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Page 1: Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti … · Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti and Great East Japan Earthquakes December 5, 2011 (Oscar Peterson

Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti and Great East Japan

Earthquakes

December 5, 2011 (Oscar Peterson Theatre, Embassy of Canada to Japan)

Ambassador Jonathan Fried opened the symposium by noting that Canada has supported the

Japanese people and Japanese reconstruction efforts in various ways, including contributions of

more than $40 million by individual Canadians, and by the Canadian government’s dispatch of

nuclear experts to assist with the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Japan and Canada are currently

working together to come up with better ways of cooperating in reconstruction and relief efforts

in disaster areas around the world. The two governments signed “the Canada-Japan Declaration

on Political Peace and Security Cooperation” during APEC Yokohama last fall, which flagged

responses to natural disaster as an important issue for bilateral cooperation.

The first panelist, Professor Iokibe Makoto, the President of the National Defense Academy of

Japan and Chairman of the Reconstruction Design Council, pointed out that the Great East Japan

Earthquake proved to the world how well prepared both Japanese society as a whole and the

Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) were for dealing with a major earthquake, compared to the

Kobe Earthquake of 1995. However, preparations for dealing with the tsunami proved limited

and inadequate. Great seismic disasters tend to trigger other disasters, and this must factor more

clearly into planning. The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, for example; is now understood as

not one, but three linked earthquakes that occurred as a chain-reaction. Japan must be prepared

for the possibility of other earthquakes inland, and increased volcanic activities. For this, Japan

must formulate a solid reconstruction scheme in order to minimize human loss in case such

disaster should strike again. Newly-reconstructed towns and schools, hospitals, and retirement

homes must be built on higher ground whenever possible, and more breakwaters must be built

along coastal towns and roads as multiple lines of defence against tsunami. Appropriate

provision must be made in the national budget for such tasks. No matter how much Japan is

forced to rely on nuclear energy in the long-run, renewable energy sources must also be given

more attention as an alternative.

Page 2: Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti … · Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti and Great East Japan Earthquakes December 5, 2011 (Oscar Peterson

General Yamaguchi Noboru, Director for the Center for National Security and Disaster

Management, analyzed the lessons of the earthquake from the standpoint of the Japan-U.S.

alliance and Japanese national security. The Great East Japan Earthquake facilitated a renewed

trust in the alliance despite previous ups and downs in the management of the bilateral relations,

thanks to the dedicated and full-fledged support of U.S. forces. Moreover, the SDF proved to be

extremely efficient in rescue and reconstruction efforts, as 40% of all SDF personnel were

swiftly mobilized in the first three months after the disaster, and various SDF facilities from

Aomori to Fukushima Prefectures cooperated efficiently with their logistical support networks.

The SDF contributed particularly to the maintenance of communication within the disaster zone,

linking prefectural governments, townships, and local shelters. The lesson must be now applied

to other regions in Japan. For example, Japanese islands on the South China Sea do not have

permanent SDF bases, and it is difficult to deploy personnel and materiel swiftly when the need

arises. It is therefore prudent that the Japanese government is considering to deploy forces and

to set up depots on its southern island chains for guaranteeing faster relief efforts in times of

possible contingency. Finally, the earthquake has promoted better communication between the

two allies, and work is underway to establish permanent operational-level liaison mechanism to

improve teamwork in cases of natural disasters and contingencies threatening Japanese national

security.

Professor Andrew Thompson of the Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of

Waterloo, analyzed the future prospect of Haiti’s reconstruction after the devastating earthquake

in January 2010. Although the sympathy and support given by the international community was

quick and generous, thanks to the United Nations mission which had already been in the country

since Haiti’s political crisis in 2004, prospects of economic recovery are grim. The earthquake

devastated Haiti’s already limited governance capacity, and the Haitian state has been largely

unable to provide for the security and basic needs of the Haitian people. Lack of infrastructure,

underdevelopment, and poverty have also resulted in a broken social contract, and have eroded

civic-mindedness. For mid- to long-term recovery, social cohesion is crucial; under current

circumstances, it is difficult to see how it can be buttressed.

Colonel Jacques Morneau, Defence Attaché, Embassy of Canada to the Republic of Korea and

the former Special Assistant to the Ambassador of Canada to Haiti, built on Professor

Page 3: Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti … · Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti and Great East Japan Earthquakes December 5, 2011 (Oscar Peterson

Thompson’s presentation by focusing on Canadian responses to the earthquake in Haiti,

spearheaded by the Stabilization & Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the Canadian

Expeditionary Force Command. In the aftermath of the earthquake, most cities in Haiti and

ministerial functions of the Haitian government were devastated as a result of the lack of

building codes. Two thousand Canadian START personnel provided the people of Haiti with

shelters by setting up refugee camps in sports fields and golf courses, and sent medical supplies

for various field hospitals. Also, along with rescue & recovery/body identification efforts,

Canada adopted orphans and evacuated the total of 4,620 people to Canada. Canadian lessons in

Haiti have also highlighted the crucial importance of tactical-level coordination between military

and international organizations for effective relief functions on the ground.

Commentator Professor David A. Welch, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs,

University of Waterloo, suggested that lessons from the comparison of the two cases would be

facilitated by focusing on “things that went well that could have gone wrong” and “things that

went wrong that could have gone well.” For both Japan and Haiti, the panelists agreed that the

communication between governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating on

the ground could have been better coordinated for more efficient allocation of much needed

supplies. General Yamaguchi and Colonel Morneau emphasized the need for unifying

communication channels and making backup plans, as well as coordinating the flow of

information between agencies by forming “NGO clusters.” Concerning Haiti, Professor

Thompson argued that the international response, at least based on Haiti’s previous record, could

have been much less generous; despite such support, however, the Haitian government still failed

to utilize the timely opportunity for facilitating cooperation with the people and overcoming

domestic political deadlock.

During the Q&A session, questions arose concerning (1) the possibility of SDF being sent

abroad to help natural disaster areas in warzones; (2) cases in which reconstruction efforts

resulted in better city functions compared to pre-disaster periods; and (3) the long-term prospects

of Haiti’s reconstruction. The panelists responded that (1) the SDF still suffers from domestic

restrictions which prevent its personnel to be dispatched to regions where the use of weapons is a

possibility; (2) Tokyo, after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, was rebuilt based on new city-

planning schemes that emphasized wide municipal parks, and thus could be regarded as an

Page 4: Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti … · Responding to Disaster: Lessons learned from the Haiti and Great East Japan Earthquakes December 5, 2011 (Oscar Peterson

example of successful city reconstruction incorporating lessons of disasters; and (3) the long-

term future prospects of Haiti are doubtful owing to the weakness of political leadership and the

difficulty of pursuing a holistic approach to rebuilding. However, progress is being made, if

slowly, and the international community should adopt an attitude of cautious optimism.

The main interest of the audience was apparently the lessons to be learned about coordinating

information flows between governmental agencies and NGOs. Panelists emphasized that the

main issue is the lack of hierarchical authority of governmental agencies and the military over

civilian NGOs, in addition to the fact that NGOs with various agendas of their own compete

among themselves for information. In order to tackle these problems, a unified web of

communication channels linking and coordinating all the organizations and agencies operating in

a given area is crucial, and setting up an “NGO hub” whose solely purpose is to coordinate and

distribute information would be advisable.

Former Ambassador of Japan to Canada Numata Sadaaki closed the event by pointing out that

Japan has largely failed to coordinate internally on communications concerning the Fukushima

nuclear power plant, not only to domestic but also to international audiences. Transmitting

accurate, scientifically sound information and analysis would have been highly desirable, not

only for preempting unnecessary and unhelpful speculation, but also for maintaining

international trust in Japan.