Almeda vs. Bathala MarketingGR No. 150806 January 28, 2008

Facts: Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract. The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case: SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him; SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect. respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.

Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract. Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.Issue: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is proper

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

GR No. 202242 July 17, 2012Facts: Under Section 8 paragraph 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can directly entertain a petition for declaratory reliefHeld: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.Republic vs. Roque

GR No. 204603 September 24, 2013

Facts: Private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being void for vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26,for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.

On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.

On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is properHeld: The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not proper in this case.Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.

A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them.

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.1wphi1 It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place.

Ampil vs. Ombudsman

GR No. 192685 July 31, 2013

Facts: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium building.

A year thereafter, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.

ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments.

On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally issued in ASBs name.

Counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the CCTs which he had originally issued in ASBs name. Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASBs name.

Respondents paid no heed to ASBs and Ampils demands. Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing Ampils complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been established.

Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the Ombudsman denied Ampils motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.

Issue: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans failure to find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the incomplete disposition of Ampils complaint.That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection.

Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsmans finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsmans discretion in determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.

The fourth circumstance is present in this case.

While we agree with the Ombudsmans disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampils charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.

Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampils complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." The Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."

Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsmans findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampils complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not detract from, much less diminish, Ampils charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Maglalang vs. PAGCOR

GR No. 190566 December 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch which was operated by PAGCOR a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869. Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incidentOn January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casinos Branch Manager, Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation dated January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Subsequently, a motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA.

In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,1 the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in out rightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal: (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, XXXXXXXXXXX; (b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.

Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we held:

Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certioraria scribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioners allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CAs outright dismissal of the petition for certiorarion the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

Corales vs. RepublicGR No. 186613 August 27, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per Resolution No. 98-64 dated 22 July 1998. During his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang Bayan per Resolution No. 2001-078 dated 12 July 2001 and 26 subsequent Resolutions, disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latters purported unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of P210,012.00.

Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007-100 dated 6 October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply.

Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andals behalf, who was impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party. The subsequent motion for its reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated 5 September 2007.

Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007.

On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision granting respondents Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing petitioners Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners suit for prohibition

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that dismissal was proper.

The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM issued by Andal merely requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM already contained a recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued. More so, there was no evidence to show that Andal had already enforced against petitioner Corales the contents of the AOM. Similarly, there was no clear showing that petitioners, particularly petitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury by reason of the issuance of the AOM. The action taken by the petitioners to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises, conjectures and speculations that petitioner Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse petitioner Dr. Angeles salaries, should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as correctly pointed out by respondent Republic in its Memorandum, what petitioners actually assail is Andals authority to request them to file the desired comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the authority to audit petitioners disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and render a final finding and recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to his audit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.

Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.

This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.

As previously stated, petitioners action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.

If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.Hipos Sr. vs. Bay GR No. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused.

2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date. Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus.Issue: Can the Supreme Court compel respondent Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding no probable caused against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.Social Justice vs. Atienza

GR No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue: Whether or not Mayor Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. we stated the reason for this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

We need not resolve this issue on whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027

Lokin Jr. vs. COMELECGR No. 179431 June 22, 2010

Facts: CIBAC was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution to proclaim CIBAC as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections. Subsequently, it issued another resolution proclaiming CIBAC as entitled to 2 additional seats.

The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.

Issue: What is the proper remedy that should be filed by Lokin who is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC, a petition for quo warranto before the HRET or a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it is a special civil action for certiorari.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.De Castro vs. Carlos