1931-4

VOL. XIX. NO. 4.

THE

NAVAL REVIEW

For Private Circulation.

(Founded in 1912.)

NOVEMBER, 193 1.

Copyrighted under Act of 1911.

II.

CONTENTS. PAGE

THE STUDY OF STRATEGY BY JUNIOR OFFICERS - - 605 SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE - - 607 READINESS FOR WAR - - - 628 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE MER-

CHANT NAVY - - - 641

DISARMAMENT AT SEA - -

PEACE ? - - -

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS - -

INITIATIVE - -

THE URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY -

ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE O F NATIONS -

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1918 AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION - -

SOME REMARKS ON THE PRESENT SITU~TION NAVAL LANDING PARTIES - -

THE FLEET AIR ARM - - AIRSHIPS : THE NEXT STEP - - - THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY : FOUR REPLIES - - -

DESTROYERS : OR THE TRAINING SCHOOL OF THE SERVICE A BALTIC EXCURSION - -

THE NEW HIGHWAY - - PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS - - - HOWE - -

REVIEWS OF BOOKS- BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931 -

" THE SEA RAIDERS." By E. Keble Chatterton -

" WITH THE HARWICH NAVAL FORCES, 1914-1918.'' By Commander Claude L. A. Woollard, R.N. -

" BEFORE JUTLAND." By Captain Hans Pockhammer -

REVIEWS OF BOOKS-continued PAGE

" Two LONE SHIPS " By Georg Kopp - - - 783 " GALLANT GENTLEMEN." By E. Keble Chatterton - 789 " THE LOG OF A U-BOAT COMMANDER, OR U-BOATS

WESTWARD, 1914-rgr8." By Ernest Hashagen - 791 " THE WAYS OF THE NAVY." By Rear-Admiral D.

Arnold Forster - - - - - 794 "WOLVES OF THE CHANNEL" (1681-1856). Ky W.

Branch Johnson - - - - - 796 " THE PIRATE WIND." By Owen Rutter - - 800 " ENGLISH SEAMEN AND THE COLONISATION OF AMERICA."

By E. Keble Chatterton - - 803 " MY GREATEST ADVENTURE." By Sir Malcolm Campbell 807 " MONS, ANZAC AND KuT." By the Hon. Aubrey Herbert 810

" ARMADAS OF THE SKY." By Paul Murphy - - 812 " ZEPPELINS OVER ENGLAND." By Freiherr Treusch von

Buttlar Brandenfels - - 814 " THE FIRST DUTCH WAR." Vo1. VI. Edited by C. T.

Atkinson - , - - 815 " THE BYNG PAPERS." Vo1. 11. Edited by Brian Tunstall 821 " NELSON." By Clennell Wilkinson - - - - 825 " MUSTAPHA KEMAL." By Dagobert von Mikusch - - 827 " MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920.'' By Lieut-Col. Sir Arnold

T. Wilson - - - - - 829 23. NOTICES OF BOOKS - - 833 24. CORRESPONDENCE - - - 845

The Regatta and Efficiency.

ERRATUM, AUGUST NO. 1931 CONTENTS PAGE

Item I for " HISTORY" read "STRATEGY."

HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.

Articles, reviews of books and correspondence intended

for the February number of THE NAVAL REVIEW should reach

the Hon. Editor not later than the last week in December.

Comments will, as always, be welcome on articles and reviews appearing in this number ; and I specially invite remarks on

the Study of Strategy (see first article).

Many of the articles and reviews are written by officers

on active employment, and I wish to avail myself of this occasion to express to the writers our gratitude for undertaking such

work-often entailing considerable trouble and research-side

by side with their service duties, and so helping to keep THE

NAVAL REVIEW in close touch with work and thought afloat.

I t will be noticed that, in some of the reviews of books, the

word " the " is omitted before the names of ships, in others it

is inserted. This is done intentionally, and I should welcome

opinions from members as to which they consider preferable.

There are a few complete sets of the nineteen volumes of

THE NAVAL REVIEW (unbound) available for £5. There are

also many miscellaneous back-numbers which can be supplied at

a reduced price to complete members' sets.

Increased membership is badly needed.

RICHARD WEBB,

Hon. Editor.

rza, Brompton Square,

London, S.W.3. November, 1931.

T H E STUDY O F STRATEGY BY JUNIOR OFFICERS.

THE writer of " Gaps in the Study of Strategy "l strikes at the root of the whole question when he suggests improving the grounding of junior officers in the subject. Admiral Boyle, in a recent lecture, while dealing with the interest produced by the present Junior Officers' War Course, said :-" Except for the haphazard instruction young officers may get on going to sea-and this depends very much where and under whom they serve-there is little to keep this interest a l i ~ e . " ~ Why should this be so ?

The average gunroom officer is keen enough, but too often the interest is gone before he even reaches Greenwich. The principal reason for this is the lack of knowledge of the existing facilities for study. As a midshipman the writer and his contemporaries had no idea of the existence of M.I.R.s., the R.U.S.I. Journal, or THE NAVAL REVIEW. In some ships perhaps this state of affairs does not exist, but it is the rule in the majority. Many, too, are unaware of the facilities provided by the Port Libraries. Those officers in charge of midshipmen might well remedy this state of affairs. In one ship recently it was the custom for gunroom officers to meet once a month under the guidance of a selected officer to discuss the information given in the latest M.I.R.s., and this period of instruction was very popular. Would it not be possible to send the R.U.S.I. Journal and THE NAVAL REVIEW if not to all gunrooms at any rate to those of big ships ? The expense would not be very high, the value would be inestimable and the applications for membership of both would certainly increase in numbers.

The lack of practice in writing English during the period between Dartmouth and Greenwich can surely be dealt with easily enough. The Journal, which should serve this purpose, is in many ships allowed to lose its entire value by becoming a sort of glorified deck log, and yet officers in charge only too often allow it to be kept in that way. In spite of the instructions given in each Journal, descriptions of places visited are seldom given, and critical comments on exercises are often not allowed. Two excellent chances of learning how to write are thus wasted.

1 NAVAL REVIEW NO. 3, Val. XIX, August, 19.31. p. 399.

R.U.S.I. Journal May, 1931, p. 368.

606 THE STUDY OF STRATEGY BY JUNIOR OFFICERS.

If junior officers were also, from time to time, set to write essays on subjects of service and general interest, the gap between Dartmouth and Greenwich would be bridged. Even if it is considered that sufficient time is not available, a prize might be offered annually for the best essay by a midshipman on a given subject. In the writer's limited experience, when midshipmen were asked on one occasion to criticise the present scheme of instruction afloat and on another occasion to write an account of a combined operation in which they had taken part, they were by no means loath to do so.

As far as possible before the commencement of any exercise, its idea should be explained to gunroom officers, and on foreign stations lectures on the political situation should be given from time to time.

If all, or any, of the above things were done in all ships, as they are undoubtedly done in some, the interest of the cadet leaving Dartmouthwould be maintained, and officers would obtain that better grounding which the writer of " Gaps in the Study of Strategy " regards as essential.

SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.]

THE subject of my paper is " Some Problems of Imperial Defence," ancl the qualification implied by the word " some " is an important one : for it is obvious that the whole of the problems of Imperial Defence could not even be sketched, however superficial the sketch, in an hour's talk. What I wish to do is to indicate something of what I would call the " anatomy " of the problem, the skeleton which, in my opinion, forms the framework, or policy, of which armaments are the executors. As far as I can I will avoid technical questions, and limit-again as far as I can-references to those very misleading and untrue things, statistics. We all know what has been said about them.

As there is, I think, nothing more important than a clear definition of the expressions we employ, it is right for me to begin by saying what I mean when I use the words " Imperial Defence " in order that we may all be thinking about the same thing and on the same lines. I have tried very hard to make a definition which is accurate. I will not say that the one I have made is the best or that it cannot be improved upon ; I dare say it could ; but what I call " Imperial Defence " is this : " The provision of security for the interests, the persons and the territory of all those people who constitute the populations of the British Empire." In the long run Security is the ultimate end.

Of course, I recognise, as everyone must, that there are two schools of thought on the question of security-on the policy by which security is to be attained. There are those who maintain that armaments not only cannot furnish security, but that, worse than that, they tend merely to produce insecurity. That is a doctrine of which I dare say you have heard a good deal lately. And there are people who think otherwise. I t is clearly not my business to discuss those particular problems. They have been before the world for a very long time. When I was reading the life of Sir Henry Lawrence, I found that he had referred to a similar conflict in opinion so long ago as 1844. An officer of the fighting services, however, so long as fighting forces exist at all, can only proceed upon the assumption that security can be provided by force, and that it is his duty to think out how it is to be provided ; for on no other hypothesis can his existence, or the existence of his tools, be justified. I t is not the

An address given by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond t o the British Empire League on April nznd, IQZI.

608 SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

fighting officer's business, qud officer, to discuss whether war can be cured by war; whether the old saying be true that if you want peace you must prepare for war ; or whether the doctrine that armaments generate war, and that lack of armaments generates peace and therefore security, are the more justified by the history of the world. Armaments do exist ; Parliaments vote them ; and it is the job of the naval officer employed in the service of the State to know how to use them if occasion arises.

So far, then, as the problem of Imperial Defence is one of armaments -that is, of force-let me begin, as one is always advised to begin in tackling any big subject of this nature, by dividing the problem up into its constituent parts, which is the only way in which any great problem can be investigated.

The first sub-division which appears to be necessary is to distinguish between those two very big branches of defence, the military and the political-I use the word " military " in its broadest sense to include all forms of fighting forces. I do not intend to discuss the political side at any length, but I do think it very necessary if we are going to study the problem of Imperial Defence to appreciate to the full the dominating part which policy plays in it.

Policy itself is divided into two categories. There is the inter-Imperial aspect of policy and there is the international aspect of policy.

The inter-Imperial aspect involves a very great question of states- manship which has been responsible for two of the greatest events in the history of England and the Empire : that is, the English Rebellion against Charles 1's policy of Ship-money and Commissions of Assay ; and the rebellion of the English in America against the policy of the Government of King George 111, of which that admirable American historian, Mr. Beer, has said, " I t was upon the rock of Imperial Defence that the loosely constructed unseaworthy old Empire shattered itself." I think those words are perfectly true.

A reminder, therefore, of the historical side of the policy of Imperial defence is not, I think, out of place; but I propose only to draw your attention to one part of it, that is, the underlying principles of that old policy which was called the " Old Colonial SystemJJ, of which Imperial defence was a part. I t has its echoes to-day. That Old Colonial System, as we know, is entirely out of date. That system, as we know, in particular from the writings of those two profound American historians, Mr. Beer and Mr. Osgood, was one of which a very striking and consistent feature may be summed up in the words " mutuality of obligation." The Englishman in England accepted certain sacrifices of one kind in assuming practically the whole charges and the cost of defence. The

SOME PROBLEMS O F IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 609

Englishman in the " Plantations " accepted sacrifices, sacrifices of another kind, in the form of a very large restriction of his commercial liberty. I do not wish to go into that in detail : I will confine myself to one quotation from Mr. Beer which, I think, expresses that policy in a few words. Hc says, " In the eyes of the statesmen and publicists of the day, England was fully justified in restricting colonial commerce in return for the burden assumed in defending and policing the Empire. If there existed any doubts on this point they were more than quieted by the preferential treatment accorded to Colonial products in the English market." The reciprocal nature of the Old Colonial system, he remarks, is manifest in the scheme of Imperial defence. That is one thing we should recollect to-day.

I t is a far cry from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century : it is a very far cry from Sir Charles Davenant, and other writers of that time, to Mr. Gladstone. New ideas of Colonial liberty and new ideas of Colonial trade came into existence during those two centuries. But in spite of those changes the conception of reciprocity and mutuality of obligation maintained a life somewhat flickering, and not always very vital. But Mr. Gladstone, himself a student of the Old Colonial system when he was Colonial Secretary, as his papers clearly show, asserted the same broad principle when he said, with very great confidence, that while it was our duty to abstain from any interference in Colonial affairs, at the same time we should impress upon our fellow subjects abroad that " there is no greater mistake than to suppose that you can separate the blessings of freedom from its burdens." The Colonies (as they then were) should, he said, pay their own way, and if the old dream of making their interests subservient to that of the Mother Country had passed away, it was just as little reasonable that the Mother Country should bear charges that in equity belonged to them ; and that all the more if barriers to the industry and production of England were set up in the Colonies. That was written by Mr. Gladstone in the middle of the nineteenth century.

So began the policy, which has been continued ever since, of the assumption by the Colon'es of a part of the responsibility and cost of Imperial defence. As you remember, nearly all the British garrisons in the Colonies were withdrawn in 1868, and an Act was passed at about the same time enabling and encouraging the growth of naval forces in the Colonies.

Now, throughout all those many years from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, and particularly in the earlier period, the kind of danger to which both the Mother Country and the outer parts of the Empire were most exposed in war was invasion ; in peace, the great


problem was the increase of trade which would enable us to support the burden of defence in war. But changes take place ; the nature of communications alters ; the nature of the danger to which nations are exposed undergoes modification^.^ Thus the measures adopted for security at one time do not necessarily apply at another. That is one of the problems of Imperial defence to-day which requires examination.

But to return to the question of policy. The adjustment of those mutual obligations, the measures of reciprocity that are desirable and practical, have been the subjects of Imperial Conferences, and they continue to be so. I t is not too much to say that they will continue increasingly to be the subject of statesmanlike co-operation as the populations and the trade of the several nations of the Empire increase. MJe do well to look ahead.

From that aspect of policy in Imperial defence I pass to the second part : Imperial defence in relation to foreign policy. The Government, as you know, has always had the task of guarding British interests against the military dangers which would, in its opinion, arise from the occupation of certain territories by foreign Powers. I t is enough to remind you of some examples of this to impress this relationship. You have the British policy regarding the Low Countries-Holland and Belgium-of which Pitt said on February 3rd, 1800, " To have that territory "-that is Belgium-" in the possession of France would be obviously dangerous to the interests of this country, and is inconsistent with the policy which it has uniformly pursued at any period in which it has concerned itself with the general system of the Continent." I t was that particular factor in Imperial defence which finally brought us to war with France in 1793 -a war which lasted for 20 years ; which caused the resumption of war in 1803 ; it was the primary cause of that Treaty of 1839 which neutralised Belgium ; and which, in the end, formed the basis of the British ultimatum to Germany in August, 1914. There are a great many other instances about which I will not do more than remind you, because no doubt they will readily occur to you. You have British policy vis-d-vis the integrity of Turkey and of Afghanistan ; the Siamese, Persian Gulf, Dardanelles Straits, and Tangier questions. Each and every one of those arises out of the needs of Imperial defence, of which it is a part. The reasons for every one of them, in its ultimate analysis, has, or has had, the military basis of " security for the interests and territories of the

%The difference may be illustrated by the size of the garrisons in the West Indies in 1736 and to-day. Invasion being the greatest danger, the garrison of Barbados was 4,812 foot and two regiments of horse. In the Leeward Islands there were 3.772 men. In Bermuda, out of 5,000 white inhabitants, there was a militia of 1,000 men. There were no less than 29 forts and 47 batteries in these islands. Contrast that with to-day, in the diminished risk of invasion.

SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 61 I

people of the Empire." This point in its Imperial aspect is important. I t is not uncommon, as I have myself observed when serving overseas, nor is it at all unnatural, to find British foreign policy subjected to the criticism that its interferences in European affairs are no concern of the outer nations of the Empire. But I venture to think that we cannot help coming to the conclusion that with certain possible exceptions- for instance, the conquest of Scinde-the foundation of British policy has been Security, and that security has been for the interests, persons and territories of the populations of the Empire as a whole, and not merely for those of this island in particular. Thus the statesmen of 1749 at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle were very bitterly criticised by the people of the Colony of Massachusetts for returning Cape Breton to France in exchange for that territory which is to-day Belgium. The papers of that time ring with complaints that we in Britain never considered the interests of the Colonies, but thought solely of our own security. The fact that the security of the North American Colonies depended ultimately and absolutely upon the security of Britain from invasion was not clear to them. There is, I think, no greater work to be done than that of impressing upon all the peoples of the Empire, including those of this country, the inter-dependence of our scattered states. The old Roman motto of co-operation and trade-concilia et commercia- with its familiar Esopian illustration of the old man, his sons, and the bundle of sticks that was unbreakable so long as they remained in a bundle, is the true foundation of a living, vital system of real Imperial defence ; for material effects come only from spiritual causes, from that understanding which furnishes the stimulant to the will.

I pass from those two aspects of Imperial defence to another. The next sub-division of the problem is that of the conditions in which security has to be provided. Those conditions are two. One of them is the condition of peace ; the other, the condition of war. Possibly people generally, not only here but in other parts of the Empire, do not realise that Imperial defence is constantly going on every day.

There are three forms of injury against which we have always to be actively guarding ourselves. We do not hear very much about them, but they are silently going on. The first of them is internal security in all the parts of the Empire ; the second is external security against some of our less civilised neighbours ; and the third is security for British subjects engaged in their peaceful and innocent business in foreign countries.

Interna' security is, obviously, in its nature police work, but the sort of occasions on which the action of police is called for vary very greatly. They vary from the arrest of a pickpocket at Epsom, or the


work of the policeman who is controlling traffic outside in Victoria Street, to the preservation of life and property in a communal riot in India, like the one which we recently had at Cawnpore ; to the suppression of very serious risings such as that of the Moplahs some years ago, and the Zulus in Natal in 1906 ; to tribal disturbances at the head waters of the Nile, in the Sudan, and in Kenya ; and to such riots as occurred two years ago in Palestine, or have frequently occurred some years ago in the West Indies.

What is the essence of the problem of internal security ? The conditions in which it has to be furnished vary vastly. In one part, as you see, the theatre may be one well furnished with railways and roads over which reinforcements could rapidly proceed ; in another it may be over miles of desert at the head waters of the Nile ; in another, for instance the West Coast of Africa, it may be in a bush country ; in another, as a t Cawnpore or Haifa, it is in a town with narrow streets ; in another, as in the case of the West Indies, in one of a set of scattered islands, separated by miles of water ; or, again, it may be in broken hills like those where Sheik Mahmud finds refuge year after year, where the Air Force has been recently operating in Irak.3 But there is one common feature which is necessary to the restoration of order, and that is that the need in each case is to bring to the troubled spot, in the shortest possible time, a force of an adequate strength and of a proper character ; with the proviso that the methods employed shall be such as to leave behind the minimum of ill will, and the maximum expectation of permanent internal peace. That is a very important point. I heard this impressed only a short time ago by a very distinguished general officer who had had personal responsibility and experience of administration.

Tiwe is in most cases of great importance, particularly among what I would call the less civilised nations. Measures which are rapidly undertaken with the proper forces may prevent a riot turning into a rebellion, a rebellion turning into a war. But it is not everything. The instrument which can arrive most rapidly is not necessarily the best, partly for those reasons of differing conditions in which the instrument can work, and partly on account of the limitations of the nature of the measures that it can employ. For instance, a man-of-war can be moved across 1,000 miles of water more quickly than a mixed brigade ; but when the man-of-war gets to her destination she is not really an effective restorer of order. She can bombard, as we bombarded Alexandria in 1882 ; but that does not restore order. A man-of-war can only land a very

"Since the address was given, the surrender of Sheikh Mahmud has been brought about, not by the Air Force alone, but by the Iraq army, with the Air Forces acting in co-operation with it.

SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 613

small number of men herself. Aircraft suffer from the same limitations. Bombardment is, if anything, a disadvantage. Troops afford the best method of restoring order-men on the ground who can go anywhere, into narrow streets of crowded towns, on foot or in vehicles like armoured cars, who can restrict their actions to the offenders and cause the least injury to property. The Palestine troubles showed this to the full. The work of restoration of order was done on the ground.

As British interests may suffer in peace from riots on land, so also they may suffer from riots of a kind-that is to say, pirates-at sea. I need not remind you of the constant work going on day by day of Imperial defence on the great rivers of China, on the coast of China, and in the preservation of order in the Persian Gulf. For this purpose ships are the only possible instrurnents.

Passing now to the next work in peace, the defence of British subjects and territories from raids by neighbours whose attitude towards meum and tuum is that of the Highlander of all generations. We have it always with us on the North-West frontier of India, and on the Northern frontier of the East African Colonies, raided as they are by Abyssinians either for the purpose of loot or of capturing slaves or cattle ; and we have had it also on the borders of Iraq. 1 think it a pity that there is a divided opinion as to the most effective means of guarding those frontiers, and an inclination to forget some very old lessons. One of those is that one arm alone is not necessarily the best instrument. I t is generally a liaison of arms that does the work best ; and the other that the measures should be such as will leave the least ill-feeling and resentment behind them. In this connection Sir Henry Lawrence, in speaking of protection against' raids in India in his day-in the forties-said it was not only necessary to get quickly upon the heels of the raiders, but it was also necessary " to ride into the villages consoling, coaxing-or bullying as may be-the inhabitants " ; that is to say, the personal touch is an essential element in Imperial defence, an element without which any merely " punitive " measures are incomplete.

Finally, there is the third condition of defence in peace, and that is the problem of the defence of British subjects engaged in innocent pursuits abroad. Lord Granville, writing to Lord John Russell in 1854, said : " British subjects of all classes engaged in innocent pursuits are entitled abroad as well as at home to the protection of their Government." We had instances of that not so long ago in the case of Shanghai and Egypt, and the Americans at the present time are confronted with that very problem in Nicaragua and Honduras.

These various demands give rise to the existence of certain armed forces in peace. Those forces we must in any case possess so long as we


retain responsibility in various parts of the world ; and if ever war should come again those elements are available for defence against external attack. You will remember, I dare say, that in the South African War some of our stoutest opponents at that time were the " Zarps." They contribute to Security in war.

From these aspects of Imperial defence-Inter-Imperial policy, Foreign Policy, and Peace Needs-I pass to Imperial defence in war.

What is war ? What do we mean by the word " war " ? War is the use, in its most effective form, of force for the purpose of compelling a nation to abandon some policy, which policy is considered injurious to the interests of the people. It may be that a demand is made for :L new orientation in foreign policy, as for instance in the case of the Franco- Prussian war and the Napoleonic wars ; or it may be for a change in domestic policy, such as in the Orsini Case, or as we demanded of t h ~ 'Turks reforms in their admini~tration,~ or the American demands concerning Cuba ; or demands may be made for the possession, or cession, of territory as in the case of Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864, the Russo- Japanese War, or the Turco-Italian War. Those art, all types of the different kinds of troubles which give rise to war.

Now in each case, if the country to whom these injurious demands are made, or upon whose interests these policies would react unfavourably, desires to resist them, it must do so by force if arbitration cannot com- pose the difference by compromise. 'The means by which compliance can be enforced upon a country are two : I t may be cut off from the outer world or it may be invaded.

Let us for a moment examine the vulnerability of the Empire t'o these two forms of pressure. This part of the problem of Imperial defence is the problem of how successfully to resist the imposition of pressure by the use of force to an extent to oblige peoples to cede territory, or interests, or privileges, which appear to them essential to their own interests.

To begin with, what is the Empire ? I t is a body of nations scattered all over the world. I t differs from every other national entity in that great bodies of citizens of British descent, some gg per cent. British by descent, live in areas widely separated, very extensive, and largely undeveloped, and therefore not susceptible to a sudden blow at one

At the time of the Armenian massacres, Mr. Gladstone's plan for coercing Turkey into reform was to seize Smyrna, Salonica and Crete. (Personal papers of Lord Iiendel, p. I 49, Cf., also p. 129 for another similar case.)

1 am not speaking of pressure imposed by means of embargoes, which is another method ; Jefferson employed it in 1806.


single heart. The Empire has another characteristic which also differ- entiates it from other nations. Every one of these nations except one- Canada-and 'she is only partially an exception-lives on an island, an island either in a geographical or an economic sense. I t may appear to be a misuse of terms to speak of the Union of South Africa, the East African or the West African Colonies, or India, as " islands " : but economic " islands " they are, for the whole of their trade, with exceptions which are quite negligible, passes by sea. Thus, for instance, out of £400 millions of the annual external trade of India only something like £20 or so millions proceed over the land frontiers. That is to say, India is in a condition of economic insularity.

Islands are, in the nature of things, most vulnerable in their external coinmunications by sea. The sea may be closed to a nation which forms part of a continent, but that nation will still possess a back door on land, through which, normally, I think I am right in saying, between 40 and 60 per cent. of its trade passes : that is the case of the principal European nations. An island has no such escape from catastrophe in the form of a hinterland into which to send its goods or from which to buy its requirements. Deny its people the power to move their goods by sea and they are at once in distress. A large island which produces its own food and clothing may, indeed, live on itself for a long time ; but it cannot maintain its standard of living. I t must infallibly be thrown back to lower and almost primitive (or what would be regarded to-day as primitive) conditions of life.

We have an example to-day in Madeira, where it appears a blockade has been imposed by the Home Government. We read in The Tinzes of Monday : " This cutting off of the island may possibly lead to trouble when the people see their business dying away. The effect of the blockade is beginning to be felt." It is announced that there is " only sufficient crude oil in stock to enable the electric light company to furnish power for another 12 days. Many people are of the opinion that a complete severance from Lisbon, combined with a serious blockade of Funchal, will settle the matter without the necessity of landing a single soldier. The whole life of the country depends on the movement in the port." In a blockaded Madeira you have in microcosm the situation of the Empire-that set of islands whose whole life depends on the " movement in their ports." Stop the movements of their exports or imports, and, sooner or later, they must give way to demands they consider injurious. The situation, is analogous in civil life to that of a general strike-or lock-out if you like-both of which are merely forms of " war " : of the use of force to compel compliance upon another party by preventing it from getting what is essential for its national life.


Now take a glance at what this external trade of the Empire consists of-at its extent, at its ownership, at the lines it moves along. There was a very useful Command Paper (Cmd. 3691 of October, 1930) issued to the recent Imperial Conference, from which I will take certain round figures.

Firstly, its extent. The total annual value of the external sea-borne trade is in the neighbourhood of some L3,ooo millions. This, however, does not include the value of the coasting trade, a very important interest, particularly in those Dominions which have long railway hauls between their several centres of population. To that I will refer later.

That trade of E3,ooo millions is divided as to ownership. There is, firstly, the trade conducted by the citizens of this island with foreign countries-a trade in which these citizens alone have an interest. There is, secondly, that trade conducted between the Dominions and foreign countries and between the several Dominions themselves-that is a trade which is of interest to the Dominions, but in which the people of this country do not participate (with the exception, of course, of freight and shipping values) and have no personal and direct interest. There is, thirdly, the trade between this country and the Crown Colonies, and between the Crown Colonies and foreign countries, that is of interest to the people of this country and the people of the Crown Colonies. And finally, there is the trade between this country and the self-governing Dominions. In whose interest is this last-named trade conducted ? Clearly it is in the interest, in an equal degree, of each participant. I t is equally to the interest of the seller that his goods shall reach the purchaser as it is to the purchaser that his means of payment-whatever they are-shall reach or be available to his client. The interest is one equally divided between the two parties to the transaction.

I am not a statistician, but I think I am not very much in error if I say that of the £3,000 millions of external Empire trade, about one- third--rather short of one-third-consists of trade conducted by the Dominions themselves ; that is to say, the trade which they conduct with countries other than the United Kingdom, together with their half of the trade conducted with the United Kingdom. How greatly the situation has altered from what it was even thirty years ago, still more since 1870 and earlier, of Dominion trade is obvious to all. To what extent this should influence the inter-Imperial political aspect of the problem I leave to you to ponder. 'That is a problem for the statesmen of the Empire to determine. As matters stand to-day, the British citizen shoulders practically the whole burden of this defence, in which, in a financial sense, he participates to the extent only of some two-thirds. He furnishes the fleet ; he furnishes the garrisons of the stepping stones


of the trade-the bases and ports from Gibraltar to Hong Kong and elsewhere.

There is, in addition, as I have remarked earlier, the coastal trade. This is a thing too often forgotten. It is a trade reserved, in some Domin- ions, to their own shipping-a movement for such a reservation has been actively advocated for some years by India. In this policy there is a sad want of that reciprocity on the need for which Mr. Gladstone laid such stress. Observe that this coastal trade is of high national importance, for it is, in reality, one branch of the distributive system of the country. I t moves the goods between the different parts of the country precisely as the railway, road or canal traffic moves them. The actual tonnage of goods moved by the Inter-State shipping in Australia in the year 1925 was approximately equal to the total tonnage of the imports of the whole of the country-about five million tons. Its cessation would have the same results as the cessation of railway services, and what that means those who remember the railway strike will readily appreciate. Hour necessary, therefore, to the interests of the people of the State is its security. 13ut no Dominion, or India, possesses forces sufficient to give security to its coastal trade. That duty still falls upon the British taxpayer.

Passing from the great problem of how the burden should be shared to that of the nature of the defence, we get two possible courses of action. One is to ensure the safety of the trade by means of treaties which shall provide for its immunity in war ; the other is to furnish it with defence. I do not propose to go into the question of the preservation of trade by means of treaties-that is a large political question-although there is a great deal which might be said upon it. My own view is that there are some serious practical dificulties, however easy it may appear super- ficially. But if I ask to be excused from entering into the question of the practicability of the former method, it is not because I put it outside the problem of Imperial defence. On the contrary, I regard it as an integral element in that great problem. In the limited time at my disposal, however, I cannot possibly cover the field satisfactorily. I would merely remind you of one thing. If trade in war time be immunised by treaty, the quantity of force hitherto required for its defence becomes no longer necessary ; and, very properly, it will not be furnished. What follows ? The total forces provided will, therefore, be less than would be necessary for defence, and security will depend entirely upon the faithful observance of the treaty, in war. Here again we are on political ground, into which I have no wish to stray, but some words appear necessary. The means we possess of forming op'nions as to how this would stand the strain of war are twofold. First, that of speculation as to


whether a nation, seeing a certain means of determining victory, will be deterred from employing it ; and secondly, actual experience of the observance of treaties, even in recent times, but also in earlier ones. What a temptation we dangle before the eyes of an enemy !

On the first of these points I cannot help observing what seems to me a certain want of consistency on the part of some who desire that we shall, and believe that we can, obtain security by such agreement. When it is proposed to set limitations upon the use of some other instrument-gas, as in the Hague Conference of 1909, or aircraft to-day-the instant reply is that no such agreements would be effective in actual practice. That very objection to prohibiting the use of gas was put forward by the American delegation at the Hague Conference ; and in 1929, when it was proposed at Geneva that the bombing of towns by aircraft should be prohibited, the British delegate opposed it on the grounds that, though the Hague Convention of 1907 had prohibited it, nevertheless it had occurred in the late war. " In these conditions," remarked our delegate, " it seemed that prohibitions of such a kind were not of great value." The same reasoning would seem to apply to the proposed prohibition of attack on shipping. If what has happened before, happens again, as in war it has a way of doing, a country which has disarmed itself against this form of attack and has no defence of its own will be precariously placed. I t would depend entirely for its security upon the action of other signatories. I cannot discover, in the histories of the past, even the most recent past, any solid grounds for supposing that the neutral nations would voluntarily-and immediately -take action in the defence of the Empire-do not forget the importance of " immediately " ; nor, indeed, do we even now see any signs which entitle us to expect that other Powers would commit themselves to a guarantee ; nor, finally, if they did give such a guarantee, of any certainty, or even probability, that excellent reasons would not be discovered for evading the obligations, as they have been discovered before. For we have a long history, and one not very creditable to civilised nations, of the breach of promises and engagements made in peace. This history led Lord Lansdowne to the apparently-but only apparently-cynical remark that the sole guarantee that a Power will fulfil the obligations it has undertaken, is, that the acts which it has bound itself to perform are acts which are in its own interests, and which an intelligent and patriotic view of its own welfare require to be done. Do we not observe a certain reluctance both on the part of ourselves and of other great nations to assume obligations ?

If, then, the security which is the aim of Imperial defence is to be afforded by force, there must be a sufficiency of force of the proper kind,


just as if life is to be saved by a fire escape the escape must be long enough to reach the ground and strong enough to carry the individual. What kind of force, then, is needed to render the movement of shipping secure ?

Shipping moves from port to port, at times across broad stretches of ocean, at others through narrow waters or congested areas off landfalls and in straits like the Gut of Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb, Singapore Straits and the Suez Canal. I t is therefore liable to attack in these different types of locality. It congregates most densely in the approaches to the larger ports.

How, then, does an enemy endeavour to do injury to this vital Imperial interest ?

There are two definite and distinct measures in that form of attack upon a nation which consists in interrupting its external supplies and exports. One is Blockade, which closes the door to all shipping; the other is the arrest and capture of the enemy's shipping in any part of the sea.

There is a very general misconception regarding Blockade. I t is very frequently asserted to-day that the British Islands are in great danger from blockade, a danger which, it is said, cannot be averted by the use of ships. In actual fact, there is no other way whatever of blockading these islands than that of obtaining a superiority at sea ; and what is true of this country is equally true of the overseas Dominions. Unless and until an enemy shall have procured, by alliance or by battle, or by both, a superiority, and that a marked one, over our naval forces, Blockade of these islands or of the Dominions is a physical impossibility. We ourselves have never been able to blockade even a single port of an enemy unless we had established a marked superiority at sea. Why it should be supposed that other Powers can do what we cannot I confess I am unable to understand.

I t is supposed by some who are obviously unacquainted both with sea affairs and international law that a blockade could be imposed by submarines and aircraft. But submarines differ in no way from other vessels which navigate the sea. Unless they, or they in co-operation with other vessels, can establish superiority, they, no more than any other form of craft, can conduct blockade. They are not exempt from the proved laws of experience, and we have sufficient, and indeed ample, experience at sea to know that the surface craft-the small vessel-is the master of the submarine-provided we possess them in sufficient quantities. Of that there is no doubt at all. Whether the agreements we have recently made give us that quantity is another matter. In my view they certainly do not ; but that is another question.


Aircraft, on the other hand, cannot occupy the areas necessary to establish blockade, and act as blockaders must act. Even, moreover, if such developments as may come in the future are taken into consideration, there is only one Power which is in a geographical position to blockade any British territory by these means, for the simple reason that the distances from potential enemy bases are too great for aircraft to operate, as they would have to operate, and the weather conditions are such that anything approaching the permanency which blockade demands is impossible. Further, to suppose that aircraft flying in the mouth or any other part of the Channel can in that position declare a " blockade " of these islands is to show that the first principles and practices of blockade in international law are not understood. A highway to Northern Europe cannot be thus summarily occupied by any Power, nor would any of the neutral Powers permit their rights thus to be arbitrarily infringed.

Nevertheless there is another method besides blockade of interrupting the exports and imports of a country. The ships carrying the goods- and they are, and can be, only carried by ships-may be intercepted at a distance from the ports. Here, again, only surface ships are capable of acting effectively against trade, and for this reason. Neutral ships are not liable to capture unless they carry contraband, and whether ships carry contraband can only be discovered by searching them. Air- craft can neither visit nor search. They may be able to sink at sight as the submarines do, but if they should do so there is not the smallest doubt that neutrals would be injured as they were in the late war under similar circumstances by the submarine ; and while a neutral may not readily intervene to implement a mere engagement or guarantee, he is very quick to take offence and action if he has any thought of his own interests suffering.

Thus ships, and surface ships at that, are the necessary instruments for attack upon trade, and ships for its defence. I do not say that there is no possibility that an enemy might use aircraft in certain zones, under certain conditions, but the injury that can be done is less than can be done in any other manner, and is restricted to some parts of this island. There is no danger whatever in the outer Dominions.

The present situation of air attack upon shipping appears to me a reproach to our common sense. We-the maritime nations in Confer- ence-have made an agreement limiting the action of submarine vessels. These reasons were, ostensibly, and I imagine, truly, of a " moral " nature. But while one form of fighting craft which swims under the water was, by that agreement, forbidden thus to sink vessels, another, which flies in the air, is not. By what processes of reasoning this extra-


ordinary situation is reached I do not know, for an act is not rendered right or wrong according to the place in which, or form in which, it is committed. If to sink a vessel with its non-combatants and neutral and other goods is wrong at all, it is wrong whether the vessel committing the act swims under, floats on, or flies above the surface of the water. Is it necessary to remark that this is a problem of Imperial defence ?

To return to the other part of the problem. While superiority is essential to blockade, a very inferior force can do great damage by attacking at many scattered points. How is this to be guarded against ? Picture for yourselves a great and open country, on which several owners graze their flocks of sheep, far apart from each other. Into this country a wolf escapes from a menagerie. What happens ? So long as that wolf is at large, unlocated, each flock, if it is to feed in the pastures, must have its guard-its sheep-dog, or dogs-sufficient to protect the flock. That is the position of trade when a sea-wolf is abroad. The flocks of ships that cross the sea must each have their sheep-dogs to guard them. That is what we call in a few words a " convoy system." And just as (contrary to the accepted pictures of our childhood) wolves in actual nature hunt solitarily, and not in packs, so the usual-though not necessarily invariable-custom of commerce attackers is to hunt singly and not to combine. That, within certain limits, is a broadly correct picture of trade defence against the form of injury by " sporadic " attack.

In that picture I have given you in epitome the " cruiser " problem of the Empire. We need sufficient " cruisers " 6 to supply the sheep- dogs for the scattered flocks of shipping moving from and towards the many ports of the Empire. That, however, is not the whole of the problem. I ask you to make another picture in your minds. You are looking down at the ocean and what again do you see ? You see a lot of little flocks of ships, some crossing the Atlantic east and west, others north and south, some crossing the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Western Pacific, some moving at intervals through the Mediterranean, each with its protecting force. But you will see something else. Though they are guarded against the solitary thief in the open waters, they must pass near ports in an enemy's country from whence not single ships, but squadrons, may sally, as the German fleet or flotillas sallied out into the North Sea and Dover Straits. If such a squadron happens, by management or good luck, to fall in with one of these flocks, the feeble defence is insufficient. This has happened more than once in war. A convoy worth over a million has been swept into an enemy harbour. To guard

6The word " cruisers" is one that has become unduly narrowed in its meaning. " Destroyers " are cruisers-small ones, but cruisers nevertheless. See them, for instance, escorting the Channel, North Sea and Mediterranean trade in 1917-18.

62 2 SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

against this there must be massed forces either e n vedette always off these places, or strengthening the guard as the flock passes through a danger area. That is what we call " cover."

I t is, however, clearly of little use for goods to reach a port, whether from abroad or to be put on board for export, if the port itself, or its facilities, or the ships in the port, are destroyed by bombardment. Im- perial defence has to include measures for the protection of the country's external traffic in those places where it is practicable-and that is not everywhere-against this form of injury, which, in the new development of flying, has become possible. I t is not my business now to discuss the measures by which this defence is afforded. It means the allocation of the proper form of defensive instruments in sufficient numbers-aircraft, guns, lights, and so forth. But I would remark that the existence of a new danger does not abolish those previously in existence. We must keep a cool judgment on this question, and recollect that quarrels have not been confined to our immediate geographical neighbours, by whom, and whom alone, this injury can be inflicted. The only great nation with whom this country came into conflict in the 100 years between 1815 and 1914 was, for instance, Russia, a country too far off, even if we make every reasonable allowance foreseeable in the development of endurance in aircraft, to do us-much less our Dominions-this injury.

So far, then, as security against injury to Imperial interests caused by vital interruption of its external interests is concerned, the Empire requires ships of types proper for the purpose : some in detachments to protect the scattered flocks ; some in bodies to guard those detachments from attacks by concentrations or force in certain areas ; and, in certain places, defence against attack from the air in their harbours.

Shipping, however, needs supplies. Ships must call at ports to trade at all, for that is what trade consists of. In the past the fuel was furnished by the wind, but there were other needs, principally water and fresh food. To-day, coal or oil take the place of the wind, and are not gifts from the skies. They must be carried and replenished. Food must still be provided. Therefore our provident statesmen of the past have placed us in possession of magazines of supply, where fuel, food and water can be furnished, and have placed defences at the important trading harbours. These bases of supply and commerce are indispensable elements in Imperial defence. How important they are must be obvious. Therefore they must be protected. This can only be done by garrisons. And in the question of furnishing the necessary garrisons we have one of the problems, to be tackled at some time, of the larger problem of Imperial defence. For remember that these bases do not serve the British trader only. They serve also those in the Dominions and Colonies


whose share in the Empire sea-borne trade is, as I have remarked earlier, about one-third of the whole.

Thus, the danger of isolation is averted by the provision of a ileet and of the means which give that fleet its power of movement-bases. The fleet may be composed of many different types of craft ; of those which move on, under, or above the surface of the water. Some serve one purpose, some another, but all are units of the same service, specialised according to need. The shore forces by land and air, in this element of Imperial defence, are the guardians of the mobility of the fleet and the trade. Of what do these shore forces necessarily consist ? There are garrisons at the various bases abroad. There are also those armed British forces for the preservation of internal order, and frontier defence where we have land frontiers, already alluded to. But as those in the bases cannot be kept permanently abroad, reliefs must exist for them, and so under the " Cardwell System " a number, approximately equal to that

b

of those abroad, is maintained at home, which itself constitutes the garrison of these islands. What modifications will result from such changes as will presumably arise out of the discussions on Indian government it is not possible now to foresee, but there is no doubt that a new element in the problem of Imperial defence will soon be brought to the forefront. What, if internal order and frontier defence are supplied by India, will govern the strength of the Army at home ?

From defence of our interests on the sea I turn to defence against invasion.

Territories may be invaded over land frontiers or sea frontiers, and the forces of invasion can travel by land, by water, and by air. I t is here that a wide vision of the problem of Imperial defence is most essentiql if economy is to walk hand-in-hand with security. There is, I assert, far too great a tendency to treat this problem sectionally. Thus one school of thought sees one danger, and it sees that danger only to the exclusion of all others. I t would take steps that should safeguard one particular part of the Empire against one particular form of attack which can be devised only by one particular Power. To render this single portion secure it would leave all other parts exposed to dangers that could not be guarded against by measures which provide that so- called and partial security. Another school of thought visualises the whole problem of defence in the light of a danger of invasion to themselves ; its eyes, focussed upon a hypothetical political situation, interpret defence solely in the terms of resistance to an enemy army which has reached their shores. The movements of a great modern army over several thousands of miles of sea, and its maintenance over a prolonged period in a distant territory in which it can draw but very


few supplies, is dismissed in their vision as though the problem were no more complicated than taking the children to the seaside for the summer holidays. This causes waste.

If these extremist views were carried to the logical conclusion of their protagonists, Imperial defence would consist in each nation of the Empire providing itself with instruments of defence whose only utility would be to avert one form of injury when attempted by one assailant. To all other forms of assault from all other possible adversaries, and in particular to that form to which the Empire is particularly and super- latively susceptible, the peoples of the several nations would be as exposed as a roofless house is to the rain.

The problem of defence must in fact be regarded as a whole. I think no greater error has been made than the way in which some

problems of defence have been treated sectionally. A mission is sent to advise on the " naval defence " of a Dominion. Another is sent to advise on its " military defence." Subsequently, since each Service must have its share of missions,. yet another is sent to advise on its " air defence." But there is no such thing as the " naval," the " military " or the " air " defence of a country. There is one thing only, and that is the defence of tlze interests of that people f rom the v a r i o ~ s injuries to whiclz it i s liable. That defence against each form of injury does not stand in a watertight compartment, as something separate, something distinct. I t is a part of a whole system. If, for example, we should, as I consider we should, find that a considerable naval force, with garrisons composed some in part of land forces, some of air forces, were essential to the security of the trade of the Empire's citizens, to guard it in its movement across the open sea and through the narrow straits it must traverse, to guard those essential stepping stones-the bases and commercial ports ; if, I say, we find such-and-such forces necessary, we must take into consideration their existence as factors in defence against the other form of danger and invasion. If there be such naval forces, and such garrisons, to what extent do they contribute to lesson the danger of invasion from the sea or across the land frontiers ? I venture to think that when the problem is subjected to what may with propriety be called a " scientific " examination, an examination in which experience and facts form the starting point, it would become evident that, except in the case of an outbreak of the madness in our statesmen with which the Gods are said to strike those whom they have decided to destroy, in which our foreign poiicy offends simultaneously several Powers, these fears of invasion over-sea of the many island parts of our Empire would disappear ; and with them would disappear all those demands for localised forces which, as I have said earlier, can only afford defence against one form

SOME PROBLEIvfS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 625

of danger, and that danger both remote and the least probable in any war in which we may be engaged

There is one other most important point in the security against invasion of the Empire's overseas territories, which arises out of the possession of that strength at sea which, as I have tried to show, is in any case indispensable. Not only is superiority when properly used a deterrent-as the long history of war shows-to the despatch of an enemy army across great stretches of water : it is much more. As the garrisons, as I said earlier, give mobility to the fleet, so the fleet furnishes our own military forces with that very mobility of which it deprives the enemy.7 What that means is just this : that as we have garrisons in various parts, and in particular a strong nucleus in the forces at home, so also many of these are available from all parts of the Empire, to give aid to any member of the family of British nations if it should be either attacked or in danger of being attacked. This means that instead of every single nation being under any necessity of regarding itself as an isolated body, dependent upon its own efforts to provide itself with local forces on a scale sufficient to defend itself from invasion, it needs far less than that : for in superiority at sea and in the other military forces of the Empire it has the certainty of help coming over the sea, in the event-the highly improbable event-of an enemy attempting the vast undertaking of an oversea invasion without superiority at sea.

I say the " vast undertaking," for vast such an undertaking undoubtedly is. I ask you merely to throw your memories back for 30 years or so and to recollect the effort which this country had to make to overcome the resistance of a small number of fighting men in South Africa. It took a quarter of a million men over two years to overcome that small body in that wide country. One may justifiably believe that an effort not proportionately less would be required to conquer any Dominion, or even a part of a Dominion, even if opposed by forces on land no larger than those or no better organised. The scale of that effort, the time which any prospective invader must calculate he must allow for its completion, and the amount of ocean-going tonnage he would have to employ throughout that time, are factors too commonly omitted from consideration. I have discerned a tendency to look at the question at the stage at which a hostile army appears off the coasts of some country. That, however, is a very incomplete way of regarding it. One must first consider how the army gets across the several thousands of miles of water which intervene, how it is protected on its voyage, how

Observe the complementary services rendered t o each other by the Navy and the Army. In one phase the Army gives the Fleet mobility. In the other, the Fleet gives the Army its mobility. And each deprive the enemy of his.


it finds transport for its men and stores, and how, when it has provided that transport, it supplies that army subsequently and at the same time where it finds shipping to conduct its national trade which, even on the most reduced basis, it is still necessary to conduct for the purposes of maintaining its national life.8 Put yourself in the position of the prospective invader before he begins to move from his ports.

There are those who assert with confidence that the older methods of defenceof providing security for the peoples of the Empire-are obsolete. The opinion is summed up in the words : " The next war will be fought in the air."

Whether this be true of the Continental nations who may fight each other, neighbours to each other, I cannot express an opinion, nor does it matter to us in our considerations of Imperial defence. But even if it be true of some cases, it is not a universal truth capable of universal adoption, nor is it a truth of the Empire. There are two tests-those of experience and of hypothesis. Try them.

If the statement is true of to-morrow it would be true also of the past if the instruments had then existed. Examine, then, experience. What were those wars, and how would they, even if air forces should have reached such a stage of development as it is possible for us to-day to foresee, have been decided by forces using the vehicle which travels in the air as their means of movement and action. Consider how such disputes as that which we had with Russia in 1854, those between China and Japan, between America and Spain, between Russia and Japan, or between Turkey and Italy might have been decided by means of aircraft. Could a Spanish army have been ejected from Cuba by air forces ? Could Cyrenaica have been conquered, or Russia forced to withdraw her claims upon, and her forces from, Korea, or Russia have forced her will upon Japan in that same dispute, by air ? If experience be any guide, the doctrine that wars in the future will be decided in the air will not stand a moment's examination.

If to this we add conjecture and look into the future the test is no less destructive of the theory. Not long after the conclusion of the late war we witnessed a strained situation between the United States and Japan. I can discover no way by which these two Powers, separated by some 8,000 miles of water, could have resolved their quarrel by the use of air forces. And if we consider hypothetical quarrels of the future

" Between July 1900 and June 1902 the total number of men embarked for South Africa was 359,000, of horses 347.000, of mules over ~oq,ooo, and of mule waggons 2,000. These figures do not include men, vehicles and animals found in South Africa itself. When the war ended the men receiving rations numbered 327,000, the horses and mules z65.000." -Fortescue, R.A.S.C., p. 264. Consider the transport problem an invader of one of our Dominions has to tackle in the light of those figures, and the larger populations of those countries.

SOME PROBLEMS OF I M P E R I A L DEFENCE. 627

-assuming, as we must, that the diplomatic machinery has failed to respond adequately to the situation-we find similar impossibilities. That there is a situation in which London might be made to suffer severely is true. But is the system of Imperial defence to be based upon one particular war with one particular Power ?

Finally, I would say this. I hope I shall have shown reasons for my belief that Imperial defence is not a mere naval and military question, to be referred only to naval and military authorities for decision. It is far more than that. The naval and military forces are the essential machinery in executing the policy. The policy, the influence and importance of which is transccendent, as I have shown, is the work of statesmen ; and the statesmen must carry with them, and educate, the people, not to an understanding of mere technical details, but to an appreciation of the nature of the problem.

I have my doubts as to whether such matters can be solved by periodic meetings of Imperial Conferences. I know that that does not accurately represent the work done in this problem, work which always is in silent progress.

Lastly, it surely admits of no denial that no scheme of Imperial defence will be developed which will distribute the burden equitably, will make a scientific distribution both qualitatively and quantitatively of the forces of defence of the Empire, and which will obtain security for all at the least possible expenditure-that is to say, will be one of good management, good economy-without the determination on the part of all concerned that these aims shall be attained ; to that end, a determination to co-operate in attaining them.

We took as a motto for the Imperial Defence College these words from an old Roman coin " Concordia roborat artos," which may be very roughly translated as " The boat goes better if the oars keep stroke." For three men pulling in stroke will do more than six out of stroke. At any conference which has this great question of our common security under examination I would have two things stamped on every sheet of paper used, down to the scribbling paper on which, when we attend such gatherings, we trace curves, turn blots into complicated figures, or draw caricatures of our colleagues. The things are, first, such a motto as reminds us that co-operation is the most economical road to strength ; and, secondly, a small drawing of a figure attempting in vain to break a bundle of sticks. Esop's fable is permanently true, and nowhere more so than in the problem of Imperial defence. Separate sticks are easily broken, but a bundle well bound together by the rope of co-operation woven of the threads of a common understanding and goodwill, is as near unbreakable as we have any right to expect in human affairs.

READINESS FOR WAR.]

PART I. POSSIBILITIES.

IN this connection we are apt to consider mainly the extent to which the Navy is ready, or otherwise, for another war. This of course is but a part of the larger question : To what extent is the nation ready for another war ? Each reacts on the other, and the final answer must depend on certain even more difficult questions such as : Illhen and where will the next war occur ? Will it be a major or minor war ? For how long would our financial and economic resources stand the strain of such a war ? If, for example, it were found that the possible wars which we consider the most exhausting and difficult were by no means the least likely, the future would look definitely blacker. And if it were found that a major war would rapidly bring this country to complete bankruptcy, the future would be blacker still. I t is proposed to examine these questions in detail.

I t is now nearly thirteen years since the end of the great war : about the same interval that elapsed between the South African War and 1914. We still cling fondly to our comfortable formula " no war for ten years," but the time has come for looking facts in the face. Let us begin with three stock arguments often used to show that war is unlikely.

(a) I t is said that the young men of to-day have seen war and they will not tolerate it again. But after thirteen years that statement is no longer true. If we reckon only Germany, Britain, France and Italy we find that in 1917 and 1918 new " cannon fodder" was being conscripted a t the rate of not less than two millions per annum. After thirteen years, therefore, we have, if we include Russia, not less than 44 million young men ready for war who have never yet been under fire !

(b) I t is often said that no nation could afford a war to-day. Un- fortunately that statement is true only of Great Britain : partly because a European conscript would be paid about ~ d . a day, or in Russia nothing, while we should pay twenty or thirty times as much to the soldier and sailor, and eight to ten shillings a day to the munition worker, nlunicipal employee or state official. Actually, in war, a nation needs only to produce, as cheaply as possible, such exports as will pay for her essential imports of war

This paper was written in April 1931, mainly to draw attention to the grave danger of a financial and economic crisis. In this respect the writer observes with deep regret that his forecast was sadly accurate. Absit omen, ! Certain excisions have been made in Part I, but that which remains is as first written.

READINESS FOR WAR. 629

material and the necessities of life. America, Russia and Rou- mania, for example, are practically self-supporting in two items of immense importance ; oil fuel and food. But we start with the terrific handicap of having to buy food from abroad (to avert immediate starvation) for nearly 30 millions of our population. To pay for this and to buy our necessary supplies of oil fuel and war material we should probably need to borrow vast sums of money. For other reasons, which will be stated later, it is fairly easy to calculate that another war would bring Great Britain straight to bankruptcy ; but this argument does not apply to other countries in the same degree. Consider for example the value obtained by three different countries from their Army Estimates. Britain, spending in recent years about k40 millions a year, is able within three months of mobilisa- tion to produce one cavalry and two infantry divisions. Italy, spending less than us, could mobilise sixty infantry divisions in the same time, and France, spending rather more than us, could mobilise forty-eight. Also, by virtue of her universal service, France would start the war with five million trained reservists, while Britain would have less than a quarter of a million. These differences are rather striking.

(c) Many place their faith in the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. Both of these are powerful factors, but they are largely offset by the alarming obligations of the Locarno Treaty. The League of Nations has done much to prevent war, but we are apt to forget that in 1929 two of the greatest nations in the world (reckoned by man power) drifted steadily into war in spite of every effort to stop them. These were Russia and China.2 The conflicting evidence produced by each to show that the other was entirely to blame gave a good example of the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the real facts. Some may have forgotten that in 1919-20 Russia made war on Poland and was finally defeated at the Battle of Warsaw, which Lord D'Abernon, for interesting reasons, has described as the eighteenth decisive battle of the world. I t was remarkable at least in this, that a match was laid to the European bonfire, and on that occasion, mainly due to the victory of Poland, the bonfire failed to ignite.

There is perhaps one other cause of comfort. History shows us that European wars have more than once broken out when responsible statesmen were telling the world that no cloud was visible on the h ~ r i z o n . ~

In 1931 Japan and China drifted towards war in a precisely similar manner.

See page 649 (infra).

6 3 ~ READINESS FOR WAR.

To-day there are many clouds in sight, and we therefore can only hope that the contrary result may ensue !

This statement about clouds will perhaps be challenged, for there are in fact a great number of responsible men who assert that war to-day is far more unlikely than in the past. But what are the facts ? If we study carefully those fundamental causes that give rise to wars, we can only say that on the whole they are more widespread over the face of the earth to-day than at any period in the last fifty years. Consider 1914, which led to the bloodiest war in history. This arose from a number of causes, none of which was really insurmountable. Among them we may quote the following :-

Germany desired to crush France, because France was supposed to be always meditating a war of revenge for 1870 : this was a matter of ancient history, but to-day the desire for a war of revenge is inflaming the hearts of millions. Germany claimed that she needed " places in the sun " for her surplus population to emigrate to : the facts show that this claim was based far more on jealousy of other nations than a really urgent need to find space for expansion. To-day, however, there are certainly two great nations (Italy and Japan) which within one or two generations will be so harassed by over-crowding that they may consider war the most convenient solution. German finance was so burdened by expenditure on armaments that it became increasingly difficult to balance the budget : the same conditions exist to-day in many countries, with this difference, that in 1914 Germany could at any moment have reduced her expenditure and enjoyed immense prosperity from her flourishing trade conditions. So much for 1914. To-day one must add the following to the possible causes of war. Once again the map of Europe has been completely re-drawn : there are bitter memories of lost provinces : there are thousands of miles of new frontiers with irksome tariff barriers along every one of them. Trade rivalry and fierce competition for the markets of the world have always been potential causes of international strife. But to-day they are unavoidably worse than before, because in every market the buyers are poorer and the sellers are more desperately in need of money. Unemployment in the world's greatest industrial countries is unprecedented, and hunger leads quickly to trouble. Other possible causes of war may be dealt with while reviewing certain of our possible enemies.

FRANCE. We mention France because, nolens zlolens, we may at any moment be brought into conflict with her through the terms of the Locarno Treaty. If we are, we have to face a war which, aerially, would be more devastating than any other. French aircraft greatly outnumber

READINESS FOR WAR. 63 I

ours, and the damage they could do to London is not pleasant to contemplate.

EX-ENEMY STATES. Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, with a total population of nearly roo millions, must endure for a long term of years conditions that they regard as not only unjust but well-nigh intolerable. Quite apart from any desire for revenge, the reduction of war debt payments and the rectification of frontiers are ideals that, given only the means, they would probably be glad enough to fight for if revision by other means proves unattainable.

RUSSIA. This war, from the military point of view, is more difficult and troublesome than any other. In 1913 some people (usually called alarmists) thought that a war might ensue because Germany did a certain amount of sabre-rattling, appeared to be jealous of our fleet, and was spending a lot of money on armaments. At intervals high German officials said that war with Britain was unthinkable. But in Russia to-day there is no such element of doubt. A nation of IOO million people has been conscripted, not for a period of years but for life, in order to make Russia self-supporting industrially and agriculturally, and to prepare for war. The foreign policy of Russia, quite openly, is summed up in two words : world revolution. The chief obstacle to success is stated again and again to be the Biitish Empire. If Russia had the power to-day, to-morrow, or in five years' time, to break up the British Empire there can be no shadow of doubt that she would start at once to do it. (And this is the country to which we are giving large credits !) Her rulers are plainly obsessed with a mad-dog mentality which makes the will-to-war as potent in that country as is the will-to-peace in Britain. But there is this difference : the will to war can at any moment achieve its aim by pressing a button. The will-to-peace can do no more than steadily disarm as a gesture of goodwill-which quite possibly invites disaster.

So much for a few possible causes of war : we come now to the last, which lies entirely in our own hands.

British politicians agree about few things, but probably all would agree that our love of peace and our desire to maintain it is as great as that of any other nation in the world. In the past, when warclouds arose a threat of armed intervention by Britain carried double weight, because it was known that she would never fight unless compelled to do so by unjust aggression. France blamed us in I914 for not using this threat to Germany, but it would probably have failed for two reasons. Germany had reviewed the whole situation very carefully. She decided that our army was entirely contemptible, and also that our preoccupation with

632 READINESS FOR WAR.

serious trouble in Ireland would make our participation in a European war almost impossible.

To-day, alas, the restraining hand of Britain is more feeble than ever before. Our army has been made more " contemptible " than in 1914, our navy is desperately reduced, our air force is only fifth among the powers of the air. Worst of all, it has become utterly impossible for us to follow our ancient practice of financing the armies of Europe whilst others did the fighting.

Continental readers of books such as " England's Crisis " by Andr6 Siegfried4 will inevitably form the opinion that economically and financially we are on the verge of ruin. Actually they would be nearer the truth than most people in this country imagine. A short paper on this subject is attached. To sum up, no one wishes to say that war is probable, but in view of all the possible causes that we see around us, who can dare to say that no war will occur in the next ten years ? If it does, history will probably say that the reckless disarmament of Britain-naval, military and financial-was without doubt one of the contributing causes. In the present state of the world it is surely not wise that the lamb should disarm as a gesture of good faith to the wolf. For thirteen years we have been trying to make the world safe for democracy, and in one country after another democracy has broken down under the strain. We are trying now to make the world safe for peace. On paper we have done so with the Kellogg Pact, but it is not unlikely that we shall be sadly disillusioned. To live in a fool's paradise is very pleasant, but to live there too long is death.

In this paper it is desired to point out (a) the state of our financial position as regards readiness for another war ; (b) the steps that must be taken if we are to have any hope of winning such a war.

It is necessary to realise that the country is more or less bankrupt now. For instance, if called upon to meet its creditors in 1931, the State could only with difficulty realise capital resources sufficient to pay them 6d. in the E. This in itself would not greatly matter if it were possible to pay off the National Debt by instalments within a limited number of years, because the chief asset of the State is its unquestioned power to levy taxes on the income of the people. But when we find that the maximum taxable capacity of the people has been mortgaged for at lebst two generations, the problem looks difficult. I t is a grand trait of the Englishman that he does not know when he is beaten : to-day we are very nearly beaten financially. It is the habit of the American

See NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 2, Vo1. XIX, May 1931, page 385.


at times to mortgage his future income for a few years to buy a car or a house : we have mortgaged the income of the whole nation for sixty years in order to buy a massacre which ended in 1918.

Now, readiness for war is largely relative ; so let us consider how other nations have fared. In 1918 the belligerents of Europe were totally unable to meet their liabilities. Somebody else had to meet them, and there were three possibilities. We decided to embark on crushing taxation for fifty or sixty years, and to pass the bulk of the burden to our children and grandchildren. Every other nation adopted the simple and more rapid expedient of repudiation or inflation. The load, or a large part of it, was thus passed at once to their creditors, and many millions of it came straight on to the back of that poor beast of burden, the British taxpayer. Dishonest, of course, but are we being honest with our children ?

The situation in Europe to-day is this : every belligerent nation except ourselves has been through the bankruptcy court and has written off the greater part of their national debt. Russia, by repudiation, has cancelled everything. Germany, by unlimited inflation, has cancelled the whole of her internal debt ; while France, by more careful inflation, has judiciously arranged to pay 4s. in the pound to those of her creditors who insist on being paid. The tremendous losses involved have fallen largely, of course, on the nationals of the countries concerned, but at least they avoid the crushing taxation that is afflicting us, and they have the pleasure of knowing that we have shouldered a considerable portion of their debt. As Andr6 Siegfried truly remarks, " She (Britain) is bearing a load of debt that is too heavy ; she is actually paying her creditors 20s. in the pound, while France is paying hers only 20 centimes in the franc. Also, she has not had a fresh start like those who have gone through the bankruptcy court." In other words our future is mortgaged and theirs is not. This difference would be a very grave handicap to us in the event of another war. Our prospects of borrowing money, either internally or abroad, would depend on what the lenders, especially the big financial houses, thought of our prospects of being solvent at the end of the war : and of this, alas ! there can be little doubt.

Let us examine more closely what can be done with our present debt. Including some £900 millions owed to America, the total debt to-day is £7,413 millions. The American item we have agreed to pay off in 62 years, and in the course of doing so we shall have paid, in capital and interest, more than double the amount of the original debt. But this is child's play compared with the other. In recent years the total national revenue collected by the State has averaged a little over £800


millions per annum. The net reduction of our national debt has, with a great struggle, averaged nearly £50 millions per annum. On this basis, during the next ten years the Exchequer will collect from us some £8,000 millions (more than the total of our whole debt !) and will reduce the load of our debt at best by rather less than 7 per cent. Surely a very expensive way of helping us to extinguish the burden ! Actually, our debt repayment has sunk so low that, allowing for new borrowing, an expert calculation puts the redemption last year at only one million pounds ! The present process is far too slow for safety, and will do little good even to the creditors who are paid. After all, repayment from taxes means in effect that those who have lent most to the State will really have to repay themselves.

Consider an analogy. A wealthy employer, Mr. Jones, has several thousands of employees. Bad times come upon him and he says to them " I am in desperate need of a million pounds : my ruin means your ruin, it is best for you to lend me the money." They do so, but when the trouble is over, Mr. Jones says to them " My friends, I have no resources from which to repay your loan. The best way to content you is this : I will deduct every year about 30 per cent. from your wages, and I will use half that money for paying you interest and for repaying your loan. The remaining half will be used to keep the business running. Those of you with higher salaries, and therefore, I regret to say, the majority of those who have lent me most, will probably have to accept a deduction from wages of even more than 30 per cent. This process will continue for about IOO years, and at the end of that time you will, I trust, be prepared to hand me a receipt acknowledging that I have repaid my creditors 20s. in the pound."

With these terms Mr. Jones' creditors are not likely to be very pleased, but the fact is the State to-day is not in a position to do any better. Actually, the bargain that the State makes with its principal creditors is definitely worse, because one tenth of the population, comprising all those who have lent most, will be required to pay off two thirds of the debt. Also, vast sums will be wasted in paying salaries for IOO years t o the huge staff required for debt administration : i.e., collecting millions in revenue and paying it out again as interest and sinking fund. Internal debt is very much a matter of book-keeping, and if it were suitably shared among the whole population of Britain (i.e., in exact proportion to the wealth of each individual) one could embark fairly light-heartedly on the drastic process of cancellation. Suppose for example that E5,ooo millions of internal public debt were repudiated to-day and written off. The nation would wake up to-morrow poorer by that amount, but we should have the advantage of knowing that our debt was more than


halved, and our taxation could be reduced by 30 or 40 per cent. Also, we should have come back to a world of financial reality and should be able to see clearly what expenditure our reduced circumstances would really permit. The main reasons against repudiation are threefold :

(I) The man who had lent all his savings to the State would be ruined, while the man who had invested his capital in foreign securities would escape scot free.

(2) There is no guarantee that a hungry Chancellor of the Exchequer would immediately remit taxation in exact proportion to the amount of debt cancelled.

(3) After cancellation, the majority of lenders (who do not yet realise that their money is already gone) would make up their minds never to lend to the State again.

As a matter of fact, in these days of ingenious financial jugglery, it is quite possible that a scheme might be devised for the gradual cancellation of k~ ,ooo million or so of our debt, by guaranteeing to British holders an immediate reduction of their taxation in exact proportion to their loss on the Bonds or Stock surrendered. But no scheme of this sort could succeed unless accompanied by a policy of real national economy far in excess of anything a t present contemplated.

So much for a brief description of the burden of our national debt. Before going further it is necessary to point out that, since financial and economic factors are inextricably mixed up with politics, it is un- avoidable to discuss all three together. One would naturally prefer t o avoid any reference to politics, but that is quite impossible. To continue ; this country suffers from two things : a burden of debt (and consequent taxation) that is far too heavy for her, and the habit, now established for fifteen years, of indulging in a millionaire's expenditure on a pauper's resources. In connection with the latter there are many pros and cons. I t has only been rendered possible because crushing taxation, which might have been used for the rapid reduction of debt, was mainly diverted to expensive social schemes while the debt was put aside to be dealt with by our children.

At a time, therefore, when we had collected in five years a burden of debt greater than all the debt of a thousand years before it, we embarked on schemes of social reform more expensive and far-reaching than anything before attempted. Waving made ourselves one of the poorest of the great powers, we deliberately created a standard of living for the wage-earner far in excess of that enjoyed by our commercial rivals and only comparable with that existing in the U.S.A., which (mainly on vast sums received from us) had become the richest country in the world.


Let it not be thought that I desire to criticise : it was a noble and courageous experiment ; maybe we were quite right to try it, but it is likely to prove a magnificent failure because we have crashed against hard economic laws. Our terrific expenditure burdens industry with heavy taxation : our high rate of wages makes costs of production so great that we are gradually losing our share of the world's markets. That loss, carried far enough, means not merely that we cease to be able to pay high wages, but that later on we may cease to be able t e avert starvation from our people. One the other side we have to our credit certain definite advantages. Throughout the war and the post- war period we have, a t terrific cost, improved beyond recognition the conditions of the wage-earner and the masses of the people. We have spent more money than any other nation in Europe on improving their housing, sanitation, wages, health and education. Much of this money was well spent, and, if we pull up in time, we shall find it has made the nation healthier and stronger in readiness for the trials that it soon must face. We have had 124 years since the war in which to get ready ; in many ways the time has been well spent, but the day of reckoning has now arrived. In 1931 we have failed to balance our budget, in 1932 it will be far more difficult, and we claim to be oppressed by " world conditions " of which the chief feature is a remarkable fall in the wholesale prices of primary commodities.

But of this we have really no right to complain. As an industrial nation we should rejoice at the low prices of raw materials : for fifteen years we have complained of high prices, and our constant cry has been- " if only we could get prices and the cost of living down to the I914 level." As soon as retail prices have adjusted themselves to wholesale we shall be getting near to that happy condition, and no one will be satisfied !

The simple reason is that, with the best intentions, we have violated certain economic laws, e.g. :-

(a) Costs of production must be such as will enable us to compete successfully with other nations in the markets of the world.

(b) In a nation so poor as ours i t is unwise and dangerous to keep the wages of sheltered occupations definitely above those of the industries that have to compete in world markets.

(c) In the modern economic world, most of all in England to-day, the payment of high wages, irrespective of the quantity or quality of work done, can only lead to ruin which the workers will be the first to suffer from. Prosperity and high wages can both be obtained (in time) by proper co-operation between employer and employed. This means a lower basic wage, hard work, and


distribution among the workers of a liberal share in all profits derived from their industry.

(d ) The best way to increase the revenue of the Exchequer is to encourage and facilitate saving in all classes of the community This will increase invested capital and thereby increase automatically the income of the people and the yield from direct taxation. Conversely, a decline in the yield of direct taxation (as now) is a very clear danger signal.

(e) If heavy debt is accompanied by light taxation, the nation can save and put aside invested capital for a rainy day. If heavy debt is accompanied by heavy taxation, the taxes should be used for the rapid extinction of debt. Otherwise, the day of reckoning may be postponed, but it is bound to come. In either case it should be noted that drastic economy in public expenditure is indispensable to salvation.

(fi National problems are more important even than social problems, for the greater contains the less. One cannot safely concentrate on social problems, though admittedly they affect a large and very important section of the community, if one leaves unsolved national problems such as debt and the burdens on industry. These two at present are threatening to wreck the whole of the good work that we have done in other directions.

AndrC Siegfried sums up the situation more briefly and more brutally thus :-" No one dares come out boldly and tell the people . . . what they must do to break the deadlock : lower the standard of living and work harder." That is a hard thing to ask, but it is the only real solution, and a better one than any other. If no war comes, the set-back will be purely temporary, and will lead us quickly to greater prosperity. If another war lies before us, compliance with the above principles now is the only alternative to disaster.

We should remember, however, that we are really at war to-day. We are engaged in an economic war, not with one nation but with the world's greatest industrial nations, which are striving with all their strength to drive us out of the markets we have enjoyed so long. Only heroic measures will enable us to win that contest, and at present it is going definitely against us.

There are two reasons why the danger signals are not at present as clear as they might be. First, our accumulated savings of a hundred years are not yet entirely gone, and on the portion remaining we can carry on for a time. Second, British Government Stocks stand abnor- mally high. This, however, is palpably not due to improvement in our financial condition : it is mainly because British investors, while anxious


to support British industries, are so uneasy about the future of every one of them that they feel compelled pro tern. to deposit their capital in government securities.

This perhaps is not the place to discuss the views of a recent writer who asserts that the nation is spiritually bankrupt, but if there be any truth in such a criticism there can be no doubt that the solving of our many problems will be a longer and far more difficult task. Economically, what we need now is a " five year plan," designed under the guidance of economic and financial experts, to enable us to restore our industries and to compete more rapidly with our load of debt. The need for this is more serious than most people realise, but if there should be any chance of a war being forced on us within five or ten years, the need is very urgent.

The above review of the situation is, I fear, both long and tedious, but the subject is a difficult one. Let it not be thought that I want to criticise any particular political party. I merely aim to show how omni- potent democracy during the past fifteen years, supported by all three political parties, has conceived and carried out a policy which is now in grave danger of defeating its own ends. This is all the more sad because the ends aimed at were entirely praiseworthy. My respect and affection for the working man, no less than my sense of duty to the State, impel me to suggest that, as I see it, we are moving rapidly nearer to the danger line. The sea is smooth, the Ship of State sails on before the breeze, but she is heading straight for the rocks.

Let us now consider what must be done in the event of war. Run on the old lines it would cost us some Ez,ooo millions a year and bankruptcy would soon be inevitable. Assuming Russia to be our most probable opponent, we should be fighting a nation that was spending immeasurably less than us, for she would conscript the whole nation and pay her workers, if at all, just so much as would procure them the bare necessities of existence. If we are to stay the course we are almost compelled to follow suit, though not, one hopes, in the same degree. War is always a test of endurance, but to-day it is in large measure a test of economic and financial endurance. National wealth is the product of the nation's industry, which normally is useful. But in war we divert the energy of the whole nation to the manufacture of war material, which is useless, and the expenditure of it, which is purely destructive.

The useful and productive work being reduced to an absolute minimum, the urgent need for economy must surely be obvious. We should have to make it clear to the people that only heroic measures could avert complete disaster. Wages would have to be fixed (unpleasant though it sounds) on a scale to enable each man to provide the necessities of life, and no more, to those for whom he was responsible. I t need not


be thought that the rich would get off any better. The poor would risk their lives, for the rich it would be " your money and your life." They must give their lives as they gave in the last war, and they must lend the whole of their savings as they did before, but with little chance of getting them back again. For facing such a possibility, five years of hard and steady preparation, economic and financial even more than military, would be all too little.

On the outbreak of war, the wages problem would have to be dealt with by conscripting the whole nation, men and women, and allotting a useful task to each. The wages of every lower or unskilled grade should be based on that paid to the common soldier, making allowance for the fact that the necessities of life are supplied to him. I t may be argued that this procedure would cause discontent. Personally I am convinced that the British people would put up with any such measures if they were told the whole truth and made to understand that our national existence was at stake. We should at least benefit by avoiding the horrible situation that occurred in 1918. In September of that year it has been said that there was grave danger of a mutiny in the fleet, the reason being that the men, and their wives, were intensely dissatisfied with the enormous wages drawn by dockyard and munition workers. These men, they said, were vastly better paid than those who had to do the fighting, and whenever they wanted more money they could organise a strike and get it !

As, in the next war, the bulk of the population will be on war work, there will in most cases be no need for them to wear uniforms. W.A.A.C.'s, W.R.E.N.'s, and similar auxiliary services should, like the munition workers, wear civilian clothes. If anything further is needed, a plain cloth cap with a stamped brass badge should be amply sufficient. This would release hundreds of the men and women who in the last war were employed producing expensive uniforms. In numerous other ways, great and small, the utmost economy must be aimed at.

If war should be sprung upon us before we have made adequate preparation, even more drastic measures would be necessary. A simple and effective plan would be to float a huge loan, borrow as much money as possible, and then inflate the currency with the aid of the printing press .Vhis of course must be done most carefully, aiming to stabilise the E sterling when its exchange value has dropped to about 10s.

The effects of this step would be numerous. The wage-earner, when prices adjusted themselves, would have lost half his wages : the creditors of the Government would be repaid, if at all, not more than half their

It must be admitted that this is almost a counsel of despair, for it obviously has grave disadvantages.


capital : the Government, having bargained to pay, say, 5 per cent. interest, would in effect pay only 2+. Internally, these measures would have to be accepted, because the plain truth is that possible alternatives, on the lines of 1918 expenditure, would prove in the end equally unpleasant, or far more so. Externally British credit would suffer, but we experienced this in the last war, and should know how to deal with it. On paper, purchases abroad would be more costly, and our debt to America would be doubled. But all payments in this connection are made with exported goods and services rendered. The amount of such exports therefore would not greatly vary, though in paying the American debt we might experience an actual reduction due to the rise of world prices that always occurs in war. The one fundamental necessity is that the huge quantity of goods we have to export shall be produced very cheaply, and in any case far more cheaply than at the present time. If this procedure had been followed in the last war we should be heartily thankful to-day that we had made the necessary sacrifices. Further, we should have learnt that those sacrifices were of infinite benefit to the community and not really serious to the individual.

This paper is already too long. Let me end by saying that, though parts of it may read like political propaganda, it represents only an attempt to review impartially a situation that is undeniably serious. My suggestions are those of an uninstructed observer with no expert knowledge. I ought perhaps to apologise for writing them, but the most alarming feature to the common man is that our experts and our leaders have quite obviously failed to reach agreement on the solution of our difficulties. In such circumstances one hopes earnestly for peace, for if war is thrust upon us it is more than likely to shake our Empire to its foundations. Time is the uncertain factor, and no one can guarantee that a long period is now at our disposal.

" The Bird of Time has but a little way To flutter, and the bird is on the wing."

THE RELATIONS BETVC7EEN T H E ROYAL NAVY

AND T H E MERCHANT NAVY.

IT is with great interest that 1 have read she article in the last quarter's XAVAL REVIEW^ on the relations between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service. For the future welfare of the Empire this is a most important question. The present writer has had an extended experience in all three Services : the Merchant Service, the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Navy.

Before joining the Royal Navy in 1895 at 28 years of age I had about fifteen years in the Merchant Service; during that period I had gone from apprentice in clipper ships to junior master in the largest shipping company in the world at that time; also during this period I had served for four years in the Royal Naval Reserve, including six months in the Excellent and Vernon and one year in a flagship on a foreign station. Joining the Royal Navy in 1895 I had various experiences until the outbreak of the war, when I was almost immediately promoted to acting captain. It will be seen from the above that my service afloat enables me to discuss this question from all points of view.

'The writer is correct, I think, in his account of the Merchant Service, except in three points, and these are pensions, age of retirement and leave. Most large companies have a pension scheme for all officers, including engineers; also an age to retire. Forty-six years ago the company I was in had a non-contributory pension scheme, the age for retirement was fifty-six, and six months leave was alloiwed every five vears. Officers could also deposit savings with the Company which carried five per cent. interest.

R e discipline in the Merchant Service; I have known it good and bad. In clipper ships it was very stric~t : stricter, in fact, than I have ever known it in the Rfoyal Navy. I have never seen men jump at the word of command in the Royal Navy as I have seen them in the clippers; why, I do not know, except that those who gave words of command had a personality about then1 which compelled one to obey. I have not experienced the " fist an'd belaying pin " principle; this system, I think, must have had its sway in American clipper ships, certainly not in British ships. Discipline in merchant ships went

642 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROYAL

rapidly down with the advent of steamers; why, it is unnecessary to g o into in this article.

T h e wri~ter is quite correct in his remarks regarding the Royal Navy being criticised by the Merchant Serviceman, but I have never yet met the Merchant Serviceman who would allow the British Royal Navy to be " run down " by a foreigner. T h e position is somewhat analogous to that between a man and his wife: they will have their rows, bur a s an outsider do not interfere or you will be in trouble.

Coming to my own time in the Iioyal Navy, I have always received the greatest kindness and consideration from fully ninety-five per cent. of :the officers I have come into contact with. From the first day I joined one of H i s Majesty's ships in commission I carried out the ordinary duties of an officer of a battery, division, and watch keeping, and I think the writer of the article in question must be a little bit in error when he says that there is little in common between the two services. If there was not a great deal in common between them I could not possibly have stepped from the deck of a merchant ship to that of a flagship and there carried on the above duties. I had never served in a cadet ship, and I had no previous training in ithe routine of a man of war ; consequently my knowledge must have come from my training in the merchant service.

There were certainly differences in words of command, but this was quickly corrected-with probably a laugh or two on the part of both officers and men. I n fact, there is a great deal in common beltween the two services, though it may not be so obvious on the surface.

From the dawn of history mercantile seamen have fought their way over the oceans, though there has not been so much of this in later years ; Ithe first merchant ship I served in had a co~mplete set of muskets, double- barrelled pistols, cutlasses and pikes ranged round the main cabin for all !hands, and in the fore peak were stowed twelve nine-pounders and their truck carriages. Even at the present day steamers on the China coast and rivers are armed to resist attacks by pirates.

T h e merchant service has always been the reserve for the Royal Navy. During the Crimean W a r 60 per cent. of the seamen serving in Her Majesty's ships were merchant seamen, and even during the threatened war with Russia in 1884 the writer entered as fourth officer of an Atlantic liner, taken up and armed a s a cruiser. This entry of mercantile seamen during a national crisis has applied in the past more to men than t o officers, and I have been shipmates with many seamen in clipper ships who had served in both the Br'itish and United States navicXs.

NAVY AND THE MERCHANT NAVY. 643

Taking it all round there is, dur ing peace, very little connection between the Mercantile and Royal Navies, but immediately on the outbreak of a war they come together again. This is a s might be expected ; their occupations are on quite different lines, they d o not frequent the same home ports, and abroad the mercantile officer's stay in a port is, a s a rule, of very short 'duration, and during that time his chances of leaving his ship are small.

-4 man of war " showing the flag "-a most important part of her duties-visits a port for a few 'days and is fully ocoupied in entertaining and being entertained by the British community ashore ; the merchant ship comes into harbour, starts discharging and taking in cargo, and is off again a s soon as possible.

In a foreign port that the writer has lately spent a few months in, a great number of cargo ships called, but only for a few days. Once a month a British mail ship arrived and stayed for ten days, and the officers were to be met ashore playing golf, atc., and mixing with the British communiity, and when a British man of war was in port I often noticed officers of both Services fraternising. This was to be explained by the fact that in those mail steamers the senior officers, and most of the juniors, were holding co~mmissions in the R.N.R. In fact, the Master of one ship was R .X .R . .%.D.C. to H i s Majesty.

'The writer is, in my oplinion, quite correct when he puts forward the suggestion that the Royal Naval Reserve is the medium by which a greater connection can be forged between the Royal Navy and its stand-by, the Mercantile Marine. T o enable this object to be attained the question arises : is the R.N.R., as a t present constituted, on the righ't lines? If not, hoiw can it be constituted to at~tain the object in view ? Personally, I think the R.N.R., a s at present constituted, is on entirely wrong lines and that it has first to be constituted into a real Service before it can attain its olbject.

At present the Royal Naval Reserve consists of some officers of the Executive, Engineening and Paymaster branch, and a few thousand seamen and firemen; they are not a Service in the real sense of the word, just a collection of men to supplement the Navy when the occasion arises. The officers practically never see their men ; during my service a s an R.N.R. officer I practically never came into contact with men of the R.N.R. For a few weeks I did some drill in an R.N.R. drill ship, and we had a few men drilling at the same rime ; and this was all.

Now, a real Naval Reserve would consist of all the ratings employed on board merchant ships who could be employed on board of a man of war, and in this connection a modern liner holds practically all those

644 TIIE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROYAL

ratings. I t would then consist of a solid body of men drilled and trained to fight a man of war, from the captain to signal boy.

The Territorial Army is constlituted on those lines. A Territorial battalion is complete and is ready to take the field as a unit, from the colonel to the ibugler boy, with the addition of an adjutant and quarter- master from the regular forces. In fact, on taking the field, there is no difference to be seen between a regular battalion and its Territorial " opposite number,'' except, I think, the letter T. on the shoulder strap.

Now, why cannot this system apply to the R.N.R.? The Naval Reserve could consist of all ranks and ratings that the Merchant Service can supply; and in addition, all officers and men of the Royal Navy who at present pass into Emergency Lists and Fleet Reserves could pass into the Royal Naval Reserve.

'The total number of officers and men in the Reserve should bear some relation to the numbers of active service officers and men, and of the ships to be colnmissioned on the outbreak of a war. For instame, if there were roo ships to commission including all classes, IOO full crew-s would be required. In addition to this would be the number of merchant ships to be taken up as auxiliary cruisers. An allowance would have to be made for men absent on distant voyages; this could easily be worked out.

T o enable a scheme of this description to be given full play an organisation would have to be worked up at one of the main dockyards. No~w Rosyth is lying practically useless for naval purpos'es: it could become the headquarters of the Royal Naval Reserve. It is very central for the purpose, as the bulk of the officers and men come from parts north of Hull and Liverpool.

In this port could be stationed all classes of ships (except battleships) that would be commissioned by the R.N.R. in an emergency. One, two or three of these ships could be used to accommodate ratings up for drill. Regularly every month some of the ships could be commissioned by the R.N.R., all officers and men being R.N.R., and the only permanent officers being the warrant officers. This is a most important part of an officer's duties, viz. to commission and get a ship ready for sea. After the ship was commissioned she could proceed to sea for a few days; then return and pay off.

The present scheme of having officers and men scattered about among different ships is good up to a certain point, as itt lets them see the routine, etc., carried out in actual ships in commission, but the work of actually commissioning a ship and running her with his own men should be the completion of a Naval Reserve officer's training. Put the responsibility of doing this upon (the R.N.R. officer.

NAVY AND THE MERCHANT NAVY. 645

During the annual fleet maneuvres, ships of the Reserve should join up fully manned by Reserve Crews, while one ship should be kept permanently in commission with the Mediterranean Fleet an'd one with the Atlantic Fleet, both ships being permanently manned by the R .N.R.

The R.N.R. officer should have lthe same chance of commanding his ships and men as have the officers serving in the Armj .

In connection with the entry of officers and men, this should be entirely done by the R.N.K. officer, and the present Admiral commanding Reserves done away with, as should also the connection between the R.N.R. and the Registrar General of Shipping and seamen.

The Admiral commanding the Reserve Fleet should do all the duties of an ,9dmiral commanding a fleet, and committees of officers should be formed to enquire into, select and recommend Mercantile marine cadets and officers for entry into the R.N.R. It stands to reason that the R.N.R. officers must be the best judge of the capabilities of mercantile marine candidates.

In these times of financial stringency there is no use in putting forward schemes that will cause increases in the estimates, but the writer is certain that, for the money now spent on the R.N.R. and Fleet Reserves, a scheme can be worked out on the foregoing lines that will cost no more, be more efficient, and make full use of the brains and energies of the R.N.R., both officers and men.

The R.N.R. is quite entitled to demand its own organisation " lock stock and barrel." I t has too long been a " paper force,'' badly trained for its special duties in time of war, and relegated to an inferior position in peace time.

D. J. NI.

DISARMAMENT AT SEA.

THOUGH I have never seen a definition of " Disarmament " I have recently seen a proposal to substitute for that word the expression " Limitation and reduction of armaments." This does not carry us very much further unless we have a definition of " limitation " ; indeed, most of our troubles arise from our inability to give unambiguous expression to even our simplest thoughts.

From the Prime Minister's statement that we can reduce no further until other countries do the same it would appear that the aim of statesmen is an all-round reduction, which shall, at the same time, guarantee to each country that relative position of security to which she considers her particular conditions entitle her, showing clearly that it is the rela- tivity of armaments which makes the task of finding a solution along present lines so hopeless.

The problem is not one of size and numbers, but of ratios. Even if an agreement producing an ostensible equilibrium were reached to-dav, the experience of any expert suggests many reasons inherent in the very nature of naval armaments, and the sea on which they are used, that would imperil its stability to-morrow ; and the unpopularity of the expert is largely due to his excusable inability to explain such reasons to the layman.

Once the ratios were agreed upon, then any reason for adopting any particular set of figures as to size and numbers of ships disappears, excepting only the work which is required to be done.

Can we then get over the difficulty of ratios and relative strengths ? Now there must always be enough ships to carry on what is often stressed as Police Work, but the difficulty about a man-of-war is that she exercises dual functions, namely, those of Peace and War ; and it is well to remember that it is only in regard to the former that the term Police Work is a legitimate one : were policemen equipped and trained for combat with each other we should speedily have yet another problem on our hands. This confusion of thought arises, of course, from the fact that we are apt to forget that police serve their own nationals in national territory, whereas, as Queen Elizabeth put it " Neither can a title to the ocean belong to any people, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and custom permitted any possession thereof."

DISARMAMENT AT SEA. 647

What seems to be the fundamental need is nothing less-or more- than a new view of the sea ; as a wise Frenchman, I believe, remarked : " I t is not the thing itself which matters, but the view which you take of it ; and this you are permitted to change at your pleasure."

Viewed, then, as a strictly neutral area, the problem would become that of providing the necessary Police Force to carry on the many services which for years have been rendered by the ships of all nations, irrespective of their own nationality or that of their beneficiaries, and it should not tax the handiness of mariners too far to devise, with the guidance of their experiences, a suitable type of ship for the purpose, having always in mind the new view of the sea and the functions of the Police Force.

Such ships would, outside their own territorial waters, fly in addition to and in precedence of their own national flag, the flag of, let us call it, the International Maritime Service : say, A Ship-Or, on a field- Aaure ; and they would be at the service of all who needed their help, and be free and welcome to the world's harbours and dockyards. They would of necessity carry sufficient armament to discourage piracy and no more ; but, always having in mind their own element, i.e. the sea, whose peace and neutrality would be confided to their keeping, and the Service whose common flag they flew, this " truncheon " armament should not, I think, cause any apprehension ; and in the consequent absence from the high seas of any other type of armed ship it is not easy to see whence a potential threat could arise.

Of course, the view may be taken that the international flag would not have a sufficiently binding effect upon the Service which flew it, or, in other words, that the Sea Police were not to be trusted, in which case the problem is hopeless indeed ; but, possibly, if the control and organisation were vested in a small representative body drawn from the world's mariners, leaving statesmen to concentrate upon their multitudinous problems ashore, experience would presently prove the sea fraternity to be equal to their task; and who knows what ,unexpected benefits might thereby accrue both ashore and afloat ?

The only difficulty which I foresee is that, if it came to a question of requiring a minimum quota from each maritime nation, some, at least, might conceivably advance financial or other reasons for considering their assessment excessive ; but the resulting controversy, if any, would a t least have the merit of novelty, and so be well worth it.

To those who will face the real facts and difficulties of armaments some such solution must, I think, appear inevitable ; though we shall, I make no doubt, require much sorrow and shoving before we get accustomed to the idea ; but it may help if we remember, which few of us do, that there is yet another view of the sea, namely that it is not only the

648 DISARMAMENT AT SEA.

largest but, characteristically also of those who sleep there, an international cemetery, and, as such, entitled to at least the same respect as is accorded to similar sanctuaries on shore.

The sanctity, however, which would, I think, alone be understood by, and make any appeal to the " Souls of the jolly, jolly mariners " would be no other than would permit their successors to go forward with the work of the High Seas, unhampered by controversy, in the spirit and tradition which have been handed down through the ages, so that

" The ships shall go abroad To the glory of the Lord Who heard the silly sailor folk and gave them back their sea."

PEACE ?

1~ might be well for naval oficers and others to reflect on the following examples from history, which illustrate the difficulty of looking into the future or forecasting peace.

1.

Five months before the Spanish -Armada sailed, Queen Elizabeth dismantled and laid up her fleet at Chatham, and, when the moment for action came, our cause was placed in jeopardy for lack of ammunition and supplies.

(See Froude. " English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century.")

11.

I n 1698, after the Peace of Ryswick, William 111.'~ Parliament reduced the army to a peace footing of 7,000 men at a time when the French army was at a strength of 180,000 men.

" Optimism and pacifism reigned at the festal boards of English- men in the Christmas of 1700. But with lthe New Year these sentiments received a series of rulde shocks." In January, 1702, the Army was recalled to the Colours. There

followed the W a r of the Spanish Succession, lasting until 1713. (G. M. Trevelyan. Blenheim.)

111.

" In 1772 he (Lord North) urged a reduction in the naval expenditure, justifying it on the same argument of ' improbability.' " Writing to the First Lord on September 5 , 1772, he said :-

"I do not recollect to have seen a more pacific appearanceofaffairs than there is at this moment. . . . This is the time, if ever there was a time, for a reasonable and judicious economy. . . . Great peace establishments will, if we do not take care, prove our ruin." (" Historicus " iin The Times of 17th February, 1930.) (See IV.)

IV. In 1774 " The British reduced the number of seamen in the Nav-y

and took no serious steps to sltrengthen their forces in America.

650 PEACE ?

W a r broke out early in the following year. In 1775 Burgoyne wrote from Boston :-

" .4fter a fatal procrastination not only of vigorous measures but of preparations for such, we took a step as decisive as the passage of the Rubicon, and now find ourselves plunged in a most serious war without a single requisition, gun-powder excepted, for carrying it on." (G. XI. Trevelyan. History of England. p. 5 53.)

v. Extract from a speech in Parliament by Mr. Pitt on February 17,

1792, during a debate on Public Income and Expenditure :- " I am not, indeed, presumptuous enough to suppose that when

I name fifteen years I am not naming a period in which events may arise which human foresight cannot reach and which may baffle all our conjectures. W e must not count with certainty on a continuance of our present prosperirty during such an interval ; but unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we may at the present moment." A year later began the W a r of the French Revolution and Empire,

lasting, with one short interval, until 181 j.

VI.

The great Exhibition of 1851 was pervaded by " a sense of international goodwill and the brotherhood of the human race," which was celebrated by the Poet Laureate in extravagant terms :-

" Breaking their mailed fist and armoured towers," etc. Three years later the Crimean W a r broke out, and many of our

regiments were still armed with the Brown Bess of Waterloo days. (G. M. Trevelyan. British History in the Nineteenth Century.)

VII. On July 6, 1870, Lord Granville received the Seals of the Foreign

Office in Mr. Gladstone's first Government. " The previous day, between three and four o'clock, Mr.

Hammond, the experienced Under Secretary of the Department, had told him that with the exception of the trouble caused by the recent murder in Greece of Mr. Vyner and his friends by brigands, he had never during his long experience known ' so great a lull in foreign affairs,' and that he was not aware of any pressing question which Lord Granville would have to deal with immediately. By the

PEACE ? 651

time Lord Granville was addressing the House next day for the first time as Foreign Minister, the sky had already grown dark and the sea of politics was streaked with foam." (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. Life of Lord Granville.) .4 fortnight later the Franco-German War broke out.

" My knowledge of the diplomacy of Europe is, perhaps, as close and as fresh as Mr. Balfour's, and 1 assert unhesitatingly that . . . there is not to my Itnowledge a single Power, be it small or great, which is shaping its policy, basing its calculations, upon the assumption that war between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable or even possible. Nor, gentlemen, can I discern in any quarter of the political horizon any cause of quarrel, direct or indirect, between us and that great and friendly nation. "

(Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, Prime Minister, at Bath, 6th January, 1910.)

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

THE question raised by Quo Vadisl is obviously of supreme importance, and not easy to answer in a short article. Either one must assume that the present organisation for war requires few alterations, or that definite changes are necessary. With due humility I suggest that the latter course is desirable.

The sins of omission and commission during the war being fresh in our memories, we may ask what we have done to avoid their recurrence. With the exception of the creation of a large Naval Staff we appear to be reverting to the very scheme of control and training which nearly turned the nation into being the " conscript appendage of a Foreign Power." The war having been controlled by officers trained under the old Britannia scheme, we eliminate the untried Fisher variety and revert to the old order of things. The engineer officer finds himself, much to his surprise, in very similar circumstances to the old scheme engineer officer.

Few will suggest that Lord Fisher was entirely correct in his scheme of training ; although a man of bold conception and vision, he, with many others, did not perceive the immense requirements of modem warfare, and that it was asking too much of a naval officer to emulate Napoleon's boast to Roederer-' There is nothing in war that I cannot do myself. If there is nobody to make gunpowder I can manufacture it ; limbers, I know how to make them ; if guns must be cast, I can arrange their casting ; the details of drill, if they have to be taught, I can teach.' What Lord Fisher did realise, however, was that modern warfare required a scientific basis of education, and that to be ignorant of, 'or careless with, details of material was inviting defeat. The Jutland action provided the necessary proof of his belief. Had the Jutland action been judged on a manceuvre standard it is probable that Admiral Jellicoe would have been counted a genius ; few judges or umpires would have denied him an overwhelming victory ; instead of the complete victory the question of material so affected the action as to render brilliant strategical and tactical moves much less effective than was anticipated.

In THE NAVAL REVIEW NO. 3, Vo1. XVIII, August, 1930, p. 569, R. X. (the author of " Quo Vadis ") asked : " In what way (or ways) can we produce the greatest increase in the fighting efficiency of the British Navy ? "

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS. 653

Before the war, if my memory is correct, a First Lord of the Admiralty in a speech, visualised the coming battle as being ' a contest of eggshells hitting each other with hammers ' ; unfortunately for us their eggshells proved very tough and their hammers uncomfortably accurate. So much has been written on the subject that it is unnecessary to mention in detail the various defects illustrated during the war, but, with regard to the Fisher scheme, criticism often appears to have stopped short and has not shown the full military results caused by this failure in material ; indeed the complacency with which these results have been accepted is remarkable; I have read no suggestions that Lord Fisher had foreseen results inseparable from the old scheme of training naval officers.

The training problem has rested, and always will rest, on the primary requirements of seagoing and fighting efficiency ; an officer responsible for the safe conduct of ships or fleets must be an efficient seaman, and, being responsible for fighting efficiency must have an intimate knowledge of the military and technical values of material, as well as a sound general education and the ability to take military command ashore ; the range is so extensive that scepticism as to results is invited.

The acid test of war showed that we possessed splendid seamen. Fleets and ships were handled with conspicuous ability from the safe conduct and navigational point of view, but fighting efficiency was reduced in standard by insufficient regard to the technical and military values of material ; for some unexplained reason, attention was not given to details of apparently the minor value which proved to be of great importance in deciding results.

Lack of vision was, perhaps, the greatest weakness displayed from the personnel point of view. Most of the important details affecting results were, curiously enough, of a simple nature ; technical wizardry was of less importance than attention to detail; our " unpalatable " experiences with Recognition was a case in point.

Our attitude to material appears to be wrong. We may regard a ship as a gun platform, and place all material to serve the gun, but if the platform is placed with its vitals exposed and where gunfire is most inaccurate, the placing of the platform is of primary importance ; it would perhaps be better to consider a ship as a human body acting as a pugilist, and frame our training accordingly. If we do this, every detail on board, from truck to keelson, has to be considered both as regards technical and military value. Knowledge of the technical and military values of material appears to be the basis of skilful fighting ; the technically perfect may fail in its military value, or a high military

654 REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

value may be technically defective ; an example of the former occurred in the earlier design of tanks, in which the exhaust pipe was led vertically above the tank with the result that, at night, sparks from the exhaust drew the enemy's fire ; the latter case may be illustrated by direct hits failing from defective fuses or pistols, etc. Another point for consideration is the possibility of material of the most innocuous type possessing a high military value ; Mr. Churchill in his book " The World Crisis " made a cryptic reference to bilge suction valves2 If material of this description can affect the fate of a battleship, it holds good for all. Again, Recognition may depend on details of material ; in the case of the 11th Flotilla's night action at Jutland the design and control of enemy searchlights was a deciding factor.

I t may be said that we have learned our lesson and that the next war will find us fully equipped. This may be so, but possibilities suggest themselves which have not apparently received attention. May I suggest that locations of fleets will, by aircraft, be almost continually known to both sides, with the resulting tendency to alter dispositions under cover of darkness-probably necessitating high speed ? High uptake tem- peratures will be caused and a glow or flare from the funnels is to be expected ; it would, I think, be possible to devise a screen to avoid detection by aircraft.

I must apologise for having stressed various details of material, but an engineer has difficulty in resisting the temptation to quote some of the many instances in which material has affected results. I t will, however, suffice to say that material dominates results to such an extent that it must have a prior claim to attention when training and organisation are considered.

We may produce highly skilled officers in the various branches of the Service, but it is then necessary to draw a line above all specialist qualifications to serve as a base from which the technique of fighting has to be constructed ; the value of this technique must depend on the

" The World Crisis, 191 1-14," p. 395.

3. . . " We kept a t four thousand feet, and circled round to watch and wait events. Nothing happened for half an hour, and we were giving up hope when my observer spotted the familiar, faint glow of an engine coming to a standstill. We made straight for it, throttling back and commencing to descend slowly. Apparently they were not aware of our presence, for they opened the furnace door, giving us the opportunity of seeing everything clearly." " Night Raiders of the Air," by A. R. Kingsford, p. 136.

" The Chief Army Command has been compelled to take a terribly grave decision and declare that according to human possibilities there is no longer any prospect of forcing peace on the enemy. Above all, two facts have been decisive for this issue ; first, the tanks. . . . " German Report, 2nd October, 1918. " The Real War," by Liddell Hart, p. 269.

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS. Q.5

accuracy with which the war of the future is visualised, and that depends on knowledge of material combined with the probable method of its use.

History may or may not repeat itself in war, but the importance of detail is never absent ; successful commanders in the past are usually credited with the possession of comprehensive detailed knowledge, but it is physically impossible for the modern Commander-in-Chief to grasp all important details ; it is therefore necessary that the Staff should be the extended brain of that officer ; those members of the Staff concerned with material should be able to assess the strength-materially- of any proposed or active operation. So many factors occur in the domain of material which may escape the notice of the executive branch and which either govern or influence military considerations that the policy of restricting the engineer officer to the technical and administrative side of his profession is both unwise and unfair to the country ; it means that the officers of a profession of major importance in war are prevented from applying to the fullest extent any military skill with which they may be possessed. I t may be said that military skill is not expected in an engineer officer ; the latter would reply that the production of any detail of material which influences military results is evidence of military skill. Engineer officers have made many suggestions of military value, often outside their own department. Casual observation accounts for some of the latter; if supplied with military information engineer officers could increase their contributions to fighting efficiency.

The tanks were, perhaps, the best known illustration in the war of this evidence of military skill arising out of material and this skill was produced by civilians despite opposition by accepted military experts. At sea, an engineer officer was responsible for the invention of the heater torpedo which swayed fleet tactics. The exclusion of the engineer officer from the Board of Admiralty and the various military divisions of Naval Staffs prevents his getting his head above the line previously referred to. Perhaps only a few engineer officers are interested in the military side of their profession. I t would be in the interests of the Service to encourage all to be so ; for this reason I suggest a course of instruction in war material should be instituted for engineer officers : the proposed course to be compiled from data founded on war experience both ashore and afloat. The nexus between cause and effect should be traced, so that the influence of material on results could be exposed. Schemes could be discussed as to the provision of material to deal with the probable requirements of any future war, stress being laid on rapid repair after damage. Warship design should be closely examined from

656 REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

the technical and military angles with the object of reducing future lists of alterations and additions.

I t is probable that certain officers will always oppose the suggestion to widen the scope of the engineer officer. Laboured attempts to depreciate his merits are not unknown. One contributor to THE NAVAL REVIEW " ventured to suggest " that "the scope of any profession is just what it is, and that it cannot be arbitrarily circumscribed or extended by regulation without introducing amateurishness, with a tendency towards quackery." A little later he remarked that " Naval Engineering provides a profession of very limited scope . . . "

I suggest that the most fruitful cause of our material troubles has been due to the fact that naval engineering has been arbitrarily circumscribed by the restriction of its potential military value. Unfortunately, in discussions of this nature, a difficulty exists in com- plying with a regulation once adopted by a junior cricket club to the effect that ' no umpire shall be employed who is not prepared to be impartial.'

Memories are very short. War reports are inclined to be superficial ; the services of naval engineers are usually referred to in general terms, while their work, being non-spectacular, has no dramatic effect ; the fact that their primary responsibility, viz., the mobility of the fleet, transcends in importance other considerations of fighting efficiency, has little weight with certain minds ; the care and maintenance of machinery, responsibility for power supply, immunity from accident in the numerous calls to raise steam with all despatch, rapid repairs in harbour and at sea, efficiency in steaming at high speeds, the millions of miles steamed in the war, training raw members of the personnel during war ; all these are evidences of professional skill, added to which is the high standard of discipline and organisation in the department. The work of individual engineer officers is little known ; they are continually improving design and adding to the efficiency of machinery under their control. Numerous cases could be quoted of individual excellence, but a branch or department stands or falls by the ability of its average member.

Keyham-trained engineer officers spent-in my day-five years a t Keyham, and about a third of these officers went on to Greenwich for another year. Two or three remained at Greenwich to complete the three-year course. They had entered Keyham by open competition after an examination corresponding approximately to the London Matriculation standard ; their numbers included sons of officers of all branches of the Service. Everything in their training-perhaps Rugby

NAVAL REVIEW NO. I, Vo1. XIV., Feb. 1926, pp. 203 & 205.


football most of all-led them to believe in teamwork, and to expect the co-operation of sailor and engineer in the work of the Navy.

Teamwork, as far as the engineer officer is concerned, is hampered by the following considerations :-

(X) There is no engineer officer who is a member of the Board of Admiralty.

(Y) The engineer officer is to a great extent rendered inarticulate by K.R. and A.I. 1866 (b)6

(2) The engineering branch is, in effect, heavily handicapped by its limitation to the technical and administrative side, whereas military results are influenced to a major degree by the professional skill of the engineer.

The combination of (X) and (Y) repeats the " absolutism " of the three-decker, also with regard to (Y) service correspondence does not readily lend itself to hypothetical suggestions from subordinates. I t is possible for an officer to lose priority and identity in connection with suggestions put forward by him. The War Staff should be the clearing house for all suggestions of military value, and this section of the staff should, I submit, include engineer officers. Suggestions based on fighting technique must frequently traverse several departments.

Another difficulty the naval engineer shares with others is that of demonstrating the relationship between material suggestions and military results. The following extract-omitting names-is taken from a case heard before the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors :-

COUNSEL. . . . but surely it must enhance my award if I show that on the solitary occasion when it was in action it did do a service to the country ?

CHAIRMAN. I do not see why it should enhance your award because the country had the misfortune to have its fleet engaged in battle. The whole point of it is to save the ship when in danger.

COUNSEL. Surely it is the best evidence you can have of utility. In the case Your Lordship broke off this morning . . . Commodore - will say his method of towing aeroplanes in a lighter and getting them up was a useful one. Your Lordship heard without protest that the immediate result of that was on one lucky occasion when it was first tried a Zeppelin was brought down.

CHAIRMAN. Nobody has said to me, nor have I ever assented to the proposition, that because a Zeppelin was brought down a bigger award should be given, if any.

Letters connected with the ship are in all cases to be signed by the captain of the ship and not by the officers in charge of the special departments. Reports from such officers dealing with special or technical details may be enclosed in the letter only if thought necessary to elucidate the subject.

6 j8 REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

COUNSEL. I t seems to me very fair evidence. If your Lordship thinks I should not draw attention to the actual circumstances of the battle which will not take me more than two minutes, I will not.

CHAIRMAN. Our view at present is, it does not matter in the least what happened in the Battle of Jutland. . . . After reading this evidence we may think of David and Goliath, and

disassociate the unexpected demise of the latter with our previous appreciation of David's efforts.

David used his powers of observation, and, getting back to the engineer officer, there is no member of the Service who has so continually to use these powers. The engineer officer of the watch spends or should spend his time in continuous observation to anticipate trouble or requirements. Over a century ago, Adam Smith wrote that " many machines are brought to perfection by men who do nothing but observe everything."

Any man who lives, moves, and has his being in a warship may be forgiven if he includes in his observation both the military and technical values of material. The trouble is that he is given very few crumbs of encouragement to do so. The greatest encouragement he can receive is the opportunity of repeating any success he may have. " Is he lucky ? " Napoleon wrote in the margin of any recommendation to promotion of his generals. There are lucky inventors as well as lucky generals. Xililitary results produced by the former frequently transcend in importance those obtained from the latter.

I t may be that I am " beating the air " in suggesting the development of the engineering branch, whose members have always had hostile forces to contend with. Our only hope is in statesmen who know the inner workings of naval organisation and who realise that the future of England is the future of engineering and its allied sciences. Engineering must go ahead, and future wars will not be won by the inspired direction of men who have been studying obsolete text books, but by men who are adepts in the efficient use of material. Experience teaches us that actions depend on a profound regard for detail. " Take care of the split pins " said an old chief engineer at a passing-out dinner at Keyham many years ago. The advice still holds good both in the military and technical sense.

But to return to the question raised by Quo Vadis. What are the possibilities of the future ? Must we regard battleships as sensitive instruments or heavily fortified machines ? Will aircraft put a Rodney or a Nelson out of action by bombing their propellers ? What length of life will huge targets, such as Aircraft Carriers, enjoy ? What casualties

Treasury Reporter's Note.


are we to expect among the guns' and tubes' crews of light cruisers and destroyers from aerial machine gun fire ? I t would appear that aircraft will practically determine the issue, for secrecy of movement will be difficult and it is possible that no fleet action will occur. Convoy protection will be paramount, and preponderating influences will be :-

(a) Coast lines, (b) Replenishments of fuel and ammunition of aircraft, (c) Do.-X and larger type of seaplanes, (d) Rocket projectiles, (e) Fast motor craft, to be towed by convoys and slipped on

attack. One imagines that the Commander-in-Chief will try to crowd his

opponent into a position or area where aircraft can overwhelm him, and this will probably be near friendly coast lines from which land machines can assist. Our warships, too, are so reduced in number that convoys will seek protection of land machines to the fullest extent.

Having regard to these possibilities and the present surplus of highiy trained officers, as well as the difficulty of employing skilled ratings on leaving the Service, I would suggest that an Imperial Coastal Service be formed. This Service should, I think, be entirely voluntary and composed of officers of the rank of Lieutenant-Commander or Commander on retired list, and also of ratings due for discharge or recently discharged, and that the latter be skilled and have had vocational training, including drilling for oil or minerals at depth. Of this Service, selected parties might be sent abroad to establish landing bases for aircraft, fuelling and replenishing Depots for air and motor craft. Each party to consist of one officer and three men, or multiples of these numbers. The depots might be established on the coasts of our Dominions and Colonies at intervals (say) of 500 miles. The requisite fuel tanks and bungalows- made in sections at the home dockyards-should be easy to transport and erect ; while for the care, maintenance, and development of these depots families might be encouraged to emigrate where conditions permit. Workshops could be established by degrees at the depots-absorbing machines, spare parts, etc., from scrapped ships and any surplus output from technical training establishments. Each depot to be strictly rationed as regards expense. Development to extend over a period of years, provision of fuel supply being the primary consideration. The difference between retired pay and coastal service pay to be partially or wholly borne by the Dominion or Colony concerned. This proposed Imperial Coastal Service to be under the zgis of the Admiralty and regarded as a Naval Reserve. The Admiralty to provide transport and supplies where necessary.

REFLECTIOKS AND SUGGESTIONS.

The advantages of the scheme would be :- (I) Great potential military advantage in time of war by allowing

freedom of manceuvre to aircraft and motor craft. ( 2 ) Assistance to civil and commercial flying owing to ease of

coastal navigation. (3) Reserve Personnel in war areas and liaison between Fleet

Air Arm and land air craft. (4) Encouragement of best English stock to emigrate. (5) Small cost, as the work necessary should be within the

capacity of the party assisted by cheap native labour. (6) The depot having been established, exploratory drilling for

oils and minerals could be carried out, successful parties receiving a bonus on results.

(7) The personnel could engage in some civil occupation in addition to their ordinary duties.

Flying experience would not be essential for the personnel so employed, the main purpose being to extend the radius of action of flying and motor craft. For example, if a succession of coastal depots were established on the shores of Australia, a hostile fleet approaching that country would have to run the gauntlet of bombers operating from the nearest depots. Aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm in any operations near the coast could refuel and replenish with ammunition if found necessary. Motor boats could extend their radius of action.

I have sketched very briefly the scheme which I submit follows the policy of " maximum defence at minimnm expense." Development would necessarily be slow and expenditure carefully controlled. If the scheme is regarded as provocative, then we may as well ask permission to use umbrellas ; a time arrives when weakness in defence becomes a direct invitation to war. I t is possible to continue suggesting various improvements, but these are mostly in the domain of material and, having already taken up valuable space, I must conclude with an apology for any impression of " laying down the law " which my expression of opinion may have created.

CLINKER.

INITIATIVE.

I \M interested to see that my short article on this subject in May has produced 4 replies in A%ugust.l Of these, numbers II. , 111. and IV. strike me a s useful and practical. I might have commented further on two or three small points in them, but they all tackle nhe subject in the right spirit and I therefore feel that I must reserve my space for the criticism contained in No. I.

The vehemence of my critic indica~tes that he is very sure of himself, but his argument is so involved that it is difficult to follow. H e takes interest in definitions and asks for one; but here a re two very strange definitions that he gives of Initiative.

On one page he says (a) " Initiative, in truth, is not a gift a t a l l ; it is a painfully acquired power, except in the sense olf the universal mental desire for improvement which is bestowed upon all human beings." On the next page he says ( b ) " Initiative is not a reasoning process, it is a blade that darts from you and acts : the word responsibility has no connection with this quality. It is above responsibility."

Surely., so far as there is clarity in either, ( b ) is contradictory of (a). Lalter he says of Initiative that I was " magisterially implying that this form of training is of recent development in the Navy; whereas mere it not the common training of ev'ery sailor no Navy could have a continued existence."

From this statement we must deduce that in any Navy which has a conltinued existence (e.g., that of Turkey, Greece, Spain and many others) Initiative is the common training of every sailor.

Surely my critic can hardly ask us to believe this. I submit that the study and cultivation of initiative is well known, historically, t o wax and wane. Thus Mahan : " T h e sequel of a long period of peace is a demoralisation of ideals. Those who rise in peace are men of formality and routine, cautious, inoffensive, safe up to the limits of their capacity, supremely conscientious, punctilious about everytthing but what is essential, yet void altogether of initiative, impulse and originality."

During my first ten or twelve years in the Service I am fairly sure that the importance of ini~tiative, or the desirabilitv of cultivating it, was never once mentioned to me by any officer under whom I served.

NAVAL REVIEW NO. 3, V01. XIX, August 1931, pp. 451-458.

662 INITIATIVE.

My critic says " our author discards the immemorial science of the sea and substitutes for it the doctrine of irresponsibility. I t is evidence itself of that which he wishes to deny ; that there is no field for initiative left."

I certainly deny " that there is no field for initiative left." I loolr on the suggestion a s horrible and untrue; but if my critic adheres to it he is surely portraying to us a strange sltate of aifairs. H e asserts earlier " 'The power of initiative is the veritable fire, the nervous system, of all forms of human life at sea ; and development of it has been the aim from time immemorial " (yet another definition !). Are we to believe that in the British Navy we have developed initiative from time immemorial, and yet have evolved a system of command where " there is no field for initiative left? " Surely the idea is fantastic. Let me add that I have nowhere suggested a desire either t o " discard the immemorial science of the sea " (whatever that phrase may mean) or to " substitute for ilt the doctrine of irresponsibility." Rather it is my critic who does this, partly in his definition (b) quoted above, and even more when he says " the responsible naval oficer confronted by a difficult situation will not be considering ' what my Commander-in-Chief would desire me to d o if he were standing beside me,' he will instantly be acting in the light of his own developed powers of judgment. No ' officer of the highest calibre,' not even one of a lesser exaltation, would put so futile a question to himself." I n other words the subordinate exercising his initiative will be guided rather by his own " developed powers of judgment " than by the probable wishes of his Commander- in-Chief. This surely is far nearer to the doctrine of irres~ponsibility ! My suggestion, however, was based on a paragraph in " Field Service Regulations " which runs a s follol~vs : " -1 departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order, and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting a s his superior, if present, would order him to act." Ts it necessary or logical, or even polite, for my critic t o apply the term " fultile " to a suggestion of this nature, which at least has enjoyed the sanction of the W a r Office, and was used for training the British Ai rmy before 1914.

However, let the dead past bury its dead. Perhaps my critic will agree with me in this, that if the modern hindrances to initiative are anywhere near a s great a s some people would have us believe, we must take special pains in the future to develop it by every means in our power.

(This completes the discz~ssion.--HON. EDITOR.)

T H E URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY.

Note : The main part of this article was written immediately afier the pub-

lication of the M a y Commission's report. Since then the nation has been faced with a tremendous Jinancial crisis, the end of which n o m a n as yet dare prophesy. Grave as the position i s , i t i s only one particular manifestation of the much more fundamental and prolonged economic crisis, through which we are passing. T h i s will not be eased by any eco.nomj1 which reduces the strength of the Royal Navy . Nearly every penny of the naval estimates i s spent ultimately in wages paid to m e n and women living inside the Empire ; consequently, so long as there i s unemployment, naval expenditure i s economically analogous to public relief works. Secondly, a n essential condition to a retu9n of prosperity i s continued peace and security, both of which depend very largely on the Royal Navy.

EVER since the war, the importance of national economy has steadily grown, and has just as steadily been ignored by an electorate too ignorant to understand, or too apathetic to care. Whether or not people will wake up in time to prevent a crash, or whether we too must pass through the ordeal of hunger and misery which has purged Central Europe, remains an open question. Such matters, although really above the plane of " politics," do not fall within the scope of this article, which is written to examine the matter from the limited naval point of view.

In no public service is the question of economy more urgent than in the Navy. The point is not so much to reduce the estimates, although this may well prove necessary, as to carry through a large building programme without increasing their total. More than one article in THE NAVAL REVIEW has drawn attention to the serious discrepancy between the fleet we are allowed by the London Treaty in 1936, and the fleet as it is likely to be. Only a costly programme of construction can make up the deficit, and maintain the country's position as a first class naval power. Somehow this cost has got to be borne, without raising the estimates on the one hand, or sacrificing efficiency on the other.

The object now is to consider ways and means of economising to this end, and for the sake of clarity a system of sub-heads is adopted :-

664 THE URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY.

NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES.

First and foremost, we must face drastic cuts in the non-effective services. Not only are non-effectives mere luxuries as compared with combatant services or war equipment, but I think it could be shown that they have not suffered their fair share in the cuts that have already taken place.

Taking the medical department for instance : one is at once struck by the large number of small ships which carry a surgeon commander, where it might be expected that a more junior officer would do. Then again, look at the immense hospital staffs, and indeed at the size of the hospitals themselves ! The improvement in naval health since pre-war days in unquestioned, added to which personnel are fewer ; surely therefore there must be room for sweeping reductions in the medical services.

The last twenty years has witnessed a great expansion in the educational branch, and no one will grudge praise for the work that has been done. No one will deny that naval education has reached a standard which is truly remarkable, but the question is : can we afford it ? Do we need so high a standard of knowledge on the lower deck in particular ? No real use is made of the knowledge of the advanced class boy, or of the artificer who passes the higher educational test. In fact too much education may even be detrimental, because there is danger in educating a man beyond the station he can reasonably expect to reach. Exactly the same argument applies to officers, who never have occasion to use half the theoretical knowledge that is given them. I t seems, therefore, that the instructional branch could be reduced in numbers, and the average length of courses cut down, both of which measures would save money.

Before leaving the question of education, it is worth while considering whether the duties of chaplain and naval instructor could not once more be combined in many commands. Undoubtedly there is a traditional association between the church and teaching, and few would assert that the average naval chaplain has enough to do as things stand. Against this people argue that it is wrong to let one church monopolise the education of men of all religions, and that an equal economy would be effected by doing away with chaplains altogether ! Since, however, naval education is limited to technical subjects the first objection is rubbish ; moreover the Church of England happens to be the national church, and only our " moderns " would deny the value of religion in a seaman's life.

Continuing the review of non-conbatants, we come next to the accountant branch. Here again there should be room for economy. Complaints are always being made of the volume of unnecessary returns,

THE URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY. 665

and so forth. Unfortunately whenever the matter has been tackled, astute secretaries have been able to " prove " that they are all essential ! Perhaps an arbitrary reduction in accountant officers and their dependent ratings by 25 per cent. would be the wisest plan. Either those who remained would then work longer hours, or else it might be discovered that some of the paper work was not quite so essential as had hitherto been supposed.

Lastly, under the same heading, it is fair to consider the position of engineer officers employed ashore. Many such appointments could equally well, if not better, be filled by civilians. Yet a naval officer is far more costly, because his pay and pension are higher, and he has to be trained at the public expense. The long " advanced E " course could probably be dispensed with if engineer officers were mainly employed in sea-going billets. (Over and above this, the present policy of training engineer officers in electrical work and turret machinery, is wasteful, seeing that executive officers have proved themselves perfectly capable of performing these duties themselves.) Although the ambition of the engineering branch to make themselves self-supporting both ashore and afloat, for maintenance and design, has much to commend it, it is, nevertheless, a luxury which we cannot afford.

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS BORNE.

So far the bulk of the economies proposed has been at the expense of non-executive officers. The same gross excess exists on the executive side. If anyone doubts this, let him look at the size of staffs in administrative commands, or a t the number of officers borne in heavy ships and shore establishments, or a t the number of officers who go through some form of S.O.T.C. and the number of times they do it !

Still, the case of executive officers is on a different footing, because there is a valid argument for retaining an excess. Doctors, school- masters and accountants all exist ashore, and in time of trouble they are availabIe after very little training to serve in the Navy, or, for that matter, in any other Government service. But executive officers have to perform duties which cannot be learned quickly, and have no counter- part in civil life either ashore or afloat. Consequently the need for a reserve is held to be justification for retaining so many in excess of present requirements, in case naval expansion again becomes the order of the day.

While admitting the importance of this argument, it must give way t o the paramount claims of economy. Thus one of the principal proposals here made is that the number of executive officers should be cut down at once to the bare minimum required for a Navy of the size allowed under the London Treaty.


A substantial portion of the estimates naturally goes to defray the cost of maintaining the fleet in a proper state of repair. Expenses in this connection can be considerably reduced by laying up ships, provided an efficient care and maintenance routine is carried out. Given this condition, not only do running costs fall, but the life of the ships tends to increase. From a material point of view there is no objection to this course, because ships laid up can remain at reasonably short notice, say four weeks at the outside.

No economy in this direction is practicable, however, unless provision can be made for the training of the personnel displaced. On the technical side it is easy enough to provide for this ashore, and also by seeing that all officers take a turn in such ships as remain in commission. But continuous sea training is desirable from the seamanship point of view, and can be obtained in any class of ship. The proposal is, therefore, that a proportion of the larger ships, which cost so much to run, should be laid up, and that sufficient reserve minesweepers should be commissioned to absorb their personnel. I t would need a careful investigation to discover just how much money could be saved in this way, but certainly there is no reason to suppose that training would suffer. Some officers might even hold that a lieutenant-commander and lieutenant would benefit more as captain and executive officer of a sloop, than as first and second divisional officer in a big ship !

An indirect advantage of such a scheme is that it would augment the amount of coal burned, at the expense of oil fuel : the only important commodity which the Navy buys abroad.

Now that economy has become so urgent, very serious thought should be given to the Fleet Air Arm. The money that is spent on carriers is little short of alarming, particularly when their permanence as a type is questioned by many critics. At any rate there is a case for running them less until a more efficient form of propelling machinery can be devised, which will not require such frequent and costly refits.

On the personnel side it is legitimate to ask why so many pilots and observers need be trained. Here again the question at issue is not whether we would like to have them, but whether it is essential!

If only two large carriers were kept in commission, and the rest repaired and then laid up, the whole Fleet Air Arm could be reduced in proportion, and a substantial saving thus effected. Doubtless the training of the rest of the fleet would suffer a little, but needs must when the

THE URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY. 667

devil drives. At the same time it might be advisable to spare a little more money for research on flying boats, which seem to be rather neglected at present.

Great care is necessary in attempting to cut down grants for experimental work, if only because the temptation is so strong. Yet although a large amount of the money spent under this head never yields any return, and although at the best it takes years before results appear, there is no branch of expenditure more vital in the long run to continued efficiency.

Even admitting all this, there remains scope for great economies. But while an association with experimental work leads to the conviction that savings are possible, it also leads to caution in suggesting how they can be effected.

Without doubt the chief measure should be a large reduction in the personnel employed under this head. Not only would their salaries be saved, but a mass of work which is not really essential would automatically be dropped. Little doubt exists that at the present moment a good deal of experimental work is undertaken chiefly to justify the position of its originator !

In addition to this, there is room for change in the organisation of the experimental services. At present there is apt to be a lack of precision in defining the goal which is being sought in any particular branch of work. Since the war it has been the custom that the staff side at the Admiralty should control policy, and lay down technical requirements, while the different bodies of " experimental officers " are only supposed to try out the material given them by the various " design " departments. Such an arrangement does not work well, because staff officers do not as a rule possess the technical knowledge required in those who initiate policy in material development. It would be better if the experimental officers performed that function, subject to advice from the staff side. By this means designers would be kept under the control of men who had a fairly thorough knowledge of the work in question both on the tactical and material side, and who would therefore know what results to expect, and how long to wait for them.

Finally there appears to be a good deal of overlapping between departments in experimental work, but this is a matter which requires special investigation.

DOCKYARD SERVICES. Although the most rigorous financial safeguards have been applied

in recent years to dockyard estimating, the belief persists that they are


still run on grossly extravagant lines. Nor is this belief entirely un- founded, as its basis is the leisurely and indifferent methods of the dockyard workmen. In spite of notable exceptions, it is true to say that no commercial undertaking could be run with profit which depended on the output of the average dockyard " matey."

Presumably the dockyard officers have done all in their power to improve matters, and we are therefore driven to suppose that trades union discipline and restrictions are too strong for them. But there is no reason why the struggle should continue, as an easier solution is to employ pensioners in lieu of the present workmen. On the technical side we know that this is possible ; it is proved by the splendid witness of the Port Edgar naval base. The only obstacle would be bitter opposition from the T.U.C. during the change over, but this could not prevail if the Admiralty were determined.

Possibly the mere threat of such a reform would bring the men to their senses, in which case it is possible that their terms of employment could be amended so as to place them more under the control of executive officers. Be that as it may, no scheme of naval economy would be complete, which did not embrace the dockyards.

PENSIONS. A number of specific economies have been put forward, all of which

are of an administrative nature, and most of which involve large reductions in personnel. The hardship entailed by such reductions is only too well known, and yet there is no alternative. If the nation is to live, we must cultivate the habit of placing the common weal before that of individuals, however hard it may be.

There is only one way in which the blow may be softened, and that is by the provision of good pensions. Unfortunately even this is not easy, because, if carried too far, the savings on one vote will be offset by the increases on another ! Even as it is, the cost of naval pensions has drawn an adverse comment from the May Committee. In spite of that, few men would be found to support dismissals on the scale recommended in this article, unless pensions, equal at the very least to those which now obtain, remain in force.

To make this possible, it is suggested that a new scheme might be tried, whereby two alternative scales were offered. One of these would be unconditional, but on an economic basis, and therefore rather low. No more need be said about it here. Alternatively there would be a high rate offered, on the condition that its recipients remained at the disposal of a special employment board. This board would keep in touch with employers' organisations, and would endeavour to obtain

T H E URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY. 669

posts for all those on its books. The latter would be obliged to accept any post thus offered, and during the time it lasted they would forfeit an amount of their pension equal to one half of the salary pzid them. For instance if an officer with a special pension of £300, was given a post with k400, he would drop £200 off his pension, thus receiving a total of £500. By this means it would obviously be in the Admiralty's interest to find employment for ex-officers who went out on this scheme. T am convinced, moreover, that the difficulty which officers and men find in getting jobs " outside " is due not to their lack of ability or fitness, but to their lack of influence and push.

In putting forward this proposal I am confident that, provided suitable men were found to serve on the employment board, it would prove a success. The Exchequer would gain through saving on pensions, the pensioners would gain by augmenting their income and having something to do, and industry would gain by receiving the services of men of proved ability, trained in the finest Service in the Empire !

Measures of economy such as those which have been discussed can, of course, be imposed upon a government department by order of the Cabinet. In such circumstances they are hardly likely to prove of lasting value. The real secret of economy is that it must come from within, and the real obstacle in its way is the absence of any incentive to the spending departments to reduce expenditure on their own initiative. Indeed, the attitude of many officers is one of indifference, or even hostility, to the efforts of the financial side. Shocking as this may seem,, it is not due to stupidity or lack of patriotism, but to the belief that it " is not their job " to secure cuts, but rather to get as much out of the Treasury for the Navy as possible. The way to do this is to spend up to the uttermost farthing of the estimates, because an economy one year is sure to be rewarded by a corresponding cut for the year following ! In a word, there is not enough sympathetic co-operation between Treasury officials and the executive heads of Admiralty departments. How then can we expect the road to economy to be easy, and what is the remedy ?

One obvious course is to give responsible officials a personal interest in cutting down expenditure, but this may be ruled out at once, because it is a certain path to corruption. An alternative would seem to lie in a modification of the existing law as to estimates. At present the law requires that every penny voted by Parliament should either be spent during the financial year for the precise purpose mentioned in the estimates, or else not spent a t all. There is no alternative. Admir-

670 THE URGENT N E E D FOR ECONOMY.

able as this system is in principle, it is thought that a slight relaxation may now be profitable. I t is suggested that the Controller should have the right, subject to the approval of the comptroller general, of utilising any savings under one head for certain specified services. These would include anything in the nature of capital reserves (such as war stock equipment, oil fuel stores, etc.) or new construction. As a safeguard these provisions would not apply to votes on account of personnel.

Only a slight departure from the narrow path of orthodox finance is involved in this proposal, and it is obvious how great a stimulus it would be to the Board to secure economies. Admittedly they would lead to no saving on the estimates for the year in question, but they would be valuable guides for the following year !

A far more daring reform, and one that ought to yield a far truer economy, would be to stabilise the estimates over a number of years. That is to say a certain fixed total would be guaranteed for a period of years, subject of course to the power of Parliament to alter it by a fresh Act. The political opposition to such a proposal would be so intense that it is hardly worth while advancing it at all ! But it is worth while noticing, that, from a purely financial point of view, such a course is entirely sound. In time of peace, a year is far too short a period to plan ahead for, and its adoption renders any far sighted constructive policy almost impossible.

CONCLUSION. Little more remains to be said. The urgent need for economy is

common ground, but a t present the Navy is being starved by a hand to mouth policy of petty savings. In this most difficult of problems, there appears to be too little co-operation : it is a case of every department for itself ! The result is general uncertainty. Schemes are launched only to be abandoned while yet incomplete, and worse still there seems a danger of equipment being neglected. These are well known signs, and it is only by a policy of retrenchment in non-essentials bold in conception and ruthless in execution, that we can avoid degenerating into a second rate Naval Power.

ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE O F NATIONS.

IN the August number of THE NAVAI. REVIEW^ there appeared a brief article which had as its object the diffusion of knowledge about the League of Nations. The present article is not written in a spirit of blind antagonism to the League, but merely to present another side to the picture. No human institution is above criticism, and it is right that naval officers should have put before them the case against the League, as it is run at present. Apart from this, since foreign affairs are rapidly approaching a crisis greater than any since the Treaty of Versailles was signed, there is no time more suitable than the present for a brief survey of the position.

To begin with, it is worth while reviewing the past record of the League. So far as minor matters are concerned, it may be conceded a t once that excellent work has been done. Such causes, for instance, as the suppression of drug-traffic, or the abolition of slavery, have been furthered to a degree almost impossible without continuous international co-operation. Neither is the League's record of dealing with small nations anything to be ashamed of. Such matters as the financial re- organization of Austria after the war, or the settlement of the Greco- Bulgarian dispute in 1925, can justly be claimed as diplomatic triumphs. But it remains to be proved whether Great Powers will be willing to accept the League as an arbiter in their disputes. Up to date the policy has been one of evasion. Not to put too fine a point on it, Geneva has run away from big issues. It has given no clear lead on the problem of reparations or inter-allied debts; it failed to take decisive action when France invaded the Ruhr; it has contributed next to nothing to the limitation of navies, or the settlement of disputes arising therefrom ; most recently of all it would not take the responsibility of handling the situation arising from the proposed Austro-German Customs Union. This last failure is particularly disquieting, because the question was eminently suitable for settlement by the League. In referring it to the purely legal tribunal at the Hague, who then proceeded to tackle it from a semi-political point of view, not only did the League demonstrate its own weakness, but it brought into disrepute the entire theory of international judicial arbitration.

NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 3, Vol. XIX, August, 1931. pp. 475 e t seq.

672 ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE O F NATIONS.

The fact of the matter is that the League council can never be sure of itself. Instead of being composed of men in a position to use their independent judgment, its members are mere delegates, sitting at the pleasure of their respective governments. This alone is a well-nigh fatal source of weakness, but it is aggravated by the low prestige of the League as a whole. Whatever the causes of this may be, it has one vital effect : the League dare not risk a rebuff on a major issue. That is the explanation of its reluctance to face up to major problems.

Yet it is only fair to say that the bulk of the men who attend a t Geneva are practical statesmen, and are inspired by a genuine desire for peace. With this end in view they have adopted reductions in armaments as their supreme policy. In this they are also supported by the fact that the securing of an all round reduction is definitely cited in the Covenant as one of the raisons d'itre of the League itself. So much attention has been concentrated on this question of armaments that people have begun to regard their reduction as an end in itself, rather than as a means to the end of peace. I t is legitimate, however, to ask whether the mere fact of smaller armies would necessarily make their employment less likely.

As things stand, there are two great forces working for peace in Europe. One of these is public opinion, which is still vitally influenced by memories of the last war. But time will reduce the importance of this factor : already there is a rising generation which knows nothing of the horrors of 1914-1918. The other safeguard is financial. No nation can afford the vast expense of war, crippling alike to victor and vanquished. This will remain true so long as armed forces are maintained on their present scale ; but the moment they are reduced the cost of war comes down as well. Herein lies the danger of reverting to the very small professional armies of a past age. They tempt an ambitious nation to embark on some sudden act of aggression, in the hope of obtaining a swift decision. In other words, it once more becomes possible to make war pay.

Against this it is argued that large armies are so unsound economically that their very expense forces nations into war, in the hope of ending the necessity for maintaining them. I believe this argument to be unsupported by a single incident in history. In any case its economic premise is untrue a t present, as no one would assert that the world needs more men released for potential productive work ! Certainly a military party may force a country into war, but that is by virtue of its political influence, which is not necessarily dependent on its size. War, after all,. is not started by soldiers, but by politicians : a point often overlooked !

ENGLAND AND T H E LEAGUE O F NATIONS. 673

The truth is that peace can only be ensured by removing the causes, both actual and potential, of war. If such action is possible in Europe to-day, it is here that the League could be of service. But before ex- amining the situation from this aspect, there is one lesser criticism of the League's record to be made.

So long as wars are recognised as possible at all, it should be the effort of every civilized government to ensure their being waged as humanely as possible. To this end two great principles have grown up :-Respect for prisoners of war, and respect for non-combatants. Of these, the latter is by far the most important, and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that civilization itself is partly based on the personal immunity of the non-combatant. Although the origins of this idea are to be sought in religious scruples and humane feeling, its practical application has also owed much to self interest. The experience of more cruel times showed that attacks on the civil populace were unsound. They scarcely affected the real strength of the enemy, and they made a lasting peace almost impossible, on account of the bitterness left in their wake.

For these reasons, " cross-ravaging," as a method of war, has been utterly discredited in Europe for about 300 years. Yet to-day it is being advocated again, under the guise of gas attacks from the air on enemy capitals. Such a mode of warfare is at once terrible and futile, and it is pertinent to ask why the League has not tried to get it banned. Ad- mittedly there have been conventions against the use of gas a t all, but these would certainly be disregarded, and indeed it can be argued that gas is more humane than bullets or high explosive. The point is that the principle of attacking non-combatants should be fought, and up to date the League has evaded the issue.

To say that everyone is a combatant in modern war is no more true, save in degree, than it was in ancient war ; and to say that the League does enough by trying to stop war altogether merely begs the question. The inference is that the League finds the bogey of gas attacks too valuable for purposes of peace propaganda to be laid, and if this is so, its whole sincerity is open to question.

Returning now to the main thread of this paper : what is the actual position in Europe to-day ? I t is based on the Versailles Treaty, which was a dictated treaty, that is to say it was a treaty imposed by force, and a treaty which is still maintained by force. Its supreme object was, and for that matter still is, to ensure the subjugation, military, economic, and financial, of the Central European powers. At one stroke it abolished the traditional policy of balance of power, and substituted that of the supremacy of France. Whatever may have been the intentions of the framers of the treaty, this, in effect, is what they have achieved.

674 ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE O F NATIONS.

Any one who cares to travel can see the result for himself. Europe is divided into two camps ; France with her $rot&g&es (such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), on the one hand, and Germany, with Austria, on the other. Entirely different standards of living prevail in the two groups. France, in particular, can boast a degree of prosperity which is unparalleled in her history. But in Central Europe there is poverty and distress, a t once so widespread and so intense, that it has to be seen to be believed. The people themselves are hardworking and virile, but they are bowed down by a weight of economic adversity and financial burden, such as no nation can permanently endure. What is more, they know it, and they know the cause. Is it a matter of surprise, therefore, that among the youth of Germany, to whom the war is only history, there should be a hatred of the French so intense that only war can appease i t ? Indeed, there must be millions who feel that nothing could worsen their present lot, and who look at death on the battlefield merely as an alternative to starvation.

Small wonder, therefore, that France is afraid, and thinks of her security. I t is not easy for her to reverse the policy of the last thirteen years, even if she would. After all, the Frenchman is proud of his country's position. " Politically and financially, as well as in military strength, her predominance is absolute, even more absolute than was that of Germany after she had forced the dismissal of M. DelcassC from the French Foreign Office." (" The Times " leading article, 14th September, 1931.) But there is one great weakness in this position : it depends too much on the maintenance of large armaments, which will in the long run embarrass her finances. To a certain extent the position was eased by the Treaty of Locarno, under which England guarantees the existing Franco-German frontier. Further than this Locarno does not go, and any idea that the status quo in Europe as a whole should be guaranteed by this country was dispelled by the rejection of the Geneva Protocol. In spite of this, France still hopes to consolidate her present position by some less costly means than a big army : that is to say by committing Great Britain to support her.

There can be little doubt that the final crisis, which will see either the consummation or the collapse of that policy, is upon us. I t is bound up with the Disarmament Conference to be held at Geneva in February next. In order to understand this, it is necessary to realise the importance which many of the lesser European powers see in this conference. Ever since the war they have looked forward to it as the supreme fulfilment of the purpose for which the League was formed. Some of them desire to ease the financial burden which their armies involve ; others, notably ex-enemy states, hope to end the present dis-equilibrium in strength,

ENGLAND AND T H E LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 675

which they regard with apprehension. Thus the future of the League itself has become bound up with the success or failure of the conference. Obviously France, as the greatest military power, holds the key to that success or failure. What will her policy be ? I have tried to show that the price for her disarmament is security as she sees it : in other words the Geneva protocol, or some analogous instrument. That would mean that the Versailles Treaty could never be revised save by force, and Germany in despair might be driven into the arms of Russia. Such is the catastrophe which threatens Europe, and it is one which will be difficult to avert, because France has cards other than the threat to the League.

Everyone knows that the financial plight of the Central European Powers is very serious. Their difficulties, although fundamentally economic, have been greatly augmented by the heavy reparations which they have to pay. A second collapse in Germany would probably precipitate a revolution in that country, with incalculable consequences to Europe at large. For this reason alone, it is of the utmost importance that financial help should be given to tide her over the present crisis. Unfortunately, for the first time in history, England is unable to assist. More than this, France is the only European nation who can, and it is not hard to guess what her price will be. Only the other day, the Bank of England was unable to participate in the Hungarian loan : it was arranged by Paris, apparently in exchange for Count Bethlen's resignation. Reckless spending has, it is true, been largely responsible for Britain's present financial impotence, but not entirely. France is not a creditor nation to any great extent, and her present immense gold reserve must have been accumulated deliberately. I t is hard to resist the conclusion that i t is to be used to further her foreign policy.

If this review of the state of Europe is correct, it follows that Britain willgointo the Disarmament Conferencewith two broadalternatives. Either she must inzist on keeping free from further security pacts, and similar entanglements, in which case the conference may fail, or else she must be prepared to buy agreement, at the cost of guaranteeing the Treaty of Versailles. The former alternative would endanger the continuation of the League, and indirectly precipitate another collapse in Germany, while the latter would destroy all chance of lasting peace in Europe. What in these circumstances is the correct policy? There can be no hesitation about the answer. England has always done what she believed to be just, and it is not just, even if i t were possible, that a great part of Europe should be kept for ever in the grip of poverty. We wish France well; we like to see her people prosperous and happy, but we cannot condone her ambition to dominate Europe. Consequently we must accept the ultimate need for treaty revision, even though in so doing we cause the

676 ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

break up of the League. As regards the less important, though perhaps more urgent, financial problem, our hope must lie in co-operation with America. Besides France, she is the one country able to help at this juncture. These arguments all point to a refusal to be committed to further treaties, at all costs. Disarmament is a great object ; the League is a wonderful ideal : but they are means to an end, not ends in themselves. Peace is the supreme object, and there can be no lasting peace without justice.

In conclusion I would like again to stress the gravity of the crisis which is gathering in Europe. It may be that England will have to pursue a policy which can be construed as destroying the League. An attempt has been made to show how this has come about, but, when the time comes, a flood of misrepresentation will be let loose. Let no one forget, however, that on the cause of peace the whole structure of Western Civilization may be said to rest. For thirteen years we have striven for peace through the medium of the League, but that must not blind us to the fact that our greatest hope lies in pursuing a just and open policy, with strength and independence. Perhaps by seeking a closer, and more stable, union with our Empire we shall find an easier road.

At home, also, the nation is facing difficult times. To a large extent these are the outcome of our immense material losses during the war. But those were not our only, or even our greatest, losses. We have lost faith : faith in our civilization : faith in ourselves. The supreme need of the moment is to recover our morale. We must have faith again in our religion : in our country : and in our Government, no matter what it be. There is no room in England to-day for doubters, or defeatists, and least of all is there room for them in the Navy. " The race is to the swift, the battle to the strong," and we must face whatever the future may bring, confident at least in the destiny of our country. Nothing, not even the League of Nations, can touch that ideal, and, if we hold to it, it is certain, as the Chancellor so aptly quoted, that " England yet shall stand."

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1918 AFFECTING T H E INTERNATIONAL S1TUATION.l

T w o distinct policies have been affecting the development of the international situation since the war ended in 1918. On the one hand there is the policy of security by force, on the other that of security by moral suasion. According to the circumstances existing at the time the current has flowed more strongly first in one direction and then in the other.

At the Peace Conference the Allies attemptefd to provide against centain potential sources of danger, and the provision made in the Peace Treaties definitely inclined more to the former policy than to the latter. With the passage of time security by force has tended to give way to security {by moral suasion, and an endeavour will be made to describte the steps that have been taken in this direction.

What has been done 'has rather naturally been aimed mainly. at the situation in Europe, and there will therefore only be brief references to other parts of the world.

Treaties with the various enemy Powers were concluded, mainly in 1919 and 1920, )but that wilth Turkey was not signed until 1923, a previous effont (Treaty of S&vres, 1920) having proved abortive.

The treaties were as follows :- Versailles 6Gern~any) 1919 St. Germain (Austria) 1919 Neuilly sur Seine (Bulgaria) 1919 Trianon (Hungary) 1920 Lausanne (Turkey) 7923

A most important feature of these rreaties is that they all, except that with Turkey, embody the Covenant of the League of Nations ; and it is essential to take this Covenant primanily into account when considering the situation that has been gradually developing since 1918 in consequence of the attempts that have been mad'e to restrict the possibility of war and eventually to ablolish it altogether. Generally speaking, all the developments have besen based on the framework of the Covenant.

Lecture given at the R.N. War College in July 1931 by the Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet.

On the more materialistic side of the treaties, briefly the principal geographical effects were : -

Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Czecho-Slovakia were esta,blished or re-established as independent powers. Hungary was separated from Austri,a. Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordania, Syria and Lebanon, Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan were taken from Turkey. (The first four named of these were made mandate'd territories under Ants. 22 and 23 oif the Covenant of the League of Nations.)

Further afield, the Genman colonies and possessions were taken away and entrusted as mandated territories to Great Briltain (anld in some cases the Dominions), to France and to Belgium. The United States was invited to accept a mandate over Armenia, but declined.

The one fact in relation to the Peace Treaties which seems to stand out above all else is that, although President Wilson took a very large hand at Versailles in drafting the Covenant od the League of Nations, the U.S.A. refused, eventually, to ratify the treaties or to enter the League. In considering the effect of the establishment of the League it is obvious that the League would have been immeasurably strengthened if one of the greatest Powers in the worlld had been inside instead of outside. Russia, too, is not a member. Both these Powers-- the United States and Russia-have taken a certain part, in some cases as " observers," in the League's work, more especially in its humani- tarian side (medical, social, measures against the white-slave traffic, etc.), but their omission to join a s full-time members has cramped the style of Che League vsery considerably.

Wi th the Treaty of Versailles were drafted two Treaties of Guarantee, one between Great Britain and France, and another between the United States and France. The coming into effect of each of these two treaties was dependent upon the signature and ratification of the other, and the fact 'that the United States refused to ratify and that France thereby failed to obtain its Treaty of Guarantee with Great Britain was a great blow to France and could not fail to have a decisive influence on French policy. Only quite recently a French Senator, hi. Lbmery, said, in discussing the Hoover Plan for one year's suspension of war debt and reparation payments :-

" W e are being compelled to build cruisers, if we do not wish our fleet to be outclassed by the new German cruisers. And these armaments are imposed upon us by the fact that the Amenicans refused to ratify the engagements into which President Wilson entered, and repudiated the guarantee of our security which he signed in 1919 . . . .What proof is there that, this time, the Congress of the United States will follow the President, especially if we safe-

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. 679

guard our rights to reparations? Let us not repeat the miistake of 1919, and let us remember that President Hoover may be disavowed by Congress." These remarks of M. LPmery were greated with loud applause in

the Senate. The geographical alterations made by the Peace Treaties possibly

have in them the seeds of future wars. In modern conditions probably more so than in older times, the loss of territtory leaves a feeling of resentment, and a desire to obtain restoration dies hard. In some cases the political reasons for the changes can be seen, in others surmised, but the disadvantages which may be obvious after a lapse of twelve years were doubtless not so evident then. Periodically the question of the revision of the Treaties crops ulp, and it will have been noticed that in the recent crisis suggestions to that end were put forward in the Press.

Taking the Covenanit of the League of Nations in a little more detail, the main points for our present purpose are :-

Article 8. T h e Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to t h e lowest point consistent w i t h national safety and the enforcement b y c o m m o n action of international obligations.

It is on this article, and on the preamble to Part V. of the Peace Trealty, that Germany bases her claim that the Allied Powers, a s a whole, have not done their share in disarming. The preamble to Part V. is as follows :-

" In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow. Article 10. T h e Members of the League undertake to respect and

to preserve as against external aggression the territorial in tegri ty and exist ing political independence of all members .

Article 11. A n y war, or threat of war, whether af fec t ing a n y of the Members of the League or not , i s hereby declared a mat ter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take a n y action that m a y be deemed wise and effectzial to safegz~ard the peace of nations.

Article 12. T h e Members o f the L e a g z ~ e agree that if there should arise between t h e m a n y dispute l ikely to lead to a rupture , they will submit the wzatter either to arbitration or judicial sett lement or to enquiry b y the Council , and they agree in n o case to resort to war

680 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1918 AFFECTING

unt i l three m o n t h s after the a.ward b y the arbitrators, or the judicial decision, or t h e report b y the Council .

By Article 13 the Members agree to refer any dispute which may arise between them, and which may be suitable, to arbitration or judicial settlement, and by Article 15 they agree that, failing this, they will submit th'e matter to the Council of the League. Article 14 establishes the Permanent Count of International Justice.

Article 16 $deals with " sanctions." I t runs as foll~ows :- Shou ld a n y M e m b e r of the League resort to war, in disregard

of i t s covenants under Articles 12 , 13, or 15, i t shall lipso facto be deemed to have commit ted a n act o f war against all other Members of the League, w h i c h du ly undertake inzmediately to submit i t to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant- breaking State , and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of a n y other State, whether a member of the League or not . This Article goes on to say that it will be the duty of the Council to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective milistary, naval or air force the members shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League; also that the memlbers agree to support one another mutually in any financial and economic measures taken.

A~ticle 17 provides for disputes between members of the League and non-membfers, or between non-members. The non-members may be invited to accept the obligations of membership for the purposes of the dispute; if b'oth parties refuse, the Council may take suich measures as will prevent hostilities and lead to a settlement.

For our present purpose it is not necessary to go further into the possibilities of these provisions, except to notice that the members of the League agree to submit disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, but that in the background there is the resort to war after a certain period for reflection. If a member resorts to war in disregard of its covenants, it is to be deemed to have committed an aat of war against all other members, anld should have the whole League against it. The underlying idea is that, if a conflict arises, the League will be against the aggressor, an'd the many discussions that have talcen place since the formation of the League show how clearly it is recognised that the decision as to who is the aggressor might be, and probably would be, one of extreme difficulty, and might result in shaking the League itself to its foundations.


As regards the sanctions conitemplated by Article 16 (Economic Boycott), can it be assumed that a great Power which is not a mernber of the League woul'd acquiesce in a drastic measure of tnis nature which would have such an effect on its own trade, when that Power itself h ~ s had no voice in Ithe decision ?

During the next few years discussions were taking place on the disarmament which had been held out at the Peace Conferences a s one of the things to be aimed at if war was to be prevented.

As a prelude to a conference on disarmament certain States were anxious a s regards their security if disarmament on any scale material- ~ised; alccordingly in 1924 there was produced the " Protocol for the pacific settlement of International disputes," commonly called the Geneva Protocol. This was an attempt to fill up gaps in the Covenant of the League of Nations. After discussion wi~th the Dominions and India, the British Government saw objections to ratifying the Protocol as it stood. In their view the League of Nations could not be relied on a s an effective instrumen~t for pacifying Europe and guaranteeing her security. In certain minor disputes it had averted serious trouble- a great gain, incidentally, a s a conflagration caused by a minor dispute has a n unfortunate habit of spreadinlg-but lit did not seem likely that for many years the League would be so well established, or that its prestige would be so great, a s t o be able to deal with any Great Power which considered its in~terests in jeopardy. T h e Corfu incident (1923) was an instance of this. In the Protoool too much emphasis was laid on sanctions (coercive measures and force), giving the idea that the business of the League was not so much to promote friendly co-operation as to preserve peace by organising war. H.31. Government considered tha~t the best way of dealing with the situation mas, with the co-operation of the League, to supplement ithe Covenant by. making special arrangements in order t o meet special needs ; that regional pacts would produce better results. T h e attitude thus ltaken up by the British Government killed the Protocol.

The next step was the

LOCARNO TRE-~TIES, 1925.

These treaties resulted from the failure of the Geneva Protocol, and took !the form of regional pacts, a s had been suggested by the British Government when ex,pressing their views on the Protocol.

The preamble to the treaties is interesting. " T h e representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction thaJt the

entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contnibute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the ttension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic probl'ems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and securilty in Europe, it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant .of the League of Nations."

I n the treaties, mutual guarantees are exchanged between Germany, France, Belgium, Great Bri~tain and Italy, to maintain the status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of these frontiers as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles.

There are subsidiary conventions between Germany and Belgium, Germany. and France, Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czecho- slovakia, undertaking to settle any disputes !by peaceful means, i .e . , by reference to a Permanent Conciliation Commission, an arbitral tribunal, o r the Permanent Court of International Justice. At the same time France entered into a treaty with Poland, whereby those Powers undertake to lend each other immediate aid and assistance in the event of any failure to observe the un'dertakings arrived at in the Locarno Treaty with Germany. France also entered into a similar treaty with Czecho- Slovakia.

The treaties are all based on the Covenant of the League of Nations, and supplement it to the extent that they become effective in the event of the machinery of the league failing in its purpose.

S o far, it will be seen, the tendency has been towards security by force. From this point onwards the current flows in the direction of security by moral suasion.

THE PACT OF PARIS, 1928.

A " General Treaty for the renunciation of war " was signed in Paris on 27th August, 1928. The treaty was also known as the Pact of Paris, or popularly " the Kellogg-Rriand pact " or " tih he Kellogg Pact." The initiative and the impetus which carried the negotiations through came from outside sources, that is sources outside the ordinary official circles. The negotiations originated between the United States and France, but eventually fifteen Governments were concerned, and all othei Powers were invited to adhere. In reply to a question asked in the House of Commons on 8th July, 1931, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that only six States, namely, Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, San Salvador- and Uruguay, out of the 66


which were invited by the Government of the United States to accede t o the Treaty, have not yet done so.

The treaty is a short one, consisting of two provisions :- T h e H i g h Contracting Parties declare that they condemn recourse

$0 war for the solution of international co~ztroversies and renounce i t as an instrument of national policy in their relations wi th one another.

T h e y agree that the settlement or solution o f all dis9utes 07 conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they m a y be, which m a y arise a m o n g them, shall never be sought except b y pacific means.

In rep~ly to certain reservations made by France Mr. Kellogg said that there was nothing in the treaty whlich restricts or impairs in any way the right of selfdefence; that that right is inherent in every sovereign State and is implied in every treaty.

The British Government made a reservation that interference with any part of the British Empire cannot be suffered; (that their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. This reservation may be compared to the attitude invariably adopted by the United States in regard to American affairs as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine.

ARBITRATION. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION. PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

Arjbitrahion as a means of settling international disputes was in use for many years b'efore the war, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to deal with su~ch cases as might be referred to it. The Court arbitrated in the following cases amongst others :-Dogger Bank incident, 1905 ; Frontier dispute between Sweden and Norway, 1909; North Atlantic Fisheries disputes between Great Britain and United States, 1910.

The Court still exists; it is not superseded by. the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was established as a result of Article 14 of the Covenanlt of the League of Nations. The jurisdiction of this Court is to hear and determine all cases which parties refer to it, and all matters provided for in treaties and conventions in force. Also, an important part of its functions, it acts as a sor~t of legal adviser to the League. It is open to States which are not members of the League.

For some years the United Statses refused to adhere to the protocol of the statutes of the Court; they wished to impose certain conditions which were unacceptable, but when Mr. Hoover was elected Presidenlt a feeling became pronounced that the United States should come in, with the result that it was found possibl'e to come to an agreement on


the poinits in regard to which there had previously been a difference of opinion.

THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE.

T h e jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice i s to hear and determine all cases which parties refer to it, but there is a clause in the statutes which States, when adhering to the protocol, may accept or not a s they wish. States which accept declare that ips0 facto they recognise a s compulsory (provided the State with which they are att issue has also accepted the clause) the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning

(i) T h e interpretation of a treaty; (ii) Any question of inlterna~eional law ;

(iii) T h e existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of a n ,international olbligation;

(iv) T h e reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

A nurnber of States have agreed t o this clause under certain conditions. T h e States comprising the British Empire did not agree for some time; it was felt that a dispute under the above headings might affect honour or vital interests anld the Empire apparently did not wish to be bound a s to the method of settlement in such a case. However, the present Government had made it a point in their foreign policy that they would sign the Clause, and accordingly in September, 1929, the British Government signed, with a reservation that the following disputes are excluded :-

(i) Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement;

(ii) Disp~utes with t'he Government of any other member of the League which is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner a s the parties have agreed or shall agree;

(iii) Disputes with regard to questlions which by international law fall exclusively wiithin the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

T h e British Government also added a condition that proceedings before the Court should be suspended if a dispute had been submitted to and was under consideration by the Council of the League of Nations, with certain limitations as to time.

T h e Optional Clause was signed at the same time by the Dominions and by India. 411 these, with the exception of the Irish Free State,


made Declarations in terms identical with that of the British Govern- ment. The Irish Free State signed without any reservations a t all.

'The signing of this Clause has this point of special interest to naval officers. Does it mean that in future the decisions of the British Prize Courts are to be liable to review by an International Count? I t is proposed to remark on this after dealing with the General Act of 1928.

The signature and ratification by all members of the British Commonwealth of Nations of the Optional Clause created an additional safeguard against war. The Optiional Clause, however, dealt only with justiciable disputes, i.e., disputes relating to

(i) the interpretation of a treaty; (ii) any question of international law;

(iii) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and

(iv) the nature or exltent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

?'he General Act was drawn up and approved by the Ninth Session of the League sf Nations in 1928, and is an attempt to deal with non- justiciable disputes, by providing machinery whereby all international disputes of whatever character should be capable of solution by pacific means. With the growth in the numbmer of treaties the range of justiciable disputes is continually extending, and that of non-justiciable disputes decreasing, but the drafting of the General Aat completes a n organised system of " all-in " arbitration.

The Gleneral Act deals with conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration. Justiciable disputes go to the Permanent Court of Inter- national Justice, unless the parties agree to a special arbitral tribunal or to a preliminary procedure of conciliation. Non-justiciable disputes g o to a permanent or special conciliation commission, or if a settlement is not reached by these means to an arbitral tribunal, whose decision is binding on the parties.

It will be seen that the General Act provides a comprehensive mcethod of settling all international disputes of whatever character. As already stated (p. 683), Article 2 of the Treaty for the Renunciation of W a r of 1928 (Pact of Paris) provides :-

T h e H i g h Contracting Parties agree that the sett lement or solution of all dispzstes or conflicts o f whatever nature or of whatever or igin t h e y may be, wh ich m a y arise betzueen t h e m , slzall never be sough t except by pacific means .


the points in regard to which there had previously been a difference of opinion.

THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE.

The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice is to hear and determine all cases which parties refer to it, but there is a clause in the statutes which S~tates, when adhering to the protocol, may accept or not as they wish. States which accept declare that ips0 facto they recognise as compulsory (provided the State with which they are at issue has also accepted the clause) the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning

(i) The interpretation of a treaty; (ii) Any question of inlterna~tional law;

(iii) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

(iv) The reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

A number of States have agreed [to this clause under certain conditions. The States comprising the British Empire did not agree for some time; it was felt that a dispute under the above headings might affect honour or vital interes~ts and the Empire apparently did not wish to be bound as to the method of settlement in such a case. However, the present Government had made it a point in their foreign policy that they would sign the Clause, and accordingly in September, 1929, the British Government signed, with a reservation that the following disputes are excluded :-

(i) Disputes in regard to wh~ich the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement ;

(ii) Displutes with t'he Government of any other member of the League which is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree;

(iii) Disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively witthin the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

The British Government also added a condition that proceedings before the Court should be suspended if a dispute had been submitted to and was under consideration by the Council of the League of Nations, with certain limitations as to time.

The Optional Clause was signed at the same time by the Dominions and by India. All these, with the exception of the Irish Free State,


made Declarations in terms identical wiith that of the British Govern- ment. The Irish Friee State signed without any reservations a t all.

'The signing of this Clause has this point of special interest :o naval oficers. Does it mean that in future the decisions of the British Prize Courts are to be liable to review by an International Cour~t? It is proposed to remark on this after dealing with the General Act of 1928.

THE GENERAL ACT OF 1928 FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. 'The signature and ratification by all members of the British

Commonwealth of Nations of the Optional Clause created an additional sateguard against war. The Optlional Clause, however, dealt only with justiciable disputes, i.e., disputes relating to

(i) the interpretation of a treaty; (ii) any question of intlernational law;

(iii) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international olbligation ; and

(iv) the nature or exitent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

The General Act was drawn up and approved by the Ninth Session of the League of Nations in 1928, and is an attempt to deal with non- justiciable disputes, by provideing machinery whereby all international dispu~tes of whatever character should be capable of solution by pacific means. With the growth in the number of treaties the range of justiciable disputes is continually extending, and that of non-justiciable disputes decreasing, but the drafting of the General Act completes an organised system of " all-in " arbitration.

The General Act deals with conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration. Justiciable disputes go to lthe Permanent Court of Inter- national Justice, unless the parties agree to a special arbitral tribunal or to a preliminary procedure of conciliation. Non-justiciable disputes go to a permanent or special conciliation commission, or if a settlement is not reached by these means to an arbitral tribunal, whose decision is binding on the parties.

It will be seen that the General Act provides a comprehensive method of settling all interna~tional disputes of whatever character. As already s~tated (p. 683), Article 2 of the Treaty for the Renunciation of W a r of 1928 (Pact of Paris) provides :-

T h e H i g h Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of (111 dispz~tes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they m a y be, which m a y arise between them, shall never be sought except b y pacific means.


No actual machlinery for solving disputes is [provided under the terms of tha~t Pact. The General Act provided the machinery. The signature of the Optional Clause was thus a logical consequence of the acceptance of the Pact of Paris, and the General Act is a further and equally logical consequence.

Amendments to the Covenant of the Idleague of Nations have been suggested so as to bring it into harmony with the Pact of Paris, i.~., to remove from the Covenant the existing possibility of recourse to \bar in certain circumstances. The amendments, as revised to meet objections that have been made to them, are to come before the A4ssembly in September next (1931).

The British Govsernment acceded to the General Act in 1931, and made certain reservations in the same way as they (had considered it necessary when signing the Optional Clause, and the reservations are practically the same. By the reservations the following disputes are excluded from the procedure provided :-

(i) Disputes arising prior to the accession of His Majesty to the General Act or relating to situations or facts prior to such accession ;

(ii) Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement ;

(iii) Disputes between H.M. Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of any other Member of the League which is a member olf the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree;

(iv) Disputes concerning questions which by International law are solely within the domestic juriisdiction of States; and

(v) Disputes with any party to the General Act who is not a Member of the League of Nations.

There is also a further reservation suspending the procedure in the case of disputes of a certain nature if submittted to and under consideration by the Council of the League of Nations. The Dominions have not yet all notified their accession to the General Act.

-4mongst international legislation of a similar nature mention should be made of a Corzvention of 1930 for the Firzancial Assistance 01 States members of the League involved in or weakened by war as victims of aggression. Briefly, this is a recognition of the help, moral as aell as material, that may be afforded by the League by timely financial assis- rtance being rendered to support a member who has been the subject of attack.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. 68y

There has also been international legislative action of a more direct type :-

( I ) The Washington Treaty, 1922. Probably the best known of the Treaties concluded at Washington

in 1922 is that dealing with the limitation of naval armaments, but another treaty was drawn up at the same time between U.S.A., Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, and resolutions were adopted, providing for :-

(a) China's sovereignty and independence ~to be recognised. The open door. China's rights as a neutral to be respected, and China to observe the obligations of neutrality.

(b) A special conference to meet to prepare the way for the abolition of " likin " (duties levied within China) and instiltution of surtax. (The Conference met and adjourned in 1926).

(c) Preparedness of Powers to reliinquish extra-territorial rights in China. (N.B. : Germans and Austrians relinquished such rights under the Peace Treaties and Russia has relinquished hers.) X Commission met and made a report.

Certain other matters concerning railways, radio-stations, etc., in China were also dealt witlh in resol~utions. In consequence of the unsettled state of Chiina little progress has been made in these matters, but negotia~tions are still going on.

In another treaty the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, agreed as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. If their rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the four parties to the Treaty agree to communicate with each other as to the measures to be taken to deal with the situation. The four Powers mentioned addressed an identic note to the Netherlands Government to the effect that as fihat Government was not a par~ty to the Treaty they wished to declare that they were resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to her insular possessions in the same part of the world.

There is also in the Five Power Treaty, i .e . , the Treaty relating to the limitation of Naval armaments (British Empire, U.S.A., France, Italy and Japan), an article by which the British Empire, the United States and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in the following places :-

(i) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ccean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, -Alaska and the

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1918 AFFECTING

Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(ii) Hong Icong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 1100 east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada; (b ) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, anfd (c) New Zealand.

(iii) The following insular [territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Xmemi-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pesca- dores, and any insular territory or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

(2) The London Naval Treaty, 1930, dealing with the limitation of naval armaments; supplemented by the Anglo-French-Italian Naval Agreementt now under negotiation.

(3) The Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 for the control of the traffic in arms and ammunition, and establishing a special regime for certain parts of the world (A4rabia, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and certain parts of Africa), and lastly,

(4) The culmination of many years of work of certain League of Nations' Commissions, in the drawing u<p tin 1930 of a skeleton draft Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments (Naval, Land and Air), which is to be submitted to a General Conference to be held in February, 1932, whose work it will be to convert it into an operative Disarmament Treaty.

Acceptance of Compulsory Arbitration under the Optional Clause and its im~lications.

The Declaration of London, 1909, after having passed through the House of Commons, was thrown out by the House of Lords because it meant that appeals from the decisions of the British Prize Courts could be taken to an International Prize Court which it was proposed to set up at the Hague. In effect, by the signing of the Optional Clause the Permanent Court of International Justice has now been consbituted an International Court of Prize.

The Labour Government in power in 1924, when contemplating signing the clause, had proposed to make a reservation that " in any measures which the fleet might take in execution of the work of the League it would not be subject to any but British Maritime Law." No such reservation was made when the clause was signed in 1929.

There was the possibility that the reservation that was made, ex- cluding " disputes with regard to questions which by international law


fall excl~usively within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom," might include Prize Court cases, but in a memorandum issued by the Govern- ment on the signing of the clause this possibility was definitely ruled out. This reservation applies to those matters in regard to which international law recognises that the authority of the State is supreme. T h e memorandum mentions the arguments against signature and then gives the reasons for considering that the arguments are not weighty enough to justify declining to sign.

I t has been argued thalt so much uncertainty still exists, both a s to the scope of international law and as to what on many points it really is, that to bind ourselves to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Inlternational Justice in all questions of international law is a leap in the dark. W i t h a particular bearing on prize law it has been put forward that there is a great difference between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental schools of thought in inlternational law, and that the Anglo-Saxon would be outweighed on the Court by the Continental. The argument on the other side is that any difference between lthe two schools of thought is not so great a s some would make out, and that it would mean waiting a long time if we are to wait until centainty on all points of international law has been reached.

The memorandum goes on to deal with the apprehension that the signature of the clause would, by exposing the legitimacy of British belligeren~t action at sea to the decision of an International Court, hamper the operations of the British Navy in time of war. T h e points made to controvert this are that such a situation can only arise if the country which is desirous of challenging the validity of such action had iitself signed the Optional Clause, and that only those countries can sign the clause which are members of the League of Nations or mentioned in the annex to the Covenant (i.e., IJ.S.X., Brazil, Ecuador and Hejaz); also that any. past belligerent action is excluded by one of the reservations. T h e general argument of the Government's memorandum is to the effect that the situation has grown up on the assumption that there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war a s a n instrument of national policy, and thalt therefore the position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent of the circumstances of any war which may be in progress; that the renunciation of war in the Pact of Paris has altered matters entirely inasmuch that nations have now deprived themselves of the right to employ war as an instrument of national policy, and are forbidden to give aid or comfort to an offender; that lthe whole policy of the Government is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations under the Covenant and the Peace Pact, and that consequenltly the only situation we must envisage in the event of war

in which we are engaged is one in which the position of the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and the Pact. In such a case we must either be the victim of aggression or waging war against a covenant-breaking State. In either case all other members of the League are bound by Article 16 of the Covenant to sever commercial relations with the aggressor or the covenant-breaking State, and they would then have no cause of complaint of any action our ships might take against one of their ships caught carrying contraband, etc., since any such protes~t must be based on a claim to trade with the enemy, which would be inconsistent with their otbligations under the Covenant. I n other words, a s between memibers of the League there can be no neutral rights, because there can be no neutrals.

This argument ignores the fact rthat the United States is not a member of the League, and that there i s nothing in the Pact of Paris o r anywhere else to say that in the event of war the United States will not claim the right to continue trading with the enemy under such conditions as it may think fit if it wishes t n do so.

T o summarise the situation :- T h e Covenant of the League of Nations endeavoured to reduce the

possibiliity of war, by encouraging Powers with disputes to setrtle them by peaceful means, or failing this by imposing a time limit for reflection before war was declared.

T h e Locarno Treaties gave additional security by guaranteeing certain States against aggression.

By the Pact of Paris ahe contracbing panties, and those who have adhered to the Pact, condemned war as a solution of disputes and agreed never to seek settlement of a dispute except by pacific means.

Signing of the Optional Clause signifies that the setltlement of justiciable disputes shall always be sought by pacific means, and provides the means by which settlement shall be attempted.

T h e signing of the General Act provides for the settlement of non- justiciable disputes always being sought by pacific means.

I t nould appear that the future would be less uncertain if the League of Nations were all-embracing. T h e attempts made by the Pact of Paris and the General Act to rule out war do bring into the picture the principal Powers whose absence weakens the power of the League.

July, 1931.

(?;oTE.-AIZ i ~ z t e r e ~ t i n g l e c t ~ ~ r e o n th i s subject , under the t i t l p " Arn7amelzt and Disarnzament since 1918," w a s give91 at the R.U.S.I. o n 7 t h October last b y M r . Wiclzha??~ S teed . I t i s reproduced in the R. U..C.l. Jourlzal for November , 1931 .--HoN. EDITOR.)

SOME REMARKS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION.

THROUGHOUT the ages the character of the English has been something of an enigma to foreign observers.

Tlze Celt in all his variants from Buil th to Bully-hoo, H i s mental frocesses are plain-one knows what he will do, .4nd can logically 9redicate his finish by his start; But the English-ah, ihe Engl i sh !-they are quite a race apart, Their psychology i s bovine, their ozctlook crude and raw, T h e y abandon vital matters to be tickled with a s traw; But the straw that they were tickled with-the chaff that tlzey

were fed witlz- T h e y convert into a weaver's beam to break their foeman's head

with. [RUDYARD KIPLING-" T h e Puzzler."l

They exhibi~t other anomalies. W i t h a quite genuine verbal de- precation of their own achievements they manage to combine a n equally genuine instinctive feeling of superiority to other races. They are ardent enemies, but quick to bury their hatred. And one of the most remarkable of these anomalies is an unusual genius for fighlting a losing battle and dying in the last ditch, together with a readiness to give up-at least verbally-a difficult situation which demands action a s hopeless, and to accept what comes with an almost Oriental fatalism.

This last tendency is very marked to-day in men's conversation when they gather over the gin, and, in one opinion at least, it is doing an enormous amount of unnecessary damage. Certainly this is no occasion for the facile, synthetic optimism of the penny press, but to talk a s if the game were lost, without even trying to gain such points a s can be saved, is ruinous to morale and lets the side down badly.

It \\ill be said that this talk should not be taken too seriously. Of course not, but it is sufficiently serious to make a difficult task far more difficult. By mental association, the phrase " exploring every avenue " has an unpleasant r ing; but it is what we should be doing at this time, and not merely deploring the state of things. TATho can say in how much better a position the coal industry would be to-day if it had applied half the effort, research and enterprise that the oil men have shown? T,il;ewise, constructive thought and action are what we all need-not jeremiads.

SOME REMARKS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION.

If we look about, we find that most of our neighbolurs are in no hetter condition than we a re ; and a survey of history reminds us that the nation and the Navy have weathered more severe storms. Let us have less of this defeatism and more of a real determination to accept un- grudgingly the sacrifices which must be made, and to use to the ultmost the resources we have.

T h e greatest danger seems to be that some of our countrymen may try to make political capital out of our present difficulties. It is a danger not confined to one side of the House of Commons, or to one class of society. W e would do well to remember Drake's words in his time of dissension :-

" By the lilfe of God, it doth even take my wits from me to think of it. Here is such controversy between the sailors and the gentlemen, and such stomaching between the gentlemen and sailors that it dolth even make me mad to hear it. But I must have it left. I must have the gentleman to draw and haul with the mariner, and the mariner with the gentleman. Let us show ourselves to be all of a company, and let us not give occasion to the enemy to rejoice at our overthrow. I would know him that would refuse to selt his hand to a rope, but I know that there is not any such here. Plnd as gentlemen are necessary for government's sake in the voyage, so I have shipped them to that and to some further intent; and yet though I know sailors )to be the most envious people in the world and so unruly without government, yet may I not be without them."

But if we are to give effect to )this, we must have leadership and a n effort to make all classes realize the situation. Propaganda is another word that stinks in our nostrils, but something of the sort me must have, t o annul what is being done in the opposite direction. Men nil1 accept hardships if they know why they must bear them, and that they are not alone. Here is an opportunity for us all to d o something useful.

As regards the fighting forces, we must of course expect most drastic economies, and yet we must not be disheartened by them. They should be an incentive to make the most of what we have, and to improve the health olf the Service which has been exhibiting disquieting sympitoms these last few years. I t is in times of stress that man advances, not in the fat years. I t might be well if the economies are directed more towards materiel rather than personnel; but, a s regards personnel, the opportunity should be taken of weeding out and discarding the misfits. O n the material side, we might well sacrifice some of these costly mechanical gadgets-the principles of THE NAVAL REVIEW will not allow them \to be mentioned in more detail, but no doubt every officer

SOME REMARKS ON T H E PRESENT SITUATION. 693

can think of a number-which in so many cases have been supplanting perfectly adequate gear. W e may do this more easily because at this time it is unlikely that our rivals will have much to spare for similar frills.

It is easy to preach this gospel; it is not so easy to practise it, and the control does not rest with us in the ranks. Yet surely there is much that lies within our power to lighten the task of those who have to lead, and in a small way we can set an example. And as a beginning we might avoid this apathetic pessimism.

NAVAL LANDING PARTIES.

A GREAT deal has been written in recent years about the dangers of specialisation, but a s a rule the subject has been approached from the point of view of the individual. That an able and brilliant officer may ruin his career by sliding into too narrow a groove is hardly open to question. Rut more important is the danger to the Service a s a whole that may follow from misapplied specialisation.

W h e n a new weapon is introduced, or while a.fresh mode of warfare is being developed, it is generally necessary to make it the special care of one particular department. That is the origin of specialisation, but it may contain in itself the germs of a n inefficiency which only becomes manifest later on. This will occur when the subject in question is essentially the concern of the Navy a s a whole, and should not, therefore, be made the preserve of any one department. An example is t o be seen in the case of signals, where, in spite of astonishing technical developments, it may be questioned whether we are better off than before the war. Since signals have become so highly specialised, executive officers a s a whole have progressively lost touch with them, to the detriment of efficiency. There is the same danger in the association of tactics with the torpedo branch, only the issues are graver.

Perhaps the most striking example of misplaced specialisation is to be seen in naval landing parties. In the past, !the value of a company of seamen ashore depended chiefly on their ability as riflemen; and, since small arm training was carried out at Whale Island, it was natural for the entire landing party organisation to drift into the han'ds of the gunnery depantment. No one doubts that the duties thus imposed were carried out conscientiously and well, and, so long as the conlditions remained a s they were before the war, the results were satisfactory. No criticism of gunnery officers is therefore implied in saying that the landing party organisation of to-day represents the weakest point in naval efficiency. T h e fault does not, and cannot, lie with any one department, but is the inevitable result of trying to " specialise " something which has become the concern of all departments. I t is never too late to mend though; and everything concerning naval operations ashore deserves our serious consideration, with a view to reform.

In the first place it may well be asked whether naval officers a s a whole recognise the importance of the subjeat. S o long a s peace con-

NAVAL LANDING PARTIES. 6 9 ~

rinues it is very unlikely that any ship \$ill be called upon to fight an action at sea, but occasions for service ashore are not uncommon. More- over it has often happened in the past, and will happen agrin in the future, that the prestige of the Emlpire, and even the maintenance of peace, turns on the conduct of a naval landing party. From this it follows that the arrangements for a ship's company operating ashore are a concern of the captain's, second only to his concern for the fighting efficiency of his ship. Obviously there is only one ofticer who should be in charge of the landing party, and that is the second in command. Theoretically this is recognised, but in practice the whole training of landing parties is left to the gunnery officer, who in nine cases out of ten lands in charge of them himself. Yet he is the one officer, besides the captain and the navigator, who is likely to be required on board during the time that fighting ashore is taking place. The marine and torpedo officers are both available in such circumstances, and are the otbvious people to form the commander's staff ashore. Thus, the first plea of this anticle is that a ship's landing organisation should be the personal conLern of the commander, who would normally take charge whenever m'en were landed for training. Further it is urged that marine and torpedo officers should train themselves to act as his advlisers on the operational and technical points likely to arise. The gunnery officer would continue ito be responsible for weapon training, but his duty during an operation would be to provide the artillery support likely to be required from the ship, and incidentally to act as her executive officer while th'e commander was ashore.

So much for the general question of command and responsibility : but it is on the ttechnical side that there is most need of reform. The weak point of a naval landing party is its small numbers, and this must always remain the case. -4 battleship is a great unit in fleet strength; in fighting power, or relative influence, she is the equivalent almost of an army corps; yet she can scarcely land 500 men : half a battalion. But small numbers ought to, and can, be redressed by superior equipment, based on the immense resources of a warship. Magazine rifles may have been good enough in the past, but in these days of revolvers and machine guns even a disaffected populace may be a match for a seaman company armed as ithey are. In order to see what arms and equipment are needed, it is first necessary to consider the types of service likely to be perforn~e~d by naval parties.

Three distinct categories stand out. Civil disturbance, riot, and revolution, is the first and most common. Secondly there may be a need for the temporary defence of some vital position, or seaport, until troops can be brought up. This is perhaps the most difficult task the

696 NAVAL LANDING PARTIES.

Navy can be called upon to perform ashore, because it may involve collision with a trained army. Lastly there are rare occasions in which a well-timed raid may delay hostilities until forces can be marshalled and further trouble averted. Such raids may be on some vulnerable bridge, or tunnel, or on some great arsenal, but in all cases they pre- suppose the presence of hostlile troops.

These three cases will now be considered in greater detail. In civil commoltion, the essential thing is to restore and maintain order, with the least possible loss of life. This latter requirement is vital, and constitutes the main d(ifficu1ty. I t is nearly always possible to suppress a riot with armed force, if action can be taken regardless of bloodshed. Unfortunately, when order is restored in this way it is short-lived, because the seeds are soiwn of further and more bitter trouble. The best way to maintain peace in a population seething with rebellion is by the display of armed force in some form in h511ich it cannot be attacked. X body of men armed only with rifles may even be a source of danger, because tthey can be sniped from the hous'etops with little chance of the real culprits being punished. On the other hand the mere presence of a ship anchored in the harbour, with guns trained on the shore, is no longer effective, because in these enlightened days everyone knows perfectly well that she would no~t be allowed t o bombard. T h e solution is to patrol the streets with tanks and armoured cars. In no ordinary riot will the populace possess weapons of any value against a tank, and therefore it is unlikely to be ahtacked. This was proved mostt effectivelj- in the general strike, during which great food convoys passed safely through some of the roughest parts of the East End. Tanks and cars have the further advantage of mobility, enabling a small number of men to exercise effeative control over a much larger area.

T h e proposal is that every heavy ship should carry two medium- sized tanks, and all ships should carry the necessary equipment to fit out a few lorries a s armoured cars : that is to say suitable machine guns and bullet-proof plating. There is nothing impracticable in this ; t he weight of such tanks would be well within the scope of the main derrick, and both weight and space considerations would permit of their being carried on the upper deck. They would either be of a special amphibious design, capable of propelling themselves ashore and crawling up the beach; or else they would be towed ashore in flat bottomed lighters, in which they would normally stow.

By this means a heavy ship, at any rate, would have the means of policing even the largest town, without sserious risk either to her landing party or of precipiltabting a disastrous conflict. Eut tanks and armoured cars, although ideal for maintaining order, are not so suited to restoring

NAVAL LANDING PARTIES. 697

it once serious rioting has started, which may well be the case on first landing. For this purpose there is only one bloodless weapon : gas. Generally, tear gas alone will be sufficient temporarily t o stop the fighters, while the sailors can g o in and disarm them, also securing the ringleaders. If it is found that more drastic steps are necessary, a non- lethal irritant can be used. Such substances will render even trained troops impoten~t for some hours, without risk of fatal consequences. They have the added advantage of being difficult to protect against, and improvised respirators would be useless. I t would be possible to distribute the gas over the disturbed areas either by means of the tanks and cars already mentioned, or from aircraft which are carried by an increasing number of ships.

In advocating the use of non-lethal gases by naval landing parties, the writer is well aware of the political olbjections which exist. T h e sooner these are overcome the better, and it is the duty of all &ell-informed people to drive hoime the essential humanity of certain types of gas. T h e agitation which has led to a blind prohibition of its use is among the most wicked and ignorant of post-war movements. Those so-called humanitarians who are responsible are the people chiefly to blame for the terrible loss of life which has occurred in native riots during the last few years. Gas was the one weapon which could have mitigated the horrors of Cawnpore, or checked the killing in Jerusalem.

The next class of operatiion to deal with is the temporary defence of a position against the attacks of a regular army. Here again the chief difficulty lies in n~umbers, and the only solution is machine-gun fire. Every Inan in the line should be part of a machine gun's crew. There is nothing difficult in this, because a warship can easily carry and maintain the neccessary number of machine guns, and keep them well supplied with ammunition. From the experience of the last war it would seem that the guns should be placed in separate proteated shelters, which could probably b'e improvised ashore with a little training. ,\rtillery. support would, of course, come from the ship herself, and should a t least be capable of preventing the enemy from conducting an effec~tive bombardment of the machine gun positions. Such artillery support requires practice, and is not at all the same a s a " bombardment " exercise, because the ship is likely to be in position first, enabling the ground to be surveyed, sighting shots fired, and SO on.

The principal requirement for defensive operations seems therefore t o be a lavish supply of machine guns. Rut a great deal of detail could be perfected with practice. For instance; there are communications with the shore observers to be provided, the best way of maintaining a con-

698 NAVAL LANDING PARTIES.

tinuous barrage to be tried out, the pro~blem of providing illumination ashore to be solved, the possibilities of strengthening a position by demolition work to be explored, and a host of other things.

Lastly, there is the pro~blem of raids in the face of a superior enemy. Here the keynote of success is always speed and surprise. Generally the essentials are a well-trained demolition party, acting in conjunction wirh a small but thoroughly reliable supporting party. The potential value of tanks and machine guns for this type of work speaks for itself, and these have already been advocated. A4 far better demolition platoon than the average ship possesses is also wanted. In the writer's limited experience, few ships exercise demolition work in anything approaching active service conditions, the main reason being fear of accidents. Indeed, practice of any kind is usually evaded, with the result that both materials and training are inadequate.

Summarising the plea of this article, it is urged first of all that landing parties should be given a much more important place in ships' organisations than is the case at present. Under the personal control of the commander, they should embrace all departments in the ship, being regarded as second in importance only to action efficiency. On the material side, a revolution in equipment is proposed; to include tanks, gas, and a lavish supply of machine guns. By these means it is claimed that a force more worthy of the ship supplying it could be put ashore when need arose.

In conclusion it is desired to anticipate one line of criticism to these remarks. It will be said that it is the human factor which counts; that the moral is to the physical as three is to one; and so on. No one disputes this. But the existence of a high morale has been taken for granlted. That by itself is not enough ; weapon efficiency must be maintained. The finest troops in the world cannot compete when hopelessly outnumbered by an enemy who is also better equipped. If smaller numbers are to prevail, they must be superior in three other respeclts : morale, training and equipment. It is the last two which are so sadly neglected at present.

THE FLEET AIR ARM.

I. THE present organisation of the Fleet Air Arm, though it has done good service, and has been the only method by which the Royal Air Force organisation could be made suitable for naval work, is but a makeshift. Only the excellent relations existing in aircraft-carriers between the two Services, and a mutual determination to make the system work, together with the fact that the supposed mysteries of the trade have enabled the Fleet Air Arm to move at its own speed without much attention from higher authority, have enabled it to function so smoothly.

11. The principle disadvantages that the Fleet Air Arm suffers from at

present are :- (I) Few captains and wing-commanders of aircraft-carriers, or com-

manding officers of Fleet Air Arm bases and training schools have had much experience of Fleet Air Arm work. While captains are rapidly becoming more experienced and this disadvantage will soon disappear, the position of wing-commanders is more grave, since there are so few posts where experience can be obtained. There is only one squadron- leader in each carrier, and they have almost purely administrative duties ; this is therefore not a position where a future wing-commander can best gain experience. The solution is to create more squadron-leaders, for whom there is now a place and a need, and to open the higher Royal Air Force ranks to naval Pilots.

(2) The conditions of service for Pilots, and to a lesser extent for Observers, are not such as best fits them for higher command, nor are they good enough, despite the obvious advantages, to attract the most capable officers or to make selection as competitive as is desirable.

Conditions of service for Pilots have the following disadvantages :- (a) Pilots have little knowledge as to their future prospects. There

is small chance of their specialised training being of much use to them in the higher branches of the Service unless the higher posts in the Fleet Air Arm are available for them. One presumes that this will occur eventually, and it will not only give a greater incentive but will also make the Fleet Air Arm more attractive. Their present conditions of service are not, however, the best preparation for filling these posts.

70° THE FLEET AIR ARM.

(b) There is a great danger of stagnation since a Pilot's responsi- bilities in his flight are small until he reaches the position of flight- commander and he naturally tends, and is encouraged, to leave the operational side entirely to the Observer, training in which is essential if he is to be capable of carrying out the duties of wing-commander efficiently.

(c ) There is no central school for the Fleet Air Arm, as in other branches to which officers can return from time to time to pick up new ideas and methods, and to repolish old ones.

(d) Until a Pilot becomes a flight-lieutenant he has had few respon- sibilities or opportunities of exercising command, and these will not increase until he becomes a commander. A more gradual increase is desirable.

Conditions of service for Observers are, on the whole, better than those of Pilots ; their training is more efficient and their subsequent employment provides an excellent experience in fleet work and brings them into close contact with the activities of other branches ; but there are the following disadvantages :-

(a) In air work an Observer may be doing the same duties from the day he joins his first carrier until he ceases flying.

(b) His opportunities of exercising leadership and command of men are comparatively small.

(c ) There are only four " promotion jobs " available for them : Senior Observer of the four large carriers.

(3) There is room for improvement in the training of all ranks and ratings, and the lack of a central establishment of similar standing to Excellent and Vernon is a great handicap.

The present training system is undoubtedly far from satisfactory. Though the Observers' course has improved enormously since Observers were sent to Lee to instruct, yet Lee has many defects as a seaplane station, is out of touch with the Fleet Air Arm, and is lacking in many of the necessary facilities for instruction.

The Pilots' course does not attain as high a standard of efficiency as is desirable.

The atmosphere of Fleet Air Arm bases and stations is not as efficient as it should be. This is possibly due to an inevitable tendency on the part of the naval officer to relax his sea standards on coming ashore if not giver, enough to do, to coming under a new commanding officer who naturally does not wish to interfere more than is necessary with the Fleet Air Arm flights, and to a lack of guidance and up-bringing i11 how things are best run ashore.

THE FLEET AIR ARM. 701

A central establishment that would set a standard would cure this, and it would also provide a place where the contrary opinions of carriers on matters requiring practical investigation could be thrashed dut.

(4) The Fleet Air Arm is a much divided branch, split as it is into Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, Pilot and Observer, and a reduction of the divisions must make for greater efficiency, even though the organisation in a carrier now works smoothly enough. The present system causes several anomalous situations such as :-

(a) When aircraft are embarked in capital ships and cruisers neither Pilot or Observer is entirely head of the air department ; an unsatisfactory situation.

(b) When a carrier's aircraft are disembarked to a shore base the senior Observer makes out all orders for carrying out fleet exercises and for fulfilling fleet requirements, and sees that they are done, yet the squadron-leader takes the responsibility.

(c) A torpedo-bomber flight, and most probably a fighter-reconnaissance flight, works as a unit and the Observers attached to it must work much more closely with the flight than is the case with spotter- reconnaissance flights. This the present system does not allow, since the Observers are not directly under the flight-commander and have no regular position in the flight.

The following three suggestions are put forward to remedy these faults :-

(I) The creation of a central training establishment, under Naval command, on similar lines to Excellent and Vernon.

( 2 ) Pilot and Observer to be combined, Officers being trained to carry out the duties of both.

(3) The formation of squadrons.

IV. CENTRAL TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT.

This is the first requirement of the Fleet Air Arm. With an establishment of this nature better training facilities could be provided, improvements could be more easily introduced and greater efficiency obtained. Moreover, a close liaison could be maintained with the carriers and sea requirements more efficiently catered for and fulfilled. '

It will also be far better able to cope with the inevitable wartime expansion than the present system. The Royal Air Force reserve of Pilots will be of little value for naval work without further training, and our own naval reserve is insignificant. I t will be zlecessary to train

702 THE FLEET AIR ARM.

a large number of ab-initio Pilots, the majority of whom will be without previous sea experience, and only a Fleet Air Arm training school will be capable of giving them a suitably specialised training in a short time.

The ideal for a Fleet Air Arm base is an aerodrome and a seaplane base in the closest proximity, with deep water where a carrier can lie ; the whole being adjacent to a naval port.

v. COMBINED PILOT-OBSERVER.

This reform should do away with the majority of the disadvantages under which both now work. I t may seem a big step, but it appears to be essential. A great weakness of the present system is that the Obser- vers are getting all the training in the operational side and the Pilots none, training which is essential to them if they are to fill the higher posts in the Fleet Air Arm; and it is chiefly to counter this that it is suggested, but it has very many other advantages. The naval officer will then be fully trained in all branches of aviation instead of being only half trained as at present.

The Fleet Air Arm school must be formed first, as neither of the present establishments is capable of giving the necessary training. The school will also be in the best position to consider the practical difficulties, since they will have to give this dual training. Spotter- reconnaissance flights will then have twelve officers appointed to them, and fighter-reconnaissance and torpedo-bomber eight, while the internal organisation of duties will be dealt with by the flight-commander or squadron-leader. Royal Air Force officers can be easily fitted into the scheme ; they would do the course, omitting the flying training, before being appointed to a carrier.

The combined course should not take longer than a year, since some of the instruction is common to both and there is room for speeding up in both the present courses.

The only disadvantage appears to be whether the combined Pilot- Observer will fail to exceed in any respect the present standard of efficiency of either. The amount of flying and annual routine training carried out by each is at present scarcely adequate, but the flying facilities in the Fleet Air Arm are increasing yearly, and this, together with the increased efficiency of training, should counter this objection without difficulty.

The following promotion zones, periods of flying and of general service are suggested for the qualified Pilot-Observer.

Flying . . 3 years. G.S. . . I year

THE FLEET AIR ARM. 7O3

Flying . . 4 years. Zone for promotion to flight-comdr. : 49 to 6 years seniority as lieut.

G.S. . . I year. Flying . . Until promotion to commander.

Zone for promotion to squadron-leader : r to 3 years seniority as lieut .-comdr.

A commander holding the position of wing-commander of a carrier or a shore base would have the rank of wing-commander.

While general service is evidently necessary at present, there will be such a large number of officers doing it that they will form a big proportion of the " salt horse " complement of capital ships and cruisers. Changes every year must reduce efficiency but longer periods are objec- tionable from the flying point of view. We must hope that when aircraft are more regularly carried in capital ships and cruisers the necessity for general service will disappear.

There should be a limit of seniority for volunteers, and the first period of flying should be elastic so that all officers will have at least six months flying during their second period before entering the zone for flight- lieutenant. Too much advantage by way of flying seniority should not be gven as this is likely to deter later volunteers.

Sergeant or petty officer Pilots are outside the scope of this paper, though they appear inevitable and must be prepared for, as are other questions dealing with personnel.

VI. FORMATION OF SQUADRONS.

Now that we have three large carriers in commission there appear to be many advantages in the formation of squadrons, since each of them will be able to carry three ; one squadron each of S.S.F. or F-R, T-B and S-R ; the squadrons being composed of three flights of from 4 to 6 aircraft.

Pilots will then get command of a flight earlier and receive a more gradual increase in responsibility. The introduction of the Pilot-Observer will make the formation of squadrons even more desirable since the duties of the flight-commander and the training of the personnel will become more complicated and require more experienced supervision, which can best be obtained by placing them under a squadron-leader.

A squadron-leader should also be appointed to look after all aircraft borne in capital ships and cruisers when the number of aircraft in these ships warrants it.

The following would be the organisation of a carrier with squadrons and the combined Pilot-Observer :-

704 THE FLEET AIR ARM.

Commander (Pilot-Observer) or Wing Commander I

Lt .-Cdr. (Operations) Lt.-Cdr. (Fighters) Lt.-Cdr. (S-K) ~ t . - ~ d r . (T-B) or Sq.-Ldr. or Sq.-Ldr. or Sq.-Ldr.

I Sq.-Ldr. (Administrative)

I F1.-Lt. (Adjutant)

I i I 1 I

Leu;. (S) Lieut. (Met) ~ i e u t : (Ph) Lieut. (Armament)

The lieut-commander (operations) would correspond to the present Senior Observer and should preferably be senior to the squadron-leaders. The squadron-leader (administrative) might be redundant if a senior flight-lieutenant was appointed as adjutant. One signal officer only would be borne.

VII. The Fleet Air Arm is out-growing its present organisation, and these

three reforms-though not the only ones necessary-appear to be the most essential if the great progress already made is to be continued.

AIRSHIPS.

SOME may say that the subject of airships can hardly be the concern of the naval officer, and-as judgesd from this writer's experience-so much confusion o~f thought exists about rhem that obviously they are not! Therefore an apology. is made for dragging this subject into a paper intended for naval officers, but a hope is sustained that an attempt to review the present situation and suggest solme of the possible developments may not be without interest.

Sir John Simon, during the course of a debate in the House of Commons, delivered the following remarks : " I think that we ought to regard airship transpont and development as an international problem- not as an opportunity merely for develoiping a national service in rivalry with, or at the expense of, other people, but as an attempt by civilised mankind to do something more to make use of the brains and courage of men, and of the chara~ter of the world in which we live. . . . But, if we want to do it, we must pay our way. W e cannot expect America and Germany and other countries to afford us the full advantage of their progress and development if we do not do something crurselves."

His Majesty's Governm'enlt have voted ~ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 per annum to enable R.100 to be kept in flying trim so that the crew and airship staff will be kept in practice an'd the laboratory conclusions tested.l In America two large ships are being built with an estimated capacity of g,ooo,ooo cub. ft., on rather similar lines to the 1,os Angeles, of Zeppelin construction, and one large metal ship of 3,800,ooo cub. fit., 100 tons lift, with a designed speed of IOO m.p.h. The two ships of Zeppelin con. struction are to be commissioned with the Navy and the third of metal construction with the Army.

It is reported that large shlips are under construction in both Germany and Russia, though as far as known thev are not of the all metal type. The paucity of the British " wait and see " policy can only be gauged when it is remembered that from a nation possessing the largest airship in the world, the first unit in a great scheme of Imperial communication,

Since this paper was written the Prime Minister has announced that R.100 would be disposed of. Times 12th September 1931.

7 0 ~ AIRSHIPS.

we have descen'ded to the last place among the great powers in airship development. This regrettable state of affairs is due, no doubt, to the serious financial condition in which we find ourselves combined with the shock and uncertainty engendered in the minds of the general public by the R.101 disaster.

Perhaps the question is asked : What outstanding advantage has the airship to offer over the aeroplane? The airship is vulnerable and expensive, whereas the aeroplane is proving more useful and saltisfactory each day; why not devote this ~ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 per annum towards their development? The answer to this question is found to be one of performance. The airship possesses a greater degree of aeroldynamic efficiency at the normal speeds of commercial aircraft, which is shown by its great radius of action. Funther the present day airship provides fewer structural problems, and is therefore probably cheaper to build, than an aeroplane of the same weight, lifting capacity and radius of action.

THE LESSON OF R . IOI .

R.101, the most ambitious airship ever projected, has probably unwittingly done more to hasten the day of the large suiccessful airship than any one event since the pioneer ascents of the first balloonists. Some such catastrophe was needed before the fundamental problems of airship construction would be carefully re-examined, and a break made with previous practice. For it has proved that airships of the R. type are unecono~mically constructed. This is no new thought ; probably few people understood this better than those responsible for R.101 and her construction, though, rather than do nothing, they elected to use the most immediate materials. Hence the next real step forward is the simplification of afirship construction.

The solution to this problem is to build an airship similarly to a ship ; that is to say, let the hull, or outer skin, displace the supporting medium and carry most of the distributed loads. T o fulfil such a design, the use of metal is suggested, because the " strength " of metals per unit weight is generally higher than that of the organic materials.

The first experimenter on record in this matter is Father Lang, who, in 1670, partially evacuated four thin copper spheres with a view to their flying. Unfortunately the external pressure of the air crushed the spheres before sufficient air had been displaced to lift them. T o this day no form of construiction or material has been employed that will obtain this ideal, i.e., lift due to direct displacement of air. The next experimenter was an Austrlian, Schwartz, who, in 1892, built a vessel

AIRSHIPS. 7O7

from sheet aluminium and displaced the air within by means of inflated fabric gas cells contained in the shell. The vessel is reported to have made an ascent posthumously to the inventor.

But it was not until 1921, .when Ralph H. Upson, a well known American automotive engineer, formed the Airship Development CO. that the metal airship became a practical possibility. The story of the production of this vessel, lettered ZMC-2, now the profperty of the U.S. Navy, is an epic of scientific enterprise. The credit must, in the main, be given to the Americans, though solme also is due to the Air Ministry and the National Physical Laboratory for their whole-hearted co-operation. Upson, together with a group of scientific and commercial men and backed by General Motors and the Ford Co., set to work in 1 9 2 1 to investigate the practical possibilities of a metal airship built on ship principles.

The fundamental problem was one of weight; that is to say would such a ship built from metal compare favourably in weight with one built on rthe Zeppelin principle, for equal lifting capacity. And this in turn largely depended upon the shape of the vessel chosen. Thin sheets of metal can be highly stressed in tension with little alteration of shape, but, in compression, small loads produce a large deformation. Thus, in the metal vessel it would be necessary to maintain a gas pressure when in flight, inside the hull, as is the practice in non-rigid ships, if the best use was to be made of the properties of the metal. From a structural point of view the best shape for the ship woul~d have been a spherical one, and the worst a cylindrical. The spherical shape would be very difficult to stabilise economically, while a cylindrical construction similar to Zeppelin would not employ the properties of the metal economically. A compromise was adopted, and the ZMC-2 was built with a fineness ratio of about 2 . 9 : I as colmpared to Zeppelin practice of about 8 : I and R.100 of about 5.5 : I ; this ratio has proved effective and easy to stabilise the shiip. The advantages expected of metal construction are best enumerated under headings as follows :-

Simplif ication of S t r z~c ture . In the R. type airship a section through the ship reveals five skins

or systems. (a) External fabric; used to preserve shape, give dynamic lift, and

protect the internals. The continual alteration of the tension in this fabric provides one of the more difficult problems in Zeppelin type airships.

(b) Shear wiring to cope with shear stresses in the hull. ( c ) Gas pressure wiring to transmit and accoimmodate load due to

lift of the gas bags.

.to8 AIRSHIPS.

(d) Gas bag netting, used to locate the gas bags in the hull and transmit load to (c)

(e) Fabric gas bags, lined with goldbeater's skin.

In the case of the metal airship the hull and internal longitudinal beam members, located with transverse frames and wire braces, do duty for all five systems enumerated above for the R. type.

Less Structure Weight. Calculation has shown that suitably stressed metal airships, designed

for large capacity (3,000,ooo cub. ft. and above) and high speeds (100 m.p.h.) show a distinct improvement on structure weight over equivalent ships of the R . type.

Economical Operation. Provided that the seams and rivetting can be made gas tight it is

found that the leakage of metal airships due to osmosis is approximately 1/10 that of airships, in which the gas containers are ma'de from goldbeater's skin and fabric. Osmosis is an important matter in the operation of all airships, and becomes yet more important if helium gas be used in place of the more usual hydrogen, though the diffusion ra~te of helium is about half that of hydrogen. Should the goldbeater's skin containers even be stretched due to a slightly excessive pressure, then their diffusion rate rapidly increases.

Ultimate Cheap Production. This is only practicable with the use of metals; for the organic

materials used in the R. type do not possess sufficient homogenity ito be used for mass-production purposes.

Miscellaneous Advantages. (a) Reduced fire risk. (b) Betlter con~ductivity, leading to a high rate of dissipation of the

charge if the ship be struck by lightning, thus avoiding high local currents.

( c ) The metal hull provides excellent heat-conducting qualities, ensuring that the gas quickly takes up the temperature of the air when changing altitude.

Worh of Construction. From the foregoing it is seen that the advantages gained by con-

structing ships fro'm metal are considerable; perhaps even the only practical method of building large ships to exceed speeds of loo m.p.h. But the difficulties in the way are also many.

AIRSHIPS. 7O9

The stressing that would occur owing to the new form of construction was first carefully examined from the drawing-office standpoint, and a tentative dfesign for a ship produced. T h e result of this work held such promise that the U.S. Navy Department ordered an experimental ship of 200,ooo cub. ft. capacity, ZMC-2, from the Company. But some very serious prac~tical difficulties were present, firstly, suitable aluminium or aluminium alloy sheet had not been produced in sheets sufficiently large and thin for the purpose. Secondly, the pitch and size of the rivets required to make the hull gastight was an exceedingly large numjber, 3,000,000 approxima~tely for the small ship to be constructed. Further, rust would be absent from the seams, which assists materially in gaso~meter practice. Thirdly, corrosion must be practically non- existent, or its effect upon the thin plates would be serious. (Thickness of plates : .oogU.) Fourthly, the effect of vibration upon plating of this nature might easily lead to extensive cracking. These constituted the major problems with which the constructors were faced, and their solution has entailed a considerable advance in engineering practice.

The Aluminium Co. of America set to work and su~cceeded in producing large sheets of duraluminium about .008" thick; no mean achievement when it is considered that the fabric employed in the R. type of ship i s approximately .o21" thick. T h e rivetting problem was surmounted by inventing and subsequently employing a machine capable of dealing with 5,000 rivets per hour. special cement, of a bitumastic base, was used between the seams and has proved very satisfactory in practice. W i t h these difficulties overcome the work of construction was commenced in March, 1928, and it was not until a considerable portion of the hull had been built that it was found the dura l~min~ium sheet developed serious intercrystalline corrosion after some six months exposure. This made its use for the ship quite out of the question. Therefore the help of the British Air Ministry was sought, the latter putting their anodic process, used in the construction of metal flying boats, at the disposal of the Company. Though this method had given entirely satisfactory results in the case of our own flying boats, it did not meet with the same uniform success when used with such thin plates. Meanwhile the Aluminium Co. of America had produced and tested a new metal, having almost i'dentical physical properties of duraluminium of equal thickness, but immune from intercrystalline corrosion. This metal, Alclad, consists of a thickness of duraluminium sandwiched between layers of pure aluminium ; as manu- factured it has a bright silvery appearance which after some service dulls over due to the formation of a thin film of aluminium oxide. It is this oxide which bestows upon the duraluminium its unique property

71° AIRSHIPS.

of resisting corrosion. Xlclad sheets seem to b'e admirable from the point of view of resisting fatigue strain; sections have been cut from the hull of the experimental airship, an'd in no case have they shown any appreciable deterioration after two years of service. These results have so far satisfied the Company that they feel quite confident in predicting at least eight to ten years life for ships made from this material. Suffice to say that most of the practical difficulties in the way of metal airships have now been mastered, and that ZMC-2, having completed some three years of arduous service, has proved the most assuring ground work on which the Company are building the military ship of 3,800,ooo cub. ft. capacity.

G.4s. A4s first designed, it was intended that the ZMC-2 should be a

hydrogen ship, though subsequently helium was employed instead, and it is to be used in the new ship. After two years of operation the loss of gas amounts to a daily average of 258 cub. ft., equivalent to approximately 16 lbs. of lift. Though this loss cannot be considered excessive it is !thought to be mainly due to the diffusion through the fabric balloonettes contained within the hull, and it is anticipated that the fitting of a new material, recently introduced, will reduce these losses considerably. Eventually the ideal may be oibtained, when the ballooneittes will themselves be constructed from metal. In the larger sizes of ships the percentage loss is likely to be further reduced because the ratio of the length of seams to the total hull area will have been greatly reduced as compared to the small ZMC-2.

The co-operation of warships and aircraft can be viewed from two points-either the uses of aircraft to warships, or the uses of warships to aircraft ; and which ever point of view may be held by an individual seems to depend upon whether he be " sea-minded " or " air-minded." T o the naval officer, because he cannot afford to dispense with aircraft, the aircraft carrier or the carrying of aeroplanes on board warships, has come as a considerable complication to his strategy and subsequent tactics. T o reap the full benefit of air services the vulnerable carrier must be close at hand anld to windward of the enemy ! To the airman the carrier inflicts all the limitations and dangers of surface craft in war, forestalling the primary advantages of the aeroplane.

Thus it would seem that the large airshi'p-aircraft-carrier would provide the simultaneous panacea to the ills of both the naval officer an'd the airman. large airship should be capable of refuelling

AIRSHIPS. 711

machines in the air, and actually carrying a small proteotive fighter flight. T h e high weight-lifting capacity of tthe large airship, coupled with its powers of endurance, large olperating staff for navigation, signals, co-ordinating information and so forth, make it a useful adjunct to any fleet. I t is not anticipated that the fuelling, provisioning, and gassing of the airship would provide very serious obstacles conducted from a ship a t sea.

Airships, however, are vulnerable to attack by aeroplanes ; therefore it would be essential that the protewtive flight should be of an exceedingly superior order; otherwise operations in which an air supremacy could not be maintained would have to be avoided, in order to keep such a vessel in being. I t should be understood that it is not suggested that the airship be used for any punpose other than that of a mobile base for the aircraft flown from a distant carrier.

Summarising the position, it appears that the metal airship will prove commercially successful, and that, in war, its maximum use would be to the Navy, in which it would serve as a mobile base for aircraft, refuelling and changing aircraft crews, and perhaps even undentaking repairs. At present the nation is committed to spending ~ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 per annum on an obsolete ship, and the Navy just aren't interested ! !

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. FOUR REPLIES.~

I. W h e n I told m y R o y a l Marine f l i tendant that there were some

w h o favoured abolit ion of the regatta, his reply w a s " They ' re no th ing nzore t h a n atheists."

THE author of the anticle " T h e Regatta and Efficiency " comes to the conclusion that an annual fleet or inter-ship regatta is " a definite hindrance to efficient training, antd a standing olbstacle to any attempt to direct the main effort of enthusiasm towards increasing the might of the fleet." H e finds, on balance, that the regatta does not generally raise morale and pride of shiip. H e believes we should direct the effort a t present expended on the regatta " towards the exaltation o~f fighting efficiency and good seamanship." The indictment is confined to the annual fleet or inter-ship regatta, a s it is emphasised that " there are many occasions when an inter-part regatta would be of inestimable value in providing interest, exercise and occu(pation for a ship's company."

I t seems possible that the opinions expressed in the article under review are held by a number of officers. I believe them to be unsound, and will try to establish that we cannot do witholua some form of colm- petition which calls on the guts of a man, and that nothing I have yet heard of is so suitable to our needs a s the regabta. I will also try and make it clear that the regatta does not lock up enthusiasm which otherwise would be available for weapon training. Finally, I will discuss that controversial subject-the effect of the regatta on ship morale.

THE CASE FOR THE REGATTA.

Afloat we are mainly concerned with progress in weapon technique and in the maintenance of a high state of fighting efficiency. Although there is small sign of war in the immediate future, our ships must be effi.cient here and now; o~therwise a lower standard will gradually come t3 be accepted anld, in the future, be the cause otf our undoing. T h e individual must be taught to be a link in the chain of immediate efficiency. H e must also be brought up in such an atmosphere, and be

See NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 3, Vo1. XIX, August 1931, pp. 472-474,

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 7I3

trained in such a way, a s will fit him to fill successive ranks a s he moves on and up through the Service. For the boy who turns the handles 0 1 a transmiltter may be a leading seaman or a lieutenant, and the midshipman who now controls the searchlight Evershed may be a lieutenant or an admiral, when they meet the test of war.

It follows, whether we like it or not, that we belong to a service which is for ever training--training men who conltrol machinery. These men must be efficient, courageous, and filled with determination, for, when we g o to war-which is the reason for our b e i n g ~ t h e y will take part in a competition in which there will only be the victor and the defeated. Our concern is therefore twofold : firstly to maintain a high stanldard in ship efficiency to pass on to our successors; secondly to fit the living, fighting element to face, sooner or later, the sternest test.

W e endeavour to maintain a high standard in ship efficiency, and, in so doing, we make our personnel efficient; for it can be said, bye and large, that men become efficient if they serve worthily as links in an efficient organisation. W e foster esprit de corps : we reward [the proficient. Naturally enough, capacities vary. Some men move on and up : others, wi~th llimited intellect, judgment, energy or power of command attain a certain level and th'ere remain. I t is only with a small minority that we fail. I t remains to discuss what we do, o r can do, t o foster those other components which the fighting man has need of- courage and determination.

Men possess these qualities, but they lie latent. They are seldom called on in the ordered existence of the subordinate. Together. when drawn on, tbey give a man lthe knowledge that he can be the master of circumstance and that he can translate them into terms of endurance. " The brave man's body is never too exhausted to respond to his demands upon it. I t always has a last reserve." Clearly it is essential that a fighting comlpany should beget this confidence, this knowledge.

Our training, therefore, must include some plan in which a man may find himself; but, in this mechanical, oil fuel, age, there is lilttle that is arduous in care of ship and weapon training. T h e daily work which can create immediate peace efficiency will not suffice. W e must loo~k elsewhere. In the conception of our plan we must remember ithat man is bolth a reasonable and a reasoning creature. I t must therefore appeaI to him.

W e could not, for example, land companies day after day till they reached a state of training which enabled them to endure long, forced, marches. T h e man in the ranks would never understand our purpose. The performance would in no way be related to his primary duties a s seaman or stoker, and he would look on it as an imposition. Nor do

7I4 THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY.

I know of any arduous form of training which, carried out on board, would meet our requirements. In addition to the necessity for reasonable appeal I believe-and state emphatically-thait our plan must introduce the competitive element; for it is only when a man strives for life or victory that he will draw on all his reserves. T h e strife for life against, o r victory over, the elements is no longer a frequent part of the sailor's life. T h e appeal of victory over natural obstacles (e.g., mountaineering) cannot be opened for reasons of opportunity to our seamen. W e are thrown back on the attempt for victory over an opponent-competiltion.

Does any form of training exist which fulfils these two conditions : appeal and competition. I know of none except the regatta. If another can be 'devised ilt will at once command attention, especially if it can be shaped so a s not to interfere with ship routine. Meanwhile, faute de mieux, the regatta. I t is competitive and it makes appeal, for it is related to life at sea. I t entails no passage to and from the shore. I t is sport with a capital S. I t fills up the interminable dog watches and creates a n unending topic of conversation. 11t enables a man to show off in front of his shipmates. I t interests the shipmates who, for one reason or another, do not take part. Finally, the training period is literally. enjoyed by many, for it draws men together under stress and s o is responsible for the making of friendships based on mutual respect.

I t will be noted that here I disagree with the author of the article un'der review. I do not believe that a higher standard of educaltion has led to any appreciably greater variety of interests. Men are certainly more temperate than they were before the war. There are more cameras in evidence. T h e bookstall, the cinema and tombola provide means of distraation. But ship life, of necessity, is still much the same. There is still congestion, a lack of privacy and little comfortable seating accommodation. Ashore, the sailor, in his uniform, is stiill a marked man. H e is still, more often than not, a stranger in a strange land. Xor has education, so far a s I know, altered the outlook a s to wha~t constitutes sport.

I t may be argued : Well and good, but the percentage who take part in the regatta is small. If arduous training is essential it should be undergone by all. T o which I answer : In practice there is a limit t o the nu,mber of crews that can be sent away. Second, some are past the age of great exertion. They inclu~de, however, those who, though their rowing days are over, back and encourage their younger shipmates. And last, so long as a goodly number compete, our purpose is, in the main, fulfilled. Not all the ancient Greeks were athletes, but the prowess of the minority inspired the whole to value courage, endurance, and perfection of physique. S o with us. Our crews, if they

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 7I5

have really striven, capture the admiration and affection of the ship and turn thought in the desired direction.

The author of the article unsder review considers that there are many occasions when an inter-part regatta would be of inestimable value in providing interest, exercise and occupation. I have tried to show that, in addition, the regatta has a sterner purpose. I have stated my belief that any form of training which calls on endurance must introduce the competitive element, and I hold that seamen will strive more for the honour of their ship-a natural unit--than for their division-an antificial uni~t. Moreover, a ship effort makes for consolidation whereas inter- departmental competitions have been known to cause dis~integration. For these reasons I consider an inter-ship regatta serves our purpose far better than doses an inter-part regatta.

This ends my case that the regatta is essential to our needs. If sound, it will be accepted, with its corollary that all other reasoning, for and against the regatta, lies on a lower plane and is therefore of secondary importance.

THE REGATTA AND WEAPON TRAINING. It is fair to say that the necessi~ty for efficiency in weapon technique

is generally acknowledged and that, in consequence, specialist officers are given personnel as and when they require them, both in and out of season. The training must insist on precision of movement and on the use of intelligenlce but, except in the loading of six-inch guns, it does not call for sustained physical effort. There are colmpetitions. These provoke interest, and enthusiasm is engendered if those in control are keen, able and understanding.

Can it seriously be urged that enthusiasm devoted towards physical achievement absorbs enthusiasm which otherwise would be expended in precision of movement and the use of intellecgt? I think not. Nor do I believe that enthusiasm is an absolute quantity ; that there is a definite amount which we must be careful to share out equally. " Every man and every officer gives fourfold under an energetic leader." I suggest that weapon and regatta training cannot be said to compete agains~t each other. They are complementary, for together they call on the greater part of the range of attribultes which the modern fighting man must possess.

THE EFFECT OF THE REGATTA ON SHIP MORALE.

There is one point which must be dealt with before the effect of the r,egatta on shi'p morale can be discusse,d. It is this. The regatta is only a means. 11t is not an end. Any who make it their end harm both their

716 THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY.

ship and the Service. Men are very perceptive. Id they know that those in authority are prepared to disregard cost in order to win the regatta, they take advantage of the fact. They ' try it on.' Oarsmen make a favour of their services, slackness creeps in only to be overlooked ; and discipline is thereby undermined. Even if the regatta is \\on, the last state of such a ship i s worst than the first. I n a case of this sort, an institution is put to improper use; but it is not, on that account, un- worthy in itself.

Regatta rtraining affects ship cleanliness: it puts extra work on officers and men : it upsets voluntary dog-watch instruction : boats suffer; they are lowered and hoisted to a greater extent than usual. Men come and g o from scrubbing decks and charging stations. Petty officers do not always know who should be away and who is skulking. Shipwrights are taken from routine tasks to fit stretchers, etc. Watch- keepers are relieved. Jumpers, flannels and the like are thrown on mess tables or left ' ' sculling " in locker flats. T h e adverse effect exercised is considerable but it is sometimes overestimated.

For instance, the regatta removes fewer hands from the upper deck before breakfast than does night leave given at a popular port. In any case the appearance of wooden decks is determined more by quality of scrubbing than quantity of scrubbers. Messes, locker flats and bath- rooms may not look their best at ogoo and 1600 but their real standard can be gauged at other times; after dinner for example. As to the shirker, he will quickly be detected if the organisation is thorough and if the petty officers know that they are expected to be worthy of their salt.

Aldmit~tedly the regatta creates extra work. I t disturbs the continuity of routine. T h e maintenance of that fin~ish, which is the hall- mark of the ship that has arrived, is difficult. But, once a ship is b'eautiful, the depredations caused by such incidents as a refit or the regatta are resisted to the last inch.

Inherent pride and self respect exert a centrifugal force. There will be no need to fan enthusiasm. A4utomatically the sh~ip will d o her best. If, after a period of hard training, her crews are not, in the aggregate, victorious, the immediate disappointment experienced will exercise no permanent effect, for honourable defeat is not inglorious. Tha t type of morale which I have described as centnifugal is unaffected by the buffets of fortune.

I t remains to consider the ship in the early stages of commission, and the ship which, though some time in commission, has not, for one reason or another, managed to arrive. These will find the regatta a labour. T h e e t i e ~ t on their morale will depend on the attitude

T H E REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 7I7

adopted. If determined, their performances will be creditable and morale will be heartened. If half-hearted, their performances will be mediocre and the ensuing disappointment will check development. -

The author of the article under review states " In some ships the regatta is never popular." This seems to assume uneducated popularity is Ithe criterion, which it is not, and that unpopularity is an argument against the regatta, whereas it nlay be one against the method of tackling it. A ship has individuality. It is passed on from commission to commission, and the 'effect on the men who man the ship may be good, negliigible or bad. This indivildualitp is, however, undoubltedly capable of transformation. If, for the better, it will be slow in the case of a capital sh ip ; more rapid in the case of a small ship. There is one well known case, and there probably are others, where the ship's company of a battleship professing only a mild interest in the regaitta, altered their outlook, and not only won the Mediterranean ' Cock ' but then kept it for two more years.

One fact which does affect the regatta outlook of a ship 's company is belief, or disbelief, in their boats. Actually the relative capabilities of boats is now more a subject of legend than of fact. T h e old " flash " cutters of the past have disappeared, for races are p u l l d in sloop cutters which are all " much of a muchness." Whalers, if they have lost their shape, can be remodelled on board to conform with service speci- fications. Only galleys, hand sewn, need differ appreciably in performance. Undoubtedly belief in the boats must be created and this is noit an easy matter. A boat, good in itself, but out of favour, can be exchanged for a boat from a dockyard. Shipwrights can be employed in the manner already indicated. Where there is the will, there is usually the way. I realise that the practice of remodelling boats lays itself open to abuse. Unfor~tunately there is still a tendency to admire a regatta officer who just manages to keep within the tenets of the eleventh commandment. This is a mistake we make, but one which, given common consent, can easily be rectified.

One last tiht. T h e regatta, the article under review tells us, " ruins the best part of the summer for officers and men alike." In my opinion. as already stated, a h igh percentage of the men who take part in the regatta enjoy the training peniod. It may be argued; perhaps so, but that is because ships are sent to places where there are few attractions ashore. T h e answer is, if the regatta was abolished we could not send our ships from large port to attractive watering place. -4 succession of such visits, a s is well known, would undermine the spirit of the best ship in existence. There is an element of austerity in the life we lead, and the fact musit be recognised. This being the case, though the


regatta calls for solme self-sacrifice a t a port, it provides interest when a ship is in the wilderness. I t is a blessing in disguise.

T h e majority of officers may not enjoy the regatta, but it must be remembered that a shiip during a summer cruise is on service. She is not on holiday. I t will be a bad day if we come to regard the duties of our vocation a s bound by the letter of the regulations or confined, except in emergency, to working hours. Actually in this mechanical and democratic age there is danger that such an outlook may grow. W e must be on our guard. Organisers, efficient works managers we must be ; but, in addition, leaders of men. Leaders, as such, servants. Those who, out of working hours, share endeavour with their men, follow their calling. In so doing not only do they learn much that will stand them in good stead ; they also meet and enjoy a comradeship nhich, in these days of peace, cannot easily be found otherwise.

A DISCREPANCY. Some may say : " Well, on the whole, a fair case has been made,

but life in the b ig fleets, especially in the Mediterranean, is too strenuous. T h e pace is too great : there is no let up : we are in danger of being worn out before our time. Something should be dropped. Weapon proficiency is essential; tactical and strategical training cannot be foregone; remains the regatta."

I beliaeve there is another solution. mThat we neemd is time to find our feet. If every ship, on first commissioning, was given three or four months in which to become efficient, this feeling of pressure would largely disappear. But this is a digression.

CONCLUSION. If the regat,ta fills a need, let us not discard before we can replace.

MAY I be permitted to attempt to refute some of the more obvious fallacies in the artilcle " T h e Regatta and Efficiency " which appeared in the August number? I hope that far more experienced and capable pens than mine will take the matter up, a s I feel it is extremely important to kill the germs of such doctrines before they infect the minds of the younger generation. T h e writer of the article expressed these doctrines through the medium of questions to which he provided answers-satisfactory to himself, but much the reverse to a great number of us. I shall enideavour to answer those questions in the manner in which they appear to me.

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 7*9

Does it do any good? Yes, and more particularly to those who dislike it, and who have to be driven and coerced into an unnatural output of " guts." It is also beneficial for those who have to do the driving and coercing. I t is good for everyone to have to d o something which he dislikes, and which calls for effort, unless he is physically unfit or feebleminded.

Is the regatta a popular event? This seems to me beside the point and quite immaterial. Many events are only popular with a few-such as tactical exercises and 15" firings-but only the Economy Committee would suggest their curtailment.

Is it worth while? Yes, in these dreadful days of peace anything one can produce uhich calls for the " Wil l to Win , " self sacrifice in training and good leadership is certainly worth while. T h e writer's alternative of directing all effort to the exaltation of fighting efficiency and good seamanship is not specially appealing, and I doubt if he has given the matter sufficient thought. He can hardly be ignorant of the fact that, in a modern ship, fighting-for the vast majority-consists of working some simple polished lever in one direction or the other, and that modern seamanship means playing with some mechanical con- traption. I t is not too much to say that leadership can only be exercised mllen one of these expensive pieces of ironmongery gets out of step, and even then a quite unled artificer would probably put it right on his own. Even if your correspondent could produce a n annual war t o stimulate all this enthusiasm for fighting efficiency, the regatta would still be necessary and desirable, as an antidote to gross materialism. The Great W a r proved this beyond all question of doubt.

Does it raise the morale? Of course it does, and particularly in those ships who don't win or come in second. They get their opportunity to exercise their sportsmanship and that inherent British quality of being good losers. I am more doubtful about those ships who win. It is far more difficult to win gracefully than to lose well.

Is there a decline in routine, smartness and efficiency in those ships who take the regatta seriously and g o all ou t? T h e writer of the article must indeed have had a curious career if he has found this to be the case. Experience shows that it is most unusual for the slackest or dirtiest ship to win the regatta or anything else. T h e temporary decline in the appearance of the boats must be accepted. One might just a s well say that it is undesirable to d o a full power trial a s it messes u p the funnels.

Is it desirable to raise to concert pitch the physical fitness of a large proportion of the ship's company and then to stop all exercise? [Any officer who stops all exercise for his men is not fit to hold the King ' s


commission and should be publicly lynched.] Yes, it is always worth while to raise anything to concert pitch.

Does the writer of the article consider that Zeebrugge was accomplished by a close application of the Field Training IlIanual ?

T h e induction of a variety of physical disorders is not borne out either by medical science or by practical experience. Footballers, runners or even racehorses would be in a sorry plight if this were the case. Might I suggest that such training as the writer of the ar~ticle has carried out would seem to have been neither careful nor systematic? I t is true that those who have done a great deal of pulling in their younger days do incline to increasing girth in middle age ; but so do those who g o in for drinking beer. In any case it is not necessarily an inconvenient or unhappy state, and may lend dignity to an otherwise featureless carcase.

Finally migh~t I suggest that perpetual exaltation of fighting efficiency and good seamanship would not accomplish its end, and would in all probability produce that moribund and morbid mentality so evident in the article in the _August number?

TIIE following- remarks are addressed to the member who wrote so dis- paragingly about the annual regatta in the last number of THE NAVAL IIEVIEW. They are based on the experience of regattas on the Medi- terranean Station only, and a s the conditions affecting regattas must be different on other stations it should be understood that they refer to present conditions existing in the Mediterranean.

'The regatta is not necessary, and if it was 'decided to do away with regattas there would not, consequently, be any reduction in the eHiciency of the fleet. No advantage can be seen in its teaching other than seaman ratings to pull an oar, nor is it argued that i~t increases the efficiency in the pulling in seaboats, which is practically the only remaining use of oarsmanship affecting the efficiency of the fleet.

T h e main training period for the regatta is during the first part of the summer cruise, when ships visit places where the recreational facilities for ratings are not good. T h e " general dislocation of routine and training " to which the writer refers is considered an exaggeration. During the recent regatta training period units of the fleet carried out exercise periods in turn at Argostoli. Certain ships had inspections by their respective admirals, and it is suggested that the inspecting officers had no reason to accept inefficiency on the grounds of a regat~ta training period.

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 721

The regatta is at present the greatest sporting event of the year in the fleet, and it is considered that it is popular with the majority. T h e material in all ships is much the same, and it is contended that results are achieved by good leadership and a sustained effort by a ship's company. Occasionally there is an exception to this when a ship does well withou~t the interference of officers or leaders of the lower deck; but this is considered to be a lucky flulte and not the general rule.

In a well organised ship there are less " bickerings and tooth suckings " than in an inefficient one. D o not these bickerings and tooth suckings give the officers and trainers of boats an opportunity to instil some lessons in spontsmanship? Surely the sailors are not so unsporting that they are past helping ? It is true that if the organisation of the regaitta is mishandled, and if a ship's company is allowed, through bad management, to develop unsporting traits, then a regatta is a veritable danger.

The regatta gives very good ground for officers and higher ratings to exercise their leadership; thus getting tthe best out of the men and developing a healthy ship spirit. I t gives an opportunity for a ship's company to get to know itself more intimately. These opportunities are all itoo few in peace time.

Hence it is considered that the regatta is good for the Service and, being convinced of that, the training period must be faced with a will to win. If it is undertaken in a half-hearted manner it becomes every bit a s painful a s the writer makes out. T h e effort made is not considered as wasted should a ship be winner, runner up, or bottom of the list.

T h e ill appearance of boats for a couple of months is considered justifiable. If no opportunity is ever given for the pulling boats to get dirtv or scratched, surely there is no~t much credit in their ever looking clean. No one whose opinion is worth having would judge a ship by the state of spit and polish of her pulling boats during a regatta period.

The regatta gives an opportunity of placing sportsmanship alongside efficiency, which makes a combinaltion well-nigh invincible.

IV.

HAVING read with interest the article entitled " Regatta and Efficiency " in the August number, may I be permitted to ad,d the following from a destroyer point of view.

In the majority of small ships the regatta a s now organised is justly regarded as a veritable curse. This view is generally held by both officers and men, and the cause is not far to seek. From the men's point of view the following points loom large.

755' T H E REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY.

(a ) No selewtion of boat for regatta purposes is possible; so little < I nursing " can be done in the way of fitting up and trying out the boat.

(b) Destroyers are almost always employed in picking up torpedoes, etc., for b ig ships, and the ordinary wear and tear to the boat is vastly magnified in consequence, n ithout commensurate repair facilities.

(c) Captain (D) carries the flotilla " chippy," who is very naturally employed by the 1st lieut. of the leader in fitting up his ship's boats for the contest.

(d) In most flo~tfillas the " flash boats " are well known; and with even crews a fair race is most unlikely, and the ship that owns or can borrow a " chippy " will come off best.

(e) T o raise a crew from certain branches (including officers) means that all members of the branches in question must pull, regardless of their age, inclinations or service duties.

(f) T h e times allowed for practice bite too deeply into the man's own time, during which he not unnaturally desires to follow his own inclinations.

(g) There is a very strong feeling that regattas are a form of organised " fatigue "-to use an army expression, and that, if it is considered to be a sport, it ought to be a voluntary affair and free from interference of any kind.

?'he above points also hold good from the officers' point of view, but there are certain additions : most officers are firmly convinced that a good regatta result means an aid to promotion and that the reverse is equally true. There is, moreover, the cost of oars to be added to the central store bill, and this extra item will often curtail the expenditure required for other more important items. Finally there is that bugbear to be contended with, namely : the appalling state of the boats dur ing the periold of regatta fever. I t is no exaggeration to say that they normally, during this period, compare unfavourably with the state of a dockyard mud-hopper.

T o compete with the disgruntled and " tooth sucking " fraternity some officers so far forget their dignity (through fear of a bad mark) that men are cajoled into competing. This type is rather too common, and the result is bad for discipline and contrary to every idea of sport.

A t present the regatta has g roun from a sporting contest into an organised interference wilth routine, cleanliness, sport and pleasure ; and though many will say that unless we have regattas we cannot hold our own against foreign navies, it may here be pointed out that foreign navies have not the money nor the means to perfect themselves in more

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY. 723

warlike attainments, and therefore concenitrate on matters such a s boat pulling, etc., which are within their capabilities.

I t is therefore suggeslted that correct boat pulling and " waterman- ship " should be more strictly taught and that all officers and men of the naval service should be so instructed that they are capable of pulling an oar correctly. This can be done on entry, and practice ensured by interpart exercises, due regard being paid to the amount oi boat work required by the non-seamen branches. More use can be made of pulling and sailing boats for duty trips-as used to be done in the old Channel and Home Fleets-power boats being restricted for cases when speed is required.

The regatta a s now organised and held is wrong in principle, and most harmful in many ways : and it is high time that ships were judged more by their efficiency for war bhan by any spasmodic efforts of pot- hunting eye-servers, whose keenness in many cases is actuated by a desire for personal advancement rather than an increase in the fighting efficiency or well being of the Navy.

(For another aspecl of t h i s question see " Correspondence," page 845.)

DESTROYERS.

THE naval officer gets his first introduction to destroyers a s a midshipman when he does four mlonths training #time. In the majority of cases this is a popular period, the midshipman enjoying the change, the novelty and the feeling that he definitely has a job of his own to d o at times. O n completion of that period, he does not think about destroyers again till nearing the completion of his sufb-lieutenant's courses, when he starts thinking of what job he woul'd like, or wondering where the Admiralty will send him.

If he does not intend to specialise in submarines or in the Fleet A4ir Arm, he will prolbably have two queries in his head, viz. : (a) Do I want t o g o to a destroyer? or ( b ) Do I want to g o as a sub. of a gunroom ? -4 certain number of sub-lieutenants will do everything possible to keep clear of big ships, while others will d o everything t o keep clear of destroyers. As this article is on destroyers, I will not waste time in giving the pros and cons of being a 'sub. of a gunroom, but will give a few pertaining to destroyers-as viewed by the sub-lieutenant about do join one.

T h e pros, a s viewed by one who takes a n active interest in his profession, are more than satisfactory. H e knows that he will get several definiite jobs of his own and any amount of sea watch-keeping and fleet- work, from all of which he will gain valuable knowledge and experience. Also, to one who is inclined to be lazy, destroyers will appear as a sanctuary in which to enjoy a quiet life free frolm a frock coat and telescope, and the subordination to many senior officers !

T h e cons vary according to personal taste, some officers disliking the small mess life, some suffering from excessive seasickness. 'There a re also many who intend specialising, and who feel, quite unjustifiably, that recommends are more forthcoming in a big ship than in a small one, and that they must avoid destroyers a s much a s possible in consequence. There is also a feeling among young officers that destroyer officers form a cliqce of their own into which thev would find ilt difficult to fall. They d o not realise that this is a fallacy, and that there are large numbers of officers at present serving in destroyers who have not always served in that particular class of vessel.

DESTROYERS. 725

Neventheless, the sub-lieutenant who goes-or is sent-to a destroyer is the fortunate one, as he enters the real training school of the Service at the very time that he should be learning his job and getting experience. Those who go to big ships may enjoy ruling the " young gen~tlemen " but, from a Service point of view, they are little more than social flunkeys on the quarterdeck, and have practically no other duties in the majority of cases.

From now on, I propose to point out some of the advantages of serving in destroyers as a sub-lieutenant or junior ' two-striper ' in com,parison wilth serving in a big ship. By being in three watches, the destroyer officer gains enormous experience of station-keeping at high and low speeds, by day and by night, without lights, in line ahead and in line of bearing-all of which cultivate a quick thinking brain, initiative and anticipation. In fleet exercises, he is in a position ro study the orders beforehand, and, by an intelligent interest in the plot during the exercise, he can follow the movements and events, lthe reason for them and the results which follow. No one can deny that fleet exercises become more interesting if one knows what is happening and why, and one benefits accordingly. Numbers of young lieutenants in destroyers are able to 'denote, by reason of past experience, the critical moment for a torpedo attack to be launched or a smoke screen lai'd.

By being in close contact with many of the more important orders and instructions (Manmuvring Orders, Battle Instructions, etc.), he can get a very good idea of the fundamental principles of tactics, strategy and of battle generally. In addition, further experience of fleet work is gained by being in close touch with the general conduct of signals and W/T procedure. H e will quite likely be the signal officer, and will automatically'become well acquainted with ~bhis very imtportant arm of the Service. Such duties as gunnery control officer, torpedo control officer, officer of quarters, all of which are responsible ones, tend to accelerate the mind and to im~prove the primary attri~bute of the naval officer-the ability to fight the ship in action.

The equivalent officer in the big ship has less station-keeping to do, and most of that is on a straight course and at a steady speed. The big ship also keeps steadier revolutions and is not affected so much by wind and sea. Anyone who has been 0.0.V:. in a destroyer 7th or 8th in the line and in dirty weather will know how difficult it is to keep good station, and what a very good lookout must be kept on the next ahead, more especially if the leader is inconsistent with her revolutions.

The junior big ship officer knows nothing, as a rule, about the exercises until they start. H e then has no possibility of studying the plot nor of knowing what is happening and why, as the chart-house

726 DESTROYERS.

is generally forbidden ground to all but the captain, navigator and plotting staff. All importtant duties with regard to the fighting of the ship are in the hands of specialised officers and the senior officers. I admit that this is not the case in all big ships but, from what I have heard and seen for myself, it is the state of affairs in the greater majority.

A s regards general seamanship, the destroyer officer will not gain appreciably, a s the majority of evolutions are peculiar to small ships. Nevertheless, a sound knowledge of anchor work should be had by all who would like to consider thems~elves good seamen. Most people can let g o a n anchor and so for~th, on paper; but, despite its simplicity in most cases, it is a very different thing when one has to d o it oneself in practice. Actually, destroyer anchor work, by reason of the lack of facilities, requires quite as much knowledge as that required for a big ship which is provided with a cable holder for each anchor in addition to a cenltre line capstan. T h e cable officer in a destroyer gets experience of anchoring with single anchor, with both anchors (as might be found when anchoring stern to wall), with securing to large and small buoys, securing alongside oilers, being towed, oiling from a big ship a t sea, and quite a probability at times of having to deal with a foul anchor or hawse. illooring, I admilt, is rarely met with nowadays in destroyers.

If the officer in question is not the cable officer, then he will be the navigator, and will thus be in a position to witness the manceuvring of the ship alongside oilers and in enclosed waters. Anyone who has been to Malta and seen destroyers berthed at the top berths in Sliema and Lazaretto Creeks in all weathers cannot but admire the very high standard shown by destroyer captains in handling their vessels. Lessons learnt will in all probability produce similar efficiency in years to come.

Before turning to harbour work, I should like to point out that serving in destroyers in dirty weather, although far from being comfortable or enjoyable, definitely makes an officer a better seaman in the strict meaning of the word. More thought has to be paid to (the safety and preservation of the ship, and he gets a sense of what a ship can stand under certain conditions; of how best to deal with adverse conditions of wind, sea and ride. If he was prone to seasickness, he will probably be cured : there are very few officers who do not get over excessive sickness in a very short time after serving in destroyers. He will get a very good idea of the conditions and discomforts under which the ship's company have to live. That this is far from pleasant will, I feel, be concurred in by the majority of first lieutenants.

DESTROYERS. 727

With reference to harbour work : to be correspondence officer is to get a first class insight into internal administration-drafting, recommends and advancements, victualling, punishments with the necessar) care needed in the framing of charges and in the making out of punishment warrants, care and custo'dy of secret and confidential books and documents, defect lists, drafting of service reports, mails, exercise records, cash accounts, pay procedure-and so on. T h e majority of the above should be general knowledge [to all in the Service, but it is quite impossible to understand it all thoroughly unless one has actually done it all oneself. I t is only in small ships, where no paymaster staff is to be found, that it can be done, and a destroyer in a running flotilla is productive of more than sufficient. Such work as chart-correlating, gunnery analyses, etc., are at least worth knowing how to do, even though they are rather boring and unproductive in results.

The last point about harbour is rather important, and I have pur- posely lefit it to the end. To be a good officer one must be a good leader of men, and a man cannot be a good leader unless he can see his subordinates' points of view and act accordingly. Many unpleasant occurrences could have been avoided if only the superior officer in question had allowed himself a minute or two's thought a s to his subordinates' point of view. By being in close proximity with the whole ship's comjpany, and by running and assisting wilth their games, a destroyer officer-in my opinion-gets a far better insight as to the human nature of the sailor, and is therefore becoming better trained a s a leader of men.

This article is written from the poinlt of view of a junior officer, and is )therefore open to criticism. Nevertheless, I do advocate that destroyers are the school of training of the Service for junior officers. I strongly disapprove of the idea of serving continuously in this type of vessel, a s it tends to prevent a broadening of outlook (wi~th reference to the rest of the Service. I, personally, ~dbd not want to g o to destroyers after my courses, and actually applied for a big ship. I was sent to a destroyer, and very soon found that I was much better off and gaining far more experience than my contemporaries in big ships, and I have been grateful to My Lords ever since.

" PROCEO."

A BALTIC EXCURSION. --

IF you happen to be a millionaire you can, at vast expense, do it in your own yacht. Those of lower financial caste may, if they choose to be of an unfamiliar herd, book for a pleasure cruise in that direction. But if you wish to enjoy the Baltic at the minimum of expense, join the Navy and pray fortune to send you to the squadron which draws the favourite in the Summer Cruise Sweepstake of the Atlantic Fleet. There are, however, Baltic cruises and Baltic cruises, and for variety of experience, interest, and enjoyment, that of 1931 would be hard to beat.

Have you been through The Sound ? past Helsingor at dawn ; thence through the Drogden Channel with five feet of water under the bottom and out into the Baltic ? Well do it, and you won't forget it. If you are unlucky you will strike fog somewhere about Bornholm, and so spend a second night on the bridge prior to the opening phases of a week's festivity at Libau. But you are not likely to visit Libau, at least not for some time to come. For the Latvian Navy, having just celebrated the tenth anniversary of its birth, is not entertaining on a large scale yet awhile, and Libau-plain Libau without any frills, without the interest of an International gathering-would be grim fare. A vast and dismal war harbour, filched from the Russians-the verb, of course, being purely of Russian origin !-empty of everything but three armed tugs, the Latvian Navy, to be supplemented later by two submarines and six seaplanes ! That by itself would bring no thrills. But the Battle of Libau ! quite another story !

The Esthonian began it. Arriving the day after the British squadron and the first of the foreigners, not content to confine his attention to the national flag and that of the Latvian Commander-in-Chief, he proceeded to salute the flag of the British admiral. This, overheard in the offing by later arrivals of six different nationalities, led to a discharge of powder which shrouded the harbour in smoke through which flag officers intent upon calls of ceremony groped their way until well nigh sunset. I t is estimated that the aggregate admiral-ladder-miles climbed that day would reach from Libau to the heart of Russia-if she has one, which nobody in Latvia will admit !

This was a hard week's work. The distance from the landing place, some three miles, combined with the frequent change of dress for different functions, made one officer at least wish that his boat could hold both

A BALTIC EXCURSION. 729

bunk and wardrobe, whilst certain selected alimentary canals were subjected to the longest full power trial on record.

But enough of Libau. People make places, and during this visit they were present in interesting variety ; but Libau, plain Libau, without any . . . however, let us get on to Stockholm.

Have you been to Stockholm ? How often that question is asked ! If you do go there, choose five o'clock on a fine summer's morning for your plunge into the bewildering, enchanting, archipelago leading to that city of delight. And if you happen to be responsible for the safety of the ship keep your eyes in the boat ; that is, if the bathing season has begun. Once upon a time there was a battle cruiser-but perhaps it really is a fairy tale ! As a matter of fact, bathing dresses are worn in Sweden now, whatever may have been the practice then.

Only a poet could adequately describe this beautiful approach to Stockholm. Wooded islands of all shapes and sizes, each the site of one or more country houses gay with the national flag of Sweden, with their white and mauve lilac trees, boathouses, piers, motor boats and sailing yachts. Every island " steep to," so that at one time you thread a canal, at another cross a wide lagoon, the landscape closing and opening as the iris to changing light. Four hours of this, and then, at the last turn, Stockholm in all its beauty is suddenly revealed, and the anchor drops in the heart of the city.

Nowhere else in the world, or at least in Europe, will you find yourself so much at home. The habits and customs of the people, their familiarity with the English tongue, and indeed their general outlook on life, provide an environment into which you may fit like a plug. A charming race these Swedes but-there always is a but-they never seem to go to bed ; perhaps they hibernate to balance up their annual rest. And bed won't see much of you. If, on rare occasions, you happen to return onboard early-round about midnight-as likely as not you will meet the night shift bound joyfully in the opposite direction. For only a system of relays will cope with the hospitality and attractions of this remarkable place. Perhaps if you are there in mid-June you will be one of a party bound by speed boat to take part in Mid-summer's Eve celebrations dear to Swedish hearts as those of Christmas Day. Stepping at sunset-some seven of you-into the fast speed boat of your Swcbdish host, you glide slowly beneath the city bridges, at higher speed shoot the rapids of the Norstrom and then, clear of the city, with full throttle, the bow lifts ar,d at thirty knots you skim the calm waters tow~rds the island home of your host twenty miles up fiord. Flash- ing betwixt the islands you catch the glint of tents beneath the trees, the glare of camp fires ; for all Sweden seems to be under canvas this

73O A BALTIC EXCURSION.

night greeting you with friendly gesture as you speed by. Cloudless sky, half light which vrrill not wholly wane, the sheer beauty of it all- as long as you live the memory of this night will be with you. How long the journey ! An instant, an eternity ; what matter ? Time is suspended to-night, and soon, too soon, you glide to rest and land to dance madly about the maypole until driven by failing light to the island mansion whence, surcharged with Swedish beer, you depart well after midnight to retrace your flight back to the twinkling lights of the dream city, Stockholm. The night shift has long turned to ; of sleep you will have but little, though surely you have been dreaming much.

And when at last and alas the time comes to leave this elysium, do not be surprised if your ship clings pathetically by her anchor to every mooring in the harbour ; she but reflects the reluctance of her company.

And so to Kiel ! Libau comedy, Stockholm romance, Kiel-what of Kiel ? surely

tragedy. And it does not require great imagination to see it. Seventeen years back almost to the day the lineal ancestor of this same British squadron enters Kiel Harbour. A fine German fleet lies proudly at its moorings ; yachts of all sizes crowd the Fiord ; Kiel week, an international festival, is in progress ; a prosperous, happy, well disciplined people fill the streets. And now : the broken remnant of a German Navy ; yachts few and of moderate dimensions ; Kiel week, it is true, is again in progress, but a purely German Kiel week ; whilst a people, doubtful in discipline, poor in pocket, and mistrustful of the future sullenly watches the arrival of their vanquishers. A chilly reception ! Would they not be more than human if it were otherwise 1 But the British Navy, embodying as it does those great characteristics of the British people, tolerance and chivalry, would wish its representatives to carry no harsh thoughts of the past into Kiel Harbour. And so the British squadron gets down to it. And surely they do it ! In three days the ice breaks, the thaw sets in, so that to the uninformed witness later functions would appear but a gathering of old friends enjoying one another's company to the full.

A memorable, maybe an historic week, but perhaps better past than to come.

But when, back through the Kiel Canal, the inevitable early morning fog with accompanying close escape from head-on collision, passing at dusk the homeward bound Bremen, her name flashing out like a sign of Piccadilly, the squadron returns to the wind and rain of an English summer it bears many warm memories of kindly host, good companion, and pleasant moment in the German port of Kiel.

THE NEW HIGHWAY. A CRITICISM.

" SEER" remarks in his article " The New Highway "l that "the large flying boat would seem to be such an indispensable unit to the Naval Service, and an instrument well in accord with the faculties of seaman ship, navigation, engineering and most of the other practices of the Service, that it is hard to understand why flying boats are not employed." The paragraphs of his article which follow are presumably meant to indicate profitable methods of employment for these boats.

" Seer " talks of the ability of the Navy to provide protection for the merchant fleet from aircraft attack by day or night. The merchant fleet is open to attack from the air by bombers, torpedo-planes or fighters. Against the highly active fighter the large flying boat would seem to offer little protection. Against either of the other types it possibly stands a chance of knocking out some of the attackers-if it was there and had time to act before the development of the attack. Unfor- tunately, the merchant fleet will refer to a convoy, which has a considerable distance to go at slow speed, and the question arises-Could the flying boat be there ? Is this modern wonder to remain in the air for the period of the voyage ? Is it to speed along the surface until the appearance of an enemy, or is it to be periodically re-fuelled from the convoy ?

" Seer " proceeds to question the extent to which flying boats could supplant destroyers for patrol and convoy work. Patrol off their own coasts is undoubtedly a use for flying boats, but the great size does not seem to be necessary, and a t present the idea seems to be to favour the seaplane for this purpose. Convoy work, by which it is presumed is meant convoy protection from all forms of attack, brings back the question-How is the flying boat to keep the air for the prolonged period of the convoy's voyage ? She would not be able to remain on the surface except in the calmest of weather, and, in any case, in this position she is not only helpless but offers no protection to the convoy from any method of attack from the air or by submarine.

A convoy is open to three varieties of attack ; from the air, by surface craft, or by submarine. Against air attack the large flying boat

" The New Highway," by "Seer," NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 2, Vo1. XIX, May, 1931 p, 287.

732 THE NEW HIGHWAY.

is of doubtful use, and only then should it chance to be in the air at the moment when the attack develops, and in sufficient numbers to repel more easily handled planes.

Against attack from surface craft the function of the air escort would be two-fold. In the first place, the surface craft may be sighted at some distance from the convoy, and the convoy diverted to avoid them. This may be successful if the raider has no aircraft, but it is not dependent on the size of the flying boat ; the small seaplane now carried by the latest cruisers would be equally effective. In the second case poor visibility may entail the enemy being within sight of the convoy before he is sighted by the air escort. A determined raider in this case is unlikely to be driven from his objective by the attentions of the flying boat.

The third method of attack is by submarine, and this is undoubtedly the most destructive. Here, again, early sighting and diversion of the convoy is the best panacea, and is more likely to be successful against the submarine than against surface craft of greater speed ; but again the small ship-borne patrol would be of equal value, although the flying boat might possibly be able to manage the submarine more effectively, should it reach an attacking position.

The main trouble for the air patrol with a convoy, therefore, is the question of " keeping the air." Until this question is solved the use of flying boats for convoy protection would appear to be nil.

On the other hand, " Seer " raises a question that is being asked by a large number of people, although he confines himself to a part of it. The question of convoy protection from all kinds of attack is a very pressing one, as there is no question that, with our reduced navy, the only defence for us in the next war will be convoy from the opening of hostilities.

In the Atlantic Fleet lately, much time has been spent on the problem of the correct counter to air attack on the battlefleet, and this will probably throw a good deal of light on the problem of merchant ship protection. The difficulty of analyzing an exercise of this kind is that no means has yet been found of testing the gun against the torpedo- aircraft attack in peace time, and therefore all results are theoretical. I t appears, however, that the gunnery world are confident of their ability to deal with this problem, and also with that of the bombing aircraft ; and the same measures, with modifications, would appear to be suitable for thc protection of a convoy.

The main danger to a convoy, in my opinion, especially one consisting of the all-important oilers, is probably from small, very fast fighter flights, carrying bombs and machine-guns, and it is quite possible

THE NEW HIGHWAY. 733

that a lucky hit from a small bomb might set alight the cargo of an oiler. The new type of pom-pom is, I believe, designed as an antidote to fighter plane attack, but nothing else, less than an adequate number of friendly fighters, could deal with a determined attack by these craft.

The reply to air attack on a convoy, like that of the battlefleet, will have to be mainly by gunfire. How much of this gun power is to be mounted in the convoy, and how much in the escort, will depend on the importance of the convoy and the escort available.

I t would seem that a single flag and sound signal for emergency alteration of course would probably preserve the squadron to a great extent from torpedo attack, the convoy-unlike the battlefleet-having nothing to lose by a large turn. Remembering it is more important to avoid the torpedoes than to bring down the torpedo planes, a large turn by a well drilled convoy, when the attackers are committed to their attack, will largely neutralise the effect of the torpedoes fired, or enforce a withdrawal and second attack, during which period the gun-armament of the escort and convoy should be able to inflict a fair amount of damage and reduce the force of the attackers.

This method should also be fairly successful against submarine attack, when evasion fails. I t is, however, surely time that it was recognised that the function of a destroyer is not to convoy merchant ships : why fit her with torpedoes if this is her object ? She is only a stop- gap ; slower ships of better sea-keeping capacity, and fitted for sabmarine hunting, are urgently required. These could be built within the limits of the Washington Conference Exemption class, and, with these available, the submarine sighted by aircraft flown from the convoy or escort would be hunted and either destroyed or kept down until no longer a menace to the convoy.

Lastly, we come back to the surface ship menace ; and here occurs a possible naval use for the large flying boat. I t is a truism that every convoy must be supported by surface craft sufficient to deal with any likely surface attack, though this support may not be very near. By employing large airplanes on permanent patrol over large areas, the area covered by the supporting force may be increased enormously, thus reducing the shortage of cruisers, and, by " fixing" the enemy forces, not only lead our own more quickly into action with them, but do away with the necessity to keep surface support in other areas where this enemy might have been. For example ; the Emden, in the late war, could have been kept on the map until destroyed, instead of appearing and disappearing numberless times and keeping large forces engaged in the almost hopeless hunt for her.

734 T H E N E W H I G H W A Y .

One further point raised by " Seer " is the possible employment of flying boats for mine-laying. Mine-laying can only be carried out in comparatively shallow water, and, from our point of view, this nearly always means close to the enemy's coast. To take the last war : most of the mine-laying was carried out off the Belgian and German coasts, very close to the shore. This necessitated silence and cover. The cover was afforded by the darkness, and the silence by well drilled destroyer flotillas. Allowing the giant flying boat equal accuracy in attaining the position, and landing on the water in darkness, the greatest difficulty to be overcome is the necessity of silence ; and the development of silencing aircraft engines, in which direction I understand experi- ments are being made, is a necessary preliminary to their employment as mine-layers. They would indeed have to be large flying boats to justify their use in this direction. A destroyer flotilla field consists of approximately 560 mines, and this is none too many. A very large flight of air giants will be required to produce anything approaching this amount.

The conclusion I reach is that the large flying boat is necessary to the Navy, but not for the purposes suggested by " Seer." It is not suitable to replace the destroyer, or, more correctly, the close escort, but it is undoubtedly required in large numbers as an ancillary to our reduced cruiser force. With the help of the air patrols suggested, the cruiser forces can once again take up key positions, in the sure knowledge of receiving information in time to deal with any enemy surface craft in their areas and threatening their convoys, thus remaining the " surface craft support," but covering a larger area and therefore reducing the number of cruisers required.

In fact, if we possessed enough of these aircraft, and if the necessary areas to be patrolled were worked out and allotted to squadrons to take up a t the opening of hostilities, the present shortage of cruisers would not be so dangerous as some people would have us believe.

PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADNIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS.

Continued from the August number, 1931.

I. THE following extracts are from the log of H.M.S. " Bellerophon," a sailing three-decker, the ship in which Frederick Richards first went to sea in 1848.

Bellerophon : Captain Robert Baynes, C.B., hulked on board Dryad in Portsmouth Harbour.

24th September, 1847 : Commander George Harper commissioned the ship. Paymaster and Purser, Richard Didham, joined this day.

251th Septemiber : Opened a rendezvous at Portsea to volunteer men. Joined Mr. Richard Spry, Gunner.

26th September (Sunday) : Joined Mr. Stephen Moore, Carpenter, and Mr. George Busman, Boatswain.

27th September : Entered 15 Petty Officers and I seaman. Joined from " Victtory " 22 boys of 1st class, 19 boys of 2nd class.

28th September : Joined Captain Haynes ; Lieutenant Micklewaite ; Captain Charles Pearce, Royal Marines; 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, I fifer, and 62 Privates.

29th September : Joined Mr. George Dowers, Master. The ship commissioned with lower masts only, her company then

being hulked on board the Vic~torious, alongside which ship the Bellero- phon was placed. S o further mention is made of the numbers of men joining, but on an average 500 to Goo pounds of fresh beef were received every other day. The captain of the Victory came on board every Friday morning to muster the ship's company by the open list.

T h e ship was steadily rigged, one mast at a time. Dockyard artificers employed on board at this period were : Shipwrights 14, Joiners g , Caulkers 2, Painters 2, Plumbers 2 .

4th Xovember : Employed getting guns into their places. 10th November : Provisioned ship. (Beef 2,630 pieces of 8 lbs. each ;

Pork 5,280 pieces of 4 lbs. each ; Flour, Suet, Raisins, Peas, Oatmeal, Sugar, Chocolate, Tea, Vinegar. R u m drawn before.)

736 PAGES AND PAPEliS FROM T H E LIFE OF ADMIRAL

25th November, 1847 : Commander Harper left the ship and Com- mander Randolph joined : the ship apparently being fully rigged by this date.

27th November : T h e ship's company moved from the hulk " Victorious " on board their ship, and Lieutenant Micklewaite relturned from volunteering men at Portsea.

30th November : Towed to Spithead. 1st December : Sir Charles Ogle, Commander-in-Chief, inspected

the ship and mustered the ship's company ; manned yards. O n December ~ ~ t h , the Bellerophon sailed for Corfu with the

Reserved Battalion of the 76th Regiment on board. She arrived at Plymouth on 19th December, and sailed again on ~ 1 s t . On the 29th she put into Gibraltar Bay to land sick of the Reserved Battalion and at 7.45 p.m., 9th January, 1848, she anchored in Corfu Roads in 19 fathoms disembarking the Battalion on the I ~ t h January. The log teems wiith entries of many sail in sight each day.

29th December : Departed this life the \\ife of Ensign Dunlop of the Reserved Battalion 76th Re,' uiment.

8th January, 1848 : Departed this life a male child of Sergeant Huntley od the 76th Regiment.

Several floggings are logged : the punishments varying between one dozen to three dozen : the offences :-drunlienness, uncleanliness, diso- bedience of orders, drinking spirits put under his charge, by a sentry.

W i t h a good quarterly breeze the ship made from g to 10 knots. S h e remained at Corfu until the 9th March \\hen she sailed for Gibraltar n i th the 34'th ixegirnent on board ( IS officers, 30 sergeants, 11 drummers, r 4 corporals, j68 privates, 36 women, 61 children. rI'otal 748).

331-d 3Iarch : Passed a steam vessel itanding to the N.E. 6 t h 1Iarch : Departed this life Lt.-Colonel Deedes commanding

H.11. 33th Regiment. 28th March : Exchanged numbers u i th the P. and 0. steamship

" Hindustan " off Cape de Gata. 30th hlarch : Born a female child to John .ltliins, Sergeant of 34th

Regiment. 9.45 p.m. : Burnt blue llqlits and firecl a m ~ ~ s l i c t to \tarn off a Danish

barque on the port tacli, nhich vessel fouled and carried anay the fl! ing jibboom to its iron.

1st April : 9.25 p.m. anchored in Gibraltar Roads. The 34th Regimenlt mas disembarked at Gibraltar. The body of

Colonel Deedes was buried nit11 military honours and 10 minute-guns were fired on the 8th *April. XIilitary invalid5 : (5 sergeants, j corporals, I drummer, 30 privates, g women and I I children. Total 61) came on board for passage to England.

OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS. 737

I I th April she sailed and on the ~ 2 n d April she anchored at Spithead ; trio days afterwards she was towed by a tug into Portsmouth Harbour. The log throughout this homeward voyage is again noticeable for the number of vessels seen daily and also passed at night, often close to.

Five floggings were recorded on the 17th 1 two for " drunkenness," two for " uncleanliness, skulking and repeated base conduct."

18th May, 1848 : Portsmouth Harbour. Manned yards, fired a Royal Salute and cheered H.M. Gracious Alajesty Queen Victoria on her passing out of the harbour in the Fairy Yacht.

1st June : Sailed out of Portsmouth Harbour, running moor at Spit- head, St. Vincent flagship of Sir Charles Napier, S.S.E. 3 cables.

On the 5th June, the Portsmouth Commanderiin-Chief, Sir Charles Ogle, inspected the ship. Manned yards on his leaving.

Muster by the open list occurred at 7.30 a.m. every day, and occasionally captains from other ships came on board to do this. Between 19th and 25th May are four entries of men " discharged run." There is no mention in the log of leave ever being given.

6th June : Arrived at Spithead the Vindictive, bearing the flag off Admiral Sir Francis Austen [one of the two admiral brothers of Jane Xusten. - -E~1~0~] .

8th Ju~ne : Sailed from Spithead 4 a.m.; anchored in Plymouth Sound evening of 9th June.

1st July : Returned to Spithead. Sentence of Court Martial on a Marine for striking the captain :--John McDonald to be transported beyond the seas for the term of his natural life."

I 5th July : Sailed from Spitheacl wi~th Channel [ ?I Squadron. Noon : Flagship N. by W. 2 4 miles.

17th July : 3.45 p.m., speed 2.2 knots lowered a boat for Captain to visit the flagship. 17th July, 9.15 p.m. : Anchored in Torbay with the Flagship Prince Regent, Blenheim and Xmphion.

21st July, 3.20 a.m. : Admiral made General signal to weigh. 4.1 j a.m. Weighed. 7.30 a.m. Took station astern of Prince Regent. 9.45 a.m. Admiral made signal to tack. 10.0 a.m. Observed Racer on the starboard quarter of Prince Regent all aback. 10.5 a.m. Tacked in station, wlhile in stays observed the Racer coming cdown on us with fresh headway, this ship having lost her way. 10.10 Racer ran us on board on the starboard gangway, carrying away six of the lower deck ports, two of the foremost chain plates of the main chains and otherwise injuring them, the foremost part of the Q.D. hammock netting, rail

738 PAGES AND PAPERS FROM T H E LIFE OF ADIIIR!\I,

stanchions and covering board, knocking overboard several hamlmocks. Lowered cutter to pick up ports, hammocks, etc. Employed repairing damage, securing lower deck ports, and foremost main swifter. I I . IS a.m. U p cutter, filled and sect courses. 22nd July, 1848, Io.qj a.m. 'Took up station astern of Prince Regent.

25th July, 1848 : -1nchored in Corli Harbour. 28th July : I captain Royal Marines, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, and

140 privates, and the field piece in limbers with 140 rounds of ammunition, sent to Waterford by the Alban steam vessel.

5th AAugust, 5.35 p.m. : Schooner J la ry Jane of Cork fouled the ship on the port side, staving the barge and capsizing her.

There are continued entries in the log whilst at Cork of exercising young gentlemen at great guns, broadsword, hantding and reefing topsails, knotting and splicing.

24th Alugus t : Sailed from Cork in company. 1 I .55 Captain hailed the -Imphion to tack which ship was standing right on to us on the starboard tack, this ship having just tacked clear of Cork-beg Bank.

26th A4ugust, 10.15 a.m. : Aldmiral made signal with guns to haul to the wind on the port tack.

and September : Returned to Cork Harbour. 13th September : Rear *Idmiral S i r Charles Napier came on board

to inspect the ship a t quarters firing tubes. 21st September : Exercised at quarters firing at a target. Expended

32 Pr . , 106 rounds, 68 Pr., 25 rounds. a j th September : Sailed from Cork Harbour. 30th September : Plymouth Sound. 5th October : Sailed at noon

and arrived at Spithead I 1.1.5 a.m. on 6th October (135 miles passing through the Needles).

18th October : Sailed in a gale of wind. ~ 2 n d October : Met a TTT.S.\V. gale, furled fore and mizen topsails,

bent storm staysails. Cape Finisterre S. 48 E. 81 miles. Star sights a re taken in all night watches without fail when at sea.

31st October : Met the Superb in tow of the Polyphemus, sent a bag of letters to her. Passed through Straits of Gibraltar.

I ~ t h November : -!hived Palermo Bay, found Vanguard who told us not to anchor. Captain went on board Vanguard.

13th November : Arrived Bay of Naples, saluted Flag of Admiral S i r William Parker, 15 guns. H i s flag in Hibernia who returned with 7 guns. Found lying here Hibernia, Queen, Howe, Rodney, steam frigates Sidon and Terrible and two French ships-of-the-line.

26th November : Sailed. 28th November : ,qnchored at Palermo.

O F T H E FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS. 739

11.

Early in 1851 Mr. Midshipman Richards joined the Fantome (the actual date of his leaving the Bellerophon is not on record). 1 2

guns, coppered, 18 officers, 27 petty officers, 42 seamen, 23 boys, 2 0

marines. Total 130.

T o Captain Richards, R .N . Kavindon, Leighlin Bridge, Co. Carlow, Ireland.

H.M.S. " Fantome," R i o de Janeiro. Monday, ~ 1 s t April, 1851 .

My dearest Papa and Mama.-We arrived here last Wednesday from Madeira after a pretty good passage of one month. W e were no~t in time for the packet, I had a letter already to send but had not an opportunity. T h e day after I wrote to you from Madeira, I went wirh the captain, surgeon, and another midshipman to the celebrated Koral which is the most magnificent sight in the shape of scenery I ever beheld. You suddenly break upon an immense chasm of miles in cir~cumference, and 4 to 5,000 feet deep, and small clouds floating abouit hundreds of feet below you. W e had a capital luncheon on the edge of it. T h e third day after we left Madeira we saw the Calliope about nine miles ahead of us, and for four days after that we never gained a mile on one another, although we were running ten knots an hour down the Trades the whole time. The next day we altered course a little and s o lost sight of her. W e have now been here six days and she has not made her appearance yet.

l'he heat of our kennel has been awful since we left Madeira, I have been literally melting away. Not being accustomed to a tropical climate 1 have been knocked u p by it. I don't like R io at all : it is the mose perfect whitened sepulchre I ever was at. Such a lovely place a s it is t o be inhabited by those rascally Portuguese. 'They hate the sight of a n Englishman because of the slave-trade. T h e harbour is magnificentt about 50 miles round and the entrance not more than three-quarters of a mile and all the hills are conical and covered with cocoa-nut trees. \TTe sail from this on Wednesday the captain being in a hurry to get out as there have been several cases of yellow fever on board the Southampton. ?'his letter is going in a steamer to Pernambuco from which place it will be forwarded because the regular mail steamer only goes once a month. I have no news of any kind. There is a likelihood of another row in the Iiiver Plate, all the ships on this station are going down there in a great hurry and I hear reports of a disturbance at .. the . Ca e of Good Ho e where we expect to go, but I do n ~ t k n ~ w - ? - P whether it is true or not. T h e Calliope has just malde her appearance

74O PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF XDMIRAI,

off the harbour. There was a great deal of mummery going on here on Good Friday; they treated Judas Iscariot as n e do Guy Fawkes and there were no end of processions, etc. I expect to hear from you on my arrival at Sydney.

T h e Calliope has just anchored so we will hear presently if we are -. to touch at the Cape or not. I here is a squadron of 8 French ships here in very good order commanded by A4dmiral Montagency de la Rogue.' W7e look very disreputable among them as you see nothing but iron rust on our sides a s n e have not yet b>een painted a t all. Two of my messmates have just come home from four years on the Y.Z. station and like it so well that they are going out for four more

Your ever truly affectionate FREDERICK RICHARDS .

Extract from a log of H.hI.S. Fantome. I t begins with her a t sea in the roaring forties, 17th June, 18j1, on voyage from the Cape to Tasmania. -1 gale of wind, force 10. Ship running before it, making 9 to 10 knots.

19th June made the Island of S t . Pauls. There are constant entries of " lowered topsails to a squall." T h e ship ran 1,440 miles in six days.

17th July : Running down the Derwenit anchored at the entrance of D'Entrecasteaux Channel, Tasmania.

25th July : Out boats. Toned into Farm Cove. Found here Calliolpe, Havannah, Steamer--4cheron, Pandora and Bramble.

12th -1ugust : Captain Sir E . J . Home mustered the ships company and inspected the ship.

16th August : Sailed from Farm Cove, Tasmania. Dirty weather. Foroe of wind 7-9.

26th August : Working into Auckland, N.Z. 3.2j p.m. anchored in 69 fathoms.

27th August : Party at the North Shore cutting firewood. The pinnace sent ashore daily for water-2 tws-the ship's daily expenditure was one [ton.

10th Septem(ber : General quarters firing at a target. Round shot 32 Prs., I j in number : cartridges for same 15 of 4 lbs. each.

28th October : Sailed to Wangar i Harbour. 7th November : Kawa Kawa River. Heavy gun practice and small

arm practice is frequent. 3rd December : Moored in Port Nicholson Harbour, N.Z. Con-

tinually exercising at grea~t guns.

The wr~ting of this name is not very legible and I have not yet verified it (EDITOR).

OF THE FLEET SIR FKEIIERICK R I C H - U D S .

'To Captain Richards, R .S ., Leighlin Bridge, Co. Carlow. Fantome, Sqldney.

July 28th, 1851 to &August 12th, 1851. 3'ly dearest Papa.-We left the Cape on the 28th May and had rather

a long passage to Hobart T o ~ n n where we arrived on the 12th of this month. The passage passed without anything m orth speaking of ; 11 e were under water nearly the whole time. Hobart Town is a very pretty place and the scenery going up the River Dern ent very beautiful. T h e town is built a t the foot of Mlt. Wellington, the top of which is covered with snow all the year round. I went to Mr. Wilson to look after Johnny but found he had come on here on his way to India, so I will send his letters on to Calcutta. Mr. Wilson behaved to me like a trump (he is the Editor of the Hobart Tomn .Idvertiser). He gave me carte blanche of his house mhile we were there. I dined att the 99th mess the night before we sailed and enjoyed myself very much. Colonel D'espard mas very kind and the old Major Last \\as one of the nicest old fellows I ever met. W e left Hobart T o ~ n on the 10th and arrived here on the 20th. This is a magnificent place. W e are all here now. Calliope, Pandora and Havannah, anld after all our passage out instead of enjoying ourselves for a short ltime the poor Fantome is going to be packed off to New Zealand to relieve the Fly. Mr. Mackay's house strikes you on conling into the harbour as being a sort of palace. I called on him the day before yesterday. T h e first startling announce- ment you see is at his avenue gate, a large placard : Beware the Blood- hounds. H e is very clever and very eccentric. . . . I melt Phillip Vigors there who was very civil to me. I dine with him at the Barracks to-day. I hear Johnny is quite cracked. H e has been down in New Zealand and all over the station. H e is quite a noted character here. T h e more I see of Sydney the more I like it. I expect to be married before I come honle. Alugusit 12th we sail for Auckland to relieve the Fly.

H.M.S. " Fantome." Wellington, S e w Zealand, a 1st January, 1852.

l l y dearest Papa.-I take up my pen again to write to you after a nearly three months' silence in which I have had no opportunity. W e left Sydney on the 1st Novemiber and got down to the Heads of Welling- ton in about five days, but there being a heavy gale against us going into harbour we bore up and anchored under an island called Maina about twenty miles off. T h e next day the weather being moderate the captain went on shore to a place called Oniena on the mainland and took the mails with him for the purpose of sending them overland to Welling- ton a distance of about tlrelve miles In his rambles about there he

742 PAGES .4ND P.4PERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADMIKAI,

found a man very ill who couldn't get a doctor tto visit him, so the next day he asked the good surgeon, Mr. Rent, to g o with him nhich he did in the gig. W h e n they had got about three-quarters of the way the boat swamped and capsized and poor Bent with four of the boat's crew were drowned. T h e captain and carpenter and two men reached the shore with the boalt in about half-an-hour very much exhausted, and were taken to the house of a hlr. Tandy an English settler who treated them very kindly. S i r George Grey and Colonel IMcCleverty rode over next day and paid them every attention. W e knew nothing aboult all this for four days supposing there was too much surf for them to get over the bar, but on Sundav the wind shifted to S.E. and Polkinghorne, the XIaster, with a picked-boat's crew went in a four oared whale boat that we have got to see what was detaining them. In crossing the bar a sea struck her and knocked the oars out of ehe rowlocks and before they had time to recover themselves another roller came and knocked her t~ and capsized her : the two finest men in the ship were drowned. Polkinghorne was picked up by the coxswain of the g ig who was matching them coming in and swam out to their assistance, and the other two were also saved. Polkinghorne was insensible for tnelve hours and was greatly shaken for a month afterwards but is all right now. W e sailed for Wellington a day o r two afterwards and stopped about a month. All the bodies of the poor fellows were picked up and buried at Porirna. W e had poor Bent's body brought to Wellington and had all the officers of the ship and the 65th Regiment and band'and all the people of Wellington to at~tend it, they showed very good feeling about it, he was loved by everybody, poor felloxv. From there we nent to Taranaki or S e w Plymouth nhere there is a colony of about 3.000 Wes t Countrymen all from Devonshire. I t is a beautiful little place built a t the foolt of 3it . Egmont which is 8,000 feet high, the top always covered with snow. You can see it go miles off. W e did not anchor there but sailed for Nelson in the other island where we stopped about a week and then went to a harbour called Croisilles about 30 miles down the coast, for water. There is one Englishman who has lived there for 13 years in a most contented manner. H e has a Maori nife whom he appears to like very much. WTe spent Christmas there and then went back to Nelson which is a very nice little place. W e nere anchored up a river called the mTaimea, a most extraordinary place formed by a long sand bank and the shore. T h e passage very narrow, n e went in at high water when the bank was covered and it was an extraordinary sight sailing along close to heavy breakers.

T h e farmers on the Waimea plains were very much disgusted because we did not come and cut their corn for them. At a me,eting

OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS. 743

they came to the lunani~mous conclusion " we pay their taxes we're darned if they oughtn't to work for us." W e came back here and the next day a vessel came in from Sydney (rather an uncommon occurrence) and brought our orders to go up to Sydney immedialtely and we start in a week's time.

Sailed January srst , 1Sj2, after a middling passage, arrived a t 7 . Sydney February 14th where we are now. I he steamer hlelbourne has been 'detained a long time by her screw being out of order, so this will not go till about the 1st March. S i r Everard Home had determined to send us up to India at once but he has altered his mind since. T h e gold diggings are going on much as ever and they are getting it in New Zealand also. In fact I think there is gold all over the islands. I wish I could ge~t some of it. I have missed all your letters since July and I don't knoa when I shall get them, for they were sent to Wellington when we were on the passage up and now are ordered up here, and we are going to New Zealand again.

The steamers being sent out to this place have made a great change in the people and they are growing more firm and enlightened Yankees every day. There has been a grealt sensation caused here by the new science or no-science of electro-biology. There is a Mr. Daly here, an Irishman, practising with great success : he does some extraordinary things, such a s making a man pour aa t e r over himself fancying he is on fire, etc. H e was dining up at the I rth Mess the other day and he fascinated one of the officers and made him drag four stronff men round the mess-room with the greatest ease. H e is an Irish barrister and one of the handsomest fellows you could meet and a perfect gentleman so that he has very little difficulty in biologising the ladies. Thcre are some very nice people living here who I very often g o to see but I don't like it so well as I-Iobantoxxn. *2dieu for a fortnight.

Saturday, 5th March. I have kept my letter open all this time waiting to send you the

latest news by the steamer for England, but as v e sail for Xuckland to-morrow I am obliged to close it. There has been nothing par~ticular going on since I left, everybody being enr-iched by the gold diggings except us poor devils, etc., etc. One of the greatest friends I have ever had in my life and the most disinterested has been made a lieutenant and is going home in the Serpent man-of-war brig- which is expected down here in a few days and he is a great loss to me. H i s name is Gammell : lives at j2, Inverlei~th road, Edinburgh. 1: J ,,b cduiJ ask him over to spend a few days I should like it very much and I know he wo~uld like it. Mr. Godley sailed for England yesterday in a sailing vessel calle'd the Anglesey; he has left the Canterbury settlement. I

744 P.1GES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS.

have nothing to tell you particularly, I am gebting on very well, etc., etc. I hope soon to see all my dear family again so God bless you all my dearest father and believe me ever your truly affectionate

FREDDY. [Freddy was eighteen and a few months when he wrote bhat 1etlter.l

H.M.S. Fantome. -luckland, N.Z., 3rd April, j 3 .

My dearest Papa.-My last letter to you was by the Melbourne which left Sydney the day before we did (6th March). W e arrived here on the zznd and are going along to-morrow t o see the Coromandel goldfields which have turned out a failure. From that we are going to TVellington and the Chatham Islands and m e will prolbably be some time in N.Z. this cruize. By some strange accident I got your letter of .qugust 30th that came out by the Cleopatra steamer (yesterday) which is the first I have had for a very long time. In fact we get about two bunches of letters during the commission. They all collect in some outlandish place and we get them all in a heap. 'L'hey have a report here to-day of a war with the French. I hope it is not the case, being a pacific character. If we are to g o to war let it be with the Yankees for whom I have a most wholesome dislike. But I suppose it is all nonsense for I should not think that Louis Xapoleon was in a position to go to u7ar at present. This is a very barren place for news 'except scancdal which the ladies brew over their tea to a n alarming extent blowing whole families up over a cup of gunpowder. I amuse myself going out pigeon shooting here which is very lucrative stport a s the pigeons here if you miss them wait quietly up in the trees till you have another shot at them, and splendid birds they are being a~bout twice the size of our wood guests. T h e colony of New Zealand is advancing very rapidly : they are about to form a Legislative Council of their own now. It will be twice the country the -Australian colonies are bye and bye, the ground is so good for agriculture. W h a t splendid pickings a foreign nation going to war with us would have now by taking these gold ships going home from -2ustralia; it would be something like the old Spanish Galleons. Phillip Vigors was stationed up at Baithurst goldfields when we were a t Sydney last so I heard nothing of him. H e is -Assistant Q.M.G. or something of that sort for the time. I am delighted to hear that old " Solsboro " is once more in the hands of the rightful owners and D.V. it will continue so. You must not be annoyed at not hearing from me regularly a s me are literally for months and months together without having an opportunity . . . .

(To be continued.)

HOWE. By LIEUTENANT P. BETHELL, R.N.

(Continued .from August Number of THE NAVAL REVIEW, vide pp. 512-530.)

WAR OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

THE republicanism of France was in the autumn of 1792 challenged by Austria and Prussia. Their enemy, having beaten them at Valmy, proceeded to invade the Austrian Netherlands. I t was therefore pro- claimed in the English parliament, on the last day of the year, that " This Government . . . will never see with indifference that France shall make herself the sovereign of the Low Countries." Nine thousand more men were voted for the Navy, and Howe fully understood that he would soon be called upon for service.

War was declared by France on 1st February, 1793, and on the same day George 111. appointed Howe to command the Channel fleet. Most of the French fleet was at Quiberon Ray on account of a Royalist insurrection in La Vendde, but it was supposed by Pitt's ministry to be in such a disorganised state as to warrant the fitting-out of a squadron for the Mediterranean before and in preference to Howe's.

Thus it was not until the end of May that the Admiral hoisted his flag in the Queen Charlotte. She was a first-rate three years old ; Codrington notes that most of the best battleships had been taken for Hood's Mediterranean fleet. The French ships were, rate for rate, bigger than oms, they had heavier guns, and they sailed better (especially in rough seas) ; it was some time before the inefficient Terrorist administration allowed these advantages to be lost. The Revolution threw aside or beheaded most of the Grand Corps dJ0Jiciers, evolving a scheme for their replacement whereby any merchant seaman with three years naval service might become captain of a ship of the line. Seamen it conscripted from the fishing fleets or army, but the navy was always short. I t is therefore fair to assume that Howe, when he left Ports- mouth in July, commanded a fleet whcse ships, although in themselves somewhat inferior to the French, were officered (if not manned) by sailors far riper in professional experience.

" The late " Lord Chatham was still the First Lord. He was annoyed a t not having been consulted as to Howe's appointment, and between the two there was no love lost.

746 HOWE.

The Admiralty instructions for 1793 ordered Howe to use his ships " either jointly or separately . . . for protecting trade . . . and for taking or destroying the enemy's ships of war, privateers, or trade going into or out of the Bay of Biscay," while particular instructions for the present cccasion told him additionally to prevent the Rochefort and I'Orient squadrons from concentrating at Rrest. He thought that the Board might have been more explicit, but sailed as soon as he was able, and, on 31st July, arrived off Belleisle with 17 of the line. He saw the French fleet in the distance, but it was soon lost to sight in the fog. Deeming it " unassailable in its probable situation off I.Groix," where its reinforcement could not be prevented and whence it did not threaten British trade, he made no effort to go after it.

As it was incapable through mutiny and sickness, this was an unfortunate decision. Howe was driven to Torbay by a gale soon after, and weatherbound there while the French Admiral (who supposed that we meditated a pounce on the coast of La Vendke) was forced by the mutineers to take the ships to Brest. Robespierre soon had the heads off the mutineers ; their admiral he replaced by a young man named Villaret Joyeuse, who three years before had been a lieutenant.

The Brest fleet does not seem to have put to sea again that year. Howe made several attempts to do so ; but he was kept mostly at Torbay by two things : one was foul weather; the other (as his instructions show) that his movements were to a large extent restricted by his having to escort convoys.

He made a sally a t the end of October. On this occasion his frigates made the signal for " enemy in sight," but because the captain of the Czesar (80) thought it beneath his dignity to repeat this signal, the fleet went in chase too late. Furthermore the French ships, which were six brand-new battleships, outdistanced their pursuers, several of whom sprang topmasts, for all that they were carrying less sail. The incident was more unfortunate than appears (and that is bad enough) because it gave some seeming justification for the taunts of English journalists, who railed a t Howe for allowing the French to sweep the seas while his own fleet snoozed a t Torbap.

We shall meet again Captain Molloy of the Czsar (though had Rodney been his Admiral we certainly should not) ; but we must examine, in its up-to-date presentation by Mahan, the newspaper tirade against Howe's system of blockade.

BLOCKADE.

It was not Howe's fault that the weather was foul, and that his fleet was often needed for convoying duties. He himself held that the close

HOWE. 747

winter blockade of Brest damaged his own ships more than the French- the latter, he said " can always . . . escape after a gale of wind by which

- the blockading squadron has been driven off . . ." " . . . an enemy is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a barely superior force," nor (recent trial had shown) could he be overtaken if he did.

Lord Howe's great kindness of heart, as much as his great age, ill fitted him for the command of a blocliade that exposed the participants to such appalling misery of body and mind. I t is all very well for Mahan to say that " when questions of material conflict with correct strategic disposition they must give way." The trouble is that they do give way. If Admiral Mahan had served in a ship of 20,000 tons and 40,000 horse- power, on an occasion when a January gale off Ushant caused her to heave-to for forty-eight hours, his treatment of Howe's problem would have been a little less doctrinaire.

Nevertheless, the facts are that St. Vincent maintained a blockade where Howe had failed. For this there are two reasons. St. Vincent's were better ships, and they anchored in Concarneau Bay for shelter ; and even there they were so battered by the blockade that it was difficult to collect a serviceable fleet for Trafalgar.

" Inaction must make us all cowards," wrote St. Vincent. Howe understood that too ; he was prepared to cruise off Brest as often and as long as possible. But in his day it was frequently not possible, and while he must remain the best judge of what was, we might note that his contemporary, Kempenfelt, had been agreed that the ships of the time could do no more than lie in readiness at Torbay. To talk of Howe's blockade as a " sheer defensive " is sheer nonsense ; it was the best that could be done.

The whole matter is summed up by Nelson in a manner that nullifies comments by Mahan or anyone else. " . . . If I am to watch the French, I must be at sea ; and if at sea, must have bad weather ; and if the ships are not fit to stand bad weather, they are useless. . . . ,,

THE GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE.

Preliminary Strategy. (FIG. I )

Howe very properly ignored the press campaign, and Pitt would not let him retire on a plea of infirmity and age. His General Instructions for 1794 were the same as those for 1793, but his particular instructions ordered him to intercept a fleet bringing grain from America-foodstuffs for France having been declared contraband of war. The convoy num-

748 HOWE.

bered 117, being protected by two battleships ; it was well on its way by the time Howe came out to meet it.

But once again his force had to be divided in strength and purpose. Convoys to the East and West Indies and Newfoundland had to be shepherded clear of the Channel by the whole fleet, while an escort of six of the line was needed as far as Finisterre.

All the ships left St. Helens on 2nd May, 1794, watched sadly but with high admiration by the great Metternich, who had begged Howe to let him come too. Off the Lizard the merchantmen were detached under Rear-Admiral Montague, who was told to cruise in the Bay of Riscay after leaving them, and finally to make sail on 20th to rejoin the main body.

Howe took the latter to Ushant, and having, on 5th May, satisfied himself that the French fleet was in Brest, shaped a course " for getting an offing from the French coast . . . but much obstructed therein . . . by a western swell and unsettled weather." As yet he had no intelligence of the grain fleet, and it is to be inferred that he made for his " Secret Rendezvous No. 5 " where Montague would be able to find him. On 14th May, he was still without news, and therefore inclined " to stand over to the British coast for a week or ten days, if the wind continues westerly. . . ." If the wind became easterly, however, the fleet would a t once close Brest, because the east wind might bring the French out.

On the evening of 16th May an east wind did bring the French oat, and the following day they slipped past Howe in a fog, bound f(or the rendezvous with the grain fleet.

Not until 19th May did Howe find that Brest was empty. On the same evening the frigate Venus joined him from Montague with news that Rear-Admiral Neilly was also at sea to meet the convoy. Montague, who was steering north to cut off Neilly's retreat, asked for reinforcements ; and Howe had already started to his assistance when information from a ship caught coming out of Brest brought about a change of plans.

Exactly what that information was we are not told ; but it is safe to say that it conveyed to Howe a very fair idea of the course steered by the French fleet ; and it is probable that Mahan does him an injustice in attributing the success of the pursuit to luck.

But, strategist or no strategist, Howe went after the Rrest Ecet. He hoped, we may suppose, to catch it and defeat it, so that the con\ oy should fall helpless into his hands ; and we may suppose so because the thing very nearly came to pass. On May 28th Howe found his enemy and fought him ; on May 30th the grain fleet, unseen in the fog, sailed through the flotsam of the flight.

HOWE. 749

The ensuing battle took place farther from land than any other in history. Villaret Joyeuse, who had been threatened with the guillotine should he lose the grain ships, sought to draw Howe away to the S.E. of the rendezvous, with the result that he was afterwards able to boast- " I saved my convoy and my head." No good Frenchman will allow that " le treize prairial" was a defeat. One achieved the object, and what of else is victory ? It is a difference of outlook.

Throughout the action the fleets were, ship for ship, about equally matched (see Appendix), though the advantage in gunfire and sailing qualities lay slightly with the French. Their crews, as we have seen, were inexperienced and largely untrained men commanded by one who three years before had been a lieutenant ; but the flagship bore a Terrorist commissioner who seems to have inspired the sailors with a high degree of confidence and zeal. Professor Hannay compares the spirit of the French fleet in this battle very favourably with the despair and confusion that reigned at Trafalgar.

Of the English fleet it is enough to say that it was well manned and tolerably well trained. In many ships, the shortage of marines had caused their berths to be filled by companies of line regiments ; particularly the Queen's and the Worcesters-who have not forgotten this.

Lord Howe was sixty-eight and half-crippled with gout. (The following account of the action, all of whose important phases

are illustrated, is nowhere essentially at issue with the account in Howe's journal. The side-margins of the plans run magnetic north and south).

28th kfay, 1794. The French were reported to windward a t dawn on 28th May. At

8.30 Rear-Admiral Pasley, with his flying squadron of four fast battleships, was ordered to reconnoitre ; while the rest of the fleet prepared for battle. By 10.0 the French had approached to nine miles.

They did not turn away until they were sure that Howe was committed to pursuit ; while Howe, directly he saw them filling on the port tack, ordered their rear to be engaged. Pasley's squadron being in advance was naturally able to obey this order first.

We have seen Howe himself leading a very similar flying squadron a t Quiberon, and we have noted that the idea was Hawke's : but the credit of establishing it as a tactical device must go to Howe.

Unfortunately on this occasion only one ship of the advanced squadron attacked with any vigour. Howe, seeing that the other three hesitated to close, ordered their particular signals for engaging the rear to be made.

By 7 p.m. the main body of the fleet, which up till then appears to have been formed in two divisions, was near enough to assist in the con-

7 9 HOWE.

centration. Thus the rear ship was beaten out of the line (R6volutionnaire, 120 guns) ; but Villaret Joyeuse, intent on putting leagues between himself and the convoy, made no effort to help her. She dropped astern locked in a struggle with the Audacious, completely crippled ; owing to defects in the night signals Howe did not know this.

May zglh. Throughout the night both fleets continued close-hauled on the star-

board tack, the British forming line as convenient on the Charlotte.

By morning Howe had drawn almost level with the enemy. Shortly before 7 he gave the order to tack in succession, following it up half an hour later with the signal to pass through the French line to obtain the weather gauge. Once again he hoped for " some good effect on the enemy's rear."

The van, although led by the best-sailing ship (Caesar), did not fetch the French rear. Codrington attributed this to the Casar's captain handling her badly with malice aforethought. All that happened was that the van exchanged broadsides with the last ships in the French line. Villaret Joyeuse promptly turned to bite those that had trodden on his tail, with the result that our van suffered considerably, while our rear and centre were thrown into confusion by having to slow down to the gait of the Caesar.

Nothing would induce Captain Molloy to make more sail, and Howe must have been exasperated beyond bearing at havinghismanceuvrespoiled. Nevertheless, when the Charlotte's first lieutenant made a pungent comment on Molloy's conduct, he was sharply told by the Admiral to " hold his tongue."

Soon " it became indispensably necessary to disengage the van from such prejudical fire." Howe sought to do this, and at the same time to cut off the French rear, by tacking the fleet in succession through the line. The signal to tack appears to have been obscured by smoke ; at any rate the Czsar, who should have been the first to obey it, made no attempt to do so, but wore and came away large.-" Look, Curtis ; there goes your friend, who is mistaken now ? " remarked Howe on seeing this latest defection of Molloy's.

He then made the signal to pass through the French line ; but as this also went unheeded in the van, he said to the Master of the Fleet-" Then tack the Charlotte, sir, and let us show them the example." The example was accordingly shown, but only three ships followed it. The rest trailed along after the Caesar to leeward of the French line, " and tacking astern thereof, were too far distant when they had regained the Charlotte's wake, for giving her any early support. . . . ,,

HOWE. 75I

Nevertheless Villaret Joyeuse, when he saw three of his rear being severely pounded, wore to their assistance and carried them off. Howe had forced upon him the choice between abandoning these ships or surrendering the weather gauge ; he accepted the latter evil.

So far we have seen Howe launch three attacks, each on the rear. All of them could have been, and were meant to be, concentrated attacks, but the tepidity of the captains had done nothing to make them so. The misconduct of Captain Molloy was and is plain to everyone, and Howe's bitter remark shows that he himself had expected something of the kind. Barrow asserts that Curtis had persuaded Howe against his will into allowing Molloy to lead the line ; but this will not do. The line had been formed " as most convenient " after the chase of z8th, and the Czsar being the best sailer had naturally taken the lead.

30th-31st May, 1794. At sunset on 29th the French were some 10 miles on our lee bow.

That night a thick fog came down, lifting the next morning no longer than to allow a glimpse of the enemy in the N.W. Howe signalled the sailing order in two divisions so as to keep the fleet together, but beyond this there was nothing to be done.

At daylight on 31st, when Howe was dozing in an armchair, Curtis came to him in a great state of nerves. The flagship, maybe, was standing into the British fleet, maybe into the French. What was to be done ?- The Admiral's answer, although of no intrinsic importance, illustrates to perfection his splendid composure-" Well, sir, it can't be helped ; we must wait with patience until the weather improves."

At I p.m. the fog cleared to show the enemy to leeward. Howe formed his fleet on a line of bearing, and having made the signals for co-terminous engagement, bore down upon the French ; " . . . but before that could be effected, the day was too far advanced for bringing them properly to action. . . . " We have seen that before Gibraltar Lord Howe exhibited a rather odd bias towards fighting after dark. Why, then, did he decline a night action now ? The answer is interesting, and Codrington supplies it. Previous to the battle, Howe had told him that with a good fleet he would certainly engage by night ; but with this fleet, he added,-" I require daylight to see how my captains conduct themselves. "

Therefore the only fighting this day took place in the Culloden, where Irishmen engaged the ship's police.

The Glorious First of June. The First of June dawned fair and fine, a moderate breeze and smooth

sea having supplanted the gale of three days before. Both sides wished

752 HOWE.

to fight. Howe, who thought " . . . some conclusive issue was loudly called for. . . ," after deployment signalled his intention " to pass between the ships in the line for engaging them to leeward." This manceuvre was his own invention, and one that all the fleet expected he would use.

Mahan called it " falling back on the old, unskilful, sledge-hammer fashion of the British Navy," which it certainly was not. Its greatest merit was that it " checkmated the French method of falling off by alternate ships to leeward and then reforming " ; moreover each ship that used it could fire both her broadsides into the defenceless bow and stern of the ships between whom she passed. Critics of this method of attack who deny that it afforded any concentration of force, should recognize that it did this very thing by developing maximum gunfire ; they might also note that Corbett said "no finer manceuvre was ever designed " than this " by which the problem of decisive action at sea was finally solved."

Into Battle. " I think we shall have a fight to-day ; Black Dick has been smiling,"

said one of the sailors. Indeed, an eyewitness remarked :-" Lord Howe displayed an animation of which at his age, and after such fatigue of body and mind, I had not thought him capable. He seemed to contemplate the result as one of unbounded satisfaction." Breakfast over, the signal was made for each ship independently to steer for and engage her opponent, and at 8.40 the whole line filled and bore down.

Howe ordered the signal for " Closer Action " to be prepared, adding- " But I only want that made in case of captains not doing their duty." Then, shutting the little signal-book he always carried :-" And now, gentlemen, no more book, no more signals. I don't want the ships to be bilge and bilge, but if you can lock the yardarms, so much the better."

Notice that our ships advanced obliquely, so that their broadsides could bear as soon as the range allowed.

The measure of obedience accorded to the signal for breaking the line can be seen from Fig. 12. The signal as it stood in the book could be read as merely an indication of the Admiral's intention, and even if it were construed as a direct command, its footnote left a loophole that made it permissive. This stupid footnote did not appear in every ship's copy ; nevertheless, two-thirds of the fleet engaged from to windward, some of them from so great a range that Howe was twice under the necessity of ordering " Closer Action." The Barfleur, for instance, kept to windward because Captain Collingwood (on whom the command had devolved) ". . . found it impracticable to pass to leeward of the enemy's line without interrupting the fire of the ships ahead of

HOWE. 753

us. . . "-Surely Lord Fisher was right when he said " Collingwood was an old woman."

The flagship was incomparably well fought. The Master hinted that there was insufficient room for her to cut the line. " What is that to you, sir ? " boomed the Admiral. -"Damn my eyes, if you don't mind, I don't," muttered Bowen, and took the Charlotte through so that her shrouds brushed the Montagne's tricolour. She then engaged the Montagne from the quarter, soon driving her off ; thereafter she fought the Jacobin, Juste, and R6publicain-and not one at a time either.

Villaret Joyeuse, driven ahead by Howe, held on until he was abreast his leading ships. Then, wearing to the northward, he carried off almost the whole of his van, which by this time had had as much as it could stomach. He could not have done this had each of his ships been "fixed" by an opponent to leeward (as Howe had intended) ; but only the Defence and Marlborough barred the retreat, and both were totally dismasted.

Seeing this manceuvre, Howe at once ordered the line ahead and astern of the Charlotte, but it was a good two hours before anything resembling a line was formed. The signal " Close and join the Admiral forthwith " met with scant response, because the ships willing to obey i t were those too battered to comply, while the ones able to obey were those that throughout the action had exhibited marked reluctance to do as they were told, or even to fight.

Somehow a collection of vessels was got together. By this time about half the French fleet, re-knit to leeward, was menacing the Queen, and it was to the help of the Queen that Howe led his ships. The Charlotte was practically unmanageable, and although the pursuit was not carried far, the mere threat of it sufficed Villaret Joyeuse, who carried off his fleet to the northward without stopping to capture the Queen.

Seven dismasted French battleships remained. Not until 3.10 p.m. did Lord Howe give any thought to securing these, and not until 4.23, when Villaret Joyeuse was ten miles to leeward, was the signal " Stay for prizes " made general.

I t is customary to conclude a survey of this battle with a stern rebuke to Howe for having preferred the capture of prizes to the pursuit of a flying enemy. This charge cannot lie. He did wish to chase, and would probably have held on after the French had not Curtis persuaded him that the re-assembly of the fleet was a matter of prior and most urgent necessity. Bowen told Codrington-" The Captain of the Fleet won't let us pursue the enemy." Stopford's evidence helps us to place this as having happened shortly before 2 p.m., and the fact that no ship was told to " Stay for Prizes " before 3.10 is clear proof that Howe did not

754 HOWE.

yield to Curtis's importunity until he found that the majority of ships either could not or would not join him in chase.

Then he did yield ; but for that only one person may sneer at him.- " A Lord Howe victory-take a part and retire into port "-is Nelson's gibe, and no one else may make it. No one but the dying Nelson, when it was hinted to him that Admiral Collingwood would take upon himself the direction of the fleet, could say-" Not while I live ! Do you anchor, Hardy, anchor ! " -Lord Howe was not dying ; only utterly exhausted in body and mind ; and while it is plain that he did in the end allow Curtis to assume the command, it is not seemly for ordinary men to blame him.

We have seen that Lord Howe showed himself a most competent tactician, setting in his flagship the highest possible example of handling and fighting. The fleet contained a Hood, two Harveys, a Graves, a Gambier, a Duckworth and a Pakenham ; also Westcott of the Nile and Cuthbert Collingwood. Why, then, did it follow and obey so badly ? Codrington answers that Howe was far too indulgent and forbearing with his captains, but this seems insufficient ; and I think the facts support the conclusion that Howe did not exercise over his officers that mastery of personality with which other admirals have so often transfigured the Navy.

Nobody at home was disposed to belittle the victory. Their Majesties paid a ten-days' visit to Portsmouth, where they dined in the Charlotte with the Admiral and presented him with a sword valued at 3,000 guineas. An immediate advance of prize-money was haid to the sailors, with the result that they joined the Pompey crowds in shouting-" God Save the King, and Lord Howe to defend him ! "

But otherwise things were not done so handsomely. The King was dis- suaded from investing the Admiral with the Garter-and this after he had already promised it. Howe's particular recommendations for promotion were not attended to ; nor was the increase of pay which he had hinted at-if not actually promised-to the sailors. At the back of this ungraciousness lay Chatham's hostility to Howe, which led the First Lord to oppose any concession that might benefit the Admiral or further the Admiral's wishes.

In the autumn Howe again took the fleet to sea, but before he had cruised a month found his gout so bad that he asked to be relieved. However, the King persuaded him to remain ; and it was not until Feb- ruary 1795 that he finally struck his flag. During this period he made two efforts to stop a certain unseasonable liveliness on the part of the Brest fleet, but foul weather foiled both. The only other noteworthy incident was a mutiny in the Culloden, whose sailors, dissatisfied with her

HOWE. 755

seaworthiness, attempted to introduce order into their methods by electing representatives whom they termed " delegates."

That closed Howe's fighting service. The mutinies followed, the history of which would fill many pages ; on returning to London after the mutinies Howe only stayed long enough to receive the Order of the Garter. He then retired to Porters', where he lived very quietly with his wife and unmarried daughter. In his study, which was modelled on the Charlotte's after cabin, the old admiral liked to put on his spec- tacles and indulge in his fondness for reading. His interest in the navy he never lost, and to the last he kept up a brisk correspondence with Curtis on service matters.

In the autumn of 1798, after an unsuccessful attempt to cure his gout by sea-bathing on the Sussex coast, he went to try the new electric treatment in London. Here he gave his whole year's pay to the Bank of England as a contribution towards the expense of the war. Pension he had none, having declined one as a rich man and a man of simple tastes.

In October he wrote to congratulate Nelson on the skill and cool judgment that had won the battle of the Nile. I t is wholly fitting to assume that the last letter he ever read was Nelson's reply, which among other acknowledgment and praise referred to Howe as " the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever produced."

He died at Grafton Street on 5th August, 1799, being buried in the family vault in Nottinghamshire, and accorded a monument in St. Paul's. As he left no sons, the English viscounty and earldom expired with him.

EPILOGUE. Some men have a magic in their character that transfigures all they do ;

for such, a bare chronicle of deeds and words is a complete biography. For others this is not enough, and we have to seek anecdotes and contemporary opinions before the picture is complete.

So it is with Lord Howe, whose deeds speak for themselves more than they speak for him. He himself spoke seldom-Horace Walpole dubbed him " undaunted as a rock, and as silent "-and this quality of reserve is apt to impart to Howe a colourless, wooden aspect which was really lacking. It deceived Mahan into dismissing him as worthy and competent but dull and orthodox ; as one who, as it were, " struck only on the box."

Now this judgment is one that nobody can allow who knows what was meant to happen-as apart from what did happen-at each stage of the battle of the First of June. Here, certainly, did Howe show originality, so much indeed, that at this distance of time one can hardly distinguish it from genius. Without tactical mobility he could not have

756 HOWE.

been original. We saw that the mobility came from a system of signals, and we know whose system it was.

After the Nile, Nelson acknowledged the Navy's debt to Howe for its signals, and praised him to his face ; but his private opinion was less complimentary. " He is certainly a great officer in the management of a fleet, but that is all."

All admirals look like feeble simpletons beside Nelson. Howe envied him " the eminently distinguished conduct of each of his captains " at the Nile ; for here was a band of brothers that only Nelson could create. Rodney's captains let him down ; but Rodney took care that they did not make a habit of it. Howe's captains, on the other hand, knew it was safe to continue slack and inattentive and lukewarm. Molloy, indeed, after he had disgraced himself, was only court-martialled because he applied for trial after Howe had advised him not to do so.

Howe's manner repelled rather than attracted his subordinates. His awkwardness and reserve made him seem cold and morose to those who saw only this dark, serious six-footer " whose rigid brow gave his countenance the harshness of an Article of War." Some will guess that at the bottom of this apparent austerity lay nothing more than shyness, and they will be right. Codrington knew it, Stopford knew it, and Howe realized it himself. When you got to understand Howe as St. Vincent understood him, you would imitate him in little things as well as big.

On top of this shyness lay another peculiarity. The Admiral, although his mind was always clear, could never express himself ; so that besides his finding it difficult to talk to people, they found him hard to comprehend. Once a party of his captains called to ask Howe to elucidate some written orders ; after the interview they tossed up outside his cabin to settle which should return for a further explanation.

Moreover, his literary style was exceedingly turgid. A latter-day admiral of distinction said of the directions in Howe's Signal-book-" Many are quite unintelligible, and many more can be understood in two or three different ways."

Several legends illustrate Howe's astonishing self-possession, but one of them gives a glimpse of something more. The lieutenant who had the middle watch one stormy night rushed into the Admiral's cabin-" My Lord, the anchors are coming home ! "-" I'm sure they are very much in the right," answered Howe, " I don't know who would stay abroad such a night as this, if he could help it."

I hdve noticed that the lower deck (which has not essentially changed much in 150 years) assesses this coolness in danger as a very high virtue in an officer, perhaps as the highest. Assuredly Howe was well-liked by the sailors ; few officers that are not get nicknames. His was " Black

HOWE. 75%

Dick " because there hung in his cabin an extremely tenebrous mezzotint of himself.

There are certain odd likenesses between Howe and Anson. There is the same strength of mind and solidity of purpose, the same flair for judging other men. Both revelled in hard work, loved orderliness and liked to poke about in minutiz ; both were temperate men of exceptional fortitude and calm-though Anson's was a much more fish-like calm. Howe was perhaps the more dashing captain, and certainly by far the finer tactician ; but as First Lord Anson probably excelled him. Neither was an ardent politician, or would connive at the nasty intrigue that politics involved.

Professor Hannay says that you can see from Howe's portrait how the Admiral inherited the type of the House of Brunswick, with their solidity of character and unshakeable valour. If you go to the National Portrait Gallery you will find nothing but a wretched little daub ; but by climbing the main staircase of Trinity House you will see everything the Professor saw and more, for all that the painting is stowed away like Discobo1us.l Lord Howe peers out of the gloom at you like a friendly bloodhound ; you may notice the fearlessness, but you cannot miss the kindness, the wisdom, and the utter dependability of him.

There is a certain sadness too. Howe was domestically inclined. Porters' was to him what Merton was to Nelson, and while his Lady may not have been an Emma, she was at any rate Howe's devoted wife. He used to promise himself "rural dissipation," but he got little enough of that. Most of his life he was at sea, and after 1782 he was never a fit man ; yet he had riches and a family on whom to spend them, and he had earned rest after war. When we remember this, it is hard to deny him a strong sense of duty, which twice made him leave these thiligs to lead the Navy that was all to him.

" . . . The Discobolus standeth and turneth his face to the wall ; ". . .

HOWE.

Shi?. Guns. Commander.

Capt. A. J. P. Molloy BELLEROPHON R-A. T. Pasley

Capt. Wm. Hope ,, Lord Hugh Seymour ,, John W. Payne ,, Hon. G. C. Berkeley

V-A. Thomas Graves Capt. Henry Nichols

,, Wm. Parker ,, Jas. Gambier

IMPREGNABLE R-A. Benj . Caldwell ICapt. G. B. Westcott

TREMENDOUS 74 ,, Jas. Pigott ,, Hon. T. Pakenham

R-A. Geo. Bowyer Capt. C. Collingwood

,, I. Schomberg ,, T. Mackenzie

Admiral Earl Howe Capt. Sir R. Curtis

,, Andrew Douglas ,, John Harvey ,, Thos. Pringle ,, J . T. Duckworth

fR-A. Alan Gardner \Capt. John Hutt

,, Hy. Harvey ,, John Bazely

V-A. Sir Alexr. Hood Capt. Wm. Domett

,, Jas. Montagu ,, Chas. Cotton ,, John Elphinstone , , Albermarle Bertie ,, Wm. Bentinck ,, Ed. Thornborough ,, Hon. A. Legge ,, Hon. R. Forbes ,, Wm. Brown ,, Hon R. Stopford ,, Robert Barlow

and 2 fireships, one sloop, 2 cutters, and hospital ship.

"denotes mounting carronades additional t o guns numbered.

HOWE.

Ship. Guns. Commander. Remarks.

I AMERIQUE 74 Capt. 1'Heritier Prize RBVOLUTIONNAIRE I 10 ,, Vandagel Beaten out of line 28th GASPARIN 74 ,, Tardey INDOMPTABLE 80 ,, Lame1 Sent home crippled evg.

% 31st * TERRIBLE

! I 10 ,, Longer ' IMPETUEUX 74 ,, Donville Prize

MUTIUS S C ~ V O L A 74 ,, Larr6gny OEOLE 74 ,, Keranguin TOURVILLE 74 ,, Langlois PELLETIER 74 ,, Berard TYRANNICIDE 74 ,, Dordelin

USTE 80 ,, Blavet Prize r l I;' MONTAGNE 120 R-A. Louis Thomas Villaret Joyeuse

JACOBIN 80 Capt. Gassin e z ACHILLE 74 ,, la Villegris Prize

VENGEUR 74 ,, Renaudin Sunk NORTHUMBERLAND 74 ,, Etienne Prize

74 ,, le Franc 74 ,, Tiphaine 74 ,, Desmartis 74 ,, Thbvenard Accompanied " Indomp-

table " on evg. of 31st

74 ,, Allary 120 R-A. F. J. Bouvet

SCIPION 74 Capt. Huguet 74 ,, Bompart Lost touch evg. of 30th

TRENTE-ET-UN MAI 74 ,, Ganteaume Joined evg. of 30th PATRIOTE 74 ,, Lucadore Joined from Nielly 19th SANS PAREIL 80 R-A. Nielly Joined 31st. Prize T$M$RAIRE 74 Capt. Morel Joined with Nielly TRAJAN 74 ,, Dumorier ,, ,9

AUDACIEUX 74 ,, Pilastre Joined from Nielly 19th towed " Revol." back 28th

and 15 or 16 frigates or corvettes.

HOWE.

and 2 fireships, one sloop, 2 cutters, and

Commander. Capt. A. J. P. Molloy

i R-A. T. Pasley Capt. Wm. Hope

,, Lord Hugh Seymour ,, John W. Payne ,, Hon. G. C. Berkeley

{ V-A. Thomas Graves Capt. Henry Nichols

,, Wm. Parker ,, Jas. Gambier

( R-A. Benj . Caldwell ICapt. G. B. Westcott

,, Jas. Pigott ,, Hon. T. Pakenham

( R-A. Geo. Bowyer Capt. C. Collingwood

,, I. Schomberg ,, T. Mackenzie

Admiral Earl Howe (Capt. Sir R. Curtis .. Andrew Douglas

, John Harvey ,, Thos. Pringle ,, J . T. Duckworth

[R-A. Alan Gardner '[Capt. John Hut t

,, Hy. Harvey ,, John Bazely

1 V-A. Sir Alexr. Hood Capt. Wm. Domett

,, Jas. Montagu ,, Chas. Cotton ,, John Elphinstone , , Albermarle Bertie , , Wm. Bentinck ,, Ed. Thornborough ,, Hon. A. Legge ,, Hon. R. Forbes ,, Wm. Brown ,, Hon R. Stopford ,, Robert Barlow

hospital ship.

*:denotes mounting carronades additional to guns numbered.

HOWE.

Ship. Guns. Comma?zder. Remarks. AMERIQUE 74 Capt. 1'Heritier Prize R~VOLUTIONNAIRE I 10 ,, Vandagel Beaten out of line 28th GASPARIN 74 ,, Tardey INDOMPTABLE I 80 ,, Lame1 Sent home crippled evg.

$ 31st * TERRIBLE 110 ,, Longer % ' IMPETUEUX 74 ,, Donville Prize

MUTIUS SCBVOLA 74 ,, Larr6gny OEOLE 74 ,, Keranguin , TOURVILLE 74 ,, Langlois PELLETIER 74 ,, Berard TYRANNICIDE 74 ,, Dordelin $ (JUsTE 80 ,, Blavet Prize MONTAGNE 120 R-A. Louis Thomas Villaret Joyeuse

8 ' JACOBIN 80 Capt. Gassin C z ACHILLE 74 ,, la Villegris Prize

VENGEUR 74 ,, Renaudin Sunk \ NORTHUMBERLAND 74 ,, Etienne Prize ENTREPRENANT 74 ,, le Franc NEPTUNE 74 ,, Tiphaine

EMMAPPES 74 ,, Desmartis $ MONT BLANC b&* 1 74

,, Thbvenard Accompanied " Indomp- table " on evg. of 3 1st

CONVENTION 74 ,, Allary 2 R~PUBLICAIN 120 R-A. F. J . Bouvet

SCIPION 74 Capt. Huguet MONTAGNARD 74 ,, Bompart Lost touch evg. of 30th TRENTE-ET-UN MAI 74 ,, Ganteaume Joined evg. of 30th PATRIOTE 74 ,, Lucadore Joined from Nielly 19th SANS PAREIL 80 R-A. Nielly Joined 31st. Prize T ~ M ~ R A I R E 74 Capt. Morel Joined with Nielly TRAJAN 74 ,, Dumorier ,, ,, AUDACIEUX 74 ,, Pilastre Joined from Nielly 19th

towed "Revol." back 28th

and 15 or 16 frigates or corvettes.

760 HOWE

5.30 PM - 28* MAY 1 794 THE CHASE

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F4

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THE CHAbE

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n, gm9 +&, .. ak b Ark., =d

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t6 the .&rA-d &A 6 m e t i t TAr h m d Xob

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Haiv failed k0,ec!? &, fie"& r e ,

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"s-. bug /Ad d A e r /rrf. - T!.. F-d u w "3 3 " r r r . t . M m .uccsv d.- -

8 0 ~ ~ - ISJUNE @ L n P r d b n DEPLOYMENT 2 i

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c N w , fo- bl. I*.. gL b&& m a DI. ?1-.

in. cj d.rvU9 ~d b-. km-a+ b d h t . b.a The & h-n &r p.+ 9.

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4 d o ee &.A b &&, &,,I& kwejMsd I-P I%? 2921 IUr

'\ i

HOWE. 763

9 . 1 5 ~ ~ !'JUNE 1794 BEARING DOWN

~ . ~ d No- /wu ~ , y m l / r d h a vlfvlim to

, k , s h d w , Me 6-& ,& - 9 9 9 &- f,, p l e e ~ & , md LC ~ d a r e d rae/l. &b f) at- fw Md pnqoge A w rubbond.

B r u s W . * a r v ~ ~

f / G 13. I I 45~~-1"JUNE 1794

Lord How* LJ e n d r a ~ w r n g fo re+ de E h r ~ d h e S d shrps ar are mt rrlppkd

0, a g ~ e d d e sad Tu A s - rn A m The hen& YM h a bmben, b r t Aeu. A d

a%,,, G & oaa,;lt--,and Ld6 UL.2 h rnund h & No,churvd

The Dueen', and BrunsiuA: m AoC

Cup& Henry Huuey m &e 'Ro-~iiims' 9- dc,",> ro & s+prc of 1's LN& in the

10 15~1- 1': JUNE 1794 7'hr ampr prt of OL 5rh.h Fleet pr$kn G ngoge

/- 0 ,"dd .QsaAs&. b. b- or&Pa..

and ' , G d C b s ' ro lau .rgnaUd

rr. '6- C&&lba' ul de drch o/ de J~itng HOL MA Ly tir &tbom, We-, Qu- end R G-POBI' npr.buga.mmpr & s ' B & w r h ' ~ cuL &b.

& - d ( B " & 9 ~ '

The 'GL5m/m'fvl, m 5 &r Q- e&o&e' The Wuv' u & ~ t 6 nn rn bmrd &e i r ' t / e s~rr '

I

T",A,.d f - - "-5 -be .- s r d 4tu~lun

I

06.-

fll; I4 2 0 PM- IS JUNE P 794

~ o , d uonr or- A Fk*. d o s e - hdh, and fa come & h &

stirbourd. tmk He &en. stnrta r w

& gr & 'Queen: udh d e ,,& &.5 the ?=&&do not &, B & b ,

but mere4 /we on h e m

On both st&, &hi &&r

. -Not =.fib mm & an bw h& &ru

iod Howe h L ANY SAP b "sbYfbr kueh *

- Pg u

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

BRASSEY'SfNAVAL A N D SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931.

\,THE headings of the chapters in this section indicate how thoroughly 'the Annual pursues the aim, already noted in the naval section, of an embracing view of all maritime affairs : and this section well illuminates the general situation of merchant shipping to-day.

The two first chapters, " Standing of the World's Merchant Fleets," I by John P. Taylor, and " The Speculative Character of Shipping," by 1 Cuthbert Maughan form an alluring and fitting introduction to those

that follow. They are most able productions, and again the reviewer is impelled by the wish that this book should have a wide and eager public, for change is the rapid order of the day and Englishmen-in spite of the changed and still rapidly changing relation that the sea now bears to human aff airs-are yet entirely subject to its control.

Chapter XII, " Standing of the World's Merchant Fleets," has some pregnant tables showing the steady increase in numbers and size ; and not only the changing nature of the ships themselves but also their changing nationality. Herein we read that whereas in 1898 Great Britain and Ireland owned 54 per cent. of the tonnage of the principal maritime countries, to-day they have only 29.9 per cent. of it. The decline is attributed to two causes : (I) the abnormal development of American shipbuilding resources during the war, and (2) the general advance of all other maritime nations, with the exception of Germany and Austria. The first is again changing, for much of the American tonnage built during the war was found to be unsuitable after it, and consequently a large proportion of it is either laid up or on the sale list.

The most remarkable fact of all which this article clearly reveals is the demand for oil. So great is this that in 1930 actually forty per cent. of the shipbuilding of the world was devoted to building " tankers." To remember, in reading these statistics, that a " tanker " is a vessel which can have no alternative cargo-it is either oil or nothing-is to be confronted with a world phenomenon ; and it is a menacing one for the heart of an Empire that is entirely dependent upon oil from abroad.

1 For Part I. see NAVAL REVIEW NO. 3, V01. XIX, August. 1931, P P 545-551.

BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931. 765

To-day eleven per cent. of the world's tonnage is occupied solely in carrying oil, and the world's merchant tonnage is some twenty-two million tons greater than it was in 1913 Coincident with this demznd for oil has been the development of the motor-driven ship. Eleven-and-a-half per cent. of the total tonnage of the world is motor driven. The reviewer would urge naval officers to study this chapter; there is a wealth of information in it that cannot be touched upon in a review.

" The Speculative Character of Shipping " (Chapter XIII). I t was Adam Smith, I believe, who remarked in " The Wealth of Nations" that the number of marriages in a country depends upon the price of bread. The dictum may be followed by a quotation from this chapter which says : " I t is largely in helping to supply immense numbers of persons with the necessaries of life that shipping is employed. These services are among the chief essentials of overseas commerce" (p. 171).

If Adam Smith was correct it would seem that the number of ships required by a country is also dependent upon the price of bread, the notion being confirmed by a succeeding paragraph which says : " Yet these essential services are shown to be subject in a very marked manner to the influence of Nature and to variations in the Fources of supply outside the control of men," and by another paragraph which says : " The unfortunate fate which overtook the shipping undustry of the wofld in I930 can be traced, in a large measure, to the beneficence of Nature. A factor which was largely responsible for the course of events in that year was the exceptionally fine summer throughout Europe in 1929, resulting in grain harvests much above the average. Consequently the need of Europe for imports was much reduced."

The argument seems to run thus : the more wheat you import the more children you have, the more children the more you develop modern industry : the one begets the other, and thence to the conclusion that not only is shipping speculative, but the life of a State which rests upon a supply of foreign food is also highly speculative, even if no war super- venes to cut if off.

The greater the population, the greater the demand for food from abroad ; to this now has to be added-the greater the demand for fuel oil from abroad. There is, no doubt, some master key to the solution of this wondrous problem which confronts England to-day ; but where is it to be found ? She can no longer control the peace of the world ; this power, which she held unmistakably at the end of the 19th century, and which the war restored to her, she has since deliberately abandoned. Peace she cannot now command. Her merchant fleet even she could not-with her present Navy-protect, were she to fall out with her recent allies.

766 BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931.

I t is fortunate indeed that the latter eventuality is in the last degree unlikely and that England has yet time to look about her. The one obvious need that she has-greater than ever before, because of her increased dependence upon overseas supplies-is a trained and most numerous race of seamen. I t is her one aching and ever-increasing need ; the style of her ships, their powers and potentialities, are as nothing in comparison with this fierce necessity. Something should be done, and at once, to establish this, and the youth of Great Britain in great numbers should be gathered and trained to the service of the sea : whether for the Royal Navy or the Merchant Navy being left an open question for decision and development as the needs of the day will indicate. There is no reason why the early training of all-officers and men for both services-should not have a common origin. The war has taught us this, has shown that the merchant seamen of Britain are of the highest temper and character : let us do something practical about it while we have yet time, and breed them in one great service of the sea.

A study of this pregnant chapter forces the need for some such development ; for ever-increasing traffic upon the seas is seen to be inevitable in spite of world-wide depression and in spite of the present complete dislocation of sea-borne trade. . If England is not to die, young seamen in increasing numbers are imperative. I t is of the first importance : ships she can have, naval and merchant alike as she wants them ;. not so seamen to man them, without the persistent preparation which to-day is grievously lacking.

Chapter XIV by "Viator" "The Ocean Tourist" and Chapter XV by " Comprador" "The Liner as an Hotel," are a flood light upon the changed relation of the sea to the average citizen or countryman of to-day. As the motor omnibus will now take him about the country in every direction so to-day will the shipping companies now take him about the seas in every direction ;

" even should he elect to travel ' tourist-third ' he is not branded as a mere wayfarer, since the tourist-third class merely indicates a definite standard of comfort on board the ship in which he chooses to travel. He may, on such an occasion, find a majority of his companions bent on the same pleasant errand as himself, and, no doubt, in its initial stages the tourist-third business sprang from an effort by the steamship lines to encourage those of moderate means to wander afield.2

Again " A large passenger line operating on the North Atlantic has advertised

the appointment of a French chef for its third-class passengers. Its latest ship has hot and cold running water in the third-class cabins, and many of them are spacious two berth rooms with ample wardrobe accommodation. The third class is no longer an emigrant class."

P. 182.

BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931. 767

" Cruises have become popularised to an enormous extent. It is doubtful whether those who originated them ever conceived of the possibility of large numbers of people following the sea in such luxury, or guessed that from humble beginnings, a sort of part-time occupation for ships during the off- season, they would develop into a highly specialised business. One tourist organisation scheduled between April and December, 1930, no fewer than I I Z cruises ranging in duration from 12 to 45 days, and in cost from i14 to k165. The tourist business has settled down to be a livelihood for thousands, and in its widely embracing organisations has risen to something like the dignity of an industry."

" Viator " who writes this chapter closes it thus :- " When it is considered how not long before the war only a few short

trips and one or two longer cruises were available, the magnitude of the tourist traffic to-day stands out as one of the most remarkable of all the efforts made to open up new avenues of business."

Chapter XVI is a comprehensive review (by Sir Charles J. 0 . Sanders, K.B.E.) of the International Load Line convention. This was settled by an International Diplomatic Conference. I t took place in London under the Presidency of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Oliver, in May and June, 1930, and was completed and signed by 5th July, 1930, by the plenipotentiaries of twenty-nine countries. If ratified by the contracting governments it will come into force on 1st July, 1932.

The remainder of the section contains a chapter on "The P. and O.," by F A. H. which is the life history in outline of this great company : and chapters on : " The Port of Tyne " ; " The Italian Merchant Marine " ; " Mercantile Marine Machinery " ; " Notable Merchant Ships of the Year " ; " Wireless Position Finding " ; and " Commercial Marine Aircraft . " Each one can be read with interest : the romance of the Tyne, growing from a little stream to one of the great industries of the world, is fascinating, as is also the story of the Italian Mercantile Marine. Both are well told and the latter, by Captain Guiseppe Fortini, is of considerable political significance. Italy has grasped her maritime problem with great decision and has restored vigorous ordered life to an industry which was dying of anarchy. A quotation from the Duce : " The healthy industries are those which find their work in agriculture and on the sea," leads to a pithy study of Italian maritime policy.

" Mercantile Marine Machinery," by R. J. Butler, M.I.N.A., covers a wide sweep of this subject, as the subheads of this chapter indicate : High-Pressure Steam ; Electrical Propulsion ; Exhaust Steam Tur- bines ; Coal-Burning Equipments ; Internal Combustion Engines ; Future Outlook.

The following quotations are chosen as being perhaps particularly suggestive for naval officers ; but the whole chapter is of great interest to them :-

BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931.

ELectricaL Propulsion :-" . . . the Viceroy of India continues to give great satisfaction to her owners, so much so that orders have been entrusted to Messrs. Vickers-Armstrongs for two further vessels of larger horse-power, with propelling machinery of the same type."

" In the case . . . in which large speed variation is not called for . . . the case for electrical propulsion is not so attractive as i t is . . . where considerable variations of speed are necessary, and (when) high economy for long runs a t lower speed than the maximum is essential."

Exhaus t S team Turbines : - ' I The first (photograph) is of one of the largest exhaust-steam turbine plants yet built, the turbine and engine together giving 7,800 i.h.p. on a single screw. The second shows the combined engine, turbine and gear as fitted in two cargo carriers of the latest type-the Dal- hanna and the Daldorch, which are of 8,800 tons dead-weight carrying capacity. On trial these vessels, fully loaded, achieved a mean speed a t sea of over eleven knots on a coal consumption of z4fr tons a day, equivalent to 1.16 lb. of Welsh coal per i.h.p. hour, with Scotch boilers of zoo lb. pressure and without superheat."

Coal-hlsrning E g u i p ~ n e n t :-" The burning of powdered fuel in marine boilers is only in its infancy, and it will be recalled that the history of the early days of fuel oil burning shows that similar serious and prolonged difficulties were encountered in the course of the necessary pioneer work. That complete technical success will ultimately be achieved is scarcely to be doubted."

Future Outlook :-" Engineers : The present generation has had to learn its trade three times-first with reciprocators, then with turbines, and last with Diesels. The engineer . . . has to be familiar with all three and with their various combinations, and has to have more than a smattering of electrical knowledge."

" The lack of apprentices entering the works, and subsequently proceeding to sea as engineers, and the emigration of skilled tradesmen are most serious matters from the national point of view, and their effect on the prosperity of an Empire whose fortunes are closely bound up with its sea-borne trade do not appear to receive the consideration they deserve."

The remainder of the book, which is about the half of it, is occupied with : Sections of Reference : Ordnance Tables ; Profiles and Plans of men-of-war and merchant ships.

The Naval Reference Section opens with the First Lord's statement of 3rd March, 1930 : " Explanatory of the Navy Estimates." I t faith- fully indicates the wobble which has been endemic in naval policy since the armistice, and which has accurately synchronised with the existing practice of Admiralty acquiescence in the assumption by the Government of all responsibility for naval policy. Twice in the 19th Century this practice obtained for short periods, but the present example of it- dates from 1904 when an Order-in-Council under a Conservative Government disabled the Board of Admiralty. I t led then directly to the Dread- nought era and the panic-stricken years which accompanied it. We shall be fortunate indeed if its continuing practice to-day does not produce similar panic-stricken results.

" THE SEA RAIDERS."

" THE SEA RAIDERS." B y E. KEBLE CHATTERTON.

(Hurst & Blackett, 21s.)

A brief review of this book was given in the May, 1931, issue of THE N ~ V A L REVIEW, but the importance of the subject and the excellence of the book justify a more comprehensive treatment.

T h e battles in the North Sea and the submarine campaigns have received their full measure of publicity, and there is a danger that in studying the operations in the main naval theatre during the Great W a r we may miss the lessons of the trade routes; it is for this reason that " The Sea Raiders " is worthy of very special attention.

In this book Mr. Keble Chatterton gives an interesting account of the operations of the German surface raiders. H e shows us how Germany sought to compensate for her lack of oversea bases by establishing agents and supply officers in all the chief neutral ports ; and how, for the first few months of the war, these agen~ts were largely successful in maintaining the German naval forces overseas. But as the war dragged on and neutrals tightened up their regulations it became impossible for the raiders of the cruiser and liner classes t o obtain sufficient stores to keep themselves going; and so, profiting by experience, Germany equipped ships of high endurance of the Wolf and Moewe type, and sent them out to prey on allied commerce.

T h e cruises of the Dresden and Karlsruhe are now fairly well known, but the author has succeeded in throwing fresh light on some of their exploits; and, in telling their story, he brings out several interesting an'd important lessons. T h e story of these German cruisers is for the most pant a story of pluck and determination in the face of ever lengthening odds. T h e fact that these ships kept going for so long is in itself proof of the skill and courage of their captains, and we may admire them all the more readily since they kept their hands clean.

The number of captures made by these cruisers may seem insignificant when compared with the huge losses inflicted by the submarines, but Mr. Chatterton reminds us that the moral effect of their depredations was out of all proportion tto the value oif ships captured; and in addition to their influence on trade they drew after them a large number of allied warships at a time when the Grand Fleet's superiority was at its lowest, and when Dominion and Colonial troops mere ready to move )to the assistance of the mother country if only warships could be found to escort them.

Of the liner raiders the Icronprinz Wilhelm's career affords a strilting example of the failure of this class of ship. Slipping out of New York on the eve of wai she met the Karlsruhe a t sea some 300 miles northeastward of Cuba, and embarked guns and ammunition. Narro~wly escaping destruction a t the hands of the Suffolk, who appeared on the scene before the transfer was completed, Kronprinz Wilhelm steamed eastward, and for eight months carried on an inter- mittent war against allied tra'de in the South Atlantic. Her captures were few, due to faulty tactics. Whenever a prize was captured carrying coal or provisions it was taken away to some unfrequented spot and gutted; thus valuable time was wasted and allied shipping which might have been sunk was allowed to pass on its way unmolested.

T h e Kronprinz Wilhelm was unsuccessful because her captain allawed himself to be deflected from his object by the sight of loot ; but the cause of this obsession is surely to be found in the size and high fuel consumption of his ship. . . . " There are indeed many lessons to be learned from this a~llbitious cruise a s to how no~t to carry on the raiding otf commerce."

I t is timpossible to pass by this phase of raider warfare without referring to the gallant action fought out between the armed merchant cruiser Carmania (Captain No'el Grant, R.N.) and the raider Cap Trafalgar, an action which should rank with that of the Chesapeake and Shannon as one of the brightest episotdes in our naval history. All the more worthy is it of publicity since the Carmania was manned chiefly by officers and men of the R.N.R. whose work during the war mas a s invaluable as it was arduous and unheralded. " T h e Sea Raiders " does full justice to this action, a s it does to those fought out between the Alcantara and Grief, and between the Dundee and Leopard.

By the autumn of 1915 Germany had come to realize that large liners were unsuitable for commerce raiding, and she opened the final phase of raider warfare with the cruise of the Moewe. T o the casual olbserver the llloewe was as harmless looking a tram,p as might be met with anywhere on the high seas, but, hidden away by devices similar to those employed in our Q ships, were four 4.1 inch guns, one 22 pdr., two torpedo tubes, and 252 mines. Talring advantage of the long winter nights she laid her mines to the eastward of Cape Wra th and off Rochefort, and then carried out a commerce raiding cruise in the South Atlantic, returning 60 Germany in March, 1916.

One incident in the second cruise of the Moewe is of more than passing interest. On 4th March, 1917, the British S.S. Otaki, defensively armed with a single gun, engaged and damaged the Moelve in

a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to escape. Her captain (Llieut. Archibald Bisset Smith, R.N.R.) went down with his ship, whose colours wlere still flying. H e was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.' This action suggeslts tlhat an unescorted convoy of defensively. armed merchant ships may prove too hard a nut for a raider to crack.

" The Sea Raiders " concludes with the story of the Wolf : her cruise is chiefly notalble for the area in which she operated; neglecting the A2tlantic she laid mines off the Cape of Good Hope, Bombay, and Colombo; then, detaching a prize to lay mines off Aden, she proceeded to attack commerce in Australasian waters, returning to Germany in February, 1918, after a cruise of 68,000 miles.

If we wish to protect our trade routes from rai'ders we mus~t study the art of raiding. Mr. Keble Chatterton has made our task the simpler by grouping the stories of all the German surface raiders, with the exception of the Emden, in~to one book. W e may infer from these stories that the best type of surface vessel folr commerce raiding is a medium speed craft of high endurance, capable of disguising her charact'er, and of changing her disguise from time to time. The heavier the armament she carries the better, but mines and torpedoes, the weapons of stealth, sho,uld not be sacrificed for the sake of the gun.

The tactics of the successful raiders appear to have been broadly similar. Striking at a focal area, they continued to work that area until they were fairly certain that their presence had become known; they then shifted billet to som'e other fruitful area, spending as little time as possible in unproductive waters, and in coaling and provisioning.

" One of the outstanding lessons to be learned from these German raiders is that of using every geographical possibility to its fullest extent. Already the reader will have noted how the islanfds and reefs of the Pacific and South Atlantic, the lonely bays and creeks, had been obviously carefully explored and considered long before war arrived. . . . And in these days of mechanical marvels it is deserving of more than passing interest that personal ingenuity availing itself of nature's opportunities can, with average luck, achieve results of the highest importance. Shells and cordite are not the only deciding factors in the contest " (p. 103).

Vide " T h e Merchant Navy," Vo l . I I . , b y Sir Archibald Hurd, pp. 412-14 for a full account o f this epic of t h e Merchant Service. Hon. Editor.

"WITH THE HARWICH NAVAL FORCES, 1914-1918."

OR UNDER COMMODORE TYRWHITT IN THE NORTH SEA.^

By COMMANDER CLAUDE L. A. WOOLLARD, R.N.

Commander Woollard's book will be of great interest to anyone who served in the Harwich Force during the War; for, although it makes no attempt to be in any way an historical account of the doings of the Harwich Force, it does give an excellent idea of events experienced both a t sea and in harbour. The book consists mainly of a collection of narratives written by officers who served in the Force, and supplemented by several very interesting photographs which add greatly to the value of the book. Perhaps the most remarkable photograph ever taken during the war was that of the sinking of the German battle cruiser Bliicher (p. 44).

Although the collection of narratives is admittedly incomplete- several important incidents being omitted-a valuable service has been done in recording many incidents, not mentioned in official histories, which otherwise would have been forgotten. So far, the Harwich Force has had no historian, and until a complete and accurate account of its many activities is written, Commander Woollard's book will fill the gap. As is only to be expected in narratives of single observers, there are some inaccuracies, particularly in the accounts of such actions as Heligoland and the Dogger Bank, and also of the larger operations carried out by the Harwich Force ; it would be of little use to attempt any detailed correction, as correct accounts are now to be found in the official histories of the war. But it may be of interest to supplement the narratives given in the book by a few general reminiscences.

General Actions. (a) The Heligoland Action and Arethusa. At the action of Heligoland, Arethusa flew the broad pendant of

Commodore (T), which had been transferred to her from Amethyst only forty-eight hours before. Arethusa herself had only been in commission about a fortnight, and was hardly in a condition to enter a general action. Her speed on trials had only reached twenty-five knots instead of the expected thirty knots, and her four-inch guns almost invariably jambed as soon as fired.

I t had been the intention to send her to the West Indies to chase Karlsruhe, but at the last moment this order was cancelled and

1 Paper covers. Printed for private circulation. Copies (price 5,'-) can be obtained from Commander Woollard, The Strand Touring Association. Ltd., 407 Strand, London, W.C.2.

she was sent round to Harwich instead. Soon after leaving harbour on the way to Heligoland, a target was dropped and practice with the four-inch guns carried out ; but, as the guns continued to jamb, the practice was soon abandoned in case they might not be ready for the expected action next day.

At dawn on the next day, the Second Cruiser Squadron was sighted ahead and was nearly attacked, as no information as to its movements had been received. During the run south towards Heligoland, the weather became misty and the visibility decreased to about two miles. Nothing was sighted, and it was feared that the enemy had had warning ; but when the Force was on the point of turning to the westward an enemy destroyer was sighted right ahead.

A chase ensued and, as it proceeded, the weather became gradually clearer and more enemy destroyers and several cruisers came into view. Shortly afterwards, the cliffs of Heligoland loomed out of the mist at a distance of not more than five miles, but the forts there did not open fire, owing, probably, to the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe. At this stage, a harmless merchant ship, which unfortunately found herself in the middle of the melee, was seen to receive at least one hit from our destroyers ; but she was apparently not badly damaged.

The action between Arethusa and Frauenlob, which started at about 5,000 yards and ended at 3,500 yards, only lasted ten minutes, but in that short time Arethusa was hit no less than thirty-six times. Her four-inch guns went out of action shortly after they began firing, but the decision was finally gained by one of the six-inch shells which struck Frauenlob by the bridge and forced her to break off the action. In addition to the casualties suffered, the superficial damage to Arethusa was considerable. Her torpedo tubes were struck and the torpedoes jambed in the tubes before they could be fired, while most of their crews were killed. This was principally due to the fact that Frauenlob was making very effective shooting with shrapnel.

But the most serious damage was done by a shell which penetrated the feed tanks and reduced Arethusa's speed to ten knots, which was kept up with difficulty till dark, when the boilers gave out and she had to be taken in tow. Notwithstanding this reduction in speed and the general condition of the ship, Arethusa turned back towards Heligoland, about two hours later, to support Commodore (S) who had reported by wireless that he was being chased by five enemy cruisers. These cruisers were, in fact, the Second cruiser Squadron, whose appearance was quite unexpected, as they had only been included in the operation at the last moment.

But the turning back of Arethusa nearly resulted in her destruction, as about an hour later she ran into two enemy cruisers who engaged her a t short range. She was only saved by the gallant action of Fearless and the 1st Destroyer flotilla who were with her and who attacked the cruisers again and again, and drove them off ; and finally her safety was assured by the arrival of Admiral Beatty and his battle cruisers.

The sinking of Mainz, which occurred shortly after this. was an unforgettable sight, and the fight she put up was gallant in the extreme. Though under fire from at least two cruisers, she turned her guns on four destroyers who were advancing to attack her and put two of them out of action-Laurel and Liberty-but not before they had fired their torpedoes.

Action of the Dogger Bank.

In this action our battle cruisers coming from the northward, the Hanvich Force coming from the southward, and the enemy coming from the eastward, all met at dawn, almost as if a rendezvous with the enemy had been arranged. Had the rendezvous of our forces only been timed for an hour later, or had it been ordered further to the eastward, the enemy would have been cut off from his base and forced to stand and fight.

VC7hen the first contact with the enemy was made, the Harwich Force was scattered. This was due to the fact that on the day before there was a dense fog at Harwich, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the ships managed to get out of the harbour. When our battle cruisers turned to pursue the enemy, the Hanvich Force was stationed on their engaged bow, but this station was almost immediately altered to the quarter. Shortly afterwards the signal was again made to take station on the engaged bow, but by that time the battle cruisers had worked up to full speed and the Hanvich Force found it impossible to draw ahead until Lion turned away badly damaged.

After this, the remaining battle cruisers, owing to a misunder- standing of the signal from Lion, concentrated on Bliicher, closing the range to about 6,000 yards. For several minutes Bliicher was under such a hail of shells that it seemed impossible that many of the crew could have survived. Yet when the fire had ceased and our light forces closed in on her, a great crowd of men was seen lining the upper deck silently watching their approach. Then, without any warning, the Bliicher started tg heel over, turned bottom upward and slowly disappeared. As she started to heel, her crew raised a loud cheer and scrambled down her side into the water. They were all wearing most efficient life belts which kept their heads and shoulders clear of the water.

Minor actions. The Harwich Force had occasional brushes with odd destroyers from

Zeebrugge, but on two occasions--one by day and the other by night- got into action with a whole flotilla.

The daylight action started off the North Hinder Light vessel a t dawn, when three cruisers and four destroyers of the Harwich Force were returning from the Hook after escorting a convoy. In order to catch the tide at Harwich, the force departed from its almost invariable custom of passing south of the Hinder Light vessel and was steering direct for Harwich, a course which passed about five miles north of the light vessel. And on this very occasion the whole enemy flotilla were sighted close to the light vessel. Fire was opened and a chase ensued, but the enemy gradually drew ahead and reached the shelter of their forts before any of them were seriously damaged.

The night action with the enemy flotilla provided two remarkable coincidences. The Harwich Force was attempting to intercept the flotilla on its way to Zeebrugge, and the cruisers were spread in groups some considerable distance apart. The night was pitch dark, and, while one of the cruiser groups was steaming to the southward, the enemy flotilla actually passed by it on a similar course and at a distance of only three cables. Fire was opened by the cruisers and the enemy replied with torpedoes, none of which hit. All that could be seen of the enemy was the red glow from their funnels as they increased speed, and this suddenly disappeared as they turned away and were lost in the darkness. Before they turned away, a hit was observed on one of their number, but she was not, apparently, disabled. Meanwhile, the other cruiser group, seeing the flash of guns and intercepting the enemy reports, steamed at high speed straight for the spot, and actually came across the enemy destroyer which had been hit, lying disabled. Fire was opened on her and she was apparently sunk-at any rate the cruisers steamed over the place where she had been last seen and saw nothing. Next morning this destroyer crawled into Ymuiden ; a hopeless wreck, but still afloat.

Capture of German merchant ships o f the Texel.

In July, 1918, about six German merchant ships which had been laid up at Amsterdam attempted to return to Germany, but the enemy made no attempt at all to cover their passage. They were sighted by the Harwich Force shortly after daylight, just south of the Texel, steering to the northward. As soon as they were sighted they all turned and steamed hard for territorial waters, which could not have been more than

a few miles distant. In order to stop them, shots were fired across their bows, but, this having no effect, the Hanvich Force continued the pursuit and finally came up with them when they were close in to the Dutch coast and well inside territorial waters. Prize crews were at once sent onboard, and all except two, which had run themselves onshore, were taken back to Harwich.

During the pursuit an incident occurred which might have had serious consequences. One of the destroyers, when close in to the Dutch coast, was firing with her foremost gun a t a merchant ship in order to make her stop. The captain, noticing that there were no splashes, looked over the bridge, and saw that the gun, owing to some mistake, was firing with maximum elevation and sending all its shots somewhere into Holland. Shouting had no effect on the gunlayer, so the captain seized a stool which was handy and, with a well directed shot, attracted his attention !

The capture of these merchant ships was observed by some Dutch Coast Defence vessels who were cruising off the Texel ; they made no attempt to interfere, but continued at intervals to protest by broad- casting the signal-" Observe neutrality." I t speaks volumes for the fairness of our Prize Courts that, at the end of the war, the claim for these ships was decided in favour of Germany.

Ope?,ations in the Bight. Until our mine barrage had been effectively established across

the Bight, the Harwich Force used to operate there continuously. Heligoland itself was sighted on no less than four occasions as follows :-

( a ) During the Heligoland Action, when it suddenly appeared out of the mist ahead and was passed at a distance of not more than five miles.

(b) During a reconnaissance carried out by two cruisers in October, 1914. The Admiralty had heard that the High Sea Fleet was concentrating off Heligoland at daylight, but on arrival there nothing was seen.

(c) During a sweep by the Grand Fleet in November, 1914 The Hanvich Force joined up with the Grand Fleet at sea and swept ahead till Heligoland was sighted. I t was on this occasion that the forts were seen to open fire ; not at the Harwich Force, whichwas well out of range, but a t one of our submarines that was closer in.

(d) During the air raid of Christmas Day, 1914. On this day when the visibility was maximum, Heligoland was in sight for at least four hours, while the Hanvich Force was awaiting the return of the seaplanes.

A i r Raids. The most successful air raid carried out was that of Christmas Day,

1914, and it succeeded in the face of many difficulties. When the Force left Harwich, the weather conditions were the reverse of favourable, but next morning they could not have been better-flat calm and a maximum visibility.

About four o'clock in the morning, the Force passed close to some trawlers who were heard shortly afterwards making signals. This was followed very soon after by an outburst of enemy signalling which clearly showed that the enemy had been warned. The Force, however, held on. The seaplanes were got out and flew off and there was nothing to do but to await their return. When the sun rose, Heligoland was plainly in view to the southward, and, from the volume of smoke rising from behind it, it was obvious that the forces there were raising steam. But although enemy destroyers were observed coming out from Heligoland they made no attempt to close or interfere with the operations ; nor did any larger forces of the enemy appear.

For one successful air raid there were many abortive attempts. On the very first attempt, in November, 1914, the Force arrived off Heligoland to find heavy rain and low visibility. About fifteen miles north of Heli- goland, the Force stopped and the seaplanes were hoisted out. Then followed a long period of waiting while the seaplanes raced up and down trying to get off. Finally, only one managed to do so, but she was recalled immediately, and the Force withdrew. The situation while waiting was not improved by a report from a cruiser that a torpedo had just passed under her.

But on another occasion, the actual firing of torpedoes by a submarine saved all the seaplanes from certain loss. The Force had just arrived at dawn off Borkum. The morning was clear and the sea calm, and the seaplanes were in the middle of being hoisted out. At this moment, the tracks of two torpedoes were observed which passed close to two of the cruisers. Seaplanes were immediately hoisted in and the Force retired. Within an hour of this, a dense fog descended which lasted the whole day. Had the seaplanes left, they would certainly have been lost.

Chasing Zeppelins. This was a favourite sport and there were many opportunities. Gun-

fire having little effect, seaplanes were embarked in the cruisers, but this met with little success. Generally by the time the cruiser had hoisted out her seaplane, the Zeppelin had cleared off ; in addition, it was difficult to keep the seaplane protected from the weather, and, consequently, its efficiency soon deteriorated.

But success was at last attained when the Force took out aeroplanes carried in lighters which were towed by destroyers. To fly off, the destroyer towed the lighter at full speed into the wind and the aeroplane flew off without any delay. This resulted in the destruction of a Zeppelin, of which Commander Woollard gives a full account. But he does not mention the story told by the pilot that, when the aeroplane swooped down to attack, some of the guns' crew who were firing at it from the top of the Zeppelin were seized with panic and sought safety by jumping over the side when at a height of 20,000 feet above the sea.

C.M.B. Raids. Many attempts were made to attack Wilhelmshaven and Borkum,

but none were successful. On the last attempt, in June, 1918, the C.M.B's were attacked by aircraft shortly after they had left their ships and none of them returned. This showed clearly their vulnerability in daylight from the air, and they were not employed again for such operations.

Mines and Mining. I t is probable that no force suffered so much damage from mines

as the cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force ; not to mention the minesweepers attached to the base, which at all times and in all weathers carried out their duty in face of constant danger and disaster.

Starting with the sinking of Amphion in the early days of the war, hardly a month passed without some ship being mined. In December, 1917, three destroyers were lost by mining off the Dutch coast on one night ; and on another occasion two cruisers were actually mined on the same day in separate localities. Both were seriously damaged but neither was sunk.

On the latter occasion, Conquest and Curacoa were just outside Harwich carrying out practices - Conquest having just returned from a long refit. I t was noticed in Curacoa that Conquest had stopped with smoke pouring from her funnels ; but nothing was thought to be wrong until it was seen that she had developed a big list. She then reported having been mined, and Curacoa took her in tow and just got her to Sheerness in the nick of time. Almost immediately after arriving back at Harwich, Curacoa and the remainder of the Force were ordered to sea on the report being received that the Centaur had been mined about fifty miles north of the Dutch coast. When sighted next morning, Centaur was seen to be steaming fast for the Humber stern first across the North Sea. She had been mined right forward and could not steam ahead without danger to bulkheads.

Centaur's mining terminated a hazardous series of operations ordered by the Admiralty in June, 1918, with the object of securing the new

German signal book which it was hoped would be obtained by the capture of German patrol boats in the Bight. With this object, the Admiralty ordered the Harwich Force to carry out a series of raids in the Bight, and to pass through between the minefields of our own barrage.

On the first occasion, many mines were cut by paravanes and a leader was mined, though she fortunately remained afloat and was towed home. Afterwards the Force pressed on, carried out its sweep well inside the barrage without sighting anything and returned safely. On the second occasion, forty-eight hours later, more serious damage occurred when Centaur was mined, and the Force turned back without. getting through. The operation was not repeated and, as events turned out, this was fortunate. At the end of the war, when the German charts were received, it was discovered that the gap in our barrage had been discovered by the Germans, who had closed it with several lines of mines.

The mining of Arethusa is fully described on page 76 of Commander Woollard's book. He relates the almost incredible story of the stoker (not two) who, finding himself trapped in the boiler room, actually escaped-though he died next day-by climbing up inside the funnel, the fire only recently having been drawn.

But a story almost as remarkable is that of another stoker who was asleep on the mess deck when the explosion occurred and continued to sleep through all the noise of towing, grounding and abandoning ship. When he did wake up and came on deck, he found the ship deserted and the boats pulling off to the rescuing destroyers.

A curious effect of the explosion was that the locked doors of the compass on the upper bridge burst open and all the magnets shot out on to the deck.

Arethusa was mined in shallow water off the Cutler shoal well inside the narrow channels leading to Harwich, which had hitherto been regarded as safe from enemy mining operations owing to their shallow depth and difficult navigation. I t was, however, taken for granted that a submarine had actually entered and laid her mines ; and to prevent this in future most of the outer buoys marking the channels were removed, which added greatly to the difficulties of pilotage until the end of the war. As a matter of fact, the mine had probably been picked up somewhere in the outer channels by our minesweepers, who dragged it into the channel and released it there when they hauled in their sweep ; for at that time there was no device for indicating the fact that a mine was in the sweep.

" BEFORE JUTLAND."

ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S LAST VOYAGE. CORONEL AND THE BATTLE OF THE FALKL-~NDS.

By CAPTAIN HANS POCKHAMMER, First Officer of the Gneisenau, and one of the few survivors.

Trans. by H. J. STENNING. (Jarrol,ds, I 2s. 6d.)

THOUGH obviously written for the general public, this book cannot fail greatly to interest the naval reader: but one regrets the translator's ignorance of English naval terms, e.g., the use of the word Commander to designate both Captain R .N . and Commander R .N . is specially confusing.

T h e opening chapter makes a n excellent preface and then we follow the author's cruise round the German sphere of interest in the Pacific and on to the South American coast. Dur ing this period the half- trained shilp's company that left Tsingtao had become the highly efficient organisation that defeated Monmouth so quickly a t Coronel, and fought their ship so gallantly in December.

Thos'e of us who have served much in the tropics will apprecia~te to the full the grit, hard work and system which accomplished this result; it was achieved in spite of almost continuous steaming in low latitudes, in ships stripped of awnings and woodwork, only varied by long spells of coaling and provisioning, often in exposed anchorages and, nearly always, with extemporized fittings.

I n Chapter IV. will be found an outline of the routine, or rather a typical account of the duties-varied and never-ending-that had to be performed. Humour is not the author's strong point, so one rather welcomes a description of how he " made " (in the naval sense of the word) a hawser. " W e secured a large hawser, quite new, made of East African hemp. Nobody had seen it : the steam pinnace brought one end on board, then we hauled in the line." (page go.)

After leaving Tsingtao we only read of {target practice on two occasions, and then, naturally, at a small target : so the excellent shooting in action is the more surprising.

T h e author was the second in command and, therefore, stationed below; so he was prevented from seeing anything of the enemy in 'either action ; but being in charge " of the buoyancy of the ship " (as he calls it) he was well in~formed about each and every injury at the Falklands, almost a s soon as it happened. English officers who saw Baden before she was sunk will remember how elaborate were the arrangements for communicating with tthe second in command in his central station.

The Germans wisely considering that keeping their own ship afloat was as important as sinking their enemy.

No description of Coronel could fail to be of absorbing interest, but, stationed below a s he was, we cannot expect times, ranges, courses, to agree with those given in " Naval Operations," Vol. I., which is based (as stated) on Admiral von Spee's Official Report and that of Glasgow. What we do get is the " atmosphere " that day on board Gneisenau before, during and after the action. W e I,earn, from the spotting corrections, that Gneisenau got on to her target, the Monmou~th, in three salvoes. (Glasgow's report saild that the German flagship hit her opposite number with her second salvo.) W e read that when Monmouth disappeared, Gneisenau shifted !her target to Good Hope, but only for a short time.

Gneisenau ceased firing at 7.26 p.m., and at 7.30 p.m. Von Spee signalled to the small cruisers to " seek the enemy and attack with torpedoes." Four hits were made on Gneisenau (one of which is claimed by Glasgow in " Naval Operations," Vol. I.) and [two men wounded, the only wounded among the five German ships.

No wonder that afterwards " The officers gathered in the mess room for the evening meal, and stared a t each other in surprise, en- quiring ' How was it possible? ' " (p. 157.)

Meanwhile a notice had been pinned on the wireless board on Gneisenau's bridge, " Niirnberg reports Monmouth sunk by gun-fire."

The German ships then visited Valparaiso : first three went in for 24 hours and then the other two, naturally receiving an enthusiastic welcome from the German colony there. Meanwhile coaling went on from prizes at Mas-a-Fuera, anfd auxiliaries joined the flag.

On 15th November the Squadron proceeded south an,d, after making use of two more anchorages, arrived off the Falklands on 8th December : the last English prize was captured on 2nd December, and sunk, when clear of coal, on 6th December. Gneisenau and Niirnberg, having landing parties in readiness, had parted company from the flag at 5 a.m. and arrived together off Port William.

The author might with advantage have told us more of the pre- liminaries of the Falkland Fight, and he has omitted at least two incidents which can be repeated in almost his own words, as uttered a t the t!ime : " I am only the Commander; my Admiral is dead, my Captain is dead; but if my advice had been followed ' the issue of the day ' would have been very different."

" When we arrived off Port William I said to my Captain, ' Look! they are raising steam, go in and attack them at anchor.' Afterwards when I saw that he would not go in, but was steaming away a t 12

knots, I said, ' If you are going to run away I submit that you run away fast, and do not run away slow.' My Captain then increased to 2 0 knots."

Pockhammer's suggestion to his Captain would be an interesting problem for the tactical board. The anchor bearings of our ships are known, and the fire from some of those inside woluld be masked by others in the outside anchorage. It is morally certain that both Gneisenau and Niirnberg would have been sunk, but it is probable that one or more of our ships might have gone down with them, provided that the Germans were determined to sacrifice themselves. At all events, torpedoes would have " come into their own " on that occasion.

All navies are the same! Pockhammer says nothing about the lieutenant in Gneisenau's fore top who reported that two modern ships with tripod masts were in the harbour, and was told by his captain that he was wrong !

The book is incorrect as to Scharnhorst's first broadside being fired at Invincible and hitting: it was fired at Inflexible and missed.

Each German ship began the action with 11 ,000 rounds of 8 inch anid 12,000 rounds of 6 inch.

From first to last the German ships fired excellent salvoes, even when reduced to two guns and receiving heavy punishment. Stress i s laid on their being out-ranged, but as a matter of fact the 8.2 inch guns were throwing shell over and across the battle cruisers when the latter had 16,200 yards on their sights, but could not reply. Through- out the action the Germans never had any difficulty in getting " cuts " on their opponents' stems wibh their 3-metre range-finders, even when masts, funnels and the rest of the hull were obscured by smoke, as was often the case. British range-finders were not so large at that time.

Five minutes after the spotting officer had evacuated Gneisenau's main-top, one d Inflexible's 12 inch shell burst in it. Rather " out " for " elevation," but a spectacular hit.

The reviewer regretted not to find Captain Maerker's speech to his men in the book. After calling for three cheers for the Emperor, he said, " When you get into the water, do not lose heart; I am sure that the English will pick you up. I myself am not coming with you."

The author was picked up on a hamm,ock. The German hammocks had mattresses of pulverised cork, and were supposed to support two men for one hour, or one man for two hours. When Pockhammer held his " review " (page 229) of th'e survivors on 9th December, he discovered a lieutenant of the Reserve, who had been put in a broadside mess under the impression rhat he was an A.B. (he, like the Com- mander, had come over the side naked).

In this book, as is so often the case, the critics have seized on a particular incident when the author dined with Sir Doveton Sturdee, and such is the interest in " personal questions " that it developed into quite a long correspondence in the " Daily Telegraph."

Most readers will have no difficulty in summing up the author's character in the light of his sometimes querulous remarks about his treatment, e.g., he complains of only two boats being employed for picking up his crew : the camera shows three (p. 208). W e may fairly describe him as " a stout fellow " who believed more in the f o r t i t e r in r e than in the s u a v i t e r in rnodo, anld who, as his remarks about attacking at anchor showed, certainly possessed a seaman's eye and a fighring instminct.

Among the lieutenants of Invincible on 8th December, 1914, was the present Captain the Hon. E. B. Ringham. It is interesting to compare his treatment as a prisoner, after winning his V.C. at Ju~tland, with that of Captain Hans Pockhammer !

c c TWO LONE SHIPS." GOEBEN AND BRESLAU. By GEORG KOPP. (Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.)

IN January, 1914, Georg Kopp, a German subject living in South Russia, required only ten months to complete his naval service. T h i s A.B. was, therefore, despatched from I<iel to join Goeben at Genoa, to be eventually sent home in the s t a t i o n n a i r e Loreley, when time expired. Later on, his proficiency in translating Russian messages led to his being transferred to the wireless branch, and, largely thanks to the knowledge gained in that capacilty, he has given the world his four years' experiences in the shape of a very readable book, with excellent photographs. English readers will be most interesbed in the first six chapters, including as they do, the escape of the two German ships from Messina.

The lesson conveyed is a clear one. T o conduct a modern war t o a successful conclusion every branch of His Majesty's Service must take an active part : the diplomat and civil servant equally with those who belong to the " Fighting Forces of the Crown." The Germans appeared to have understood this axiom better than we did. There were many brilliant exceptions, but in a few cases our diplomatic people never appeared to have " taken their coats off "-so to speak; e.g., during the war one, at least, of our Embassies closed its doors regularly for three hours in the middle of the day, to the indignation of the British community, the ambassador asking " how otherwise could the young fellows get their exercise ? "

Goeben had been at Constantminople in May, 1914, and in June she was visiting the German colonies at Haifa and Jaffa. The ship had not been docked since leaving Kiel; she also had boiler defects and she badly required a refit.

On Sunday, 28th June, 1914, rhe Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet and his staff were dining with the Sultan a t the Yil'diz Kiosk : all the Ministers were there, with the notable exception of Enver Pasha, who was in Smyrna. As the guests rose from table, the news went round that the Archduke Franz Fer~dinand had been assassinated ! Naturally no other topic was discussed, and possibly some in that party realized, more or less, what might follow.

I t had been customary for British Admirals during th'eir tenure of command, ,to pay a visit to the Sultan, and, as a rule, the stationnaire was sent to bring them ulp through the Dardanelles. However, in this case, Sir Berkeley Milne, having heard that the German admiral had come up in his own flagship, the Goeben, very properly insisted that H.B.M. Ambassador shoulrd claim a similar privilege for him. S o Inflexible was lying off Dolma-Bagtsche.

I t is interesting to note that Inflexible and Goeben had been together at Athens for the funeral of King George of Greece. On that occasion, the two Admirals walked silde by side in the procession, the English chief of the staff walking with the German flag captain.

On 1st July Goeben arrived at Larnaka, Cyprus, carried out a landing party exercise, ansd proceeded that evening for Pola. On 10th July the Commander-in-Chlief's flagship and other British ships arrived at Larnaka and Limasol for a five days' visit. On the same day, 10th July, Goeben arrived in Pola and immediately started her refit, apparently with her own resources. The material had been sent from Germany, and over 4,000 boiler tubes were replaced. The refit was completed in 18 days-a highly satisfactory piece of work which was to prove its value in the immrediate future.

On 29th July Goeben left Pola for Trieste, where she coaled, but did not take in as much as she wanted; so she proceeded on the 30th for Brindisi, wlher'e she hoped to do better.

The (preliminary) warning telegram on 27th July found the greater part of the British Mediterranean Fleet art Alexandria, where Officers and men were being entertained by the British communi~ty. The fleet sailed at the appointed time, according to the programme, but steamed faster afterwards. As it so happened, the orders for the summer cruise issued in April, had laid down that war routine would be carried out between Alexandria and Malta. S o no further orders were required !

The fleet arrived a t Malta on the 30th and coaled. (The actual warning telegram had arrived on the zgth, during the passage.)

At 8 p.m. on the 30t'h, the Commander-in-Chief had his instructions to the effect that his first task should be to assist the French in trans- ponting their African Army, and that he should take up a covering position and endeavour to bring to action any fast ship-particularly Goeben-which might try to interfere with the operation. All the British Mediterranean Fleet were a t Malta on 1st August, Admiral Traulbridge ,in Defence having arrived on 31st July.

On and August the -4dmiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief to remain at Malta himself, but to detach two battle cruisers to " shaldow the Goeben." He was also to watch the approaches to the Adriatic with his cruisers and destroyers. Admiral Troubridge a~ccordingly sailed with two battle cruisers, three armoured cruisers and eight destroyers. At 5 p.m. Chatham was sent to search for Goeben in the Straits of Messina. The Admiralty gave the Commander-in-Chief permission to communicate with the French Admiral.

1st August saw Goeben arrive at Brindisi, bu~t she failed to get coal, the Italians considering there was too much sea in the roads. S o she proceeded for Messina, picking up Breslau (from Durazzo) en route. The two ships arrived a t Messina the next afternoon, cleared for action and coaled till midnight, " 'dumping " rheir superflu'ous gear on board the S.S. General of the German East African Line. At I a.m. on 3rd August both slhips slipped out of harbour and shaped course to the westward.

At 7 a.m. on Monday, 3rd August, Chatham reported that neither Goeben nor Breslau were in the Straits of Messina. At the same time information was received that the German ships, early on Sunday the and, had been steering S.W. in the Gulf of Taranto. At 1.30 p.m. Indomitable and Indefatigable were ordered to proceed through the Malta Channel and then westward to search for Goeben; and S.N.O. Gibraltar was reqiues~ted to keep a close watch on the Straits. At 8.30 p.m. the Admiralty ordered two battle cruisers to be despatched to Gibraltar at high speed to prevent 'Goeben leaving the Mediterranean. Meanwhile Dublin had been sent to Bizerta with a letter to the French Aldmiral, having failed to get in touch by other means.

On the eveninlg of 3rd August the German ships received news of the declaration of war with France by wireless, and at dawn next morning Goeben, under Russian colours, approached the harbour of Philippeville. When within range she hoisted German colours and bombarded barracks, harbour works, warehouses, and mole with her secondary armament for about ten minutes, the French howitzer batteries opening fire too late.

It may be noted that, when the British Mediterranean Fleet had visited Philippeville in 1913, rhe officers had been told that all the

artillery personnel would be on the Eastern frontier of France next year, and that the fortress would be de-classified.

After steaming for a short time on a N.W. course, Goeben altered to the eastward and joined Breslau, who reported having successfully bombarded Bona.

Later on the German ships were informed that on 2nd August Germany had concluded an alliance with Turkey, and that they were to make at once for Constantinople.

At 9.40 a.m. on 4th August occurred the dramatic meeting with the two English battle cruisers, and later on with Dublin. Early on 5th August Goeben ran into the Messina roadstead. Breslau was there already. The English ships had been met after war with France had started, and before war with England had been declared.

At 6 p.m. on Tuesday, 4th August, the Admiralty telegraphed that no ship of war was to pass within 6 miles of the Italian coast. At midnight on 4th-5th August war was declared with Germany.

After the declaration of war there is no need to follow the movements on both sides, ending in the disappearance of the two raiders into the Dardanelles : there, as was at first supposed, to be interned for the duration of the war. That might perhaps have followed had Great Britain been represented at Constantinople by a Lord Stratford de Redclyffe or a Sir William White. But in that case the Admiralty would perhaps have known of the secret treaty, and watch would then have been kept to the eastward instead of to the westward of Messina.

The Navy, however, has another legitimate grievance against the Foreign Office. M. Venizelos asked the British Government if he was to supply coal to Goeben or nor, and was advised to supply her. W h y was not Sir Berkeley Milne informed that coal was going to her from the Pirzeus ? Finally, there was the " blameless " war-declaring clerk, who produc'ed a delay of twenty-four hours and a corresponding expenditure of coal. All conspired to prevent the initial mistake from being rectified.

With the arrival of Goeben and Breslau at Constantinople, a very unpleasant time began for Admiral Limpus' Naval Mission, until it became necessary to withdraw it on 9th September as they " were ,exposed to daily insolence at the hands of the Germans and the Turkish war panty."' " TWO Lone Ships " contains several derogatory remarks on the mission and its methods.

The author gives us a spirited account of the simultaneous attack carried out on 27th October, 1914, on Odessa, Sevastopol and Novorossisk : but of course there had been no previous declaration of

"The World Crisis," 1911-14, page 491.

war, and it was presumably designed by the Germans finally to force the hand of the Turkish Government. At Sevastopol, the Russians were slow in opening fire, as the battery commander was trying to get permission from the fortress commander. This attack, at all events, moved our Embassy out at last, under cover of a twelve hours' ultimatum to the Turkish Government.

The various raids into the Black Sea, carried out by the two German ships singly, or working together, are well described: but it is not easy to ascertain the dates, and there are some curious mistakes, e.g., page 237 refers to the loss of Panteleimon : she was not torpedoed and survived the war, while Sinope, stated to have fouled a mine, was at Odessa, unhurt, in January, 1916.

Page 243 refers to the action with Imiperatriza Maria in September, 1916, as a first meeting with a Russian Dreadnought, which is incorrect. On 8th January, 1916, Ekaterina II., just completed at Nikolaieff, met Goeben on her voyage round to Sevastopol. The Russian ship had never fired her guns before, but the officers were delighted w~ith the pleasant twenty minutes they had with Goaben, who got away.

The efficiency. of the Black Sea Fleet was far belaw that of the Baltic Fleet and Admiral Ebergard, the Commander-in-Chief, good officer and honest gentleman that he was, was really too old for his work. The submarine service was by no means so good as its opposite number in the Baltic, and an atltempt to bring English officers south from the other fleet in the winter months failed, as might have been expecte'd. On one occasion Admiral Ebergard pointed out, not without humour, that his submarine captains were improving and (that the Bosporus Patrol now relieved each other on their beat and no longer in Sevastopol Harbour !

Far frotm avoiding Goeben and Breslau, the Russians were most anxious to meet them. After the capture of Trebizond in May, 1916, 18,ooo troops were sent there from Mariupol, in thirty transports. The whole trip, there and back again with the empty transports, took nine days, speeds varying from 5 to 8 knots.

On the 6th day of this operation Breslau and two destroyers were reported off Kentch. The Russian naval officer, as a rule, was better at theory than practice, and the Rear Admiral D had worked out to his own satisfaction that three of his destroyers, with three of their long +inch guns each, would knock out Breslau in smooth water. S o he started to sweep for her, arguing that Breslau would have to engage three targets and the t.b.d.'s only one. An English guest, who disagreed with the theory, was pleased when the sweep was given up after twenty-four hours ! I t was afterwards discovered, as stated in this book, that Breslau had been re-armed with 6-inch guns.

The escort provided for the thirty transports may be of interest :- I Dreadnought (Imperatriza Maria). 3 Destroyers, for screening. 2 Cruisers. Yacht Almaz. I I Destroyers. I Seaplane carrier. 2 Icebreakers ! ! No vessels were lost, and no atltempt was made on the convoy. At Christmas, 1914, Goeben anid Breslau were returning from a

cruise in the Black Sea, when the former hit two mines off the Bosporus, and was brought in with difficulty. (Field Marshal von der Goltz was on board her at the time.) The holes measured 8 metres by 5 on the pont side and 10 by 4 on the starboard. She lay in Stenia Creek, waiting for coffer dams to be built. Soon afterwards, on 27th January, 1915, Breslau and Hamidieh were being hotly pursued by Russian cruisers, and their capture appeared inevitable. Then the disabled Goeben started raising steam, whereupon the local secret wireless stations of the enemy presumably reported the smoking funnels, and the Russians stopped their pursuit. Rather a tall yarn ! (pp. 161-165).

On anlother occasion (no date given) Goeben goes out into the Black Sea after dark, anchors off Kilia and returns next morning. Still with (the two holes in her bottom ! (pp. 178180).

Then we come to a more precise account. The long expected coffer dams came alongside on 18th March, 1915, and one was placed in position. Then the work was stopped, steam was raised, the coffer dam lifted and, at 5 p.m., Goeben proceeded down the Sea of Marmora and anchored close to the Dardanelles with her nets out, in readiness to assist the defence against the allied ships, should they renew the attack next morning. On the afternoon of the 19th Goeben, " with strong torpedo protection around her," returned to her berth in Stenia Creek, and on 20th March the coffer dams came alongside again. (pp. 181-188).

Speaking generally, the narrative is vague, jumps about from year to year, and is sometimes un,convincing.

There is no doubt that both ships were fine advertisemenlts for German ship-building. How the necessary repairs after the serious injuries received from time to time by mines and gun-fire were able to be repaired is little short of marvellous. For Breslau there was a floating dock, but only. coffer dams for Goeben. I t is probable that Goeben's speed after 4th August, 1914, was considerably exaggerated.

" GALLANT GENTLEMEN." 789

Four men were killed in the boiler room on 7th August, and when Gloucester turn'ed round the enemy's speed was only 15 knots.

The last chapter but one, describing the author's journey from Nikolaieff to Lotzen, is one of the most interesting in the book.

" GALLANT GENTLEMEN." By E. KEBLE CHATTERTON. (Hurst & Blackett 10s. 6d.)

HERE we read the story of Coronel and the Battle of the Falkland Islands from the British side in the chapters headed Cruisers at Coronel, T h e Approach to Battle, and Duel to the Death, and we are told how Kent avenged her sister-ship Monmouth by sinking Nurnberg.

Here also we meet again Goeben and Breslau. W h y the Goeben got away is easily answered with the after-knowledge that is produced by an accomplished fact ; but the official verdict remains on record that their Lordships approved of the conduct and dispositions of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, and the measures taken by him, in all respects.

The three B class submarines (p. 30) were ordered to be retained strictly for the defence of Malta, and no one acquainted with the details of the armament of that island in 1914 could question the necessity of that restriction.

Mr. Winston Churchill's seven " Ifs "l can still be read with advantage, and the narrowest margin of all was the one badly-coded " group " which probably prevented Captain John Kelly of the Dublin from sharing his brother's well won pedestal of fame.

" Gallant Gentlemen " contains such good reading that the inclusion of The D u m m y Fleet would hardly appear necessary. It might, however, be worth mentioning that, on the strong recommendation of Sir John de Robeck, the Admiralty promoted Commander Forbes (p. 60) to Captain on the retired list, which gave pleasure to the recipient without costing one penny to the Crown !

The capture of the Cameroons was a model combined operation, and it is a pleasure to find a chapter devoted to Commander Strong and H.M.S. Dwarf (pp. 128-145). (The Adventures of " Dwarf ".)

That gallant and fortunate officer, Commander Godfrey Herbert, appears in two chapters, and it is well that the story of the Baralong should be told openly and fully (pp. 146-178). (The Decoy Steamer and T h e Gallant " Baralong ".)

"The World Crisis," 1911-1914, p. 225.

Commander Goodhart (p. 181) had come unhurt through all the dangers confronting a Baltic submarine, only to be killed as a passenger in another man's command : his former squadron mate, Fenner, perished in a similar manner. ( T h e Diae to Death.)

T h e Gate Crashers, Boom Jum$ing and The Incredible Adventure bring in an entirely new atmosphere, that of Adriatic waters and the pitting of Italian mosquito craft against Austrian battleships. In the two former we read of Lieutenant Luigi Rizzo's achievements in sinking Wien and Szent Istvan. These were fine exploits : but why are we told nothing about M.A.S. 21's part on the second occasion.

Very properly is the exploit of Major Raffaele Rossetti and Surgeon Lieutenant Raffaele Paolucci called T h e Incredible Adventure and their craft " The Device." They started with the intention of sinking an Austrian ship, sank two belonging to Yugo-Slavia, but still succeeded in their object !

" That wonderful summer's night, when the younger generation of seamen proved to the world what could be achieved by the newest type of vessel " is the author's summing up of the C.M.BJs dash into Kronstadt in 1919. I t is a marvellous story which can be read again and again in the chapter headed Dashing into li'ronstadt.

I t is curious that the first ship to be sunk in this attack was the old home of the British submarine crews for two years. The Pamiat Azova was one of the two Russian ships allowed to fly the St. George's flag. Having disgraced her name by joining in the Revolution of 1905, she was deprived of her St. George's ensign and re-named the Dwina. In the revolution of 1917, her name was restored to her and the St. George's flag solemnly hoisted and then hauled down again and replaced by the Red flag, while Cromie and his men were actually on board.

Lieutenant Bremner of C.M.B. 79A was wounded in eleven places and captured by the Bolsheviks (p. 260) ; possessing neither chivalry nor mercy they would not allow him a stretcher, and he was dragged by two men through the streets of Petrograd, his wounded legs trailing on the cobble stones.

The last chapter in the book relates some recent piracies in China. To judge from the present state of that country this theme will probably supply sea stories for some years to come.

" Gallant Gentlemen " is a good book, and may help the Sea Service to regain a little of its pre-war popularity; but recent events have not been helpful in that direction.

" T H E LOG O F A U-BOAT COMMANDER, OR

U-BOATS WESTWARD 1914-1918."

By ERNEST HASHAGEN, Commander late Imperial German Navy. Translated from the German by LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER VESEY ROSS.

(Putnam, 10s. 6d.)

IN " The Log of a U-Boat Commander," in spite of a title that suggests nothing very new or thrilling (owing to the steady flow of books and histories on submarine matters which have continued up to the pres-nt day), we appear to have a good informative book that fills a gap. I t is real and, in parts, artistic. The ennobling aspects of war have their proper setting, and the horrors of war their proper secondary place. With the exception of three necessary maps the book is entirely illustrated by photographs-some of which are pleasing to a degree. To persons who have little or no knowledge of submarine warfare the " Log of a U-Boat Commander " should give good value.

The contents consist of a foreword and a preface, both by the author, followed by seventeen chapters and an epilogue. In his foreword the author deprecates the " policy " which held back the High Sea Fleet- condemned it to inactivity and finally robbed it of its " spirit," the vicious circle ending in its steaming-" mechanically perfect "-into Scapa Flow to secure a " bloodless victory " for the English. The British blockade had done its work, in spite of early looseness and laxity.

" In the Great War we failed to master politics " he remarks ; and then the tinge of bitterness gives place to the subject of his book : his U-Boat men-their battles on and beneath the sea-the spirit and will which once imbued them-their faith in and their loyalty to their leaders -" yes, even to the revolution." These attributes belong to the submarine officers and men of every navy, and thus can be widely appreciated. Klaxon in his " Story of our Submarines," in order to explain these bonds that unite submarine officers and men, has coined the expression : " The democracy of things real."

The preface amongst other matters contains an explanation of how this log came to appear so late on the scene, nearly thirteen years after the Armistice. The author had his notes, and also the logs of all his cruises. Somehow, however, he felt there would not be " any genuine desire in Germany of the first post-war years to hear about the experiences of the men who had so hotly fought and suffered for bhe Freedom of the Fatherland."

Early in 1917, Commander Hashagen was in command of U.62 and, with a surprise attack, sank a British Q-ship. Her captain, Commander

792 " THE LOG O F A U-BOAT COMMANDER,

N. Lewis, R.N., was taken a prisoner onboard U.62, and " for nineteen days cruised with the Germans," receiving chivalrous treatment at their hands, which continued in Germany whilst a prisoner of war. In the summer of 1929, Commander N. Lewis, R.N., (retired) was an active member of the League of Nations Union working for world peace, and, accidentally stumbling across his former captor's name, obtained his address and wrote asking his recent enemy if he would speak and appear on the same platform as himself. How Commander Hashagen at first thought it out of the question to accede to such a request, how he still resented the " calumny spread about the German submarines and their methods," andhow, after thinking the whole matter over carefully, he saw a prospect of being of service to his country and perhaps to humanity in general, is described in the preface. In November, 1929-at Reading- he spoke on the " nature and spirit of the U-Boat war " before many thousands of Englishmen and with the strong co-operation of the whole English press. He was pleased with the result of his visit and decided to publish his war experiences. " The words duty and sacrifice threaten to vanish from our vocabulary." " No one would refuse to give the new generation of growing youth :in honest account of our battles-the present generation has no conception of war and for that very reason wants to know why their fathers died."

The chapters are well arranged, and Chapter I. is called The Sea. I t is refreshing at any time to read about the sea. " The sea. I t is ilnconquerable, he who would sr~i l it must fight it." " The seaman is a fighter to-day as he was thousands of years ago." He admits that the use of U-Boats against merchant ships was theoretically considered before the Great War, but asserts that the British blockade caused a " spontaneous outburst of the German nation's will " demanding that submarine warfare should begin. Early successes rather amazed them ! (Pathfinder, Cressy, Hogue and Aboukir). " So submarines could not only watch, but strike and destroy ! ! "

Most books on submarines start with a chapter describing how they dive-manceuvre, submerge and return to the surface. This explanation-a lucid one-is here reserved until Chapter V.

Chapter II., The Seal, is an analogy. Before joining submarines the author was in an uninteresting ship, the Kaiser Barbarossa, on an uninteresting job. When he actually joins his first boat, U.22, two things impress him. His captain tells him to learn all he can about depth keeping, and the engineer has caustic remarks to offer on the flooding and venting arrangements. I t is questionable whether either of these officers really knew his business perfectly. Especially are the engineer's remarks on venting hard to understand, unless U.22 was " the only

one of her class." Then a cruise to the Minch (West Coast of Scotland)- big seas-thick weather-icy cold water coming over the bridge. The Germans had faith in their U-Boats, and appreciated the " feel" of them as a horseman appreciates the " feel " of a good and trusty horse between his legs. It is to be remembered here that a sea which would drop on the casing of a British submarine and then rebound over the bridge would go tl&ough the wooden battens of a U-Boat's upper deck- enough to prevent her bridge being swamped.

Chapter III., A Diving Mishap, should interest the layman. With a bad trim-certain leaky valves-the foremost hydroplanes jammed- some mistakes on the part of the crew superimposed-what submarine officer does not know how such will all combine occasionally to produce a " bad day " ? U.22 was lucky to have her bad day on one of quick changing visibility. l

The submarine of the future will not be likely to exceed 300 feet in length. I t should be quick diving-a good seaboat, mechanically simple and strong-with the highest speed possible. " To be first in the race is everything" (Fisher). " If we have the advantage of speed which is the first desideratum in every class of fighting vessel (battleships included) then and then only can we choose our distance for fighting " (Fisher). Although these words would appear to be common sense, nevertheless there is at present a movement afoot to try and prove that speed matters little. Drake said in 1588 : " The advantage of time and place in all martial actions is half a victory, which being lost is irrecover- able."

It is not intended in this review to discuss every chapter. Suffice it to say that practically all the adventures are there-for the reader to find. Aground in rough weather and off again by great good luck. The sinking of Q.12. The effects of depth charges. The escape of an officer

l After the Armistice the German U-Boats were delivered up a t Hanvich and apportioned out amongst the Allies. Britain was among the few who took the trouble to t ry them out properly. The U-Boat in general had less longitudinal stability than British submarines, the planes had more effect and the tanks flooded more quickly. The tanks at the extreme ends of these U-Boats were exceptionally quick in flooding, each tank taking in between 25 to 30 tons of water when the boat dived. Their foremost super- structure was designed to flood in a very short space of time. The Kingstons were large flaps and the big tanks had two such Kingstons. The vents were large-10 inches in dia- meter, and far ahead even of present day construction-although hand worked. All were worked from the control room, and the rod gear was perfect. The vent lifted up the fraction of an inch and then turned completely off the top. The stern of a U-Boat when diving came up when speed was increased. Everything was designed so that the boat dived rapidly a t an angle down by the bow. The planes were powerful because they were placed low. The tops of the main ballast tanks were level with the waterline when in main ballast trim and undev the waterline if for any reason the boat was the slightest bit heavy. The difficulty in a U-Boat was to stop her from crashing under a t an angle, but after experience she was beautiful to handle.

and two men from a submarine sunk by a mine-without any apparatus such as the perfected Davis Submerged Escape Apparatus of the present day. The value of camouflage is discussed, and there are the inevitable descriptions of the sinking of merchant ships. The author gives himself two resounding pats on the back, and it would be unfair to grudge him these completely. The first is for coming back, after one particiilar trip, through the mine barrage of the Dover Straits between Folkestone and Gris-Nez instead of north about, he having carte blanche in the matter. This barrage was an obvious nightmare to the Germans, and the " aching anxiety " increased as the time to carry out the return passage approached. The other self-inflicted pat on the back is for his convoy attacks. The attendant destroyers with their depth charges and latent powers of ramming are there to deter him from " getting in close." " I saw that one can do anything with a submarine if one is only careful and makes full and clever use of one's powers of surprise."

Before concluding, it is desired to draw attention to a sentence which occurs when the submarine school exercises are described. " To save time we were towed to the firing position by torpedo boats." In this connection the following facts may be of interest :-

I. British submarines were towed by cruisers to the Heligoland Bight early in the Great War, to save fuel and increase their time on patrol.

2 . They have been towed by destroyers on passage to refit, to save daylight or catch a tide.

3. They have been taken in tow by an escort or ship in the vicinity when entirely broken down.

4. The British submarine S.I was towed by a captured German trawler in 1915 back from the Heligoland Bight to Harwich. The absence of an index in such a work is much to be regretted. I t

would greatly facilitate reference.

" THE WAYS O F THE NAVY." By REAR-ADMIRAL D. ARNOLD FORSTER, C.M.G.

(Ward, Lock and Co. 7s. 6d.)

IN this book the author endeavours to explain, quite simply, the naval way of doing things. Most of the chapters consist of brief descriptions of the everyday routine of a fleet, and the right way to carry it out. Towards the end, however, the reader is given a few very interesting reminiscences, and many people will regret that there are not more of them.

The first chapter is devoted to customs and ceremonial, and, although it makes no attempt to treat the subject exhaustively, there are little points concerning the origin of certain things which will be new- to many naval officers. In the following chapter on " Naval Lore " there is food for thought for the professional seaman as well as the interested layman. I doubt, for instance, whether a better description of how to make and use a hand log is to be found in any manual of seamanship. There is also a valuable reminder that fleets cannot always be manceuvred in fog by W./T., owing to possible war conditions. The reference to gun signals recalls a method which the modern navy has almost forgotten.

The next chapters, on ship and boat work respectively, are well written, and contain much that is at least of historical interest to younger officers, while the sections which deal with boat pulling and boat sailing are excellent. Perhaps the weakest part of the book is that which deals with fleet gunnery, as it is rather out of date, although we are compensated later in the same chapter by a very good account of torpedo work, and of wirelessly controlled target ships. Further on, there is an interesting description of towing, but one feels that perhaps the author has in mind older and smaller ships rather than the modern battleship. I t is assumed, for instance, that in heavy weather the towing ship would steam across the bows of the ship to be towed instead of coming up on the same course, as is the modern practice. Consequently the book contains no reference to the question as to whether the towing ship should come past on the windward or leeward beam of the ship that is stopped.

After describing fleet work, the book goes on to deal with the different functions of various classes of ship, and the section dealing with cruisers is particularly good. In talking of mines, however, the author keeps rather too much to their technical aspect, and no mention is made of their strategic importance in connexion with blockade and the control of shipping in general. This is a pity, because it is a subject on which even naval officers are inclined to be hazy.

Reference has already been made to the chapter on reminiscences, and the last chapter, called " Old and New Navy," is in effect a continuation of them. The description of coaling ship will awaken vivid memories, but the account of an incident in the old training squadron deals with an aspect of life at sea on which very few serving officers can comment to-day (pp. 268-281).

Taking the book as a whole, its outstanding merit is the balance with which it is written. The author has managed to keep very up to date, while avoiding the pitfalls of being either too technical or in the slightest degree controversial. This is an achievement only too rare among recent books on the Navy. I t is legitimate to wonder, however, whether a

book of this nature will appeal to as wide a public as it deserves. There is a risk that it may fall between two stools, as the ordinary layman would undoubtedly find it hard to follow, while to the naval officer, although it contains much that is of interest, it is too light to be of value a s a text book. On the other hand it would prove an invaluable guide to a naval cadet, or to merchant service officers wishing to learn about the navy, or even to naval officers' wives anxious to understand how their husbands pass their time !

" WOLVES O F THE CHANNEL " (1681-1856). By W. BRANCH JOHNSON.

(Wishart & Co., 15s.)

ALTHOUGH this is in many ways a remarkable book, it is in a sense a disappointing one, since it might have easily been so much better. I t is packed from cover to cover with interesting information, presented, too, from an aspect which strikes quite a new note in naval history for the average reader. Herein we meet with the heroes who bore such names as Jean Bart, Duguay Trouin, Cassard, Surcouf and a dozen others, familiar through our having seen them upon the stems of French men of war or met them in Jane's " Fighting Ships," rather than in the pages of our naval history. We hear the story from the French side, naturally a partisan one, which becomes the more conspicuously so owing to the fact that it is told in English and presumably by an Englishman.

A reviewer in these pages is, I take it, more concerned with the material presented than the method of its presentation, but it seems a pity that the author has not at times taken a little more trouble to construct his phrases so that they should be easier and more intelligible English. Again, there are certain peculiarities in the use of words. The French privateersman is always a Corsair-though according to our author he was anything but that. The author derives the word fromguerre de course, but the dictionary tells us that a Corsair was a pirate and, as a secondary meaning, that he was a privateer in the employ of a Turkish or Saracen ruler. Neither of which seems to fit the case of the French privateersman, who often had a fleet organisation not inferior to that of the National Navy.

Having made these criticisms one may now give wholehearted praise to Mr. Branch Johnson's book, which contains an extraordinary amount which is a t least new to the present writer, who is not entirely unread in naval history.

It is a national peculiarity-not by any means confined to the British -that we are apt, in history, to dwell upon our successes rather than our failures, and to devote as many pages to a successful naval operation as we do lines, or even words, to those in which the enemy had the best of it, even if the incident be not entirely ignored.

Thus in " Wolves of the Channel " we hear of events which come to us with an impression of absolute novelty. Such, for example, on page 132, where we hear of Duguay Trouin, then in command of five privately fitted out ships, cruising off Portugal. He receives orders to join with the naval squadron in a united attack upon a large munitions fleet destined for the Anglo Portuguese army in the Peninsula. I t sounds strangely as if the writer had placed the happening a hundred years too soon, but we were then nevertheless working in conjunction with our oldest ally (the alliance dating 1703) taking part in the wars of the Spanish Succession. I t appears that we sustained a severe defeat shortly after at Almanza and thus we have conveniently forgotten the little affair. Haydn's Dictionary of Dates tells us " that our forces were completely defeated by the French and Spanish under the Duke of Berwick and most of the English were killed or made prisoners."

But to return to RCnC Duguay Trouin who, with Jean Bart, may be considered the most notable and perhaps the most representative of French privateersmen. Duguay Trouin, though he was ennobled and given a commission in the Royal Navy, was essentially a commoner, and more than once fell foul of the aristocratic and supercilious naval officer. This attack on the British Convoy may be considered to have been one of his most brilliant exploits, and it also brings out the friction which always existed between the French naval officer and the privateersman, with whom he was brought into far closer contact than was ever the case with his chief rivals on the other side of the channel.

The story is a dramatic one. " The fleet was sighted-twenty vessels escorted by five ships-of-the-line-and Duguay Trouin, with his usual ardour, hurried forward in the fast-sailing Lys to meet them ; but de Forbin attempted to hold him back, grudging him too great a share of the glory. Echoing the words of Cassard in similar circumstances, ' My duty to my King overrides that to my Admiral,' Duguay Trouin pressed on nevertheless, met the escort, and engaged them. The fight became desperate ; the Lys was outmatched and some of the remaining ships of the privateer squadron severely handled ; but Duguay Trouin stuck tenaciously to his task, sank the largest of the English line-of-battle ships and captured three moye, as well as a considerable number of merchantmen. Only when the fight was ended did de Forbin arrive on the scene, after having deliberately stood away from it. He it was who

conducted the principal prizes into Brest, leaving the slower ones to Duguay Trouin ; and immediately on arrival hurried to Versailles, where with unblushing audacity he represented himself as the hero of the day. At first, his birth prejudicing the court strongly in his favour, he was taken at his word ; only the arrival of Duguay Trouin spoiled what must have been a very gratifying episode in de Forbin's career. The tale told by the indignant corsair was so diametrically opposed to that of the peacock-proud Chevalier-and it was Duguay Trouin's that was corroborated by others who had taken part in the engagement- that, after some days of bewilderment, Pontchartrain (the Minister of Marine) invited the authors of both versions to thrash the matter out in his presence. We do not know the details of that interview, more's the pity ; but the rumours which spread concerning it were sufficient to scandalise maritime circles throughout France, and as its result Duguay Trouin received his patent of nobility " (pp. 132-134).

He was already a captain in the navy, though seemingly acting in a secondary capacity as privateer. I t was not the first time that he had received scurvy treatment when working with the Navy. I t is curious that in the account of this engagement, as in many others, we hear nothing whatever of the story as told by the other side, nor are we given the officers in command. For some reason the author has divided up the account of this action, and we get another part of it (p. 148) with a reproduction of a very curious old print " The Burning of the Devonshire." She is here described as a huge go gun ship-of-the-line. " She found herself surrounded by bombarding privateers. By admirable handling she managed for a long time not merely to hold them at arm's length but to inflict considerable damage on their hulls and rigging ; at last Duguay Trouin manceuvred himself into a position to come to close quarters. Scarcely were his men over her rails, however, than he noticed she was on fire ; hurriedly he recalled them and cast off, so as to avoid being himself involved. In a quarter of an hour the Devonshire was burning furiously below and aloft. The sea was high, and she rolled dangerously ; her guns escaped from their lashings into the lee scuppers ; her masts went by the board. She took a heavier and heavier list, and, while still a gigantic torch flaring skywards she dived beneath the waves-out of a crew of nearly nine hundred only three were rescued."

St. Malo and Dunkirk appear to have been the principal ports on which the French privateers were based ; and there is no doubt that those who financed them made enormous profits. These marine financiers were known as armateurs ; they generally managed to get the lion's share of the prize money, though the French government appears to have occasionally given some protection to the interests of the seamen.

It is probable that such action was dictated rather by the desire of ren- dering the service popular than by any great consideration for the men themselves. The government believed that by the guerre de course they were weakening their adversary, and when one turns to the records one cannot wonder that they hoped to win the war that way just as did the Germans in 1914.

Colbert seems to have been the great exponent of privateering, and it was under his reglme that the privateers experienced their most palmy days. In these pages (pp. 19 and 20) we learn-" In the one year 1689, for instance, four thousand two hundred English and Dutch craft fell into the hands of French corsairs ; in forty years of war four thousand three hundred and forty-four prizes were sold in the Admiralty Court at Dunkerque alone ; in the year 1751, two hundred and fifty-one English prizes were carried into the same port. In the Republican era, during the years 1793 to 1795 inclusive, French captures amounted to two thousand and ninety-nine ; the latter year Moultson, an American sailing under French colours, captured a large part of the enormously valuable Jamaica fleet, and another privateer, Richgry, broke up the Labrador fisheries and sank eighty vessels engaged in that trade. The British flag was swept out of the Mediterranean-; at home, the funds fell and the Bank of England suspended specie payments. From the 1st October, 1804 to the 1st April, 1805, our losses totalled two hundred and seventy vessels. In the same period our captures numbered seven !"

The author continues " A mere recital of losses, however, is scarcely fair to ourselves. We lost much because we had much to lose : . . . for every French merchantman on the seas there were many English."

One would like to quote more of this interesting book which deals very thoroughly with the whole history of privateering. The headings of the chapters give indication of what may be expected : " Privateer Types," "The Business Side of Privateering," "The Tactics of a Privateer," " American Privateers in French Ports," " French Privateers and Scottish Jacobites," " Privateering in the New World." In this last we get a most interesting account of the French Florida settlement of 1562, destroyed by the Spaniards, who " massacred the greater part of the Frenchmen, hanged the rest, and flayed the leader alive " (p. 163). I t was a gentleman of Gascony, Dominique de Gourgues, who avenged the death of his fellow countrymen in dramatic manner. Leaving the survivors of the garrison hanging on the same trees as had borne the bodies of his countrymen, he burned upon the trunk of a near by pine tree the legend : " I do this, not because you are Spaniards, but because you are traitors, thieves and murderers " (p. 169).

de Gourgues was an energetic and enterprising soul. We hear that Queen Elizabeth invited him to enter the service of England. Kipling therefore, with his usual accuracy, is right in making Gloriana refer to the massacre in " Rewards and Fairies."

Wolves of the Channel is well worth reading.

"THE PIRATE WIND." By OWEN RUTTER, F.R.G.S. (Hutchinson & Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d.)

THE easterly breeze which brought the predatory Malay cruising fleets from Sulu to prey upon the Brunei coast, became known to the natives as the Pirate Wind : hence the title of this book. Its pages deal with Malay piracy in the last century, chiefly upon the north coast of Borneo.

The author explains that the Malay was not by nature a pirate, as is generally supposed, though he has always been a seafarer from the time of Sinbad the Sailor, before ever European ships had found their way to eastern seas. He tells us :

" Though these Malays were pirates, it is but fair to say that it was largely European intercourse with the east that made them so. I t is true that the old Malay romances contain references to piratical cruises, yet there seems no doubt that piracy was not practised on a wholesale scale until the eighteenth century.

" What was it then that caused these people and their neighbours to revert from peace to piracy ? The answer is : the greed of the Euro- pean powers who traded in the eastern seas. From time immemorial outside commerce with the Archipelago had been in the hands of the Chinese, whose junks would come down in the N.E. monsoon and return in the S.W., laden with precious cargoes of spices, rattans, edible birds' nests, camphor, sharks' fins and pearls. Then came the Portuguese, and after them the Dutch, who, bent on securing the trade for themselves alone, created a system of monopolies and, by treaties with the Malay rulers, were able to command the produce at their own rates and so under- sell the Chinese. By planting ' factories ' or trading stations in the Archi- pelago, they diverted to Malacca or Batavia the trade which for centuries had gone direct to China, so that in time the junks could compete no longer and came no more. One result of this change was that the chinese immigrants-the forebears of those settlers to whom modern Malaya owes so much of its prosperity to-day-returned to their native shores, and no others came to take their places. The Chinese, most of them skilled craftsmen or zealous agriculturists, had been a source of revenue to the rulers in whose territories they settled, nor were these

revenues replaced with the coming of the traders from the west, who took all and gave in return as little as they could.

"As time went on, what may be called the bread and butter lines of trade, rattans, sago, wild rubber, beeswax and other jungle produce came to be neglected, owing to the expense of the double carriage ; so that thousands of natives were bereft of their normal occupations, both in collecting the produce, and in carrying it from port to port, whilst the precious spice trade was regulated with such jealousy that the Dutch would wantonly destroy quantities of cloves and nutmegs rather than allow them to fall into foreign hands.

" Not content with this . . . they fomented dissension . . . until they destroyed the authority of the rulers and disorganised the commercial enterprise of the people.

" Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish and English all played the same game. " They (the Malays) were a proud people accustomed to freedom:

they resented most bitterly the injustice shown them and the restraints imposed by those whom they regarded as white barbarians.

" They were accustomed to the sea and, under the leadership of their princes, they turned their ways to piracy and plunder . . . one may see in the attacks on European shipping that followed, acts of retaliation against those interlopers from the west, until in course of time this guerilla warfare . . . developed . . . into an habitual mode of life, more lucrative and certainly more exciting than their former ways of peace.

" Piracy became looked upon as an honourable occupation, so that any chief who wished to improve his fortune, could collect about him a handful of restless followers and settle with them upon some secluded island in the Archipelago . . . ; if he was successful he would gain fresh adherents . . . whilst his fleet would become large enough to be divided into small squadrons. ''

It is to be noted that in certain cases the pirates' craft could even be dismantled and taken to pieces, so that they could be carried over intervening spits into waters where it was impossible for normal craft to follow.

As is usually the case with piratical races as distinct from the buc- caneer, they did not confine themselves to attacks upon shipping. " For a pirate squadron slaves were more lucrative than loot, and easier to dispose of." Once a full cargo of slaves had been secured in one quarter the pirates would sail away to dispose of them in another, rather, i t is to be feared, in the manner of the poacher who, selling stolen pheasants' eggs to a game preserving estate, will often relieve the owner of his own stock, selling them to yet another proprietor. The Island of Sarangani

off the coast of Mindanau became a recognised centre of the slave traffic, traders coming from all parts to barter, a fact which bears an extraordinary similarity to the slave market at Delos where the second century Cilician pirates were wont to dispose of thousands of captives in a day. Indeed the analogy between the two nations of pirates is so close that, did space allow, it would be interesting to institute a fuller comparison showing how like causes produce the same results. Our author notes that the Chinese settlers in the Archipelago were always eager buyers of women slaves, since the laws of their own country forbade female emigration.

As regards prices we are told that a boy was valued at about £6 in the local currency, whilst a good looking girl might fetch from two to two and a half times as much.

Except for the natural discomforts incident to transport in small and crowded vessels the fate of the native slave was generally far less hard than that of the European, who was often subjected to most fiendish cruelty, particularly if suspected of concealing valuables ; but both were always in danger of being thrown overboard if wounded or sick, to avoid inconvenience to the captor.

I t is certain that British seamen bore their full share both in loss and ill-treatment by the pirates. " Yet the British Government allowed her ships to be captured and her flag insulted, her sailors to be enslaved, tortured and killed without effective reprisals, which was a curious contrast to the one nation without any settlement in the Archipelago-the United States-which took prompt and energetic steps to avenge any outrages inflicted on her shipping . . . sending her warships on frequent visits to Malayan ports."

As might have been expected, such slackness brought about its own punishment, and the pirate fleets increased in size and boldness until, in the 3rd and 4th decades of the 19th century we find that even well manned and armed merchant men could by no means count upon immunity if becalmed in the vicinity of the pirate coasts. The author gives us typical and graphic descriptions of pirate enterprise and the cruelties perpetrated. He tells us of the capture of the important East India Company's trading station at Balambangan on the North Coast of Borneo, and thus brings us to the period about 1844 when a real effort was made for the first time to end the scandal.

We hear of an attack by Captain Belclier in H.M.S. Samarang in that year upon a pirate fleet, a case which shows how difficult is the question of a pirate's status when a whole people are tarred with the same brush, the pirates claiming to be a punitive force sent out by a native ruler. Later we hear of the exploits of Admiral Cochrane in

H.M.S. Agincourt, and of Captain Rodney Mundy, H.M.S. Isis, in 1845, to whose enterprise-and that of Raja Brooke-we owe the fact that these seas were at last made secure for British trade.

In the last chapter we are told how Captain Ross, as late as 1863, commanding a fine brig the " Lizzie Webber," mounting six 12 pr. guns, stood off a pirate fleet ; a saga in which Mrs. Ross played the part of heroine, and incidentally saved the ship when the magazine was in danger.

The book is well illustrated with reproductions of rare pictures and prints, and gives an interesting side light on the work of the Royal Navy at a period and in a locality which has been rather neglected by naval historians.

" The Pirate Wind " can be heartily commended to naval readers.

"ENGLISH SEAMEN AND T H E COLONISATION O F AMERICA."

By E. KEBLE CHATTERTON. (Arrowsmith. 12s. 6d.)

THE above title is somewhat of a misnomer, since this book deals, and that very partially, with the early colonial history of British America, and with English seamen only in so far as their doings were bound up with the fate of the colonial pioneers. I t could equally have been called the early colonial history of Virginia, whose plantation occupies most of its pages and which is described as being " not only the pioneer of all other American settlements, but the creative inspiration, the encouragement and model."

In the great prominence which has been given in past writings to the story of the " Mayflower" and the pilgrim fathers we are apt to overlook the fact that, though the celebrated little craft (160 tons) landed her passengers in the year 1620, the first enduring settlement in British America had been made at Jamestown, Virginia, just fourteen years earlier, an event preluded by various abortive attempts dating as far back as 1578. I t was, perhaps, the difficulty of deciding upon what really was the pioneer vessel of the southern settlement which has caused her name to be forgotten.

Three ships, we are here told, took part in that enterprise : the " Susan Constant " (100 tons), the " God Speed " (40 tons) and the " Discovery " (20 tons). The third of these remained behind as tender to the settlement ; thus, as also the smallest, she may perhaps be given pride of place as the parallel of the Mayflower in the settlement of

Virginia. Incidentally, Mr. Chatterton tells us that the celebrated voyage of the latter was almost her last, and that she was then broken up and her timbers used in the construction of a barn. She brought to America about 102 persons, but hardly more than half survived the first year, to become ancestors to the countless thousands who claim Mayflower ancestry.

To return to the settlement of Virginia, which occupies the greater portion of the book now under review. The three ships were sent out by the London Virginia Company who at the same time attempted to make a settlement on what is now the coast of Maine. The northern venture proved a complete fiasco, as indeed did very nearly the other portion of the enterprise. In these days of discussion of the morality of lotteries it is interesting to note that by such means was raised the greater part of the funds required for the beginning of the United States of America.

The settlers taking part in the venture were badly chosen, ill-organised and without colonial experience ; it is thus a marvel that they ever won through. If the credit for this result can be accorded to any one man it must be given to Captain John Smith, the one person who stands out above all the rest as a great man. His personality and repute pervades the whole history of those early years. Not only was he a great man and a strong one, but, as is often the case with personalities who have secured a place in popular imagination, there was the romance of the P~incess Pocahontas to make his memory still more secure. Captain Smith was just the man required to deal with the Indian chiefs, whose methods he was able to understand and counter.

I t is interesting in this book to contrast the early history of the two colonies, Virginia and New England. The troubles in the former case were almost invariably due to insubordination and incapacity. This was because the Virginia colonists were, in the main, entirely unsuited to steady industry ; they were, indeed, mostly wastrels induced to take part in the enterprise by greed for gold and love of adventure. In the case of New England, the colonists were largely godly and sober men ; far better colonising material, it is true ; better organised and with the results of fourteen years of experience to guide them ; but the results, due to bigotry and religious intolerence, produced effects almost as fatal to progress as those which retarded the progress of Virginia.

The early colonists, in addition to famine and shortage of supplies, had twc other grim spectres ever hovering near. The first was the threat of Spanish aggression-a threat which, strangely enough, never materi- alised. The danger was, however, a very real one, for spies kept the Spanish court well informed as to the condition of the English settle-

ments, whilst the fate of a French settlement in Florida, which was completely exterminated by a Spanish fleet, showed what might quite possibly happen to them. I t seems probable that at first the condition of the colony was such that it was likely to cease to be, without interference from outside ; while later, at a critical moment, times were not propitious for Spanish action until the colony had become too firmly planted to make interference desirable.

The second ever-present danger was the possibility of an Indian rising. Upon the arrival of the colonists in small numbers, the Indians, impressed with the superior civilisation of the white man, had been more or less friendly. They naturally resented the ever increasing numbers of the immigrants and, though deriving some benefits from the intercourse, they found many of the white man's ways extremely obnox- ious : whilst he treated the whole country as his own. In 1622 occurred what was probably the first concerted attempt by the Indians to rid themselves of the incubus. The savages surprised and slew 347 of the English colonists, scores of families were brutally murdered. Horrible though the behaviour might be to civilised minds one cannot but feel that the Indian chief Opechancanough, who conceived the idea that " it was about time this rapidly increasing colony of pale faced men and women should be wiped out, as they were surely about to take away the red man's territory for ever," had come to a very natural and accurate conclusion. Since he failed, the Indian cause was lost, and the attack gave strength to those who declared in after days that the only good Indian was a dead one.

The colony survived the attack and, in course of time, began to prosper. When it became fairly obvious that neither gold nor pearls were to be expected in paying quantities from the new colonies, another get-rich-quickly snare arose in the shape of the tobacco growing industry which, whilst helping to finance public expenditure, more than once threatened disaster by the very attractive nature of its profits. The demand for the luxury at remunerative prices by Europe was an insistent and growing one ; but tobacco would not feed the hungry mouths, even though it was so much desired as to become a staple currency. In the year 1622 we read in this respect :

" Sixty more, young and handsome maids, well recommended for their virtue and upbringing, were sent out from England each as an intended wife, bearing a testimonial. The price of each woman was 120 lbs. of tobacco at first, though afterwards it was raised. The current price of tobacco being then 3s. a pound a wife cost £18 or the equivalent of nearly £200 in modern money."

By the year 1634, less than 30 years from the first settlement, the infant colony had got over the worst of her teething troubles and we find :

"Already 300 British ships were being employed, sailing to Virginia, New England and Nova Scotia, whilst, notwithstanding the arrival in that year of 1,200 newcomers into the colony of Virginia, it was possible to export ten thousand bushels of corn for the relief of New England. . . . ( P 254).

" There were plenty of beeves, goats, hogs, all sorts of poultry and oranges, lemons, vines as well as all kinds of fruit were being grown."

As regards the foreign element in the settlers we learn that, in 1621 : " Virginia was attracting foreigners as well " (p. 215) " Walloons and Frenchmen were anxious to go out and plant." Some zz7persons of these nations appear to have been accepted; they were the best type of colonists; we hear of a medical student, a weaver, leather-dressers, vine-dressers, brewer, tiller of the earth, dyer, locksmith and many similar professions. Italian glass-workers were also introduced to make the glass beads beloved of the Indians. (p. 218).

We hear in these pages a good deal about the ill-treatment of servants and apprentices which hardly tends to increase one's respect for the " good old times." " Some of the men who could not endure ill-treatment fled to the savages but were usually retaken and then hanged, shot or broken on the wheel : one man for stealing corn was punished by having a bodkin driven through his tongue and he was chained to a tree until he starved to death." (p. 229).

Homeward bound ships from the new colonies often suffered severely from the depredations of the Moorish pirates. In the year 1625, we hear that, within ten days in the Atlantic approaches to the British Isles, 27 ships and zoo persons returning from the plantations were taken by these marauders. I t is probable that most of these were fishing craft from the Banks, but still the risk even to larger vessels was considerable.

The settlement of Newfoundland itself was decided upon in answer to a petition stating that the island had become a haunt of pirates, and that between 1612 and 1621 damage to shipping to the extent of over ~40,000 had been done. (p. 248). Such a sum would be near half a million pounds to-day.

The only one of several foreign settlements made within the British sphere of influence which ever threatened seriously to interfere with the general scheme was that made by the Dutch in 1609, Henry Hudson having planted a settlement on the bank? of the river which now bears his name. As regards the continuity of this settlement our author tells US :

" There is reason to believe that, in 1613, Captain Sam Argall, when he sailed from Jamestown to expel a French encroachment on the coast of Maine, called at Hudson R. on his way back and compelled the little Dutch settlement on Manhattan I. to surrender . . . it was not long before the Hollanders were trading again."

The settlement by the Dutch had, however, to be formally recognised by the Government in 1646, and Peter Struyvesant, the Dutch Governor, even negotiated a settlement of boundaries with the British colonies. In 1664, being then at war with Holland, New Amsterdam (i.e., New York) fell to the British : at the close of the war the Dutch colonies became British : in 1673, New York was recaptured by the Dutch, but in the following year it was returned and remained in our hands until the declaration of independence.

We are told a good deal about the internal disputes of the colonists, the fact being that the type of colonial settler was not one who could easily conform to any other person's views : non-conformists they were in politics if not in religion, and the spirit which finally brought the revolution was no new manifestation. They were always a turbulent lot and, when not fighting the Indians, they fought amongst themselves. Religion was, of course, always a splendid rallying ground for trouble. We hear of the Salem train bands cutting the red cross out of their "Ancient " (colours) not as a political gesture, but because they thought it to be a popish emblem. (p. 280). We are told in these pages that the effect of the strife between the King andtheParliamenthadalsoanechointhe colonial feeling across the Atlantic : the Crown had gone, and with it much of the prestige of rule from England. Later, when Jacobinism crossed the Atlantic, it met with less resistance because of this feeling.

In closing this slight summary of a capable and entertaining book we may state that much is to be found between these covers which can only be collected elsewhere from a variety of sources often difficult of access. I t is well and copiously illustrated with reproductions from rare prints. There is a good index, and, if any criticism can be made, it is that a few more maps, particularly early ones, would add to an interesting appreciation of the letterpress.

" MY GREATEST ADVENTURE." By SIR MALCOLM CAMPBELL.

(Thornton Butterworth, Ltd. 6s.)

THE reader who expects this book to tell of motor racing or breaking of records-hurtling through space at fabulous speeds-will be dis-

appointed. I t is the story of a treasure hunt at Cocos Island, a spot which lies almost in the focus of the Gulf of Panama. It is a well told story in the true buccaneering manner, and one which will be of special interest to those naval men who remember the fact that some years ago the then Commander-in-Chief upon the Pacific station took there three ships and, daily for some weeks, landed working parties upon the island, in the vain hope that he had obtained reliable information as to the location of the treasure. Those who then took part in the search were generally of opinion that considerable landslides had much altered the contours in the neighbourhood, and one officer who was present told the writer that he believed the treasure had already been found and removed,

Sir Malcolm Campbell gives us chapter and verse for at least three treasures, which are believed to be hidden in the Island, so that the removal of even one will still leave plenty of hope for further searchers. Contrary to general opinion he pins his faith to Chatham Bay as the most likely locality, and not to Wafer Bay which has been the scene of most of the previous digging. The so called " Mary Dier " treasure is the one in which he is mainly interested. He estimates its amount a t some IZ millions sterling, and, even after spending many weeks in unsuccessful search, it seems that he is still convinced of its existence. The writer of this review, whilst he feels it most unsporting to throw cold water upon such a glorious yarn, is inclined to take the view of the late Captain Whall who, in a chapter devoted to hidden treasure in his " Romance of Navigation," suggests that the whole story of this treasure " was an invention of Keeling or Hackett as a modification of the well-known Spanish treasure hoax."

In the story as he tells it, though its main details agree with those given by Sir Malcolm Campbell, the original seizure of the treasure at Callao took place in the year 1835 and not in 1821 as stated by Campbell. The latter would seem, however, to be the more probable date.

The tale, in brief, is as follou7s. At the time when the insurgents under Bolivar were threatening Lima in 1821 the authorities, fearing the looting of the city, embarked an enormous treasure from the government stores, cathedral, etc., upon the British ship " Mary Dier," then in harbour at Callao. The temptation proved too great for the honesty of her crew who, after murdering the guards, made off with the treasure and, fearing pursuit, buried it at Cocos Island. The treasure is said to have taken eleven boat-loads to land. Later the piratical crew were captured, but one of them managed to escape, taking with him the secret of the treasure.

Now, assuming, as is most probable, that the year 1821 is correct, we have the known fact that Lord Cochrane was at that time upon the coast, supporting San Martin, the insurgent general ; Bolivar did not appear upon the scene until a year or two later. I t will be remembered that the revolutionary party were very hard pressed for funds, and one can hardly believe that a man like Cochrane would allow such a dainty prize as £12 millions in gold and valuables to be carried off from under his very nose without any attempt to secure it. He remained upon the station until the year 1823, and we do hear of his putting an embargo upon the loot stored by San Martin at Arica for the purpose bf satisfying his crews who had received no pay for a long time, but we do not hear anything about the Cocos Island treasure. The present writer was in Callao and Lima for many months in 1883, only some 62 years after the earlier date mentioned, or but 48 years from the second, but he never heard a rumour of this horrible act which has been ascribed to British seamen. He believes that had it ever taken place it would have at that time have formed an excellent taunt to hurl at the head of the none too popular " Gringo ", and a good excuse for the bare altars of the great cathedral at Lima.

Sir Malcolm Campbell, while he is, without doubt, a gallant gentleman and a great racing motorist, is also a most entertain'ng writer; but, like many others who have fallen victims to the lure of treasure hunting, he does not seem ever to have attempted to verify the early history of his quarry.

There are sundry pointers which suggest that he is not over and above accurate in his statements, whilst his organisation of the landing party, even according to his own statements, would shame a gunroom picnic party.

He appears to believe that the treasure cache was a considerable distance from the beach, and he persisted in this belief though he emphasises the great difficulty he experienced unburdened, when making his way through the scrub. He does not suggest a reason for carrying several tons of gold into the interior of the island when it might equally well have been hidden upon the shore.

Not the least interesting feature of his story is his declaration of belief in the probability that in the more inaccessible parts of the island there may yet linger some vestiges of the old Inca race-refugees from the mainland after the Spanish conquest. As, however, a settler has been living upon the island for many years, it seems incredible that he should never have come in contact with such inhabitants.

One must not, perhaps, take such a suggestion too seriously ; Sir Malcolm was out to make a good yarn, and he has done so. He is no

doubt quite aware that the joy of treasure hunting lies rather in the quest than the discovery, however complete. When once discovered, the treasure must lose its glamour and become mere deposits in banks, investments, stocks and shares, as commonplace as those of any successful stock broker ; whilst the poor owner, tied with these golden bonds, will often look back with reminiscent envy to the days when he only enjoyed his treasure in anticipation.

" MONS, ANZAC AND KUT." By the HON. AUBREY HERBERT, with an introduction by DESMOND

MACCARTHY. (Hutchinson 3s. 6d.)

THIS book was originally published anonymouslyin 1919 during the author's lifetime, at a moment when, as the introduction tells us, everyone wanted to forget the war. It is now re-published, with an introduction and the author's name.

I t is, perhaps, one of the most brilliant books of its kind which the war produced, and has been described as a masterpiece. The personality of the writer was remarkable, and he tells his story in a vivid manner which holds the reader right through the book.

The chapter of greatest interest to naval readers is, of course, that of Anzac, where the author, debarred through defective eyesight from the fighting line, served on the peninsula as Intelligence Officer to the New Zealand forces, and was usually either in the thickest of the fighting or interviewing tongue-tied Turkish prisoners.

The book is a series of extracts from his war diary, usually written on the spot, and of all the more interest for that reason. On the an- nouncement of the decision in March, 1915, after the failure of the naval attempt on the peninsula, to carry out a strong combined landing there we read :-" In every discussion there was, as far as I saw, unanimity between military, naval and political officers, who all wished the landing to take place a t Alexandretta, and deplored (not to use a stronger word) the project of the Dardanelles, which the Turks had been given ample time to fortify " (p. 96). There was no question here of wisdom after the event, and the opinion among officers in Egypt, where the author then was, was largely shared by those at home.

He landed at Anzac a few hours after the first assault by the Australian and New Zealand troops on 25th April, 1915, and has much to say about the inevitable confusion. " I believe that, had it been possible, we should

have re-embarked that night ; but the sacrifices involved would have been too great " (p. 105).

His comparison of the Australian and New Zealand troops is interesting. " The Australians had brought with them two ideas which were only eliminated by time, fighting and their own good sense. The ' eight hours day ' was almost a holy principle. . . . Their second principle was not to leave their pals. When a man was wounded his friends would insist upon bringing him down instead of leaving him to the stretcher-bearers. . . . I saw more of the New Zealanders who had the virtues of the Australians and the British troops. They had all the dash and hlan of the Australians, and the discipline of the English- men " (p. 107).

The description of life on the peninsula, with hardly any protection from constant bombardment, and all the discomforts and misery it entailed, are set out in wonderfully clear language. Writing subsequently of the flies which pervaded everything, he says : " The flies and their habits deserve to live in a diary of their own. They were horrible in themselves and made more horrible by our circumstances and their habits. They lived upon the dead and came bloated from their meal to fasten on the living. . . . " (p. 199). And it was that sort of life which our men stood right through a hot Mediterranean summer.

Words fail to do justice to the wonderful spirit of our troops, and it is well that books such as this should help to keep the memory of that spirit green.

One bright spot strikes the naval reader. Although the author does not refer to it in so many words, one realises very forcibly the wonderfully close liaison that existed between the Navy and Army. It was Quebec over again. At Quebec close co-operation made success possible, and, had success been obtainable at the Dardanelles, it would have been largely on account of the splendid team work by the two Services.

His third chapter on Kut is a tragic one : and he is very bitter on the lack of preparation. "We embark upon a compaign without any forethought a t all. Then, naturally, we get into extreme difficulties. After that we talk to the natives telling them quite truthfully that we have magnificent principles of truth, justice, toleration, etc., that where the British Raj is all creeds are free. They like these principles so much that they forget to count our guns. Then, principles or no principles, we have got to retreat before a vastly superior force, and the people who came in with us (e.g., the friendly Arabs) get strafed. Then they all say 'perJide Albion,' though it's really nobody's fault-sometimes not even the fault of the government " (p. 231).

Both a t Anzac and Kut the author had on more than one occasion to go with a flag of truce to arrange terms with the Turks, and his experiences on this service are interesting and instructive.

"ARMADAS OF THE SKY." THE PROBLEM OF ARMAMENTS.

By PAUL MURPHY. Foreword by SIR MAX PEMBERTON. Preface by MAJOR-GENERAL N. G. ANDERSON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Houghton, 5s.)

THE title of the book speaks for itself. The writer is an enthusiast, and General Anderson, in his preface, bears witness to his technical qualifications.

The burden of his song is that the warfare of the future will be essentially in the air, and that navies and armies will be almost redundant ; and he strongly advocates a Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate the three services.

As regards a country like our own " to whom seaborne trade is a necessity " the author does, however, admit that other factors supervene. " I t is necessary, or a t least wise, to assume some limit to the range of aircraft. In that case it must be kept in mind that the range of sea- borne aircraft is their own range plus that of the sea fleet which forms their base, and for that reason it would seem that the naval air arm must remain " (p. 62). He further asserts that the growth of air power on sea and land spells the doom of the submarine.

" The sea arm " he continues " then emerges as clearly as the rest of the picture. In effect it will be a sea base for aircraft ; a conclusion which strengthens the case for fusion. Just as land base aircraft will operate over the sea, so will sea base aircraft operate over the land. That they should operate independently is incredible. Central direction of the whole is inevitable."

As regards land forces he asserts that " I t is impossible to resist the conclusion of the ultimate superiority of air fleets over mechanized armies, and that the former will supersede the latter."

He has much to say about the chemical weapon, which he argues can be suited to almost any occasion. The combination of aircraft and chemical warfare is . . . both variable and flexible. It will be

feasible to exert, first, mild coercion; then, if that fails, a more severe coercion, and finally to employ methods severe in character and yet falling far short of the brutality of the older forms of war " (p. 67).

The underlying fallacies of many of his contentions will be readily apparent to naval readers. He seemingly takes no thought, for instance of conditions of weather, visibility and other hampering factors. As an enthusiast, his geese are naturally all swans. But nevertheless, his arguments are interesting and instructive, and well repay close study.

Towards the end of the book he gives an imaginary picture of the first 24 hours of a future war. Like a bolt from the blue comes the first threat of danger; then there follows a surprise air attack on London following a raid on Berlin within a few hours of the severing of diplomatic relations.

This he follows by a chapter in which he first condemns lighter-than- air-craft " not because they have no merits, but because there are other and stronger claims which rule them out " (p. 107).

He then proceeds to criticise the attitude of the Admiralty towards the aeroplane, which he defines as a " defensive " one, and asserts that the sailor's answer to any arguments on the direction of naval aircraft development is :-" place all air control as it affects the sea in the hands

- of the Admiralty." " But," he adds, " it is not quite so simple as that " (p. 110) After similar remarks on the army attitude, which he brackets with the naval one as " reactionary," he passes on to a Ministry of Defence, which he defines as " a focal point for a new way of regarding an old problem " (p.111).

" But no Ministry of Defence . . . will avail without the formation of a new outlook. The choice is between complacent postponement and a bold imaginative policy of immediate reform. Let us hope that the latter may come swiftly before a second sign from the sky (i.e., R 101)

. . . may bring home to us too late the unwisdom, in times of revolutionary change, of an adherence to a fixed idea " (p. 114).

In his concluding chapter the author urges the League of Nations " to discover and eliminate the causes of war. . . . The fighting instinct can never be eradicated. But it can be diverted to more beautiful and and useful purposes than indiscriminate slaughter for objects which are obscure to the vast majority of the belligerents. . . . The true war of the future is the war against war itself " (pp. 118 and 120).

The book is a short one. I t is crammed full of contentious matter, with much of which the naval officer cannot agree. But it does try to go to the root of the matter, and the time spent in reading it will be time well spent.

" ZEPPELINS OVER ENGLAND." By FREIHERR TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR BRANDENFELS. Trans. by H.

PATERSON. (Harrap 8s. 6d.)

IT is inevitable that the first feeling any Englishman must experience on opening this book is one of horror at the cold blooded nature of the work which the Zeppelins were ordered to carry out, and one reads with astonish- ment that air raids were officially permitted " only subject to the memorable order that all museums and royal palaces were to be spared " (p. 216).

The writer shows, too, how opinion in Germany itself changed on the subject. " During the war it was impossible for us to carry out air raids on England sufficiently often to please the German people, but after the war it was an entirely different story. Then . . . we heard . . . the question : What purpose did the air raids actually serve ? Many people declare that all they achieved was to exasperate the English people without doing any appreciable damage " (p. 217).

He took part in twenty raids and was selected from the whole flotilla for the exceptional honour of the order Pour le Mkite, so his credentials are of the highest. He was in the first air raid, when he frankly admits he had no idea where his bombs were dropped ; and a similar uncertainty runs through all the attacks.

At first the Zeppelins had it all their own way, and he tells a story of meeting a British flight of seven aeroplanes early in the war who like himself turned away " for the wedge of aeroplanes had not the foggiest notion of how to deal with us either, and they too turned about ! " But he continues " later on when the English began to fire with phosphorus, a single hit was sufficient to set an airship on fire " (p. 195).

The book shows very clearly how the Zeppelin threat gradually declined, and the task of raiding England became ever more difficult and dangerous. Weather, too, was a serious factor, though the airships were often saved from disaster by the wise counsel of Dr. Eckener (now commanding the Graf Zeppelin) whom they nicknamed " the Pope ", because his meteorological prognostications were infallible.

The author gives some interesting figures. During the war the Kavy (under which the airships came) had 65 Zeppelins and 13 others-78 in all, of which 72 saw service. There was only one (the L2) on the outbreak of war. 26 were destroyed by enemy action, 14 by bad weather and 12 through fire, explosions, etc. Of these fifty-two, 28 were destroyed with all hands. On Armistice day only seven remained in commission (p. 218).

Looked a t as a war episode the author tells his tale clearly and well- without bombast or abuse, and with a cheery style which is refreshing.

The various incidents are all well set out ; only once does he show personal animosity, and that is in the case of the trawler King Stephen which declined to rescue a shipwrecked Zeppelin crew. Happily the translator also supplies the official Admiralty tale, which puts the matter in quite a different light (p. 168).

His experiences were packed with excitement. Encounters with anti- aircraft guns, with bad weather, with a British minelayer, with some decoy fishing craft and with British aeroplanes are well told, as are the accounts of his frequent desperate situations and how he overcame them.

There is an interesting account of the flight of a Zeppelin to East Africa, of the catastrophe to the airship base-when six Zeppelins were destroyed-and finally of a brilliantly successful attack on the author's own airship and another one in their sheds by British aeroplanes.

Altogether (except for its raison d' i tre) an interesting book, well worth reading.

"LETTERS AND PAPERS RELATING TO THE FIRST DUTCH WAR," 1652-1654. VOL. VI.

Edited by C. T. ATKINSON.

(The Navy Records Society, 1931, Vol. LXVI.)

TO-DAY the young naval officer is being more and more strongly urged to interest himself in strategy, and to gather knowledge on this subject. I t is admitted that only from the study of naval warfare can this k n o ~ - ledge be obtained. By war alone does the unreality of hypothetical problem become actual fact, and shows the best method to be adopted under varying circumstances and conditions. The three Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century provide the least complicated material for this study, as the strategical problems therein involved are most clearly shown. I t follows that an authoritative work on the Dutch wars is of value and interest.

The book can be divided into two parts. The first, the introduction to the last phase of the war, with the letters and correspondence covering the period. The second, the editor's general conclusions on the whole war, and a very useful index for the six volumes. The period dealt with covers the last nine months of the war. The action com- mences with the resumption of the blockade of the Dutch ports, which had been interrupted by the damage resultant on the battle of the Texel, the last battle of the war. Though there are, necessarily, no fleet actions to be described, yet there is much of real interest and importance in the book.

There is very definite evidence that the English had at this period grasped the essential principle that anything which weakens the effort made to destroy the enemy fleet must lead to failure. I t will be remembered that the object of the war was to exhaust the enemy resources, that both sides were trying to obtain that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive. At the start the English had made several attempts to strike directly at Dutch trade without taking into account the enemy battlefleet. This policy had led to disaster, culminating in the crushing defeat off Dungeness. With nothing in the past to teach them, the English were finding by experiment what was the true policy. A special committee was appointed to investigate the causes of the failure and, consequent on this inquiry, Monck was appointed as General-at-Sea, and the strategy of the English changed. The effect of this change was shown at the battles of the Gabbard and the Texel, the only decisive English victories of the war. When the faulty English strategy was rectified, the inferiority of the Dutch as an organised fighting force became at once apparent.

There were, before the publication of this volume, several indications of this change of strategy, but these papers add a new, interesting and imprtant piece of evidence to the rather slender stock. We find that the English had decided not to keep the battle fleet at sea throughout the winter, but to maintain command by frigates supported, when necessary,by the big ships. The Dutch, copying this new idea, decided that : " in their opinion the same thing would be advantageous also on their side with a view of avoiding the danger of losing a number of ships without probably getting one opportunity of seriously engaging the enemy." Thus we can be quite certain that both sides had by now fully realised the importance of making the armed force of the enemy " the corner stone of all combinations."

The letters also show that this idea was extended at the time and fully developed later by Howe into his famous system of " Open Block- ade." The Channel and the North Sea were systematically patrclled by cruisers, whilst the main body at St. Helens was ready to go to sea immediately, " should the wind go into the east, for the better intercepting of any ships that wind may bring from the coast of Holland." This patrolling was very efficiently organised and carried out, both in the Channel, where many French privateers were captured, and in the North Sea, where Dutch trade was so severely harassed that they were forced temporarily to give up the convoy system and to let their merchantmen come and go as best they might, rather than to give their enemy the chance of capturing a large number of ships in a single effort.

On the other hand English trade was thoroughly protected : supplies of ammunition and timber from the Baltic, heretofore much harassed by the Dutch, began to come in regularly : the Newcastle colliers were able to sail securely. In fact, English trade was increasing above normal as that of the Dutch was declining.

The situation which obtained at the close of the war emphasises the truth of the statement that : " . . . it is not the taking of convoys, be they few or many, which strikes down the money power of a nation." Thus had the English started the war. Their sporadic attack on trade was not related to battle with the enemy fleets. The war closed with a determination to overthrow the enemy powers of resistance, his fleet. This done, the English were able to " close the highway by which commerce moves " and so to exhaust the Dutch.

It is impossible to form an estimate of the correctness of a certain strategy, by whatever standard it is to be compared, unless the com- parative administrative efficiency of the two belligerents can be arrived at. This book gives plenty of details under all headings ; in fact, the greater part of it deals with administrative problems. At this late stage in the proceedings it was only to be expected that both sides would have considerable difficulty in manning their ships. Carpenters and other skilled artisans were not forthcoming in anything like large enough numbers. The general state of health of both fleets seems to have been low, particularly that of the Dutch. On the English side one reads of the " Cocke being a noisesome, sickly ship which was verv loathesome." Chirurgiens were far too scarce, and the sick when ashore had, in some cases, to be quartered in " tippling houses " to their great detriment.

Besides lack of suitable seamen to man the fleet, there are records of complaints as to the quality of recruits enlisted and pressed : " old men and boys." Difficulties of obtaining supplies of hemp and timber, a shortage of pitch, these and heaps of other things, show some of the difficulties with which the Commissioners of the Navy had to contend.

There are many orders of a disciplinary nature which are of interest. " For the future prevention of abuses, and those sad events which have lately happened by irresistible fire to several vessels it is strictly ordered as follows . . . that no person presume (after the watch is set) to keep any candles lighted between decks except such as are necessary to the ship's use and these to be carried in lanthorns only. That no tobacco be taken between decks. That no strong water or any other strong drink be sold in any vessel of the Service. . . . " The "Additional Articles of War," and the further instructions issued by the Generals- at-Sea, show that experience was teaching us the importance of a care-

fully thought out fighting organisation. Another order states that, should private ships again be taken for the further use of the Common- wealth, the authorities will appoint the captains. During the early stages of the war, the English commanders had often attributed their defeats to the cowardice or cupidity of the owner-captains who " would not risk to engage their ships closely." This ordinance substantiates these statements, and so clears up a point which up to now has been open to debate.

It is clear that great efforts were made to remedy evils and abuses, producing among other things the instructions " for considering and giving relief unto sick and wounded men in the service of the Commonwealth, and to widows, children and impoverished parents, and also for the ordering of prisoners in war." For this work a sub-committee was formed to work under the Navy Commissioners. The difficulties which confronted the English seem very small when compared with those under which the Dutch laboured. These letters show with graphic clearness how truly the English blockade was strangling the life of Holland. 'i . . . now that matters have reached a climax. . . . >, " . . . The burden that is at present crushing us. . . . ,I " . . . There is nothing to look forward for but that the glory of this country on the seas will be untimely overturned and extinguished." Even when at sea the Dutch sailors drank water and got but two meals a day-a serious thing when they were so terribly undermanned that one man had to do two men's share of work, and when they knew that their enemies drank beer. The sailors had not been paid for months, and the lack of stores made it quite impossible to refit the fleet after the great storm overtook a large number of De Witte's ships.

Peace, which was a relief to the English, was a necessity to the Dutch. They could do no more.

This picture of Holland beaten to her knees should be taken to heart by those champions of President Wilson's second point, who, to quote Admiral Richmond " agree to sell their birthright for a mess of pottage." In a few short years the greatest trading nation in the world and one of the most wealthy was so reduced that " The Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts." " The country was full of beggars, grass grew in the streets, there was nothing to raise credit on." These things were the result of the most humane form of war possible-a war that the non- combatant cannot see, a form of war that defiles no territory, nor yet threatens women or children. It is true that it is not applicable in every instance ; it is in most. To-day it could be more powerful than ever, as all nations have grown less self-supporting. Peace still needs the backing up of coercion, either economic, or bullets, bayonets and bombs.

There is little doubt that the opinion of the able men who alone are qualified to judge is decided and clear. Security and peace cannot be gained by promises or gestures ; they must spring from universal brotherly love, which takes into account neither nation nor colour-so Utopian a hope as to be ridiculous. But peace can be maintained by wholesome fear and respect for a police force, ready not to threaten indiscriminate murder and ruin, by bombs or invasion, but to employ economic pressure. It is surprising that the short sighted and incompetent idealists of peace should not have studied " forms of war," and, having first ruled out of court the barbarous methods of fighting, have left intact the " Freedom of the Seas " question. For it is on the high seas, the great highway by which commerce moves, that lies the future hope of civilisation.

In the second part of his introduction, The general conclusions, the editor has gathered together all the important points concerning the war, discussed them briefly, and pointed out references suitable for further enquiry. I do not think that any other work exists capable of giving at one time a summary of the war and detailed information on any particular event or series of events. Naturally, the references concern the six Navy Records Society Volumes; very few cross references are made, yet hardly a thing of importance or of interest has been omitted. The letters take one back into the past, and, being free from any construction put on them by historians with theories to develop, they leave the reader to form his own conclusions, they encourage thought and clear up points which have hitherto been doubtful.

In exposing the real power of England the editor shows how much the well disciplined Commonwealth Navy counted for. The Dutch, on the other hand, were not a military nation ; theirs was not the spirit that animated the " New Model." Staunch fighters as they were, they were no match for the English fleet when it was properly led. The English trade, though expanding, was not so large as to be of vital importance ; there was no essential necessity for it, so that any stoppage of this would not be very serious. But to the Dutch trade was their very existence, and even a partial interruption was a matter of the gravest concern. The strategical position of England flanking both the Channel and North Sea trade routes was a tremendous advantage. Even after Dungeness the Dutch could only menace and impede our trade ; they could not stop it entirely, as we did theirs after the Texel.

One point-an important one, I think-the introduction does not bring out. The Dutch sea organisation before contact was made was greatly superior to that of the English. Their scouting and patrolling was of a very high order. Tromp's Journal for the year 1639, shows this. I t will be remembered that Monck himself, by far the ablest of

our admirals, was within a few miles of Tromp's fleet on May 4/14> 1653, but did not know it, though Tromp knew all about the movements of the English fleet1. But he was then in no position to fight ; instead, he drew Monck well to the northward, and so allowed the Dutch outward bound convoy to sail away in safety, re-united the separated Dutch fleets and fought the battle of the Gabbard. He had postponed battle until the most propitious moment to fight, and it was only owing to his very sound scouting system that he was able to do this. The systematic cruiser work of the English seems to have been the result of Dutch example, but it is more than probable that no one thought of applying the idea to obtaining accurate intelligence once the battlefleets were a t sea. Probably the necessary dispersal of ships for scouting could not be countenanced as it would weaken the battlefleets, and so sin against the " concentration school " of which Monck was so successful an adherent.

The editor's remarks on Tromp's difficulties in May, 1652, are of the greatest interest, though debateable. Tromp, the commander who realised above all others the importance of concentration and of destroying the enemy fleets, was sent westward with the dual objective of destroying the enemy fleet2, and of escorting through the Channel a large outward bound convoy, bringing back a second convoy escorted by some warships. On his outward voyage Tromp defeated the English fleet off Dungeness, but was unable to destroy it as he had hoped to do. Even if Tromp, saddled with this difficult dual objective, had momentarily placed the neutralisation of the enemy fleet second to the shepherding of his convoys, the fault lay more with his orders than with the admiral. The conclusions of the editor imply that Tromp, rather against his will, did subordinate the seeking out of the enemy fleet to his escort duties. Tromp, however, remained watching the English fleet for three weeks after his victory, seeking the opportunity for finishing the work started off Dungeness. He even went so far as to discuss a raid on enemy ships lying in the Thames ; this was decided against in council on account of the navigational difficulties and dangers. Meanwhile, the English fleet was refitting and increasing in size ; Tromp asked for reinforcements but none were forthcoming. The homeward bound convoy could no longer be delayed in sailing from the Ile de Re. If Tromp had remained in mid-Channel the English could have t.imed their attack to deal with his fleet, or with the convoy and escort separately. He was in no position to fight a fresh and augmented English fleet under conditions of the enemy's choosing. He kept the initiative, and, to keep his forces con-

" The First Dutch War," Volume V, pages 5 and 129. " The First Dutch War," Volume 111, pages 22 and 69.

centrated, sailed to the west and brought the homecoming convoy and warships back with him. Thus he brought the greatest possible force to bear at the decisive point. Tromp had the enemy fleet in mind the whole time. He never lost sight of the necessity for the second battle, but did all he could to ensure success ; he concentrated and placed his battlefleet where the enemy was most likely to be met ; that is alongside his convoy. In reviewing this episode Admiral Custance quotes it as the " outstanding example "3 of correct strategical insight.

I t is also somewhat surprising to find excuses being made for the Englisli strategy at the opening of the war. The division of the fleet, Blake with 16 ships sent down to the Shetlands, Ayscue with 7-9 left in the Downs. Both were ordered to attack Dutch trade4. No mention was made of Tromp's fleet. The Dutch, on the contrary, were directly ordered to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet5. I t was the most cruel of ill luck that the two storms robbed Tromp of what might have been a repetition of his magnificent exploit of 1639. Still, there is no doubt that these points are disputable.

These six volumes on " The First Dutch War " are so well edited, contain so much new material and are so authoritative that they are really the standard work for this period.

hl. F BRUCE WARD.

"THE BUNG PAPERS." VOLUME 11. Selected from the Letters and Papers of ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE BYNG, First Viscount Torrington and of his son ADMIRAL THE HON. JOHN BYNG.

Edited by BRIAN TUNSTALL.

(The Navy Records Society, 1931. Vol. LXVIII.)

THIS is the second volume (out of seemingly three), and in it is continued the publication of the Ryng Letters, of which the first volume has already been reviewed in our last issue.

The letters still continue to be those of the first Viscount. They are divided into six sections :-

I.--The intended invasion of Scotland, 1708. 11.-Personal correspondence, 1708.

111.-Combined operations in home water, 1708. 1V.-Voyage to Lisbon with the Queen of Portugal, 1708.

3 "A Study of War," page 66. 4 " The First Dutch War," Volume I, pages 302-3. 3 '' The First Dutch War," Volume I, page 32j.

V.-Exploiting the capture of Port Mahon. V1.-Mediterranean operations, 1709.

Of these the first and fifth sections are likely to prove most interesting to the general public, though Part I11 contains much that will be of interest and value to the student of joint naval and military operations.

The story of the Jacobite raid of 1708 is one that is well worth re- telling. I t is somewhat of a coincidence that in it we have an account of an affair which from another point of view is told in " Sea Wolves of the Channel ", a book which is also reviewed in this number.

The French fleet which was collected a t Dunkirk was largely reinforced from the privateer squadrons of that port.a We find the same personalities amongst the naval leaders in the two accounts. We meet with Fourbin and Duguay Trouin, the last appearing under such strange guise as Du Gue, du Guay, De Guy, etc.

The story of the raid, as unfolded in these letters, will have a particular interest to the very large body of naval officers whose sphere of action during the late war was in and about the Firth of Forth ; and it will no doubt afford amusement to many to draw comparisons between the methods of warfare in 1708 and 1914.

Byng in 1708 had recently been advanced to the rank of Admiral of the Blue. He was 45 years of age, we are told ; " Death and disgrace had swept almost all professional rivals from his path." "Apart from Sir John Leake, the senior officer on the active list, he was now the most considerable man in the Navy " (p. vii.)

He was here to be tested in a manner which, for the moment at least, seems to have shaken his popularity and repute. This was not from any insufficiency on his part, but rather because his failure seemed to fit in too well with the designs of others in high places. Byng was by some censured for having refused to adopt the rather impractical advice of his juniors in high command that he should prevent the sailing of the French fleet by sinking " some old ships with stones and ballast in the harbour of Dunkirk."

The pilots, who were surely the best authorities, gave as their considered opinion (p. 126) " That the stopping up the channels which lead into Dunkirk will be of little use and service, for the ships of that place will be able notwithstanding to come out over the sands a t high water on a Spring tide."

When the French fleet, having managed to evade Byng in the ChanneI, a t length reached the coast of Scotland theymade their land fall too far to the north. We have reports of their arrival on the coast from the local authorities at Aberdeen and Crail. They appear to have treated the locals with consideration, but they were evidently much disappointed

with the warmth of their reception. They believed that the unpopularity of the Act of Union had brought about a far more general revival of Jacobite feeling than was actually the case. The troops they had brought with them were but a bare 5,000.

The Royal claimant does not appear to have had that in his personality which, in 1746, was to prove such an asset to the cause of the young Pretender, the Chevalier Prince Charles Edward. We are told that the Old Pretender " was a tall, slight young man-pale smooth face, with a blue feather in his hat and a star on his cloak. He was cheered when the expedition started, but people were very mute at his coming back." " He had but recently recovered from an attack of measles and he was sea sick the whole voyage " (pp. 133 and xiv.)

When the two fleets did at length get in touch with one another on the 12th March, we find the British Fleet at anchor for the night three leagues to the south of the Isle of May. An officer was sent ashore to obtain intelligence (a lighthouse is mentioned). They were quite unaware that the French fleet was anchored just to the north of the island. Next morning the fleets were visible to each other and Byng crowded on sail and chased to the north. Fourbin finding the British fleet in superior force, made good his escape. His ships being clean and chosen in the main for speed were able to show a superior rate of sailing, with the exception of one bearing the English sounding name of " Salisbury " which became a prize with important Jacobite prisoners on board (pp. g and 10).

The charges against Byng, which never seem to have been officially formulated, were as follows (pp. xi.-xii.) :-

I.-He allowed Fourbin's expedition to put to sea and reach Scotland.

11.-He neglected to block up the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour by sinking ships in the fairway, as recommended to him by Lord Godolphin.

111.-He neglected to bring the French fleet properly to action off the coast of Scotland.

None of these charges seem to have been justified by the facts as shown in these letters, some of which bear the appearance of having been collected with a view to rebutting these charges, if made. His fleet was undoubtedly foul from long periods out of dock, and was collected hurriedly to meet an emergency. Those who were perhaps best able to judge what he had done in the way of averting disaster, namely the Burgesses of Edinburgh, voted him the freedom of that ancient capital. One may perhaps sum up by saying that the passage of time has vindicated Byng's memory, and the matter need hardly have been referred to, except that the 18th century biographer of Sir John Leake has accused him of permitting

the Pretender to escape on private instructions from Queen Anne. The commentator remarks that the Pretender would certainly have been an embarrassing prisoner.

There are a few points in the other portions of this volume which may be singled out as being of peculiar interest ; for example, in Part IV. I t may seem strange that it was necessary for a British fleet to escort a Queen of Portugal to her own country. We are told in the introduction (p. xxi.) :--" The new King of Portugal, John V, who succeeded in 1706, had married a daughter of the Emperor Joseph I , and it was therefore a matter of some difficulty and importance to get her to Lisbon without being captured by the French privateers which infested both the Channel and the Mediterranean."

In Part V (p. 327) we learn that the capture of Port Mahon was of far less importance in 1709 than it would have been in 1704-1707. " Toulon was impregnable, the fighting in Spain was becoming de- sultory and lifeless, and the only grand advantage to be reaped instantly was the control of trade." This, however, appears to have been considerable, and for many years we derived great benefit from holding this position, nominally on behalf of King Charles 111 of Spain, but really for our own advantage.

One of the letters of this series refers to the Court Martial on a certain Lieutenant. Mr. Relcham, and its facts, as put before us most naively, throw curious side lights upon the naval conditions of those days, some of which seem to have been almost incredible. That officers were excused when off duty even when drinking to very great excess may have been in accord with social conditions of the time and the canons of the Service, but it is strange that a captain-however poor a creature he may have been- should write in an official report to his senior (p. 311) :-" Mr. Belcham returned with threatening and shaking his long-Glass said he should some time meet me (as I understood him) ashore and then he would do himself Justice, and it was spoke with such a provoking air and publicly before the ship's company that I told him he should have taken another time and place, not in service, to have threatened me thus." Such an attitude would seem to have made discipline impossible.

In the same letter we get a curious insight into the working of sweeps, which seem to have been thrown overboard with lanyards upon the ship coming into action : " fearing (we) should lose our oars had ordered the people to thrust them out with lanyards on the starbd. side."

The volume contains a portrait of Admiral Sir George Byng after Sir Godfrey Kneller, which, however, does not suggest that artist at his best level. The book, as a whole, is fully worthy of the standing Series-

a very high one, as all acquainted with the publications of the Navy Records Society will admit.

One may, in conclusion, quote that the introduction ends with the following statement : "This volume will be the first . . . . for eighteen years which has not been edited or supervised by Mr. W. G. Perrin and I take this opportunity of paying my tribute to him as a friend, a mentor and a national figure."

a NELSON." By CLENNELL WILKINSON. (Harrap. 12s. 6d.)

THERE are some ninety volumes of Nelson papers in the British Museum, and according to the museum catalogue very few of them-much less than half-have been consulted by the writers of lives of Nelson. I t is, therefore, hard to believe that Mr. Wilkinson is right when he says it is impossible to say anything new about our greatest admiral ; nor is it fair to look upon his book as a work of reference, or as a critical and detailed study of the Navy and naval war in Nelson's time. Mr. Wilkin- son's object was to write his life in the " modern way " for the " modern reader " ; he thinks his hero should be a favourite subject with English writers. And very good reading this book makes, though one may feel bored sometimes with its pretence of an intimate knowledge of sailors and their ways (he thinks us a queer lot), with its persistent use of the phrase " on " a ship and of that horrid word " middy" for midshipman. The person who jibs at Mahan or Sichel1 will find here what he really wants : a very interesting, fair, and on the whole convincing, picture of Nclson's character in three hundred pages.

The book brings out Nelson's great qualities very well : his thorough- ness and zeal, his long views, his readiness to take responsibility and to stand by what he believed to be right ; above all his extraordinary influence over his fellow men, which stands out on nearly every page. At the same time Mr. Wilkinson does not flinch from discussing his hero's foibles, his vanity and love of flattery, his hatred of criticism. We are told not to take the great man " too desperately seriously " ; and a little thought shows this somewhat unexpected advice to be really very wise. The value of Nelson's life and example as a living inspiration to the service suffers far more from a blind and unreflecting admiration, from too much of the idea that he was perfect and there was no one like him, than from any amount of mere scurrilous misrepresentation.

Mr. Walter Sichel wrote the standard life of Lady Hamilton.

826 " MUSTAPHA KEMAL."

The events in the Admiral's career at sea are told in an easy, flowing style that is pleasant to rcad and gives a good general idea of his story ; but one is not always sure how far to trust the writer's judgement orhis comments on men like Hotham, Hyde Parker, and the Cornwallis brothers : for instance, the remark that Lord Cornwallis " was distinguished only for having lost North America " makes one a little suspicious.

Mr. Wilkinson is a t his best on the purely personal side ; the nature of the man interests him more than his deeds. The story of Nelson and Lady Hamilton is particularly good. I have not read another account of this important incident in the Admiral's life so fair to Lady Hamilton and to Lady Nelson as well. As a rule, either Lady Nelson is dismissed as the wrong sort of woman to be a hero's wife, to put it at its kindest, or Lady Hamiltoil is looked on as nothing more than a partner in a shameful intrigue. Mr. Wilkinson goes into the matter in detail, and treats it with sympathy, judgement, and understanding; he shows that the affair was too complicated to be lightly explained away, and he is fair and charitable to everyone, including the often forgotten Sir William Hamilton.

Upon the whole, this book is to be recommended as an excellent study of our greatest sea officer. The strictures-or the cautions-I have ventured to offer are meant to point out that it is not the last word, and that a great part of the life of Nelson lies outside its writer's province.

" MUSTAPHA KEMAL."

Ry DACOBERT VON MIICUSCH. Trans. from the German by JOI-IN LINTON (Heinemann, 12s. 6d.)

THE author is a German friend of the Turkish Dictator, and he tells the story-naturally with considerable anti-British bias-of his youth and his rapid rise in the Army.

He traces out the prominent part taken by Mustapha Kemal in the Young Turk movement and shows how he came into sharp conflict with Enver I'asha : the two were rivals and, up to the Armistice, Enver succeeded in keeping his adversary down: but with the collapse of Turkey and Enver's disappearance Kemal came into his own, and rose to world-prominence.

There is an interesting sidelight on the passage of Goeben and Breslau through the Dardanelles : it seems that permission was granted in a

few words from Enver, the Minister of War, with no reference to any higher authority (p. 131).

It is the later part of the book that will appeal chiefly to the naval reader. In the Dardanelles campaign it was our August landing at Suvla Bay which gave Kemal his first chance. The book tells graphically of the first success of the landing, and the gaining of the heights overlooking the Straits by our men. " The key position of the peninsula is in their hands. Beneath them the plain stretches out, and before their eyes for the first and only time is their longed-for goal-the blue arm of the Dardanelles . . . . And then by an inexplicable blunder, a broadside from the English battleships pours into their own ranks1 Many of them fall ; the rest waver and then fall back. But these few minutes are long enough to allow the Turks to rush forward and scramble up the slopes : and they now establish themselves firmly on the summit " (p. 142). Whence that disastrous salvo came will probably never now be known, but it was, in fact, the death knell of our attempt. The author tells us that it was the supineness of the Turks in allowing our troops to gain the crest which brought about the appointment of Mustapha Kemal to command the entire group of Turkish forces in that area.

Kemal's last act of the war was to round up the few Divisions left of the Turkish army after Allenby's sweep north to Aleppo. He established a line immediately South of the mountain range of the frontier of Asia Minor, and it is that line which forms the frontier of the Turkey of the present day (p. 167).

Then came the armistice. The author very severely criticises the Allies for the leniency of the terms. " It was true the entire fleet had to be handed over,2 but the land forces were dealt with very leniently. There was no mention made of disarming and disbanding the armies, or of giving up munitions, as is usual in capitulations of this kind " (p. 170). This the author ascribes (quite erroneously) to the Machiavellian policy of England, who " wished to keep themselves free to utilise Turkey as a factor not yet completely eliminated, when they came to oppose the undesirable claims of their allies."

Turkey now lay at the feet of the Allies, and it only remained for the latter to impose terms of peace which, however severe, she would have had to accept, had they been forthcoming promptly.

But delay and friction occurred, coupled with two cardinal blunders in May, 1919. One was the decision of the Supreme Council in Paris, against the advice of everyone, to despatch a Greek force to Smyrna to keep order; but where as a matter of fact the Vali, working in close

See "The Dardanelles," by Major-Gen. Sir C. E. Caldwell, pp. 205-6. This is not quite correct. The ships were to besurrendered and interned in a Turkish

port.-HON. ED.

touch with the British Senior Naval Officer on the spot and the High Commissioners at Constantinople, had the situation well in hand : the second blunder was committed by the Turkish Government in sending Mustapha Kemal to Anatolia " where the Armenians, Turks and Kurds stoods snarling at one another " to restore order, instead of keeping him under their hand in Constantinople.

" The Smyrna blunder," says the author, " . . . . supplied him (Kemal) with the best means of raising a population that was still paralysed, and of fostering rapid growth in the germinal cells of national resistance."

How well he succeeded this book clearly sets out : the tale is well told without undue exaggeration, and affords a most interesting study in personality. For this man accomplished a well-nigh incredible task. In a country beaten to its knees, its capital dominated by the victors, its rulers-the Sultan and the Grand Vizier-bitterly hostile to him, and with an execrated Greek army desecrating its soil, he resurrected Turkey, ejected the Greeks, and finally compelled the retirement of the victorious Allies.

The story is too well known to need repetition here. " With the disappearance of the Greek army from Asia Minor, the Allies found themselves directly face to face with a victorious Turkey. . . . The Greeks had carried out their retreat with amazing swiftness. . . . The sea now lay between them and the Turks and there was only one single passage across -the narrow strait that stretched from the Bosporus past Constantinople to the Dardanelles " (p. 318). The strategic point of the crossing lay at Chanak, and here the Allies sent troops and ships to bar the way. But, for reasons which are best left undiscussed, France and Italy withdrew their forces, and Mustapha Kemal found himself face to face with England. The Mudania Conference followed. Turkey demanded the Greek evacuation of Eastern Thrace and the withdrawal of the Allies from Constantinople. To the first demand General Harington assented : the second demand he refused.

" Ismet Pasha transmitted the reply to Angora, where Mustapha Kemal was awaiting it. He realised immediately that the prestige of Britain was now involved. To tamper with that would be more dangerous than all his inflexible persistence : . . . the decision came from Angora : " Accept ! " The tension was relaxed. . . England . . . had once more assumed the leadership in the Orient, which for a short time had passed to France " (p. 323) .

And the book ends with these words : " The figure of Mustapha Kemal stands at the point in the history of

Europe and Asia, where the pendulum begins its return swing. He

" MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920." 829

brought the apparently irresistible forward march of the West to a stand at the place where the greatest danger lay-the point where both continents are in contact. . . . There was a moment when it looked as if England were destined to complete her conquest of the Near East. She had already laid her hands on the five seas-the Caspian, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, with its outlet to the Indian Ocean. She had thus command of the connections with the East on land and on sea and had incorporated Anterior and Central Asia in her sphere of power. Sakaria and the Peace of Lausanne brought these far-seeing designs to an end, at least in the North. Turkey bolted the door against her " (p. 375).

It may be said with some truth that Mustapha Kemal has stood between England and her destiny so far as the Near East is concerned. But other matters, nearer home, are demanding her attention; and it may be that things have worked out for the best. Be that as it may, the humiliation suffered by England after the victorious campaigns of Allenby and Maude will live long in many memories, and not least in the memory of those directly in touch with the events of the Turkish Armistice. And the cause of that humiliation was the Ghazi Pasha, Mustapha Kemal.

" MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-~gzo." A CLASH O F LOYALTIES. A PERSONAL AND HISTORICAL RECORD.

By LIEUT.-COL. SIR ARNOLD T. WILSON, K.c.I.E., c.s.I., c.M.G., D.S.O. Formerly Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, etc., etc.

(Milford. 2 5s.)

OF all difficult tasks, that of turning over a duty is often the most difficult, even when the same routine has to be carried out. This is the history of the turning over of the government of Iraq from a Military to a Civil control, a transfer made all the more difficult because " Those in Authority at Home " did not know what they wanted, and so could not make decisions.

There was delay in deciding who was to control Iraq, as to what was to be the nature of the control, and how the control was to be enforced. This delay gave time for malcontents, both in Iraq and in Syria, to make trouble. There was an inability for " Those " to grasp that Iraq was not Arabia ; that what might seem excellent for Mecca did not suit Kerbala ; that there were many who would far rather be ill-governed, and let alone, by the Turk, than be efficiently governed, and supervised by the British. Last there was distrust of our willingness or power to face trouble stirred up at our instigation.

830 " MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920."

The book opens with an account of the defeat of the Turkish Army on the Upper Euphrates, of the terms made, on the spot, with the defeated General, and of the declaration to occupy the Mosul Territory.

Next comes an account of the advance to the Caspian and of the doings of Dunsterforce. We are given one very definite piece of information : that the object of the dispatch of Dunsterforce was to prevent supplies, especially oil from Baku, reaching the Central Powers. When the strength of the armed forces actually available at Baku are considered the virtual impossibility of effecting this object will be seen. The supply of oil from Baku could be stopped by a control either of production, or of the sea transport over the Caspian and Black Seas.

There was a drastic alternative : to destroy the oil wells and refining plant, and " Those " did order it. How it was to be done, or what the attitude of the owners and workers at Baku might be, seems to have been neglected. In the long run the supply of oil from Baku was controlled by the Royal Navy, who occupied and controlled the sea routes.

The history of Dunsterforce has been written : with the publication of the final volume of the Official History of the War-Naval Operations -it seems likely that the work of the Royal Navy in the Caspian will remain unknown. Yet it is thought that had that force been maintained, and the control of the Caspian Sea retained in British hands, those in Iraq would have been spared the anxiety of the Bolshevic Invasion of Persia in 1920.

We come back to Iraq, and read of the development of local resources made necessary by the increase in the numbers of the Army, and the shortage of shipping. Comment is made of the use of imported coal instead of local oil. Conversion from coal to oil-burning takes time and labour : coal can be dumped anywhere, oil cannot. The Admiralty are criticised for placing on the A.P.O.C. the burden of the construction of the River gunboats : with the many demands of the fleet it is hard to see how men and machinery could have been spared from England.

With the growth of the organisation of local resources came the spreading of a Civil Administration-and the facing of troubles. The fact was that, though the Turkish Army had been defeated, there remained many who had yet to learn obedience, and to find the lesson a painful one, not the least being the priesthood. The arrival of a Political Officer with an Escort-a profession of submission. The reduction of the Armed Force-a brewing of trouble. The murder of the Political Officer-the despatch of a punitive expedition, is an oft told tale. Najaf had to be blockaded before the murder of Captain Marshall were dealt with. Kirkut, occupied in May '18, was evacuated- with the inevitable loss of prestige.

" MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920." 831

The conclusion of hostilities with Turkey brought new problems to " Those in Iraq," more people formed councils in Paris, and President Wilson took a hand. " Indigenous " Governments were to be formed for Syria and Iraq, but who were " the people," and who were to decide ? Again, why link Syria to Iraq ? There was no possibility of getting an agreed decision from the various classes in Iraq, and finally approval was given to the proposal for British Control under a High Commissioner. Sir Percy Cox was to be High Commissioner ; the idea of an Arab Amir was put aside. The situation was that of an Armistice-not a Peace- with Turkey ; an Armistice with Germany ; an unsubdued Mosul ; an unsatisfied Syria ; an un-determined Iraq. Mosul, with its oil, was to give as much trouble as the Kurds, who had seen us occupy-and evacuate -Kirkut. There were " incidents," four Political Officers were murdered : there were punitive expeditions-and we withdrew to Southern Kurdistan.

With the Armistice came demobilisation, and also a replacement of troops with war service by those with little or none. The many Experts were needed back in their own Services, in India and elsewhere, and the task of building up a Civil Administration was hard. First, as regards men ; the prospects in Iraq were not such as to attract the best. Next as regards money : the scale necessary for the supply and support of a large Army had meant the growth of Basra to a well equipped port, and the laying of railways. The revenue of Iraq could not meet this, but a start was made : a system of short time contracts for Civil Officers was introduced, and the Irrigation, Judicial and Educational Departments were organised.

On June 28th, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed, and another Council appeared : that of the League of Nations, and the suggestion of Mandates. I t was not yet certain who was to have the Mandate for Iraq. The idea of self government was stressed, but there was still the difficulty of getting any real agreed decision as to the form of government desired. A start was made with Divisional and Municipal Councils. Lord Inchcape liquidated a large part of the River Flotilla, but the Army declined to part with the control of their Lines of Communications. Even in December, 1919, there was no decision : we waited on the U.S.A., and the delay thus enforced gave time for the brewing of trouble.

The troubles were from Syria, whose self appointed Committees wanted the Mosul oil ; from the Turks ; from the priests ; from the lack of certainty as to our remaining. Who would declare for England with the risk of our evacuating ?

In May, 1920, Great Britain accepted the Mandate for Iraq. " Those at Home " said " now ask the people of Iraq how they would like to

832 " MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920."

be governed." " Those in Iraq " said " it is your duty to say what the form of Government shall be." " Those at Home " said they'd see about it. In June it was decided that Iraq was to be an Independent State, under a British Mandate ; an Elective Assembly was to be formed. Sir P. Cox was to be the Chief British Representative. It was too late, and, for the extremists, it was not enough ; the Insurrection in Meso- potaniia had started.

The chapter dealing with the Insurrection and its quelling is the least pleasing reading of the book. The Bolshevics had invaded Persia. There was a large camp of Army wives and children in Persia, beyond railhead. 50,000 refugees had to be fed, 14,000 prisoners and vast quantities of Military stores had to be guarded. Arms supplied, by the British in Palestine, were flooding into the Mosul area. The British troops were mostly new. General Haldane had a hard task, and 15,000 additional troops were needed before he won. Few men can ever have had a more thankless command, or have " cleared up the situation " more thoroughly. I t is of interest that three naval officers who chanced to be in Baghdad were given the duty of organising the Floating Defences, the " Fly " Gun Boats were nearly all out of use. Special note should be made of the gallant defence of " Greenfly."

By October the Insurrection was crushed, and a strict policy of disarming was enforced. The lesson-which it is thought had to come, however painful the teaching-had been learned by most. I t was seen that, despite all the previous lack of decision, Great Britain could and would enforce the Mandate which she had accepted : the field was thus cleared for the Civil Administration to take control.

The last chapter is full of more than interest-almost pathetic humour. I t tells how-in the height of the insurrection-" Those at Home " asked what all the trouble was about. To few-very few-can such a chance of speaking one's mind to the Great Ones of Whitehall ever have come.

I t was taken. The reply told " Those " of the eighteen months of warnings; of

the delay in giving decisions ; of the agitation following on the Pub- lication of the " 14 points " ; of the reduction of the Armed Forces while the land was yet-really-unsubdued.

And so the book ends-the keys of the office are restored to Sir Percy Cox. A. T. Wilson-a man who had ever stood by his subordinates and gained their best services-had completed the " Turn Over."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

NAVAL.

BRASSEY'S NAVAL AND S H I P P I N G ANNUAL, 1931. (For continuation of neview see page 764.)

T H E SEA RAIDERS. By E . KEBLE CHATTERTON. (Hurlst & Blackett. 21s.) (For review see page 769.)

W I T H T H E H A R W I C H NAVAL FORCES, 1914-18. By COMMANDER C. L. A. WOOLLARD, R.N. (Published privately.) (For review see page 772.)

BEFORE JUTLAND. Admiral von Spee's Last Voyage. Coronel and the Battle of the Falklands. By CAPTAIN HANS POCKHAMMER, First Officer of the Gneisenau. Trans. from the German by H. J. STENNING. (Jarrolds. 128. 6d.) (For review see page 780.)

TWO LONE S H I P S . Goeben and Breslau. By GEORG I ~ O P P . Trans. from the German by A. CHAMBERS. (Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.) (For review see page 783.)

GALLANT GENTLEMEN. By E . KEBLE CHATTERTON. (Hurst 8r Blackett. 10s. 6d.) (For review see page 789.)

T H E LOG O F A U-BOAT COMMANDER or U-BOATS WESTWARD, 1914- I g r 8. By ERNEST HASHAGEN, Commander late Imperial German Navy. (Putnam. 10s. 6d.) (For review see page 791.)

T H E WAYS O F T H E NAVE'. By REAR ADMIRAL D. ARNOLD FORSTER, C.M.G. (Ward, 1,ock. 7s. 6d.) (For review see page 794.)

\I7OLVES O F T H E CHANNEL (1681-1856). By W. BRANCH JOHNSON. (Wishart. 15s.) (For levien- see page 796.)

PRIVATE MEN-OF-WAR. By C. W. KENDALL. (Allan. 15s.) This book, like " Wolves of the Channel," deals with privateers, and it

justly claims to be a comprehensive survey of privateering throughout the ages, enlivened with many tales of strange atdventure, and showing the attitude which British Law and Brdtish Monarohs have adopted towards it. (A full review will be given in the February Number.)

834 NOTICES OF BOOKS.

H.M.S. RODNEY. The Story of an Immortal Name. By INSTRUCTOR LIEUT.-COMMANDER C. R. BANSTEAD, R.N. (Sellicks, Plymouth. zs. 6d.) This handy little book has been written for the benefit of naval charities, and

was first on sale at Plymouth on the Rodney's bookstall during this year's Navy Week. The book forms a precedent which might well be followed in bhe Service ; for ships' histories are badly needed, and a complete series would be welcome both in the Service and for the information and instruction of outsiders.

The book divides into two parts : Chaptem One and Six deal with Rodney the man, his career, his actions and his subsequent treatment by an ungrateful aountry. Chapters Two to Five deal with the various ships that have borne his name, their careers, their armaments and the crews that sailed in ehem.

The author is to be warmly commended for the mass of information, historical, personal and material, which he has successfully cmpressed into so small a space.

FAMOUS SEA F I G H T S . From Salamis to Jutland. By JOHN RICHARD HALE. (Methuen. 7s. 6d.) This is a 1931 reprint d a book first published in 1911, and revised from

time to time. I t has now been brought up to date by the addition of chapters dealing with the naval events of the Great War, includ'ing the battles of Coronel, the Falklands and Jutland. The stories are brief, but they are well and clearly told, and the whale book makes an interasthg study of the culmination through the ages of all sea strategy-the Sea Battle.

STRANGE INTELLIGENCE. Memories of the Naval Secret Service. By HECTOR C. BYWATER and H. C. FERRABY. (Constable. 10s. 6d.) Much of the work of the Secret Service is, as the authors point out, hidden

away in official archives. But this book, which claims to be compiled solely from facts, tell~s a wonderful story of a very remarkable organizatian, and many incidents in connection with Naval Intelligence now see the light for the first time.

(A full review will be given in the February Number).

ENDLESS STORY. The Work of Destroyers in the War. By " TAFFRAIL "- CAPTAIN TAPRELL DORLING, D.S.O., R.N. (Hodder and Stoughton. ~ I S . ) This long, but intensely interesting, book does not pretend to be a compre-

hensive history of the work of the ,destroyers in the war ; but a popular account of what they did, by one n h o served in them. Four chapters are devoted to destroyers at Jutland, and others to the Battle of ithe Heligoland Bight, destroyer work at the Dardanelles, in the Dover Straits and at Zeebrugge. The author has included much of his own personal experience, and has collected many little- known incidents and rescues which do not figure in the Official History. Chap- ters are allso devoted to the German submarine campaign, the convoy system, mine laying from destroyers, the work of the Australian and American destroyers -indeed, every aspect of the destroyers' work during hostilities.

The book is fully indexed, and has a complete list of all the losses and their causes, together ~vith a nominal list of all flotilla-leaders and destroyers built, and in service, during the war. The sketch maps and diagrams of the various aatiorlis with which the book is liberally supplied are exceedingly clear and easy to follow; and, in addition, there are many pen-and-ink sketches of destroyers at work which are entirely in keeping with the general plan of the book.

(A full review will be given in the February Number).

NOTICES OF BOOKS. 835

NAUTICAL.

T H E PIRATE WIND. By OWEN RUTTER, F.R.G.S. (Hutchinson. 12s. 6d.) (For ievien see page 800.)

ENGLISH SEAMEN AND T H E COLONIZATION O F AMERICA. By E . I~EBLE CHATTERTON. (Arrowsmith. I 2s. 6d.) (For review see page 803.)

MY GREATEST ADVENTURE. By SIR MALCOLM CAMPBELL. (Thornton Butterworth. 6s.) (For review see page 807.)

T H E PACIFIC. By STANLEY ROGERS. (Hzrrap. 7s. 6d.) The author admits that he has covered a wide field and makes no pretence

at dealing fully with any one isubject therein. H e describes his r81e as that of a bird d passage, tarrying here and there for a while and passing on. H e gives us stories of navigators and privateers, glimpses of the innumerable islands, an account of the strange monoliths of Easter Island, tales of the old Pacific clipper ships, and of their 20th century successors. H e also deals with the literary Pacific, wherein naturally R . L. S. and Pierre Loti play a prominent part. H e follows this with a chapter on the language of the Pacific, and ends with same terrible tales of shipwrecks in that vast expanse of water. A book for casual reading rather than for close study.

LEAVES FROM AN U N W R I T T E N LOG-ROOIC. By CAPTAIN WALTER H . PARKER, C.B.E., R.D., R.N.R. Lately commanding the R.M.S. OLYMPIC. (Sampson Low. 12s. 6d.) Captain Parker has a good yarn to spin and he spins it well. Starting in

the old sailing ship days he worked hi~s way steadily up in his profession, mostly in the service of the P.S.N.C., the Orient and the R.M.S.P. , finishing in the White Star Line. His war experiences he describes as brief, but they were also very interesting. His first service was with the auxiliary patroh in the North Sea, passing thence to Commodore of Convoys, of which he gives a good description. The books gives the naval reader a good idea of the outlook and life of the merchant service officer as lived in a modern liner, and brings home the valst difference in the life and surroundings in the two Sea Services.

SAILING T H E SEAS. By E . REBLE CHATTERTON. (Chapman & Hall. 18s.) A brief but interesting survey of ships and seafaring canditions from the

time d the early Egyptians to the and of sailing ship days. I t is a very readable book and copiously illustrated.

SOUTH GEORGIA. By I.. HARRISON MATTHEWS. (Wright. 15s.) Few men of war now visit this island, but its history is an interesting one.

Formerly the centre of the greatest whaling industry in the world it is now the heatdquarters of an extremely prosperous sealing industry with, apparently, an assured future. The island is 30 miles wide and IOO miles long, and much of it has never jet been explored.

U N D E R T H E N O R T H POLE. The Wilkins-Ellsworth Submarine Expedition. By SIR HUBERT WILKINS. (Benn. 18s.) This book was written before the expedition to the Arotic ice started, the

purpose being to put on record the plan and equipment of the vessel for future


guidance. The vessel was the old U. S. Submarinei 0 . 1 2 condemned to be scrapped under the Washington Treaty, and specially fitted up for Arctic work.

Captain Wilkins, in reply to doubts as to how the vessel would fare if she encountered icebergs, pointed out that " there are no icebergs on the whole route from where we first meet the Arctic pack N o r ~ h of Spitzbergen to where we emerge from it North of Alaska, after having made the crossing by way of the North Pole." Nansen i s stated to have discovered that even several winters of freezing do not produce in the Arctic Sea any ice mlore than fourteen feet thick.

The vessel is fitted wibh hollow drills for cutting through the ice above, and so renewing its supply of air ; lit also has a diving chamber whence divers can be sent out to effect repairs.

The account of the actual voyage will be awaited with interest.

T H E DIARY O F P E T E R BUSSELL (1806-1814). Edited by his Great Grandson. (Davies. 10s. 6d.) This is the story of the master and part owner of a small trading cutter

which was captured in 1806 by a Frenah privateer in the Channel. Bussell was kept a prisoner until the accession of Louis X V I I I . in 1814, and the book is a record of his experiences. H e was subjected to many long marches and varying trfeatment-some kindness and a good deal of the reverse.

P IRATES, OLD AND NEW. By JOSEPH GOLLOMB. (Selwyn Sr Blount. 18s.) The book consists of eleven breathless tales of piracy ranging from the days

of Julius Czsar to those of modern steamships. All are founded on fact, though occasionally incorreot in detail, and the whole makes excellent reading, a.lbeit with somewhat of an American flavour.

MONS, ANZAC AND K U T . By AUBREY HERBERT. Introduction by DESMOND MACCARTHY. (Hutchinson. 3s. 6d.) (For ~eview see page 810.)

I N T H E ENEMY'S COUNTRY, 1915-1918. Hy JOSEPFI CROZIER (alias LIEUTENANT PIERRE DESGRANGES, of the 2nd Bureau lde 1' Etat-Major). Translated from the French by Forrest Wilson. (Hutchinson. 7s. 6d.) The book is chiefly of interest to naval readers for two reasons : first for

the light he throws on the capture of Captain Fryatt of bhe Brussels, due, as he alleges, to Fryatt 's rashness in exhibiting in Rotterdam the gold chronometer presented to him by the British Admiralty. H e [states that he warned the British authorities (p. 146) but whether that warning (if given) ever came through to the proper quarter in England is exceedingly doubtful.

The second point of interest is his experiences in connection with the blockade, and he lha~s some interesting stories to tell of the serious leakage of supplies from England itself into Germany : not for nothing did the neutrals hint th2t England was herself " a base of supplies for the enemy " !

CHARLTON. (Faber anid Faber. 10s. 6d.) The author describes himself as a military misfit. None the less, writing in

the third person, he has produced a very interesting book, distinguished for its frankness and self-revelation. Starting his career in the Army, he saw service in Crete, and later in South Africa, taking part in the action of Spion Kop, where


he gained his D.S.O. After varied experiences in the Cold Coast and elsewhere he transferred to the R. F.C. and served through the War in the Air Force, finally commanding a Brigade of the R.A.F. After the War he went as Air Attach6 to Washington and, as such, met the Renown, with H .R .H. the Prince of Wales onboard, when she passed through the Panama Canal, begging a passage in her to Honolulu. As a guest onboard his comunenbs might, perhaps, have been more happily expressed.

The book is an unusual one, and on the whole well worth reading.

B E H I N D T H E SCENES I N MANY WARS. Being the military reminis- . cences of LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, K. C.B., K. C. S. I . ,

D.S.O. (Murray. 15s.) The first part of the book is taken up with the author's service in India and

South Africa. The War found him Director of Remounts at the War Office, and he ha~s some interesting stories to tell of the inside working of that great institution. Then in July, 1915, he was sent out to the Dardanelles, and his descriptions of that campaign and the subsequent evacuation are well worth study. From there he passed to Mesopotamia, and he gives a vivid description of that arduouis campaign up to the final victorious end. H e returned to Mesopotamia after the war as C.in-C. passing from tihere to Q.M.G. in India. His Dardanelles chapter brings out nell the excellent co-operation between the two services, both on the peninsula and at the Mudros Base.

H I G H E R COM'MAND. By EDEL KOPPER. (Faber and Faber. 7s. 6d.) The book gives a good idea of the mentality of the average German soldier,

and is wribten with much vividness. " The change effected by the war on the artilleryman's character . . . . is even more terrible in contrast wibh the garbled news reports an'd the cheerful optimism of stay-at-home patriots. I n tone the book most resembles Her Privates W e , yet it contains a more explicit condemnation of the horrors of war." (Publishers' note.)

SOLDIER'S TESTAMENT. Seleoted Maxims of RENE QUINTON. Translated (from the French) with a critical introduction, by DOUGLAS JERROLD. (Eyre & Spottiswoode. 5s.) The general tenor of this little h k i s perhaps best expressed in some of

the writer's awn maxims, e . g . :-" Man is intended to die in his prime." " Man zs nothing but the servanf of the idea and voluntary death is the tribute which he pays. Ideas, not men, are the founders of races." " By death man saves the life of the world." The translator-who writas (the introduction-tells us that Quinton reached his conclusi~ns from what he saw in the war-in which he served with distinction. " The keystone of Quinton's thesis," says the translator, " is the doctrine that the end of life, for the mlale, is something beyond life, and that until this instinct to serve the race . . . . is dominant, man is not truly masculine, not truly mature."

The interest to be derived from a perusal of the maxims themselves will ~vell repay the time spent on them.

W H E N I BECAME A MAN. A private Memoir of two years oversea Service. By A. E. HORTON. 55121 M.G.C. (Houghton. 7s. 6d.) Out of the mlass d similar books which now adorn every bookseller's window

this may be selected as perhaps the best value for time and money. Coming of a pmr hardworking family the author did well at school, and when war came


he was a school teacher with a small family. H e joined up in 1916 as a Machine Gunner and [saw service first in the Salient and then in Italy. Both phases are recorded with clarity and interesting detail : perhaps the latter will be most closely studied, owing to our rel~ative lack af informbation of that theatre of the war. I t would seem that the trouble on the Italian front was largely fomented by agitation on the part of recruits from the United States who were extremely dissatisfied with their Italian pa!. As one soldier put~s it to the author : " Being an Italian conscript I am only paid Italian rates-seven lira a week. H a d I come over with the Americans I should have had ten lira a day and separation allowance. . . . Let them who get paid to fight, fight. I'm not going L- i > LO.

H e is an observant writer. and has much to say about the country behind bhe lines (" the land immortalized by Slhakespeare ") as well as the fighting areas. H e has high praise for British aircraft and Austrian artillery.

A T G.H.Q. By ~ R I G A D I E R GENERAL JOHN CHARTERIS. C.M.G., D.S.0. (Cassell. 12s. 6d.) A very clear and well-written account of Intelligence worlc at British

Headquarters in France. No short commentary on this book can do justice to it, and none will be attempted. But naval readers interested in the working of the higher commands in war-time in relation to the political direction of the war at hame are recommended to put this book on their bookshelves alongside Sir W. Robertson's " Soldiers and Statesmen," and study the two in parallel. 'rhe results will be interesting.

F O C H , T H E MAN O F ORLEANS. By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART. (Eyre & Spottiswoode. 2 IS.) All through his life Foch believed in the Voice which spoke to him of

ultimate success, just as the Voices spoke to Thz Maid. Hence the title. I t is doubtful whether, even yet, Foch's many-sided nature is truly under-

stood by those who reaped such immea~surable benefit fram his inspired leadership. This book brings out Foch in many aspects, but chiefly as a great co-ordinator of plans, even more than as a brilliant commander in the field. H e not only preached the principles of war; he practised them. And it was his relatively small number of mistakes, coupled with the loyal co-operation he received from Sir Douglas Haig and others, that made overwhelming victory possible.

AIR. - ARMADAS O F T H E AIR. The Problem of Armaments. By PAUL MURPHY.

(Houghton. 5s.) (For review see page 812.)

Z E P P E L I N S OVER ENGLAND. By FREIHERR TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR BRANDENFELS. Trans. by H. PATERSON. (Harrap. 8s. 6d.) (For review see page 814.)

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPI-IY.

L E T T E R S AND PAPERS R E L A T I N G T O T H E F I R S T DUTCH WAR, 1652-1654. Edited by C. T. ATKINSON. Vo1. VI . (The Navy Records Society. Vol. LXVI.) (For review- see page 81 5 . )


N E W E S T EUROPE. By MARTIN MACLAUGHLIN. (Longmans Green. 6s.) The tradition of the " splendid isolation " d this country from the rest

of Europe is a long time in dying. Since the war, however, and particularly in recent years, people have begun to realize that the prosperity of Great Britain is closely bound up with the politics and progress of other European nations. For this reasm, if for no other, Professor MacLaughlin's new book can be recammended to those readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW who wish to study international problems, for it contains a most clear and concise account of the histories and problems of the succes~sion states, as well as a brief survey of the politics and personalities of the greater powers.

Undoubtedly the best chapter in the book is that devoted to Italy. The story o'f the rise af Fascismo and its eventual triumph is of absorbing interest, and can be recommended to all thoise who are watching bhe progress of Mussolini's greet experiment.

Very little space is devoted to the Nazi movement in Germany, and apparently the author does not attach much importance to it. Yet should Herr Hitler and his followers get control of the Gerrnan government the whole peace of Europe will be imperilled.

The chapter on France gives a gmd picture of the situation there, as do bhose on Russia and the Baltic States and Poland.

The chapter on The Balkans well repays study b~ naval readens. " The Balkans," says the author " are still Europe's political voilcano." This may, in part, be due to the demoralizing influence of five centuries of Ottolman rule; but in any case the result is a group of states no one of which is on particularly friendly terms with its neighbour.

Greece, having abandoned Asia Minor to the Turk, is singled out as being the best off. Her tendencies are maritime, and so it is natural s(he should turn her back on the Balkans and look once more to the Mediterranean for her future. She has had terrible experiences since 1912, and they have left her exhausted: but ghe passesses in 31. Venizelos a statesman of a very high order; it is greatly to his credit that, following m the cardinal blunder of Smyrna in 1919, and his subsequent expulsion by his countrymen, he has once again taken the reins of office into his strong hands. But neither he nor Mustapha Kemal in Asia Minor can laat for ever, and with the passing of one or both of them the future of the Near East-and of the Dardanelles, with all that it implies to sea-power in the Mediterranean-is difficult to foresee.

I n spite of a wealth of detail crammed into its ZII pages, the information in the book is concisely set out in an attractive style, and ishould hold the interest, not only of the student of ont temporary history, but also of the reader who desires a general knowledge of E u r o ~ e a n politics.

THE ANGLO JAPANESE ALI.IANCE. By HUNG-FU CHANG, Ph.D. (Milford. 11s. 6d.) This bmk is written by a Chinese student of an American Univensity, but

it is singularl! free from bias and is drawn up with considerable skill. The author is evidently of a very painstaking character, and his bibliography on the subject, drawn from all nations and all sources--official and private-covers eight pages.

The indexing is well done, and the book as a whole is a very useful book of reference on the subject.

The author carefully traces all the events an,d happenings which led up to the Treaty, and it is interesting to know that, as originally planned, the Treaty


was a 3 Power one, the third party being Gemnany (pp. 74 and 80). The suggestion of an Anglo-German-Japanese pact originated, actually, from the German Colonial Secretary, Baron von Eckardstein, early in 1901. Ry 25th March the chief points were fixed, but further discussion showed it was impossible, and Germany dropped out.

Events then moved rapidly, and, on 30th Januarj , 1902, the Treaty was signed. The Russian Government naturally was greatly upset at thi~s diplomatic defeat, and clearly saw what it would lead to. She and France, her ally, drew up a counterblast, stating that they reserved to themselves the right to adopt contingent methods.

After tracing the effect of the Alliance on the Russo-Japanese war and the resultant situation, the author discusses verq clearly the causes of its termination. l ' As the alliance had been, since the making of the agreement in 1902, the foundation of Japanese foreign policy, Tokio naturally was anxious to continue the alliance with Great Britain. Rut in 1921 the relations between the United States and Japan were so unsatisfactory that it was impossible for Great Britain to continue her alliance with Japan without offending the United States. The situatioln at the time showed that it was impossible for Great Britain to have the friendship of both these countries at one and the same time.'' (p. 276.)

So the Alliance termir~ated, and, to save Japan's face, the Four-Power Treaty was signed on 13th December, 192r, by Great Britain, United States, France and Japan, by which each country pledged itself to respect the rights of one another in relation to their insular possessions in the Pacific. I t was also agreed in the Washington Naval Armament Treaty of 6th February, 1922, that the status quo in the Pacific (with certain exceptions) was to be maintained.

In discussi~lg the future, the author mentions the suggestion that " Tokio should seek support in a new direction from Russia anld Germany." But he puts his finger on the governing factor-Sea Power. " I t is extremely doubtful," he saqs, " whether Russia and Germany can, at present, render much service to Japan. The best ally of Japan is still Cheat Britain." (p. z?8.)

H e concludes by asserting that tihe future of the all~ance rests with the British Empire, whose attitude depend~s on its relations with bhe United States. l L The alliance was concluded first in 1902 to make a war possible; it was terminated by the Four-Power Treaty in Washington Conference. I t is safe to say that it will not be renewed unless a war is again decided upon-in this case, between Great Britain and the United States." (p. 281.)

T H E B R I T I S H E M P I R E . By D. C. SOMERVELL. (Christmophers. 12s. 6d.) I t would be difficult to find, compressed into a book of some 340 pages,

so much information concerning the British Empire as is clmprised in this volume. The book opens with a general sketch of the imperial policy of the Mother Country from the beginnings down to the end of the nineteenth century. Then follow chaptens on the various Dominions, India an8d the Colonies. I t concludes with a brief chapter on the Empire as a whole, the part it plajed in the great war and its place in the post-war world.

Every cihapter teems with useful matter set out in an easy style, all of which makes singularly pleasant reading.

T o analyse the book in detail would take too long, and wouId serve no useful purpose. I t i~s essentially a book of reference, equal care having been bestowed on each member of the great British family, and it can be confidently recommended to all who wish to keep before them in handy form a simple, clear and up-to-date guide to our great Empire.


Personally, the present writer always keeps a copy on his table with his Navy List and Whitaker's Almanac, and it would be hard to say which he refers to the mast often.

T H E E L E M E N T S O F IMPERIAIJ D E F E N C E . A study of the geographical features, material resources, cmmunications and arganisation of the British Empire. By A. G. BOYCOTT, B.A. (Gale & Polden. 12s. 6d.) The scope d this book is fairly well summed up in iix sub-title. I t is,

in a way, supplementary to the preceding book in this list (The British Empire). The author explains that it is an attempt to clasiify the available material resources of the principal parts of the Empire : to set out the means whereby imperial inter-communication is maintained : to indicate the main lines of the organisation whereby the maximum co-ordination of effort may be secured.

The whole baok is a mine of information, with many good maps; and each section has a useful bibliography, though none of them are very complete.

The index is good so far as it goes, but needs considerable amplification for satisfactory service with a book of reference.

F I R S T A T H E N I A N MEMORIES. By COMPTON MACKENZIE. (Cassell. 7s. 6d.) An account of the espionage and counter espionage which went on in and

around Athens in 1915, and a good picture of the political " atmosphere " of the Near East in the earlier days of the war.

( H e r e ore two books which might make acceplable Christmas presents.)

K ERRELL. By " TAFFRAIL. " (CAPTAIN TAPRELL DORLING, D. S. O., R. N.) (Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.) This war novel, by (the well-known naval writer-Taffrail, is one of the

best of ibs kind that the war has produced. Running through it is a somewhat unorthodox love story; but this merely forms a background to the war experiences of the hero, Lieutenant George (Toby) Rerrell, R.N., all of which occur in destroyers in the Nor~th Sea and the Straits of Dover.

The book opens with the Dogger Bank fight, and gives a graphic description of the sinking of the Blucher : then comes a brilliant and well-described fight with German destroyers off the Belgian coast. Jutland follows; then Toby gets his first command, an old destroyer in the Dover Patrol, when he succeeds in sinking an enemy submarine; this brings him promotion to a larger destroyer in which he tackles four enemy destroyers and gets sunk.

The book is a very readable one, and well brings out the work done by small craft in the war, of which the British public heard and knew so little. This point is well stressed by a 17th Century quotation from John Holland's first ~ z s c o u r s e of the Navy at the beginning of the book. " If either the honour of a nation . . . . be things worthy of thy esteem (though it may be beyond thy shoal conceit), then next to God and the King give thy thanks for the same to the navy, as the principal instrument whereby God works these good things to trhee. . . . 1 )

POST-WAR PIRATE. By STEPHEN RING-HALL. (Methuen. 7s. 6d.) This well known author has supplied us with a joyous book of sea adventure

which is interesting and exciting from cover to cover. The escapades of " Jimmy," and his well thought out schemes, have such a delightful naval


flavour that they must appeal to a wide circle of 'THE NAVAL REVIEW readers, and the book can he confidently recommended as a sure remedy to anyone suffering from a slight attack of pessimism.

PERIODICALS.

N I N E T E E N T H C:ENTURY AND A F T E R . SEPTEMBER, 1931 This number contains an important article by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance

entitled On Changes zn Naval Thought which should be read by all naval students of war. The author points out that in war time the political object is to keep the trade moving and that this is ensured by two factors, the Navy and Insurance. " If the Navy fails the losses by capture increase, the insurance premiums rise and the stoppage increases until a point is reached when the delay must be accepted and the convoy system introduced. "

In di~scussing convoy it has to be remembered that there are two distinct phases : (a) The High Seas, and (6) Submarine Waters. I n the last war, owing to German reluctance to risk their surface ships and their failure to appreciate the imiportance of co-operation of surface vessels with $heir submarines, the latter were left to fend for themselves. and the convoys on the high seas were thus immune from attack. Rut it is too much to hope that the same will necessa~ily be the case in the next war. Ocean escorts will therefore be needed in sufficient numbers and strength to deal with any enemy squadron which may threaten to attack the convoys.

Possibly thi~s consideration was passing in the Admiral's mind when he said : " Upon \\hat conception should our cruiser building policv rest? Can it be doubted that sooner or later the submarine will force the adoption of the convoy system in any future war as it did in the last one? The strength and composition of our cruiser force will, therefore, depend largely upon the demands of the convoy service. These demands will call for numbers and fighting power rather than excessive speed. But cruisers have many other duties to perform besides convoy work. . . . 1 J

I t will be no easy matter in the next war to decide when the psychological moment has arrived " when the delay must he accepted and the convoy system introduced." That will depend on many factors whioh were absent in the last war. The closer co-operation of the mercantile marine, the greater use of wireless, efficient air reconnaissance of an ever-widening radiuis are some of those factors. But above all these considerations is the one wh~ich did operate so severely, namely, the shortage of escorting vessels. And when we compare the number of vessels suitable for escort-on the high seas or against submarines-at the disposal of the Admiralty in 1917 with those available to-day, we may well ask ourselves what is to be done when that moment comes that convoy is regarded as imperative.

I t is not too much to say that no greater difficulty faces the Admiralty to-day than the solution of this problem.

F I G H T I N G FORCES. OCTORER, 1931. 'The editorial notes contain some interesting comments on National Economy

as it affects the Services. What the financial crisis means to many officers " who can only balance their personal budget witjh the greates't difficulty " is well brought out without over-emphasis.

The question of parity is briefly dealt with, and it is pointed out that in face of the efforts which England and America are making to solve the problems of world wide depression in industry, '! questions of naval parity become of relatively small importnnre. "


Captain Acworth contributes an article on Fuel and the Fighting Forces which, as the Editor reminds us, should be read in conjunction with the official views on ehe subject given in the August No. of the R.U.S.I. Journal. The writer's arguments are too well known to need repetition here, and whether we agree or disagree with hiis deductions in favour of a return to coal, we must regret that no means has yet been found for the economic extraction of oil from coal.

I n an article on The City o f London and a Regimental Privilege, Major T. J . Edwards, M.B.E., explains the basis of the claims of various regiments to march through the City of London with fixed bayonets, colours flying and drums beating. One of the claimants is the Royal Marines. " The claim of this corps rests upon the fact that some of its original companies were men of bhe London Trained Bands. I t was raised in 1664 by Order in Council as the Lord High Admiral's Regiment, later taking the title of 1st Maratime (sic) Regiment and finally the Royal Marines. . . . The descent of the corps from the Trained Bands is also commemorated by the univer~sal nickname of ' Jolly ' for a Marine. ' Tame Jolly ' was an old cant for citizen soldiers, and according to Admiral Smythe ' Royal Jolly ' was a time-honoured phrase for a Marine in contradistinction to the ' Tame Jollies ' or Militiamen.' ' I t only remains to be added phat their claim is fully recognised.

T H E MARINERS MIRROR, OCTOBER, 1931, has an interesting article on Second-Hand Men-of-FVar in 1712-14 showing how Peter the Great in the absence of ship-building facilities in his own country built up his navy by purchases of foreign--chiefly British-ships. Seventeen were thus added between 1700 and I 7 15 as against sir built in Russian yards.

AIR FORCE QUARTERLY, OCTOBER, 1931, has no article bearing very directly on the naval side of the air service, but ~t is full of interesting matter for bhase who are " air minded," and includes two Prize Essays.

T H E ROUND TABLE, SEPTEMBER, 1931, contains a thoughtful article on The Political Foundation for Disarmament, setting out the importance of the forthcoming Disarmament Conference, and the gravity of the problems by which it will be confronted. After tracing out some of the causes of the War the writer discusses briefly the coming of the League of Nations, which he calls an attempt to substitute the reign of law for the reign of terror in international affairs.

H e argues that in every respect except disarmament progress has been made in the last ten years; but that armaments are the " acid test " of confidence in the League.

H e then takes note of the military predominance of France and her allies, and points out that a solution must be found of the differences dividing France and Germany and their respective friends.

Finally he discusses the British position and says her primary object must he a reduction in those weapons of war which are primarily offensive in character. Should the Conference fail, the British Empire should, he maintains, stand outside military commitments in Europe, and act with the United States to do their best to bring any war to an end by such methods as may seem best at the time.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY.

Sir,-I feel that the author of the article entitled " The Regatta and Efficiency," which appeared in the August number of THE NAVAL REVIEW, omitted to mention a most disquieting and unsatisfactory feature of the modern fleet regatta. I refer to the " Tote."

On joining one of our large fleets just before the regatta this year I was amazed to find that arrangements were being made for a totalisator to be run on the regat t~ day in practically all the capital ships and in several of the cruisers and Captain (D)'s ships. Signals were being made to other ships inviting ratings to come on board and invest their money, and the ship's company were being urged not to back their own boats' crews, as was always done surreptitiously in the past a t " a bob a thwart," but to gamble on the races and back any boat of any ship that they fancied.

Surely one of the chief objects of the regatta, like every other form of inter-ship sport, is to inspire esprit-de-corps in the ship's company. Whatever the objections to it, at least it could be said that there was nothing like a regatta for pulling a ship together and increasing the inorale and pride of ship of all who served in her. But this no longer holds good. This year I saw the ship's company of H.M.S. " X " lining the side and enthusiastically cheering on a cutter belonging to H.M.S. " Y," which they had backed heavily for that race. Meanwhile their own cutter, pulling well some way astern, was receiving none of that vocal encouragement which helps so much towards the end of the race, and almost compensates the boat's crew for those hard weeks of training and that gruelling two-miles pull. Discussing this matter with other officers and petty officers, I found that a large majority were as disgusted as I was. I was told, however, that as every other ship had a tote we must have one.

The tote is an excellent institution on a race course ; but to introduce it at a regatta opens up the way for some of the sharp practices of the race course. Before long we shall have instances of boats' crews being " got at " like jockeys.

I hope that the weight of public opinion in the Service, rather than official action, will see to it that the tote at the annual regatta dies a natural death.

I am, etc., LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER, R.N.

THE HON. EDITOR, THE NAVAL REVIEW.

1931-4

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