Patrick (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies, Oxford University Press. 1996 Arikawa, Y. and H. Miyajima (2007), Relationship Banking in Post-Bubble in Japan: Coexistence of Soft- and Hard Budget Constraints, in Aoki, M., G. Jackson, and H. Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan, Oxford University Press. Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Mayer, C. (1988), New Issues in Corporate Finance, European Economic Review 32, 1167-1183. Miyajima, H. and F. Kuroki (2007), The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan: Causes, Effects, and Implications, in Aoki, M., G. Jackson, and H. Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan, Oxford University Press. Osano, H. (1996). Intercorporate Shareholdings and Corporate Control in the Japanese Firm," Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 1047-1068. Osano, H. and Y. Tsutsui (1985), Implicit Contract in the Japanese Bank Loan Market, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 211-229. Peek, J. and E. S. Rosengren (2005), Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan, American Economic Review 95, 1144-1166. Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markts to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity, Crown Business. 2006

26

Scholtens, S. and D. van Wensveen (2000), A Critique on the Theory of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 1243-1251. Yasuda, A. (2007), Bank Relationships and Underwriter Competition: Evidence from Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 87, 369-404..

27

1

1980 1985 506 495 (97.8%) 11 (2.2%)

1985 1990 510 500 (98.0%) 10 (2.0%)

1990 1995 542 535 (98.7%) 7 (1.3%)

1995 2000 538 526 (97.8%) 12 (2.2%)

2000 2005 473 446 (94.3%) 27 (5.7%)

2005 2008 431 416 (96.5%) 15 (3.5%)

+ + + + + + + + + + 0 4 4 3 0 6 2 1 1 3 4 0 0 10 2 0 0 4 2 2 19 (2) (9) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) 0 0 5( 5)

9 2 2 2 (1) (1)

1

7(UFJ 5, 2)

4(UFJ 3, 1)

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 11.0 10 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 / / (+)/++

61.9 58.0

62.9 57.8 57.6 52.1 50.1 46.5 37.5 29.5 10.8 10.0 9.7 9.1 7.9 6.4 29.7 6.2 30.3 31.1 30.2 31.6 55.5 53.1 49.6

45.7

47.2

45.6

44.7

43.6

41.8 36.2 32.9

27.9 7.1

26.0 6.8

6.1

6.7

7.3

8.8

1995

2000

2005

29

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1970

92.5

89.7 87.8

87.1 81.4 74.0 65.9 55.8 55.6 58.7 60.5 69.5 62.7 79.1

19.2 17.9 16.8 17.4 17.7 16.7 15.5 12.7 12.0 12.3 13.8 1995 15.3 18.2 17.9

1975

1980

1985

1990 Year

2000

2005

/[ + ]

/ [ + ]

30

1973 533 513 (96.2%) 332 [ 64.7] 91 [ 17.7] 44 [ 8.6] 24 [ 4.6] 22 [ 4.3] 1.70 20 (3.8%) 8 ( [

1980 528 493 (93.4%) 362 [ 73.4] 73 [ 14.8] 30 [ 6.1] 17 [ 3.5] 11 [ 2.2] 1.48 35 (6.6%) 21

1985 514 470 (91.4%) 380 [ 80.9] 67 [ 14.3] 13 [ 2.8] 6 [ 1.3] 4 [ 0.9] 1.27 44 (8.6%) 29

1990 553 467 (84.4%) 404 [ 86.5] 43 [ 9.2] 14 [ 3.0] 4 [ 0.9] 2 [ 0.4] 1.20 86 (15.6%) 60

1995 558 471 (84.4%) 426 [ 90.5] 28 [ 5.9] 12 [ 2.6] 3 [ 0.6] 2 [ 0.4] 1.15 87 (15.6%) 63

2000 430 370 (86.0%) 312 [ 84.3] 45 [ 12.2] 7 [ 1.9] 4 [ 1.1] 2 [ 0.5] 1.22 60 (14.0%) 47

2005 421 349 (82.9%) 290 [ 83.1] 39 [ 11.2] 14 [ 4.0] 4 [ 1.2] 2 [ 0.6] 1.25 72 (17.1%) 52

2007 391 321 (82.1%) 283 [ 88.1] 21 [ 6.5] 10 [ 3.1] 3 [ 0.9] 4 [ 0.6] 1.22 70 (17.9%) 45

2008 257 205 (79.8%) 189 [ 92.2] 8 [ 3.9] 5 [ 2.4] 2 [ 1.0] 1 [ 0.5] 1.18 52 (20.2%) 39

1 2 3 4 5

) ]

31

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Year

4.86

5.05

4.96

4.80

4.75 4.08 4.02 4.09 4.09 4.11 4.00 3.84 3.20 2.33 2.30 2.30 2.33

1995

2000

2005

32

1973 10 533 481 (90.2%)

1980 528 499 (94.5%)

1985 514 491 (95.5%)

1990 553 519 (93.9%)

1995 558 534 (95.7%)

2000 539 518 (96.1%)

2005 477 347 (72.8%)

2008 433 315 (72.8%)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 10

121 126 82 55 30 17 17 16 11 6

[ 25.2] [ 26.2] [ 17.1] [ 11.4] [ 6.2] [ 3.5] [