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Responses to complexhumanitarian emergenciesand natural disasters: Ananalytical comparisonJ M Albala-BertrandPublished online: 25 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: J M Albala-Bertrand (2000) Responses to complexhumanitarian emergencies and natural disasters: An analytical comparison,Third World Quarterly, 21:2, 215-227, DOI: 10.1080/01436590050004328

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Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No 2, pp 215–227, 2000

Responses to complex humanitarianemergencies and natural disasters: ananalytical comparison

J M ALBALA-BERTRAND

ABSTRACT This article analytically compares complex humanitarian emerg-encies with natural disasters, concentrating on disaster responses and interfer-ence with society. There are some important analytical differences between theresponses to these two types of disaster, like overlapping and interactions,persistence and duration, access and timing, assistance involvement and inter-vention, physical and societal recovery, and others. However, the fundamentaldifference between natural and politically induced disasters is the way institu-tions are affected. In natural disasters, there can be some signi� cant interferencewith society and therefore institutional change arising from both the impacteffects and the responses, but this is infrequent, mostly incidental and notnormally widespread or long-term. In complex emergencies, most aspects of theimpact and effects have deliberate institutional aims and overtones. Likewise, theresponse to this type of calamity is also bound to cause signi� cant interferencewith society, which may be intense, long-term and mostly deliberate.

A natural disaster impact is primarily the outcome of a physically uncompen-sated interaction between an unleashing natural event and a social system,whereas a complex humanitarian emergency is primarily the outcome of aninstitutionally uncompensated interaction between an unleashing societal eventand a social system. The latter has been de� ned as:

a purposeful and unlikely neutral response, intended mostly to counteract the worseeffects of the massive human destitution that derive from an overt politicalphenomenon, which takes the form of a violent, entrenched and long-lastingfactionalist con� ict or imposition with ultimate institutional aims. (Albala-Bertrand,2000a: 20 emphasis in the original).

As discussed there, a complex humanitarian emergency, or a complex emer-gency for short, appears to be implicitly embedded in a similar conceptualstructure to that of the general disaster situation framework that was proposed byAlbala-Bertrand (1993). Although this analytical framework was especially usedto study natural disasters, its abstraction level makes it � exible enough toaccommodate other types of disaster. This implies the articulation of three maincategories of factors: (i) pre-disaster factors; (ii) disaster impact and impact

J M Albala-Bertrand is at the Department of Economics, Queen Mary and West� eld College, University ofLondon, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK.

ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/00/020215-13 Ó 2000 Third World Quarterly 215

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effects; and (iii) disaster response and disaster interference. As such, thisframework caters for the analysis of any type of disaster from an articulatedgeneral structure, while the complex emergency approach analyses the threecategories above for a particular kind of disaster from the speci� c point of viewof an emergency response.

A comparison between natural disasters and complex emergencies, for the � rsttwo categories, has already been dealt with by Albala-Bertrand (2000b). Accord-ing to this author:

the key feature of a long lasting complex emergency is the societal/institutionalweakness that fails to accommodate entrenched and violent competing identitygroups, while the key characteristic of a natural disaster is the physical weaknessof structures and processes that fails to compensate for extreme natural events.(p 35 emphasis in the original).

He suggests that the main difference between complex emergencies and naturaldisasters is the degree of societal endogeneity of cause and effect, the formerbeing fully endogenous, while the latter being only partially so. In complexemergencies most effects are deliberately institutional, these effects representingthe whole aim of warfare and political imposition. Conversely, in naturaldisasters most effects are random, the institutional effects being mostly inciden-tal and not normally important. In this paper therefore I shall analyticallycompare complex humanitarian emergencies with natural disasters within theframework of a disaster situation, concentrating on the third category of factors,ie disaster response and societal change.

Disaster response and effects

Disaster response can be de� ned as a wide array of endogenous and exogenousreactions, measures and policies that are aimed at mitigating, counteracting andpreventing disaster impacts and effects. The response side of a disaster situationcan be articulated as follows: once a disaster has occurred, the impact effectsthemselves stimulate both the unfolding of systemically incorporated mecha-nisms of response and the creation of especially designed response measures.These two sets of responses aim at emergency activities that temporarilycompensate for functioning � ow losses and at restitutive activities that perma-nently compensate for stock and/or institutional losses. The impact effects andthe derived compensatory responses also stimulate an anticipatory responseaimed at prevention and mitigation of future potential disasters (see Albala-Bertrand, 1993). This then generates three main areas of attention, which makeup the response side of a disaster situation: (i) response mechanisms; (ii)compensatory response; and (iii) anticipatory response. In addition, as a disastersituation always generates varying degrees of societal change, I shall also focuson response-induced effects, that interfere with the way a society was previouslyrun.

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Response mechanisms: endogenous and exogenous

Response mechanisms refer to endogenous and exogenous processes ofresponse. Endogenous response mechanisms are those channelled throughsociety’s in-built institutional processes. These processes represent a series offormal and informal feedback mechanisms, which are part of the existingself-regulatory social machinery, eg the family, the market, political and admin-istrative frameworks, cultural norms and customs, psychological attitudes andhabits, and so on. These involve a wide array of activities that range from highlyautomatic to non-automatic in-built responses. For example, extended familysolidarity represents a highly automatic endogenous reaction, while the use ofthe hazard reserve item of the public budget is mostly a non-automatic in-builtresponse. Likewise, market reactions and emergent coalitions appear to liesomewhere in between. Exogenous mechanisms, in turn, are those channelledvia ad hoc, unpatterned, unguaranteed, or irregular processes, which areexpressed in action, measures and policies that may formally � ll gaps left byin-built responses, bypass endogenous channels, shift initiatives away fromregular actors, or superimpose alternative structures. This normally impliesprivate and public interventions that go beyond in-built actions, and internationalassistance and aid, to go beyond existing guarantees.

The above mechanisms have been observed and sometimes societally analysed(eg Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1981; Quarantelli, 1978; White& Hass, 1975; Barton, 1970; Dynes, 1970; Sorokin, 1942). In natural disastersthis represents quite a complex area of motivations, actions and reactions, but itis even more so in the case of complex emergencies. This is because the latterare the result of the deliberate disruption of institutional arrangements, whichmay reduce the endogenous response to little more than primary group compen-satory reactions from family, ethnic groups, clans or otherwise. At the sametime, a violent con� ict seeks to obstruct the compensatory actions of theopponent, eroding the exogenous responses to precarious levels. This is no doubtan important area of research in its own right, but it often comes partially andincidentally to disaster or emergency studies, losing sight of the societalframework within which these mechanisms � t in the � rst place.

For example, Duf� eld (1994) and similarly Keen (1994) and Rangasami(1985) make the effort to avoid this shortcoming to a large extent, as theyanalyse some cases of complex emergencies via the processes of asset transferand exploitative activities between primordial groups. These processes translateinto appropriatory raiding, forced asset sales, arms-based restriction of victims’movements, forced migration and politicisation of relief deliveries. It would notbe suf� cient, and would probably be misleading, to speak about these processeswithout characterising them as part of wider institutional problems. One suchproblem is the relaxation of normal societal frameworks, like markets andprivate property rights, which may stimulate speculation and appropriation ofproperty, requiring abnormal response mechanisms—like sales under duress andmigration (see ODS, 1997)—to compensate for livelihood deterioration. Buteven in these studies the overall institutional articulation is somehow missed, asthere is an excessive focus on the particular processes themselves.

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In complex emergencies, both endogenous and exogenous response mecha-nisms are also present. But as the parties in a con� ict always seek to weakenboth the institutional and the ad hoc compensatory actions of the opponent, theresponse is bound to be unstable and less effective than in natural disasters,especially in the absence of supraregional or supranational support. The strategicpriorities of war also make it unlikely that the parties in con� ict devote enoughresources to compensate appropriately for the signi� cant and widespread victim-isation of civilians, which normally emerges in the form of hunger, disease anddisplacement. International organisations usually attempt to bridge this gap sothat the affected people can be supported. But, precisely for this reason, thewarring factions may perceive the international response as being politicallypartial (Macrae & Zwi, 1994b), making the whole exercise overwhelminglymore sensitive and dif� cult than for natural disasters. Natural disasters may alsohave some political overtones, but it is unlikely that the response will operate inan environment of violent factionalism and institutional erosion, which makes itcomparatively simpler than for complex emergencies.

The duration and the overlapping of the expected responses vary with the typeof disaster. In natural disasters, the emergency is normally a short-term type ofresponse, while both the restitutive response, or reconstruction, and the anticipa-tory response, or prevention, are by their very nature long term and, as indicatedbelow, there is some small overlapping in the sequence of these responses.Contrary to sudden natural disasters, but somehow akin to slowly developingdisasters, like drought-induced famines, in complex emergencies, as the impactor overt con� ict persists, then the impact effects also persist, making theemergency itself persist (Vayrynen, 1996). This persistence makes the emer-gency both longer lasting than in sudden natural disasters and mixed withelements of the restitutive and anticipatory responses, implying a major overlap-ping of responses. The latter two cannot take place unless the source of theemergency, ie the overt violent con� ict, has ceased or at least been temporarilycontained.

Another associated difference is the way the impacts of a disaster, or thesource of its effects, ends. In natural disasters, the source of effects, although notnecessarily the effects themselves, ends naturally, without much societal inter-vention. In complex emergencies, however, the end of the violent con� ict, ie thesource of effects, can only happen as a societal outcome. That is, when eitherone of the factions achieves absolute victory or when some negotiated trucecomes into effect. In the latter situation, but also insofar as the effects ofreprisals from the former are involved, international aid institutions normallyplay a fundamental role, as is further indicated below (Macrae & Zwi, 1994a).

Compensatory response: emergency and restitution

A compensatory response is that unfolded as a reaction to actual disaster impacteffects via emergency and restitution activities. The former seeks to counteractindirect effects on people, the economy and the polity, while the latter seeks torestore permanently the losses from the direct disaster effects on people,capital/animal stocks and institutions. This reconstruction does not necessarily

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aim at replicating the actually damaged and destroyed items, but at the restitutionof the system’s lost capabilities and functions, implying a range of substitutions,complements and overall change in the rebuilt system, which may have asigni� cant institutional impact (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Geipel, 1982).

Emergency response. In natural disasters, this set of response activities seeksto put people back on their feet via both relief and rehabilitation activities. Reliefaims at the alleviation of victims, distress and the re-establishment of suppliesfor the satisfaction of the most basic needs, while rehabilitation aims atprovisionally re-establishing both social � ows and functioning frameworks. Inthe wake of recovery, there is some interaction and overlapping between thesetwo types of activities, as without some relief there cannot be sustainablerehabilitation, and without some rehabilitation there could not be sustainablerelief. The normal location for these activities is the ‘disaster area’, ie thelocation where the disaster had its main impact, including its taxed surroundings;only rarely does the tackling of temporary shelter, food supply and otherlivelihood conditions take place outside this area.

In complex emergencies some emergency activities are carried out within theareas that have been affected by warfare, but the most obvious work ofinternational emergency efforts normally involves the tackling of displacementand associated ailments, ie the shelter, disease, hunger and livelihood stability ofthe people displaced by warfare (Nafziger & Auvinen, 1997). This normallyimplies locations removed from the interface of con� ict violence or war havens,as otherwise the stability and effectiveness of emergency activities may beseriously impaired. The expectation is, however, that displaced people willreturn to their home locations, but is would require extending the emergency topeacemaking and peacekeeping activities as well as contributing to buildingconsensus institutions (Ake, 1997). These institutions should be stable andcapable of both preventing future bouts of widespread political violence andsecuring peace and development. That is, the emergency activities wouldnecessarily be combined with some restitutive and anticipatory responses, thisinteraction and overlapping being an important distinction from natural disasters.

Another difference between these two types of disaster is the misuse thatdomestic parties can make of the emergency resources. In natural disasters it isnot uncommon for some items of aid and assistance to be misdirected orsiphoned away by of� cials in charge of distribution. This is usually the resultmore of the laxity of pre-existing institutional patterns than of either opportunis-tic corruption or political expediency, although the latter can be serious, as wasthe case in the 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Black,1981). In complex emergencies, given the institutional change-seeking nature ofpolitical con� icts, overall aid and assistance deliveries normally become highlypoliticised, often being used as a weapon in the service of the con� ict itself bythe domestic parties that exercise some control over them (see Macrae & Zwi1994a; Duf� eld, 1994).

Other important differences are the right to access, the reach and the timing

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of emergency activities. In sudden natural disasters, like earthquakes and � oods,it is unlikely that there will be important government and institutional restric-tions that prevent emergency operators and general response institutions fromreaching the disaster area and the victims. There have, however, been cases inwhich the government tried to prevent the emergency parties from reaching thearea and/or declared an early end to emergency activities for political reasons,as in the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, among other cases (see Albala-Bertrand,1993). As soon as a government of� cially declares an end to emergencyactivities, of� cially sanctioned international as well as national institutions arenot longer able to continue activities. To do so would require specially grantedrights, as in the aftermath of the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, among othercases (see Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Cuny, 1983). In slowly developing naturaldisasters, like drought-induced famines, obstacles to international emergencyactivities are bound to affect the timing of response, contributing to additionalhardship and mortality in the famine areas. These obstacles are likely to arisewhen an autocratic, but nevertheless politically fragile, government attempts tohide its own failings, as in the 1974 drought-induced famine in Ethiopia (seeAlbala-Bertrand 1993; Sen, 1981; Harsch, 1978).

In complex emergencies, the negotiation of access between the warringfactions and international organisations, normally in an environment of mistrust,is one of the main issues associated with emergency activities and therefore withboth the reach and the timing of response (Macrae & Zwi, 1994a). This is betterdescribed in the wider context of international assistance and complex emer-gency studies, as is shown below.

Studies and activities mostly focus on the international response, normallydiscarding endogenous and even exogenous local responses, as de Waal (1994)contends. This author is highly critical of the ‘disastrous’ US ‘humanitarian’intervention in Somalia in 1993, and concentrates on the dynamics of faminerelief in Somalia 1991–93. He indicates that the international relief system,including NGOs, has shown serious failings everywhere, Somalia being the worstcase, and only local programmes appear to have delivered appropriately, but theywere largely overlooked by the international relief system. Generally, this maybe an accurate critique at � eld level, but the fact is that, without internationalinvolvement of some sort, it is highly unlikely that a con� ict can be moderated,let alone ended. This is bound to let war victimisation grow, making theemergency persist for as long as the overt violent con� ict persists. Internationalinvolvement and responses are paramount in complex emergencies, as otherwisethe response may become too unstable and unviable, which is another differencefrom natural disasters.

Issues on the mixing of assistance delivery with negotiated access or withpeacemaking and peacekeeping activities have become central to the inter-national response agendas. According to Hoffman (1997), in the post-cold warera international humanitarian agencies and NGOs appear to have become themain conduit through which some $5 billion of international emergency assist-ance is channelled, making these institutions become part of, but more often asubstitute for, a political solution to complex emergencies.

This implies that traditional ethical humanitarianism which reasserts the

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principles of neutrality and impartiality and ensures that legitimacy and accessare not denied, appears to be in question. This principled endeavour would onthe surface represent the ideal of a typical emergency relief and rehabilitationresponse. But this purist neutrality may be highly costly for both the assistanceinstitutions and the likelihood of peace making, as no check on the persistenceof violence and therefore on victimisation would be raised from these quarters.This may potentially fuel rather than contain the calamity, as the bene� tingwarring parties may release resources for continuing warfare and feel freer topursue their objectives, without having to take full responsibility for the socialand human costs. Neutrality at any cost may prove to be too costly.

Restitutive response. In natural disasters, once the emergency response hascontained the spread and the deepening of indirect effects, the basis for reversingmost of the direct effects would be feasible. Restitution or reconstructioncomprises all those responses aimed at bringing the system back to its originalstate by reinstating destroyed and damaged elements and capabilities. This is along-term type of activity, normally taking many years. It comes in the shape ofphysical reconstruction plans and is for the most part an exogenous type ofactivity, except insofar as � nancing from insurance or other in-built systems areinvolved. These responses will require not only a good amount of funding outof the public budget, from current public expenditure, new grants and subsidies,and tax and bills write-offs, but also from foreign aid and credit, includingmaterial, technical and labour assistance (Kunreuther, 1997; Albala-Bertrand,1993). These responses are therefore bound to interfere with standard activitiesthat may compete for the same resources.

In the case of complex emergencies, the physical restoration of damaged anddestroyed socioeconomic capabilities is normally long term and costly. In theabsence of a Cold War or other supranational politico-economic interests, itsforeign funding may be less forthcoming than it otherwise would have been(Green, 1994). But once the disaster has ended, although not necessarily theconcomitant factors that led to it, reconstruction is not mostly a question ofreplacing the rundown physical stocks, as in natural disasters, even if that isimportant. The fundamental priority is the reconstruction or restructuring of anappropriate institutional framework, which can be capable of eliciting sustain-able coexistence, peace and order among heterogeneous identity groups. Thisimplies the creation of social and political institutions that are strong and � exibleenough to accommodate, absorb and defuse potential con� icts, which mayinclude some sort of democratic rule. However, when the primary groups are notdemocratic in the � rst place, decentralisation and/or democracy may unnecessar-ily cause further fragmentation and havoc, as, for example, in Yugoslavia,Russia and Africa in general, after the end of either colonial rule or the Cold War(Ake, 1997).

But reconstruction would be quite unstable and ineffectual without securingthe end of the con� ict in the � rst place. This would, however, shift the responsetowards addressing the direct source of the effects so as to stop the violence,potentially making the emergency action more effective and reconstruction

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possible. But this is a thin line to tread, as the international relief system maybe perceived both as one more warring faction and as siding with a particularideological conception of the world. This may make the whole exercise highlyunpredictable, as happened with the US intervention in Somalia in 1993, and theNATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999 (see The Economist, June andJuly 1999; Silber & Little, 1996; de Waal, 1994). The alternative, however, doesnot appear to fare a lot better. Therefore, some combination of emergency actionand peace making is normally attempted, in a dif� cult balancing act.

Anticipatory response. In natural disasters, this represents a series of actionsand measures that seek to prevent, soften or mitigate a future disaster and/or itseffects. This response aims at tackling pre-disaster factors (ie societal/physicalvulnerability, proneness and unleashing events), the impact proper (ie theinterface of a susceptible social system and an unleashing event), and itspotential effects, if the impact as such cannot be prevented (Albala-Bertrand,1993; Smith, 1992). This comprises a range of activities from technological orengineering to societal ones. For example, essentially technological activitiesinclude cloud seeding, controlled triggering of avalanches or landslides, destroy-ing pests at source, prediction research and the like. In turn, engineeringactivities would normally seek to separate the interface between a natural eventand a social system, like dams and reservoir, bypass channels, tree lines,landslide barriers, dune control, etc. These two types of preventative actionshave few societal side-effects.

There is, however, a third type of preventative activity that may have societalimplications as it aims to modify people’s behaviour and institutions so that, ifthe impact cannot be avoided at least its effects can be both reduced andeffectively counteracted when they occur. It includes the setting up of land-useregulations and building codes, with their associated enforcement structures. Italso deals with people’s involvement in prediction/warning and self-help sys-tems, with their related positive reaction patterns, and also with the govern-ment’s rapid and effective reaction to potential and actual impact effects(Godschalk et al, 1998; Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Dreze & Sen, 1990/91; Miletti& Sorensen, 1988). Furthermore, it includes insurance, mortgage and taxationsystems that encourage safer types of behaviour and a better distribution of risk,so that disaster effects can be reduced (Kunreuther, 1997; Albala-Bertrand, 1993;Giarini, 1984; Cochrane, 1975; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969). And it also includesthe monitoring of markets, migrations and people’s reactions in general, so thatresponse effectiveness can be maximised, while antisocial and speculativebehaviours can be minimised (Albala-Bertrand, 1993).

In complex emergencies, the three types of anticipatory responses are present,but their focus and articulation are different from those of natural disasters. Theanticipatory responses are aimed at the societal preconditions of violent politics(see Albala-Bertrand, 2000b), at the potentially violent con� ict itself, when thepreconditions cannot be modi� ed in the short or medium term, and at thepotential effects of a violent con� ict, when the con� ict itself cannot be avoided.The former two responses are interlinked and mostly associated with institutional

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arrangements, as is shown later. In turn, the latter, in the case of internationalwar, is mostly associated with the physical conditions and arrangements thatsupport the policies of standard defence and internal order, plus diplomaticinteraction and agreements. In addition, there are attempts that may moderatewar excesses via international agreements over the rules of engagement, thetreatment of prisoners, the care of the wounded, and the like.

In the case of civil war, which is the main concern of complex emergencies,the faction that controls the government may also have more widespread controlof the necessary physical resources, but this by no means guarantees a bettercontainment of the violent con� ict effects in the long term. The experience isthat government resources erode fast without the support of external thirdparties, which is also true for non-government factions. With external support,a civil war of attrition can be very long-lasting and damaging, which may alsomean that international assistance may unwittingly support the persistence andreach of the con� ict. Apart from domestic and foreign forms of politicalintermediation, there have lately been some attempts at globalising the monitor-ing and punishment of human rights violations. For example, the setting up ofthe International War Crimes Tribunal, whose � rst investigating have concernedactions during the break-up of Yugoslavia as well as the setting up of theinternational convention on torture, whose � rst test-care is dealing with GeneralPinochet, may contribute to discipline violence and victimisation. But, as distinctfrom natural disasters, the physical resources from aid and assistance may makeno contribution to the moderation of actual impact effects, unless the physicalaspects of mitigation are somehow directly linked to con� ict resolution.

In turn, the anticipatory response that acts on both the preconditions and thecon� ict itself is mostly an institutional type of effort. It actually attempts toimpose or negotiate ways to alter social behaviours, so that the violent con� ictcan be moderated/stopped or the potential for overt political con� ict can bereduced/abolished. For example, in some cases, only an authoritarian/repressiverule may contain and suffocate a clear potential con� ict, even if it does notaddress its causes. On other occasions, some decentralisation/democratisationmay contribute to defusing a potential con� ict. But there is clearly no rule thatcan be applied everywhere or at all times (Ake, 1997).

In complex emergencies, the response may attempt to link the provision ofassistance and aid to the strategies of con� ict resolution, but this cannot be doneby imposing a particular foreign solution, as it may not gain the requiredpolitical support and consensus for long-term stability. According to Hoffman(1997), a useful response would not assume any explicit role for humanitarianassistance as a direct tool of con� ict in� uence, but the formulation of anappropriate conceptual framework for consensual negotiation. Therefore, thiswould aim at understanding the underlying causes of the con� ict but, contraryto a direct strategy of con� ict resolution, it would not espouse advocacy,avoiding the taking of sides and refraining from imposing particular solutions.The objective here is the development of facilitative processes of dialogue andanalysis, so as to reduce the sources of short-term political susceptibility toviolent con� ict, to induce long-term changes in the institutional vulnerability tocon� ict and to aid long-term institutional restructuring for peace sustainability.

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This implies actions like short-term second-track diplomacy, community-based initiatives and longer-term indirect initiatives that soften cleavages. Theseactions are likely to strengthen civil society, reinforce humanitarian principlesand re-establish the legitimacy of central institutions (Ake, 1997). That is, thisresponse, while allowing for relief and rehabilitation, does not directly addressthe overt con� ict as such; rather it addresses it only indirectly via short- andlong-term measures orientated towards the causes behind the con� ict. As such,it mixes the short-term urgency of the emergency response with the long-termconsolidation of restitutive and, more prominently, anticipatory responses.

According to Hoffman (1997), a small number of NGOs appears to have startedto move towards this response strategy, making it more of an explicitly regularpolicy than before. The fact is that there has always been international input intoviolent con� ict resolution and warring country stability. Most cease� re andpeacemaking/peacekeeping activities have normally been arranged and moni-tored by international sources that can guarantee some minimum balance andassistance, such as the UN, the EU, the cold war structures of the past, or givengroups of countries (Holsti, 1991; 1996). This strategy is therefore intended tohave institutional repercussions, but seeks to introduce them in a gentle manner,so as to avoid unpredictable and more intractable repercussions. But as it doesnot in itself guarantee a cessation of hostilities, it could therefore become a longendeavour without rewards.

Societal interference

As has been shown, both the impact and its effects and the responses and theireffects are bound to cause some variable degree of interference with normalsociety. In the case of natural disasters, this interference is for the most part anincidental effect of the impact and the response of a disaster situation. Therecould also be some interference that intentionally seeks to reduce societalvulnerability to future disasters, and this may in addition have a developmentalcomponent. And there could also be some deliberately opportunistic politicalinterference that takes the occasion to come to the fore (Albala-Bertrand, 1993).At any rate, incidental interference is explained by the encroaching of bothimpact effects and disaster responses on normal societal activities, making theprevailing resources undergo some rationalisation and redirection.

In the case of complex emergencies, however, interference is part and parcelof the impact effects, as these are mostly an intended set of overt violent actionsthat seek ultimately to create institutional effects. Normal political con� ict isabout gaining power, status, and resources at the expense of the opponent. Anyeffective war plan seeks to weaken and/or destroy the enemy’s logistic supportand relative autonomy, undermining in this way also their institutional basis ofsupport and legitimacy. In other words, war plans what natural disasters do onlyrandomly. Both offensive and defensive actions are bound to interferesigni� cantly with ‘normal’ society (Brown, 1997; Ben Rafael, 1979). In addition,as was shown, emergency action, and reconstruction in particular, may also behighly interfering.

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The three main responses we discussed above have, however, differentdegrees of potential interference. In natural disasters, emergency response islikely to have a high degree of incidental interference, derived from generalinstitutional stress. But it may also stimulate some deliberate political interfer-ence, derived both from the fragmentation of the state apparatus and the ensuinginward activities of identity groups. However, this seems to depend on societalpre-disaster conditions. This appears to have been the case with the secession ofBangladesh from Pakistan after a severe cyclone in 1970. And it also appears tohave been the case with the abolition of the monarchy in Ethiopia, after thedramatic drought/war-induced famine of 1974 (Albala-Bertrand, 1993;Chakrabarty, 1978). This interference is normally unlikely to be so dramatic asin the examples above, and is usually the incidental effect of physical, ratherthan institutional, demands. In some cases, however, as in the response to theSahelian drought/famine of 1974, the emergency response itself became theproblem for long-term recovery, as it created a strong foreign-assistance depen-dency, weakening the domestic capacity for autonomous social and economicrecovery (Lateef, 1982). In turn, in complex emergencies, the emergencyinterference may normally be quite intense, as was shown above.

In natural disasters, the restitutive response is mostly of a technological orengineering nature, with the associated � nancial requirements, which may causemostly incidental interference with society. In complex emergencies, however,this response aims at both stopping the overt violent con� ict and at re-establish-ing a consensual institutional framework for peace and development, seekingdeliberately to modify or create institutions. Therefore, it is by its very naturehighly interfering with ‘normal’ institutions and behaviours, as it aims to havestrong endogenous consequences for society.

In natural disasters, the anticipatory response represents a mix of technologi-cal and societal actions, as was shown. Given that most legislation aboutdisaster prevention and protection has come as a result of actual disasters, thisis bound to have important endogenous societal repercussions. This too repre-sents a form of societal interference, of course, just as the development ofdisaster insurance and disaster subsidy systems do (Kunreuther, 1998; Albala-Bertrand, 1993). In complex emergencies, however, the interference is the aimin itself. Contrary to natural disasters, this operates together with restitutiveresponses, as the institutional framework that serves to re-establish peaceinstitutions is also likely to serve as a preventative in-built system for futuresocietal tensions, reducing the likelihood of societal impasse and violent resol-ution of con� icts.

Conclusions

The main analytical differences in the response to natural disasters and that tocomplex emergencies are essentially based on the institutional setting withinwhich these calamities occur. First, the violent and entrenched political natureof complex emergencies is bound to make the response more complex, dif� cultand unstable than that for natural disasters. For the same reason, an internationalresponse is signi� cantly more important for complex emergencies than for

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natural disasters, as it is unlikely that a violent con� ict can be moderated, letalone stopped, without foreign involvement and assistance. Second, there issigni� cantly more overlapping and interaction between emergency, reconstruc-tion and prevention in complex emergencies than in natural disasters, whichagain makes the overall response to the former highly complex and unpredict-able.

Third, contrary to sudden natural disasters, unless the source of an overtviolent con� ict has stopped, the duration of emergency activities in complexemergencies is likely to be a long-term endeavour. This also implies that theresponse itself can have signi� cant repercussions for the development of theviolent con� ict. Purist emergency neutrality may add fuel to the con� ict, whilesome negotiated type of emergency deliveries may contribute to moderating it.Further, a more active involvement of assistance institutions may be perceivedas partisan, making the response highly risky and unpredictable. Therefore, apolicy that mixes elements of neutrality with those of active involvement andproposes useful frameworks for peace, stability and development, may appearpotentially more fruitful. But this would require a deft balancing act, which maynot always be available or achievable in the short term, implying a long-termtesting and monitoring of actions and reaction.

Fourth, there are important differences in the right to access, the reach, thelocation and the timing of the emergency response. In natural disasters, accessis not normally a problem and therefore the response timing and reach as wellas the location can be better de� ned, planned and executed. In complexemergencies the right to access normally involves protracted negotiations andmistrust, affecting both the timing and the reach of the response, the location ofit being normally removed from the con� ict interface. This may also involve atrade off between assistance deliveries and negotiated access. Fifth, setting asideplanning and informational problems, while in natural disasters the misplace-ment of resources is normally associated with institutional and ordinary corrup-tion, in complex emergencies it is normally associated with warfare opportunismand tactics. Sixth, contrary to natural disasters, the reconstruction in complexemergencies aims more at the restructuring of institutions for peace and develop-ment than at the physical reconstruction of rundown stocks, even if the latter isalso important, but without the former there can be no stable pattern for thelatter. These efforts also involve preventative or anticipatory activities, as thepeace institutions that can be reached by negotiated consensus are likely toguarantee some minimum stability, preventing the recurrence of widespreadpolitical violence.

Finally, all the above points lead us to a fundamental difference. In naturaldisasters there can sometimes be some signi� cant interference with society fromboth the impact effects and the responses, but this is mostly incidental andnormally not widespread or long-term. In complex emergencies, most aspects ofthe impact and effects have institutional aims and overtones, ie the violentcon� ict is being staged precisely to interfere with and modify societal institu-tions. In these circumstances, the response to this type of calamity also causesome signi� cant societal interference, which is mostly deliberate, intense andlong-term.

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