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2002 11: 212Current Directions in Psychological ScienceTerry Connolly and Marcel Zeelenberg

Regret in Decision Making  

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Paulus, P.B., & Nijstad, B.A. (Eds.).(in press). Group creativity. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Note

1. Address correspondence to Paul B.Paulus, Department of Psychology, Uni-versity of Texas at Arlington, Arlington,TX 76019; e-mail: paulus@uta. edu.

References

Bennis, W., & Biederman, P.W. (1997). Organizinggenius: The secrets of creative collaboration. Read-ing, MA: Addison Wesley.

Brown, V., Tumeo, M., Larey, T.S., & Paulus, P.B.(1998). Modeling cognitive interactions duringgroup brainstorming. Small Group Research, 29,495–526.

Collins, A.M., & Loftus, E.F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing. Psy-chological Review, 82, 407–428.

Dennis, A.R., & Williams, M.L. (in press). Elec-tronic brainstorming: Theory, research, andfuture directions. In P.B. Paulus & B.A. Nijstad(Eds.), Group creativity. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Diehl, M., & Stroebe, W. (1991). Productivity lossin idea-generating groups: Tracking down theblocking effect. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 61, 392–403.

Dugosh, K.L., Paulus, P.B., Roland, E.J., & Yang,H.-C. (2000). Cognitive stimulation in brain-storming. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 79, 722–735.

Leggett, K.L. (1997). The effectiveness of categoricalpriming in brainstorming. Unpublished master’sthesis, University of Texas at Arlington.

Leggett, K.L., Putman, V.L., Roland, E.J., & Paulus,P.B. (1996, April). The effects of training on per-formance in group brainstorming. Paper presentedat the annual meeting of the SouthwesternPsychological Association, Houston, TX.

Mullen, B., Johnson, C., & Salas, E. (1991). Produc-tivity loss in brainstorming groups: A meta-

analytic integration. Basic and Applied SocialPsychology, 12, 3–23.

Paulus, P.B. (2000). Groups, teams and creativity:The creative potential of idea generating groups.Applied Psychology: An International Review, 49,237–262.

Paulus, P.B., & Brown, V. (in press). Ideational creativityin groups: Lessons from research on brainstorming.In P.B. Paulus & B.A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity.New York: Oxford University Press.

Paulus, P.B., Dugosh, K.L., Dzindolet, M.T.,Coskun, H., & Putman, V.L. (2002). Social andcognitive influences in group brainstorming:Predicting production gains and losses. Euro-pean Review of Social Psychology, 12, 299–325.

Paulus, P.B., Larey, T.S., & Ortega, A.H. (1995).Performance and perceptions of brainstormersin an organizational setting. Basic and AppliedSocial Psychology, 18, 3–14.

Paulus, P.B., & Yang, H.-C. (2000). Idea generationin groups: A basis for creativity in organiza-tions. Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-sion Processes, 82, 76–87.

Sutton, R.I., & Hargadon, A. (1996). Brainstorminggroups in context. Administrative Science Quar-terly, 41, 685–718.

Regret in Decision MakingTerry Connolly1 and Marcel ZeelenbergDepartment of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona (T.C.), and Department of Economic and Social Psychology, Tilburg University,Tilburg, the Netherlands (M.Z.)

AbstractDecision research has only

recently started to take seri-ously the role of emotions inchoices and decisions. Regret isthe emotion that has receivedthe most attention. In this arti-cle, we sample a number of theinitial regret studies from psy-chology and economics, andtrace some of the complexitiesand contradictions to whichthey led. We then sketch a newtheory, decision justificationtheory (DJT), which synthe-sizes several apparently con-flicting findings. DJT postulatestwo core components of deci-sion-related regret, one associ-ated with the (comparative)evaluation of the outcome, theother with the feeling of self-

blame for having made a poorchoice. We reinterpret severalexisting studies in DJT terms.We then report some newstudies that directly tested(and support) DJT, and pro-pose a number of research is-sues that follow from this newapproach to regret.

Keywordsregret; decision making; emo-tion; decision justification theory

Decision researchers have onlyrecently started to take seriously anaspect of making choices that everylay person already knows about:Making a choice, whether of a va-cation destination, a spouse, a med-ical treatment, or a career, can be

an intensely emotional experience.Of course, most people give suchdecisions careful thought: What arethe options? What consequencesmight each lead to? How likely arethey? How desirable are they? But,in addition to these important cog-nitive considerations, there arestrong emotional factors. At the timeof the decision, the person has feel-ings about the decision itself (fearof surgery, anxiety about a careerchoice) and expectations aboutfeelings he or she may experiencelater (relief at a good outcome, sad-ness at a poor one). After the fact,the individual experiences emotions,which may or may not track withthe earlier expectations.

The emotion that has receivedthe most research attention fromdecision theorists is regret. Mostpeople can readily recall or imag-ine situations in which a poor deci-sion led to painful regret. In theearly 1980s, researchers in both lab-oratory and field settings started toproduce elegant theories and vividdemonstrations of the antecedentsand consequences of regret. Contin-ued research through the 1990soverturned some of these early

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CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 213

findings, modified others, and ledto a more complex and comprehen-sive understanding of regret in de-cisions.

In this short review, we firstsample a number of the initialstudies, and trace some of the com-plexities and contradictions towhich they led. We then sketch anew model that synthesizes theseapparently conflicting findings andidentify several research issues fornew work.

EARLY STUDIES

Perhaps the best-known of theearly regret studies is by Kahnemanand Tversky (1982). They asked stu-dents to assess the regret thatwould be felt by two investors,both of whom lose $1,200, one as aresult of buying a particular stock,the other as a result of holding onto the same stock. A stunning 92%of the respondents guessed that theactive buyer would feel more re-gret than the passive holder. A badoutcome resulting from actionseemed to be more regrettable thanthe same bad outcome when it wasthe result of inaction.

Intriguingly, just the opposite pat-tern emerged from a series of stud-ies by Gilovich and Medvec (1995)looking at retrospective regrets. Peo-ple asked to recall real-life regretstended to recall omissions more fre-quently than commissions, the ad-ventures they had passed up ratherthan the leaps they had taken.Gilovich and Medvec argued thatregret follows a characteristic tem-poral pattern: Regrettable actionshurt more than omissions in theshort run, but when looking back,people experience more regret overpaths not taken. Research we de-scribe later showed, however, thatpeople may regret inactions morethan actions in the short run also.

Economic choice theorists (e.g.,Loomes & Sugden, 1982) have also

studied regret (though their use ofthe word differs from ordinaryusage; Connolly & Butler, 2002).These theorists predicted that peoplewould feel regret if a decision out-come was worse than what theywould have received by choosing adifferent option, and that theywould try to avoid options that ex-posed them to this possibility. Initialstudies seemed to confirm these pre-dictions, but newer experiments(e.g., Starmer & Sugden, 1993) sug-gest that these studies were flawed.As a result, research in this traditionseems mainly to have stopped.There is, however, good evidencethat choices are influenced by antici-pated regret, and that such anticipa-tion is affected by whether or not oneexpects to learn the outcomes of un-chosen options (Zeelenberg, 1999).

DECISION JUSTIFICATION THEORY

To accommodate these conflict-ing results, we propose a model ofregret called decision justificationtheory (DJT). DJT postulates twocore components of decision-relatedregret, one associated with the(comparative) evaluation of theoutcome, the other with the feelingof self-blame for having made a poorchoice. The overall feeling of regretat some decision is a combinationof these two components: Youregret both that the outcome ispoorer than some standard (oftenthe outcome of the option you re-jected) and that the decision youmade was, in retrospect, unjustified.

The two components do not nec-essarily go together. Someonemight experience high self-blameregret even when the outcome isgood. Suppose that you leave aparty somewhat inebriated and de-cide to drive home rather than takea cab. You arrive home safely, butthe following morning you areracked with regret as you think back

on your decision. You knew at thetime that you had had too much todrink, and that options were avail-able. You have no excuse: Your de-cision to drive was entirely unjusti-fied, and could easily have led todisastrous outcomes. The actualoutcome was good, but you stillfeel regret.

Compare this with another sce-nario: Imagine yourself as a parenttrying to decide whether or not tovaccinate your 1-year-old againstsome serious disease. You consultdoctors, gather information, thinklong and hard, and decide to vacci-nate, despite knowing the vaccinesometimes has bad side effects.You are unlucky, and your childsuffers the bad side effects. Ofcourse, you regret this misfortune:The outcome is not what you hadhoped (and would not have hap-pened if you had decided againstvaccination). But, even in retro-spect, you see no reason to blameyourself. You did everything a pru-dent parent could to make the bestpossible choice. Your decision wasfully just i f ied (as comfortingfriends will remind you; being ab-solved from blame is a great way toreduce regret) . Driving homedrunk leaves you with self-blameregret but (if you are lucky) nobad-outcome regret; an unfortu-nate vaccination result leaves youfeeling bad-outcome regret, but notthe extra pain of self-blame.

Of course, most decisions thatresult in bad outcomes generatesome mixture of these two regretcomponents. Sometimes a decisionthat felt well justified at the timeappears unjustified later. Crawford,McConnell, Lewis, and Sherman(2002), for example, induced exper-imental participants to follow the(bad) advice of an unknown strangeras to which of two football teams tobet on, despite having detailed anduseful information on which tobase their bets. At the decisionpoint, most participants followedthe stranger’s advice. In retrospect,

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after they had bet and lost, theyseemed to scold themselves: “Howcould I have been so stupid? In ret-rospect, there was no reason for meto trust this anonymous tipster. Mydecision was unjustified.” In thiscase, the regret appears to have in-volved both poor-outcome andself-blame components.

DJT provides a parsimonious ac-count of many earlier findings onregret. For example:

Simonson (1992) offered stu-dents two imaginary choices:whether to take advantage of acurrent, moderate sale or waitfor a later, possibly better sale,and whether to buy a bargain-brand VCR or a more expensive,well-known, high-quality brand(a SONY). Control subjects dis-played no clear preference in ei-ther choice, but subjects asked tothink about the regret theymight feel after making their de-cision predominantly chose thesafer options (the current saleand the SONY). Apparentlythinking about regret led themto look for justifications for theirchoices, and the safer brand andguaranteed sale offered the justi-fication they were looking for.

In separate studies of the role ofdecision responsibility in regret(Connolly, Ordóñez, & Coughlan,1997; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, &Manstead, 2000), we exploredhow students expected to feel ifthey changed course sectionsand then found the section theymoved into was better than,worse than, or the same as thesection they had left. Studentswho made the decis ion forthemselves expected to feelmore regret if the outcome wasbad (and more rejoicing if theoutcome was good) than stu-dents who had the same out-come imposed on them by an ar-bitrary computer reassignment.However, even the computer-assigned students expected to

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feel substantial regret for a badoutcome, despite having no de-cision responsibility. Apparently(though neither of us interpretedthe results this way at the time),the computer-assigned group ex-pected only outcome-evaluationregret, whereas the self-choicegroup considered possible self-blame regret as well. (It is alsointeresting that the key referencepoint in all these studies was thestatus quo, the quality of thecourse section initially assigned.A variety of reference pointsmay be involved in regret-related comparisons.)

In another study (Zeelenberg,Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Piet-ers, 2002), participants wereasked how much regret a soccercoach would feel if his team lostafter he either changed or didnot change the team—a soccerparallel of the two-investorsproblem discussed earlier. As inthe case of the investors, partici-pants expected more regret forthe active than for the inactivecoach—but only if the team hadpreviously been enjoying a win-ning record. If the team hadbeen losing, the inactive coachwas seen as feeling more regret.In DJT terms, the winning coachwas unjustified in changing histeam, and can thus be blamedfor the subsequent loss. In con-trast, the losing coach was justi-fied in making changes, even ifthey did not immediately workout, and thus was expected tofeel less blame, and less regret.

Seta, McElroy, and Seta (2001) rana between-subjects replication ofthe two-investors problem, butattaching short personalitysketches of the investors as ei-ther cautious risk avoiders or en-trepreneurial risk takers. Theyreplicated Kahneman and Tver-sky’s original result (more regretexpected for action than for inac-tion) for the cautious investors,

•

•

but found the reverse for thebolder investors, who were seenas regretting losses from inac-tion more than losses from action.Apparently behavior can some-times be justified by its consis-tency with one’s personality.

These are, of course, simply posthoc reinterpretations in DJT termsof findings from existing studies(though we are impressed with theease with which the theory re-solves apparently conflicting re-sults). We have also undertakenseveral direct tests of the theory. Inone (Connolly & Reb, 2002), wetook three scenarios (the vaccina-tion, two-investors, and soccer-coachproblems) and asked subjects to as-sess a range of emotions the pro-tagonists might feel if the decisionturned out badly. We also askedthem to rate five short argumentsthat one might use to guide deci-sion making in each context (e.g.,“When it comes to [this topic], Ijust have to trust my gut instinctsabout what to do”; “It is better tosit still in situations like this than totake action”). Half the participantsevaluated these arguments before,and half evaluated them after, as-sessing the protagonists’ likelyemotions. Considering the argu-ments was intended to prime theparticipants with a range of alter-native rationales that could miti-gate the feelings of decision-relatedregret when things went wrong. Intwo of the three scenarios, this isexactly what we found: For boththe vaccination and the soccer-coach scenarios, the active protago-nist was seen as significantly lessregretful by participants who hadjust read the justificatory argu-ments than by those who had not.(Interestingly, the appropriatenessof the arguments varied signifi-cantly across scenarios. A justifica-tion that is perfectly appropriate foran investment decision may beseen as inappropriate for a health-care decision for one’s child.)

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CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 215

A second test of DJT (Inman &Zeelenberg, 2002) studied con-sumer regrets. In the scenarios usedin this study, consumers eithermade repeat purchases or switchedproducts. In some experimentalconditions, subjects got informationjustifying the consumer’s decision(e.g., she had bought the productonly once before, found it unsatis-factory, and switched); in otherconditions, the decision seemed un-justified (e.g., she had bought theproduct several times before, likedit, but switched anyway). The studyshowed that regret over poor out-comes was associated not withwhether the consumer switched orstayed, but with whether or not thedecision was justified.

A third set of related studies(Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2002) exam-ined the regret people experiencewhen they behave in ways they didnot originally intend. These studiesshowed that such inconsistency,which is often hard to justify, am-plifies regret independently of theoutcomes of the behavior. This in-consistency effect was obtained us-ing a scenario approach (Study 1),when people were asked about au-tobiographical memories of regret-table events (Study 2), and in a lon-gitudinal study of a significantreal-life decision, voting in nationalelections (Study 3). These resultssuggest that the notion of justifi-ability as put forward in DJT mayalso explain other effects of deci-sion procedures on regret.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

We have been surprised toooften in our studies of regret toprophesy with any confidencewhere the next steps will come, butthere are plenty of excellent re-search topics available. As yet, psy-chologists know almost nothingabout the sorts of arguments thatmake for good justifications, whether

people vary systematically in thejustifications they find compelling,and whether people produce justi-fications spontaneously or only un-der prompting. Understanding theproduction of justifications mightprovide a basis for “regret ther-apy,” for helping people find therationales that will work for themin reducing painful regret. It mighteven help them make better deci-sions. For example, when we askedsubjects to rate justifications (Con-nolly & Reb, 2002), one of the bestgeneral-purpose justifications wasthat one made a careful, competentdecision based on a wide range ofinput information. If anticipatedregret led people to engage inthoughtful decision making of thiskind, it could lead directly to im-proved decision making.

We are also eager to explore theeffects of decision-related rejoicing,if that is the positive emotion thatcorresponds to regret. (Preliminarydata in Connolly & Butler, 2002,suggest that regret and rejoicingmay not be simple polar oppo-sites.) Certainly people expect posi-tive decision outcomes to lead torejoicing, though as yet there is lit-tle evidence that justification af-fects such rejoicing. Good out-comes seem not to provoke thesorts of soul-searching that triggerregret and the search for justifica-tion. Regret and rejoicing may thusbe driven by rather different mech-anisms, and are not necessarilymirror images of one another.

The issues, then, are wide open.The emotional side of decision mak-ing is clearly important, but research-ers are only now starting to under-stand it. Compared with the hugeresearch literature describing howpeople think, and should think,about their decisions, the research onhow people feel in and about the de-cision-making process is in its in-fancy. The research we havesketched here considers one emotion,regret, and describes some of the sub-tle ways in which it influences, and is

influenced by, the choices peoplemake. As researchers improve theirunderstanding of regret and otherdecision-related emotions, peopleshould be able to improve theirchoices, and their feelings about theconsequences of those choices. Wefeel good about the prospect.

Recommended Reading

Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V.H. (1995).(See References)

Landman, J. (1993). Regret: The persis-tence of the possible. Oxford, En-gland: Oxford University Press.

Mellers, B.A., Schwartz, A., & Ritov,I. (1999). Emotion-based choice.Journal of Experimental Psychology:General, 128, 332–345.

Sugden, R. (1985). Regret, recrimina-tion and rationality. Theory andDecision, 19, 77–99.

Acknowledgments—We thank Lisa Or-dóñez and Jochen Reb for helpful com-ments on an earlier draft.

Note

1. Address correspondence to TerryConnolly, Department of Managementand Policy, 405Q McClelland Hall,University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721; e-mail: connolly@u.arizona.edu.

References

Connolly, T., & Butler, D. (2002). Searching for the“Regret” in “Regret Theory.” Manuscript sub-mitted for publication.

Connolly, T., Ordóñez, L.D., & Coughlan, R.(1997). Regret and responsibility in the evalua-tion of decision outcomes. Organizational Be-havior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85.

Connolly, T., & Reb, J. (2002). “No reason to blameyourself”: Justification in decision-related regret.Manuscript submitted for publication.

Crawford, M.T., McConnell, A.R., Lewis, A.C., &Sherman, S.J. (2002). Reactance, compliance,and anticipated regret. Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 38, 56–63.

Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V.H. (1995). The experi-ence of regret: What, when, and why. Psycho-logical Review, 102, 379–395.

Inman, J.J., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). Regret in re-peat versus switch decisions: The attenuatingrole of decision justifiability. Journal of Con-sumer Research, 29, 116–128.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The psychol-ogy of preferences. Scientific American, 246,160–173.

Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret Theory:

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An alternative theory of rational choice underuncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.

Pieters, R., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). On bad deci-sions and deciding badly: Intention-behavior in-consistency as a source of regret. Manuscriptsubmitted for publication.

Seta, J.J., McElroy, T., & Seta, C.E. (2001). To do ornot to do: Desirability and consistency medi-ate judgments of regret. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 80, 861–870.

Simonson, I. (1992). The influence of anticipatingregret and responsibility on purchase deci-sions. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 105–118.

Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1993). Testing for juxta-position and event-splitting effects. Journal ofRisk and Uncertainty, 6, 235–254.

Zeelenberg, M. (1999). Anticipated regret, ex-pected feedback and behavioral decision-mak-ing. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12,93–106.

Zeelenberg, M., Van den Bos, K., Van Dijk, E., &Pieters, R. (2002). The inaction effect in thepsychology of regret. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 82, 314–327.

Zeelenberg, M., Van Dijk, W.W., & Manstead,A.S.R. (2000). Regret and responsibility re-solved? Evaluating Ordóñez and Connolly’s(2000) conclusions. Organizational Behavior andHuman Decision Processes, 81, 143–154.

Is Laughter the Best Medicine? Humor, Laughter, and Physical HealthRod A. Martin1

Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada

AbstractThis article examines re-

search evidence for the popu-la r idea tha t humor andlaughter have beneficial ef-fects on physical health. Poten-tial theoretical mechanisms forsuch effects are discussed first.Empirical evidence for benefi-c ia l e f fec ts o f humor andlaughter on immunity, paintolerance, blood pressure, lon-gevity, and illness symptoms isthen summarized. Overall, theevidence for health benefits ofhumor and laughter is less con-clusive than commonly be-lieved. Future research in thisarea needs to be more theoreti-cally driven and methodologi-cally rigorous.

Keywordshumor; laughter; health; im-munity; pain

Belief in beneficial effects of hu-mor and laughter on physicalhealth has become increasinglypopular in recent years. The mediafrequently report claims about sci-entific evidence for health benefitsof humor and laughter. Some prac-titioners have even begun to advo-

cate the use of “therapeutic hu-mor” in the treatment of illness andmaintenance of health, and clownsand comedy carts have become fa-miliar sights in many hospitals.The idea that laughter is good forone’s health can be traced to bibli-cal times, and was revived periodi-cally by various physicians andphilosophers through the centuries.In recent decades, interest in thehealing power of laughter wasgiven new impetus by the best-sell-ing account by Cousins (1979) ofhis recovery from a progressive andpainful rheumatoid disease aftertreating himself with daily bouts oflaughter, along with massive dosesof vitamin C.

THEORETICAL MECHANISMS

How might humor and laugh-ter influence physical health?There are at least four potentialmechanisms, each involving a dif-ferent aspect of humor, and eachsuggesting different implicationsfor the application of humor towell-being. First, laughter mightproduce physiological changes invarious systems of the body, whichmay have beneficial effects onhealth. Various authors have sug-

gested, for example, that vigorouslaughter exercises and relaxes mus-cles, improves respiration, stimulatescirculation, increases the productionof pain-killing endorphins, decreasesthe production of stress-related hor-mones, and enhances immunity. Ac-cording to this theoretical model,hearty laughter is crucial in the hu-mor-health connection, whereas hu-morous perceptions and amusementwithout laughter would not be ex-pected to confer any health benefits.

Second, humor and laughtermight affect health by inducing pos-itive emotional states, which mayin turn have beneficial effects onhealth, such as increasing pain tol-erance, enhancing immunity, andundoing the cardiovascular conse-quences of negative emotions (Fred-rickson, 2000). Compared with thefirst model, this model gives humorand laughter a less unique role inhealth enhancement, as they are onlyone means of increasing positiveemotions, along with love, joy, op-timism, and so forth. Furthermore,according to this model, overtlaughter may not even be neces-sary for health benefits to occur, be-cause humor and amusement mayinduce positive moods even with-out laughter.

Third, humor might benefithealth indirectly by moderating theadverse effects of stress on health.A considerable body of research in-dicates that stressful life experi-ences can have adverse effects onvarious aspects of health, includingsuppression of the immune systemand increased risk of infectious dis-ease and heart disease (O’Leary,

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