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ASCI 490 COMPREHENSIVE EXAM 1

ASCI 490 Aeronautical Science Capstone Course

Comprehensive Examination

Ruben DeLeon

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ASCI 490 Aeronautical Science Capstone Course

Submitted to the Worldwide Campus

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of

Bachelor of Science in Professional Aeronautics


Abstract

To comply with the partial requirements of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University’s Bachelor of

Science in Professional Aeronautics degree program, an extensive analysis of cumulative

knowledge will be conducted. Research and discussion of specific aeronautical topics will be

carried out at the appropriate undergraduate level to show a clear grasp and understanding of the

program requirements. The topics which will be examined include:

1. An explanation of fatigue as well as the effects and countermeasures.

2. The effects of drugs and alcohol on a pilot’s physiology and performance, and

regulations that have been implemented by the FAA concerning drugs and alcohol.

3. An examination of the different types of illusions that may be experienced during flight

as well as useful training methods to incorporate.

4. Discussing when most accidents and fatalities take place and the causes.

5. Describing the role and importance of security in aviation.


Proposal

Comprehensive Question 1

Statement of Question: Pilots and crew may experience numerous forms of

physiological effects throughout their respective flight careers. Fatigue is an example of a

physiological constraint that is detrimental to the pilot’s safety. Describe the effects of fatigue

and the countermeasures that can be taken to prevent instances of fatigue? What, if any, actions

may a pilot perform to remedy the effects after the onset of fatigue symptoms? What are the

regulations, if any, that have been implemented by the FAA as a result of accidents caused by

fatigue?

Core Competency Outcomes addressed by this question:

Outcome 1: Critical Thinking competency will be satisfied by explaining how fatigue

affects cognition and performance of flight duties. Research and explanation of the current

regulations concerning the issue will be conducted to identify the appropriate measures for

safety.

Outcome 2: The Quantitative Reasoning competency will be satisfied by evaluating

statistics and economic data in relation to fatigue to aid in developing an effective safety plan.

Outcome 3: The Information Literacy competency will be satisfied by conducting

research based on plausible and relevant information retrieved from sources such as the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and additional credible

sources.


Outcome 4: The Communication competency will be satisfied by means of

communicating both technical and non-technical information through use of effective concepts

of written and presentation skills. I will organize information so that facts or ideas build upon

one another to lead the reader to a specific conclusion.

Outcome 5: The Scientific Literacy competency will be satisfied by explaining how

mental effectiveness and aircraft control is degraded as a result of fatigue.

Outcome 6: The cultural literacy competency will be satisfied by identification and

examination of prior events of aviation history and how the Federal Aviation Regulations FAR’s

have been change and updated to protect the crews.

BSPA Discipline Outcomes addressed by this question:

Outcome 8: The Aeronautical Science competency will be satisfied by demonstrating

thorough knowledge regarding fatigue with resultant impacts on pilot performance and aircraft

operation.

Outcome 9: The Aviation Legislation and Law competency will be satisfied by

examination of pertinent Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s) that detail fatigue management

and rest requirements.

Outcome 10: The Aviation Safety competency will be satisfied by discussing how to use

countermeasures to combat fatigue; in addition how the use of physiological training enables the

pilot to understand the safety concerns of fatigue.



Statement of Question: Drugs and alcohol can also cause physiological constraints on

pilots and flight crewmembers that are detrimental to safety. Describe the effects drugs

(including prescription medications) and alcohol may have on a pilot’s physiology? Discuss any

limitations and requirements that are described in the FAA polices and regulations. Discuss any

new laws or regulations that have recently been instituted by the FAA concerning drugs and

alcohol. Discuss the effects on the public image of an airline when a pilot violates a drug and

alcohol regulations.


Outcome 1: Critical Thinking competency will be satisfied by examining issues related

to the relationship between drugs and alcohol and the pilot as well as the decision making steps

used to determine which course of action is deemed appropriate.


statistics and economic data in relation to drugs and alcohol in the aviation field in order to assist

in producing an efficient safety plan.



Aviation Administration (FAA) and additional credible sources.







Outcome 9: The Aviation Legislation and Law competency will be satisfied by detailing

applicable regulations that have been implemented for flight operations both nationally and

internationally.

Outcome 10: The Aviation Safety competency will be satisfied by expressing the

importance of how following the guidelines found in the applicable certification FAR’s mitigates

the likeliness of safety related accidents.


Statement of Question: Other forms of physiological effects that pilots and flight

crewmembers may experience during flight throughout their own individual flight careers can be

caused by sensory and visual illusions. Describe the different illusions that a pilot may

experience during flight. Describe how a pilot can train to realize when he or she is experiencing

an illusion and to know how to correct for it.


Outcome 1: Critical Thinking competency will be satisfied by examining issues related

to the relationship between illusions experienced during flight and the pilot as well as the

decision making steps used to determine which course of action is deemed appropriate.


statistics and economic data in relation to in-flight illusions and in developing an effective safety

plan.




Aviation Administration (FAA), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and additional credible

sources.





Outcome 5: The Scientific Literacy competency will be satisfied by explaining how

mental effectiveness and aircraft control is jeopardized as a result of in-flight illusions.


examination of prior events of aviation history and how the Federal Aviation Regulations FAR’s

have been change and updated to protect the crews.


Outcome 8: The Aeronautical Science competency will be satisfied by demonstrating

thorough knowledge regarding in-flight illusions with resultant impacts on pilot performance and

aircraft operation.

Outcome 9: The Aviation Legislation and Law competency will be satisfied by

examination of pertinent Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s) that detail fatigue management

and rest requirements.


Outcome 10: The Aviation Safety competency will be satisfied by discussing how to use

countermeasures to combat illusions during flight; in addition how the use of physiological

training enables the pilot to understand the safety concerns of in-flight illusions.


Statement of Question: Most accidents and fatalities that happen in aviation take place

during the departure (take off / climb) and arrival (approach/landing) stages of flight. Provide

examples proving the severity of the subject. Describe how human factors play a role

concerning safety during these crucial phases in flight. Discuss the economic and psychological

cost of CFIT during these phases. Additionally, what safety actions can be implemented to

mitigate these risks?


Outcome 1: Critical Thinking competency will be satisfied by identifying issues related

to CFIT during departure and arrival stages of flight and analyzing effective measures needed to

promote safety throughout all flight phases.


statistics and economic data concerning CFIT to aid in developing an effective safety plan.



Aviation Administration (FAA), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).






Outcome 5: The Scientific Literacy competency will be satisfied by explanation on how

human factors including pilot-controller communication, situational awareness, decision making

and effective briefings are associated with CFIT during these critical phases.


examination of prior events of aviation history.

Outcome 7: The Life Long Personal Growth competency will be satisfied by

demonstrating that proper and recurrent training, use of safety plans and attention to detail during

all flight phases can reduce the occurrence of CFIT.


Outcome 9: The Aviation Legislation and Law competency will be satisfied by detailing

applicable regulations that have been implemented for flight operations both nationally and

internationally.

Outcome 10: The Aviation Safety competency will be satisfied by discussing how

implementation of an effective runway safety program will provide key contributions to

decreasing the likeliness of CFIT.

Outcome 11: The Aviation Management and Operations competency will be satisfied by

detailing the steps that management must take to ensure that crews are performing their duties in

an effective and safe manner while during flight.



Statement of Question: Safety is very important in aviation but so is security. Describe

the role of security in aviation. Why is security conducive to a safe environment? How is

security implemented in the aviation industry? What effect do security measures have on the

aviation industry?


Outcome 1: Critical Thinking competency will be satisfied by examining the different

reasons there is security in the aviation environment and the ways it helps and hurts the industry.

Outcome 2: The Quantitative Reasoning competency will be satisfied by examining

statistical evidence that show how proper practices reduce errors.





Outcome 7: The Life Long Personal Growth competency will be satisfied by explaining

that adherence to security procedures as well as effective communication which promotes safer

working practices and satisfactory final products.


Outcome 10: The Aviation Safety competency will be satisfied by discussing the cause

and effect of human factors involving current security practices and will determine whether these

practices are satisfactory or if they can be improved.


Outcome 11: The Aviation Management and Operations competency will be satisfied by

outlining criteria that managers and supervisors must enforce to aid in the security process.

Comprehensive Examination Question #1

Statement of the Comprehensive Examination Question #1

Pilots and crew may experience numerous forms of physiological effects throughout their

respective flight careers. Describe the effects of fatigue and the countermeasures that can be

taken to prevent instances of fatigue? What, if any, actions may a pilot perform to remedy the

effects after the onset of fatigue symptoms? What are the regulations, if any, that have been

implemented by the FAA as a result of accidents caused by fatigue?

Research and Answering of the Question:

In today’s world there are many people who try to accomplish so much during the day

and will shorten their sleeping periods at night so they can have more time to do what they have

to do during the day. From the overworked career woman/mother who balances her career with

keeping the household and being a good wife and mother to the pilot with the random, long

shifts; many people experience fatigue frequently in their lives. But fatigue is normal and we are

well aware of what our bodies can handle. Fatigue is not really a big deal, right?

Clinically fatigue is defined as the state of diminished physical or mental efficiency

(FAA, 2009). Fatigue on its own is not the threat. The danger to safe aviation operations

emerges from the deterioration to alertness and the decline of performance when fatigue is

present (Rosekind, n.d). Humans have a built in need for sleep and we have a requirement to

sleep at night and be awake during the day on a 24 hour schedule. A challenge to these basic

physiological principles is produced when we are required to work odd hours throughout the 24


hour cycle. Shift work, changing work schedules, multiple time zone transitions, extended

periods of wakefulness, and sleep loss can cause sleep and circadian disruptions that greatly

enhance the opportunity for an incident or accident. Obligations such as these present stressful

physiological challenges which affect productivity, performance, and safety.

A study done by NASA found that 89 percent of regional airline pilots found fatigue to

be a serious concern and 88 percent found fatigue to be a common occurrence while 86 percent

said they received no training for fatigue (FAA, 2009). It is important to know the symptoms

and causes of fatigue not only to avoid costly incidents and accidents but also for our well being

and for the safety of those in our environment. Common symptoms of fatigue are:

Loss of appetite

Weight loss

Insomnia

Depression

Irritability

Slurred speech

Apathy

Physical and emotional isolation from others

Decreased alertness and attention

There are also different factors that can affect a person’s tolerance to fatigue. Factors that can

reduce an individual’s tolerance to fatigue can be divided into three categories: individual,

environmental and operational (FAA, 2009). Individual fatigue factors are specific to each

individual. These include:


Poor physical fitness

Excess body weight

Poor sleeping habits

Improper diet and inadequate nutrition

Dehydration

Drug or alcohol use

Use of medications (non-prescriptions and prescription)

Excessive use of caffeine consumption and use of tobacco

Environmental fatigue factors involve all aspects that can affect an individual in their

immediate surroundings and include such things such as family, work environment, bad weather

during flights, noise, vibration, g-forces, and high and low ambient forces (FAA, 2009).

Operational factors include the type of work performed and when it is performed. Some

examples of operational fatigue include a heavy work schedule, multi-time zone operations, shift

work and night operations (FAA, 2009). Some of the major causes of fatigue are emphasized

by: sleep loss, work schedules, circadian rhythm disruptions and recreation or extracurricular

activities (FAA, 2009).

Research has found that sleep is an active and complicated physiological state (Rosekind,

n.d). When deprived of sleep, the brain generates a signal which prompts the individual to get

sleep because the physiological need has not been met and if deprived of sleep for too long a

person can unconsciously shift from wakefulness to sleep (Rosekind, n.d). The more fatigued a

person is the more often and intense these shifts between wakefulness and sleep can be from very

short (i.e. microsleeps, lasting only seconds) in duration to as long as several minutes (Rosekind,

n.d). This occurrence can greatly degrade a person’s performance especially at critical and


stressful times (approach and landing after an extended flight segment, ATC surge at a busy

airport, aircraft maintenance during night shift, etc.)(Rosekind, n.d). Unfavorable affects of

fatigue on performance are channelized attention, poor judgment, slowed reaction time,

inattention, ease of distraction, and technical errors resulting in task saturation (FAA, 2009). As

fatigue increases performance decreases (even with increases in effort).

Some recent sleep research has related performance degradation by equating it to Blood

Alcohol Concentration (BAC) (Rosekind, n.d). After being awake for 17 hours straight,

cognitive performance is diminished to a level that is the same to that of the performance

impairment seen at a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05 percent (Rosekind, n.d). In many

western countries this is the prohibited level of alcohol intoxication for driving, operating

machinery and doing a number of other safety-related activities. After being awake for 24 hours,

cognitive performance is further diminished to a level that is similar to the performance deficit

noticed at a blood alcohol concentration of approximately 0.10 percent (Rosekind, n.d). FAR

Part 91 Section 91.17 states that no person may attempt to fly an aircraft with a blood alcohol

concentration of 0.04% or greater. Being fatigued can be just as dangerous as being intoxicated.


(Rosekind, n.d)

Two years after the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 which killed 50 people, ABC News

came out with a report which said that, according to the NTSB, fatigue has been linked to more

than two dozen accidents and more than 250 fatalities (Ross & Lieberman, 2011). It also said

that there have been several near misses, including a Mesa Airlines flight that happened on

February 13, 2008, nearly a year to the day before the Colgan 3407 crash (Ross & Lieberman,

2011). The Mesa Airlines flight had departed from Honolulu and was on its way to Hilo,

Hawai’i with 40 passengers and three crewmembers aboard when it flew past its destination

without landing and headed out over the Pacific (Ross & Lieberman, 2011). The NTSB found

out that during this incident the pilots did not respond to calls from controllers for 18 minutes

because they had both fallen asleep (Ross & Lieberman, 2011). Some other aircraft accidents

involving fatigue are:

1993 Kalitta International, DC-8-61F at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1997 Korean Air, 747-300 at Guam


1999 American Airlines, MD-82 at Little Rock, AR

2004 MK Airlines, 747-200F at Halifax, Nova Scotia

2004 Corporate Airlines, BAE Jetstream31 at Kirksville, USA

2004 Med Air, Learjet35A at San Bernadino, CA

2005 Loganair, B-N Islander at Machrihanish, UK

2006, 27th Aug, Comair, CRJ100 at Lexington, KY

2007, 25th June, Cathay Pacific 747F at Stockholm, Sweden

2007, 28th Oct, JetX, 737-800TF-JXF Keflavik airport, Iceland

Following the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407, The Department of Transportation

identified the issue of pilot fatigue as a top priority at a 2009 airline Safety Call to Action. The

FAA issued a ruling on pilot fatigue that revised commercial passenger airline pilot scheduling to

make sure that pilots have a longer opportunity for rest before they enter the cockpit (FAA,

2011). The ruling increases a pilots minimum rest period from 8 hours to 10 hours and flight

time to eight or nine hours depending on the start of the pilot’s entire flight duty period. The

allowable length of a flight duty period depends on when the pilot’s day begins and the number

of flight segments he or she is expected to fly, and ranges from 9-14 hours for single crew

operations (FAA, 2011). The new ruling requires that pilots have at least 30 consecutive hours

free from duty on a weekly basis. This is a 25 percent increase over the old rules. The new rule

also addresses potential cumulative fatigue by placing weekly and 28-day limits on the amount

of time a pilot may be assigned any type of flight duty and also places 28-day and annual limits

on actual flight time (FAA, 2011). According to the press release, an airline may come up with a

different way of relieving fatigue based on science and using data that must be authorized by the

FAA and constantly regulated (FAA, 2011).


In 2010, Congress mandated a Fatigue Risk Management Plan (FRMP) for all airlines

which will provide education for pilots and airlines to help address the effects of fatigue which

can be caused by overwork, commuting, or other activities (FAA, 2011). Airlines will be

required to train pilots about the potential effects of commuting and mandatory training updates

every two years will include fatigue mitigation measures, sleep fundamentals and the impact to a

pilot’s performance (FAA, 2011). The training will also address how fatigue is influenced by

lifestyle – including nutrition, exercise, and family life – as well as by sleep disorders and the

impact of commuting.

Fatigue countermeasures can be classified into two broad strategies: prevention and

mitigation (Rosekind, n.d). Prevention attempts to reduce or get rid of fatigue through efficient

means like sufficient sleep quality and quantity (Rosekind, n.d). Mitigation tries to fight fatigue

in the actual operational environment and as a result provides measure to deal with fatigue while

at work (Rosekind, n.d). Some examples of fatigue mitigation strategies include environmental

lighting, controlled napping, and caffeine use (Rosekind, n.d).

Fatigue is a physiological constraint that is detrimental to safety that can be prevented by

taking appropriate preemptive measures. By planning to get enough sleep, eating well and

exercising, an individual can prevent or greatly reduce the occurrence of fatigue. In the

workplace, fatigue management should be handled like safety and should be structured similar to

safety management systems currently in use (Rosekind, n.d). Management should encourage

employees to use fatigue countermeasures and they should also be involved in the process of

eliminating fatigue in an operational environment (Rosekind, n.d). Management should not only

implement fatigue management programs but also provide training and education in the matter.

Decreasing the chances for fatigue to occur decreases the chances of costly and fatal errors.




Drugs and alcohol can also cause physiological constraints on pilots and flight

crewmembers that are detrimental to safety. Describe the effects drugs (including prescription

medications) and alcohol may have on a pilot’s physiology? Discuss any limitations and

requirements that are described in the FAA polices and regulations. Discuss any new laws or

regulations that have recently been instituted by the FAA concerning drugs and alcohol. Discuss

the effects on the public image of an airline when a pilot violates a drug and alcohol regulations.


There is an impression that the media likes to play up the Hollywood fiction of hard-

drinking, hard-flying pilots (Reed, 2008). From the typical office humor to David Letterman and

Jay Leno, jokers have found great amusement with this subject (Reed, 2008). It appears that the

media often calls out a drunken pilot for nearly riskily putting in danger hundreds of passengers

(Reed, 2008). Whenever a pilot gets caught not fit to fly due to alcohol consumption, the news

media immediately has a good story of horrifying, melodramatic connotations of a pilot with an

alcohol problem and people dying in a horrible plane crash (Reed, 2008). Although even if these

events did not occur, the subconscious elements are there and readers go crazy with this type of

story (Reed, 2008).

One such investigation stated that it found that the FAA is monitoring about two

thousand certified pilots who have been recently convicted of drunken driving (TV, 2010). It

goes on to say that hundreds more airline pilots, jet mechanics and flight crew members who are

employed by major airlines are also being watched for drug problems. The investigative reporter


of the article, Chris Halsne, declares the FAA is under fire by the NTSB for not handling this

situation. According to the FAA, pilots convicted of drunken driving are tracked and often

sanction because their behavior indicates a problematic “medical issue” (TV, 2010). Halsne and

his investigative team say they double checked the agency’s system and found that hundreds of

pilot DUI convictions where the FAA took no action or never even found out. When Halsne

went to an FAA press event to ask FAA Administrator, Randy Babbit, about these issues, Babbit

did not seem to know about the NTSB’s concerns (TV, 2010). Later a public relations official,

sent out a statement saying (TV, 2010), “Alcohol abuse by commercial pilots is rare, but the

FAA does have stringent measures in place to make sure pilots with alcohol dependence don’t

reach the cockpit. Whenever a commercial pilot applies for a medical certificate – every six to

12 months – he or she signs a medical for authorizing the FAA to search the National Drivers

Registry for violations involving alcohol or drug use, and the FAA does check those records.

We responded positively to several alcohol–related NTSB recommendations in the last three

years and detailed actions that would improve the detection of pilots with a history of abuse. The

Board continues to carry our response to carry our responses in “acceptable” status.”

According to the Centers of Disease and Prevention 50.9 percent of adults 18 years of age

and over are current regular drinkers (CDC, 2012). Alcoholic beverages are used by a lot of

people to relax after a long day or to relieve tension in social situations. Alcohol consumption in

the United States is widely accepted in the majority of social circles and is usually a key element

found at social gatherings and celebrations. Even though alcohol use is common and acceptable

in our society, it is not a shock that the use of alcohol creates problems during performance of

safety-related activities, like driving a car or flying an aircraft.


Alcohol is a sedative, hypnotic, and addicting drug which when consumed immediately

hinders judgment and leads to behavior that can easily contribute to, or cause accidents. Even

after complete elimination of all of the alcohol in the body, there are undesirable effects that can

last 48 to 72 hours following the last drink (Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol and Flying A Deadly

Combination, 2005). Most of the adverse effects that alcohol generates deal with three important

organs to a pilot - the brain, the eyes, and the inner ear (Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol and Flying

A Deadly Combination, 2005). Some of the ways that the brain is affected include impaired

reaction time, reasoning, judgment, and memory. Use of alcohol decreases the brain’s ability to

make use of oxygen; a condition that can be intensified with exposure to higher altitude.

Alcohol intake distorts vision and can lead to double vision and difficulty focusing due to eye

muscle imbalance. It can cause dizziness, decreased hearing perception and diminished ability to

distinguish between sounds. Adding other variables such as sleep deprivation, fatigue,

medication use, hypoxia, or flying in bad weather or at night greatly amplifies the negative

effects.

Studies have shown how alcohol affects pilot performance. One of the ways that pilots

have shown impairment is in their ability to fly an ILS approach or to fly IFR. Concentrations at

or above 0.04% blood alcohol gravely raises the number of serious errors carried out by pilots

(Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol and Flying A Deadly Combination, 2005). Some studies have

even shown a decline in pilot’s efficiency with a BAC as low as 0.025 percent (Antuñano &

Salazar, Alcohol and Flying A Deadly Combination, 2005). A pilot experiencing a hangover can

be said that s/he is still under the influence of alcohol and therefore is not fit to fly. Hangovers

can be just as bad as intoxication itself with symptoms such as: headache, dizziness, dry mouth,


stuffy nose, fatigue, upset stomach, irritability, impaired judgment, and increased sensitivity to

bright light (Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol and Flying A Deadly Combination, 2005).

Medications are like alcohol in that they also impair a pilot’s ability to fly even though

the pilot may feel well. Something that a pilot should consider when taking a medication, any

medication, is the underlying condition that he or she is treating. The pilot needs to consider the

fact that the medication may wear off in midflight and they need to think about whether they

depend on the medication or not to fly safely. If the untreated condition is one that would keep

the pilot from flying safely than the pilot should not attempt to fly until the condition improves

with or without the medication (Carpenter, 2010). The potential for common side effects to

occur should also be considered (Carpenter, 2010). The manufacturer of the medication lists this

type of reaction on the label. Even if the medication has been taken before without experiencing

any side effects, they can occur any time without warning (Carpenter, 2010). For this reason a

pilot should not fly after taking medications with potential side effects such as lightheadedness,

dizziness, drowsiness, or visual disturbance (Carpenter, 2010). If a pilot has never taken a

medication before then they should not fly (Carpenter, 2010). An uncommon or unexpected

reaction to the medication can be experienced and this will not be known until after the

medication has been taken (Carpenter, 2010). Drugs may cause poor motor and coordination

skills, impaired reflexes, blurred vision, an inability to judge distance and speed, fatigue,

memory loss, perceived distortions of time, place and space, nausea and vomiting, dizziness and

fainting and a number of other things.

It is apparent that alcohol should not be consumed before flying and medications should

not be taken before flying so it is even more obvious that alcohol and drugs should not be mixed

and taken together anytime especially before flying or while flying. When alcohol and drugs are


taken together the outcome is not known. Several things can happen. First, the drug may offset

or delay the effects of alcohol. Second, the alcohol and drug may work independently, so that

neither is affected by the other. Third, the drug may have an additive effect in which the effects

of either the alcohol or the drug or both may be increased (synergistic effect). The result of the

combination can be hazardous or even fatal. There is no set formula for what will happen when

an individual consumes both alcohol and medication.

There are general recommendations concerning alcohol and flying. CFR 91.17 states that

no person may operate or attempt to operate an aircraft:

Within 8 hours of having consumed alcohol

While under the influence of alcohol

With a BAC of 0.04% or greater

While using any drug that adversely affects safety

A more cautious approach would be to wait 24 hours from the last use of alcohol before flying

especially if there was intoxication or if the pilot plans to fly IFR (Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol

and Flying A Deadly Combination, 2005). The pilot must also recognize the effects of a

hangover. Just because CFR 91.17 states that the pilot can fly after eight hours from their last

drink does not mean that the pilot is actually in the best shape to fly or that their BAC is below

legal limits (Antuñano & Salazar, Alcohol and Flying A Deadly Combination, 2005). CFR

91.17 goes so far as to say that “a pilot of a civil aircraft may not even allow a person to board an

aircraft as a passenger or otherwise if that person appears to be intoxicated or appears to be under

the influence of drugs except in an emergency.” There is an exception in case of an emergency,


i.e. a medical patient under proper care. The best solution would be for the pilot to simply avoid

alcohol all together when planning or accomplishing a flight.

There are also some recommendations for medications and flying. When taking

medications the pilot should read and follow the label directions. If the label warns of significant

side effects, the pilot should not fly after taking the medication until at least five maximal dosing

intervals have passed (Carpenter, 2010). An example of this would be if the directions say to

take the medication every 4-6 hours, the pilot should wait until at least 30 hours after the last

dose to fly. Never fly if the underlying condition being treated would make it unsafe if the

medication stops working (Carpenter, 2010). A pilot should also not fly after taking a

medication for the first time until at least five maximal dosing intervals have passed and no side

effects have been observed (Carpenter, 2010). A pilot should ask their doctor, pharmacist, or

AME about possible side effects and the safety of using the medication while flying.

According to the National Institutes of Health, The FAA has been conducting random

alcohol testing since 1995 from 25 percent of its safety-sensitive employees including pilots

(Mojica, 2011). Tests are scheduled in advance with employees who must show up to the testing

area on time and be positively identified (Westlake, n.d.). If the employee does not show up or if

they have a BAC of 0.04 percent or above they fail the test and different measures are then taken

(Westlake, n.d.). The employer can then decide to suspend or fire the employee. If the employer

decides not to fire the employee the employer must offer the employee a list of Substance Abuse

Professionals who can aid them in following the appropriate procedures to the FAA’s standards

before the employee is allowed to return to duty (Westlake, n.d.). An evaluation by a SAP and

an alcohol rehabilitation/treatment program, if necessary, must be completed before the

employee is given approval to return to work (Westlake, n.d.). Anyone who submits a positive


drug test will be suspended by the FAA and flight surgeons may lose their medical certificate

(Norman, 2012). If a person fails their drug test they may eventually be authorized to fly again if

they go through a treatment and monitoring program (Norman, 2012). Before May 2009, the

FAA had been enforcing drug and alcohol testing regulations under a widespread set of

regulatory codes. Since then it has modified all its enforcement authority into one set of

regulations to make testing requirements easier to understand (Norman, 2012).

Alcohol use can also affect a pilot on the ground and outside of the workplace

environment when he or she is not even thinking about flying. When a pilot is applying for a

medical certificate they fill out FAA Form 8500-8 which asks them to sign an express-consent

provision that allows the National Driver Register (NDR) to release information about the pilot’s

driver record to the FAA(Katz, 2012). The FAA is confident that through the NDR they can find

out about any incident in which the pilot was involved and if the pilot does not consent to

allowing the NDR to send his or her driver record to the FAA the act can put in peril the

airman’s flying future (Katz, 2012). Under 14 CFR 61.15, all pilots must send a notification

letter in the prescribed format to the FAA’s Security and Investigations Division in Oklahoma

City within 60 days of the effective date of an alcohol-related conviction or administrative

action. If the pilot does not accomplish this, all certificates, authorizations or ratings can be

suspended, revoked or denied. Sending the letter will most likely lead to an investigation being

opened, which itself could end in suspension, revocation or denial. On a pilot’s next application

to the FAA for a medical exam the pilot will also need to make a report. If a pilot gets a DUI

offense and the court documents obtained by the medical examiners show the pilot had a positive

alcohol test or BAC of 0.15 percent or greater the AME cannot issue a medical certificate (Katz,

2012). It is a person’s individual rights to refuse to allow police to run an alcohol test but if an


airman practices this right the medical examiner is barred from issuing a medical

certificate(Katz, 2012).

Elaine Weinstein, former head of safety recommendations at the NTSB, says she is

assured by many years of accident data that there needs to be a zero tolerance policy for alcohol

and drug use by pilots and others who transport people for hire(Levin, 2010). Former chairman

of the NTSB, Jim Hall agrees and says, “It’s always been important, but now with the

technology and the alertness required in the modern cockpit we cannot tolerate any level of

intoxication”(Levin, 2010). The FAA has become more rigid in recent decades after a few high-

profile cases of airline pilots flying while intoxicated(Levin, 2010). A lot of pilots drink alcohol

but this very rules-oriented group obeys the rules. Pilots drink when it is legal to do so. Don

Hudson, an Aurora, Colo., specialist in aviation medicine and aeromedical advisor to the Air

Line Pilots Association, says, pilots drink alcohol “just like most of America but the culture of

‘I’ll drink and put on my red scarf and go fly’ has gone away” (Reed, 2008).



Other forms of physiological effects that pilots and flight crewmembers may experience

during flight throughout their own individual flight careers can be caused by sensory and visual

illusions. Describe the different illusions that a pilot may experience during flight. Describe

how a pilot can train to realize when he or she is experiencing an illusion and to know how to

correct for it. Discuss the steps taken by the FAA to help pilots deal with these dangerous

physiological conditions.



On October 12th, 2009, Capt Derek Furniss (32) from Rathfarnham, Dublin and Cadet

David Jevens (22) from Glynn, Co Wexford, were participating on an Air Corps flight training

exercise when they crashed near Cornamona on the Galway-Mayo border(Siggins, 2012). An

Aircraft Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) determined that the pilots tried to take action after

they found themselves in deteriorating weather, became disoriented and crashed(Melia, 2012).

The reports also say that the F265 Pilatus PC-9 (M) training aircraft made a “rapid series of steep

turns” than changed its course towards a northerly heading as it flew between a confined and

steep-sided valley on the western shores of Lough Mask(Melia, 2012). In a transcript obtained

from the aircraft’s flight recording device Jevens is heard communicating his unease about going

into the valley(Siggins, 2012). Soon afterwards his instructor, Capt Furniss, is heard responding

to the anxious cadet’s question with: “OK, hang on, let’s continue in and let’s look at our options

when we get in a bit further alright”(Siggins, 2012). The instructor then took the controls and

was recorded six seconds later saying: “Bad decision now” (Siggins, 2012). Audible warnings

relating to the aircraft’s excessive G-forces and height are heard right before the ending of the

transcript(Siggins, 2012). The reports states that the two pilots had succumb to “spatial

disorientation” which likely caused the two pilots to think they were flying upside down and

plummeting towards the ground when in fact they were really flying right side up and ascending

or flying level (Melia, 2012). The report from the AAIU also says that the instructor had

probably been trying to maintain visual ground contact and lost situational awareness(Melia,

2012). The report says that: "This incorrect perception can be so compelling that it may lead to a

situation where a pilot no longer trusts or follows his flight instruments"(Melia, 2012).

What is this phenomenon that these two pilots experienced? Are there other experiences

that aviators may encounter that misconstrue an airman’s senses when he or she is flying? The


two pilots experienced spatial disorientation. Spatial disorientation is defined as the inability of

a pilot or other air crew member to determine spatial attitude in relation to the surface of the

earth; it occurs in conditions of restricted vision, and results from vestibular illusions. When this

happens the pilot perceives he or she is in a different position or direction then is actually the

case. This is sometimes brought on by disturbances to the vestibular system but more often from

changes in flying conditions; i.e. flying into weather conditions with low or no visibility. When

a pilot flies into conditions with low or no visibility they lose sight of the horizon which the

airman uses to determine his/her sense of up and down while flying. JFK, Jr.’s plane crash in

1999 and the events leading to The Day the Music Died on February, 1959 were most likely

caused by spatial disorientation.

While inexperienced or non-instrument rated pilots are more susceptible to this condition

it does not mean that experienced and instrument rated pilots cannot fall victim to this condition

or to other illusions that may be experienced during flight. The senses are suited to aid humans

on the ground and often pilots cannot trust their senses alone to navigate a flight. Sensory input

is not always accurate and precise in reflecting to the pilot the movement and position of the

aircraft being flown. Illusions that can be encountered by airmen during flight can be

categorized as vestibular/somatogyral illusions, vestibular/somatogravic illusions and visual

illusions.

Fluid in the inner ear reacts only to rate of change and not to sustained change. When a

pilot first initiates a turn the inner ear will discern the roll into the turn but if the pilot holds the

turn constant, the inner ear will adjust and will tell the brain it has gone back to level flight.

When the pilot returns to level flight the inner ear will inaccurately report to the brain that the

pilot is actually not flying straight and level. This is a dangerous problem for pilots relying on


their senses instead of on the instruments to fly because the signals the inner ear produces feel

right but are incorrect.

Illusions involving the semicircular and somatogyral canals of the vestibular system of

the inner ear occur when there is limited or unreliable outside visual references. These illusions

make the person experiencing them believe they are rotating when in fact they are not. These

illusions include the leans, the coriolis illusion, the graveyard spin and the graveyard

spiral(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of Your Pants,

n.d.).

The leans is the most usual illusion experienced during flight. This illusion is caused by a

sudden return to straight and level flight after a gradual and prolonged turn that went unnoticed

by the pilot (Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of Your

Pants, n.d.). Such a gradual turn made by a pilot can go unnoticed because human exposure to a

rotational acceleration of 2 degrees per second squared or lower is below the detection threshold

of the semicircular canals(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of

Your Pants, n.d.). Leveling the wings after such a turn may cause an illusion that the aircraft is

banking in the opposite direction (Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly

By the Seat of Your Pants, n.d.). When this happens a pilot may then lean in the direction of the

original turn as a way to try to regain the perception of a correct vertical posture. The pilot may

try to lean in the opposite direction in an attempt to fly straight and level and if the pilot does not

recognize the disorientation and persists to lean, the plane may over bank in the wrong direction

and cause rolling. The coriolis illusion is an illusion that is associated with a sudden tilting

(forward or backwards) of the pilot’s head while in a prolonged constant-rate turn that has

stopped to stimulate the brain’s motion sensing system (Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation —

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Vertical_posture&action=edit&redlink=1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semicircular_canals

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vestibular_system

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Somatogyral&action=edit&redlink=1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semicircular


Why You Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of Your Pants, n.d.). This may happen when the pilot tilts

his or her head down (to look at a chart on their lap), or when the head is tilted up (to look at an

overhead switch or instrument) or when it is tilted sideways. This causes a sensation that is

almost too much to handle because it feels as if the aircraft is rolling, pitching, and yawing all at

once. It can be compared with the sensation of rolling down a hill and can make the pilot

immediately become disoriented and lose control of the aircraft.

The graveyard spin can happen to a pilot that enters a spin(Antuñano, Spatial

Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of Your Pants, n.d.). An example would

be if a pilot enters a spin to the left and can tell at first that he or she is spinning in the same

direction but if the left spin keeps going the pilot will perceive that the spin is slowly decreasing.

If the pilot applies right rudder to stop the left spin, while he/she is already sensing that the spin

is slowly decreasing, the pilot will suddenly sense a spin in the opposite direction (to the right).

If the pilot thinks that the aircraft is indeed spinning to the right, the pilot will respond by

applying left rudder to counteract the sensation of a right spin. But by doing this the pilot

unconsciously re-enters the original left spin s/he had been in. By cross checking the turn

indicator, the pilot would actually see that the turn needle is indicating a left turn while he/she

senses a right turn which creates a sensory conflict between what the pilot sees on the

instruments and what the pilot feels. Believing the body sensations instead of trusting the

instruments, the left spin will continue and if enough altitude is lost before this illusion is

identified and corrective action is taken, a crash into the ground is certain.

The graveyard spiral is more common than the graveyard spin and it is related with a

return to level flight after a constant bank turn(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You

Shouldn't Fly By the Seat of Your Pants, n.d.). An example would be when a pilot first enters a


banking turn to the left s/he will at first sense the turn but if the left turn continues too long, the

pilot will sense that s/he is flying level even though s/he is still engaged in the turn. If the pilot

now tries to level the wings s/he sense that s/he is turning and banking in the opposite direction

(to the right) and if the pilot believes his/her senses that s/he is turning to right instead of flying

level, the pilot will re-enter the original left turn in order to try to “correct” for the sensation of a

right turn. Regrettably, the aircraft will actually be turning to the left and losing altitude. Trying

to apply power will only make the turn tighter and the aircraft will continue turning left and

losing altitude until collision with terrain occurs if the pilot never realizes the illusion and does

not level wings.

Somatogravic illusions are caused by linear accelerations and involve the utricle and the

saccule of the vestibular system(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation — Why You Shouldn't Fly By the

Seat of Your Pants, n.d.). These illusions are more inclined to occur under conditions with

unreliable, limited or inaccessible outside visual references. These illusions include the

inversion illusion, the head-up illusion and the head-down illusion. The inversion illusion can

happen when there is a sudden change from climb to straight-and-level flight which can cause

the sensation of tumbling backwards. The disoriented pilot may intensify this illusion by putting

the aircraft into a nose-low attitude. The head-up illusion can happen when there is an abrupt

forward linear acceleration during level flight. The pilot may sense that the nose of the aircraft is

pitching up and will try to pitch the nose down. Taking off at night from a well-lit airport into a

totally dark sky can also lead to this illusion and could also result in a crash. The head-down

illusion can occur when there is an abrupt linear deceleration during level flight. The pilot will

sense that the nose of the aircraft is pitching down and s/he will pitch the nose up which could

put the aircraft in a stall if this illusion happens during low-speed final approach.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vestibular_system

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccule

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utricle_(ear)


Of all of the senses vision is the most important and dominant in obtaining reference

information during flight. The flight attitude is often determined by the pilot’s reference to the

general horizon(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). Reference to the

surface is used if the general horizon is obscured(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual

Illusions, 2011). If neither horizon nor surface references exist, the aircraft’s attitude can only be

determined by artificial means such as the attitude indicator and other flight

instruments(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011).

Many visual illusions can occur during the takeoff and landing phases of flight. Some

factors that can create illusions during landing are: runway width and/or length, runway slope,

surrounding terrain, for and haze, smooth, solid surfaces, and runway lights(Antuñano, Spatial

Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). A final approach over flat terrain with an upsloping

runway may create the illusion of being high on final approach(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation

Visual Illusions, 2011). Flying over downsloping terrain over a flat runway may also produce

the same illusion as does an approach over a narrow or long runway(Antuñano, Spatial

Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). If the illusion of being high on final approach is believed,

the pilot may pitch the nose down to decrease the glide path which if performed too close to the

ground can result in an accident(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). A

final approach over flat terrain with a downsloping runway may create the illusion of being low

on final approach(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). Flying over

upsloping terrain over a flat runway can also produce the same illusion as well as an approach to

an unusually wide runway(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011). If the

illusion of being low on final approach is perceived to be true, the pilot may pitch the nose of the


aircraft up to increase the glide path which may result in a missed approach or it may result in a

low attitude stall(Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011).

Night flying can also produce illusions. Performing a final approach during the night

with no stars, moonlight, and no city lights before the runway to a lighted runway beyond which

the horizon is not visible is called a black-hole approach (Antuñano, Spatial Disorientation

Visual Illusions, 2011). An approach under these conditions may produce the illusion of being

high on the glide path. The autokinetic illusion gives the pilot the impression that a stationary

object is moving in front of the airplane’s path. This is caused by staring at a fixed, single point

of light in a totally dark or featureless background. This illusion can make the pilot think that the

light is another aircraft on a collision course with his own aircraft. The false visual reference

illusion may cause the pilot to orient the aircraft along a false horizon. This illusion is caused by

flying over a banked cloud, night flying over featureless terrain with ground lights that are

indistinguishable from stars or night flying over a clearly defined pattern of ground lights with a

dark starless sky. In addition, problems can be caused during landing by a lack of visual depth

and texture caused by blowing dust and snow, fog and haze, and overwater approaches.

According to the Aeronautical Information Manual, spatial disorientation is ranked as the

most cited contributed factors to fatal aircraft accidents. The Air Safety Foundation Accident

Database found that from 1994 to 2003 91% of accidents involving spatial disorientation were

fatal(Wynbrandt, 2004). While spatial disorientation is only a small contribution to the overall

General Aviation accidents, it is responsible for a high percentage of fatalities(Wynbrandt,

2004). Some examples of accidents involving airlines that were caused by illusions

are(Wynbrandt, 2004):


Air India Flight 855, graveyard spiral accident

Air New Zealand Flight 901, false visual reference illusion accident

Alitalia Flight 4128, black-hole approach illusion

VASP Flight 168, black-hole approach illusion

Since spatial disorientation and illusions during flight are so dangerous how does a pilot train

for them? How does a pilot recover if s/he finds that they are experiencing an illusion or are

disoriented in the middle of a flight? Some things that can be done are(Antuñano, Spatial

Disorientation Visual Illusions, 2011):

Obtain training and maintain proficiency using instruments.

Use and rely on flight instruments, especially when flying at night or in reduced

visibility.

Preflight and become familiar with unique geographical conditions along the flight path,

at the destination and at possible alternates.

If the pilot is only Visual Flight Rules (VFR) qualified, the pilot should not attempt visual

flight at night and when there is a possibility of being trapped in deteriorating weather.

If a visual illusion or disorientation is experienced during flight the pilot should rely on

the instruments and ignore all conflicting signal the body sends.

If a visual illusion or disorientation is experienced during flight, the pilot should transfer

control of the aircraft to the other pilot if there is one.

Airmen should have enough training and adequate information concerning all facets of spatial

disorientation and the appropriate countermeasure. It is to all pilots’ advantage to understand

spatial disorientation and to put into use proper countermeasures that minimize SD-caused

accidents.



Statement of the Comprehensive Examination Question #

Most accidents and fatalities that happen in aviation take place during the departure (take

off / climb) and arrival (approach/landing) stages of flight. Provide examples proving the

severity of the subject. Describe how human factors play a role concerning safety during these

crucial phases in flight. Discuss the economic and psychological cost of CFIT during these

phases. Additionally, what safety actions can be implemented to mitigate these risks?


On December 20, 1995, American Airlines, Flight 965, a regularly scheduled passenger

flight from Miami, Florida, to Cali, Colombia, crashed into mountainous terrain located in Buga,

Colombia during (Aviation Safety, 2012). The crash happened during a descent under

instrument flight rules and killed 151 passengers and 8 crew members. At about 18:34 EST,

American Airlines Flight 965 took off from Miami for a flight to Cali. At 21:34, while

descending to FL200, the crew contacted Cali Approach (Aviation Safety, 2012). The aircraft

was 8nm south of the airport at the time which was 63nm out of Cali VOR (Aviation Safety,

2012). Cali cleared the flight for a direct Cali VOR approach and report at Tulua VOR.

Followed one minute later by a clearance for a straight in VOR DME approach to runway 19 (the

Rozo 1 arrival) (Aviation Safety, 2012). Because their Jeppesen approach plates showed 'R' as

the code for Rozo, the crew tried to select ‘R’ for the Rozo NDB on the Flight Management

Computer (FMC) (Aviation Safety, 2012). But 'R' in the FMC database meant Romeo which is a

navaid 150nm from Rozo, but has the same frequency (Aviation Safety, 2012). The aircraft had

just passed Tulua VOR when it started a turn to the left towards Romeo (Aviation Safety, 2012).


Since Rozo 1 was to be a straight in approach this action caused confusion (Aviation Safety,

2012). 87 seconds after starting the turn, the crew activated Heading Select (HDG SEL), which

disengaged LNAV and began a right turn (Aviation Safety, 2012). The left turn had taken the

B757 over mountainous terrain, so a Ground Proximity (GPWS) warning sounded (Aviation

Safety, 2012). With increased engine power and nose-up the crew tried to climb (Aviation

Safety, 2012). However, the spoilers were still activated (Aviation Safety, 2012). The stick

shaker then activated and the aircraft crashed into a mountain at about 8900 feet (Cali field

elevation being 3153 feet) (Aviation Safety, 2012).

PROBABLE CAUSE: "Aeronautica Civil determines that the probable causes of this accident

were (Aviation Safety, 2012):

1. The flight crew's failure to adequately plan and execute the approach to runway 19 at

SKCL and their inadequate use of automation;

2. Failure of the flight crew to discontinue the approach into Cali, despite numerous cues

alerting them of the inadvisability of continuing the approach;

3. The lack of situational awareness of the flight crew regarding vertical navigation,

proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids;

4. Failure of the flight crew to revert to basic radio navigation at the time when the FMS-

assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload in a critical

phase of the flight.

Contributing to the cause of the accident were the following factors (Aviation Safety, 2012):

1. The flight crew's ongoing efforts to expedite their approach and landing in order to avoid

potential delays;


2. The flight crew's execution of the GPWS escape manoeuvre while the speed brakes

remained deployed;

3. FMS logic that dropped all intermediate fixes from the display(s) in the event of

execution of a direct routing;

4. FMS-generated navigational information that used a different naming convention from

that published in navigational charts."

Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is when an airworthy aircraft under the control of a

pilot is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, into a body of water, an obstacle, etc.

Usually pilots are unaware of the danger until it is too late. Accidents involving aircraft that is

damaged and uncontrollable are not considered CFIT. Most accidents and fatalities take place

during the departure (take off/climb) and arrival (approach/landing) phases of flight (1001 Crash,

2012). During these stages aircraft are close to the ground and in a more vulnerable

configuration than during any other phase in flight (1001 Crash, 2012). Not only this but the

flight crew has to deal with a high workload and reduced maneuver margins (1001 Crash, 2012).


(1001 Crash, 2012)

Probably the biggest contributor to CFIT is human error. Airlines operate under

instrument flight procedures and the aircraft used is designed to keep it in airspace far from

terrain and other obstacles. One of these human errors is when pilots fly the aircraft outside of

the airspace in which it is legal to fly a transport aircraft under instrument flight rules, in

particular below minimum altitudes for instrument flight in that area (Ladkin, 1997). Sometimes

they do this on purpose and sometimes it is a result of the pilots losing ‘situational awareness’

(Ladkin, 1997). The loss of situational awareness can be caused by increased workload, or by

misperceiving or not paying attention to altitude restrictions when flying a non-precision

approach (Ladkin, 1997). It can also happen through misleading instrument readings; for

example, because incorrect `altimeter settings' were being used, either because they were not put

in correctly by the crew, or because the crew had obtained a misleading altimeter setting

somehow (Ladkin, 1997). There are also several other factors that could cause the loss of

situational awareness such as fatigue, alcohol use, drug use, night flying, etc.


A CFIT accident almost occurred recently when a pilot got distracted by incoming text

messages on his cell phone (Kindelan, 2012). The flight was forced to abort a touch-down just

500 feet from the tarmac (Kindelan, 2012). Besides the apparent lack of communication

between the Captain and the First Officer, an investigation surmised that the captain, reported to

have more than 13,000 hours flying experience, and his FO were unsuccessful in following a

number of standard pre-landing procedures, including lowering the landing gear, completing the

landing checklist, selecting auto break and checking the flight parameters (Kindelan, 2012).

Fortunately for everyone, a warning alarm sounded when the plane was at 500 feet with the

landing gear still not deployed (Kindelan, 2012). The pilots reacted quickly and thrust the plane

back into the air (Kindelan, 2012).

A good countermeasure to CFIT is to have the equipment. Progress in technology has

resulted in cockpit equipment that can considerably improve a pilot's situation awareness

(Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). A lot of this technology is also

economical for general aviation applications. Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) have

been mandatory on large transport aircraft for years and been conducive in preventing some

CFIT accidents (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). Terrain Awareness

and Warning Systems (TAWS) has increased capabilities and is in the process of replacing

GPWS; while the less capable but most cost effective TAWS have been developed for the

smaller aircraft market (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). All of these

systems use an onboard terrain database and compare it with the aircraft’s position (as

determined by its navigation systems) (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.).

Audible and/or visual warnings go off if there a potential threat of collision with terrain. Global

Positioning Systems (GPS) are used to a great extent throughout both commercial and general


aviation operations (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). When used

correctly, these systems can provide increased navigation capability and accuracy, instrument

approaches in locations where no ground-based approach aids are available and better situational

awareness (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). All of these possible

advantages can help to minimize the CFIT accident rate, especially in circumstances involving

flight in instrument conditions or visual flight in reduced or marginal visibility; both situations

are potential factors in CFIT accidents (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.).

Specific training and education in the area of CFIT awareness/avoidance is possibly of

greater importance than equipment improvements (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez

Peralta, n.d.). Even though the emphasis for this training has been on these types of operations,

the statistics show that general aviation accidents account for the highest percentage of the

overall CFIT accidents (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.). For this

reason, GA pilots should familiarize themselves with the flight circumstances typically

associated with CFIT accidents and the countermeasures available to reduce the potential for

these accidents (Véronneau, Ayotte, McMenemy, & Gomez Peralta, n.d.).



Safety is very important in aviation but so is security. Describe the role of security in

aviation. Why is security conducive to a safe environment? How is security implemented in the

aviation industry? What effect do security measures have on the aviation industry?



Aviation security exists worldwide to thwart criminal activity in airports and on aircraft.

Criminal activity includes but is not limited to assaults on passengers and staff, hijacking of

aircraft, and terrorism. The high number of people that pass through airports daily presents a

large potential target for terrorism and other forms of crime. The high concentration of people

also presents a possible high death rate, and the ability to use a hijacked plane as a lethal weapon

may provide an alluring target for terrorism. Airport security aims to stop likely dangerous

situations and threats from happening or entering the country. The following are examples of

security measures that have been implemented in U.S. airports.

The first line of defense in an airport is the most apparent: fences, barriers and walls

(Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). Tall and difficult to climb fences enclose the entire airport

property while security patrols regularly scan the perimeter in case someone does make it past

the fence. Fuel depots, terminals and baggage handling facilities are especially sensitive areas

that are more secure, with more fences and security checkpoints. Surveillance cameras and

guard stations monitor all access gates. Loading zones are kept clear of traffic and no one is

allowed to park close to the terminal (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012).

Another important security measure at airports is to confirm the identity of the travelers

passing through (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). This is done by checking a photo ID and by

checking a passport if traveling internationally. Secure Flight works behind the scenes to match

passenger information against blacklists maintained by the government.

Before boarding a flight all passengers must pass through a metal detector and their

baggage passes through an x-ray machine (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). While most things

that cannot be brought aboard a plane are obvious (sharp objects like knives, guns and


explosives), there are also some things that most people would not even think about such as a

smoke detector. It is best to ask the local airport or look it up online if a person has any concerns

about something they may plan to carry onboard.

Air marshals are the last defense (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). If all else fails and a

terrorist still gets onto a flight with a weapon, an armed air marshal can take control of a

situation and restrain the attackers (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). Air marshals look like

regular passengers and are authorized to carry a gun and make arrests (Tyson & Grabianowski,

2012). There are not enough air marshals and no one knows which passenger is an air marshal

or if one is even onboard. Even if there are no air marshals on a flight, recent incidents have

proved that passengers will not sit by and do nothing like before 9/11 if something does happen.

Since 9/11, locks on reinforced cockpit doors have been implemented to prevent

hijackings by terrorists who are trained to fly passenger jets by keeping them away from the

flight controls (Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012).

Terrorism is a constant and terrifying threat, therefore any mention of certain words, such

as “bomb,” “hijack” or gun, can lead to a passenger being removed and maybe even arrested

(Tyson & Grabianowski, 2012). Everyone who works in aviation is trained to react immediately

to these words.

Since 9/11, airport security has been overhauled and billions of dollars have been spent

on technology that has been installed across the country (CBS, 2011). Even with all the security

enhancements, there have been lapses. Since November 2001, there have been more than 25,000

security breaches at U.S. airports (CBS, 2011). Not long ago, a cellphone-sized stun gun was

found on a plane operated by JetBue (CBS, 2011). While officials do not believe the stun gun


was intended to be used in an attack, the FBI is looking into how and why it on the plane (CBS,

2011). Then there is the Nigerian American who is accused of breaching three layers of airport

security when he went on a cross-country flight with an expired pass (CBS, 2011).

Former TSA chief, Kip Hawley, says that TSA’s current approach to airport security is

“broken.” Hawley says that TSA internal systems and operating procedures say that if TSO’s do

everything by the book then they are covered. Hawley goes on to say that there are a lot of

politics involved in trying to change things with TSA (Lovitt, 2012). The problem with TSA is

that every brick that has been put up has been put up in a wall and stays there even after

vulnerabilities addressed have been closed (Lovitt, 2012). It took an act by Congress to let

lighters back on planes even after al-Qaida had already moved to electronic detonators (Lovitt,

2012).

Many people still view security to be a set of common sense, airtight and rigid rules

reinforced by powerful technologies, not as an arrangement of connected networks striving

toward a terrorist threat that is always deviating and changing. A great security system would be

one which uses technology to network intelligence and other information, machines to scan

people and bags for known threats while allowing people to use their abilities to pick up subtle

clues signaling unidentified threats (Hawley & Means, 2012). Others say that we need to focus

more on human factors and forgo the standardized procedures implemented by TSA and the

focus on prohibited items. A few years ago George Zarur, Ed Kittel, and a few others were able

to connect the TSA with security opportunities presented by the scientific community (Hawley &

Means, 2012). Meanwhile, the EU and US security strategies were strengthened when they were

connected by Marjeta Jager (Hawley & Means, 2012). At the airport level, TSA created several

flexible security layers, like Carl Maccario’s behavior-detection force (Hawley & Means, 2012).


By incorporating Andrew Cox’s “Playbook” strategy, security actions at different airports would

be different and as a result unpredictable by a terrorist who is keeping close observation of

airport security (Hawley & Means, 2012). The concept produced exceptional results when tested

at airports like St. Louis, but got weakened when headquarters attempted to take charge of which

plays to use and some airports cringed against the observed interference in local operations

(Hawley & Means, 2012).

A suggestion that is often repeated is that the United States should model its aviation

security after the “Israeli method.” Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv has experienced no serious

terrorist incidents for more than 30 years (Security Solutions, 2012). According to Raphael

“Rafi” Ron, who served as director of security at Ben Gurion for five years, airport security

directors have failed in creating all-inclusive layered security checkpoints which protect airports

in their entirety, from perimeter access roads to passenger checkpoints (Security Solutions,

2012). Another area that Ron says that the U.S. has failed is to acknowledge the human factor

element of security (Security Solutions, 2012). There are two incidents that have produced the

current security at Ben Gurion since 1972, when 24 people died during an attack on the airport

led by Japanese Red Army militants and 9/11. Referring to the attack led by the Japanese Red

Army militants, Ron says, “We assumed that before an attack could take place, there had to be a

person with the intention of carrying out an attack, and second, there had to be a weapon. On

September 11, we learned that a weapon is not necessary. What remains is the human factor.

Without a person who intends to do harm, an attack will not take place” (Security Solutions,

2012).

Ben Gurion creates a security of layers, or circles of around airports (Harris, 2009).

There are toll-booth-like security entrances for all vehicles entering the airport perimeter (Harris,


2009). Somewhat reminiscent of crossing the international border from Mexico to Texas, every

car is stopped, while guards make visual examinations and follow their training and instinct.

Young men with sub-machine guns stand in the back alert and ready (Harris, 2009). Upon

entering the terminal buildings more non-uniformed guards stand by while visually screening

(Harris, 2009). At the first actual security line in advance of the flight check-in an official

approaches each passenger in line and patiently asks questions (Harris, 2009). The questions

could be unpredictable or rather extensive and usually accompany the review of tickets and

passports – before the formal passport control, which only comes in after check-in – to certify

statements about itineraries and check travel patterns (Harris, 2009). Even after successfully

passing the security line there are more security measures to pass through right up to the plane’s

interior where air marshals are deployed on every flight (Harris, 2009).

Israel knows that a security system that cautiously examines everyone is needed because

you can never tell who might be involved (Harris, 2009). Israel’s approach relies as heavily on

the human dimension as much as it does on sophisticated technology (Harris, 2009). While the

TSA is busy confiscating cosmetics, small pocket knives and water bottles, the Israelis have

come to understand that it is people, who are the threat, not the objects they carry. Their system

also places a higher priority on avoiding catastrophes than giving in to privacy issues or to

political correctness (Harris, 2009). Israel has also shown that it requires ongoing training and

the ability to predict the terrorists’ next moves (Harris, 2009). The U.S. tends to employ the

“after-the-fact” strategy, also known as fighting the last war (Harris, 2009).

Obviously, no country can say they have a foolproof perfect aviation security system and

experience can be shared by all countries in the front lines against terrorism (Harris, 2009).

Israel can provide impressive security due to their strong public support (Hawley & Means,


2012). Some of the procedures implemented by Israel can work at U.S. airports while some of

the other procedures they use will definitely not work here. There is still much that can be done

to improve aviation security in the United States. There needs to be less politics and bureaucracy

and more free thinking and flexibility to create better security protocols at our airports.

Conclusion

When I was a little kid I used to think that flying a plane was as simple as getting in and

taking off whenever from wherever. Maybe it was this way during the barnstormer era. These

days we have to think about several factors that contribute to the safety of a flight. Some of the

things that are of concern include: the many safety regulations in place, the health issues that

may prevent the pilot from being fit to fly, situational awareness and disorientation, and drugs

and alcohol. We have to remember that fatigue can contribute to loss of situational awareness

and disorientation and can increase the possibility of a potentially fatal accident. Taking

medications and/or drinking alcohol before or during a flight can also contribute to loss of

situational awareness and disorientation as well as increase the chances of being in a potentially

fatal accident. Another thing to consider is that loss of situational awareness and disorientation

can happen even if the pilot is not fatigued, on medications or intoxicated and that proper

training can help the pilot so that they can recognize the symptoms and know the proper

countermeasures. In order to reduce CFIT incidents, CFIT avoidance training is of high

importance. Being aware of the most critical phases in flight is also very important so that the

pilots focus solely on flying the plane during these critical stages in flight. These are some of the

issues that pilots today must consider. One of the things that everyone that deals with aviation

must consider is aviation security. Our current form of aviation security needs improvement.

The Israeli model may not work here but we can learn from it and incorporate some elements.


Hopefully, those in charge of aviation security take away unnecessary measures, improve what is

already in place, and continue to keep one step ahead of the terrorists.


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