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PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al.

GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.)

Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particularsituation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with thesaid banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the mattercontemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then PresidentCorazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with theSandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages againstrespondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referredto as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan(Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration onproperties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their closerelationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed

with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Courtreferred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of formerPresident Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as counsel forrespondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runsafoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyersfrom accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervenedwhile in said service.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in CivilCases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

HELD:

The petition is denied.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in

the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former governmentlawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter asany discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situationand specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved inthe case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and

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even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given byrespondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated byRule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylightin stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations orlaws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the termmatter and cannot disqualify.

It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply torespondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does anact which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting governmentor agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed byrespondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actualparticipation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpretingRule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by itsmisapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose notonly the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence Theclient with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule onthe official independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position ofSolicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed thatthe position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is thisindependence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is thisindependence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office.

Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on therule of law.

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interestprong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period.Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously,and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the SolicitorGeneral, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid todisqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,qualify as reasonable.