review of the western european breeder programs

EnergyVol. 23, No. 7/8, pp. 581–591, 1998 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reservedPergamon PII: S0360-5442(98)00003-6 Printed in Great Britain

0360-5442/98 $19.00+ 0.00

REVIEW OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN BREEDER PROGRAMS

J. P. CRETTEAffiliate of University of Paris Dauphine CGEMP, 3 rue León Chartier, 91160 Saulx-les-Chartreux, France

(Received 24 March 1997)

Abstract—Since the beginning of the nuclear era, breeder reactors were recognized as the bestway to make use of uranium resources. In Europe, the early development of the liquid metal fastbreeder reactor (LMFBR) was initiated in England and in France in the mid-50s. Two demon-stration plants, the PFR in Scotland and Pheńix in France, started operation in the mid-70s. The1200 MWe commercial size LMFBR Superpheńix, built and operated by an international consor-tium from France, Germany, and Italy, first reached full power in 1986. Besides electricity pro-duction and the demonstration of breeding gain, it is scheduled to test burning of plutonium andother actinides in a fast flux. Present European developments are now focused on the design of acommercial European fast reactor (the 1500 MWe EFR), which could become economically com-petitive with LWRs when the price of uranium has increased several times. 1998 ElsevierScience Ltd. All rights reserved

1. INTRODUCTION

To introduce the present breeder program for Western Europe, it is worthwhile recalling what has beendone in the past, why it was done and which factors led to change from the initial strategy. Just afterWorld War II, the rapid increase of energy demand and the limited reserves of fossil fuels led nearlyevery industrialized country to conclude that nuclear energy was an urgent necessity. Moreover, thefact that the amount of fissile isotopes in natural uranium is limited in terms of world energy consump-tion showed the need for breeder reactors early in the development of nuclear energy. This early recog-nition of the importance of breeding is indicated by the fact that the first nuclear reactor to produceelectricity namely, the EBR-1 (which was put into operation in 1951 at 0.2 MWe) was an LMFBR(liquid metal fast breeder reactor). The main financial support in the period 1950–1960 was devoted todeveloping a submarine reactor in the U.S.A. Sodium-cooled reactors received relatively little emphasiscompared to light water-cooled reactors. This approach resulted in the dominance of the PWR andBWR types over all other types of reactors in the Western world. LWRs have been developed, enlargedand have become progressively more standardized. They are now built and operated as well-establishedindustrial plants in serial production.

In Europe, the first petroleum crisis led to a sudden surge of development. In France, it was decidedin 1975 to build a series of standardized PWR plants to serve as the main electricity supply. In 1992,about 75% of the total electricity used was produced from 53 French PWR reactors.

The challenge for the LMFBR in Europe is to compete economically with standardized LWRs inthe 1000 MWe range. The only useful reference reactor is one prototype, the 1200 MWe Superpheńix.The achievement of useful breeding is no longer a short-term priority although it remains a mid- tolong-term goal. The principal factors leading to the change are reduction in the rate of growth ofelectricity demand and a stability of uranium prices that is typical of an abundant and relatively cheapraw material. The stability of uranium prices is due to the slowdown in the rate of commitments to newnuclear plant construction, coupled with increased discoveries of large fields and increased estimates ofnatural uranium reserves and resources.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN WESTERN EUROPE

European countries started experimental and developmental work on sodium-cooled, fast neutronreactors nearly four decades ago. The common approach was to use plutonium as the fissile fuel and

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natural or depleted uranium as fertile material. These programs started in the period 1950–1955 indifferent countries, earlier in Great Britain, and a bit later in Italy. Among the Western Europeancountries involved in this development (mainly France, Great Britain, Germany), France is now themost advanced with the Superpheńix at Creys Malville which reached design power in December 1986.We review briefly the strategy followed initially in France and then also in other European countries.

2.1. Initial French strategy

At the beginning, a clear strategy was enunciated in France. The development of the LMFBR shouldbe conducted through successive phases as follows:

1. development of sodium technology and acquisition of necessary physical data (1950–1965),2. construction of an experimental reactor (without electricity generation) to confirm the know-how

previously acquired and obtain a good idea of operation, safety and maintenance problems, includingespecially tests of fuel elements (Rapsodie was put into operation in 1967),

3. construction of a demonstration plant with a significant electric power output to prove feasibility ofthe concept at an industrial size, to demonstrate plant availability under normal operating conditionsand to obtain first-hand knowledge of construction and operation costs on a significant scale(construction of Pheńix at 250 MWe was started in 1968 and industrial operation began in 1974),

4. construction of a prototype plant to confirm the technical features for a commercial plant size(construction of Superpheńix at 1200 MWe was started in 1977, full power operation was reachedin 1986),

5. construction of a series of commercial plants at a pace compatible with the amounts of plutoniumproduced in thermal neutron nuclear plants.

The program for these 5 phases had to be established progressively since it was required that eachphase should be started only after the results of the previous phase had been judged to be satisfactory.The original plan for step (v) has been delayed, and its scope and timing is under extended reevaluation.The French program has progressively been slowed down during the last decade. It was anticipated byEDF in 1976 (after the first oil crisis) that a capacity of perhaps 10,000 MWe of LMFBR power plantsshould be in the process of being committed in the 1990s. Now it is clear that any further LMFBRpower plant will only be ordered after the year 2000. During the period 1980–1990, a detailed prelimi-nary design was made of a 1500 MWe plant (the RNR 1500 or SPX2) that could have followed SPX1completed in 1987. In parallel, another preliminary design has been carried out as the reference designSNR2 and was intended to be built in Germany. It should be noted that neither the SPX2 nor the SNR2will be built since these two projects have been replaced by the EFR (European Fast Reactor) project.As is discussed in section 3, the schedule for the EFR is now indefinite and most likely postponedbeyond the year 2010.

The slowing of interest in breeders in France (as everywhere in the world except possibly in Japan)is due to the following factors:

1. the difficulty of showing economic competitiveness with LWRs at current and foreseeable uran-ium prices,

2. the improving supply picture for natural uranium,3. the general slowing down of nuclear plant commitments (except in the Western Pacific Rim

countries),4. increasing public opposition after the Chernobyl accident, including political effects of changes in

majority parties and the emergence of active green parties,5. the relative abundance and stability of supplies of oil and natural gas,6. the slowing of economic activity in many industrialized countries with evident consequences on

investments and on the growth of energy demands, accompanied by a decline of interest in long-term energy supplies or in strategies for attaining self-sufficiency.

2.2. Technical and economic achievement in France

The first phase was started in 1955 and launched the development of basic LMFBR technology,mainly in the Cadarache CEA Center. This site is equipped with many experimental facilities used totest both technology and physics developments. This development effort, together with work in the

583Review of the Western European breeder programs

U.S. and other countries, enabled the construction of Rapsodie, Pheńix, Superpheńix 1 and also sup-ported further enhancements of the Superpheńix 2 and EFR designs.

In the second phase, the design of the 20 MWt test reactor Rapsodie started in 1958. Heat wastransferred from two primary loops to two air-cooled secondary loops. Its construction was started in1962. Every main component (pump, intermediate heat exchanger, air cooler, rotating plug, control-rod mechanism) was intensively tested in sodium loops especially built for that purpose. The reactorreached operation at its full nominal power in 1967. After an operating period of 3 years with goodavailability, the power level was doubled to 40 MWt in 1970 and the plant was called “RapsodieFortissimo” after the modification. The accumulation of operating hours in Rapsodie provided the testingof fuel element designs for Pheńix and the following reactors. Rapsodie was shut down in 1983 afterthe operation of the Pheńix reactor provided much larger capacity for further testing of fuel elements,as well as the accumulation of more prototypical operating experience.

The third phase dealt with the demonstration plant Pheńix. This study started around 1962 and con-struction was begun in 1968, 1 year after Rapsodie was put into operation. The choice of reactor typewas a pool rather than a loop design. This selection was made after a comparative study showed thatit was simpler, more reliable and safer to operate and also because it appeared to be cheaper to build.Phenix went critical in August 1973, reached full power in March 1974 and was put into commercialoperation in July 1974. Since then, this demonstration plant has furnished electricity to the grid withvery good availability (61% load factor over 15 years). The electrical power of this plant (250 MWe)was chosen to be the same as for the conventional thermal plants in operation in the 1960s. Theturbogenerator set is the 13th of a series built by CEM for EDF. This summary shows the policyfollowed for Phenix. All technical features were not necessarily new except when they were linked tothe LMFBR process. They were treated systematically as in conventional power plants (water–steamequipment, control command, civil works) and with duplicate equipment for functions that needed tobe made to be as reliable as possible.

The NSS design has benefited from the experience of Rapsodie, the technology of which has beenused for most of the equipment (pumps, IHX, control-rod drives, etc.) with scale-up of most of thecomponents. Components have also been pretested as much as possible in experimental facilities. Forthe steam generators, a prudent choice was made of a modular concept, with separate regions for boiling,superheating and reheating sections. This has permitted the testing of modules at full scale, usingmaterials adapted for the conditions of each section.

Due to the policy of intensive pretesting of components, the expected costs and schedules have beengenerally achieved as planned. The construction and operation of Pheńix has been a real success. Pheńixwas 85% financed by CEA and 15% by EDF. The plant is located at a CEA site at Marcoule and isoperated by a mixed team drawn from CEA and EDF. Its output is sold to the EDF grid.

The fourth phase, that of a prototype plant of commercial size, is the Superpheńix. Good progresswas being made in 1972 in the construction of Pheńix. This allowed the start of the preliminary designfor a large, commercial-size plant. Parallel discussions between European utilities and engineering com-panies led progressively to the plan to build Superpheńix as a multinational project. In 1971, Electricite´de France (EDF), Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Rheinisch-Westfa¨lisches Elektrizita¨t-swerk (RWE) signed an agreement for the construction of two breeder plants. Following this agreement,the design and construction consortium NERSA was created in 1974 in France and ESK in Germany.NERSA (51% EDF, 33% ENEL and 16% RWE) was organized to design, build and operate Super-phenix in France. Another consortium ESK (51% RWE, 33% ENEL and 16% EDF) was organized tobuild SNR2 in Germany, with some elements and components derived from the SNR-300 design. Inparallel, it was decided that the engineering of the Nuclear Boiler for SPXI would be done by a Franco-Italian consortium which would then make a turnkey bid to NERSA.

The supply of the different plant components was divided among the manufacturing industries ofthe participating countries in proportion to their share of financing. In France, Novatome was createdin 1976 for the design, engineering and supply of breeder boilers. Its engineers had participated in theconstruction of Pheńix and in the design of Superpheńix. NIRA in Italy was in charge of breederengineering and of coordination of the Italian companies that were involved. In 1975, 1 year after startof the Pheńix operation, the design of Superpheńix was sufficiently advanced to permit NERSA towrite precise specifications for the NSSS and for other parts of a 1200 MWe plant. Novatome andNIRA made a turnkey tender to NERSA for the NSSS in July 1976. The other tender was put by

584 J. P. Crette

NERSA in April 1977. Filling of the NSSS with sodium started in mid-1984. After extensive testingof different loops, fuel loading and criticality were achieved during the second part of 1985. Couplingto the grid occurred at the beginning of 1986, and full power was reached in December 1986.

A sodium leak occurred in the fuel storage vessel in April 1987, resulting in a plant outage of18 months. During this period, the fuel subassemblies were removed from the storage drum. The leakwas located in September 1987 during sodium draining. Although no other through-wall cracks weredetected by further radiographic inspections, it was decided to replace the fuel storage drum. The newdesign solution was implemented in January 1988 and involved replacing the fuel-storage drum witha fuel-transfer post. The original intent for spent-fuel storage in the adjacent vessel has been abandoned.This function is now provided within the reactor vessel itself. These changes did not interfere signifi-cantly with the plant operation. Full power was again achieved in spring 1989 and the plant remainedin operation until September 1989, when it was shut down for 7 months to modify the core configuration(to compensate for reactivity changes) and also to check for the possible presence of a gas bubble inthe diagrid. Full power was again achieved in June 1990. The plant was shut down again in July 1990,due to abnormal contamination of the sodium by the inadvertent intrusion of air into the argon cover-gas due to the failure of a diaphragm in an argon compressor. As the sodium cleanup was beingcompleted, a part of the turbine building roof collapsed in December 1990, due to an unusually heavysnowfall. After the necessary repairs had been made, the plant was ready to resume operation at halfpower in May 1992. Authorization to restart the plant was refused in June 1992 by the governmentand by the safety agency which asked for a new safety review. This also required additional technicalmodifications and the completion of a new review procedure for authorization of restart which wasrequired by regulations after any 2 year outage.

A report from the “Ministre de la Recherche et de l’Espace” to the Prime Minister, issued on 17December 1992 [6,6], recommends the use of Pheńix and Superpheńix to study and test the possibilityof burning plutonium and actinides in fast reactors specially used for that purpose. Consequently, aprocedure of public inquiry was initiated at the beginning of 1993.

Since then, Superpheńix resumed operation after some rearrangements of the core and ran at 90%nominal power during the year 1996, with an availability factor of 95%.

This summary of the Superpheńix design, construction and operation shows large differences com-pared with the schedule for Pheńix (10 years between order and full power as compared to 6 years forPhenix). The differences result from the increased size of the plant (1200 MWe against 250 MWe) andalso the complexity of an organization that is typical for a multinational project with many constraints.Differences also include the prototype character of the plant yet subject to the same regulatory require-ments as a standard PWR. These factors have led to an increase of the initial investment cost by about50% and consequently to a higher than expected cost per kWh, higher than that of a standard PWR(see Table 2).

Preliminary studies for the fifth phase started in 1977 at EDF, Novatome and CEA. This phase wasintended to define the French breeder plant to be called Superpheńix 2 which could follow Superpheńix1. This new plant, using the same basic technical options as Superpheńix 1, should be much cheaperto build and operate due to a number of simplifications, innovations and improvements. A detailedpreliminary design was launched in July 1983, with the aim of reaching the stage of a plant order in1988 (1 year after the Superpheńix start-up). Safety requirements further defined for this new plant bythe safety authorities were transmitted to EDF in September 1983. Specific design and constructionrules have been written during this period and have led to the publication of a document equivalent tothe one used for PWRs in France.

The electrical power of the plant has been chosen to be 1500 MWe, which is compatible with theuse of the turbogenerator set (ARABELLE type) developed for the standard PWR (N4 type). Thispower corresponds to a 3600 MWt nuclear boiler. The detailed preliminary design of the plant (calledRNR 1500) was completed in 1987; it showed a considerable reduction of mass of the nuclear boiler(nearly 50% less in terms of steel weight per kWe as compared to Superpheńix 1). The reduction ofcost per installed kW for a single unit to be built on the Creys-Malville site has been estimated tonearly 40% for the NSSS and 35% for the plant (in terms of direct investment cost per kWe, ascompared to Superpheńix 1). This estimate resulted from consultations with experienced Europeanmanufacturers who participated in the component supply for the SPX1 and for many PWRs. However,this did not lead to a firm offer from Notavome to EDF to build Superpheńix 2 without the previously


planned European participation. Several reasons led to this decision. These included the general econ-omic slowdown and the associated slowing down of nuclear programs. These circumstances also ledto a decrease in uranium prices. With relatively abundant and stable supplies of oil, coal, gas anduranium, the possible need for deployment of breeders has receded well into the future, although itremains prudent for the long term. The cost per kWh produced by a first-of-a-kind LMFBR plant, evenat the maximum practical size, does not compete with that produced by a standard PWR.

In view of the changing circumstances, the next construction should be carried out in a Europeancontext. Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy signed an agreement in 1984 which coversthe intent for joint efforts in the development of the LMFBR. This agreement has been followed byseparate agreements between the various R&D organizations, utilities and engineering companies. EDFwas already committed to participate in the construction of SNR2 in Germany (a 1974 agreementcreated NERSA and ESK). This project is no longer considered viable in Germany following thepolitically-forced abandonment and dismantlement of the completed SNR-300 plant. Furthermore RWEwithdrew from participation in SPX2.

2.3. Technical achievements in other Western European countries

Great Britain followed almost the same strategy as France at the beginning and started even sooner.The experimental reactor DFR was put into operation in 1959. The construction of the demonstrationplant PFR (250 MWe) started before Phe´nix but PFR reached full power operation only in 1976. Sincethen no further progress has been made in Great Britain. A proposed project for a commercial prototypeplant of 1300 MWe called CDFR has been terminated. Nevertheless, Great Britain for a time continuedsupporting efforts to develop LMFBR. It has participated to the detailed preliminary design of SPX2and was initially engaged in the common European effort (see section 3).

Germany followed a closely similar path. The KNK experimental reactor went into operation in 1971and was followed by the design and construction of the demonstration plant SNR-300 that was com-pleted and was ready to start operation in 1987. The project experienced an extended constructionperiod because of litigation, regulatory delays, and protests from nearby Holland. Although completed,it was never allowed to be loaded with fuel elements. Since then, it was decided to dismantle it. RWEand German industry participated (to the extent of 16%) in the SPX1. The preliminary design of SNR2was completed in 1987, but this effort has been stopped and is now replaced by participation in thecommon European project EFR (see section 3).

Italy also has been interested in LMFBR development but has not mounted as large an effort as theother three countries. Design of the experimental reactor PEC started around 1967, but the constructionof this reactor was stopped after the decision taken in Italy in 1987 to abandon nuclear energy. In Italy,mainly ENEL and Italian industries have participated actively in the development of SPX1 (33% ofparticipation as already mentioned). They have also participated on a small scale in the preliminarydesign of SPX2. Italy also started participation in the EFR effort but has now almost completely with-drawn except as a potential supplier of some components.

Belgium and The Netherlands were also interested in the development of LMFBR in Europe.Although they did not build fast reactors on their own, they participated in the construction of Rapsodie(through Euratom), of SNR-300, of Superphe´nix (through INB, a consortium led by Interatom, withBelgonucleaire and Neratom). Belgium is still participating in the common European effort, at a reducedlevel and is still in the INB organization. For a time Holland also operated a medium-scale test loopfacility for sodium reactor components. No other European countries have shown appreciable interestin LMFBR development.

3. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

3.1. General objectives

Since no plant construction is being planned in the near future, European utilities have decided asa part of EFRUG (European Fast Reactor Utilities Group), to finance the preliminary design of acommercial power plant called EFR (European Fast Reactor) that could be built in any of the participat-ing countries after 1996–1997 to prepare in time a series of plants, starting around 2010. The objectivesof this study were

586 J. P. Crette

1. to improve the existing designs (SPX2 being the more elaborate),2. construction and operation costs reductions, and3. safety improvements by designs that more fully exploit the natural convection potential for residual

heat removal.

As far as France was concerned, this program fulfilled the EDF objective to be ready, if necessary, tolaunch a series of LMFBR power plants that would be at least quasi-competitive with PWR powerplants. The expectation was that these would be used to replace part of the existing PWR plants afterthey reach 30 or 40 years of operation, that is around 2010–2015. This study started in March 1988for 5 years until 1993.

The declining rate of growth of nuclear capacity in the world and obstacles to public acceptance, aswell as economic considerations, have led Great Britain to decide to terminate its efforts on LMFBRdevelopment except for laboratory studies. Germany has similarly curtailed its efforts. In France, thestudy of the EFR as a potential near-term construction project is not being further pursued after issueof the final report in 1993. However, development involving laboratory and test facilities has notstopped. France will be the only country in Western Europe to own LMFBR plants ready to operate(Phenix and Superpheńix, with Italian and German participation on the Superpheńix).

France may now pursue two objectives:

1. to be ready to build LMFBR plants that are as economical as possible when appropriate, eitherbecause the uranium price is going up or because it appears that the LMFBR is well adapted tomanage the end of the fuel cycle for spent fuel from its PWR plants and

2. to study the possibility of using fast reactors to consume plutonium, actinides and some fissionproducts so that the total amounts of these elements resulting from PWR-plant operation (or fromnuclear weapons) will be limited. Pheńix and Superpheńix could be used experimentally to test anddemonstrate this possibility.

A report from the French Minister of Research and Space to the Prime Minister, issued in December1992 [6], calls for this study and for the use of Pheńix and Superpheńix for that purpose. Other Europeancountries have not recently announced any definite plan for the use of LMFBRs.

3.2. Cost-reduction objectives

Construction and operating costs for the EFR (first of a kind) should be compared with the corre-sponding costs for a standard PWR plant and the changes of these costs should be estimated if a seriesof plants is built. It is difficult to do such an exercise and the results will depend on the country inwhich the comparison is made. For this reason, it is wise to limit this comparison and to try to reacha conclusion for a single reference case. As France produces the cheapest nuclear kWh in Europe, thefollowing comparison is made with the standard (EDF) PWR plant (N4, 1450 MWe) and also takesinto account probable improvements with an improved future (2010) standard plant. The references forthe LMFBR plant are the SPX1 costs, the estimation made in 1987 for the SPX2 plant and the objectivefor the EFR. The reduction of costs expected when the EFR is built in series results from a study madein 1987 under the sponsorship of the Commission of European Communities. This group has gatheredthe opinions of representatives from the European nuclear industry on the expected size of the costeffect of series construction, taking account of the work done on the SPX1 design.

3.3. The EFR program

The Western European utilities interested in fast reactor development have formed a group involvingBelgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy and called EFRUG, which decided in 1987 topromote a new FBR project, called EFR [5]. For that purpose, the European industrial partners formeda group, called EFR Associates with INB (INTERATOM, Germany, leader of INB), NNC (GreatBritain), and NOVATOME (France) [4]. This means that the well known national projects such asCDFR in Great Britain, SNR2 in Germany, and SPX2 in France were replaced by a common Europeanmodel, the EFR. Its design study started in March 1988. Its objectives are to reduce the kWh costbelow the costs of previous LMFBR designs and to produce a design acceptable for construction inany of the European countries. The new design must meet at least the same safety criteria as LWRsand the plant must be buildable in 5 years. The design emphasizes accessibility for convenient in-serviceinspection and maintenance or repair.


The EFR program was planned in 4 phases. Phase 1 was the conceptual design phase and lasteduntil March 1990. Phase 2 is the concept validation phase of 2–3 years. This allows for confirmingnew design options with detailed studies and short term R&D and to review the revisions with aEuropean safety experts committee. Phase 3 is a pre-construction period of 4 years for site selection,licensing procedures and other pre-construction activities. Phase 4 is the construction phase from 1996–1997 to about 2005. In phase 1, the safety approach was defined by EFRUG and applied by EFRAssociates. The design rules were been defined using the RCC-MR code (French code for design andconstruction of fast reactor components, with some later refinements). The design options and theEuropean R&D program were chosen to meet the EFR performance objectives. The main options wereconfirmed in phase 2 that included a final with estimates of the construction costs.

3.4. EFR options compared with Superphe´nix 1

The power of the plant will be 1500 instead of 1200 MWe, which is consistent with the power ofmodern PWR plants (e.g. N4). The choice of this 1500 MWe unit is based on economic considerations.All studies carried out in Europe confirmed that the investment cost in terms of installed kWe is reducedwhen the unit power is increased and cannot be reduced when unit power is reduced, regardless of thepower level chosen, if similar safety conditions are applied. In addition, a unit power of 1500 MWe iswell adapted to the grids of major industrial countries. The diameter of the main reactor vessel will bereduced from 21 to 17 m when using a singleredan (i.e. an internal structure separating hot and coldsodium), reductions of the number of intermediate heat exchangers from 8 to 6 and of primary pumpsfrom 4 to 3, and also using smaller rotating plugs for road transport.

The fuel burn-up will be increased to 170,000 MWd/t (maximum burn up per ton of mixed oxide)or 20 atom%. The spent fuel will be placed in an intermediate fuel storage inside the reactor vessel.The number of secondary loops will be 6 instead of 4. The steam generators will be of straight tubetype, using a modified ferritic steel with 9% chromium. The decay heat removal system will use 6loops of 15 MWt with any two of them being sufficient in accident conditions with no pumps operatingand using only natural convection cooling. The safety approach will apply the same principles as forthe future LWRs. Improved passivity of the safety systems and tolerance to failure with respect toprevious projects are introduced in the design. Safety functions require only a modest amount of emerg-ency power supplied by batteries for more than 24 hours, although diesel-driven backup power willalso be provided. In particular, cooling of the core subassemblies and of the main structures of thereactor is supplemented by natural convection without exceeding the design limits.

3.5. Provisional results[3]

The design work has resulted in major reductions in the amount of steel required for the maincomponents of the Nuclear Island (N.I.) of EFR as compared to SPXI. This is expressed in percentageof steel weight per units of electrical power produced. This corresponds to an average steel weightreduction of more than 50%, expressed in kg/kWe, or to an overall steel weight reduction of the nuclearboiler of more than 30% combined with a power increase of about 20%. These results, if confirmed,would meet the cost-reduction objectives of EFR (Table 1).

3.6. Research and development support and budgets[1,2]

In 1984, European governments of interested countries signed an agreement to develop togetherLMFBR reactors and to share the expenses. To support the research and development for the EFR, theR&D organizations of France, Germany and Great Britain signed an agreement in 1989, in parallelwith industrial companies signing similar cooperative agreements. Some cooperative work started yearsearlier. The consequence of these agreements and work sharing have been to reduce the annual R&Dexpenditures of CEA in France by about a factor of two. This level was sufficient to support theengineering work at EFR.

The budget in 1989 for research and development on the LMFBR in France was about 600 MFF(including the Phe´nix operating cost), of which about 250 MFF were specifically devoted to EFR sup-port. Roughly the same amount of money was available in Germany and in Great Britain so that thetotal amount of R&D expenses for EFR support (plant design and fuel development) was estimated tobe 800 MFF in 1989, in addition to the total engineering budget of 250 MFF/year. Altogether, theavailable resources for EFR development were roughly 1000 MFF in 1989. However the total R&Dbudget for EFR has decreased steadily in the following years.

588 J. P. Crette

Table 1. Breeder reactor investment costs in FF per kWe at a discount rate of 8%.

Prototype Series

Component SPX1 SPX2 EFRa EFRb PWRc

Nuclear Island 9100 5700 5000 3400 2200BOP 5800 3700 3700 3300 3200Construction costd 14,900 9400 8700 6700 5400Additional coste 10,500 5200 4800 3000 2300Investment cost 25,400 14,600 13,500 9700 7700Ratio to Std. PWRf 3.30 1.90 1.75 1.26 1

aCost estimated for a plant built at the Creys-Malville site.bCost estimated for 4 units/site with 2 units committed/year.c4 units per site as in footnote (b), but with assumed technical progress to 2010.dThis is the direct cost (original estimate made in 1986).eThis is the indirect cost, including utility (prime contractor) expenses, interests during construction, pre-operational tests, pro-

vision for decommissioning.fThe investment cost for a present day PWR/N4 plant is about 8500 FF/kWe, with a direct construction cost of 5900 FF/kWe.

The cost ratio of SPX1 to N4 is 3.

4. COMMENTS ON THE EFR PROGRAM

4.1. Technical perspectives

EFR is an optimization of SPX, with drastic simplification and cost reduction. The most importantchanges in options (such as internal fuel handling, for instance) do not significantly modify the Super-phenix concept. The changes are to make the EFR simpler, easier to build and less costly. This evol-utionary way of developing LMFBRs, avoiding more radical changes, parallels the way LWRs havebeen successfully developed to maturity. This general concept has been proven since Pheńix and theother European designs of commercial plants (such as SNR2, CDFR, SPX2) have all adopted the poolconcept, with relatively small differences in design principles. Many alternate designs have been pro-posed elsewhere in the world, notably in the U.S.A. and Japan. However, so far none of them haveappeared to be attractive enough to replace the EFR approach.

Advanced studies have been made in Western Europe to try to find less costly design solutions.These have led to the conclusion that except possibly for some new arrangements in fuel-handlingequipment, it is better to follow an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary design approach. The EFRapproach for developing LMFBR plants involves systematic simplifications and optimizations of bothsystems and components. Many of these changes subsequent to Superpheńix 1 have been made possibleby progress in R&D and in long-term testing. This program includes progress in thermohydraulics,material compositions, stress analysis, dynamics, fuel behavior, and safety-system simulations. Further-more, there is practical knowledge acquired with the construction, commissioning and operation of thePhenix and Superpheńix plants. To bring a large-scale industrial product to maturity requires progressiveimprovements in successive generations of design. This has been true for energy production, auto-mobiles, aircraft, and electronic equipment. Experience in building full-size plants is the essential basisfor designs that are optimized with respect to costs.

4.2. Economic perspectives

The cost of a kWh depends on investment, operating and fuel-cycle costs, and also on operatingavailability, useful plant life, and applicable discount rates. Table 2 gives the results of calculationsmade with different discount rates and lengths of life of the plants (hypotheses A and B) but withequal values for direct investment costs, operating costs, availability of the plants, and fuel-cycle costs.The values used for the fuel-cycle costs are a uranium price of 500 FF/kg and a plutonium price of100 FF/g [7].

Although part of the investment cost contribution to the kWh cost is dependent on the economicassumptions (going from hypothesis A to B means that the investment cost is multiplied by 0.59), thecompetitivness of the LMFBR plant (expressed in terms of kWh cost relative to PWR) is only weaklydependent on these assumptions (by about 5% if prudent assumptions on uranium and plutonium pricesare used) because the operating cost is not affected by these assumptions and the fuel-cycle cost is


Table 2. Relative costs of electricity vs discount rates.

French Prototype SeriesC/kWh

(EC 1/86) SPX1 EFR EFR PWR

Economic A B A B A B A Bassumptiona

Investment 35.3 20.8 19.7 11.6 13.2 7.7 10.7 6.3Operation 7.6 7.6 5.3 5.3 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.9Fuel cycle 8.8 7.6 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 5.0 4.5

Total 51.7 36.0 28.5 19.9 20.1 14.3 19.6 14.7kWh 2.6 2.4 1.5 1.4 1.03 0.97 1 1FBR/PWR

a“A” refers to the current economic principles used by the French Commissariat au Plan, including a 25-year plant life and an8% discount rate. “B” refers to economic principles often used in other industrialized countries, including 40-year plant lifeand 5% discount rate. There are some differences from the assumptions in Table 1: the EFR prototype is not assumed to bebuilt at Creys Malville and the series consists of 30 units instead of 12.

only affected by about 10%. In France, the A-basis has been used. In many other countries, the discountrate used to make comparison of investments is often the B-basis. Discount rates below 5% are some-times used.

The assumption of a series of 30 units built over a period of 15–20 years is feasible in France andprobably in Europe as well when it becomes necessary to replace the existing reactors.

The EFR investment–cost estimate was based on a detailed proposal for the SPX2 project completedin 1987. A parallel study was done by Electricite´ de France and NOVATOME in 1987 for the EuropeanCommunity Commission and directed by UNIPEDE. The purpose was to evaluate the cost-reductionpotential from series construction. The SPX2 investment cost was established by consulting the variousEuropean companies that participated in construction of the SPX1. These reviews dealt with more than70% of the total cost.

The EFR investment cost was determined while taking into account the technical progress alreadymade and that anticipated from the SPX2 project. In spite of extensive studies supporting these costestimates, an inherent uncertainty of 10–20% is believed likely after allowing for inflation.

The EFR fuel-cycle cost takes into account a burnup of 170,000 MWd/t. This cost is based onFrench studies concerning investment and operating costs; in this case, the validity of the fuel-cyclecost calculation is estimated to be from− 5 to + 15%.

The combined error in the cost calculation of the EFR kWh is the same as for the investment cost,namely+ 10 to + 20%.

4.3. Conclusion on competitiveness with LWRs

The results presented for investment, operating and fuel cycle costs show that the LMFBR can becompetitive on the condition that a series of plants is built. Is this conclusion realistic? To answer, weconsider several questions.

4.3.1. Are the figures credible? The figures given for SPX1 are the actual values. The figures forSPX2 resulted from industrial consultations. They are believed to be valid with normal margins ofuncertainty. The target figures for the EFR prototype result from SPX2 figures and include the effectsof technical progress. These improvements appear practical but they have to be proven. The figures forthe EFR series include the beneficial effect of standardized serial production derived from a study madefor the Commission of European Communities. Some points of the analysis are conservative, that ispessimistic. For example the cost of the BOP has been taken as somewhat higher than for a PWRdespite the much better efficiency of the plant. The result that a series of LMFBR plants should beable to attain capital costs no more than 25% higher than for PWRs is believed to be realistic for asmall series of plants. To validate these assumptions, an EFR prototype should be built. If the expectedresult is obtained, the cost per kWh produced by a series of plants should be competitive with PWRswithin a few percent, depending mainly on the applicable discount rate and on the natural uranium

590 J. P. Crette

prices in effect during the plant lifetime. Roughly 10% of the investment cost of the plant may becompensated by a reduction of 1 C/kWh in the differential cost of the fuel cycle. With a natural uraniumprice of 500 FF/kg, the fuel-cycle cost for the FBR is less than that for the PWR by more than 2 C/kWhand can compensate for all or most of any extra capital cost of the FBR. With a natural uranium priceof 2000 FF/kg, this differential increases to more than 4 C/kWh, which means that competitivenesswith the PWR could be obtained even if the investment cost for the FBR plants is higher than expectedby 20% or more, depending on the uranium price.

4.3.2. Are the necessary means available? Until recent years, utility R&D organizations and engin-eering companies have been organized in Europe and have worked together in good cooperation,because the necessary funding to study the EFR phase II (prior to 1993) was available. But, morerecently, Great Britain decided not to participate further in the EFR development since no new fastreactor is anticipated in Great Britain within the next decades. For the same reason, Germany willprobably terminate participation. Though no new LMFBR is likely to be committed in France by theyear 2000, there is still an intent to preserve readiness to take advantage of Pheńix and Superpheńixexperience. There are continuing efforts to improve the technology of the LMFBR and to make progressin know-how. Studies of the utilization of fast reactors as incinerators for plutonium and actinides areproceeding, as are also studies for electricity production. It is expected that core competence in R&D,engineering, and in the electricity production organizations will be maintained sufficiently to supporta revived large-scale program when it will again become appropriate.

4.3.3. Is the development compatible with European strategy? When the EFR program waslaunched, EFRUG recognized that 2010 was a realistic date for ordering commercial FBRs in Europeto replace partly the first generation of LWRs. Consequently, EFRUG recommended readiness to launchan EFR prototype by 1995. Up to now, the program has been followed, but no date for prototypeconstruction has been decided. EFRUG will probably recommend a slow-down and the developmentwill be adapted to this strategy.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The long-term development and utilization of LMFBR plants, which can make more than 60 timesbetter use of natural uranium than PWRs, is justified by both resource and economic considerations. Itappears imprudent to continue to burn primarily just the235U content of uranium reserves after the year2020. Yet it is clear that the FBR, even in large series production, is unlikely to be able to produceelectricity at a cost competitive with PWRs at present-day uranium prices. However, it is also reasonablyassured that FBRs will be competitive with PWRs when the uranium price increases to about2000 FF/kg. This conclusion holds even with 20% added to the current best estimates of the relativecapital costs.

The increase of uranium price seems to be unavoidable when reserves start to decrease due to foresee-able cumulative consumption. Increases in prices of petroleum products are also likely in the same timeframe or sooner. Under these conditions, the LMFBR should be able to provide orderly transition toan energy source with a well proven technology. The operation of Pheńix and Superpheńix, togetherwith R&D work on such topics as materials, sodium fire controls, in-service inspection, and plutoniumand actinide burning should yield the necessary know-how to optimize the EFR prototype design.Finally, the development and use of fast reactors is also consistent with a basic policy of the Frenchnuclear program, namely, the practice of reprocessing spent fuel from PWRs as a step towards themore efficient utilization of natural uranium.

REFERENCES

1. Rapin, M.,Fast Breeder Reactor Economics. Royal Society Discussion Meeting, 1989.2. Private communications on programs and budgets of EFR R&D program in Europe. Commissariat a` l’Energie

Atomique, France, 1991.3. Private communications on LMFBR and PWR costs. Novatome and Framatome, 1992.4. Green, A., et al., Fast Breeder Reactors (EFR Associates).Proceedings ENC 90, 0000, p. 564.5. Albert, M., Eitz, A. W., Davis, D. A. and Velona, F.,Proceedings ENC 90, 0000, p. 582.6. Le Traitement des Produits de la Fin du Cycle e´lectronucleaire et la Contribution possible de Super Pheńix.

Rapport du Ministre de la Recherche et de l’Espace a` Monsieur le Premier Ministre, 17 December 1992.


7. Janin, R., inCentre de Ge´opolitique de l’Energie et des Matie`res Premie`res, Report. Universite Paris Dauphiie,Paris, France, 1993.

review of the western european breeder programs

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