reflections on the history of behavioral theories of language

Reflections on the History of Behavioral Theories of LanguageAuthor(s): Ryan D. TweneySource: Behaviorism, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 91-103Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758932 .

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Reflections on the History of Behavioral

Theories of Language

Ryan D. Tweney*

Bowling Green State University

i do not believe that we can avoid mistakes merely by studying past mistakes. That is an article of faith which has been repeated in the prefaces of too many history books, and which seems to betray a facile ignorance of the difficulty involved in relating complex events in the past to similarly complex events in the

present. Generally, we do not know enough about either the past or the present to

be able to make adequate inferences.1 Even so, the study of the past does have its uses. Just as knowledge of the reinforcement history of an organism can, under ideal circumstances, allow us to predict future behavior, so also we can some times extrapolate historical trends in a way that aids in the evaluation of current

trends. Such extrapolation is especially likely to be useful when "ideologically hot" issues are under discussion. Study of the past can help attain distance and a

dispassionate objectivity in approaching such problems. One of the things i hope to do in this paper is to convince the reader that, viewed in the proper historical

light, the gap between the behavioral tradition and the cognitive tradition in the psychology of language, what i will refer to as the "two cultures," is smaller than it is usually thought to be (by, e.g., Segal & Lachman, 1972 or by MacCor quodale, 1970). i think the point emerges out of consideration of some of the early behaviorist work on language.

* Based on a paper presented at the 84th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., September 1976, as part of a Division 25 symposium entitled '' Verbal Behavior and Psycholinguistics: Closing the Gap.'' The author is indebted to Evalyn Segal

and to Thorn Verhave for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, and to B.F. Skinner for allowing access to unpublished mimeographed material. Requests for reprints should be sent to Ryan D. Tweney, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

*Of course, many scholars have disagreed with this point, and have claimed for history a special usefulness as a guide to the future. Esper (1964) shares this view, an irony that will be apparent later in this paper.

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Ryan D. Tweney

Behaviorists and the Problem of Language

Behaviorists, and behaviorally oriented psychological theorists have, of

course, long noticed that language behavior presented a special testing ground for any explanatory account of behavior. Because of its overt complexity, its

rapid sequence of distinct but inter-dependent events, and its seemingly close

relation to "the mental life," a convincing account of how language is learned

and how it is controlled by situational and organismic variables appeared to be

essential. Thus, in his 1914 book John Watson argued that language habits were

not intrinsically different from such other complex, learned habits as were

involved in, say, the horse "Clever Hans" who could indicate the answers to

arithmetic problems by counting with his hoof. Just as Hans' behavior proved to be under the control of his trainer, so also could human language be related to a

series of learned habits. So confident was Watson in the validity of this view that

he somewhat flippantly passed over the inadequacies of the only relevant study available to him in 1914: Wyczoikowska's (1913) poorly executed attempt to record tongue movements while subjects were "told to think of a word or

sentence" (Watson, 1914, p. 325). Results for five subjects, including a "Dr.

W.," were reported (though only partially), and included introspective accounts

as well as kymograph tracings. The study established nothing, since there was no

control over any of the relevant variables other than that provided by the

instructions, and the tongue movement recordings were validated only intro

spectively.2 Apparently Watson's faith in the usefulness of this method was

shaken, since there is no mention of the study in the 1919 book, Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist, nor in its 1924 second edition ? both of which contain more careful and more extensive accounts of language habits than the

1914 book. Watson, perhaps as a result of his departure from the academic world

in 1921, never developed an experimental approach to language.

Simply to show that behaviorists have attempted accounts of language cer

tainly does not require that we go back to Watson ? there is Kantor (1952), Skinner (Note 1; 1957), and many contemporary behaviorists whose work estab

lishes the same point. As far as interest is concerned, there has never been a gap between the cognitive and the behavioral traditions. Science takes more than

interest, however. In spite of the long history of concern with this problem, the research actually conducted by behaviorists on language is, for the most part,

very recent. There is a sense of newness about the endeavor, and a feeling of

confidence in what can be achieved. Yet many of the issues and problems which

2It is interesting to note that Wyczoikowska's paper appeared in the same volume of Psycholog ical Review that published Watson's classic paper "Psychology from the standpoint of a be

haviorist," and Angell's (1913) attack on that position. Included also was a paper by Rudolf Pintner (1913) reporting an experiment that inhibited vocal articulation during silent reading (by using an

interfering digit-recitation task). Pintner found no change in reading speed or comprehension ? a

result that is inconsistent with Watson's theory. It is fascinating to realize that Watson edited the journal that year, and that Angell, Pintner, Watson, and Wyczoikowska were all at the University of Chicago!

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Behavioral Theories of Language

are being encountered by behavioral approaches to language were dealt with

decades ago by a rather neglected behaviorist: Erwin Esper. His work, its

antecedents and its consequents, will constitute the principal focus of this paper and the historical "lesson" that I have to offer.

ESPER AND THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE CHANGE

Erwin Allen Esper (1895-1972) was a student of the behaviorist Albert Paul Weiss (1879-1931) at Ohio State. Weiss had strong ties to the problem of lan guage. His system of behavioral psychology (Weiss, 1929) was influential in persuading Leonard Bloomfield, the American linguist, to alter his originally Wundtian approach to language (Bloomfield, 1914) in favor of one based on behavioral principles (Bloomfield, 1933; Esper, 1968; Hymes & Fought, 1975). Esper had studied classical philology prior to entering psychology and, encour

aged in his interests by Weiss, it was natural for him to pursue a psychological problem which had its origins in the study of historical change in language (Esper, 1973; Hockett, 1973; Olmsted, 1970; Wesley, 1973).

That languages change gradually over long (or sometimes even short) periods of historical time is a fact whose full significance had become apparent in the nineteenth century (Pedersen, 1931; Robins, 1967). Even more interesting for the emergence of scientific accounts of language was the demonstration that lan

guage change was lawful, systematic, and empirically discoverable. The insights of Rask, Grimm, and others culminated in the development of comparative linguistic methods and in reconstruction of a language, "Proto-Indo-European,"

which no longer existed, but whose phonological properties could be deduced by extrapolating the effects of the laws of sound change backwards in time. A

serious problem faced this endeavor, however, when it became clear that not all

laws of sound change were completely regular. For example, consider "Grimm's Law" of phonetic correspondence: the discovery that aspirates like /bh/ tend to

become voiced plosives like /b/, that voiced plosives tend to become unvoiced plosives like /p/, and that unvoiced plosives tend to become fricatives, like HI (Pei & Gay nor, 1969). This is why, for example, German "tag" became English

"day." The discovery of such laws in the first place led to an extension of the concept of "natural law" to sound change, and a search for the psychological

under-pinnings of the regularities. But the discovery that exceptions existed was

an embarrassing anomoly. If language was the result of naturally occurring processes, then why weren't all the rules exceptionless (Esper, 1973, Chapters 2

& 3; Hoeningswald, 1974; Wheeler, 1887; Whitney, 1867, pp. 95-99)? Careful inspection of some of the exceptions indicated that many of them

could be accounted for by invoking a principle of analogical change ? two

words which are similar in meaning may tend to converge in form as well. This

explained why, for example, the terms for "father" and "mother" were highly similar to each other in all Indo-European languages: the close meaning relation

ship led to sound change in the direction of greater similarity. Change by analogy

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Ryan D. Tweney

can be invoked to "explain away" most of the exceptions to regular sound

change (Waterman, 1963, pp. 48-55).

Analogy is a nicely psychological principle. It is also easily misused: it can be the "mentalistic fix" that makes everything orderly and comfortable. On the other hand, if analogy represents a true psychological process, then it should be

possible to specify the conditions under which it will occur. Further, before we

invoke it as a causal principle, we had better know something about what other

processes might or might not be involved. Since many analogical pairs are also

related associationally (father-mother is again an example), it is evident that

word associations should be examined, together with analogical change process es. In fact, an entire school of philologists, the Neogrammarians, evolved around

the notion of a close relation between analogy and association.

Artificial Language Systems

Esper took a direct, simple, and satisfying way to approach these issues. He

developed an artificial linguistic system which he taught to human subjects under controlled conditions, and he determined experimentally the variables that were

important in determining sound change. Esper's procedure was to establish,

during a long series of training trials, a sound-meaning correspondence between a

set of colored shapes and a set of nonsense words. He then tested subjects by

presenting new color-shape combinations and observing the response (Esper,

1925). The procedure differed from nonsense item procedures of the Ebbinghaus (1885) type in that the nonsense items were structured both semantically and

morphologically; NAS-DEG might correspond to "red-shape 3," for example, while NAS-KOP corresponded to "red-shape 2," and ROJ-DEG to "yellow

shape 3." After such a series, Esper found that newly presented combinations

could be learned very quicklyfc'by analogy'' ?

provided that the syllabic division

of the nonsense words was consistent with English syllabication and conformed

to the semantic dimensions of the shapes (color and form, in this example). Thus,

ROJ-KOP, for "yellow-shape 2," was an easily learned correspondence, after

the above series had been learned. If, however, the form of the nonsense words

corresponded to the semantic referents in ways which did not conform to English syllable structure, then initial learning was slower, and novel instances tended to

become assimilated to properties of some single instance of the stimulus set.

Suppose, for example, that NU-GDET was paired with "green-shape 1" in a

series that also contained NU-MBOW and NU-LGEN. Since syllabication did not correspond to that of English, learning was slower to begin with than for the other series. Further, there was a strong tendency for the nonsense words to be

assimilated to more English-like forms, for NU-GDET to become NUL-DET, by

analogy with NUL-GEN. Many of the observed changes were strikingly like analogical changes in actual historical examples involving natural languages.

Esper's results thus proved that analogic change processes do occur in at least

some of the ways predicted by philologists ? new forms were altered "by

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analogy" with existing forms of similar meaning. Subsequent experimental studies investigated the conditions under which analogical change occurred and, in particular, showed that the existence of associations between items was not a

necessary condition for analogical change to occur. Rather, there were context

dependent factors which led to the production of both analogical change and associations:

True analogical formations . . . may occur when a syntactic or semantic

context elicits a morph or morphs which, though previously learned in

similar contexts, have not previously been uttered or heard by the

speaker in this particular context. . . . The relation of analogical forma

tions to word-associations comes about through the fact that when a

context tends to elicit several different forms, each form also acquires a

tendency to elicit the others. (Esper, 1973, pp. 201-202) The conclusions were all supported by experimental data, providing the final confirmation of the Neogrammarian assumption. In effect, Esper had shown that

analogical changes and the bothersome exceptions to regular sound laws could

be accounted for using lawful, psychological principles. Furthermore, those

principles were based on functional relationships between certain kinds of con

texts and changes in the nature of the linguistic responses. No appeal to meaning was necessary to explain the phenomena. To be sure, there remain problems of

generalization: Do the laws found to hold in vitro also hold in vivo? This question has not yet been addressed.

The major point to be made here about Esper's research concerns its close relation to linguistic science. In devising an experimental approach, Esper was

following a suggestion advanced by two philologists, Albert Thumb and Karl Marbe (1901). The successful experimental implementation of this suggestion of course required a good amount of careful preliminary experimental work on

Esper's part (Esper, 1918; 1973). Yet in formulating a researchable question, he relied on the extensive analyses which linguists had already made of the opera tion of analogical processes. In fact, the question of whether or not analogical processes are factors in language change could not even be raised until after

linguistic analysis had shown the insufficiency of sound-change laws.

The Relationship Between Linguistics and Psychology

There is, I believe, a lesson here. Most of the work proposed by behaviorists interested in language has taken a different tack, since behavioral analyses are

generally somewhat independent of descriptive linguistic studies:

A long-standing problem in the analysis of verbal behavior is the size of the unit. Standard linguistic units are of various sizes. . . . Any one of

these may have functional unity as a verbal operant. A bit of behavior as

small as a single speech-sound, or even a pitch or stress pattern, may be

under independent control of a manipulable variable. ... If this seems at

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Ryan D. Tweney

odds with traditional linguistic analysis, it must be remembered that the verbal operant is exclusively a unit of behavior in the individual speaker. (Skinner, 1957, p. 21)

Only psychological research can determine what units are functionally impor tant, and, until we know how to "carve up" the speech stream into units, the careful classificatory attempts of the linguists are idle. Similar views were ex

pressed by others, e.g., Kantor (1952). If Esper had believed this, I think it is clear that we would not have had the

benefit of his research. The psychological problem of analogical change emerged from the linguistic analysis of phonemic sound change, not the other way around.

Thus, for example, the manipulation of syllable structure in Esper's experiments was clearly based on a careful analysis of language units. There is, to be sure,

great uncertainty about the empirical status of some of the units that now form the stock-in-trade of linguistics. The behaviorist attempt to remove meaning as a

construct in the explanation of language behavior (a major goal of Skinner's work on language; Skinner, Note 1; 1957; Hefferline, Note 2), seems to have engen dered a similar removal of any other construct derived only from linguistic analysis. Esper alone was able to see that a meaning-free account did not mean an

alinguistic one. It is senseless to ignore the descriptive endeavors which led up to

established linguistic units, and it is unlikely that purely functional approaches can recover all the important units and only the important units.

The above point is related to the fact that language systems are systems, not

just collections of learned responses. Esper was very clear on what this meant ?

all of his experiments relied on analysis of the discrete sound-meaning corre

spondence and on an analysis of the effects of changes in one set of correspon dences on other sets. Thus, whether or not analogic change occurs when new

instances are presented depends upon what other instances have previously been

presented ? on the entire system of correspondences, or, if you prefer, on the

subjects' entire learning history. Using either terminology, the conditions can be

precisely formulated. The resulting empirical relations are both functional and

lawful, and they are clearly dependent on the entire system of correspondences. In 1933, Esper provided the following rationale in reporting some of his

studies:

Language, in its fundamental, living form, consists of a system of verbal

responses to (chiefly external) stimulus patterns, closely interrelated

with the patterns of manipulative behavior. The fundamental unit to be

investigated then is not a purely grammatical one, but a stimulus

response unit. . . . Words and word-mixtures occur as responses to

situations, and changes in the form or meaning of words are only one

aspect of a changed relationship between certain patterns of stimulation and the response patterns of the individuals of a speech community. It is from a study of the conditions determining these changes in a stimulus

response relationship that we may hope to arrive at the principles of

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linguistic change and of linguistic organization. (1933, p. 347, emphasis in the original)

Given Esper's acceptance of systemic properties, it may be easier to under

stand why he has had influence only on non-behaviorists, rather than on be

haviorists. In spite of Esper's dislike of Chomsky's formulations (Esper, 1968) and of the "psycholinguists" (Esper, 1973), miniature language systems have been used by some very mentalistic types ? notably George Miller (1967), and some of James Jenkins' students (e.g., Smith, 1967). I have previously given a

brief account of this development within psycho linguistics (Tweney, 1974), but it is worth pointing to again as an example of how close the two cultures can be in approaches to a psycholinguistic problem. Both are committed to the scientific understanding of natural phenomena, and both should recognize a good method, no matter what its theoretical pretensions.

Consider the following quote from Miller's paper on miniature language

systems:

When skilled behaviors can be analyzed into independent responses, either overt or covert, that can be reinforced individually and assembled

without significant interaction, the principles of learning derived from conditioning experiments may be applicable. Independent components,

however, are not characteristic of rule-guided human behavior, and the

systemic aspects cannot be avoided. (1967, p. 184) This seems, at first sight, to be as sharply anti-behavioral as it could be, since it

denies the applicability of reinforcement principles. Yet, in fact, it is quite consistent with Esper's work, and should not stand in contrast to behaviorist

analyses in general. The major issue involved is an empirical one that does not

involve reinforcement: either the components of a linguistic system are indepen dent, or they are not. The question is empirically answerable using artificial

systems (which prove in fact to have non-independent components), and the results then can be extended for empirical confirmation in natural systems.

Whether or not reinforcement principles can be used is, then, a secondary issue.

An analysis along reinforcement lines could appeal to such interactive principles as generalization and response induction to account for non-independence. All

that, however, can come only after previous work has determined the nature of

the system.

Structure, Function, and Behavior

It is now worth contrasting Esper's approach with the process-oriented

approach of Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957). The major difference resides in

the level of processing which is focused upon. Skinner does not ignore language change, though, in an attempt to show that all meanings derive from concrete

terms, he cites some long-since discredited work on etymological change by

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Ryan D. Tweney

Home Tooke (1786, 1805) and his followers.3 Nevertheless, Skinner's major effort was directed toward explication of the reinforcing events and discrimina

tive stimuli which are operative during a verbal utterance. It is, to use the precise

phrasing of a recent behaviorist account, a "

'plausible reconstruction,' or

theory of the origin, maintenance, and control of verbal behavior" (Winokur,

1976, p. 3). Esper's theory, on the other hand, is one which focuses on the

systematic properties of language ?on the interrelations of words, syllables, and

phonemes to other linguistic units. It is both diachronic and synchronic, though the distinction becomes quite artificial in the context of such a behavioral theory. An Aristolelian might say that Skinner emphasized efficient causes, and sought a functional theory, while Esper emphasized formal causes, and sought a struc

tural theory.

A dichotomy between structure and function in behavioral science is no new

thing. Titchener (1898, 1914, 1929) argued for a structural psychology that would be analogous to anatomy, while a functional psychology would correspond to

physiology. It is not that he was opposed to functional psychology, as is some

times thought. Instead, he felt such efforts should necessarily follow structural

descriptions ? in contrast, of course, to the behaviorist point of view. American

linguistics has been overwhelmingly structuralist in recent decades, particularly since the impact of Chomsky's analysis. Cognitive psycholinguistics initially tried (and failed) to incorporate linguistic structures directly into a cognitive theory of language. Most recently, Catania (1973) on the behavioral side and

Miller (1974) on the cognitive side have argued for the utility of maintaining a distinction between structure and function in psychology. Further, Catania

(1972), Segal (1977), and others have tried to carry out "translations" of

Chomskyean descriptions of sentence structure into functional behavioristic

terms that avoid mentalistic constructs like "deep structure." Esper tried a

similar translation with the notion of "grammatical rule" in his last, 1973, book.

Given the historical origins of Chomsky's analysis ?

Zellig Harris's structuralist

linguistic theory (Harris, 1951), itself Bloomfieldian in spirit ? we should not be

surprised to see that such translations are possible. There is a feeling among some

scholars that Chomsky should be seen as a stage in the history of structural

linguistics, rather than as the creator of a new paradigm (see, for example,

Aarsleff, 1970; Hymes & Fought, 1975). Given this, I can't help wondering about the lack of human experimental work

by behaviorists on the problem of language. If, as many have argued, the

categories of linguistic analysis are more properly treated from a functional,

3Tooke, in what he thought of as an extension of Locke's analysis of language, tried to show that all words, even function words like "if," and verbs like "to be," were etymologically derived from

concrete nouns. Tooke knew little of the new philological methods then being developed, and his analyses are now regarded as spurious, and as having retarded the development of linguistics in

England (Aarsleff, 1967, has a lively account).

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behavioral point of view, then why is there so little relevant research by be

haviorists? Esper was able to point to his own research as an example of how the

structural properties of language could be approached while avoiding mentalistic

categories. Whether one accepts his approach or not, it seems clear that be

havioral psycholinguistic research can be done, and it is important research, no

matter what one's conceptual orientation. Unfortunately, there are few compar

able attempts to turn other behaviorist analyses of language into research on the

properties of human language.

Variability and Language

Esper's concern with systematic properties was reflected in one other aspect of his research ? the attention given to the importance of explaining and

accounting for variation. Behavioral theory has always had to deal with this

concept in one fashion or another, though often it has done so only negatively, as

something to be explained away. It is clear that if reinforcement principles are to be used to account for adaptive behavior, then there must be variability in the behavior. Just as natural selection can result in speciation only if there exist

individual differences between organisms (Darwin, 1859), so also reinforcement

can "select" adaptive responses only if a range of responding exists prior to the

reinforcing events (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner, 1957). More generally, we cannot feel completely comfortable with laboratory demonstrations of the

controlling factors of behavioral change unless we can also show that the ob

served variability in behavior outside the laboratory is functionally related to factors which can also be directly controlled. The logic of this methodology was

clearly presented by Crozier (1929; Crozier & Hoagland, 1934) and is implicit in all of the behaviorist research methods that have derived from Skinner's

methodological and conceptual breakthroughs (Skinner, 1938). If we wish to understand behavior, then one strategy is to bring it into the laboratory and

demonstrate that we can control it completely ?

eliminating variability and the

need for statistical analysis of sampling variations in one stroke. Whether or not

this is possible with a particular problem, we are still bound to identify, as best we can, the factors that produce the variability in the natural situation and to embed those factors within functional, lawful relationships.

This point has an important application to language. The discovery that

languages changed historically led very early to the supposition that languages might represent evolving systems, like biological species. Darwin himself felt

strongly that this must be the case (Darwin, 1872; Gruber, 1974). Attempts to understand sound change using evolutionary principles were made by many

philologists ? notably by Schleicher (Waterman, 1963; Blumenthal, 1970). Con

ceptually, the idea seems very promising. There is great individual variation in

pronunciation and syntax, and notions of "least effort" can be formulated to

provide a selection principle (as by Zipf, 1949). But very little research has been

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Ryan D. Tweney

conducted on these questions.4 Esper, in contrast, was able to make some

progress by experimentally demonstrating that certain individuals in his minia ture language experiments showed greater tendencies to assimilate novel forms

into English morphological categories. If so, then such individuals should play a critical role in language change, since any changes they impose should be trans

mitted unchanged by other, "nonanalogizing," persons. Esper tested this pre diction by devising a social communication study in which subjects who had learned an artificial system served as stimulus sources for other, naive subjects

(Esper, 1966). Although the program of research was, unfortunately, never

completed, Esper was clearly aware of the necessity of embedding experimental work on language variation within the context of social interactions and of the

potential explanatory power of such an approach. Variation in language goes far beyond individual differences, of course. Even

more striking is the attempt made by Esper to use contextual factors to predict

analogic change. Thus, he stated the main goals of one study as follows:

(a) What are the conditions determining relative stability and instabil ity in verbal responses, and what characteristics differentiate stable from

unstable stimulus-response units; and (b) in what manner and as a result

of what changes does an unstable linguistic system tend toward an

equilibrium among its component stimulus-response units. (1933, pp.

347-348) In that study, "stimulus-response unit" was operationalized by using free

association techniques and measuring the kind and latency of response. After

training in a miniature language, subjects were tested for their associations to the

learned item. Esper found that variability in association tendencies was corre

lated in some interesting ways with the semantic field of the miniature language: . . . Variation of response, this readiness to respond to an object not only

with a uniform verbal response, but sometimes also with the responses made to somewhat similar objects, undoubtedly is the behavior tendency which has been responsible for most linguistic (and logical) organization. Its end-products in language are semantic and phonetic word groups.

(1933, p. 372) The implications of this are very general. It points to the possibility of a coherent, integrated theory of language which can include both structural and functional descriptions. If behaviorist psychology is to show how the structure of language

4Skinner's work on the "verbal summator" (Skinner, 1936) seemed as if it would lead to an examination of the sources of variability in language. By presenting repeating samples of speech like sounds at barely audible intensities, Skinner was able to evoke a bewildering variety of interpretations from subjects about what the sample "said." No complete account of the laws governing behavior in such a task was pursued by Skinner, however. Instead, the verbal summator was later described (Skinner, 1957) merely as an illustration of the way in which vague external stimuli could supplement other variables to produce an overt response. This is not a very helpful reduction, however, since the account is a plausible reconstruction, unsupported by empirical laws. Such laws have not been sought by behaviorists for situations of this sort.

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emerges from the functional laws of language use, then some such theory is

essential. Both levels, that of structure and that of function, can be based on

empirical findings, and both can be consistent with the tenets of good science.

Conclusion

Esper's research is of interest to psychologists no matter what their theoreti

cal persuasion. It has demonstrated relationships which cannot be ignored by either cognitive or behavioral theories. In spite of the difference in level of explanation, in spite of the difference in preferred vocabulary, in spite, even, of

the great differences in research strategies, both sides ought to recognize that the

phenomena investigated by Esper are relevant and important to an understand

ing (however one chooses to define that term!) of language. There is a pointed, topical message here. The intensity of some of the

interchanges between the two cultures (notably Chomsky, 1959; MacCor quodale, 1970) has obscured some of the striking commonalities. Is it too much to suggest that each side may be in a position to offer empirical aid and comfort to the other? Even if agreement on matters of theory is impossible, recognition that

language can be studied and can be understood should lead to more agreement on

our common knowledge about the phenomenon ? it is, after all, not the posses

sion of theory alone that distinguishes the scientist from the non-scientist.

Instead, the scientist is one for whom theories are subservient to the phenomena

they are intended to explain. History will more likely remember us, as it remem

bers Esper, for what we learn about the phenomena, for our empirical findings, rather than for our theories. Theories are tools ? to be used until dull, then

discarded. But we should dull them on hard facts, and not waste ourselves in

argument about which theory is the finest tool. In the end that will be decided by the knowledge we discover, and not by the tool with which we unearth it.

Note 1. Skinner, B.F. Verbal behavior. Unpublished manuscript. Cambridge: Harvard Uni

versity, 1948.

Note 2. Hefferline, R. A psychological analysis of verbal behavior. Class notes made by R. Hefferline, Summer 1947, in a course at Columbia University, given by B.F. Skinner. Unpublished manuscript, no place, no date.

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reflections on the history of behavioral theories of language

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