Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia1

DAVID N. GIBBSUniversity of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

Abstract. This article examines factors that motivate major powers to par-ticipate in humanitarian interventions, with a case study of US interven-tion in Somalia during the period 1992-93. Two potential explanations areassessed: First, the ar ticle considers the conventional perspective that theUn i ted States interven ti on was guided by hu m a n i t a rian con s i dera ti on s ,particularly a desire to attenuate effects of famine,war, and political disor-der in Somalia. Second,US intervention may have reflected realpolitik con-siderations, e.g. maintaining control over traditional spheres of influencefor re a s ons of n a ti onal power and pre s ti ge , as well as gaining access topotential oil supplies. While altruistic concerns may have had some influ-ence on US conduct, this study finds that humanitarianism was (at best)mixed with considerations of national interest.

IntroductionWith the termination of the Cold War, it is often asserted that international rela-

ti ons no lon ger have a basic logic or com m on thre ad . A con tra ry vi ew holds thatm a ny analys t s’ con f u s i on abo ut world po l i tics stems from the irrel eva n ce of re a l i s tp a rad i gm s . In deed , Ch a rles Kegl ey ’s 1993 Pre s i den tial Ad d ress to the In tern a ti on a lStudies Association raised the possibility of realism’s obsolescence for the current era.Kegley argued that recent events could herald a return to Wilsonian idealism.2 Theview that we have entered a “neo-Wilsonian” era is widespread.

One manifestation of this neo-Wilsonianism is the rise of humanitarian interven-ti on . It appe a rs that the po s t - Cold War era has finally inaugura ted a world orderwhere great powers use their military force not as an expression of realpolitik, as wastrue earlier, but as a technique to restore democratic governance, overcome famine,or pro tect minori ti e s . Even Jack Don n elly, a skepti c , ack n owl ed ges that “hu m a nrights and issues of humanitarian politics more generally, have achieved an interna-tional prominence at least as great as at any other time in modern history.”3

Hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on also has tra n s form ed the ideo l ogical ch a racter ofdeb a te on intern a ti onal rel a ti on s . L i beral activi s t s , of ten of feminist and/or pac i f i s torientation, and hostile to foreign intervention, have in recent years become enthusi-a s tic su pporters of the con cept , provi ded that interven ti on is of the hu m a n i t a ri a nvariety. Indeed, in the debate over intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo,many of the strongest advocates of force had previously been staunch opponents ofUS intervention in Vietnam or Central America during the Cold War.4 This article

In tern a tional Pol i ti cs 3 7: 4 1 - 5 5 , Ma rch 2000© 2000 Kl uwer Law In tern a ti o n a l . Pri n ted in the Un i ted St a te s

examines hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on in the case of Opera ti on Re s tore Hope inSomalia during December 1992-May 1993.

Humanitarian intervention may be defined as forceful interference in the internalpolitics of one country, undertaken by another country or countries, motivated pri-marily by altruistic considerations. Such interventions have often been undertaken inthe context of peacekeeping operations, although humanitarian intervention differsin key aspects from classical pe ace keep i n g. In classical pe ace keep i n g, i n tern a ti on a lm i l i t a ry forces are assu m ed to ref rain from any interven ti on in the affairs of t h eco u n try or co u n tries wh ere they opera te . Pe ace keepers are dep l oyed on ly with thepermission of the affected parties, and they adhere to the norm of noninterventionand strict impartiality.5

Humanitarian intervention, by contrast, has dropped the nonintervention injunc-tion and, by implication,the doctrine of impartiality – if impartiality means that theinterveners fail to take sides. In cases of humanitarian intervention, the intervenersare supposed to take sides.6 The most important point, however, is that the interven-ing power, acting on hu m a n i t a rian gro u n d s , should serve univers a l i s tic goals com-m on to all hu m a n i ty; the power must also esch ew parochial con s i dera ti ons ofnational interest, which tend to compromise the operation’s humanitarian character.

As a corollary, countries that field troops in humanitarian interventions ought notuse the opera ti on as a cover to furt h er their own intere s t s . Su ch an activi ty wo u l dclearly violate basic norms of humanitarian intervention and would, at least, com-promise the mission’s purported hu m a n i t a rian inten t . Herein is the key probl em :How does one know wh et h er or not an interven ti on is “hu m a n i t a ri a n” and thatnational interests actually are eschewed? How can one know whether official claimsto humanitarian intent are genuine or are mere pretenses or rationalizations for for-eign policies based on old fashioned notions of national or material interests? Theseare questions to be examined in the Somalia case.

An important component for any theory of humanitarian intervention would be aconception of conditions that make such interventions possible and ensure that par-ticipants serve cosmopolitan interests. Three factors may be offered: First, humani-tarian interventions are generally multilateral operations undertaken simultaneouslyby several countries. Such multilateralism tends to dilute the influence of any singles t a te and increase the likel i h ood that intern a ti onal and co s m opolitan interests areserved by the operation. Purportedly humanitarian operations undertaken unilater-a lly by a single state , su ch as Fren ch pe ace keeping in Rwanda or va rious Ru s s i a noperations in the former USSR are therefore suspect, although they may be endorsedby the UN Security Council.7 Truly humanitarian operations are presumed to have abroad multinational character, both in the operation’s overall spirit and in the wayforces are constituted.

Second, humanitarian operations are expected to obtain prior authorization fromthe United Nations Security Council, to ensure further that national interests of par-ticipating powers will not corrupt the operation. The UN is thus expected, at least inpri n c i p l e , to undert a ke some su pervi s ory functi on . To be su re , this principle waswe a ken ed by recent NATO bom bing in Ko s ovo and Serbi a , i n i ti a ted wi t h o ut UNauthorization. Whether and to what extent this will set a new precedent remains to

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be seen. This exception notwithstanding, some degree of UN involvement is general-ly considered a sin qua non for humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era.

Th i rd , and most import a n t , hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons are usu a lly undert a ken inregions believed to be of marginal economic or strategic value. This fact is often citedas evi den ce that specific opera ti ons are hu m a n i t a rian in su b s t a n ce , as well as inname. According to this logic, a realist state would not intervene in such st rategicallymarginal regions as Somalia since this would constitute a waste of resources. Thusthe US intervention in Somalia must imply humanitarian motives.8

Great powers are motiva ted to parti c i p a te in hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons for re a s ons ofpri n c i p l e ; con s i dera ti ons of n a ti onal intere s t , i f not absen t , a re moved into the back-gro u n d . The basic probl em is this: Advoc a tes of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on too of tena s sume altru i s tic motiva ti on s , wi t h o ut dem on s tra ting their salien ce thro u gh em p i ri c a lre s e a rch . Re a l i s t s , in con tra s t , tend to be so skeptical of hu m a n i t a rian motiva ti ons thatt h ey avoid the qu e s ti on altoget h er.9 The crucial third factor – rega rding the stra tegi ci rrel eva n ce of t a r get co u n tries – espec i a lly is asserted more of ten than it is dem on s tra t-ed . Th ere is, of co u rs e , the danger of t a uto l ogical re a s on i n g. That hu m a n i t a rian inter-ven ti ons occur in stra tegi c a lly marginal areas may be “dem on s tra ted ” by interven ti onof mu l ti l a teral forces in su ch regi ons is one su ch tauto l ogy.

Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions may not reflect altruistic motivationsof p a rti c i p a ting state s . In tern a ti onal interven ti on in Somalia is an excell ent casestudy since it was one of the largest and most complex cases of humanitarian inter-ven ti on undert a ken to date . This assessment of fers no com preh en s ive analysis ofwhat caused US and intern a ti onal interven ti on . In s te ad , I focus on the con du ct ofthe intervention after the initial deployment. In particular, I assess the most signifi-cant and controversial feature of the peacekeeping operation – the decision by the USand the UN Secretariat to begin a process of military confrontation with the militiaof Mohammed Farah Aideed. In the process of analyzing these events, we reassess thethesis that this operation was motivated by altruistic mot ivations and was not sub-stantially influenced by US or other national interests.

Origins of Operation Restore HopeAlthough it has become commonplace to view Somalia as of little strategic or eco-

n omic intere s t , this was not alw ays the percepti on . Du ring the Cold Wa r, i n deed ,Somalia was accorded an important strategic status. The significance of the countrywas pri m a ri ly its geogra phic loc a ti on – close to Red Sea shipping lanes and, m oreimportant, the Bab-el-Mandeb straits. The latter is a narrow channel of water, locat-ed where the Arabian Peninsula almost (but not quite) meets the African continent.Through this channel passes most of the oil shipments that travel between the Per-sian Gu l f and We s tern Eu rope . The Ba b - el - Ma n deb “ch o kepoi n t ,” as it has beentermed, was considered a major area of interest for the US military during the courseof the Cold War, and was depicted – not altogether accurately – as the economic life-line of Western Europe.10 Somalia’s shoreline lay close to the Bab-el-Mandeb.

Western interest in Somalia grew considerably during the 1970s,partly in responseto the OPEC oil embargo of that decade and subsequently heightened interest in oiland oil-shipping. During this period, Somalia was ruled by the military dictatorship

Re a l po l i ti k and humanitarian interven tion 4 3

of Mo h a m m ed Si ad Ba rre . O ri gi n a lly Sovi et - b acked , Si ad Ba rre sought and ga i n edWestern support beginning in 1978. The United States eagerly supported his regime,despite its nominally Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, and replaced the Soviet Union as theprincipal source of aid. Other NATO powers, notably Italy, the former colonial ruler,supplied substantial support as well.11

In retu rn , Si ad Ba rre all owed the Un i ted States access to the Sovi et - built nava lbase at Berbera in the north of the country not far from the Bab-el-Mandeb, as wellas the southern port of Kismayu. A considerable amount of effort was spent upgrad-ing these cities’ infrastructure during the 1980s for eventual use by the US CentralCommand. Berbera did not actually become a permanent base for the US Navy, butthe Navy clearly sought to make the base available in the event of need. In response,Si ad Ba rre received econ omic and military aid, as well as diplom a tic su pport thatproved crucial to his regi m e . Bet ween 1979 and 1991, Somalia received over $800million in both economic and military aid from the United States.12

As Cold War tensions abated, Somalia and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits declined ingeostrategic importance. But it would be wrong to assume that the Bab-el-Mandeband Somalia lost all significance for Western defense planners. US Senate testimonyby General Norman Schwarzkopf in 1990 reaffirmed the strategic importance of thisarea. Securing this area was a major objective of the US Central Command duringthe post-Cold War era:

The Red Se a , with the Suez Canal in the north and the Ba b - el -Mandeb in the south, is one of the most vital sea lines of commu-nication and a critical shipping link between our Pacific and Euro-pean all i e s . . . Si n ce a significant part of U S C E N TC O M ’s force swould deploy by sea, ensuring these waterways remain open to freeworld shipping must be a key objective.13

And Gen eral Schw a r z kopf ad ded : “Access to fac i l i ties in Somalia con ti nues to be apart of USCENTCOM’s regional strategy.” Overall,it is important to note that Soma-lia was not so remote from Western strategic interests as is commonly believed.

The Si ad Ba rre regime began to disintegra te at the end of the 1980s due to a com bi-n a ti on of declining produ cti on of Som a l i a’s principal ex ports (hide s , m e a t , c a t t l e ,b a n a n a s )1 4 and growing dom e s tic oppo s i ti on to the incre a s i n gly repre s s ive and mega l o-m a n i acal rule of Si ad Ba rre . Al t h o u gh Somalia is rel a tively hom ogen eous with vi rtu a llythe whole pop u l a ti on speaking Somali and practicing Is l a m , the co u n try remains divi d-ed by regi on , cl a n , and su b - clan gro u p i n gs . The oppo s i ti on to Si ad Ba rre accord i n glyra i s ed militias based on clan all egi a n ce , u n i ted on ly on the basis of oppo s i ti on to theregi m e . Wh en Si ad Ba rre was driven from Mogad i s hu in Ja nu a ry 1991, the oppo s i ti onm i l i tias tu rn ed on one another, reducing most of the co u n try to the anarchic Hobbe s i a ns t a te of n a tu re that has been a staple of Somali po l i tics to the pre s ent day.

The Role of AideedMo h a m m ed Fa rah Ai deed had been a key player in the overt h row of the Si ad

Ba rre dict a tors h i p, a n d , a f terw a rds was a major factor in the co u n try ’s de s t a bi l i z a-ti on . Ai deed had long oppo s ed the regime and spent several ye a rs in a po l i ti c a l

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prison. At other times, he had served Siad Barre as military commander and, in hislast official po s i ti on , as Am b a s s ador to India – pre su m a bly a form of d i p l om a ti cexile. In 1989, he joined the United Somali Congress (USC), a key opposition groupbased in Rome and headed by Ali Mahdi, a rich hotel proprietor. Aideed opened anEthiopia office for the USC and proceeded to organize a military force to infiltratei n to the co u n try.1 5 L a ter, Ai deed would break with Mahdi in a stru ggle for powerduring the final days of the old regime. Aideed and Mahdi, now with separate militiaforces, would emerge as the principal protagonists in battle for control of Mogadishuafter Siad Barre fled in early 1991.

On Decem ber 9, 1 9 9 2 , Opera ti on Re s tore Hope was launch ed and 28,000 USforces stormed ashore in Mogadishu in what was described by Le Monde as the “mostmedia saturated (mediatisé) landing in military history.”16 Twenty-four other coun-tries sent additional contingents,17 although the American forces exceeded in size thecom bi n ed forces of a ll other parti c i p a ting co u n tri e s . Robert Oakley, a form er USambassador to Somalia, was appointed by President George Bush to direct the opera-tion, with the title of Special Presidential Envoy.

Operation Restore Hope began with a high level of cooperation between the Unit-ed States and Aideed. In fact, Aideed at first expressed a respectful attitude toward theUnited States and welcomed US intervention. Aideed’s pro-American views stemmedf rom a close rel a ti onship he en j oyed with the US-based Con ti n ental Oil Com p a ny(Conoco). Apparently, Aideed expected that his ties to Conoco would promote closerelations between him and Ambassador Oakley and US forces.

At the same time, Aideed was intensely hostile towards the United Nations and inparticular to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This animosity was long-standing. Prior to his work at the UN, Boutros-Ghali had been an Egyptian diplo-m a t , and a su pporter of the Si ad Ba rre dict a tors h i p.1 8 More import a n t ly, in 1991,Egypt co-sponsored a meeting of Somali political figures at which Aideed’s rival AliMahdi was decl a red “pre s i den t” of Som a l i a . The title of pre s i dent was essen ti a llym e a n i n gless since Mahdi was never able to con trol even the capital, l et alone thewhole co u n try. However, this event establ i s h ed that Egypt , and by implicati onBoutros-Ghali, was partial and opposed to the interests of Aideed and his supporters.

Aideed’s attitude toward Operation Restore Hope can thus be politely termed ascomplicated. On the one hand, Aideed strongly favored the American role while, onthe other hand, Aideed was critical of the organization that had endorsed the opera-ti on and had given it legal legi ti m ac y, i . e . the Un i ted Na ti on s . Ai deed su rely mu s thave been concerned when US troops landed in December, since it was made clearthat this unilateral intervention would be brief. It was always intended that the Oper-a ti on would lay the gro u n dwork for a full - f l ed ged UN pe ace keeping opera ti on inSomalia, to be administered by the UN Secretariat.

In any case, Aideed’s supporters proceeded to praise the United States, while theya t t acked the UN. O a k l ey and the Am erican forces retu rn ed the com p l i m ent andworked closely with Aideed. Several days after landing, US forces discovered a largea rms cache bel on ging to the Ai deed facti on , containing significant qu a n ti ties ofh e avy we a pon s , a ll within one bl ock of the cl o s ed US em b a s s y, but they took noaction.19 Alex De Waal, director of African Rights and formerly with Human Rights

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Watch, provides the following account:So Oakley co s i ed up to Gen eral Ai deed . For ex a m p l e ,O a k l ey chose torent his house from Ai deed ’s ch i ef f i n a n c i er Osman “Ato,” u s eAi deed ’s mon eych a n gers for the lu c ra tive business of converting USdo ll a rs to Somali shill i n gs , and gave the Gen eral a series of p u bl i crel a ti ons coups by heralding “bre a k t h ro u gh s” in pe ace talks that hadin fact been nego ti a ted by UN diplomats some months earl i er.2 0

Ai deed told a form er US ambassador that, “ ‘O n ly Am erican diplom a t s’. . . co u l dunderstand Somalis’ differences, solve the country’s political problems, and bring itspeople together... ‘Only American t roops,’ he added for good measure, were ‘impar-ti a l , d i s i n tere s ted , and wel come among Somalis as pe ace keeping force s .’ ”2 1 U Sfavoritism toward Aideed occurred despite evidence that Aideed had intermittentlyco ll a bora ted with the govern m ent of Su d a n , wh i ch was perceived as a purveyor ofIslamic fundamentalist ideo l ogy and an en emy of the Un i ted State s . On the otherhand, despite ties to Sudan, Aideed’s organization remained essentially secular, moredriven by a hunger for power than by ideology.22 And, Aideed’s Sudanese flirtationsa pp a ren t ly were out wei gh ed in the eyes of the Am ericans by his close assoc i a ti onwith Conoco, the largest US investor in the country.

Although in this initial phase the United States and the entire peacekeeping opera-tion were technically neutral, there was a strong sentiment among the other factionsthat Oakley was not really neutral and instead was promoting Aideed’s ambitions atthe expense of arch-rival Mahdi. This perception became embarrassing for Oakley,particularly when he initiated a series of peace conferences to work out cooperationa m ong the va rious militias and, at one con feren ce in Addis Ab a b a , Ai deed bega nboasting about his US connections. This caused the State Department to complaindirectly to Oakley about the perception of favoritism. In addition, Boutros-Ghali wasincensed by Aideed’s continued vituperation against the United Nations (and againstBoutros-Ghali personally), and this, too, became a source of complaint. The Finan -cial Ti m e s reported that, “Some angry UN officials all ege priva tely that the US isen co u ra ging the anti-UN camp, and as a con ce s s i on to [Gen eral] Ai deed hasbreached a number of agreements, such as operating under a UN flag and providingproper security to the UN.”23

In the context of these objections, Oakley began to distance himself from Aideedor to project the impression that distance was being created. On January 7, with con-s i dera ble fanfare , Am erican forces attacked an arms depot bel on ging to Ai deed ’sm i l i tia in Mogad i s hu ; h el i copter gunships and arm ored veh i cles were used to dis-lodge pro-Aideed forces. In an interview with the author, Oakley acknowledged thathe was receiving complaints from several directi ons abo ut all eged US parti a l i tytoward Aideed; in response, he told critics that they should “wait twenty four hours.”The next day the attacks against the arms depot com m en ced .2 4 And in his coa u-t h ored mem oi rs , O a k l ey notes that the raid “p ut an en d , at least tem pora ri ly torumors of favoritism.”25

General Aideed was surprisingly understanding of the whole situation and – per-haps feeling guilty about his earlier boasting that had been so awkward for Oakley –

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the gen eral did not publ i cly cri ti c i ze the ra i d . In deed , he con ti nu ed to praise theUn i ted States even as he con ti nu ed to attack the UN. According to a form er USdiplomat,“US intervention is quite different in Aideed’s mind from foreign interven-tion and is much more acceptable.”26

At the January 1983 Addis Ababa peace conference, Aideed continued to adopt anintransigent position, demanding that other faction leaders acknowledge his domi-nance.27 Apparently, he continued to believe that he had US support, and this wasconfirmed by events. During the conference, a battle took place in the southern portcity of Kismayu, where pro-Aideed forces under Omar Jess were seeking to hold thecity against attacks by Said Hersi (known by his nom de guerre, “Morgan”). The battlewas crucial since Kismayu was a major port in the southern sector of the country anda strategic prize. In late January, the United States intervened with helicopters, sup-ported by Belgian ground forces which attacked Morgan’s troops as they prepared anattack.28 This move enabled Aideed ally Jess to retain control of Kismayu, at least forthe time bei n g. O a k l ey pers on a lly inform ed Ai deed of the hel i copter attack , wh i chundoubtedly must have been pleasing to the warlord.

The Politics of OilSomalia had long been known to the intern a ti onal oil indu s try as a po ten ti a l

s o u rce of u n t a pped cru de . Si z a ble oil finds in nei gh boring Yem en in the 1980sincreased interest in Somalia since Somalia lay in the same general geological zone.Although the size of the oil reserves in Somalia and the economics of exploitation areunknown, there can be little doubt that significant reserves do exist. In a 1991 study,the World Bank assessed the potential of eight African countries as petroleum suppli-ers – Somalia was at the top of the list.29

Four Am erican oil companies had sign ed ex p l ora tory agreem ents with the Sa i dBa rre regi m e . Du ring the disorder that fo ll owed the regi m e’s co ll a p s e , t h ree of t h efour oil companies abandoned their activities due to the absence of security and thefact that agreements signed with Siad Barre were now unenforceable. Conoco, how-ever, proved more tenacious and retained some of its staff in Mogadishu.30 Its localdirector, Raymond Marchand, developed a close relationship with Osman Ato, chiefadvi s or to Ai deed ; Ato was in fact the own er of the property that con t a i n ed theCon oco com pound in Mogad i s hu . Ato had a lon gstanding con n ecti on with theAmerican oil industry, having worked as a contractor for Western Geophysical Cor-pora ti on , wh i ch undertook nearly “a ll of Con oco’s seismic su rvey work in Som a-lia.”31 The relationship with Ato proved advantageous for Conoco, since this provid-ed the company with at least some source of security and political protection.32 Atoand Aideed,in turn, obtained revenues with which to pursue their political and mili-t a ry ambi ti on s . It is important to note that Con oco’s close ties to Ato were wellk n own in Somalia – they were a matter of “p u blic notori ety ”3 3 according to on ejournalist – even if this association was little reported outside Somalia (at least in theEnglish-language press). Through this connection, Conoco was also linked to Ato’sboss, General Aideed.

The Con oco exec utives had excell ent ties to US govern m ent officials as well . It is,a f ter all , not uncom m on for large oil companies to have forei gn policy con n ecti on s ,3 4

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but Con oco had the ad d i ti onal adva n t a ge of being vi rtu a lly the on ly functi on i n gAm erican en ti ty in Som a l i a . Du ring the peri od of a n a rchy in 1991-92, the Con ococom pound proved useful for US diplom a t s . Wh en Jan We s tco t t , the US em er gen c yrel i ef coord i n a tor for Som a l i a , paid a visit to Mogad i s hu in April 1991, “s ec u ri ty andl ogi s tical su pport provi ded by the pre s i dent of Con oco - Somalia proved cru c i a l .”3 5

Con oco also played an important role in planning the logi s tics for the US marine land-ing in Decem ber 1992. Am erican officials were su f f i c i en t ly pleased that Bri gad i er Gen-eral Frank Libut ti , a top US com m a n der in Opera ti on Re s tore Hope , s ent a let ter ofcom m en d a ti on to Con oco’s Ma rch a n d , praising his assistance , n o ti n g : “Wi t h o ut Ray-m on d ’s [Ma rch a n d ’s] co u ra geous con tri buti ons and selfless servi ce , the [landing]opera ti on would have failed .”3 6 In ad d i ti on , Con oco officials who were gen era lly welli n form ed on internal po l i tics in Somalia provi ded intell i gen ce to the US mission . Th eCon oco con n ecti ons to US officials in Re s tore Hope were su f f i c i en t ly close that theya ro u s ed hosti l i ty among com peting oil companies with interests in the regi on .3 7

It is not known whether Conoco actually lobbied the State Department in favor oflaunching the intervention, but there is no doubt that Conoco executives, as well asthose of o t h er oil companies with interests in Som a l i a , were pleased wh en it didoccur. An article in the Los Angeles Times noted that,“Industry sources said the com-panies holding the [Somali exploration] rights to the most promising concessions areh oping that the Bush Ad m i n i s tra ti on’s dec i s i on to send US troop s . . . wi ll also hel pprotect their multimillion dollar investments there.”38

Wh a tever caused Re s tore Hope to take place , it prob a bly did not re sult fromConoco’s urging. Yet, once US forces were on the ground, it seems likely that Conocoi n f lu en ced the con du ct of the opera ti on . The very close rel a ti ons bet ween Con ocostaff and top level officials in Operation Restore Hope would have given the companyexclusive channels of influence. US officials were so comfortable with these connec-tions that they developed a rather insouciant attitude: The Conoco compound wasthe headquarters for Oakley and his staff and functioned as the de facto US embassy.At least one US official made a habit of wearing a shirt and hat with the Conoco logoon it,39 which no doubt made it difficult for Somalis and also some foreign journal-ists to distinguish between the American government and the Conoco oil company.While Conoco was making itself helpful to US officials, it simultaneously upgradedits already strong connections to Aideed. That Aideed had a record of great brutalityand held a world view somewhat distant, at the very least, from the ideals of Jeffer-sonian democracy are certain. But, Aideed’s unsavory qualities40 did not arouse toomuch concern among the Conoco officials or Oakley and his staff; after all, they haddone business previously with Siad Barre, an equally unpleasant figure.

According to the Rome daily La Repu bbl i c a, e a rly in Opera ti on Re s tore HopeConoco made an agreement with Aideed that it would continue to back him if, inexchange, Aideed would grant Conoco exclusive rights to all oil exploration activityas soon as his militia establ i s h ed full con tro l .4 1 In other word s , Con oco sought anarrangement that would freeze out potential competitors, and this seemed advanta-geous to all parti e s . Con oco evi den t ly assu m ed that Ai deed would be the mostpromising possibility for a national leader, while Aideed expected Conoco to generatediplomatic support from the United States.42 It is likely that this alliance with Cono-

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co was an important factor in Aideed’s openly pro-American sentiments at the outsetof Opera ti on Re s tore Hope . Ai deed ’s Con oco con n ecti on , in short , provi des vi t a lcontext in comprehending his favorable attitude toward American forces, as well asthe willingness of the Americans to advance Aideed’s agenda.

This all i a n ce proved short - l ived . In Febru a ry 1993, Con oco exec utives were lessthan impre s s ed by the military perform a n ce of Ai deed ’s ally Omar Jess du ring thebattle for con trol of Ki s m ay u . Al t h o u gh Jess had initi a lly rep u l s ed an attack byopposing force s , it requ i red direct Am erican and Bel gian interven ti on . This less-t h a n - s tellar military perform a n ce by one of Ai deed ’s key allies cre a ted do u bts thatAideed was the best horse to back, so to speak. These fears were confirmed in Febru-ary when Jess lost control of Kismayu altogether. Accordingly, Conoco switched sidesand established a new alliance with Aideed’s principal adversary, Ali Mahdi. Accord-ing to La Repubblica, Aideed discovered that, “Mahdi had signed a temporary agree-ment for exclusive oil rights for the time when the war would end. The Americanshad dumped [Aideed], since they did not believe he could remain predominant overother clans anymore.”43

Aideed not only lost support from Conoco, but also from the US staff in Opera-tion Restore Hope. With the loss of both Conoco and US support, Aideed began, forthe first ti m e , to open ly cri ti c i ze the Am eri c a n s , blaming them for the fall ofKismayu. By the end of February, Aideed “urged supporters in a radio broadcast toturn against the Americans.”44 A wave of rioting by Aideed supporters erupted in thes treets of Mogad i s hu .4 5 Thus began the long process wh ereby Ai deed became theprincipal villain,at least from the standpoint of US foreign policy. This negative viewof Aideed was quickly adopted by mass media – and it has been adopted retrospec-tively by some ac ademic accounts of the opera ti on .4 6 What su ch interpret a ti on si gn ore , h owever, is the initial peri od of the opera ti on wh en the Am ericans workedclosely with Aideed and disregarded his violent background. In any case, the schismbetween Aideed and the Americans was now clear, and it continued to widen.

In May 1993, Re s tore Hope was term i n a ted and the UN assu m ed a more directro l e . The rep l acem ent force for Re s tore Hope , term ed UNOSOM II,4 7 was at leasttech n i c a lly ad m i n i s tered by the UN Sec ret a ri a t . Du ring the UNOSOM II peri od ,Ai deed would be furt h er dem on i zed , l e ading to direct military con f ron t a ti on wi t hthe UN forces from June to Oc tober 1993. The decision to use military force againstAi deed was one of the most con troversial – and also one of the most lack lu s ter –actions in the history of UN peacekeeping operations.

AnalysisA close ex a m i n a ti on of this matter reveals that the con du ct of US forces va ri ed

con s i dera bly over ti m e , f rom one of close coopera ti on with Ai deed and favori ti s mtoward his position, to a later stance of hostility and ultimately military confronta-tion. The conventional view is that US confrontation with Aideed resulted from ide-alistic and bureaucratic considerations. The United States, it is argued, was repelledby Ai deed ’s intra n s i gen ce and procl ivi ty tow a rd vi o l en ce ; Am erican and later UNforces over- re acted to the disru pti on that he and his militia were causing by usingm i l i t a ry force . In ad d i ti on , the opera ti on su f fered from the familiar bu re a u c ra ti c

Re a l po l i ti k and humanitarian interven tion 4 9

ph en om en on of “m i s s i on creep,” wh ereby a rel a tively limited obj ective of f a m i n erelief evolved into a much broader effort to reconstitute the Somali state; 48 Aideedstood in the way of this expanded objective, reinforcing the atmosphere of hostility.Thus, it was General Aideed’s obstructionism, combined with UN objections to theGeneral’s amoral tendencies, that led to confrontation.

The above interpretation, by far the most common one of the Somali operation, isnot well supported by the facts. It fails for two reasons. First,it assumes consistent USh o s ti l i ty tow a rd Ai deed from the beginning of the opera ti on , growing in inten s i tyover time. As we have seen, this view is mistaken, since there was a close US relation-ship with the militia ch i ef at the begi n n i n g, on ly later rep l aced by hosti l i ty. Al s o,Ai deed ’s less savory qu a l i ties were well known at the initial troop landing, but hisch a racter did not seem to have bo t h ered Oakley, his staff, or their co u n terp a rts inCon oco. A Fren ch journalist noted (with a heavi ly ironic tone) the eagerness wi t hwhich the Americans sought out Aideed:

To work out the conditions of the [marine] landings, Robert Oak-l ey and Frank Libut ti met wi t h . . . G en eral Ai deed! The pri n c i p a lfigure in the Somali war? The man who used the orphanage of [aidorganization] SOS as a human shield? Who... had shelled the capi-tal du ring the “s econd battle of Mogad i s hu” produ c i n g. . . t h o u-sands of deaths, nearly all civilians? It was him, General Aideed. Itwas with him that the American officials negotiated the arrival offorces, before they went to see in north Mogadishu [Aideed’s rival]Ali Mahdi.49

The policy of distance and ultimately confrontation with Aideed was a shift in policyby the peacekeepers, which cannot be explained by the conventional view.

A more satisfactory account of these facts is that the United States allowed itself touse the circumstances of a humanitarian intervention,and all the legitimacy that thiscon ferred , to adva n ce the interests of a US inve s tor, Con oco. Con oco’s interests inSomalia may not have caused the intervention — original causes of the operation arenot the subject of this essay. I am arguing, instead, that sympathy for Conoco led USforces to act the way they did once on the ground.

This interpretation fits well with the facts and, crucially, accounts for the shift inpolicy. Conoco had close connections with Aideed’s militia at the beginning of theopera ti on and so the Am erican force s , accord i n gly, e s t a bl i s h ed close rel a ti ons wi t hAideed. When Conoco’s relations with Aideed deteriorated after the fall of Kismayu,American forces distanced themselves from Aideed. When Conoco opted to shift itssupport to Mahdi, the American forces did the same and Mahdi became the favoredSomali political figure. The parallel between the interests of Conoco and the actionsof Am erican troops is clear and impre s s ive . An d , c ru c i a lly, the interpret a ti on thatConoco caused the US to act as it did produces a better fit with historical facts thandoes the conventional view that emphasizes a combination of idealism and bureau-cratic politics as motivating factors.

5 0 David N. G i bb s

Re a l po l i ti k and humanitarian interven tion 5 1

Let us, f i n a lly, con s i der the Somalia case in light of the theory of hu m a n i t a ri a nintervention, as outlined in the introduction. The theory of humanitarian interven-tion is above all a theory of constraint. It is presumed that specific states may alwaysbe tempted to exploit humanitarian intervention to further that state’s own nationali n tere s t , t hus com promising the opera ti on’s integri ty. Even the most ide a l i s tic ana-lysts implicitly recognize that humanitarian or peacekeeping operations can be usedas cover for a country seeking to project power and/or to protect its sphere of influ-en ce . Th ere are three aspects of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on that con s train su chpo ten ti a lly sel f - i n tere s ted beh avi or. Let us recon s i der these three factors in light ofthe Somalia case.

The first constraining factor in humanitarian operations is the multinational qual-ity typical of such operations. A second and closely related constraint is UN supervi-s i on . In the Somali case, n ei t h er factor con s tra i n ed the Un i ted State s . Al t h o u ghOperation Restore Hope was a multinational military force with contributions fromtwenty nations, the American component constituted such an overwhelming propor-tion that it is difficult to see how the other nations offered anything but legitimationfor the operation. Nor is there any evidence that the UN authorization constrainedAmerican policy to any great extent. Indeed, the US continued to work closely withAi deed in the early phase of the opera ti on de s p i te strong obj ecti ons from the UNSec ret a ri a t . According to one analys t , “The Sec ret a ry Gen eral (Bo utro s - G h a l i )acknowledged that the UN cannot undertake any major military operation unless theUS participates actively. But when it does, it insists on running the whole show anduses the UN simply as a fig leaf, as in Iraq and Somalia.”50

The third, and potentially most salient constraint on great power opportunism isthat Somalia was su ppo s ed to be a co u n try wi t h o ut stra tegic or econ omic sign i f i-cance. This vie w, although widely held, is ina ccurate. As we have seen, Somalia hadl ong been rega rded as stra tegi c a lly important due to its prox i m i ty to oil shipp i n gro utes thro u gh the Red Sea are a . More import a n t , it was the site of s i gnificant oi lexploration activities by Conoco. Thus, there was little in the way of structural con-straint to prevent the United States from using the operation to further its interests ifit sought to do so.

It must be em ph a s i zed that this argument does not deny that hu m a n i t a ri a nmotives influenced the Somalia operation; evidence presented here does not permitso broad a finding. My purpose here is more limited – to demonstrate the considera-tions of realpolitik in the Somalia case,and the considerably greater role of such con-siderations than is commonly recognized. Above all, the Somali case underscores thei m port a n ce of i n - depth and cri tical re s e a rch on pe ace keep i n g. It is too easy toa s sume that pe ace keeping and hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons are altru i s ti c ; too of tenre s e a rch ers have simply accepted these assu m pti ons wi t h o ut con c rete evi den ce . Inthe en d , a s s e s s m ents of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti ons should, l i ke everything el s e , bebased on critical analysis, rather than wishful thinking.

NOTES

1 . Re s e a rch for this proj ect was su pported with a fell owship from the Ud a ll Cen ter for Stu d i e sin Pu blic Po l i c y. I thank John Son n et t , Diana Ri x , Ronald W. Cox , and James Petras for pro-viding assistance . I am solely re s pon s i ble for any errors . An earl i er vers i on of this paper waspre s en ted at a con feren ce on “ Pe ace keeping on the Mi d dle Eastern Peri ph ery,” s pon s ored bythe Cen ter for Mi d dle East Stu d i e s , Un ivers i ty of Ari zon a , Febru a ry 1999.

2. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Mythsand the New In tern a ti onal Re a l i ti e s ,” In tern a tional Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 3 7 , No. 2 1(1993), pp. 131-147.

3 . Jack Don n elly, “ Human Ri gh t s , Hu m a n i t a rian Cri s i s , and Hu m a n i t a rian In terven ti on ,”In tern a tional Jou rn a l, Vo l .4 8 , No. 4 (1993), p. 6 0 7 .

4 . For a useful su rvey of l i beral re s ponses to the crises in Bosnia and Ko s ovo, s ee Pa u lS t a robi n , “The Liberal Hawk Soa rs ,” The Na tional Jou rn a l ( May 15, 1 9 9 9 ) , pp. 1 3 1 0 - 1 3 1 7 .

5 . Rega rding the import a n ce of pe ace keeping imparti a l i ty, s ee the fo ll owi n g : A . B. Fet h ers ton ,Towa rds a T h e o ry of Un i ted Na tions Pe a ce ke ep i n g ( New York : S t . Ma rti n’s Pre s s , 1 9 9 4 ) ;Mi ch ael Ha rbo t t l e , The Im pa rtial Sol d er ( Lon don : Ox ford Un ivers i ty Pre s s , 1 9 7 0 ) ; Al a nJa m e s , Pe a ce ke eping in In tern a tional Pol i ti cs ( New York : S t . Ma rti n’s Pre s s , 1 9 9 0 ) ; Ol iverRa m s botham and Tom Wood h o u s e , Hu m a n i t a rian In terven tion in Co n tem po ra ry Co n f l i ct( Ca m bri d ge , U. K . : Po l i ty Pre s s , 1 9 9 6 ) ; Raimo V ä yry n en , “ Preven tive Acti on : Fa i lu re inYu go s l avi a ,” In tern a tional Pe a ce ke ep i n g, Vo l .3 , No. 4 (1996), pp. 2 1 - 4 2 ; Mats Berd a l , W h i t h erUN Pe a ce ke ep i n g ? ( Lon don : Bra s s ey ’s , 1 9 9 3 ) ; Ma rrack Goulding, “The Evo luti on of Un i tedNa ti ons Pe ace keep i n g,” In tern a tional Af f a i rs, Vo l .6 9 , No. 3 (1993), pp. 4 5 1 - 4 6 4 .

6. Of course,it may be argued that humanitarian intervention can still be considered impar-tial in the larger sense of the term in that interven ers re a s on a bly act to furt h er et h i c a lprinciples.

7 . This is argued at length in Laura Ne ack , “UN Pe ace keep i n g : In the In terest of Com mu n i tyor Sel f ? ” Jou rnal of Pe a ce Re se a rch, Vo l .3 2 , No. 2 (1995), pp. 1 8 1 - 1 9 6 .

8 . It is wi dely bel i eved that Opera ti on Re s tore Hope re su l ted from hu m a n i t a rian motive sem a n a ting from el i te govern m ent circl e s , the mass med i a , a n d / or the gen eral publ i c . Th el a t ter two el em ents have been em ph a s i zed as part of the so-call ed “CNN ef fect ,” wh erebym edia covera ge gen era ted public pre s su re to “do som et h i n g,” wh i ch caused the US inter-ven ti on in Som a l i a . For a cri tical assessment of this ph en om en on ,s ee Steven Livi n gs ton andTodd Eachu s ,“ Hu m a n i t a rian Crises and US Forei gn Po l i c y: Somalia and the CNN EffectRecon s i dered ,” Pol i tical Co m mu n i c a ti o n, Vo l .1 2 , No. 4 (1995 ), pp. 4 1 3 - 4 2 9 .

9 . Ken n eth Waltz accord i n gly makes no men ti on of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on , pe ace keep i n g,or human ri ghts in his analysis of i n tern a ti onal rel a ti ons after the Cold Wa r. See Wa l t z , “Th eE m er ging Stru ctu re of In tern a ti onal Rel a ti on s ,” In tern a tional Securi ty, Vo l . 1 8 , No. 2 (1993),pp. 4 4 - 8 0 .

1 0 . The re a s on for the qu a l i f i c a ti on is the fo ll owi n g : The military logic assumes that the ship-ping lanes that pass thro u gh the Ba b - el - Ma n deb are in fact vital for the econ omies of We s t-ern Eu rope and, i f the shipping lanes were bl ocked , the Eu ropean econ omies would bei rrep a ra bly damaged . This is not re a lly acc u ra te since the shipping lanes were in fact bl ockeddue to interm i t tent figh ting bet ween Is raeli and Egyptian forces du ring the peri od 1967-75.Du ring that peri od , oil ships simply ro u n ded the Af rican con ti n en t , wi t h o ut any severed a m a ge to the Eu ropean econ om i e s .

1 1 . On this peri od see John G. Som m er, Hope Re s to red ? Hu m a n i t a rian Aid in Somalia, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 (Wa s h i n g ton , DC : Cen ter for Policy An a lysis and Re s e a rch on Ref u gee Is su e s , Ref u geePolicy Gro u p, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 7 . See also Jef f rey Lefebre , Arms for the Ho rn ( P i t t s bu r gh : Un ivers i tyof P i t t s bu r gh Pre s s ,1 9 9 1 ) .

5 2 David N. G i bb s

Re a l po l i ti k and humanitarian interven tion 5 3

1 2 . Som m er, op. ci t ., p. 7 . Al s o, Keith Ri ch bu r g, “O rphan of the Cold Wa r: Somalia Lost its KeyRo l e ,” Wa s h i n g ton Po s t ( O ctober 15, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. A 2 4 .

1 3 . G en eral Norman Schw a rt z kopf te s ti m ony Ma rch 6, 1 9 9 0 , p u bl i s h ed in US Sen a te , Depa rt -m ent of Defen se Appropri a tions for Fi scal Year 1991, S . H r g. 1 0 1 - 9 3 6 , pp. 1 4 3 , 1 5 1 . I thankJames Petras for drawing my atten ti on to this citati on . No te that Berbera was loc a ted inwhat had become by 1991 the de facto state of Som a l i l a n d . Owing to US non recogn i ti on ofSom a l i l a n d , the Berbera base was not ref u rbi s h ed and reocc u p i ed du ring Opera ti on Re s toreHope . However, the US arm ed forces made ex ten s ive rep a i rs to air and port fac i l i ties inMogad i s hu and several other loc a ti on s . A US businessman with ex peri en ce in Som a l i a ,“s tron gly su s pect s” that the US non recogn i ti on policy tow a rd Somaliland re su l ted in partf rom poor rel a ti ons bet ween the Somaliland govern m ent and the principal US oil com p a nywith interests in the regi on , Con oco. In form a ti on from intervi ew with Robert Jack s on , a ni n depen dent oil ex p l ora ti on specialist with ex peri en ce in Som a l i a , n ow based in Tu l s a ,O k l a h om a ,U S A . In tervi ew con du cted October 19, 1 9 9 8 .

1 4 . See Y. Ho s s ein Fa r z i n , Food Im po rt Depen d en ce in Somalia: Ma gn i tu d e , C a u se s , and Pol i c yOpti o n s (Wa s h i n g ton , DC : World Ba n k ,1 9 8 8 ) .

1 5 . This inform a ti on is from John Drys d a l e , What Ever Ha ppen ed to Somalia? ( Lon don : Ha a nAs s oc i a te s ,1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 2 2 - 2 6 .

1 6 . Alain Frach on ,“ L’ Opera ti on Mi l i t a i re en Som a l i e ,” Le Mo n d e ( Decem ber 10, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 4 .Tra n s l a ted from the Fren ch by the aut h or.

1 7 . Som m er, op ci t. , p. 3 3 .1 8 . G é ra rd Pru n i er, “The Ex peri en ce of Eu ropean Armies in Opera ti on Re s tore Hope ,” in Wa l-

ter Cl a rke and Jef f rey Herb s t , ed s . , Le a rning from Somalia: The Le s sons of Arm ed Hu m a n i t a r -ian In terven ti o n ( Bo u l der, C O : We s t vi ew, 1 9 9 7 ) , p. 1 4 6 ; John Drys d a l e ,“ Forei gn Mi l i t a ryIn terven ti on in Som a l i a : The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Pe ace keeping to Pe acem a k-ing and its Con s equ en ce s ,” in Cl a rke and Herb s t , op. ci t ., p. 1 1 9 .

1 9 . Wi lliam Cl a i borne and Ba rton Gell m a n ,“ Rival Wa rl ords Si gn Pe ace Pact in Som a l i a ,” Wa s h -i n g ton Po s t ( Decem ber 12, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. A 1 .

2 0 . Al ex De Wa a l , “US War Crimes in Som a l i a ,” New Left Revi ew, No. 230 (1998), p. 1 3 2 .2 1 . Frank Cri gl er, “A Flaw in the Somalia Game Plan,” C h ri s tian Sci en ce Mo n i to r (Ja nu a ry 11,

1 9 9 3 ) , p. 1 8 . This qu o te is from Cri gl er, who para ph rases Ai deed .2 2 . However, a f ter the US-UN con f ron t a ti on with Ai deed beginning in June 1993, t h ere was

growing evi den ce of an opportu n i s tic Ai deed assoc i a ti on with both Sudan and Ira n . Rega rd-ing the Is l a m i c / Su d a n e s e / Iranian angle to the Somalia cri s i s , s ee , Ma rk Hu b a n d ,“ Un e a s yL a n d f a ll for US Ma ri n e s ,” London Gu a rd i a n ( Decem ber 5, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. A 1 0 ; “Why Pe ace Elu de sMogad i s hu ,” West Af ri c a ( O ctober 11-17, 1 9 9 3 ) , pp. 1 8 1 8 - 1 8 1 9 ; “Som a l i e :L i a i s ons Aeri en n e savec le So u d a n ,” La Let tre de l’Ocean In d i en ( Septem ber 11, 1 9 9 3 ) , el ectronic vers i on ;“ Le sFru s tra ti ons du Nord - E s t ,” Le Mo n d e ( Decem ber 15, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 6 ; Ma rc Ya red , “Ce qui At ten dles Ma rines sur le Terra i n ,” Jeune Af ri q u e ( Decem ber 10-16, 1 9 9 2 ) , pp. 1 8 - 2 0 ; Ka t hy Eva n s ,“US Wa rns Off Kh a rto u m ,” London Gu a rd i a n ( Decem ber 10, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 1 3 .

2 3 . Julian Ozanne, “Wa rl ords Drive Wed ge bet ween US and UN: The Limits of Pe ace Effort sh ave been Ex po s ed ,” Fi n a n cial Ti m e s (Ja nu a ry 6, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 4 . In form a ti on on Ai deed ’s con-du ct at Addis Ababa is from Robert B. O a k l ey, i n tervi ew, Septem ber 21, 1 9 9 8 .

2 4 . O a k l ey intervi ew, Septem ber 21, 1 9 9 8 .2 5 . John L. Hi rs ch and Robert B. O a k l ey, Somalia and Opera tion Re s to re Hope (Wa s h i n g ton , DC :

US In s ti tute of Pe ace , 1 9 9 5 ) , p. 6 0 . It should be noted for the record that the Oakley / Hi rs chaccount implies that the ru m ors of US favori tism tow a rd Ai deed were unfo u n ded .

2 6 . Q u o ted from Cri gl er, op ci t.

2 7 . Jen n i fer Pa rm el ee , “Somalis at Pe ace Pa rl ey Jockey for Power,” Wa s h i n g ton Po s t (Ja nu a ry 14,1 9 9 3 ) , p. A 2 4 .

2 8 . Keith Ri ch bu r g, “US Envoy in Somalia Vi ewed as Linchpin of Recon c i l i a ti on ,” Wa s h i n g to nPo s t ( Febru a ry 2, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. A 1 4 . See also Terren ce Lyons and Ah m ed I. Sa m a t a r, S o m a l i a :St a te Coll a p se , Mu l ti l a teral In terven ti o n , and Stra tegies for Pol i tical Re co n s tru cti o n (Wa s h i n g-ton , DC : Broo k i n gs ,1 9 9 5 ) , p. 4 7 .

2 9 . “Somalia is ‘Si t ting on an Oil Fortu n e ,’ ” Af rican Business ( April 1993), p. 4 2 . See also Ho u s-ton Dev Geor ge , “Wi ll the Ma j ors Retu rn to Som a l i a ? ” Of fs h o re ( O ctober 1995), p. 8 ; a n dMa ria Ki el m a s , “Oil Hopes Hi n ge on North Somalia Oil Ex p l ora ti on ,” Petrol eum Eco n o m i s t( O ctober 1991), p. 1 9 .

3 0 . In ad d i ti on , P h i llips Petro l eum held a 25 percent stake in a Con oco con ce s s i on and, t h ere-fore , it also ret a i n ed an intere s t . Roger Ben ed i ct ,“ P h i ll i p s , Con oco Cl o s ely Mon i tor Pe aceTalks in Somalia for Effect on Ex p l ora ti on Activi ty,” Oil Da i ly ( Febru a ry 16, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 1 1 .

3 1 . Jonathan Steven s on , Losing Mo ga d i s h u ( An n a po l i s , M D : Naval In s ti tute Pre s s , 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 2 4 ;i n form a ti on con cerning Ato’s own ership of the Con oco com pound was su pp l i ed by Oakley,i n tervi ew Septem ber 21, 1 9 9 8 .

3 2 . It is com m on p l ace for mu l ti n a ti onals that face ex ten ded po l i tical stabi l i ty to pursue po l i c i e sof su pporting po l i tical facti ons or militias in the areas wh ere they opera te . Su ch a stra tegycan influ en ce the po l i tics of u n s t a ble regi ons or civil wars , s i n ce even small amounts offinancial su pport can sway the balance of power. The po l i tics of mu l ti n a ti onal companies insu ch situ a ti ons is the obj ect of a small but growing ac ademic litera tu re . See for ex a m p l e ,Wi lliam Ren o, “ New Con s ti tuti onalism in Af ri c a ,” in Ronald W. Cox , ed . , Business and theSt a te in In tern a tional Rel a ti o n s ( Bo u l der, C O : We s t vi ew, 1 9 9 6 ) .

3 3 . S teph en Sm i t h , S o m a l i e : La Gu erre Perdue de l’Hu m a n i t a i re ( Pa ri s : Ca l m a n n - L é v y, 1 9 9 3 ) , p.1 1 3 . Tra n s l a ted from the Fren ch . Ato’s ties to Con oco are also noted in the Italian pre s s . See“Ca t tu ra to il ‘Ca s s i ere’ dell ’ O r ga n i z z a z i one Osman Ato – Uccisi a Mogadiscio Tre So l d a tiPa k i s t a n i ; I Ra n ger Arrestano il Braccio De s tro di Ai ded ,” Il Sole 24 Ore ( Septem ber 24,1 9 9 3 ) , p. 4 .

3 4 . On the historical con n ecti on bet ween major oil companies and US forei gn policy du ri n gthe Cold War peri od , s ee the classic stu dy, John Bl a i r, The Co n trol of Oi l ( New York : Pa n-t h eon Boo k s ,1 9 7 6 ) .

3 5 . Som m er, op ci t. , pp. 1 2 - 1 3 .3 6 . Bri gad i er Gen eral Frank Libut ti qu o ted in Ma rk Finem a n , “The Oil Factor in Som a l i a ,” Lo s

An geles Ti m e s (Ja nu a ry 18, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 1 .3 7 . In tervi ews with Robert Jack s on ,O ctober 17, 1998 and October 19, 1 9 9 8 .3 8 . F i n em a n , op ci t.3 9 . S teven s on , op ci t. , p. 2 3 .4 0 . On Ai deed ’s record of a troc i ti e s ,s ee Sm i t h , op ci t. , p. 1 1 3 .4 1 . Fa bio Scuto and Ma rio Tede s chini Lall i , “ In Somalia a Caccia di Petro l i o,” La Repu bbl i c a

( August 3, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 1 8 .4 2 . It was wi dely bel i eved among Somalis du ring the early part of Opera ti on Re s tore Hope that

the Un i ted States was backing Ai deed , and that su ch US su pport was rel a ted to Ai deed ’s ti e sto Con oco. “I So l d a ti Italiani Ma n d a ti in ‘ Provi n c i a ,’ Bu s h , Natale a Mogad i s c i o,” LaSt a m pa (Tu rin) (Decem ber 18, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 8 .

4 3 . Q u o ted from Scuto and Lall i , op ci t. Tra n s l a ted by Ren a to Corbet t a .4 4 . Bern a rd Morri s , “US Seeks Way Out of Somali Bl ood b a t h ,” Su n d ay Ti m e s ( Febru a ry 28,

1 9 9 3 ) , el ectronic vers i on .4 5 . S cott Peters on , “An ti - West Mood Im perils Sec u ri ty as Somalia Opera ti on Shifts to UN,”

C h ri s tian Sci en ce Mo n i to r ( Ma rch 18, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 7 .

5 4 David N. G i bb s

4 6 . See , for ex a m p l e , Ken Men k h a u s ,“ In tern a ti onal Pe acebuilding and the Dynamics of Loc a land Na ti onal Recon c i l i a ti on in Som a l i s ,” in Cl a rke and Herb s t , op. ci t. , pp. 4 4 - 4 8 .

4 7 . UNOSOM stands for Un i ted Na ti ons Opera ti on in Som a l i a . UNOSOM I referred to a smallscale UN pe ace keeping mission that opera ted for several months in 1992, pri or to Re s toreHope .

4 8 . The ph rase “m i s s i on creep” is bel i eved to have been first used by Gen eral Jo s eph Hoar of t h eUS Ma rine Corp s . See “Cl i n ton’s Quick and Di rty Ro ute to a Fiasco in Som a l i a ,” Lo n d o nGu a rd i a n ( Ma rch 17, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 1 2 .

4 9 . Sm i t h , op ci t. , p. 1 6 8 . The qu o t a ti on was tra n s l a ted from the Fren ch .5 0 . Bo utros-Ghali is para ph ra s ed in Herman J. Co h en ,“ In terven ti on in Som a l i a ,” in Allan E.

G ood m a n , ed . , The Di pl o m a tic Re co rd ,1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ( Bo u l der, C O : We s t vi ew, 1 9 9 5 ) , p. 7 3 .

Ad d ress for co rre s po n d en ce: D avid Gibb s , Dep a rtm ent of Po l i tical Scien ce , 315 Social Scien ce sBl d g. , Un ivers i ty of Ari zon a , Tu c s on , AZ 85721-0027 USA.P h on e :5 2 0 - 6 2 1 - 8 9 8 5 ; Fa x :5 2 0 - 6 2 1 - 5 0 5 1 ;E - m a i l :d gi bb s @ a ri zon a . edu

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