quantitative risk assessment of the baic sa …...the baic facility in coega consists of process...

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PROJECT COMPLETED ON BEHALF OFSRK CONSULTING (SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) LTD

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THEBAIC SA AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING LTDFACILITY LOCATED IN THE COEGA SPECIALECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ZONE, EASTERN

CAPE PROVINCE

Author: I.D Ralston

Date of Issue: 4th October 2019

Report No.: R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2

DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY

PAGE/LINE CHANGE DATE REV

Document Initial release 27th May 2019 0

Document Updated to client comments 28th June 2019 1

Mitigationmeasures

Land PlanningConfidence

Updated to recent developments regardingBAIC’s release of a preliminary designreport and land planning discussions.

4th October2019

2

COPYRIGHT WARNING

All content included in this document is the property of RISCOM (PTY) LTD and is protected by South African and international copyrightlaws. The collection, arrangement and assembly of all content of this document is the exclusive property of RISCOM (PTY) LTD andprotected by South African and international copyright laws.

Any unauthorised copying, reproduction, distribution, publication, display, performance, modification or exploitation of copyrightedmaterial is prohibited by law.

This report may only be copied for legal notification as required by the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Major HazardInstallation regulations, or any local government bylaws. Should the report be copied or printed, it must be done so in full to comply withSANAS accreditation requirements (ISO/IEC 17020:2012).

DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared by RISCOM (PTY) LTD. The material in it reflects the best judgement of RISCOM (PTY) LTD in light of theinformation available to it at the time of preparation. Any use that a third party makes of this report, or any reliance on or decisions to bebased on it, are the responsibility of such third parties. RISCOM (PTY) LTD accepts no responsibility for damages, if any, suffered by anythird party as a result of decisions made or actions based on this report.

RISCOM (PTY) LTD

RISCOM (PTY) LTD is a consulting company that specialises in process safety. Further tothis, RISCOM1 is an approved inspection authority (AIA) for conducting Major HazardInstallation (MHI) risk assessments in accordance with the OHS Act 85 of 1993 and its MajorHazard Installation regulations (July 2001). In order to maintain the status of approvedinspection authority, RISCOM is accredited by the South African National AccreditationSystem (SANAS) in accordance with the IEC/ISO 17020:2012 standard. The accreditationconsists of a number of elements, including technical competence and third-partyindependence. Registration and accreditation documents for Riscom are contained inAppendices A and B.

The independence of RISCOM is demonstrated by the following:

RISCOM does not sell or repair equipment that can be used in the process industry; RISCOM does not have any shareholding in processing companies nor companies

performing risk assessment functions; RISCOM does not design equipment or processes.

Mike Oberholzer is a professional engineer, holds a Bachelor of Science in ChemicalEngineering and is an approved signatory for MHI risk assessments, thereby meeting thecompetency requirements of SANAS for assessment of the risks of hazardous components,including fires, explosions and toxic releases.

M P Oberholzer Pr. Eng. BSc (Chem. Eng.) MIChemE MSAIChE

Ian Ralston is a professional engineer (Registration No. 920262, Appendix C), holds a Bachelorof Science in Chemical Engineering and has prepared this quantitative risk assessment inaccordance with the EIA and MHI regulations.

I.D Ralston Pr. Eng. BSc (Chem. Eng.) FSAIMM MIChemE MSAIChE

1 RISCOM™ and the RISCOM logo are trademarks of RISCOM (PTY) LTD

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE BAIC SA AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING LTD FACILITYLOCATED IN THE COEGA SPECIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ZONE, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page i

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE BAICSA AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING LTD FACILITY

LOCATED IN THE COEGA SPECIAL ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT ZONE, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

BAIC SA Automotive Manufacturing Ltd (hereinafter referred to as BAIC) owns and operatesa vehicle manufacturing facility in Zone 1S of the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ).

Construction of the body/assembly shop, offices, despatch centre, oil/chemical store, energycentre, waste centre, test track and offices are at an advanced stage or has been completed.Additional facilities such a paint shop, bulk storages for Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG), as wellas bulk storages for diesel and unleaded petroleum (ULP) are scheduled for construction aspart of further developments on the site.

Since off-site incidents may result due to the hazards of some of the material to be stored onor transported onto site, RISCOM (PTY) LTD was commissioned to conduct a risk assessmentto quantify the extent of the impacts on and risks to the surrounding communities.

1.1. Terms of Reference

The main aim of the investigation was to quantify the risks to employees, neighbours and thepublic with regard to the proposed modifications to the BAIC facility in Coega.

This risk assessment was conducted with the following terms of reference:

1. Development of accidental spill and fire scenarios for the facility;

2. Using generic failure rate data (for tanks, pumps, valves, flanges, pipework, gantry,couplings and so forth), determination of the probability of each accident scenario;

3. For each incident developed in Step 2, determination of consequences (such asthermal radiation, domino effects, toxic-cloud formation and so forth);

4. For scenarios with off-site consequences (greater than 1% fatality off-site), calculationof maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all generic failure rates, initiatingevents (such as ignition), meteorological conditions and lethality;

5. Using population density near the facility, determination of societal risk posed by thefacility.

This risk assessment is for the use of the Basic Assessment (BA) and is not intended toreplace a Major Hazard Installation risk assessment. Furthermore, the assessment coversonly acute events and sudden ruptures and not chronic and on-going releases, such as fugitiveemissions. It is not intended to be an environmental risk assessment and may not meetspecific the requirements of environmental legislation.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page ii

1.2. Purpose and Main Activities

The main activity at the proposed BAIC facility in Coega is the receipt and storage of motorvehicle components, the assembly of motor vehicles, and the distribution of completedvehicles to retail customers.

1.3. Main Hazards Due to Substance and Process

The main hazards that would occur with a loss of containment of hazardous components atthe proposed BAIC facility in Coega include exposure to:

Thermal radiation from fires;

Overpressure from explosions


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page iii

2. ENVIRONMENT

Physical Address of facility:

Erf 233Lwandle StreetCoega Special Economic Zone (SEZ)Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.

The BAIC facility on satellite imagery, dated 2nd of December 2018.

Satellite Co-ordinates:South 33°48'50.27"East 25°39'15.39"

The BAIC facility, as shown in Figure 2-1, is located at Erf 233, in the southern portion of zone1 (1S) of the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ), between Lwandle Road and the StGeorges N2 interchange (R335). It lies approximately 16 km north east of Port Elizabeth and4.3km south west the deep-water Port of Ngqura in the Eastern Cape within the NelsonMandela Metropolitan Municipality.

The site is surrounded on three sides by the SEZ which has been designated for specialeconomic land use, with the southern site boundary forming part of the southern boundary ofthe SEZ. The closest residential area is St. Georges Strand, which lies approximately 280 msouth of the site.

The land use surrounding the BAIC facility is indicated below:

to the north is the remainder of zone 1S of the SEZ; to the east is open land which has been allocated to zone 8 (the port cluster) of the

SEZ; to the south is the R335 and undeveloped areas (thicket vegetation) with the residential

area of St Georges Strand beyond; to the west lies the N2 and across the motorway zone 2 of the SEZ (the automotive

cluster).

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE BAIC SA AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING LTD FACILITY LOCATED IN THE COEGA SPECIAL ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT ZONE, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page iv

Figure 2-1: Location of the proposed BAIC facility in the Coega SEZ

Information for companies neighbouring BAIC and their classification as MHIs is contained in Figure 2-2. No neighbouring facilities have madethemselves known to BAIC as MHIs. This information would need to be confirmed as part of the MHI risk assessment


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page vi

No.Company

NameNature of Business Address

Contact Person/Telephone No.

MHIYes/No

1 Caltex Service Centre 1 Wells Estate, St Georges Strand 041 461 1442 1 not required

2 CFR Freight Logistics 87 Nurburgring Rd, Coega 041 505 0600 not required

3 FAW SA Motor Vehicle Assembly Coega SEZ PE not required

4 Aldo Scribante Race Circuit Coega SEZ 041 461 1388 not required

5Vector

LogisticsLogistics

Coega SEZ not required

6APM

TerminalsContainer Handing Depot

(refrigerated citrus)Coega SEZ

041 816 3604not required

7PE ColdStorage

Cold Storage Bridgewater Street, Coega 041 405 0800not required

8General

Motors SAMotor Vehicle Assembly Coega SEZ

not required

ASt Georges

StrandResidential Area

BSt GeorgesInterchange

Motorway Interchange

C Wells Estate Residential Area

DCoegaPrimarySchool

Primary School

EAloes Railway

StationRailway Station

Figure 2-2: List of facilities neighbouring BAIC and their MHI classification


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3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION

1 Site

The BAIC facility in Coega consists of process facilities, offices, workshops, warehouses andhazardous chemical installations, as shown in Figure 3-1.

No. Description No. Description

1 Offices 8 Pond

2 Paint Shop 9 Diesel and ULP fuel station

3 Body Assembly Shop 10 Oil/Chemical Store

4 250 kℓ Fire Tanks and pumps 11 Waste centre

5 Sewerage plant and water tank 12 Energy centre/compressors

6 Product parking and dispatch 13 LPG Offloading and 2x90 m3 tanks

7 Test track 14 CKD Body Shop (Stage2)

15 Pond A,B,C Vehicle entrances

Phase 1

Phase 2

Figure 3-1: Site layout


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page viii

1.1 Process Description

1.1.1 Manufacturing Process

The BAIC facility will comprise of an automotive manufacturing plant which will be constructedin two phases and various sub-phases (stages).

Phase 1 (comprises 3 stages) of the development consists the workshops, offices andancillary buildings required for the manufacture of both semi-knocked down (SKD) andcompletely knocked down (CKD), vehicles. The anticipated production for Stage 1 willbe 50,000 units per annum stepping up to 100,000 units per annum by the end of Stage3.

A number of the facilities have already been constructed and the SKD assembly hasbeen established. BAIC employees are currently receiving training in preparation forproduction.

Phase 2 will include the facilities to manufacture vehicle components and store SKDcomponents required for full manufacture of up to 100 000 vehicles, but this liesoutside the scope of this report.

Initially vehicles will be received partially assembled (semi knocked down (SKD)), which willbe assembled in the Stage 1 body and assembly shop which has already been constructed(as illustrated in Figure 3-2). Inspection and testing requirements would be provided for, buthere would be minimal requirements for painting, etc. Construction of the paint shop wouldcommence during this phase.

The assembly of completely knocked down (CKD) vehicle parts and components (completelyknocked down (CKD)), will have require body assembly and painting (as illustrated inFigure 3-3). This would be provided for by a separate body shop for the assembly of bodypanels and the completed paint shop (Phase 1 Stage 2).

Phase 1 Stage 3 would require the expansion of the assembly and body shops toaccommodate additional vehicle assembly requirements. Non-assembled vehicle parts andcomponents, as well as raw materials will be received by road from various suppliers.

The unpainted body (“body-in-white”) will be assembled by welding, gluing or riveting formedbody panels together and will be transferred to the paint shop. Various coatings/paints will beapplied to the body for its protection. Gas fired (LPG) drying ovens will be provided to dry thevarious coats between applications.

Other components will be added to the vehicle such as:

hard trim (instrument panels, steering columns, and body glass); soft trim (seats and upholstery); engine and tyres.

The vehicle will finally be subjected to rigorous inspection including driving the vehicles on atest track. Completed vehicles will be despatched from site, by road to meet clientrequirements.

Chemicals (paints and solvents) and fuels (liquid petroleum gas, petrol and diesel) will be usedas part of the process, triggering NEMA listed activities (storage of dangerous goods thatexceeds the 80 m3 threshold). The transportation and storage of these are described below.


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1.1.2 LPG Offloading and Storage

BAIC will use LPG (a mixture of propane and butane) to heat the various drying ovens locatedin the paint shop. The gas will be stored as a liquid in two 90 m3 pressure vessels underambient conditions. A layout sketch of the area was prepared by Riscom based on BAIC layoutdrawings for facilities containing smaller tanks (Figure 3-4).

BAIC has recently prepared an interim report itemising the design considerations that are tobe incorporated during the detailed design of the LPG facility (Section 17.3 of Appendix G).

It is estimated that to produce 100 000 motor vehicles (full production) will require an averageLPG consumption of 43.5m3 per day. Two 90m3 horizontal steel pressure vessels are providedto ensure adequate buffer capacity to meet production requirements.

The storage vessels would typically be designed to operate at a maximum working pressureof 17 bar (g), and a temperature range of –50 ⁰C to 150 ⁰C. The liquefied gas is fed to direct flame vaporizers. The regulator bank would typically operate at an inlet pressure of 7 bar (g)and an outlet of pressure of 1 bar (g). A 150 mm (6’’) pipeline would carry the gas from theregulator station to the paint shop. The pressure will be reduced further to be fed to the burnersat the ovens.

The LPG gas is fed by underground pipeline to the paint shop and is sleeved at all penetrationpoints into the building, as added safety and protection to the line.

The storage vessels are protected by a sprinkler system that would activate in the event afire.

Figure 3-4: LPG storage and offloading layout sketch

LPG will be delivered to the site via road tankers having a carrying capacity of 47 000 ℓ in a single compartment. A dedicated ring road and canopy will be provided for gas delivery, thecanopy will be protected by a sprinkler system. Bollards are provided to prevent interactionsbetween the LPG installation and the road tankers.

7-8 deliveries per week would be required to meet consumption requirements.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page x

Facilities for the filling of forklift cylinders will be provided. A liquid line from the filling tankwould extend into the cylinder-filling bay where the pressure would be increased by a pumpto fill the cylinders. The operator would place a 19 kg cylinder on the scale, connect the flexiblehose to the cylinder and fill the empty cylinder until it contains 19 kg of LPG. At this stage, theoperator will terminate the filling operation and disconnect the flexible filling hose.The number of cylinders to be filled per year has not been specified.

The LPG gas storage area will be fenced to prevent unauthorized access and two doublegates will facilitate escape in the event of a fire. A sloping concrete pad (sloped away from thetanks) will be provided to prevent accumulation of LPG liquid beneath the tanks.

1.1.3 Fuel Filling Area

Packaged hazardous chemical goods are to be stored in stores specifically designed for therequirement these include:

the oil-chemical warehouse (max 84 m3 of flammable goods); the paint storage area located in the paint shop; the water treatment chemicals (water treatment chemical requirements).


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1.1.4 Flammable Storages

1.1.4.1 Oil-Chemical Storage

A separate storage is provided for the storage of packaged goods such as oils, paraffin,lubricants, solvents etc. in an allocated building designed for this purpose (only allocated toflammable materials).

The building has been constructed with three compartments (1x 89 m2 and 2 x 179 m2) eachof which is provided with walls, a bunded area (150 mm high), and a fire protection system(roof mounted sprinklers). Segregated storage of the packaged goods on the basis of theirflashpoint.

Mechanical ventilation is provided on the roof.

The oil chemical store has been constructed will currently not be used for the storage offlammable materials. During the ramp-up it envisaged that up to 84 m3 of flammable materialswill be stored in this facility.

1.1.4.2 Paint Mixing and Storage

A paint mixing and storage area is provided in the south-east corner of the proposed paintshop. Packaged goods such paints, solvents, etc. will be stored and prepared for use in thepaint shop.

The mixing and storage facilities will be separated in two different areas.

The area will be classified as Class 1 (Division 1.1) and will designed according to thisrequirement.

The walls and roof area between this area will be constructed of materials that have a minimumfire rating of 120min. Windows will be omitted to protect personnel from glass projectiles in theevent of an explosion.

Spillage and runoff in the area will be collected for disposal to protect the environment.

Foam activated sprinklers will be activated in the event of a fire.


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1.1.5 Effluent Treatment Plant

Treatment of plant effluent primarily from the paint shop area.

Storage areas are required for the storage of chemicals for the treatment of plant effluents(water) which are predominantly sourced from the paint shop.

Bulk storages for 35 % Hydrochloric Acid have been identified as being located in this areafrom the drawings provided.

1.1.6 Waste Storage

Collection and Storage of solid and other wastes including paint sludge to be stored in drums.

Waste will be separated and stored in bins or skips for removal as follows:

General waste (paper, packaging, wood, etc.); Hazardous waste (flammable paint sludge etc.) - stored in drums for daily removal to

a hazardous waste site.

1.1.7 Fire Fighting System

A conceptual Fire Protection Design was provided in the documentation provided (STUDIOD’ÁRC (2016)).

Two 250 m3 fire water tanks sufficient for 2 hours supply is provided. Two (2) water pumpsdriven by diesel motors (one (1) duty and one (1) standby pump will supply water to the hydrantring main ensuring sufficient flow rates and pressures. One (1) electrical jockey pump willmaintain system pressure in the water ring main preventing false alarms.

Dedicated sprinkler systems will be provided at in the following areas:

Bulk LPG storage vessels and offloading area; Paint Mixing and Storage area; Oil-Chemical Store; Cut-off sprinklers will be installed at both ends of the inter-connected bridge structures

to prevent horizontal fire spread.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xiii

1.3 Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site





1.4 Packaged Hazardous Goods Inventory




© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xiv

2 METHODOLOGY

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presentsto the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability andconsequence should be considered, but there are occasions where, if either the probability orthe consequence can be shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can bemade based on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component of the report, the following considerations aretaken into account:

Chemical identities;

Location of on-site installations that use, produce, process, transport or storehazardous components;

Type and design of containers, vessels or pipelines;

Quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release;

Nature of the hazard most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases,e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fires or explosions, large quantities to be storedand certain handling conditions of processed components.

The evaluation methodology assumes that the facility will perform as designed in the absenceof unintended events such as component and material failures of equipment, human errors,external events and process unknowns.

The Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) process is summarised with the following steps:

1. Identification of components that are flammable, toxic, reactive or corrosive and thathave potential to result in a major incident from fires, explosions or toxic releases;

2. Development of accidental loss of containment (LOC) scenarios for equipmentcontaining hazardous components (including release rate, location and orientation ofrelease);



5. Using the population density near the facility, determination of societal risk posed bythe facility;

6. The results of the QRA are then used to make a determination of environmentalsignificance of the impact of hazardous chemicals on the public.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xv

3 CONCLUSIONS

Risk calculations are not precise. The accuracy of predictions is determined by the quality ofbase data and expert judgements.

This risk assessment included the consequences of fires and explosions at the BAIC facilityin Coega. A number of well-known sources of incident data were consulted and applied todetermine the likelihood of occurrence for an incident.

This risk assessment was performed with the assumption that the site would be maintained toan acceptable level and that all statutory regulations would be applied. It was also assumedthat the detailed engineering designs would be done by competent people and would becorrectly specified for the intended duty. For example, it was assumed that tank wallthicknesses have been correctly calculated, that vents have been sized for emergencyconditions, that instrumentation and electrical components comply with the specified electricalarea classification, that material of construction is compatible with the products, etc.

It is the responsibility of BAIC and their contractors to ensure that all engineering designswould have been completed by competent persons and that all pieces of equipment wouldhave been installed correctly. All designs should be in full compliance with (but not limited to)the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and its regulations, the National BuildingsRegulations and the Buildings Standards Act 107 of 1977 as well as local bylaws.

A number of incident scenarios were simulated, taking into account the prevailingmeteorological conditions, and described in the report.

4 NOTIFIABLE SUBSTANCES

The General Machinery Regulation 8 and its Schedule A on notifiable substances requiresany employer who has a substance equal to or exceeding the quantity listed in the regulationto notify the divisional director. A site is classified as a Major Hazard Installation if it containsone or more notifiable substances or if the off-site risk is sufficiently high. The latter can onlybe determined from a quantitative risk assessment.

BAIC proposes to store LPG in quantities of greater than 25 t in a single vessel (90 m3) andis required to notify the authorities accordingly. For this reason alone, the BAIC site inCoega would be classified as a Major Hazard Installation and would be required toprepare an MHI Quantitative Risk assessment Report.

4.1 LPG Storage Area

Jet and flash fires and vapour cloud explosions resulting from a loss of containment at theLPG storages with subsequent fires were simulated. The worst case 1% fatality incidents aretabulated Table 7-1in for information only, as the decision on MHI status is based on risk notconsequence.

Table 7-1: Worst Case 1% fatality distances

LPG Tanks 1and 2 - 90m3 LPG Vessels

Fixed duration (Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire) 413 m

Instantaneous release (BLEVE) 380 m


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xvi

The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth extends about 30 m beyond the siteboundary, and this alone qualifies the site as a Major Hazard Installation.

Whilst this would be acceptable for workers (e.g. if the adjacent areas were zoned for industrialuse), it would require to be mitigated to be generally acceptable for the public (includingsensitive populations).

4.2 Fuel Filling Area

Pool and flash fires and vapour cloud explosions resulting from a loss of containment at theULP or diesel storages with subsequent fires were simulated.

The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth does not extend beyond the siteboundary, and this would not qualify the site as a Major Hazard Installation.

4.3 Oil-Chemical Store

Class 3 (flammable liquids) would be stored in the oil-chemical storage and paint preparationand storage areas. These are specifically designed to resist fires for a period, therebypreventing fires from moving from one area to another. As the buildings would be constructedout of a fire-resistant material and are located well away from the plant boundary (large safetydistance), fires formed in these areas would remain within the building and would not impactneighbouring properties or the public.

This aspect will be reviewed and more fully addressed during the MHI Risk Assessment ifrequired, once more detail is made available.

4.4 Paint Mixing and Storage



4.5 Effluent Treatment Plant

Risk contours were not calculated as the impacts did not extend beyond the Water TreatmentPlant and the general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the fullproduct inventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.



© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xvii

4.6 Waste Storage

Risk contours were not calculated as the impacts did not extend beyond the Waste Storageand the general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the full productinventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.


4.7 Societal Risks

The expected guide value (E) depicted on the graph is an interpreted value based on the blueline (the upper guide value). The Risk CurvesTM software calculates a guide ratio (R) whichindicates the distance to reach the expected guide value, a value of > 1 indicates that it hasbeen exceeded and the societal risk would be intolerable.

The expected guide value (E) depicted on the FN curve is an interpreted value based on theblue line (the upper guide value). The calculated guide ratio (R) of 0.2 indicates the distanceto reach the expected value, a value of < 1 indicates that is well below the expected value.

The calculated societal risks to workers are well below the upper guideline and would fall intothe tolerable if ALARP range.

The expected guide value (E) depicted on the FN curve is an interpreted value based on theblue line (the upper guide value). The calculated guide ratio (R) is 0.36 which indicates thedistance to reach the expected value, a value of < 1 indicates that is well below the expectedvalue.

The societal risks to the public are well below the lower guideline and would thereforeacceptably low.

4.8 Major Hazard Installation

This investigation has concluded that:

the risks (1x 10-6 fatalities per annum per person) from accidental fires and explosionsat the BAIC facility in Coega would extend beyond site boundaries.

notifiable quantities of LPG (> 25 t in a single tank) would be stored on site.

BAIC would be required to complete an MHI risk assessment and permit application based onfinalised design information prior to construction of the facilities. This would be a mandatoryrequirement.

The proposed modifications to the facility would result in it being classified a MajorHazard Installation, and the relevant authorities should be notified

4.9 Land Planning

The BAIC vehicle assembly plant would potentially affect the allowable land use in theimmediate vicinity of the site’s southern boundary based on its risk profile. The north-westerncorner of the vacant land adjacent to the residential area of St Georges Strand wouldpotentially be affected.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xviii

Rezoning of the affected land by the local authority for industrial use (excludes theestablishment of schools, old aged homes, etc.) and appropriate offsite emergency planningwould potentially mitigate/eliminate the MHI’s impact on the population.

Recent discussions with the CDC and local authorities indicate that rezoning of the affectedland would not be an option, and that BAIC would be required to mitigate the risks within theboundaries of the SEZ. BAIC is confident that this can be done via mitigation measuresincorporated into the design of the LPG facility, which will be further assessed based on finaldesign plans and confirmed via the MHI assessment and permit application.

Clearly no new land planning should be approved without consultation of the PADHI land-planning tables attached in Appendix H.

4.10 Impact Assessment

The rating methodology has been provided by SRK (refer to Appendix E).

Current activities associated with the manufacture of semi knocked down vehicles do not havean impact beyond the site boundaries of the BAIC site. The introduction of fuels (LPG, dieseland petrol) during the ramp up of production and introduction the manufacture of completelyknocked down vehicles will potentially have impacts (fires and explosions associated with thestorage of LPG) that extend beyond the site boundary and affect a small vacant area currentlyzoned as general residential (adjacent to the existing residential dwellings in St GeorgesStrand).

Table 7-2: Calculated Impact Ratings Based on Impact Criteria

Impact SignificanceRating

Receptor ProbabilityDuration

2-15years

>15 years

General Public/Environment < 40% - Improbable Low Medium

Vulnerable Populations < 40% - Improbable Medium High

The impacts of the introduction of hazardous materials would be considered adverse (-ve).

The impact on the general public would be considered to be low and may not have anymeaningful influence on the decision regarding the proposed activity/development.

Table 7-2 highlights the requirement to specifically address the requirements of vulnerablepopulations such as children (schools), the aged (old age homes) and disabled (homes for thedisabled).

No cumulative impacts have been identified.

No impacts are associated with the no-go option (the assembly of only SKD vehicles) as onlythe diesel and ULP storage facilities would be installed which are a lower risk than the LPGstorages.

4.11 Mitigation Measures


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xix

The risks are fairly evenly distributed between offloading operations (high frequency) andstorage (tank failures) i.e.it is function of the current siting and LPG delivery frequency. Variousmeasures would be effective to mitigate the risk:

improved understanding of the location of the LPG provided by detailed designs(safety distances from the SEZ boundary)//relocation of the facility further away fromthe site boundary;

detailed design of the LPG facility that will be completed prior to the MHI riskassessment;

Installation of a firewall on the site boundary has been proposed, as contemplated in SANS10087, but cannot be credited based on the limitations of the simulation software, and therequirements of SANS 1461. The installation of a firewall on the boundary would provide somerelief from thermal radiation affecting the public, but should not be used as a justification forreducing the prescribed safety distance at the site boundary.

Recent discussions with the CDC and local authorities indicate that rezoning of the affectedland would not be an option, and that BAIC would be required to mitigate the risks within theboundary of the SEZ.

BAIC are confident that the risk can be mitigated to fall within the SEZ. This will need to beconfirmed on the basis of detailed designs and the preparation of the MHI report.

4.12 Confidence

The available information allows a medium confidence level in the assessment, this is basedon the information provided not being finalised and the engineering judgement of thespecialist. The assumptions regarding plant layout and mitigation measures considered in thereport, have been confirmed by the BAIC’s release of its preliminary design report for thefacility (Section 17.3 of Appendix G).

The potential exists for changes during the implementation and construction phase. Typically,a high level of confidence would only be assigned based on designs that are finalised forconstruction.

This study is not intended to replace the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment whichshould be completed once detailed designs have been finalised for construction.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xx

5 RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the quantitative risk assessment study conducted for the proposed modificationsto the BAIC vehicle manufacturing plant in Coega, a number of events were found to haverisks that extend beyond the site boundary. These risks could be mitigated to acceptable levelsdepending on the outlook regarding land planning going forward.

RISCOM did not find any fatal flaws that would prevent the project finalising the detailedengineering phase of the project, this would be predicated based on the requirement formitigation. RISCOM would support the project with the following conditions:

1. Compliance with all statutory requirements, e.g. safety distances, etc.

2. Full compliance with the most recent applicable SANS codes, i.e. SANS 10087,SANS 10089, SANS 10108, SANS 10263, SANS 1461, SANS 1514, etc.;

3. Incorporation of applicable guidelines or equivalent international recognised codes ofgood design and practice into the designs;

4. Completion of a recognised process hazard analysis (such as a HAZOP study,FMEA, etc.) on the proposed facility prior to construction to ensure design andoperational hazards have been identified and adequate mitigation put in place;

5. Full compliance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (Safety Instrument Systems) standardsor equivalent to ensure that adequate protective instrumentation is included in thedesign and would remain valid for the full life cycle of the facility;

6. Including demonstration from the designer that sufficient and reliable instrumentationwould be specified and installed at the facility;

7. Ensure that all potential spills, including pump failures and offloading are fully containedand would not enter the soil or leave the site;

8. Appropriate firefighting measures have been put in place for the mitigation of fire risk;

9. Preparation and issue of a safety document detailing safety and design featuresreducing the impacts from fires, explosions and flammable atmospheres to the MHIassessment body at the time of the MHI assessment;

a. including compliance to statutory laws, applicable codes and standards and world’sbest practice;

b. including the listing of statutory and non-statutory inspections, giving frequency ofinspections;

c. Including the auditing of the built facility against the safety document. Noting thatcodes such as IEC 61511 can be used to achieve these requirements;

10. Demonstration by BAIC or their contractor that the final designs would reduce the risksposed by the installation to internationally acceptable guidelines (ALARP);

11. Approval of all designs by a professional engineer registered in South Africa inaccordance with the Professional Engineers Act, who takes responsibility for suitabledesigns;

12. Completion of an emergency preparedness and response document for on-site andoff-site scenarios prior to initiating the MHI risk assessment (with input from localauthorities);

13. Permission not being granted for increases to the product list or product inventorieswithout the relevant licensing amendments being in place;

14. A suitable resolution of the land planning requirements for the area can be achieved,that satisfies the required risk criteria for such use;

15. Final acceptance of the facility risks with an MHI risk assessment that must becompleted in accordance to the MHI regulations. Basing such a risk assessment on thefinal design including engineering mitigation.


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xxi

Table of Contents

LPG Storage Area..........................................................................................xv

2 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1-1

Legislation.................................................................................................... 1-1

National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) andits regulations............................................................................................... 1-1

Environmental Amendment Act (No. 30 of 2013)........................................... 1-2

National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of1977)............................................................................................................ 1-4

Study objectives........................................................................................... 1-5

Terms of Reference............................................................................................. 1-6

Assumptions and Limitations ............................................................................... 1-6

Information Sources ............................................................................................ 1-6

Facility Inspection................................................................................................ 1-7

Software .............................................................................................................. 1-8

3 ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................... 2-1

General Background............................................................................................ 2-1

Meteorology......................................................................................................... 2-5

Surface Winds.............................................................................................. 2-6

Precipitation and Relative Humidity .............................................................. 2-7

Temperature ................................................................................................ 2-8

Atmospheric Stability.................................................................................... 2-9

Default Meteorological Values.................................................................... 2-11

4 PROCESS DESCRIPTION......................................................................................... 3-1

Site...................................................................................................................... 3-1

Process Description............................................................................................. 3-2

Manufacturing Process................................................................................. 3-2

Offloading and LPG Storage ........................................................................ 3-4

Fuel Filling Area ........................................................................................... 3-5

Flammable Storages .................................................................................... 3-6

Effluent Treatment Plant............................................................................... 3-6

Waste Storage ............................................................................................. 3-6

Fire Fighting System .................................................................................... 3-7

Bulk Hazardous Chemical Inventory............................................................. 3-7

Packaged Hazardous Chemical Inventory.................................................... 3-7

Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site.................................................. 3-8

5 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 4-1

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................ 4-2

Notifiable Substances................................................................................... 4-2

Substance Hazards...................................................................................... 4-2

Chemical Properties..................................................................................... 4-2

Components Excluded from the Study ......................................................... 4-6

Historical Major Incidents at LPG Storage Facilities ..................................... 4-7

IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PHYSICAL AND CONSEQUENCE MODELLING) ...... 4-9


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xxii

LPG Storage and Offloading ...................................................................... 4-10

ULP and Diesel Storage............................................................................. 4-22

Flammable Stores ...................................................................................... 4-28

Effluent Treatment Plant............................................................................. 4-30

Waste Storage ........................................................................................... 4-31

Summary of Impacts.......................................................................................... 4-32

Consolidated Risks .................................................................................... 4-34

Societal Risk .............................................................................................. 4-35

REDUCTION OF RISK...................................................................................... 4-38

Risk Ranking.............................................................................................. 4-38

Mitigation.................................................................................................... 4-40

6 IMPACT ASSESSMENT............................................................................................. 5-1

Potential Impacts of the Project ........................................................................... 5-1

Impact Assessment Methodology ........................................................................ 5-2

Operational Phase Risk Assessment................................................................... 5-2

Impact Significance Rating........................................................................... 5-2

Mitigation Measures ..................................................................................... 5-9

Cumulative Impacts ............................................................................................. 5-9

No-go Impacts ..................................................................................................... 5-9

Confidence................................................................................................... 5-9

7 MHI ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 6-1

8 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 7-1

Notifiable Substances.......................................................................................... 7-1

LPG Storages...................................................................................................... 7-2

Fuelling Station.................................................................................................... 7-2

Flammable Stores ............................................................................................... 7-2

Effluent Treatment Plant...................................................................................... 7-2

Waste Storage..................................................................................................... 7-3

Impacts onto Neighbouring Properties, Residential Areas and Major HazardInstallations ......................................................................................................... 7-3

Societal Risks...................................................................................................... 7-3

Major Hazard Installation..................................................................................... 7-4

Land Planning ..................................................................................................... 7-4

Impact Assessment ............................................................................................. 7-4

Mitigation Measures ..................................................................................... 7-5

Confidence................................................................................................... 7-6

9 RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................... 8-1

10 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 9-1

11 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS....................................................................... 10-1

12 APPENDIX A: DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR CERTIFICATE (2017-2012) ................ 11-1

13 APPENDIX B: SANAS CERTIFICATES (2017-2021) ............................................... 12-1

14 APPENDIX C: DETAILS OF SPECIALIST AND SPECIALIST DECLARATION ........ 13-1

Declaration by Specialist ................................................................................... 13-1

Professional Affiliations ..................................................................................... 13-2


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Curriculum Vitae................................................................................................ 13-3

15 APPENDIX D: NOTIFICATION OF A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION................. 14-1

16 APPENDIX E: QRA METHODOLOGY...................................................................... 15-1

Hazard Identification.......................................................................................... 15-1

Notifiable Substances................................................................................. 15-1

Scenario Selection ..................................................................................... 15-2

Modelling Software..................................................................................... 15-5

Physical and Consequence Modelling ............................................................... 15-5

Fires........................................................................................................... 15-6

Explosions.................................................................................................. 15-8

Risk Analysis ................................................................................................... 15-12

Background.............................................................................................. 15-12

Predicted Risk.......................................................................................... 15-13

Risk Calculations...................................................................................... 15-22

Assessment Rating of Potential Impacts.......................................................... 15-28

Impact Rating Procedure.......................................................................... 15-28

Impact Assessment Matrix............................................................................... 15-32

Potential Impact No.: ................................................................................. 15-32

17 APPENDIX F: PHYSICAL PROPERTIES ................................................................. 16-1

Propane............................................................................................................. 16-1

Propane Constants .................................................................................... 16-1

Propane Coefficients.................................................................................. 16-2

Diesel Modelled as n-Dodecane ........................................................................ 16-3

n-Dodecane Constants............................................................................... 16-3

n-Dodecane Coefficients ............................................................................ 16-4

ULP Modelled as Heptane................................................................................. 16-5

Heptane Constants .................................................................................... 16-5

Heptane Coefficients.................................................................................. 16-6

18 APPENDIX G:........................................................................................................... 17-1

Site layout Drawings.......................................................................................... 17-1

Land Use (Saint Georges Strand)...................................................................... 17-2

LPG Layout and design ..................................................................................... 17-1

19 APPENDIX H: PADHI LAND-PLANNING TABLES................................................... 18-2

Development Type Table 1: People at Work, Parking........................................ 18-2

Development Type Table 2: Developments for Use by the General Public ........ 18-3

Development Type Table 3: Developments for Use by Vulnerable People ........ 18-7

Development Type Table 4: Very Large and Sensitive Developments............... 18-8

20 APPENDIX I: INCIDENT SCENARIOS ..................................................................... 19-1

LPG Scenarios .................................................................................................. 19-1

Storage Vessels ......................................................................................... 19-1

Road Tanker Offloading (Gantry) ............................................................... 19-3

21 APPENDIX J: MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS................................................. 20-1

Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG).............................................................................. 20-1

Diesel ................................................................................................................ 20-2


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xxiv

ULP (Gasoline).................................................................................................. 20-3


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xxv

List of Figures

Figure 1-1: Artists impression of the BAIC Phases 1 and 2 viewed from the NorthEast............................................................................................................. 1-7

Figure 2-1: Location of the proposed BAIC facility in the Coega SEZ ............................ 2-2

Figure 2-2: List of facilities neighbouring BAIC and their MHI classification ................... 2-4

Figure 2-3: Seasonal wind speed as a function of wind direction at Ngqura (Coega)the period from 2011 to 2015 ...................................................................... 2-6

Figure 2-4: Atmospheric stability as a function of wind direction .................................... 2-9

Figure 2-5: Representative weather classes for Ngqura (Coega) ................................ 2-11

Figure 3-1: Site layout ................................................................................................... 3-1

Figure 3-2: Semi knocked down (SKD) flow schematic ................................................. 3-3

Figure 3-3: Completely knocked down down (CKD) flow schematic .............................. 3-3

Figure 3-4: LPG storage and offloading layout sketch ................................................... 3-4

Figure 3-5: Diesel and ULP storage and offloading layout sketch.................................. 3-6

Figure 4-1: Thermal radiation for a large LPG pool fire (LPG storage fixed duration)... 4-12

Figure 4-2: Thermal radiation from a PSV jet fire at varying wind speeds (with thereference height 1 m aboveground)........................................................... 4-13

Figure 4-3: Lethality from PSV jet fire .......................................................................... 4-14

Figure 4-4: Radiation Isopleths for a jet fire resulting from fixed duration releasefrom a 90m3 LPG Tank.............................................................................. 4-15

Figure 4-5: Flash fire limits due to various releases of LPG......................................... 4-16

Figure 4-6: 0.1 bar overpressures from VCEs due to LPG releases ............................ 4-17

Figure 4-7: Blast overpressures for the worst-case vapour cloud explosion ................ 4-18

Figure 4-8: The 1% fatality isopleths for various BLEVEs............................................ 4-19

Figure 4-9: Worst case fatality isopleths for BLEVEs................................................... 4-20

Figure 4-10: Lethal probability isolines associated with the LPG installation.................. 4-21

Figure 4-11: 1 % fatality isopleths for various diesel and ULP pool fires........................ 4-23

Figure 4-12: Thermal radiation isopleths for pool fires resulting from the catastrophicfailure of the ULP Road Tanker ................................................................. 4-24

Figure 4-13: Flash fire limits due to various releases of LPG......................................... 4-25

Figure 4-14: Blast overpressures for the worst-case vapour cloud explosion from theULP Tanker............................................................................................... 4-26

Figure 4-15: Lethal probability isolines associated with the flammable component Xinstallation ................................................................................................. 4-27

Figure 4-16: Lethal probability isolines associated with the combined risk..................... 4-34

Figure 4-17: Societal risks for the BAIC facility (including workers on site) .................... 4-37

Figure 4-18: Risk Analysis points for individual risks at the BAIC facility........................ 4-39

Figure 5-1: Area of Impact Land Planning Requirements .. Error! Bookmark not defined.

Figure 15-1: Airborne vapours from a loss of containment of liquefied gas stored in apressurised vessel..................................................................................... 15-2

Figure 15-2: Event tree for an instantaneous release of a liquefied flammable gas ....... 15-3

Figure 15-3: Event tree for a continuous release of a liquefied flammable gas .............. 15-3

Figure 15-4: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable gas ............................ 15-4

Figure 15-5: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid.......................... 15-4

Figure 15-6: UK HSE decision-making framework....................................................... 15-23


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Figure 15-7: Town-planning zones for pipelines .......................................................... 15-25

Figure 15-8: Town-planning zones .............................................................................. 15-26

Figure 17-1: Saint Georges Strand Layout of Erven ...................................................... 17-2


© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R /19/SRK˗01 Rev 2 Page xxvii

List of Tables

Table 2-1: Long-term rainfall at Port Elizabeth ............................................................. 2-7

Table 2-2: Long-term temperatures measured at Port Elizabeth .................................. 2-8

Table 2-3: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability............................................ 2-9

Table 2-4: Representative weather classes................................................................ 2-10

Table 2-5: Allocation of observations into six weather classes ................................... 2-10

Table 2-6: Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on localconditions.................................................................................................. 2-11

Table 3-1: Summary of hazardous components to be stored on site ............................ 3-8

Table 4-1: Flammable and combustible components stored on, produced at ordelivered to site ........................................................................................... 4-5

Table 4-2: Representative components........................................................................ 4-6

Table 4-3: Components excluded from the study ......................................................... 4-6

Table 4-4: Endpoint distances for pool fires................................................................ 4-11

Table 4-5: BLEVE characteristics............................................................................... 4-19

Table 5-6: Maximum distance to 1% fatality from point of release .............................. 4-32

Table 4-6: Population Density Data.................................................................................. 4-35

Table 7-1: Risk ranking of scenarios with the highest off-site risks ............................. 4-38

Table 6-1: Calculated Impact Ratings Based on Impact Criteria......................................... 5-5

Table 6-2: Significance rating of impact MH1 and mitigation measures.............................. 5-6

Table 6-3: Significance rating of impact MH2 and mitigation measures.............................. 5-8

Table 8-1: Calculated Impact Ratings Based on Impact Criteria......................................... 7-5

Table 15-1: Thermal radiation guidelines (BS 5980 of 1990)........................................ 15-6

Table 15-2: Summary of consequences of blast overpressure (Clancey 1972) ............ 15-9

Table 15-3: Damage caused by overpressure effects of an explosion(Stephens 1970)...................................................................................... 15-10

Table 15-4: Influence of public perception of risk on acceptance of that risk, basedon the POST report ................................................................................. 15-12

Table 15-5: Failure frequencies for single containment atmospheric vessels ............. 15-14

Table 15-6: Failure frequencies for pressure vessels aboveground............................ 15-14

Table 15-7: Failure frequencies for atmospheric vessels below ground...................... 15-14

Table 15-8: Failure frequencies for process pipes...................................................... 15-15

Table 15-9: Failure frequencies for aboveground transport pipelines ......................... 15-16

Table 15-10: Failure frequencies for underground transport pipelines.......................... 15-16

Table 15-11: Failure frequency for centrifugal pumps and compressors....................... 15-17

Table 15-12: Failure frequency for reciprocating pumps and compressors................... 15-17

Table 15-13: Failure frequencies for loading and offloading arms and hoses ............... 15-17

Table 15-14: Failure frequencies for road tankers/rail tank wagons with anatmospheric tank..................................................................................... 15-18

Table 15-15: Failure frequencies for road tankers/rail tank wagons with a pressurisedtank ......................................................................................................... 15-18

Table 15-16: Fire in a storage facility ........................................................................... 15-19

Table 15-17: Human failure rates of specific types of tasks.......................................... 15-20

Table 15-18: Probability of direct ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009)........ 15-21


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Table 15-19: Classification of flammable substances................................................... 15-21

Table 15-20: Land-use decision matrix......................................................................... 15-26

Table 15-21: Criteria used to determine the Consequence of the Impact ....................... 15-28

Table 15-22: Method used to determine the Consequence Score.................................. 15-29

Table 15-23: Potential Calculated Consequence Scores Based on Criteria ................... 15-29

Table 15-24: Probability Classification ........................................................................... 15-29

Table 15-25: Impact Significance Ratings ...................................................................... 15-30

Table 15-26: Potential Calculated Consequence Scores Based on Criteria ................... 15-31

Table 15-27: Impact status and confidence classification............................................... 15-31

Table 15-28 Significance rating of impact No. and mitigation measures....................... 15-32


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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE BAICSA AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING LTD FACILITY

LOCATED IN THE COEGA SPECIAL ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT ZONE, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE

1 INTRODUCTION

BAIC SA Automotive Manufacturing Ltd (hereinafter referred to as BAIC) owns and operatesa vehicle manufacturing facility in Zone 1S of the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ).

Construction of the body/assembly shop, offices, despatch centre, oil/chemical store, energycentre, waste centre, test track and offices are at an advanced stage or has been completed.Additional facilities such a paint shop, bulk storages for Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG), as wellas bulk storages for diesel and unleaded petroleum (ULP) are scheduled for construction aspart of further developments on the site.

Since off-site incidents may result due to the hazards of some of the material to be stored onor transported onto site, RISCOM (PTY) LTD was commissioned to conduct a risk assessmentto quantify the extent of the impacts on and risks to the surrounding communities.

Legislation

Risk assessments are conducted when required by law or by companies wishing to determinethe risks of the facility for other reasons, such as insurance. In South Africa, risk assessmentsare carried out under the legislation of two separate acts, each with different requirements.These requirements are discussed in the subsections that follow.

National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) and itsregulations

The National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) contains the principalSouth African environmental legislation. Its primary objective is to make provision forcooperative governance by establishing principles for decision making on matters related tothe environment, on the formation of institutions that will promote cooperative governance andon establishing procedures for coordinating environmental functions exercised by organs ofstate as well as to provide for matters connected therewith.

Section 30 of the NEMA deals with the control of emergency incidents where an “incident” isdefined as an “unexpected sudden occurrence, including a major emission, fire or explosionleading to serious danger to the public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to theenvironment, whether immediate or delayed”.

The act defines “pollution” as “any change in the environment caused by:

(I) Substances;

(ii) Radioactive or other waves; or

(iii) Noise, odours, dust or heat…



Emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of waste or substances,construction and the provision of services, whether engaged in by any person or anorgan of state, where that change has an adverse effect on human health or wellbeingor on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural or managed ecosystems,or on materials useful to people, or will have such an effect in the future... ”

“Serious” is not fully defined but would be accepted as having long lasting effects that couldpose a risk to the environment or to the health of the public that is not immediately reversible.

This is similar to the definition of a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) as defined in theOccupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act) 85 of 1993 and its MHI regulations.

Section 28 of the NEMA makes provision for anyone who causes pollution or degradation ofthe environment to be made responsible for the prevention of the occurrence, continuation orreoccurrence of related impacts and for the costs of repair to the environment. In terms of theprovisions under Section 28 that are stated as:

“ Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution ordegradation of the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent suchpollution or degradation from occurring, continuing or recurring, or, in so far as suchharm to the environment is authorised by law or cannot reasonably be avoided orstopped… ”

Environmental Amendment Act (No. 30 of 2013)

Section 30 of NEMA, has been amended the insertion of section 30A, which came into effecton 18 December 2014. The amendment provides for emergency situations, which are defineddifferently to an emergency incident. An emergency situation is defined as:

“ a situation that has arisen suddenly that poses an imminent and serious threat to theenvironment, human life or property, including ‘disaster’ as defined in section 1 of theDisaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002) but does not include an incidentreferred to in section 30 of this Act… ”

A competent authority is allowed in terms of 30A (1) to issue verbal and written directives tothe person responsible for undertaking listed or specified activities without obtaining theprerequisite environmental authorization, in order to prevent or contain an emergency situationor to prevent, contain or mitigate the effects of an emergency situation.

It is important to be able to distinguish between an incident and an emergency situation. Onemust look to the Disaster Management for a definition of what constitutes a disaster forguidance

“ A disaster is defined as “a progressive or sudden, widespread or localised, natural orhuman-‐caused occurrence which –

(a) Causes or threatens to cause(i) Death, injury or disease;(ii) Damage to property, infrastructure or the environment; or(iii) Disruption of the life of a community; and

(b) Is of a magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by thedisaster cope with its effects using only their own resources… ”



A determination is required to be made by the responsible person as to whether an incidentconstitutes the potential to be considered a situation rather than an incident. An assessmentof the potential severity of the impact of incidents on the environment, workers and the public,together with an assessment of the ability and resources to deal with an incident, would bekey considerations in determining the potential for other parties such competent authorities tobecome involved. This is a similar requirement to that imposed by the OSH MHI Regulations.

The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993; OHS Act)

The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993; OHS Act) is primarily intended forthe health and safety of the workers, whereas its MHI regulations are intended for the healthand safety of the public.

The OHS Act shall not apply in respect of:

“ a) A mine, a mining area or any works as defined in the Minerals Act, 1991 (ActNo. 50 of 1991), except in so far as that Act provides otherwise;

b) Any load line ship (including a ship holding a load line exemption certificate),fishing boat, sealing boat and whaling boat as defined in Section 2 (1) of theMerchant Shipping Act, 1951 (Act No. 57 of 1951), or any floating crane,whether or not such ship, boat or crane is in or out of the water within anyharbour in the Republic or within the territorial waters thereof, (date ofcommencement of paragraph (b) to be proclaimed.), or in respect of anyperson present on or in any such mine, mining area, works, ship, boat orcrane. ”

While the OHS Act has made provision for excluding the application of the act on shippingactivities, in Clause 78 of the Government Notice 255 Ports Rules of 2009 requirescompliance of the OHS Act and its regulations.

“ 78. Occupational health and safety legislation

All persons, including service providers, terminal operators, drivers oftransport vehicles, employers, lessees and visitors within port limits, mustcomply with the provisions of any legislation relating to occupational healthand safety matters, including the Merchant Shipping Act No. 57 of 1951, theOccupational Health and Safety Act No. 85 of 1993 and its regulations, theMaritime Safety Regulations of 1994, the IMDG Code and the National RoadTraffic Act No. 93 of 1996. ”

Major Hazard Installation (MHI) regulations

The Major Hazard Installation (MHI) regulations (2001) published under Section 43 of theOccupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act) require employers, self-employed persons andusers who have on their premises, either permanently or temporarily, a major hazardinstallation or a quantity of a substance which may pose a risk (our emphasis) that could affectthe health and safety of workers and the public to conduct a risk assessment in accordancewith the legislation. In accordance with legislation, the risk assessment must be done by anapproved inspection authority (AIA), which is registered with the Department of Labour andaccredited by the South African Accreditation System (SANAS), prior to construction of thefacility.

Similar to Section 30 of NEMA as it relates to the health and safety of the public, the MHIregulations are applicable to the health and safety of workers and the public in relation to the



operation of a facility and specifically in relation to sudden or accidental major incidentsinvolving substances that could pose a risk to the health and safety of workers and the public.

It is important to note that the MHI regulations are applicable to the risks posed and not merelythe consequences. This implies that both the consequence and likelihood of an event need tobe evaluated, with the classification of an installation being determined on the risk posed toworkers and the public.

Notification of the MHI classification is described in the regulations as an advertisementplacement and specifies the timing of responses from the advertisement. It should be notedthat the regulation does not require public participation.

The regulations, summarised in Appendix D, essentially consists of six parts, namely:

1. The duties for notification of a Major Hazard Installation (existing or proposed),including:

a. Fixed;

b. Temporary installations;

2. The minimum requirements for a quantitative risk assessment (QRA);

3. The requirements for an on-site emergency plan;

4. The reporting steps for risk and emergency occurrences;

5. The general duties required of suppliers;

6. The general duties required of local government.

Pressure equipment regulations

These regulations apply to the design, manufacture, operation, repair, modification,maintenance, inspection and testing of pressure equipment, with a design pressure equal toor greater than 50 kPa, with a view to health and safety.

National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of 1977)

National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of 1977) governs howbuildings should be constructed. The legislation became enforceable as law in September1985 and two years later was published by the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) aspart of the original Code of Practice for the Application of the National Building Regulations(SABS 0400-1987).

The following referenced documents2 are indispensable for the application of this document:

SANS 10089-3 (SABS (2010), the petroleum industry; Part 3, The installation,

modification, and decommissioning of underground storage tanks, pumps/dispensersand pipework at service stations and consumer installations;

SANS 101313 (SABS (2004)), aboveground storage tanks for petroleum products.

2 For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of thereferenced document (including any amendments) applies.

3 SANS 10131 is a standard for tanks below the volume of 85 m3. Aboveground storage of petroleumproducts in bulk is covered in SANS 10089-1.



Study objectives

The risk assessment was completed as part of an environmental Basic Assessment (BA),conducted by SRK on behalf of BAIC. This risk assessment has the main objective todetermine any fatal flaws that would prevent the project from proceeding. This differs from aMajor Hazard Installation (MHI) risk assessment, which will determine if the project could beconstructed and operate with risks to employees and the public at an acceptable level.

The risk assessment should have a statement from a professional person covering thefollowing questions:

1. Whether the proposed project would likely be considered an MHI;

2. If it is likely to be considered an MHI, whether it would meet the requirements of theMHI regulations and whether the risks could be engineered or managed to meetacceptable risks;

3. Whether there are any factors that will prevent the project from proceeding to the nextphase of construction or whether the project could continue under certain conditions ormitigations;

4. Whether there are any special requirements that local authorities need to know whenevaluating the proposal.

Purpose and Main Activities

The main activity at the proposed BAIC facility in Coega is the receipt and storage of motorvehicle components, the assembly of motor vehicles, and the distribution of completedvehicles to retail customers.

Main Hazards Due to Substance and Process

The main hazards that would occur with a loss of containment of hazardous components atthe proposed BAIC facility in Coega include exposure to:

Thermal radiation from fires;

Overpressure from explosions

Approach to the study

As an approved inspection authority (AIA), RISCOM uses the methodologies and criteriadescribed in Appendix E.

It is important to know the difference between hazard and risk. A hazard is anything that hasthe potential to cause damage to life, the property and the environment. Furthermore, it is aconstant parameter (such as that of petrol, chlorine, ammonia, etc.) that poses the samehazard whenever present. Risk, on the other hand, is the probability that a hazard will actuallycause damage and how severe that damage will be. Risk is therefore the probability that ahazard will manifest itself. For instance, the risk presented by a chemical depends upon theamount present, the process it is used in, the design and safety features of its container,prevailing environmental and weather conditions, the exposures and so on.



Terms of Reference

The main aim of the investigation was to quantify the risks to employees, neighbours and thepublic with regard to the proposed modifications to the BAIC facility in Coega.

This risk assessment was conducted with the following terms of reference:

1. Development of accidental spill and fire scenarios for the facility;

2. Using generic failure rate data (for tanks, pumps, valves, flanges, pipework, gantry,couplings and so forth), determination of the probability of each accident scenario;



5. Using population density near the facility, determination of societal risk posed by thefacility.

This risk assessment is for the use of the Basic Assessment (BA) and is not intended toreplace a Major Hazard Installation risk assessment. Furthermore, the assessment coversonly acute events and sudden ruptures and not chronic and on-going releases, such as fugitiveemissions. It is not intended to be an environmental risk assessment and may not meetspecific the requirements of environmental legislation.

Assumptions and Limitations

The risk assessment was based on the documentation currently made available by the projectteam. EIAs are to suggest mitigation measures which may alter the design and layout of theproject. It is thus understood that detailed designs would be required taking into account theBA and Record of Decision to complete the design of the project for construction.

Riscom used the information provided and made engineering assumptions as described in thedocument to complete the quantitative risk assessment for the site. The accuracy of thedocument would be limited to the available documents presented at the BA.

Information Sources

The input to this BA specialist report has been derived from the following sources:

the site development plan for the site (STUDIO D’ÁRC 2016); the amended site development plan (STUDIO D’ÁRC 2018);

block plans and other building drawings for the construction of the Phase 1 facilities.



Facility Inspection

The BAIC site in Coega was inspected on the 25th of April 2018 with the objective of verifyingthe location of the site and the nature of the surrounding receiving environment. An artist’simpression of the site viewed from the north is contained in Figure 1-1.

The inspector representing RISCOM during the site visit was Mr I.D Ralston, accompanied byMs N. Rump and Ms T. Speyers both of SRK.

The representative for BAIC (SA) during the site visit was Dr B. B. Kgobane, accompanied bysite safety representatives.

The following observations were made during the site visit:

the site is located on a large site located in Zone 1S of the Coega Special EconomicZone to the west of the N2 highway;

the site is surrounded on three sides by the SEZ with the southern site boundaryforming part of the SEZ southern boundary;

the closest residential area is St Georges Strand which is located to the south of thesite;

construction of a number of the buildings/facilities has been completed or is inprogress. These include the gatehouse (A), offices (B), body shop and extension ( Cand D), as well as the despatch centre (E) and test track (F);

A vehicle assembly line for semi knocked down vehicles (SKD) has been establishedin the southern portion of the assembly/body shop (D). This is being used for thetraining of BAIC personnel;

The construction of the paint shop (1) will commence in the coming months; Areas have been established for the construction of the storage and offloading facilities

for LPG (2), diesel and unleaded petrol (3) and construction of these facilities will becompleted with the paint shop.

The facilities required for the assembly of completely knocked (CKD) down vehicles(4) will follow at a later stage;

Phase 2 will be located to the east of Phase 1 and is excluded from the current scope.

Figure 1-1: Artists impression of the BAIC Phases 1 and 2 viewed from the North East



Software

Physical consequences were calculated with DNV’s PHAST v. 6.7 and the data derived wasentered into TNO’s RISKCURVES v. 9.0.26. All calculations were performed by Mr I.D Ralstonand checked by Mr M.P Oberholzer.

These models were then inserted into the satellite image mentioned above to obtain graphicrepresentations of the various consequences and risk isopleths.

Ian Ralston’s professional and academic qualifications as well as a Curriculum Vitae areincluded in Appendix C.



2 ENVIRONMENT

General Background

Physical Address of facility:

Erf 233Lwandle StreetCoega Special Economic Zone (SEZ)Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.

The BAIC facility on satellite imagery, dated 2nd of December 2018.

Satellite Co-ordinates:South 33°48'50.27"East 25°39'15.39"

The BAIC facility, as shown in Figure 2-1, is located at Erf 233, in the southern portion of zone1 (1S) of the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ), between Lwandle Road and the StGeorges N2 interchange (R335). It lies approximately 16 km north east of Port Elizabeth and4.3km south west the deep-water Port of Ngqura in the Eastern Cape within the NelsonMandela Metropolitan Municipality.

The site is surrounded on three sides by the SEZ which has been designated for specialeconomic land use, with the southern site boundary forming part of the southern boundary ofthe SEZ. The closest residential area is St. Georges Strand, which lies approximately 280 msouth of the site.

The land use surrounding the BAIC facility is indicated below:

to the north is the remainder of zone 1S of the SEZ; to the east is open land which has been allocated to zone 8 (the port cluster) of the

SEZ; to the south is the R335 and undeveloped areas (thicket vegetation) with the residential

area of St Georges Strand beyond; to the west lies the N2 and across the motorway zone 2 of the SEZ (the automotive

cluster).



Figure 2-1: Location of the proposed BAIC facility in the Coega SEZ

Information for companies neighbouring BAIC and their classification as MHIs is contained inFigure 2-2. No neighbouring facilities have made themselves known to BAIC as MHIs. Thisinformation would need to be confirmed as part of the MHI risk assessment.



No.Company

NameNature of Business Address

Contact Person/Telephone No.

MHIYes/No

1 Caltex Service Centre 1 Wells Estate, St Georges Strand 041 461 1442 1 not required

2 CFR Freight Logistics 87 Nurburgring Rd, Coega 041 505 0600 not required

3 FAW SA Motor Vehicle Assembly Coega SEZ PE not required

4 Aldo Scribante Race Circuit Coega SEZ 041 461 1388 not required

5Vector

LogisticsLogistics

Coega SEZ not required

6APM

TerminalsContainer Handing Depot

(refrigerated citrus)Coega SEZ

041 816 3604not required

7PE ColdStorage

Cold Storage Bridgewater Street, Coega 041 405 0800not required

8General

Motors SAMotor Vehicle Assembly Coega SEZ

not required

ASt Georges

StrandResidential Area

BSt GeorgesInterchange

Motorway Interchange

C Wells Estate Residential Area

DCoegaPrimarySchool

Primary School

EAloes Railway

StationRailway Station

Figure 2-2: List of facilities neighbouring BAIC and their MHI classification

1 Information regarding the MHI status of the sites will be required for the completion of the MHI report.



Meteorology

Meteorological mechanisms govern dispersion, transformation and eventual removal ofhazardous vapours from the atmosphere. The extent to which hazardous vapours willaccumulate or disperse in the atmosphere is dependent on the degree of thermal andmechanical turbulence within the earth's boundary layer.

Dispersion comprises of vertical and horizontal components of motion. The stability and thedepth of the atmosphere from the surface (known as the mixing layer) define the verticalcomponent. The horizontal dispersion of hazardous vapours in the atmospheric boundarylayer is primarily a function of wind field. Wind speed determines both the distance ofdownwind transport and the rate of dilution as a result of stretching of the plume, andgeneration of mechanical turbulence is a function of the wind speed in combination withsurface roughness. Wind direction and variability in wind direction both determine the generalpath hazardous vapours will follow and the extent of crosswind spreading.

Concentration levels of hazardous vapours therefore fluctuate in response to changes inatmospheric stability, to concurrent variations in the mixing layer depth and to shifts in thewind field.

For this report, the meteorological conditions at Ngqura (Coega), as measured by the SouthAfrican Weather Services, were used as the basis of hourly wind speed and directiondeterminations. Due to an incomplete weather set at Coega with no hourly readings afterAugust 2015, the weather set comprised of four years from 1 January 2011 to 31 December2014.

The long-term weather conditions at Port Elizabeth, as measured by the South AfricanWeather Services, from 1981 to 2010 were used as the basis of, temperature, precipitationand atmospheric humidity and stability.



Surface Winds

Hourly averages of wind speed and direction recorded at Ngqura (Coega) were obtained fromthe South African Weather Services for the period from the 1st of January 2011 to the 31st ofDecember 2014.

Ngqura (Coega) does not experience calm conditions, with the yearly average being 1.5%The wind roses in Figure 2-3 depict seasonal variances of measured wind speeds. In summermonths, wind blows predominantly from the south with the south-south easterly winds havinga frequency over 10%. The southerly wings could be medium to high wind speeds with thelower frequency northerly wind consisting of predominantly low speed

During the winter months, the wind is predominantly from the north western quadrant with highfrequency medium to high wind speeds.

Figure 2-3: Seasonal wind speed as a function of wind direction at Ngqura (Coega)the period from 2011 to 2015



Precipitation and Relative Humidity

The long-term rainfall and relative humidity recorded at Port Elizabeth was obtained from theSouth African Weather Services for the period from 1981 to 2010, as given in Table 2-1.

In Port Elizabeth there is an average annual rainfall of 581 mm occurring throughout the yearwith no distinct winter or summer rainfall patterns.

The average relative humidity typically ranges from 61 % during the day to 82 % during thenight time. There is no marked seasonal variance between the relative humidity ranges.

Table 2-1: Long-term rainfall at Port Elizabeth

MonthAverage MaximumRelative Humidity

(%)

Average MinimumRelative Humidity

(%)

Average MonthlyPrecipitation

(mm)

January 82 63 39

February 84 64 38

March 84 64 51

April 83 63 45

May 81 56 47

June 78 52 54

July 79 52 40

August 82 58 67

September 82 63 45

October 83 65 57

November 83 65 53

December 82 63 45

Year 82 61 581



Temperature

The long-term temperatures recorded at Port Elizabeth was obtained from the South AfricanWeather Services for the period for the period from 1981 to 2010, as given in Table 2-2.

The surrounding region has a temperate climate with the average daily maximum between20°C and 25°C. Temperatures rarely extend below freezing, with the mean minimum averagedaily temperature of 13°C.

The diurnal temperature average was calculated to be 18°C, and liquid pool calculations werecalculated with a temperature of 18°C.

Table 2-2: Long-term temperatures measured at Port Elizabeth

Month

Temperature (°C)

HighestRecorded

Average DailyMean

Average DailyMaximum

Average DailyMinimum

January 37.3 21.6 25.6 17.6

February 37.6 21.9 25.9 17.9

March 39.6 20.6 24.7 16.4

April 40.1 18.7 23.4 14.0

May 36.9 16.8 22.1 11.4

June 32.4 14.5 20.5 8.6

July 33.1 14.2 20.2 8.2

August 34.4 14.8 20.0 9.6

September 39.0 15.7 20.3 11.0

October 39.1 17.1 21.2 13.1

November 38.2 18.7 22.7 14.6

December 36.0 20.3 24.3 16.2

Year 40.1 17.9 22.6 13.2



Atmospheric Stability

Atmospheric stability is frequently categorised into one of six stability classes. These arebriefly described in Table 2-3. Atmospheric stability, in combination with wind speed, isimportant in determining the extent of a particular hazardous vapour release.

A very stable atmospheric condition, typically at night, would have low wind speeds andproduce the greatest endpoint for a dense gas. Conversely, a buoyant gas would have thegreatest endpoint distance at high wind speeds.

Table 2-3: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability

StabilityClass

StabilityClassification

Description

A Very unstable Calm wind, clear skies, hot conditions during the day

B Moderately unstable Clear skies during the day

C UnstableModerate wind, slightly overcast conditions during the

day

D Neutral Strong winds or cloudy days and nights

E Stable Moderate wind, slightly overcast conditions at night

F Very stable Low winds, clear skies, cold conditions at night

The atmospheric stability for Ngqura (Coega), as a function of the wind class, was calculatedfrom hourly weather values supplied by the South African Weather Services from the 1st ofJanuary 2011 to the 31st of December 2014, as given in Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-4: Atmospheric stability as a function of wind direction



Calculations for this risk assessment are based on six representative weather classescovering stability conditions of stable, neutral and unstable as well as low and high windspeeds. In terms of Pasquill classes, representative conditions are given in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4: Representative weather classes

Stability Class Wind (m/s)

B 3

D 1.5

D 5

D 9

E 5

F 1.5

As wind velocities are vector quantities (having speed and direction) and blow preferentiallyin certain directions, it is mathematically incorrect to give an average wind speed over 360° ofwind direction; the result would be incorrect risk calculations.

It would also be incorrect to base risk calculations on one wind category, such as 1.5/F forexample. In order to obtain representative risk calculations, hourly weather data for windspeed and direction was analysed over a four-year period and categorised into the six windclasses for day and night conditions and 16 wind directions. The risk was then determinedusing contributions from each wind class in various wind directions.

The allocation of observations into the six weather classes is summarised in Table 2-5 withthe representative weather classes given in Figure 2-5.

Table 2-5: Allocation of observations into six weather classes

Wind Speed A B B/C C C/D D E F

< 2.5 m/s

B 3 m/s

D 1.5 m/s F 1.5 m/s

2.5 - 6 m/s D 5 m/sE 5 m/s

> 6 m/s D 9 m/s



Figure 2-5: Representative weather classes for Ngqura (Coega)

Default Meteorological Values

Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on local conditions, are given inTable 2-6.

Table 2-6: Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on localconditions

Parameter Default Value (Day) Default Value (Night)

Ambient temperature (°C) 23 13

Substrate or bund temperature (°C) 18 18

Water temperature (°C) 18 18

Air pressure (bar) 1.013 1.013

Humidity (%) 61 82

Fraction of a 24-hour period 0.5 0.5

Mixing height 1 1

1 The default values for the mixing height, which are included in the model, are:1500 m for Weather Category B3; 300 m for Weather Category D1.5; 500 m for Weather Category D5and Weather Category D9; 230 m for Weather Category E5; and, 50 m for Weather Category F1.5.



3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

Site

The BAIC facility in Coega consists of process facilities, offices, workshops, warehouses andhazardous chemical installations, as shown in Figure 3-1.

No. Description No. Description

1 Offices 8 Pond

2 Paint Shop 9 Diesel and ULP fuel station

3 Body Assembly Shop 10 Oil/Chemical Store

4 250 kℓ Fire Tanks and pumps 11 Waste centre

5 Sewerage plant and water tank 12 Energy centre/compressors

6 Product parking and dispatch 13 LPG Offloading and 2x90 m3 tanks

7 Test track 14 CKD Body Shop (Stage2)

15 Pond A,B,C Vehicle entrances

Phase 1

Phase 2

Figure 3-1: Site layout



Process Description

Manufacturing Process

The BAIC facility will comprise of an automotive manufacturing plant which will be constructedin two phases and various sub-phases (stages).

Phase 1 (comprises 3 stages) of the development consists the workshops, offices andancillary buildings required for the manufacture of both semi-knocked down (SKD) andcompletely knocked down (CKD), vehicles. The anticipated production for Stage 1 willbe 50,000 units per annum stepping up to 100,000 units per annum by the end of Stage3.

A number of the facilities have already been constructed and the SKD assembly hasbeen established. BAIC employees are currently receiving training in preparation forproduction.

Phase 2 will include the facilities to manufacture vehicle components and store SKDcomponents required for full manufacture of up to 100 000 vehicles, but this liesoutside the scope of this report.

Initially vehicles will be received partially assembled (semi knocked down (SKD)), which willbe assembled in the Stage 1 body and assembly shop which has already been constructed(as illustrated in Figure 3-2). Inspection and testing requirements would be provided for, buthere would be minimal requirements for painting, etc. Construction of the paint shop wouldcommence during this phase.

The assembly of completely knocked down (CKD) vehicle parts and components (completelyknocked down (CKD)), will have require body assembly and painting (as illustrated inFigure 3-3). This would be provided for by a separate body shop for the assembly of bodypanels and the completed paint shop (Phase 1 Stage 2).

Phase 1 Stage 3 would require the expansion of the assembly and body shops toaccommodate additional vehicle assembly requirements. Non-assembled vehicle parts andcomponents, as well as raw materials will be received by road from various suppliers.

The unpainted body (“body-in-white”) will be assembled by welding, gluing or riveting formedbody panels together and will be transferred to the paint shop. Various coatings/paints will beapplied to the body for its protection. Gas fired (LPG) drying ovens will be provided to dry thevarious coats between applications.

Other components will be added to the vehicle such as:

hard trim (instrument panels, steering columns, and body glass); soft trim (seats and upholstery); engine and tyres.

The vehicle will finally be subjected to rigorous inspection including driving the vehicles on atest track. Completed vehicles will be despatched from site, by road to meet clientrequirements.

Chemicals (paints and solvents) and fuels (liquid petroleum gas, petrol and diesel) will be usedas part of the process, triggering NEMA listed activities (storage of dangerous goods thatexceeds the 80 m3 threshold). The transportation and storage of these are described below.



Figure 3-2: Semi knocked down (SKD) flow schematic

Figure 3-3: Completely knocked down (CKD) flow schematic



Offloading and LPG Storage

BAIC will use LPG (a mixture of propane and butane) to heat the various drying ovens locatedin the paint shop. The gas will be stored as a liquid in two 90 m3 pressure vessels underambient conditions. A layout sketch of the area was prepared by Riscom based on BAIC layoutdrawings for facilities containing smaller tanks (Figure 3-4).

BAIC has recently prepared an interim report itemising the design considerations that are tobe incorporated during the detailed design of the LPG facility (Section 17.3 of Appendix G).

It is estimated that to produce 100 000 motor vehicles (full production) will require an averageLPG consumption of 43.5m3 per day. Two 90m3 horizontal steel pressure vessels are providedto ensure adequate buffer capacity to meet production requirements.

The storage vessels would typically be designed to operate at a maximum working pressureof 17 bar (g), and a temperature range of –50 ⁰C to 150 ⁰C. The liquefied gas is fed to direct flame vaporizers. The regulator bank would typically operate at an inlet pressure of 7 bar (g)and an outlet of pressure of 1 bar (g). A 150 mm (6’’) pipeline would carry the gas from theregulator station to the paint shop. The pressure will be reduced further to be fed to the burnersat the ovens.

The LPG gas is fed by underground pipeline to the paint shop and is sleeved at all penetrationpoints into the building, as added safety and protection to the line.

The storage vessels are protected by a sprinkler system that would activate in the event afire.

Figure 3-4: LPG storage and offloading layout sketch

LPG will be delivered to the site via road tankers having a carrying capacity of 47 000 ℓ in a single compartment. A dedicated ring road and canopy will be provided for gas delivery, thecanopy will be protected by a sprinkler system. Bollards are provided to prevent interactionsbetween the LPG installation and the road tankers.

7-8 deliveries per week would be required to meet consumption requirements.



Facilities for the filling of forklift cylinders will be provided. A liquid line from the filling tankwould extend into the cylinder-filling bay where the pressure would be increased by a pumpto fill the cylinders. The operator would place a 19 kg cylinder on the scale, connect the flexiblehose to the cylinder and fill the empty cylinder until it contains 19 kg of LPG. At this stage, theoperator will terminate the filling operation and disconnect the flexible filling hose.The number of cylinders to be filled per year has not been specified.

The LPG gas storage area will be fenced to prevent unauthorized access and two doublegates will facilitate escape in the event of a fire. A sloping concrete pad (sloped away from thetanks) will be provided to prevent accumulation of LPG liquid beneath the tanks.

Fuel Filling Area

Diesel and petrol will be required for vehicle testing.

The refuelling station for vehicles will be located beneath a roofed canopy. Diesel and ULPfuel dispensers will be located on a central island and will dispense to both sides of the island.Spill areas will collect any fuel spillages and direct them to the separator. Fuel will also bepumped to four dispensers (2 diesel and 2 ULP) that will be located in the body shop.

Diesel and ULP will be delivered to site by road tanker, each delivery will consist of 30,000-40 000 ℓ of ULP or diesel. It is delivered in a multi-compartmented tanker with a maximum compartment size of 7000 ℓ. It is anticipated that 38 deliveries of each, will be required per annum based on the manufacture of 100 000 vehicles.

Diesel will be stored in a steel 50m3 aboveground tank which is bunded (80m2) to containspillage. ULP will be stored in a steel 50m3 underground tank. Diesel and ULP will be pumpedto the various dispensers via underground pipelines as required for vehicle refuelling.

The offloading area will be provided with a spill slab and cut off drainage. Spillages during off-loading will spread over the concreted filler spill slab provided and will be directed to theseparator via cut off drains. Spillages and contaminated stormwater from the diesel bundedarea will also be directed to the separator.

Spillages containing hydrocarbons will be directed to the 3 closed compartments that makeup the separator. Water will be separated from coagulated fuel by decantation, and the waterwill then be sent to the storm water drain. The separator is located adjacent to the fuel fillingarea.



Figure 3-5: Diesel and ULP storage and offloading layout sketchFlammable Storages

Oil-Chemical Storage

A separate storage is provided for the storage of packaged goods such as oils, paraffin,lubricants, solvents etc. in an allocated building designed for this purpose (only allocated toflammable materials).

The building has been constructed with three compartments (1x 89 m2 and 2 x 179 m2) eachof which is provided with walls, a bunded area (150 mm high), and a fire protection system(roof mounted sprinklers). Segregated storage of the packaged goods on the basis of theirflashpoint.

Mechanical ventilation is provided on the roof.

The oil chemical store has been constructed will currently not be used for the storage offlammable materials. During the ramp-up it envisaged that up to 84 m3 of flammable materialswill be stored in this facility.

Paint Mixing and Storage Area

A paint mixing and storage area is provided in the south-east corner of the proposed paintshop. Packaged goods such paints, solvents, etc. will be stored and prepared for use in thepaint shop.

The mixing and storage facilities will be separated in two different areas.


The walls and roof area between this area will be constructed of materials that have a minimumfire rating of 120min. Windows will be omitted to protect personnel from glass projectiles in theevent of an explosion.

Spillage and runoff in the area will be collected for disposal to protect the environment.

Foam activated sprinklers will be activated in the event of a fire.

Effluent Treatment Plant


Storage areas are required for the storage of chemicals for the treatment of plant effluents(water) which are predominantly sourced from the paint shop.

Bulk storages for 35 % Hydrochloric Acid have been identified as being located in this areafrom the drawings provided.

Waste Storage







Fire Fighting System

A conceptual Fire Protection Design was provided in the documentation provided (STUDIOD’ÁRC (2016)).

Two 250 m3 fire water tanks sufficient for 2 hours supply is provided. Two (2) water pumpsdriven by diesel motors (one (1) duty and one (1) standby pump will supply water to the hydrantring main ensuring sufficient flow rates and pressures. One (1) electrical jockey pump willmaintain system pressure in the water ring main preventing false alarms.

Dedicated sprinkler systems will be provided at in the following areas:

Bulk LPG storage vessels and offloading area; Paint Mixing and Storage area; Oil-Chemical Store; Cut-off sprinklers will be installed at both ends of the inter-connected bridge structures

to prevent horizontal fire spread.

Bulk Hazardous Chemical Inventory





Packaged Hazardous Chemical Inventory





Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site

A summary of the bulk hazardous materials considered for storage on site during operation atfull capacity is given in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Summary of hazardous components to be stored on site

TankNo. Product CAS No.

1TankHeight

(m)

1TankDiameter/

Width(m)

TankVolume

(m3)Tank Type

1 LPGMixture:propane74-98-6butane

106-97-8

3.05 13.2 90 Horizontal steel, aboveground

2 LPG 3.05 13.290

Horizontal steel, aboveground

3 Diesel 68334-30-5 8.5 2.9 50 Horizontal steel, aboveground

4 ULP 86290-81-5 8.5 2.9 50 Horizontal steel, below ground

Total Storage Capacity 320

1 Based on typical dimensions for this type of tank



4 METHODOLOGY

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presentsto the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability andconsequence should be considered, but there are occasions where, if either the probability orthe consequence can be shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can bemade based on just one factor.








The QRA process is summarised with the following steps:

1. Identification of components that are flammable, toxic, reactive or corrosive and thathave potential to result in a major incident from fires, explosions or toxic releases;

2. Development of accidental loss of containment (LOC) scenarios for equipmentcontaining hazardous components (including release rate, location and orientation ofrelease);



5. Using the population density near the facility, determination of societal risk posed bythe facility.

The QRA process is described in more detail in Appendix E.



HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Notifiable Substances


BAIC proposes to store LPG in quantities of greater than 25 t in a single vessel (90 m3) and isrequired to notify the authorities accordingly. For this reason alone, the BAIC site in Coegawould be classified as a Major Hazard Installation and would be required to prepare anMHI Quantitative Risk assessment Report.

Substance Hazards

All components on site were assessed for potential hazards according to the criteria discussedin this section.

Chemical Properties

A short description of the bulk hazardous components to be stored on, or delivered to site isgiven in the following subsections. The material safety data sheets (MSDSs) of the respectivematerials are attached in Appendix J.

Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG)

LPG is used as a fuel in a range of applications including in heating and cooking appliances,industrial applications, in vehicles and as a propellant and refrigerant. LPG can be obtainedprimarily as propane, butane or a mixture of the two. It is a colourless odourless liquid to whicha powerful odorant is added so that it is easily detected.

LPG is highly flammable and heavier than air so that it will settle and may accumulate in lowspots such drains and basements. In these areas it could present a significant fire or explosionor suffocation hazard. As a flammable gas LPG would fall into class 2.1 (SANS 10228 (SABS(2012)).

For the purposes of this MHI report the LPG mixture has been simulated as pure propane.

Propane is a colourless gas at room temperature with an odour of commercial natural gas. Ithas a low boiling point of ˗41.9C and is often compressed and transported and sold as aliquid, primarily as a fuel.

Propane is a severe fire and explosion hazard, with an invisible vapour that spreads easilyand can be set on fire by many sources such as pilot lights, welding equipment, electricalmotors, switches, etc. It is heavier than air and can travel along ground for some distance toan ignition source, or it can persist as pockets in areas of restricted airflow, that could pose arisk of delayed ignition



Propane is not compatible with strong oxidants and can react with these, resulting in fires andexplosions.

Propane is not considered a carcinogenic material. The toxicology and the physical andchemical properties of propane suggest that overexposure is unlikely to aggravate existingmedical conditions.

Overexposure to propane may cause dizziness and drowsiness. Effects of a single (acute)overexposure may result in asphyxiation, due to lack of oxygen that could be fatal. Self-contained breathing apparatus may be required by rescue workers. Moderate concentrationsmay cause headache, drowsiness, dizziness, excitation, excess salivation, vomiting andunconsciousness. Vapour contact with the skin will not cause any harm. However, contactwith the liquid may cause frostbite due to the low temperature of liquid propane.

Unleaded Petroleum Petrol (ULP, Gasoline)

Petrol is a hydrocarbon mixture with variable composition with a boiling point range of between20°C and 215°C. It is a pale-yellow liquid with strong petroleum odour. Due to the flashpointof ˗40°C, it is considered highly flammable and will readily ignite under suitable conditions. The vapours are heavier than air and may travel some distance to an ignition source.

Petrol may contain up to 5% volume of benzene, a known animal carcinogen. It may alsocontain ethers and alcohols, as oxygenates, to a maximum concentration of 2%. It may alsocontain small quantities of multifunctional additives to enhance performance in a combustionengine.

It is stable under normal conditions but will react with strong oxidising agents and nitratecompounds. Such a reaction may cause fires and explosions.

Although it is of a low to moderate oral toxicity to adults, ingestion of small quantities mayprove dangerous or fatal to small children.

Contact with vapours may result in a slight irritation of nose, eyes and skin. Vapours maycause headache, dizziness, loss of consciousness or suffocation; lung irritation with coughing,gagging, dyspnoea, substernal distress and rapidly developing pulmonary oedema.

If swallowed, it may cause nausea or vomiting, swelling of the abdomen, headache, CNSdepression, coma and death.

The long-term effects of exposure have not been determined. However, it may affect lungsand may cause skin to dry out and become cracked.

Petrol floats on water and can result in environmental hazards with large spills into waterways.It is harmful to aquatic life in high concentrations.

Diesel

Diesel is a hydrocarbon mixture with variable composition and a boiling-point range between252°C and 371°C. It is a pale-yellow liquid with a petroleum odour. Due to a flashpoint between38°C and 65°C, it is not considered highly flammable, but it will readily ignite under suitableconditions.



It is stable under normal conditions. It will react with strong oxidising agents and nitratecompounds. This reaction may cause fires and explosions.

Diesel is not considered a toxic material. Contact with vapours may result in slight irritation tonose, eyes and skin. Vapours may cause headache, dizziness, loss of consciousness orsuffocation as well as lung irritation with coughing, gagging, dyspnoea, substernal distressand rapidly developing pulmonary oedema.

If swallowed, it may cause nausea or vomiting, swelling of the abdomen, headache, CNSdepression, coma and death.

The long-term effects of exposure have not been determined. However, this may affect thelungs and may cause the skin to dry out and become cracked.

Diesel floats on water and can result in environmental hazards with large spills into waterways.It is harmful to aquatic life in high concentrations

Corrosive Liquids

Corrosive liquids considered under this subsection are those components that have a low orhigh pH and that may cause burns if they come into contact with people or may attack andcause failure of equipment.

No bulk materials to be stored on, produced at or delivered to site are considered extremelycorrosive.



Reactive Components

Reactive components are components that when mixed or exposed to one another react in away that may cause a fire, explosion or release a toxic component.

All components to be stored on, produced at or delivered to site are considered thermallystable under atmospheric conditions. The reaction with air is covered under the subsectiondealing with ignition probabilities.

Flammable and Combustible Components

Flammable and combustible components are those that can ignite and give a number ofhazardous effects, depending on the nature of the component and conditions. These effectsmay include pool fires, jet fires and flash fires as well as explosions and fireballs.

The flammable and combustible components to be stored on, produced at or delivered to siteare listed in Table 4-1. These components have been analysed for fire and explosion risks.

Table 4-1: Flammable and combustible components stored on, produced at ordelivered to site

Compound Cas No.FlashPoint(°C)

BoilingPoint(°C)

LFL(vol. %)

UFL(vol. %)

SANS 10228Classification

propane 74-98-6 -103.7 -42 2 9.5 2.1

butane 106-97-8 -104.4 -0.5 2.1 9.5 2.1

diesel 68334-30-5 > 55 290 0.6 7.5 3

ULP 86290-81-5 -40 87 1.4 7.6 3

Fuels consist of a mixture of components and may have small variances with regards to theparameters listed.

Toxic and Asphyxiant Components

Toxic or asphyxiant components of interest to this study are those that could producedispersing vapour clouds upon release into the atmosphere. These could then cause harmthrough inhalation or absorption through the skin. Typically, the hazard posed by toxic orasphyxiant components will depend on both concentration of the component in the air and theexposure duration.

No bulk components stored on, produced at or delivered to site are considered acutely toxicor asphyxiant.

Environmental Considerations

Petrol and diesel are contaminants that can contribute to environmental degradation. In largeconcentrations, they are highly toxic to many organisms, including humans. Petroleum alsocontains trace amounts of sulphur and nitrogen compounds, which are dangerous bythemselves and can react with the environment to produce secondary poisonous chemicals.



Physical Properties

For this study, petrochemical components were modelled as a pure component, as given inTable 4-2. The physical properties used in the simulations were based on the DIPPR1 database. See Appendix F for the physical and toxicological values used in the simulations.

Table 4-2: Representative components

Component Modelled as

LPG propane

ULP n-heptane

Diesel n-dodecane

Components Excluded from the Study

Components excluded from the study are listed in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Components excluded from the study

Component Inventory Reasons for Exclusion

Diesel (emergencygenerator)

1 000 kgssmall bunded inventory locatedwell away from site boundary.

Diesel dispensersFuel filling area

small nozzles and low flowrates

Diesel dispensersBody Shop

small nozzles and low flowrates

Workshop gasessmall inventories of portablecylinders

1 Design Institute for Physical PRoperties



Historical Major Incidents at LPG Storage Facilities

Historical Major Incidents at LPG Facilities

There is a lot of benefit/opportunity to be derived from the review of historical accident data,since one can learn from both one’s own mistakes and the mistakes of others (lessons learnt).It is vital to ensure that the accident data included in the review has some relevance to siterequirements.

The LPG storage and offloading facilities have yet to be constructed at BAIC.

Major Incidents

There have been several large incidents involving LPG bulk installations over the years. Thesewould include:

San Ixhuatepec, Mexico (November 1984). An explosion whilst offloading escalated toresult in massive BLEVEs to two 1 250 t and four 650 t LPG storage spheres. Thesecond BLEVE resulted in a 3-400 m fireball and the result was total destruction of thefacility;

Visakhapatnam, India (September 1997). A leak in a pipeline found a source of ignitionproducing a vapour cloud explosion destroying seven tanks.

These incidents highlight the following:

the potential severity of LPG incidents arising from its fire and explosive hazards; the potential for LPG incidents/fires to escalate into BLEVEs (domino effects).

Grove Park Mills, Maryhill, Glasgow – Tuesday 11th May 2004

An LPG explosion occurred in the basement of the former mill building, as a result nine peoplelost their lives and forty-five were seriously injured in the explosion and subsequent collapseof the building. In the enquiry that followed, it was concluded that an old buried pipeline hadcorroded and the resultant leak had caused LPG to accumulate in the basement.

The high-level enquiry appointed to investigate the incident came to a number of conclusionsregarding the safety management of commercial LPG installations:

the importance of the design of the facility; the importance of change management. Modifications to the site had caused the gas

pipeline to be buried resulting in corrosion to the line and an inability to inspect it; LPG leaks into unventilated voids may have serious consequences; the industrial norm for the supplier to supply both the product and the tank to the

industrial user, and installation arrangements vary according to the supplier. This canbe an issue particularly in the event of a change of supplier and may have resulted inthe owner not realising its responsibility for the service pipework. A heavy emphasiswas placed on the need for the maintenance of comprehensive installation records.

the need for independent verification of the installation and maintenance of LPG pipingand tanks.

the system of risk assessments (between the site the Health and Safety Executive)that was supposed to be in place had failed.



Effectiveness of Mitigation Measures

Mitigation is a key consideration in the preventing the escalation of incidents involving LPG.

An example of this would be the extensive use of excess flow valves (EFVs) in preventingpipe or hose breaks from becoming more serious incidents. In some cases, it can bedemonstrated that in some instances they did not perform as intended, because ofmisapplication. This is highlighted in an American Environmental Protection Safety Alert (EPA(2007)).

This highlights the importance of ensuring that not only are mitigations/safety controls in place,but that they will also be effective in the event of an emergency situation.

Offloading Incidents:

Riscom is aware of some incidents that have occurred in South Africa due to the following:

failure/rupture of offloading hoses; failure of offloading couplings.



IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PHYSICAL AND CONSEQUENCE MODELLING)

The production of semi-knockdown vehicles at the BAIC facility which is currently beingphased in does not require the storage of flammable liquids in bulk. Transition to theproduction of completely knocked down vehicles will require the installation of the paint shoptogether with various storages for liquid fuels, paints, solvents, etc. The presence of theseflammable liquids potentially poses the potential for increased impacts and risks associatedwith fire and explosion, on employees, neighbouring operations and the public.

A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) using the Major Hazard Installation regulations as aguideline is used to assess the extent of these impacts and risks. The methodologies arecompliant with SANS1461 (SABS (2018a)) for the completion of MHI Risk Assessments,which is based on the Dutch Legislation described in RIVM (2009). In the absence of specificmethodologies and assumptions not specified in SANS 1461, the relevant methodologies andassumptions were based on RIVM (2009) e.g. reference height of 1m above the ground wouldbe consistent with the RIVM (2009) standard. Specific consequence values, duration timesand interpretations were also based on RIVM (2009), except where values to be plotted onmaps are specified in SANS1461.

Each flammable liquid storage facility was assessed, by selecting the relevant scenarios andcompleting outflow and consequence modelling. Selection of the release scenarios was basedon SANS 1461 (RIVM (2009)). The consequences and associated risks for each scenariowere then used to compile a total risk profile for each facility.


The methodology used in this study is fully described in Appendix E.



LPG Storage and Offloading

Purpose of Processing Unit

LPG would be transported to the facility by road tanker and stored in vessels as a liquid underpressure. Liquid LPG would be drawn from the vessels as required by the process, andvapourised using vaporisers for use in the various gas ovens located in the paint shop.

LPG would also be used to fill the cylinders required for the forklifts used in material handling.

Hazard Identification

LPG is considered to be an extremely flammable component but is not considered acutelytoxic. The vapour is heavier than air and may accumulate in low lying areas.

More than 25 t of LPG would be stored in each of the 90m3 which would then be classifiedas a notifiable substance, automatically classifying the facility as a Major HazardInstallation. Notwithstanding this it is still required to make a determination of the extentto which the public may be affected by means of a QRA.

Consequence Modelling

The incident scenarios considered for LPG are given in Appendix I.

Pool fires

LPG is a gas under atmospheric temperatures and pressures. The LPG is stored as a liquiddue the high pressure within the storage vessel. A loss of containment of liquid LPG from astorage vessel or road tanker impinging directly the on the ground would result in a spreadingpool. A portion of the liquid would vaporise, whilst the remaining liquid would form the pool atthe boiling temperature of the LPG. As with uncontained liquids the pool would spread until itcould spread no more, or until it is contained by a natural barrier.

LPG storage tanks are required to be unbunded (SANS 10087 Part 3 (SABS (2015)) and aliquid or two-phase spill will spread until it is contained by the nearest buildings or otherobstructions. The nearest buildings at the BAIC facility are located approximately 90 m fromthe LPG storages and the LPG would be able to flow until it reaches the maximum diameterof 56-63m depending on the wind conditions.

The maximum spread of the fires and associated thermal radiation are summarised inTable 4-4, whilst the thermal radiation isopleths for loss of containment from storage vesselare depicted in Figure 4-1. The solid lines represent the thermal radiation due to a strong windfrom all directions, whilst the thinner lines represent wind from a northerly direction.



Table 4-4: Thermal Radiation Endpoint distances for pool fires

Results 47 m3 Road Tanker 90 m3 Tank

Initial mass in vessel (kg) 23 596 45 180

Maximum diameter of the pool fire (m) 44 62

Distance to 4 kW/m2 (m) 171 225

Distance to 10 kW/m2 (m) 124 162

Distance to 37.5 kW/m2 (m) 79 99

In the event of a large pool fire, the LPG storage vessels could be damaged with knock-onevents such as LPG tank BLEVEs (as discussed in Appendix E).

It is thus imperative that the water sprays are operational and working to the design flow rates.

The open spaces around the storage vessels provide adequate egress for site personnel soas not to pass too close to the fire. Evacuation to beyond the extent of the 4 kW/m2 isoplethwould be required.

The 4 kW/m2 is capable of breaking glass and is the lower limit in emergency planning forescape routes. The 10 kW/m2 represents the 1% fatality for unprotected people, with exposureduration at 20 seconds. The 37.5 kW/m2 represents initial damage to metal equipment.

The impacts from pool fires could extend beyond the site boundary to the south but its spreadwould be checked by the ring road running around the facility perimeter. The potential to startveld fires in the thicket vegetation that lies between the site boundary and the residential areaof St Georges Strand would exist.



LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION(kW/m2)41037.5

Figure 4-1: Thermal radiation for a large LPG pool fire (LPG storage fixed duration)



Jet Fires

Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) Failure

A multiport pressure safety valve (PSV) would be located on the LPG tanks and is a statutoryrequirement to protect the vessel in the event of overpressure. Overpressure in the tankabove the set pressure would cause PSV to rise and would result in a vertical release froma height of 5.5 m of LPG vapour which may ignite when exposed to a source of ignition. Astrong wind could tilt the flame towards the ground resulting in the largest impact distancefor ground thermal radiation.

Figure 4 2 illustrates the thermal radiation for a single vessel, highlighting the impact ofthermal radiation and its rapid drop off with distance. The flame length in calm conditions (nowind) was calculated at 39 m. At high wind speeds the flame would be tilted producing alarger thermal radiation at ground level. At a wind speed of 9 m/s the maximum referencelevel of thermal radiation would be 23 kW/m2 (at 1.0 m aboveground).

The edge of the flame would have over 238 kW/m2 of thermal radiation and could potentiallycause damage to an adjacent unprotected LPG vessel if impacted.

Figure 4-2: Thermal radiation from a PSV jet fire at varying wind speeds (with thereference height 1 m aboveground)

The solid lines indicate the effect zone in all wind directions. While the effect zone appearslarge, the actual damage due to high thermal radiation would be localised to a relatively smallarea.

The 1% fatality, represented by the 10 kW/m2 thermal radiation isopleth, extends to the siteboundary whilst the 4 kW/m2 isopleth extends slightly beyond. The 1% fatality could occurup to distance of 27.8m downwind of the jet fire if people were not able to escape, as shownin Figure 4-3: Lethality from PSV jet fire.

Thermal radiation that would result in 100% fatality and damage to steel, represented by the37.5 kW/m2 isopleth, is not reached, despite this impact on LPG and liquid fuel tanks withcascading effects cannot be ignored (must be taken into consideration as part of the designof the PSV installation).



LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION(kW/m2)410 (1 % fatality)37.5 (not reached)

Figure 4-3: Lethality from PSV jet fire

90m3 Storage Vessel Empties in 10 min

The release of the entire contents of the 90 m3 vessel would require a hole of approximately60 mm in diameter. Initially the released material would consist of two-phase flow, but onceignited it would form a jet fire. A horizontal flame can reach a maximum length of 63 m with alow wind speed. The maximum radiation of the flame will be at the surface of the flame andwill decrease rapidly from the flame surface.

The thermal radiation isopleths are depicted in Figure 4-4. The solid lines represent thethermal radiation due to wind from all directions, while the thinner lines represent wind from anortherly direction.

The impacts from jet fire could extend beyond the site boundary to the south. The potential tostart veld fires (knock-on effect) in the thicket vegetation that lies between the site boundaryand the residential area of Saint Georges Strand would exist.

The 4 kW/m2 is capable of breaking glass and is the lower limit in emergency planning forescape routes. The 10 kW/m2 represents the 1% fatality for unprotected people, with exposureduration at 20 seconds. The 37.5 kW/m2, which represents initial damage to metal equipment.

The open spaces around the storage vessels provide adequate egress for site personnel soas not to pass too close to the fire. Evacuation to beyond the extent of the 4 kW/m2 isoplethwould be required.



LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION(kW/m2)41037.5

Figure 4-4: Radiation Isopleths for a jet fire resulting from fixed duration releasefrom a 90m3 LPG Tank



Flash Fires

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but could extend beyond thislimit, due to the formation of pockets. It is assumed that unprotected people within the flashfire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash fire would remainunharmed.

The dominant flash fire scenario is the failure of a single 90 m3 storage vessel, as shown inFigure 4-5. Off-site impacts are indicated by the LFL, which in the worst-case scenario canextend 341 m downwind of the release.

In the worst conditions, a flash fire from a loss of containment of LPG could extend into thearea of undeveloped thicket to the south of the facility but would not extend into the existingresidential areas of Saint Georges Strand.

LEGEND SCENARIO90m3 LPG tank – catastrophic failure90m3 LPG tank – empty in 10 minRoad tanker – catastrophic failureRoad tanker - empty in 10 min

Figure 4-5: Flash fire limits due to various releases of LPG



Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs)

The 0.1 bar blast overpressure isopleths, represents the 1% fatality for a VCE, no lethal effectsare expected below 0.1 bar overpressure for people in the open.

A loss of containment of LPG with an ignition source could form either a flash fire or a vapourcloud explosion. Figure 4-6 indicates various scenarios having large blast overpressures of0.1 bar due to the release of flammable vapours from loss of containment scenarios underworst meteorological conditions. In this instance, the vapours drifted to an ignition point beforedetonating. This is referred to as a late explosion. The solid lines indicate the effects from allwind directions.

The 0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of houses being severely damaged and aprobability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 baroverpressure for people in the open.

In the worst conditions, a VCE from a loss of containment of LPG could extend into the areaof undeveloped thicket to the south of the facility and in the worst case would extend into theexisting residential area of Saint Georges Strand.

LEGEND SCENARIO90m3 LPG tank – catastrophic failure90m3 LPG tank – empty in 10 minRoad tanker – catastrophic failureRoad tanker - empty in 10 min

Figure 4-6: 0.1 bar overpressures from VCEs due to LPG releases



The worst-case blast overpressures, which in this case would be the catastrophic failure ofthe 90 m3 propane tank, are shown in Figure 4-7. The thinner solid lines indicate theoverpressures due to vapours drifting from a northerly wind, while the thicker solid show theeffect zone due to drifting vapour clouds from all wind directions.

The 0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of houses being severely damaged and aprobability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 baroverpressure for people in the open. The 0.03 bar corresponds to the critical overpressurecausing windows to break, thus the limit of building damage. The 0.3 bar overpressurerepresents 100% fatality for people in the open and could result severe damage to buildings.The 0.7 bar represents almost total destruction.

Windows would be broken (0.03 bar overpressure isopleth) over a wide area of St GeorgesStrand.

The catastrophic failure a pressure storage vessel has a very low probability, and thus theworst-case scenario is an unlikely event (high impact but low frequency).

LEGEND BLAST OVERPRESSURE(bar)0.030.10.30.7Drift line

Figure 4-7: Blast overpressures for the worst-case vapour cloud explosion



Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs)

BLEVEs can occur at the storage vessel as well at the delivery road tanker. The characteristicsof these BLEVEs are given in Table 4-5.

Table 4-5: BLEVE characteristics

Parameter90m3 Storage

Vessel47m3 Road

Tanker

Initial mass in vessel (kg) 45 184 23 596

Burst pressure of the vessel (bar) 25 25

Duration of the fireball (s) 13.8 11.7

Maximum diameter of the fireball (m) 211 171

Maximum height of the fireball (m) 316 256

Distance to 1% fatality (m) 380 280

The 1% fatality isopleths for the LPG storage vessel and the LPG road tanker BLEVEs areshown in Figure 4-8. In the worst case the 1% fatality extends over the southern site boundaryinto the area of undeveloped thicket and impacts the north western portion of the existing StGeorges Strand residential area.

LEGEND SCENARIO90m3 LPG tankLPG Road tanker

Figure 4-8: The 1% fatality isopleths for various BLEVEs



LEGEND FATALITY %(%)1105090

Figure 4-9: Worst case fatality isopleths for a BLEVE incident



Maximum Individual Risk

The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth, due to a release of flammable LPGextends beyond the site boundary into the thicket vegetation that lies between the site andresidential area of Saint Georges Strand, as shown in Figure 4-10. As a result, the BAIC facilitywould be classified as a Major Hazard Installation.

The risk to the public would be considered acceptable based on the calculation of the societalrisk.

LEGEND RISK(fatalities per person per year)1x10˗4

1x10˗5

1x10˗6

3x10˗7

Figure 4-10: Lethal probability isolines associated with the LPG installation



ULP and Diesel Storage


ULP and diesel fuel are required to fill the vehicles to manoeuvre them around the site andtest them.



Pool fires, either tank or bund fires, consist of large volumes of a flammable liquid componentburning in an open space at atmospheric pressure.

The flammable component will be consumed at the burning rate, depending on factorsincluding prevailing winds. During combustion heat will be released in the form of thermalradiation. Temperatures close to the flame centre will be high but will reduce rapidly totolerable temperatures over a relatively short distance. Any building or persons close to thefire or within the intolerable zone will experience burn damage with severity depending on thedistance from the fire and time exposed to the heat of the fire.

In the event of a pool fire, the flames will tilt according to the wind speed and direction. Theflame length and tilt angle affect the distance of thermal radiation generated.

The refuelling station has relatively few scenarios associated with it. These are describedbelow.

Pool fires

An instantaneous failure of the diesel storage vessel can result in a portion of the materialoverflowing the top of the bund, which is referred to as overtopping. The amount of overtoppingis taken to average 33% and is translated to the risk assessment by increasing the surfacearea of the bund by 50% (RIVM 2009).

A release at the diesel tank that is not considered catastrophic, such as a severe leak of thevessel or a piping failure within the bund, would not result in overtopping and would becontained within the bunded area in the worst case.

Spillages due to losses of containment of a compartment from a road tanker compartment, orruptured/ leaking offloading pipes at the road gantry would be collected by the spill slab andflow under gravity via the spill slab sump to the oil separator, leaving only a small residuewithin the road gantry area. Fires from a loss of containment of this type would thus occur atthe oil separator, subject to an ignition source in the area.

The pool formed during the catastrophic failure of a road tanker would not be contained by thespill slab and would spread over a wide area in the absence of obstacles. An area of 1 200 m2

has been considered based on RIVM (2009).

The thermal radiation isopleths due to pool fires resulting various losses of containment aredepicted in Figure 4-11. The 10 kW/m2 thermal radiation represents a 1% fatality and lowerlimit of plastic and instrumentation damage. The solid lines indicate the effect zone in all winddirections at high wind speeds whilst the thinner line represents the impact from a northerlywind direction only.



None of the isopleths extend over the site boundary to affect the neighbours or residentialarea of Saint Georges Strand.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION(10 kW/m2)40 m3 ULP Road tanker – catastrophic failure50 m3 Diesel tank - catastrophic failureFire at the oil separator

Figure 4-11: 1 % fatality isopleths for various diesel and ULP pool fires

The worst-case thermal radiation isopleths due to the catastrophic failure of a diesel tankerare depicted in Figure 4-12.

The 4 kW/m2 thermal radiation isopleths, represents the end of the emergency plan forevacuation. The 10 kW/m2 thermal radiation represents a 1% fatality and lower limit of plasticand instrumentation damage, while the 37.5 kW/m2 thermal radiation represents the lower limitof steel damage which is close to 35 kW/m2 which represents 100% fatality.



LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION(kW/m2)41037.5 (not reached)

Figure 4-12: Thermal radiation isopleths for pool fires resulting from the catastrophicfailure of the ULP Road Tanker



Flash Fires

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but could extend beyond thislimit, due to the formation of pockets. It is assumed that unprotected people within the flashfire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash fire would remainunharmed.

The dominant flash fire scenario is the failure of a ULP road tanker, as shown in Figure 4-13.No offsite impacts are indicated by the LFL isopleth, which would not extend beyond the siteboundary.

LEGEND SCENARIO

LFL ULP Road Tanker – catastrophic failure

Figure 4-13: Flash fire limits due to various releases of LPG




The 0.1 bar blast overpressure isopleths, represents the 1% fatality for a VCE, no lethal effectsare expected below 0.1 bar overpressure for people in the open.

A loss of containment of ULP with an ignition source could form either a flash fire or a vapourcloud explosion. Figure 4-6 indicates various scenarios having large blast overpressures of0.1 bar due to the release of flammable vapours from loss of containment scenarios underworst meteorological conditions. In this instance, the vapours drifted to an ignition point beforedetonating. This is referred to as a late explosion. The thinner solid lines indicate the effectsfrom a northerly wind, while the thicker solid line indicates the effects from all wind directions.

The 0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of houses being severely damaged and aprobability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 baroverpressure for people in the open.

In the worst conditions, a VCE from a loss of containment of ULP would not extend beyondthe site boundary as indicated in Figure 4-14.

LEGEND BLAST OVERPRESSURE(bar)0.030.10.30.7Drift line

Figure 4-14: Blast overpressures for the worst-case vapour cloud explosion from theULP Tanker




The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth, due to a release of diesel and ULP,did not extend beyond the site boundary, as shown in Figure 4-15. The installation of thefuelling station as currently proposed would not result in the BAIC facility beingclassified as a Major Hazard Installation.

This is consistent with expectations based on:

the nature of and extent of the hazards accessed; the provision of secondary containment (bunding at the diesel tank) and location of the

ULP tank underground; the distance from the installations to the plant boundaries.

LEGEND RISK(fatalities per person per year)1x10˗3 (not reached)1x10˗4 (not reached)1x10˗5 (not reached)1x10˗6 (not reached)3x10˗7

Figure 4-15: Lethal probability isolines associated with diesel and unleadedpetroleum (ULP) installation



Flammable Stores


Flammable stores are/to be provided for the purpose of safe storage and handling of packagedflammable materials used in the process.

These include:

Oil-Chemical Storage: A separate storage is provided for the storage of oils, paraffin,lubricants, solvents etc. in an allocated building designed for this purpose (only allocated toflammable materials).

The building has been constructed with three compartments each of which is provided withwalls, a bunded area, and fire protection system (roof mounted sprinklers).

Paint Mixing and Storage Areas: An area in the proposed paint shop has been allocated tothe mixing and storage of paint. Packaged goods such paints, solvents, etc. will be stored andprepared for use in the paint shop.



There exists the potential for warehouse type fires in the flammable stores.

The potential for explosive hazards exists in the paint mixing and storage has been raisedprompting additional precautions such as the omission of windows to prevent the propagationof glass projectiles in the event of an explosion.

The areas are or will be bunded to capture any spillage and fire water runoff from activation ofthe sprinkler systems. Runoff from the bunds are to be captured prior to disposal.


Toxic Components

It is not anticipated that the products stored in these areas will be of a toxic nature or producetoxic combustion products on combustion. The production of toxic combustion products wouldbe restricted by the relatively small footprint of the areas under consideration.



Fires

The flammable stores are located well away from the site boundaries which would mitigatetheir impact on the public.

Bund and Pool Fires

The buildings would design to contain flammable materials and the flammable materials wouldbe contained within the storage. Potential pool fires would be limited in size determined by thepackaging size and size of the bunded area. There would have limited potential impact on thesurrounding facilities.


Risk contours were not calculated as impacts did not extend beyond the Waste Storage andthe general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the full productinventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.

Recommendations

BAIC and Local Authorities must satisfy themselves that the existing/proposed flammablestores would be/are constructed in accordance with the National Building Regulations,SANS 10400, SANS 10263. National Building Regulations and SANS 10400 shall takeprecedence in the event of any conflicting codes and standards.

Hazardous area classification to be developed as required in in accordance with SANS 10108with all associated electrical equipment and instrumentation within the being area compliantto the code.







Storage areas are required for the storage of chemicals for the treatment of planteffluents (water) which are predominantly sourced from the paint shop.

Bulk storages for 35 % Hydrochloric Acid have been identified as being located in thisarea from the drawings provided.


There exists the potential for corrosive hazards due to the loss of containment of 35 %.Hydrochloric Acid. Appropriately designed and constructed bunded areas would be providedfor the hydrochloric acid.


The impact of corrosive materials would be limited due to bunding and the large distance ofthe facility from the facility boundary.


Risk contours were not calculated as the impacts did not extend beyond the Effluent TreatmentPlant and the general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the fullproduct inventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.

Recommendations




Waste Storage




General waste (paper, packaging, wood, etc.); Hazardous waste (paint sludge etc.) - stored in drums for daily removal to a hazardous

waste site.


Solid wastes are potentially flammable, whilst the paint sludge is potentially flammable/ highlyflammable.


The disposal of site wastes would be centralised and controlled in a building designed for thepurpose that is located well away from the site boundary.

Hazardous wastes (paint sludge) is to be removed daily which limit inventories. The wastecentre would be provided with natural ventilation (mesh walls) which would prevent theaccumulation of flammable vapours.


Risk contours were not calculated as impacts did not extend beyond the Waste Storage andthe general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the full productinventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.

Recommendations




Summary of Impacts

The maximum distances to the 1% fatality from the point of release for all the LPG scenariosare indicated in Table 4-6.

A delayed ignition forms a release which would result in either a flash fire or a vapour cloudexplosion. The largest distance for either the vapour cloud explosion or the flash fire isindicated. In most instances, the vapour cloud explosion produces the largest distance to the1% fatality. Areas impacted by the explosion or flash fire or VCE as depicted for a single winddirection impact significantly smaller areas than affected from all directions for the sameincident.

Table 4-6: Maximum distance (m) to 1% fatality from point of release

Tank 1 90m3 LPG Vessel

19BLPG- 101 instantaneous release (BLEVE) 380

19BLPG- 102 instantaneous release (Flash Fire) 326

19BLPG- 103 instantaneous release (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 401

19BLPG- 104 fixed duration set (jet fire) 75

19BLPG- 105 fixed duration set (flash fire) – LFL distance 181

19BLPG- 106 fixed duration set (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 413

19BLPG- 107 fixed duration set (pool fire) 162

19BLPG- 108 -10mm hole (jet fire) 25

19BLPG- 109 -10mm hole (flash fire) 0

19BLPG- 110 -10mm hole (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

19BLPG- 111 PSV Failure (jet fire) 29

19BLPG- 112 PSV Failure (Flash Fire) 0

19BLPG- 113 PSV Failure (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

19BLPG- 114 Overfilling (jet fire) 25

19BLPG- 115 Overfilling (Flash Fire) 0

19BLPG- 116 Overfilling (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

19BLPG- 401 Pipe Rupture (jet fire) 74

19BLPG- 402 Pipe Rupture (flash fire) 104

19BLPG- 403 Pipe Rupture (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 164

19BLPG- 404 Pipe Leak (jet fire) 20

19BLPG- 405 Pipe Leak (flash fire) 14

19BLPG- 406 Pipe Leak (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 12



Table 4 6: Maximum distance (m) to 1% fatality from point of release

Tank 2 90m3 LPG Vessel





19BLPG- 205 fixed duration set (flash fire) 181


19BLPG- 207 107 fixed duration set (pool fire) 162

19BLPG- 208 -10mm hole (jet fire) 25

19BLPG- 209 -10mm hole (flash fire) 0

19BLPG- 210 -10mm hole (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

19BLPG- 211 PSV Failure (jet fire) 29

19BLPG- 212 PSV Failure (Flash Fire) 0

19BLPG- 213 PSV Failure (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

19BLPG- 214 Overfilling (jet fire) 18

19BLPG- 215 Overfilling (Flash Fire) 0

19BLPG- 216 Overfilling (Vapour Cloud Explosion) 0

LPG Road Tanker offloading (47 m3)





19BLPG- 505 fixed duration set (flash fire) 114


19BLPG- 507 Hose Rupture (jet fire) 45



Consolidated Risks

The combined site risk is the summation of all the individual risks and is shown in Figure 4-16.

The combined risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth extends beyond the siteboundary into the thicket vegetation that lies between the site boundary and residential areaof Saint Georges Strand. As a result, the BAIC facility would be classified as a MajorHazard Installation.


1x10˗5

1x10˗6

3x10˗7

Figure 4-16: Lethal probability isolines associated with the combined risk

The risk of 3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year isopleth indicates the extent for land-use thatwould be unsuitable for vulnerable populations, such as hospitals, retirement homes, nurseryschools, prisons, large gatherings in the open, and so forth. No facility within the 3x10-7 fatalityper person per year isopleth should be approved without first evaluating the impacts on theproposed faculty and potential land usage. Acceptable developments can be verified in thetables provided in the HSE’s Land Use Planning Methodology (UK 2011) attached inAppendix H.



Societal Risk

Risk criteria discussed so far have been for individual risks. There is also a need to considerincidents in the light of their effect on many people at the same time. Public response to anincident that may harm many people is thought to be worse than the response to manyincidents causing the same number of individual deaths. Compliance with an individual riskcriterion is necessary but not always sufficient. Even if it were sufficient, societal risk wouldalso have to be examined in some circumstances.

Societal risk is risk of widespread or large-scale harm from a potential hazard. The implicationis that consequence would be on such a scale as to provoke a major social or politicalresponse and may lead to public discussion about regulation in general. Societal risk thereforetakes into account the density of the population around a Major Hazard Installation site and isthe probability in any one year (F) of an event affecting at least a certain number (N) of people(also known as an FN curve).

Societal risk used in this study are based on SANS 1461 (SABS (2018a)).

Societal Risk Calculation

The population densities used for the societal risk were based on the values contained inTable 4-7.

Table 4-7: Population Density Data

Description

Day

(persons per

hectare)

Night

(persons per

hectare)

Comments

BAIC site personnel 12 6Based on 1500 employees (1000Day and 500 night)

Industrial areas(medium density)

40 8 Obtained from CPR 16E (1992)

Thicket to south offacility (zoned forresidential)

10 25Obtained from CPR 16E (1992)

Medium housing density based onresidential zoning



The societal risk for the facility, including workers, is given in Figure 4-18.

Figure 4-17: Societal risks for the BAIC facility (including workers on site)




The societal risk for the facility, excluding workers, is given in Figure 4-18.



Figure 4-18: Societal risks for the BAIC facility (excluding workers on site)





REDUCTION OF RISK

While the risks were found to be tolerable, continual risk reduction programs should beinvestigated to reduce the impacts from accidental toxic clouds or fires and explosions.Mitigation that can be considered to reduce the risks levels are listed in the subsections thatfollow.

Risk Ranking

This risk assessment considered a number of fire and explosion scenarios. Some of thesescenarios have more serious consequences than other scenarios. The scenarios of particularinterest are those with high-risk frequencies extending beyond the boundaries of the site.Priorities for mitigation can thus be obtained from the risk ranking. The risk rankings for thescenarios with the highest off-site risks are given in Table 4-8.

The analysis point selected is located at the southern boundary of are shown in Figure 4-19.

Table 4-8: Risk ranking of scenarios with the highest off-site risks

Analysis Point: Analysis Point 1Total Individual Risk at analysis point (=734, Y= 457) is: 2.39E-06 /yr

No. ScenarioFailure

Frequency(per annum)

Contribution(%)

Accumulated(%)

119BLPG-519 Hose Leak (Jet fire) (47 m3LPG Road Tanker)

2.43E-07 10.2 10.2

219BLPG-519 Hose Rupture (Jet fire) (47 m3LPG Road Tanker)

2.43E-07 10.2 20.4

319BLPG-103 Instant Release (Explosion)(Tank 1 90m3 LP Vessel)

2.33E-07 9.75 30.15

419BLPG-203 Instant Release (Explosion)(Tank 2 90m3 LPG Vessel)

2.22E-07 9.31 39.46

519BLPG-102 Instant Release (Flash Fire)(Tank 1 90m3 LP Vessel)

1.53E-07 6.4 45.86

619BLPG-202 Instant Release (Flash Fire)(Tank 2 90m3 LPG Vessel)

1.53E-07 6.4 52.26

719BLPG-104 Fixed Duration (Jet fire) (Tank1 90m3 LP Vessel)

1.51E-07 6.34 58.6

819BLPG-501 Line Rupture (Jet fire)(Equipment)

1.36E-07 5.68 64.28

919BLPG-204 Fixed Duration (Jet fire) (Tank2 90m3 LPG Vessel)

1.24E-07 5.19 69.47

1019BLPG-106 (Explosion) (Tank 1 90m3 LPVessel)

1.06E-07 4.42 73.89

1119BLPG-206 (Explosion) (Tank 2 90m3 LPGVessel)

1.06E-07 4.42 78.31

1219BLPG-503 Line Rupture (Explosion)(Equipment)

9.52E-08 3.99 82.3

1319BLPG-503 Line Rupture (Explosion)(Equipment)

9.49E-08 3.97 86.27

1419BLPG-501 Line Rupture (Jet fire)(Equipment)

7.72E-08 3.23 89.5




1x10˗5

1x10˗6

3x10˗7

Figure 4-19: Risk Analysis points for individual risks at the BAIC facility



Mitigation

Mitigation for consideration includes that described in the following subsections.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Hazardous areas should be reviewed using a detailed process hazard analysis (PHA)1 suchas a HAZOP study. Such an analysis should be completed to identify potential hazards andsuggest further mitigation for safer operations.

It may be necessary as part of the MHI study to demonstrate the principle of ALARP (As LowAs Reasonably Practicable) as contemplated in SANS 1461. Completed PHA studies areconsidered a key component of this discussion.

Codes and Standards

The design has indicated that the applicable standards for the design would be SANS 10087part 3, SANS 10131 and SANS 10089 Part 3. These are acceptable standards and fullcompliance with these standards would be mandatory. It would also be mandatory for fullcompliance with SANS 10108 covering the types of electrical instrumentation required for theprocess in order to reduce ignition sources.

Ignition Sources

Ignition sources near the LPG storage and pipeline must be minimised as far as possible. Thisis particularly relevant with LPG offloading. Applicable codes should be consulted for thesafety distances of other vehicles to the offloading propane truck.

A hazardous area classification as per SANS 10108 must be developed for the LPGinstallation. Only suitable instrumentation and electrical equipment should be installed inaccordance to the requirement of the code.

Tanker Offloading

Tanker offloading will be required to take place every day and is indicated as having asignificant weighting during the risk analysis.

Several incidents have been recorded in South Africa including fatalities due to the failure ofcouplings and offloading hoses. BAIC should satisfy themselves that they are not adverselyexposed to risks associated with this activity (discretionary).

1 A process hazard analysis is not a regulated activity but merely identifies potential hazards andrecommends mitigation.



Relocation of the LPG Facility further from the Site Boundary

The LPG tanker offloading and storage facilities are currently located at ca. 20m from theboundary fence, SANS 10087 Part 3 (SABS (2015)) recommends a 15 m safety distance forsuch an installation.

Relocation to an alternative position on the site to reduce offsite risk could be considered(discretionary) but would potentially compromise the existing site arrangements/infrastructuresuch as the concreted roads, etc. and incur considerable costs that would not be justified giventhat the site risk as currently configured lies in the acceptably low region.

Completion of the MHI Risk Assessment

This study is not intended to replace the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment (and permitapplication).

The current investigation has concluded that the proposed modifications to the BAIC vehiclemanufacturing facility will result in the site being classified as an MHI. An MHI risk assessmentis mandatory in this instance (Major Hazard Installation (MHI) regulations (2001) publishedunder Section 43 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act)).

Once detailed designs have been finalised incorporating the mitigation of the BA, the MHI riskassessment must be completed based on final design information, prior to the construction ofthe proposed facilities. This is a requirement to determine the acceptability of the risks posedto the public.

Interim LPG Area Layout and Design Report

BAIC has recently prepared an interim report itemising the design considerations that are tobe incorporated during the detailed design of the LPG facility (Section 17.3 of Appendix G) toaddress the concerns raised regarding the ability to mitigate the risk to fall within theboundaries of the SEZ.

The drawings in this report confirm a number of the assumptions made in the preparation ofthis QRA report and the modelling on which the findings are based.

BAIC are confident that the risk can be mitigated to fall within the SEZ. This will need to beconfirmed on the basis of detailed designs and the preparation of the MHI report for permitting.



5 IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Potential Impacts of the Project

The emphasis of an MHI QRA is by virtue of its very nature orientated towards assessing theimpacts of the introduction of hazardous materials to a facility during its operational phase.These impacts tend to be life cycle dependant and are affected by the design of the facilitytogether with the implementation of operational and engineering controls for theirmanagement. These impacts will be experienced over the entire operational phase up untilthe point that the facility is decommissioned and the hazardous materials are removed fromthe site.

The introduction of flammable fuel storages (LPG, diesel, and ULP) and other flammablestorages, as part of the ramping up of production at BAIC introduces the following potentialincidents to the site:

pool fires (LPG, ULP and diesel); flash fires (LPG and ULP); vapour cloud explosions (LPG and ULP); warehouse type fires e.g. at the chemical/oil store; losses of containment (ULP, diesel, paint sludge) with the potential to enter the ground

and surface water.

The proposed introduction of hazardous material handling and storages at BAIC has beendetermined to be an MHI in their proposed configuration, based on the storage of notifiablequantities of LPG and assessed risk criteria.

A QRA based on the Major Hazardous Regulations (which include the requirements of SANS1461 (SABS (2018a)) requires the assessment of the impacts on workers and the public andquantitative determination of their acceptability against individual and societal risk criteria.Impacts on the environment are not specified but may be derived by semi-quantitative analysisof the QRA report.

Going forward the specific risks associated with workers would be considered in the MHI RiskAssessment that would be completed as part of the design and implementation phases of theproject. These are not required to be carried forward as part of the environmental impactassessment.

The following impacts associated with the introduction of hazardous materials to the site havebeen identified to be carried forward as part of the environmental impact assessment:

MH1: the impact on the public in particular vulnerable groups such as children, theaged and disabled;

MH2: the impact on the environment in particular loss of containment of materials onthe site.



Impact Assessment Methodology

The Basic Assessment uses the impact assessment methodology provided by SRK, which iscontained in Appendix E.

Operational Phase Risk Assessment

LPG, diesel and ULP and other potentially hazardous materials will be transported to the siteby means of road tankers and trucks. They will be stored in tanks, storerooms or warehouseswhich are designed according to specific requirements for their safe storage and transport.The hazardous materials will be consumed in the process as per the requirements of thevehicle manufacture and assembly process.

Impact Significance Rating

The impact significance ratings for the various impacts identified during the QRA aresummarised in the sections that follow.



Potential Impact MH1: The Impact of the Introduction of Hazardous Materials to the Site on the Public and VulnerablePopulation Groups

Current activities associated with the manufacture of semi knocked down vehicles do not have an impact beyond the site boundaries of the BAICsite. The introduction of fuels (LPG, diesel and petrol) during the ramp up of production and introduction the manufacture of completely knockeddown vehicles will potentially have impacts (fires and explosions associated with the storage of LPG) that extend beyond the site boundary andaffect a small vacant area currently zoned as general residential (adjacent to the existing residential dwellings in St Georges Strand).

There are impacts that potentially extend beyond the site boundaries (regional) and manifest themselves over the operational life of the project(medium to long term).

Incidents involving hazardous materials are typically of short duration with potentially high intensity (potential for property damage and fatalities),but having a low frequency. The probability/frequency of occurrence is several orders of magnitude less than those considered improbable in therisk assessment methodology. For the purposes of this assessment the probability of an impact would be considered improbable.

The 1 x 10-6 and 3x10-7 fatality per annum isopleths that affect land planning potentially extend beyond the site boundary, and would impact landplanning decisions as described earlier in the report. The societal risk exposure based on the population density, maximum individual risk andderived FN-curve would be considered to be acceptable, as highlighted in earlier sections of the report. The area affected is relatively small(approximately 7 hectares).




1x10˗5

1x10˗6

3x10˗7

Figure 5-1: Area of Impact Land Planning Requirements



Applying the impact significance rating methodology provided by SRK (refer to Appendix E), one obtains the range of outcomes contained inTable 5-1.



Duration

Receptor Probability2-15

years>15 years

General Public < 40% - Improbable Low Medium


The impacts of the introduction of hazardous materials would be considered potentially adverse (-ve).

The impact on the general public would thus be considered to be low and may not have any meaningful influence on the decision regarding theproposed activity/development. This would be further addressed with BAIC, the Department of Employment and Labour (DEL) and LocalAuthorities once the MHI Risk report has been completed.



Table 5-1 highlights the requirement to specifically address the requirements of vulnerable populations such as children, the aged and disabled.Zoning of the affected land by the local authority as industrial (excludes the establishment of schools, old aged homes, etc.) and appropriateoffsite emergency planning would mitigate/eliminate the issue as highlighted in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Significance rating of impact MH1 on vulnerable populations and mitigation measures

SpatialExtent

Intensity Duration Consequence Probability Significance+

-Confidence

Before Management Regional HighMedium-

Long TermHigh/Very High Improbable

Medium-High

- Medium

Management Measures

complete final design incorporating BA mitigation, ensuring that all mandatory design requirements are incorporated.

complete MHI quantitative risk assessment based on finalised designs to confirm extent of risk exposure for submission to local authorities

and the Department of Labour (mandatory, South African legal requirement OSH Act)

consult with Local Authorities to make a determination on zoning as contemplated in Regulation 9 of the MHI Regulations

After Management Regional NoneMedium -

Long TermNone Improbable Insignificant - Medium



Potential Impact MH2: The Impact of the Introduction of Hazardous Materials to the Site on the Environment

The impacts to environment are likely to be confined to site but may manifest themselves offsite in the absence of appropriate mitigation. Theywill manifest themselves over the operational life of the project (medium to long term).

The requirement for offsite environmental emergency planning together with competent authorities should be considered.

Applying the consequence score methodology, a very low - low consequence score is obtained.

Incidents involving hazardous materials are typically high impact with a low frequency (orders of magnitude less than those considered improbablein the risk assessment methodology). For the purposes of the assessment an impact would be considered improbable.

The impacts of the introduction of hazardous materials would be considered potentially adverse to the environment(-ve).

Potential Section 30 Incidents/30 A Situations

The production, use and storage of bulk hazardous materials generates the potential for Section 30/30A incidents during the operational phaseof the project which may include:

loss of primary containment of ULP/Diesel vessels or piping during processing into the ground or surface water; loss of primary/secondary containment (bunds) of ULP/Diesel during storage, pumping or road tanker loading/offloading with ingress into

the ground or surface water.

Diesel and other fossil fuels may accumulate in the environment. LPG is a gas when outside the storage tank and will not accumulate as it willdissipate into the air.

The potential for an incident to escalate into a situation that will require external assistance or attract the attention of competent authorities islimited by the following factors:

relatively small quantities of ULP and diesel are proposed to be stored on site in underground tanks; the storage areas are to be bunded and located well removed from the site boundaries.

A table of suggested mitigation measures is highlighted in Table 5-3.



Table 5-3: Significance rating of impact MH2 and mitigation measures

SpatialExtent


-Confidence

Before Management Regional Low Long Term Medium Improbable Very Low - Medium

Management Measures

bunding and capture of losses of containment of ULP and diesel from offloading activities to prevent ingress into the ground or ground

water (mandatory);

underground storages to be of a design that mitigates the ingress of diesel or ULP into the ground (mandatory);

Onsite and offsite environmental emergency planning

Provision of appropriate resources for environmental clean-up

After Management Local Low Long Term Low Improbable Very Low - Medium



Mitigation Measures







Cumulative Impacts


No-go Impacts

No impacts on the public are associated with the no-go option (the assembly of only SKDvehicles) as only the diesel and ULP storage facilities would be installed which are a lowerrisk than the LPG storages.

Confidence






6 MHI ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS

Emergency response plans have not been provided at this time. In light of the potential MHIstatus determined for the modified vehicle assembly plant, an on-site emergency plan wouldbe required to be prepared by BAIC, as part of the input to the MHI Risk Assessment.

The development and implementation of the on-site emergency plans would be required tocomply with the following legal requirements of the MHI Regulations (DOL (2001)):

an on-site emergency plan must be made available and must be followed inside thepremises of the installation or the part of the installation classified as a Major HazardInstallation, in consultation with the relevant health and safety representative orcommittee;

the on-site emergency plan must be discussed with the relevant local government,taking into consideration any comment on the risk related to the health and safety ofthe public;

the on-site emergency plan must be reviewed and where necessary updated, inconsultation with the relevant local government, at least once every three years;

a copy of the on-site emergency plan must be signed in the presence of two witnesses,who shall attest the signature;

the on-site emergency plan must be readily available at all times for implementationand use;

all employees must be conversant with the on-site emergency plan;

the on-site emergency plan must be tested in practice (drills) at least once a year, anda record must be kept of such testing.

The requirements for the establishment of an emergency plan for a Major Hazard Installationis also formalised in the recently published SANS 1514 (SABS 2018b), which the DEL haveindicated will eventually become mandatory for all MHI sites.

Once the onsite plan is implemented in the event of an emergency occurrence, BAIC wouldbe required to:

subject to the provisions of Regulation 6 of the General Administrative Regulations,within 48 hours by means of telephone, facsimile or similar means of communication,inform the chief inspector, the provincial director and relevant local government of theoccurrence of a major incident or an incident that brought the emergency plan intooperation or any near miss;

submit a report in writing to the chief inspector, provincial director and local governmentwithin seven days;

investigate and record all near misses in a register kept on the premises, which shallat all times be available for inspection by an inspector and local governmentrepresentatives.



7 CONCLUSIONS

Risk calculations are not precise. The accuracy of predictions is determined by the quality ofbase data and expert judgements.

This risk assessment included the consequences of fires and explosions at the BAIC facilityin Coega. A number of well-known sources of incident data were consulted and applied todetermine the likelihood of occurrence for an incident.

This risk assessment was performed with the assumption that the site would be maintained toan acceptable level and that all statutory regulations would be applied. It was also assumedthat the detailed engineering designs would be done by competent people and would becorrectly specified for the intended duty. For example, it was assumed that tank wallthicknesses have been correctly calculated, that vents have been sized for emergencyconditions, that instrumentation and electrical components comply with the specified electricalarea classification, that material of construction is compatible with the products, etc.

It is the responsibility of BAIC and their contractors to ensure that all engineering designswould have been completed by competent persons and that all pieces of equipment wouldhave been installed correctly. All designs should be in full compliance with (but not limited to)the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and its regulations, the National BuildingsRegulations and the Buildings Standards Act 107 of 1977 as well as local bylaws.

A number of incident scenarios were simulated, taking into account the prevailingmeteorological conditions, and described in the report.



BAIC proposes to store LPG in quantities of greater than 25 t in a single vessel (90 m3) andis required to notify the authorities accordingly. For this reason alone, the BAIC site inCoega would be classified as a Major Hazard Installation and would be required toprepare an MHI Quantitative Risk assessment Report.



LPG Storages

Jet and flash fires and vapour cloud explosions resulting from a loss of containment at theLPG storages with subsequent fires were simulated. The worst case 1% fatality incidents aretabulated Table 7-1in for information only, as the decision on MHI status is based on risk notconsequence.

Table 7-1: Worst Case 1% fatality distances

LPG Tanks 1and 2 - 90m3 LPG Vessels

Fixed duration (Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire) 413 m

Instantaneous release (BLEVE) 380 m

The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth extends about 30 m beyond the siteboundary, and this alone qualifies the site as a Major Hazard Installation.

Whilst this would be acceptable for workers (e.g. if the adjacent areas were zoned for industrialuse), it would require to be mitigated to be generally acceptable for the public (includingsensitive populations).

Fuelling Station

Pool and flash fires and vapour cloud explosions resulting from a loss of containment at theULP or diesel storages with subsequent fires were simulated.

The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth does not extend beyond the siteboundary, and this would not qualify the site as a Major Hazard Installation.

Flammable Stores




Risk contours were not calculated as the impacts did not extend beyond the Water TreatmentPlant and the general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the fullproduct inventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.




Waste Storage

Risk contours were not calculated as the impacts did not extend beyond the Waste Storageand the general public would not be involved in a major incident. Furthermore, the full productinventory is not available at this stage to accurately calculate the risk profile.


Impacts onto Neighbouring Properties, Residential Areas and Major HazardInstallations

The vacant area (zoned as residential) which lies on the southern boundary would potentiallybe affected by the requirement to install large (90m3) LPG storages, once the facility beginsto ramp up its production of vehicles.

The neighbouring companies have been identified and are located on the western andnorthern boundaries. The closest of these is the FAW facility which is 550m to the west of theLPG storages on the opposite side of the N2 highway. None of the neighbouring companiesidentified have informed BAIC of having Major Hazard Installation status. None of these sitesare currently impacted.

The proposed truck stop and filling station (cnr. Neptune Road and Alcyon Road) is the closestpotential MHI identified, but this is located approximately 2.1 kms to the northwest of the LPGstorages and will be unaffected.

The identification the MHI status of neighbouring sites, will form part of the MHI investigationfor the BAIC facility.

Societal Risks








Major Hazard Installation

This investigation has concluded that:

the risks (1x 10-6 fatalities per annum per person) from accidental fires and explosionsat the BAIC facility in Coega would extend beyond site boundaries.

notifiable quantities of LPG (> 25 t in a single tank) would be stored on site.

BAIC would be required to complete an MHI risk assessment and permit application based onfinalised design information prior to construction of the facilities. This would be a mandatoryrequirement.

The proposed modifications to the facility would result in it being classified a MajorHazard Installation, and the relevant authorities should be notified on completion of therequired MHI risk assessment.

Land Planning

The BAIC vehicle assembly plant would potentially affect the allowable land use in theimmediate vicinity of the site’s southern boundary based on its risk profile. The north-westerncorner of the vacant land adjacent to the residential area of St Georges Strand wouldpotentially be affected.

Rezoning of the affected land by the local authority for industrial use (excludes theestablishment of schools, old aged homes, etc.) and appropriate offsite emergency planningwould potentially mitigate/eliminate the MHI’s impact on the population.

Recent discussions with the CDC and local authorities indicate that rezoning of the affectedland would not be an option, and that BAIC would be required to mitigate the risks within theboundaries of the SEZ. BAIC is confident that this can be done via mitigation measuresincorporated into the design of the LPG facility, which will be further assessed based on finaldesign plans and confirmed via the MHI assessment and permit application.

Clearly no new land planning should be approved without consultation of the PADHI land-planning tables attached in Appendix H.

Impact Assessment

The rating methodology has been provided by SRK (refer to Appendix E).

Current activities associated with the manufacture of semi knocked down vehicles do not havean impact beyond the site boundaries of the BAIC site. The introduction of fuels (LPG, dieseland petrol) during the ramp up of production and introduction the manufacture of completelyknocked down vehicles will potentially have impacts (fires and explosions associated with thestorage of LPG) that extend beyond the site boundary and affect a small vacant area currentlyzoned as general residential (adjacent to the existing residential dwellings in St GeorgesStrand).





Receptor ProbabilityDuration

2-15years

>15 years

General Public/Environment < 40% - Improbable Low Medium


The impacts of the introduction of hazardous materials would be considered adverse (-ve).

The impact on the general public would be considered to be low and may not have anymeaningful influence on the decision regarding the proposed activity/development.

Table 7-2 highlights the requirement to specifically address the requirements of vulnerablepopulations such as children (schools), the aged (old age homes) and disabled (homes for thedisabled).


No impacts are associated with the no-go option (the assembly of only SKD vehicles) as onlythe diesel and ULP storage facilities would be installed which are a lower risk than the LPGstorages.

Mitigation Measures









Confidence






8 RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the quantitative risk assessment study conducted for the proposed modificationsto the BAIC vehicle manufacturing plant in Coega, a number of events were found to haverisks that extend beyond the site boundary. These risks could be mitigated to acceptable levelsdepending on the outlook regarding land planning going forward.

RISCOM did not find any fatal flaws that would prevent the project finalising the detailedengineering phase of the project, this would be predicated based on the requirement formitigation. RISCOM would support the project with the following conditions:

1. Compliance with all statutory requirements, e.g. safety distances, etc.

2. Full compliance with the most recent applicable SANS codes, i.e. SANS 10087,SANS 10089, SANS 10108, SANS 10263, SANS 1461, SANS 1514, etc.;

3. Incorporation of applicable guidelines or equivalent international recognised codes ofgood design and practice into the designs;

4. Completion of a recognised process hazard analysis (such as a HAZOP study,FMEA, etc.) on the proposed facility prior to construction to ensure design andoperational hazards have been identified and adequate mitigation put in place;

5. Full compliance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (Safety Instrument Systems) standardsor equivalent to ensure that adequate protective instrumentation is included in thedesign and would remain valid for the full life cycle of the facility;

6. Including demonstration from the designer that sufficient and reliable instrumentationwould be specified and installed at the facility;

7. Ensure that all potential spills, including pump failures and offloading are fully containedand would not enter the soil or leave the site;

8. Appropriate firefighting measures have been put in place for the mitigation of fire risk;

9. Preparation and issue of a safety document detailing safety and design featuresreducing the impacts from fires, explosions and flammable atmospheres to the MHIassessment body at the time of the MHI assessment;

a. including compliance to statutory laws, applicable codes and standards and world’sbest practice;

c. including the listing of statutory and non-statutory inspections, giving frequency ofinspections;

c. Including the auditing of the built facility against the safety document. Noting thatcodes such as IEC 61511 can be used to achieve these requirements;

10. Demonstration by BAIC or their contractor that the final designs would reduce the risksposed by the installation to internationally acceptable guidelines (ALARP);

11. Approval of all designs by a professional engineer registered in South Africa inaccordance with the Professional Engineers Act, who takes responsibility for suitabledesigns;

12. Completion of an emergency preparedness and response document for on-site andoff-site scenarios prior to initiating the MHI risk assessment (with input from localauthorities);

13. Permission not being granted for increases to the product list or product inventorieswithout the relevant licensing amendments being in place;

14. A suitable resolution of the land planning requirements for the area can be achieved,that satisfies the required risk criteria for such use;

15. Final acceptance of the facility risks with an MHI risk assessment that must becompleted in accordance to the MHI regulations. Basing such a risk assessment on thefinal design including engineering mitigation.



9 REFERENCES

AICHE (1985). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. New York: American Institute ofChemical Engineers.

CLANCEY, V. J. (1972). Diagnostic Features of Explosion Damage. Edinburgh: SixthInternational Meeting of Forensic Sciences.

CPR 14E (1997). Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects (“Yellow Book”). ThirdEdition. Apeldoorn: TNO.

CPR 16E (1992). Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (“Green Book”). FirstEdition. Apeldoorn: TNO.

CPR 18E (1999). Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (“Purple Book”). First Edition,Apeldoorn: TNO.

COX, A. W, LEES, F. P. and ANG, M.L. (1990). Classification of Hazardous Locations. BritishInstitution of Chemical Engineers.

DOL (2001). Occupation Health and Safety Act, 1993: Major Hazard Installation Regulations(No. R692). Regulation Gazette. No. 7122, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa: Department ofLabour.

HSE (2011). PADHI: HSE’s Land Use Planning Methodology. Available at: Health and SafetyExecutive Website. http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/ methodology.htm

LEES, F. P. (2001). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification,Assessment, and Control. Second Edition. London: Butterworths.

RIVM (2009). Reference Manual BEVI Risk Assessments. Edition 3.2. Bilthoven, theNetherlands: National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).

RIVM (2015). Handleiding Riscoberekingen Bevi. Versie 3.3. Bilthoven, the Netherlands:National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).

* The most recent version of the SANS to be consulted as required.

* SABS (2004), Aboveground storage tanks for petroleum products, (SANS 10131:2004(Edition 1)) ISBN 0-626-15187-2, South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division,Pretoria

SABS (2010), The petroleum industry Part 3: The installation, modification anddecommissioning of underground storage tanks, pumps/dispensers and pipework at servicestations and consumer installations, (SANS 10089-3:2010 (Edition 4)) ISBN 978-0-626-2458-1, South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria

*SABS (2011), The application of the National Building Regulations –fire protection, (SANS10400-t- 2011 (Rev 5)) ISBN 978-0-626-25188-8 South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria

* SABS (2012), The identification and classification of dangerous goods for transport by roadand rail modes, (SANS 10228:2012 (Edition 6)) ISBN 978-0-626-27397-2, South AfricanBureau of Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria

* SABS (2015), The handling storage, distribution, and maintenance of liquefied petroleumgas at domestic, commercial, and industrial installations Part 3: Liquefied petroleum gasinstallations involving storage vessels of capacity exceeding 500 ℓ, (SANS 100087-3- 2015(Edition 5)) ISBN 978-0-626-31399-9 South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division,Pretoria

* SABS (2017a) The Classification of Hazardous Locations and Selection of Equipment forUse in Such Locations. (SANS 10108 - 2017) ISBN 978-0-626-34009-4. South African Bureauof Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria.

* SABS (2017b) The Warehousing of Dangerous Goods; Part 0: General Requirements.(SANS 10263-0 - 2017) ISBN 978-0-626-34175-6. South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria



* SABS (2018a), Major Hazard Installation – Risk Assessments, (SANS 1461:2018 (Edition1)) ISBN 978-0-626-35955-3 South African Bureau of Standards -Standards Division, Pretoria

* SABS (2018b), Major Hazard Installation: Emergency Response Planning (SANS 1514-2018: Edition 1)) ISBN 978-0-626-307058-9. South African Bureau of Standards -StandardsDivision, Pretoria.

STEPHENS, M. (1970). Minimizing Damage to Refineries. US Dept. of the Interior, Offices ofOil and Gas.

(STUDIO D’ÁRC 2016). Site Development Plan for Proposed Automotive Manufacturing Plantfor BAIC SA Automotive Manufacturing Company in Zone 1 South Logistics and CommercialCluster, September 2016(STUDIO D’ÁRC 2018). Site Development Plan for Proposed Automotive Manufacturing Plantfor BAIC SA Automotive Manufacturing Company in Zone 1 – South Logistics Cluster, CoegaIDZ, November 2018



10 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIA See Approved Inspection Authority

ALARP The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) developed the risk ALARPtriangle, in an attempt to account for risks in a manner similar to thoseused in everyday life. This involved deciding:Whether a risk is so high that something must be done about it;

Whether the risk is or has been made so small that no further precautionsare necessary;

Whether a risk falls between these two states and has been reduced tolevels ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP).

Reasonable practicability involves weighing a risk against the trouble,time and money needed to control it.

ApprovedInspectionAuthority

An approved inspection authority (AIA) is defined in the Major HazardInstallation regulations (July 2001)

Asphyxiant An asphyxiant is a gas that is nontoxic but may be fatal if it accumulatesin a confined space and is breathed at high concentrations since itreplaces oxygen containing air.

BlastOverpressure

Blast overpressure is a measure used in the multi-energy method toindicate the strength of the blast, indicated by a number ranging from 1(for very low strengths) up to 10 (for detonative strength).

BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions result from the suddenfailure of a vessel containing liquid at a temperature above its boilingpoint. A BLEVE of flammables results in a large fireball.

Deflagration Deflagration is a chemical reaction of a substance, in which the reactionfront advances into the unreacted substance at less than sonic velocity.

DEL Department of Employment and Labour (DEL) formerly Department ofLabour (DoL).

Detonation Detonation is a release of energy caused by extremely rapid chemicalreaction of a substance, in which the reaction front of a substance isdetermined by compression beyond the auto-ignition temperature.

EmergencyPlan

An emergency plan is a plan in writing that describes how potentialincidents identified at the installation together with their consequencesshould be dealt with, both on site and off site.

Explosion An explosion is a release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuityor blast wave.

FlammableLimits

Flammable limits are a range of gas or vapour concentrations in the airthat will burn or explode if a flame or other ignition source is present. Thelower point of the range is called the lower flammable limit (LFL).Likewise, the upper point of the range is called the upper flammablelimit (UFL).

FlammableLiquid

The Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 defines a flammableliquid as any liquid which produces a vapour that forms an explosivemixture with air and includes any liquid with a closed cup flashpoint ofless than 55°C.Flammable products have been classified according to their flashpointsand boiling points, which ultimately determine the propensity to ignite.Separation distances described in the various codes are dependent onthe flammability classification.



Class Description0 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)

IA Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of below 23°C and aboiling point below 35°C

IB Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of below 23°C and aboiling point of 35°C or above

IC Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 23°C and above butbelow 38°C

II Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 38°C and above butbelow 60.5°C

IIA Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 60.5°C and abovebut below 93°C

Flash Fire A flash fire is defined as combustion of a flammable vapour and airmixture in which the flame passes through the mixture at a rate less thansonic velocity so that negligible damaging overpressure is generated.

Frequency Frequency is the number of times an outcome is expected to occur in agiven period of time.

IDLH Immediately dangerous to life or health values were developed by theNational Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).IDLH value refers to a maximum concentration to which a healthy personmay be exposed for 30 minutes and escape without suffering irreversiblehealth effects or symptoms that impair escape (ranging from runny eyesthat temporarily impair eyesight to a coma). IDLH values are intended toensure that workers can escape from a given contaminated environmentin the event of failure of the respiratory protection equipment.

IgnitionSource

An ignition source is a source of temperature and energy sufficient toinitiate combustion.

Individual Risk Individual risk is the probability that in one year a person will become avictim of an accident if the person remains permanently and unprotectedin a certain location. Often the probability of occurrence in one year isreplaced by the frequency of occurrence per year.

Isopleth See Risk Isopleth

Jet A jet is the outflow of material emerging from an orifice with significantmomentum.

Jet Fire orFlame

A jet fire or flame is combusting material emerging from an orifice witha significant momentum.

LFL Lower Flammable Limit see Flammable Limits

LOC See Loss of Containment

LocalGovernment

Local government is defined in Section 1 of the Local GovernmentTransition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993).

Loss ofContainment

Loss of containment (LOC) is the event resulting in a release ofmaterial into the atmosphere.

Major HazardInstallation

Major Hazard Installation (MHI) means an installation: Where more than the prescribed quantity of any substance is or

may be kept, whether permanently or temporarily;

Where any substance is produced, used, handled or stored insuch a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a majorincident (the potential of which will be determined by the riskassessment).



Major Incident A major incident is an occurrence of catastrophic proportions, resultingfrom the use of plant or machinery or from activities at a workplace.When the outcome of a risk assessment indicates that there is apossibility that the public will be involved in an incident, then the incidentis catastrophic.

Material SafetyData Sheet

According to ISO˗11014, a material safety data sheet (MSDS) is adocument that contains information on the potential health effects ofexposure to chemicals or other potentially dangerous substances and onsafe working procedures when handling chemical products. It is anessential starting point for the development of a complete health andsafety program. It contains hazard evaluations on the use, storage,handling and emergency procedures related to that material. An MSDScontains much more information about the material than the label and itis prepared by the supplier. It is intended to tell what the hazards of theproduct are, how to use the product safely, what to expect if therecommendations are not followed, what to do if accidents occur, how torecognize symptoms of overexposure and what to do if such incidentsoccur.

MHI See Major Hazard Installation

MIR Maximum Individual Risk (see Individual Risk)

MSDS See Material Safety Data Sheet

OHS Act Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993)

PAC See Protective Action Criteria

PADHI PADHI (planning advice for developments near hazardousinstallations) is the name given to a methodology and software decisionsupport tool developed and used in the HSE. It is used to give land-useplanning (LUP) advice on proposed developments near hazardousinstallations.PADHI uses two inputs into a decision matrix to generate either an‘advise against’ or ‘don’t advise against’ response: The zone in which the development is located of the three zones

that HSE sets around the major hazard:

o The inner zone (> 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year);

o The middle zone (1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year to1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year);

o The outer zone (1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year to3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year);

The ‘sensitivity level’ of the proposed development which isderived from an HSE categorisation system of ‘developmenttypes’ (see the ‘development type tables’ in Appendix H).

QRA See Quantitative Risk Assessment

QuantitativeRiskAssessment

A quantitative risk assessment is the process of hazard identification,followed by a numerical evaluation of effects of incidents, bothconsequences and probabilities and their combination into the overallmeasure of risk.

Risk Risk is the measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequencyat which it is likely to occur. Risk is expressed mathematically as:

Risk = Consequence x Frequency of Occurrence

RiskAssessment

Risk assessment is the process of collecting, organising, analysing,interpreting, communicating and implementing information in order to



identify the probable frequency, magnitude and nature of any majorincident which could occur at a major hazard installation and themeasures required to remove, reduce or control potential causes of suchan incident.

Risk Contour See Risk Isopleth

Societal Risk Societal risk is risk posed on a societal group who are exposed to ahazardous activity.

TemporaryInstallation

A temporary installation is an installation that can travel independentlybetween planned points of departure and arrival for the purpose oftransporting any substance and which is only deemed to be aninstallation at the points of departure and arrival, respectively.

UFL Upper Flammable Limit (see Flammable Limits)

Vapour CloudExplosion

A vapour cloud explosion (VCE) results from ignition of a premixedcloud of a flammable vapour, gas or spray with air, in which flamesaccelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significantoverpressure.

VCE See Vapour Cloud Explosion



11 APPENDIX A: DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR CERTIFICATE (2017-2012)



12 APPENDIX B: SANAS CERTIFICATES (2017-2021)



13 APPENDIX C: DETAILS OF SPECIALIST AND SPECIALIST DECLARATION

As required by Appendix 6, of the EIA Regulations the following details are attached.

Declaration by Specialist



Professional Affiliations



Curriculum Vitae

of 4

CURRICULUM VITAE (CV) FOR PROPOSED PROFESSIONAL STAFF

IAN DUNCAN RALSTON

Position: Process Safety Engineer

Name of Firm: RISCOM (PTY) LTD

Name of Staff: Ian Duncan Ralston

Profession: Chemical Engineer

Date of Birth: 21 June 1960

Years with Firm/Entity: 30 months

Nationality: South African/British

Membership of Professional Societies:

Registered Professional Engineer (Registration No.: 920262) with the Engineering Council of South Africa

(ECSA)

Fellow Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy

Member of the South African Institute of Chemical Engineers

Member of the Institute of Chemical Engineers (UK)

Member of the South African Mine Metallurgical Managers Association

Key Qualifications:

Ian Ralston is currently a process safety engineer with RISCOM. He is a registered professional engineer and

holds a BSc (Chemical Engineering, Minerals Processing) from the University of the Witwatersrand (1983). Ian

has over 30 years of experience with Anglo American in all aspects of metallurgical plant operations and project

implementation. This has included roles such as Plant Manager, Lead Process Engineer (Projects and Project

Reviews), Process Simulation Engineer, Commissioning Manager and Safety Audit Manager. Since leaving

Anglo, Ian has used his simulation and process safety skills to complete risk assessment studies for Riscom.

Relevant projects are included in the following sections.

FAST MOVING CONSUMER GOODS AND PACKAGED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Lead Process Safety Engineer for quantitative risk assessment of:

2018 Chilleweni Cold Storage Warehouse, Wadeville, Gauteng (MHI)

2017 SPAR Mount Edgecombe Distribution Centre, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga (MHI)

of 4

2017 SPAR Lowveld Distribution Centre, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga (MHI)

2016 Freightmax , Hazardous Materials Warehouse (MHI),

PHARMACEUTICALS


2016 South African National Blood Service (SANBS) and National Biological Institute blood and plasma

processing facility, Pinetown.

TANK FARM, FLAMMABLE STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION


2018 Pool fire calculations Bidvest Tank Terminals (pool fire calculations)

2018 Air BP Fuel Depot East London Airport (MHI)

2018 Air BP Fuel George Airport (MHI)

2017/18 H&R Island View and Mobeni (MHI and EIA QRA)

2017 Mahle Behr LPG storage in Phoenix Industrial Park Durban (MHI)

2017 Trellidor LPG storage in Phoenix Industrial Park Durban (MHI)

2017 Q-fuels bulk storage of diesel in Delmas (EIA Quantitative Risk Assessment Specialist Report)

2016 Enco Bulk bulk petrol and diesel storage facility in Polokwane (MHI).

2016 Puma Energy petrol and diesel storage facility in Hectorspruit (MHI and EIA QRA)

2016 Rocolor bulk storage of diesel in Bronkhorstspruit (MHI)

POWER GENERATION


2018 Central Termica de Temane (CCT) Project (EIA Quantitative Risk Assessment Specialist Report)

WASTE TREATMENT


2017/2018 A-Thermal Waste Treatment Plant, Olifantsfontein, Gauteng (MHI)

2017 Anglo Platinum Polekwane and Mortimer Smelter SO2 Abatement Projects (EIA Quantitative

Risk Assessment Specialist Report)

of 4

Education:

BSc (Chemical Engineering, Minerals Processing Option), University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, 1983

BCom (Quantitative Management (Operations Management) and Business Economics), University of South

Africa, 1992

Employment Record:

2016-Present Process Safety Engineer, RISCOM (PTY) LTD

Completion of risk assessments for Major hazard Installations (MHIs) and specialistquantitative risk reports for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s).

2015 Vice-President, Sales, Proposals and Marketing – Minerals Processing Outotec,

South Africa

Managed the sales, proposals and marketing of minerals processing equipment for a

large international equipment company (26 reports).

2010-2014 Principal Metallurgist, Anglo American TBCG, Group Metallurgy, South

Africa

Management of and process (including safety requirements) input to the review of

major capital projects (due diligence). Operational Reviews of Group operations.

2002-2010 Principal Process Engineer, Anglo American, Anglo Technical Division,

Johannesburg, South Africa

Lead Process Engineer for various capital projects in South and West Africa (design,

construction and commissioning). Technical support for various Mondi Paper projects.

Safety Peer Review leader for various sites. Development of the Amira P754 Metal

Accounting Code (co-author of international code).

2000-2002 Lead Process Engineer Waterval 400 ktpm Concentrator Anglo American

Technical Services/Murray & Roberts JV, Johannesburg, South Africa

Development of the concentrator designs (included Hazop) for the JV and

responsibility for all process decisions during the implementation of the project.

Appointed by Anglo Platinum as the owners team commissioning manager on site with

responsibility for the development and execution of commissioning plan requirements

(multi-disciplinary team) for the concentrator and its associated infra-structure. The

concentrator was successfully commissioned (February 2002) and ramped up to 400

ktpm in 3 months. At the time it was the largest platinum concentrator in Anglo

American Platinum of any type.

1998-2002 Senior Process Engineer, Anglo American Technical Services, Johannesburg,

South Africa

of 4

Lead Process Engineer for various projects in West (Mali) and Southern Africa (FEL 1-

3), across a range of commodities (gold, vanadium, nickel and platinum).

Development of a wide range of activities starting with metallurgical testwork through

to commissioning.

1996-1998 Senior Control and Instrumentation Engineer (Simulation), Anglo American

Technical Services, Johannesburg, South Africa

Plant and mine simulation using various packages. Development and commissioning

of advanced control solutions for metallurgical plants.

1996-1998 Plant Manager No.1 Gold Plant, West Rand Region of Anglo American Gold

Division

Management of 140 000 tpm Carbon In Pulp Plant including responsibility for safety,

security, maintenance and slimes dam management. Development and

implementation of business plan for the plant.

1983-1996 Various Production Positions, Vaal Reefs, Anglo American Gold Division

Completed National Service and Anglo Americans ECSA approved training

programme. Advanced through a series of promotions, culminating in Production

Superintendent West Uranium Plant (1st June 1989). Responsible for the production

management of a 260 000 tpm Uranium Plant followed by a 260 000 tpm Flotation

Plant and 212 tpd sulphuric acid plant (including calcine gold production).

Languages:

Speaking Reading Writing

English (first) Excellent Excellent Excellent

Afrikaans Good Good Average

Certification:

I, the undersigned, certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, this data correctly describes me, myqualifications and my experience.

…………………………………… Date: Monday, 1st October 2018

Full name of staff member: Ian Duncan Ralston



14 APPENDIX D: NOTIFICATION OF A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION

Prior to assessment of potential impacts of various accidental spills, reference needs to bemade to the legislation, regulations and guidelines governing the operation of thedevelopment.

Section 1 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act; Act No. 85 of 1993) defines a"major hazard installation" to mean an installation:

“ (a) Where more than the prescribed quantity of any substance is or may be kept,whether permanently or temporarily;

(b) Where any substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored insuch a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident(our emphasis). “

It should be noted that if either (a) or (b) is satisfied, the Major Hazard Installation (MHI)regulations will apply. The prescribed quantity of a chemical can be found in Section 8(1) ofthe General Machinery Regulation 8 (our emphasis).

A major incident is defined as: "an occurrence of catastrophic proportions, resulting from theuse of plant and machinery or from activities at a workplace”. Catastrophic in this contextmeans loss of life and limbs or severe injury to employees or members of the public,particularly those who are in the immediate vicinity (our emphasis).

It is important to note that the definition refers to an occurrence, whereas Section 1b) refers topotential to cause a major incident. If potential to cause a major incident exists, then theOHS Act and the Major Hazard Installation regulations will apply (our emphasis).

On the 16th of January 1998, the MHI regulations were promulgated under the OHS Act (ActNo. 85 of 1993), with a further amendment on the 30th of July 2001. The provisions of theregulations apply to installations that have on their premises a certain quantity of a substancethat can pose a significant risk to the health and safety of employees and the public.

The scope of application given in Section 2 of the MHI regulations is as follows:

“ (1) Subject to the provisions of Subregulation (3) these regulations shall apply toemployers, self-employed persons and users, who have on their premises,either permanently or temporarily, a major hazard installation or a quantity ofa substance which may pose a risk that could affect the health and safety ofemployees and the public (our emphasis);

(2) These regulations shall apply to local governments, with specific referenceto Regulation 9. “

It is important to note that the regulations refer to a substance, and furthermore the regulationsare applicable to risks posed by the substance and NOT merely the potential consequences(our emphasis).



The regulations essentially consist of six parts, namely:

1 Duties for notification of a Major Hazard Installation (existing or proposed), including:

a. Fixed (see List 1);

b. Temporary installations;

2 Minimum requirements for a quantitative risk assessment (see List 2);

3 Requirements of an on-site emergency plan (see List 3);

4 Reporting steps of risk and emergency occurrences (see List 4);

5 General duties required of suppliers;

6 General duties required of local government.

Notification of installation (List 1) indicates that:

Applications need to be made in writing to the relevant local authority and the provincialdirector for permission:

o To erect any Major Hazard Installation;

o Prior to the modification of any existing installation that may significantly increaserisk related to it (e.g. an increase in storage or production capacity or alteration ofa process);

Applications need to include the following information:

o The physical address of installation;

o Complete material safety data sheets of all hazardous substances;

o The maximum quantity of each substance envisaged to be on premises at any onetime;

o The risk assessment of the installation (see List 2);

o Any further information that may be deemed necessary by an inspector in interestsof health and safety to the public;

Applications need to be advertised in at least one newspaper serving the surroundingcommunities and by way of notices posted within these communities.



The risk assessment (List 2):

Is the process of collecting, organising, analysing, interpreting, communicating andimplementing information in order to identify the probable frequency, magnitude andnature of any major incident which could occur at a Major Hazard Installation andmeasures required to remove, reduce or control the potential causes of such anincident;

Needs to be undertaken at intervals not exceeding 5 years and needs to be submittedto the relevant local emergency services;

Must be made available in copies to the relevant health and safety committee, with60 days given to comment thereon and the results of the assessment made availableto any relevant representative or committee to comment thereon;

Should be undertaken by competent person(s) and include the following:

o A general process description;

o A description of major incidents associated with this type of installation andconsequences of such incidents (including potential incidents);

o An estimation of the probability of a major incident;

o The on-site emergency plan;

o An estimation of the total result in the case of an explosion;

o An estimation of the effects of thermal radiation in the case of fire;

o An estimation of concentration effects in the case of a toxic release;

o Potential effects of a major incident on an adjacent major hazard installation or partthereof;

o Potential effects of a major incident on any other installation, members of the public(including all persons outside the premises) and on residential areas;

o Meteorological tendencies;

o Suitability of existing emergency procedures for risks identified;

o Any requirements laid down in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act of 1989(Act No. 73 of 1989);

o Any organisational measures that may be required;

The employer shall ensure that the risk assessment is of an acceptable standard andshall be reviewed should:

o It be suspected that the preceding assessment is no longer valid;

o Changes in the process that affect hazardous substances;

o Changes in the process that involve a substance that resulted in the installationbeing classified a Major Hazard Installation or in the methods, equipment orprocedures for the use, handling or processing of that substance;

o Incidents that have brought the emergency plan into operation and may affect theexisting risk assessment;

Must be made available at a time and place and in a manner agreed upon betweenparties for scrutiny by any interested person that may be affected by the activities.



Requirements related to the on-site emergency plan (List 3) are:

After submission of the notification, the following shall be established:

o An on-site emergency plan must be made available and must be followed insidethe premises of the installation or the part of the installation classified as a MajorHazard Installation, in consultation with the relevant health and safetyrepresentative or committee;

o The on-site emergency plan must be discussed with the relevant local government,taking into consideration any comment on the risk related to the health and safetyof the public;

o The on-site emergency plan must be reviewed and where necessary updated, inconsultation with the relevant local government, at least once every three years;

o A copy of the on-site emergency plan must be signed in the presence of twowitnesses, who shall attest the signature;

o The on-site emergency plan must be readily available at all times forimplementation and use;

o All employees must be conversant with the on-site emergency plan;

o The on-site emergency plan must be tested in practice at least once a year, and arecord must be kept of such testing;

Any employer, self-employed person and user owning or in control of a pipeline thatcould pose a threat to the general public shall inform the relevant local government andshall be jointly responsible with the relevant local government for establishment andimplementation of an on-site emergency plan.

In reporting of risk and emergency occurrences (List 4):

Following an emergency occurrence, the user of the installation shall:

o Subject to the provisions of Regulation 6 of the General Administrative Regulations,within 48 hours by means of telephone, facsimile or similar means ofcommunication, inform the chief inspector, the provincial director and relevant localgovernment of the occurrence of a major incident or an incident that brought theemergency plan into operation or any near miss;

o Submit a report in writing to the chief inspector, provincial director and localgovernment within seven days;

o Investigate and record all near misses in a register kept on the premises, whichshall at all times be available for inspection by an inspector and local governmentrepresentatives.



The duties of the supplier refer specifically to:

Supplying of material safety data sheets for hazardous substances employed orcontemplated at the installation;

Assessment of the circumstances and substance involved in an incident or potentialincident and the informing all persons being supplied with that substance of thepotential dangers surrounding it;

Provision of a service that shall be readily available on a 24-hour basis to all employers,self-employed persons, users, relevant local government and any other bodyconcerned to provide information and advice in the case of a major incident with regardto the substance supplied.

The duties of local government are summarised as follows:

“ 9. (1) Without derogating from the provisions of the National Building Regulationsand Building Standards Act of 1977 (Act No. 103 of 1977), no localgovernment shall permit the erection of a new major hazard installation at aseparation distance less than that which poses a risk to:

(a) Airports;

(b) Neighbouring independent major hazard installations;

(c) Housing and other centres of population; or,

(d) Any other similar facility…

Provided that the local government shall permit new property developmentonly where there is a separation distance which will not pose a risk (ouremphasis) in terms of the risk assessment: Provided further that the localgovernment shall prevent any development adjacent to an installation that willresult in that installation being declared a major hazard installation.

(2) Where a local government does not have facilities available to control a majorincident or to comply with the requirements of this regulation that localgovernment shall make prior arrangements with a neighbouring localgovernment, relevant provincial government or the employer, self-employedperson and user for assistance…

(3) All off-site emergency plans to be followed outside the premises of theinstallation or part of the installation classified as a major hazard installationshall be the responsibility of the local government… ”



15 APPENDIX E: QRA METHODOLOGY

The methodologies of this report are compliant with SANS1461 (2018), which is based on theDutch Legislation described in the Bevi (External Safety Establishments Decree) RiskCalculations Manual (RIVM (2009)). Thus, in the absence of specific methodologies andassumptions not specified in SANS 1461 (SABS (2018a)), the relevant methodologies andassumptions were based on RIVM (2009) e.g. reference height of 1m above the ground wouldbe consistent with the RIVM (2009) standard. Specific consequence values, duration timesand interpretations were based on RIVM (2009), except where values to be plotted on mapsare specified in SANS1461.


The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards. The merit of including a hazardfor further investigation is then determined by how significant it is, normally by using a cut-offor threshold value.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presentsto the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability andconsequence should be considered but there are occasions where, if either the probability orthe consequence can be shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can bemade based on just one factor.







The evaluation methodology assumes that the facility will perform as designed in absence ofunintended events, such as component and material failures of equipment, human errors,external events and process unknowns.





Scenario Selection

Guidelines for selection of scenarios is given in RIVM (2009) and CPR 18E (Purple Book;1999). A particular scenario may produce more than one major consequence. In such cases,consequences are evaluated separately and assigned failure frequencies in the risk analysis.Some of these phenomena are described in the subsections that follow.

Scenarios for Release of a Pressurised Liquefied Gas

The nature of the release of a liquefied gas from a pressurised vessel is dependent on theposition of the hole.

A hole above the liquid level will result in a vapour release only, and the release rate would berelated to the size of the hole and internal pressure of the tank. Over a period of time, bulktemperature reduces, with an associated decrease in the vapour release rate.

A hole below the liquid level will result in a release of a liquid stream. In the reduced pressureof the atmosphere, a portion of the liquid will vaporise at the normal boiling point. Thisphenomenon is called flashing and is shown in Figure 15-1. The pool, formed after flashing,then evaporates at a rate proportional to the pool area, surrounding temperature and windvelocity.

Figure 15-1: Airborne vapours from a loss of containment of liquefied gas stored ina pressurised vessel



Instantaneous Release of a Pressured Liquefied Flammable Gas

An instantaneous loss of containment of a liquefied flammable gas could result in theconsequences given in the event tree of Figure 15-2. Probability of the events occurring isdependent on a number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown inthe figure are determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 15-2: Event tree for an instantaneous release of a liquefied flammable gas

Continuous Release of a Pressurised Liquefied Flammable Gas

The continuous loss of containment of a liquefied flammable gas could result in theconsequences given in the event tree of Figure 15-3. Probability of the events occurring isdependent on a number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown inthe figure are determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 15-3: Event tree for a continuous release of a liquefied flammable gas



Continuous Release of a Flammable Gas

The continuous loss of containment of a flammable gas could result in the consequencesgiven in the event tree of Figure 15-4. Probability of the events occurring is dependent on anumber of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in the figure aredetermined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 15-4: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable gas

Continuous Release of a Flammable Liquid

The continuous loss of containment of a flammable liquid could result in the consequencesgiven in the event tree of Figure 15-5. Probability of the events occurring is dependent on anumber of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in the figure aredetermined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 15-5: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid



Modelling Software

Physical consequences were calculated with DNV’s PHAST v. 6.7 and the data derived wasentered into TNO’s RISKCURVES v. 9.0.26. All calculations were performed by Mr I.D Ralstonand checked by Mr M.P Oberholzer.

These models were then inserted into the satellite image mentioned above to obtain graphicrepresentations of the various consequences and risk isopleths.

Ian Ralston’s professional and academic qualifications as well as a Curriculum Vitae areincluded in Appendix C.

Physical and Consequence Modelling

In order to establish which impacts follow an accident, it is first necessary to estimate thephysical process of the spill (i.e. rate and size), spreading of the spill, evaporation from thespill, subsequent atmospheric dispersion of the airborne cloud and, in the case of ignition, theburning rate and resulting thermal radiation from a fire and the overpressures from anexplosion.

The second step is then to estimate the consequences of a release on humans, fauna, floraand structures in terms of the significance and extent of the impact in the event of a release.The consequences could be due to toxic or asphyxiant vapours, thermal radiation or explosionoverpressures. They may be described in various formats.

The simplest methodology would show a comparison of predicted concentrations, thermalradiation or overpressures to short-term guideline values.

In a different but more realistic fashion, the consequences may be determined by using adose-response analysis. Dose-response analysis aims to relate the intensity of thephenomenon that constitutes a hazard to the degree of injury or damage that it can cause.Probit analysis is possibly the method mostly used to estimate probability of death,hospitalisation or structural damage. The probit is a lognormal distribution and represents ameasure of the percentage of the vulnerable resource that sustains injury or damage. Theprobability of injury or death (i.e. the risk level) is in turn estimated from this probit (riskcharacterisation).

Consequence modelling gives an indication of the extent of the impact for selected events andis used primarily for emergency planning. A consequence that would not result in irreversibleinjuries would be considered insignificant, and no further analysis would be required. Theeffects from major incidents are summarised in the following subsections.



Fires

Combustible and flammable components within their flammable limits may ignite and burn ifexposed to an ignition source of sufficient energy. On process plants releases with ignitionnormally occur as a result of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties ofthe component and the operating parameters, combustion may take on a number of forms,such as pool fires, jet fires, flash fires and so forth.

Thermal Radiation

The effect of thermal radiation is very dependent on the type of fire and duration of exposure.Certain codes, such as the American Petroleum Institute API 520 and API 2000 codes,suggest values for the maximum heat absorbed by vessels to facilitate adequate relief designsin order to prevent failure of the vessel. Other codes, such as API 510 and the BritishStandards BS 5980 code, give guidelines for the maximum thermal radiation intensity and actas a guide to equipment layout, as shown in Table 15-1.

The effect of thermal radiation on human health has been widely studied, relating injuries tothe time and intensity of exposure.

Table 15-1: Thermal radiation guidelines (BS 5980 of 1990)

Thermal RadiationIntensity(kW/m2)

Limit

1.5 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure

2.1Sufficient to cause pain if unable to reach cover within40 seconds

4.5Sufficient to cause pain if unable to reach cover within20 seconds

12.5Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood andmelting of plastic tubing

25Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely longexposures

37.5 Sufficient to cause serious damage to process equipment

For pool fires, jet fires and flash fires CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) suggests the followingthermal radiation levels be reported:

4 kW/m2, the level that glass can withstand, preventing the fire entering a building, andthat should be used for emergency planning;

10 kW/m2, the level that represents the 1% fatality for 20 seconds of unprotectedexposure and at which plastic and wood may start to burn, transferring the fire to otherareas;

35 kW/m2, the level at which spontaneous ignition of hair and clothing occurs, with anassumed 100% fatality, and at which initial damage to steel may occur.



Bund and Pool Fires

Pool fires, either tank or bund fires, consist of large volumes of a flammable liquid componentburning in an open space at atmospheric pressure.

The flammable component will be consumed at the burning rate, depending on factorsincluding prevailing winds. During combustion heat will be released in the form of thermalradiation. Temperatures close to the flame centre will be high but will reduce rapidly totolerable temperatures over a relatively short distance. Any building or persons close to thefire or within the intolerable zone will experience burn damage with severity depending on thedistance from the fire and time exposed to the heat of the fire.

In the event of a pool fire, the flames will tilt according to the wind speed and direction. Theflame length and tilt angle affect the distance of thermal radiation generated.

Tank-top fires

A tank-top fire occurs within a tank, and thus the pool fire is limited to the area of the tank. Atank-top fire could escalate to a bund fire should the tank fail, releasing a flammable orcombustible component into the bund.

Jet Fires

Jet fires occur when a flammable component is released with a high exit velocity ignites.

In process industries this may be due to design (such as flares) or due to accidental releases.Ejection of a flammable component from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange may give rise to a jetfire and in some instances the jet flame could have substantial ‘reach’.

Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and impinge on other pipelines, equipment orstructures. The thermal radiation from these fires may cause injury to people or damageequipment some distance away from the source of the flame.

Flash Fires

A loss of containment of a flammable component may mix with air, forming a flammablemixture. The flammable cloud would be defined by the lower flammable limit (LFL) and theupper flammable limit (UFL). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the quantityof the released and mixed component, physical properties of the released component, windspeed and weather stability. An ignition within a flammable cloud can result in an explosion ifthe front is propagated by pressure. If the front is propagated by heat, then the fire movesacross the flammable cloud at the flame velocity and is called a flash fire. Flash fires arecharacterised by low overpressure, and injuries are caused by thermal radiation. The effectsof overpressure due to an exploding cloud are covered in the subsection dealing with vapourcloud explosions (VCEs).

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit; however, due to the formation ofpockets, it could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed thatpeople within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flashfire would remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate peopleto a safe distance in the event of a release.



Explosions

The concentration of a flammable component would decrease from the point of release tobelow the lower explosive limits (LEL), at which concentration the component can no longerignite. The sudden detonation of an explosive mass would cause overpressures that couldresult in injury or damage to property.

Such an explosion may give rise to any of the following effects:

Blast damage;

Thermal damage;

Missile damage;

Ground tremors;

Crater formation;

Personal injury.

Obviously, the nature of these effects depends on the pressure waves and the proximity tothe actual explosion. Of concern in this investigation are the ‘far distance effects’, such aslimited structural damage and the breakage of windows, rather than crater formations.

Figure 15-2 and Figure 15-3 give a more detailed summary of the damage produced by anexplosion due to various overpressures.

CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) suggests the following overpressures be determined:

0.03 bar overpressure, corresponding to the critical overpressure causing windows tobreak;

0.1 bar overpressure, corresponding to 10% of the houses being severely damagedand a probability of death indoors equal to 0.025:

o No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 bar overpressure on unprotected peoplein the open;

0.3 bar overpressure, corresponding to structures being severely damaged and aprobability of death equal to 1.0 for unprotected people in the open;

0.7 bar overpressure, corresponding to an almost entire destruction of buildings and100% fatality for people in the open.



Table 15-2: Summary of consequences of blast overpressure (Clancey 1972)

Pressure (Gauge)Damage

Psi kPa

0.02 0.138 Annoying noise (137 dB), if of low frequency (10 – 15 Hz)

0.03 0.207 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain

0.04 0.276 Loud noise (143 dB); sonic boom glass failure

0.1 0.69 Breakage of small under strain windows

0.15 1.035 Typical pressure for glass failure

0.3 2.07‘Safe distance’ (probability 0.95; no serious damage beyond thisvalue); missile limit; some damage to house ceilings;10% window glass broken

0.4 2.76 Limited minor structural damage

0.5–1.0 3.45–6.9Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damageto window frames

0.7 4.83 Minor damage to house structures

1.0 6.9 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable

1.0–2.0 6.9–13.8Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminiumpanels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling; woodpanels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in

1.3 8.97 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted

2.0 13.8 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses

2.0–3.0 13.8–20.7 Concrete or cinderblock walls (not reinforced) shattered

2.3 15.87 Lower limit of serious structural damage

2.5 17.25 50% destruction of brickwork of house

3.0 20.7Heavy machines (1.4 t) in industrial building suffered littledamage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away fromfoundations

3.0–4.0 20.7–27.6 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished

4.0 27.6 Cladding of light industrial buildings demolished

5.0 34.5Wooden utilities poles (telegraph, etc.) snapped; tall hydraulicpress (18 t) in building slightly damaged

5.0–7.0 34.5–48.3 Nearly complete destruction of houses

7.0 48.3 Loaded train wagons overturned

7.0–8.0 48.3–55.2Brick panels (20 – 30 cm) not reinforced fail by shearing orflexure

9.0 62.1 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished

10.0 69.0Probable total destruction buildings; heavy (3 t) machine toolsmoved and badly damaged; very heavy (12 000 lb. / 5443 kg)machine tools survived

300 2070 Limit of crater lip



Table 15-3: Damage caused by overpressure effects of an explosion (Stephens 1970)

EquipmentOverpressure (psi)

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20

Control house steel roof A C V N A Windows and gauges break

Control house concrete roof A E P D N B Louvers fall at 0.3–0.5 psi

Cooling tower B F O C Switchgear is damaged from roof collapse

Tank: cone roof D K U D Roof collapses

Instrument cubicle A LM T E Instruments are damaged

Fire heater G I T F Inner parts are damaged

Reactor: chemical A I P T G Bracket cracks

Filter H F V T H Debris-missile damage occurs

Regenerator I IP T I Unit moves and pipes break

Tank: floating roof K U D J Bracing fails

Reactor: cracking I I T K Unit uplifts (half filled)

Pine supports P SO L Power lines are severed

Utilities: gas meter Q M Controls are damaged

Utilities: electric transformer H I T N Block wall fails

Electric motor H I V O Frame collapses

Blower Q T P Frame deforms

Fractionation column R T Q Case is damaged

Pressure vessel horizontal PI T R Frame cracks

Utilities: gas regulator I MQ S Piping breaks

Extraction column I V T T Unit overturns or is destroyed

Steam turbine I M S V U Unit uplifts (0.9 filled)

Heat exchanger I T V Unit moves on foundations

Tank sphere I I T

Pressure vessel vertical I T

Pump I Y




The release of a flammable component into the atmosphere could result in formation of a flashfire, as described in the subsection on flash fires, or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). In thecase of a VCE, an ignited vapour cloud between the higher explosive limits (HEL) and thelower explosive limit (LEL) could form a fireball with overpressures that could result in injury ordamage to property.

Fixed-Roof Tank Explosions

A confined gas explosion occurs when the exploding flammable mixture is restricted fromexpanding by physical barriers, such as walls, equipment or other obstacles.

A fixed-roof tank explosion is a confined gas explosion within a tank. The explosive mass iscalculated as the volume of the tank at its lower flammable limit (LFL). It should be noted thatan explosion can only occur if a flammable atmosphere can be formed. For this study, onlyflammable components with flashpoints lower than 38°C were considered.

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs)

A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) can occur when a flame impinges on apressure cylinder, particularly in the vapour space region where cooling by evaporation of thecontained material does not occur; the cylinder shell would weaken and rupture with a totalloss of the contents, and the issuing mass of material would burn as a massive fireball.

The major consequences of a BLEVE are \ intense thermal radiation from the fireball, a blastwave and propelled fragments from the shattered vessel. These fragments may be projectedto considerable distances. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number ofBLEVEs suggest that the majority land within 700 m from the incident. A blast wave from aBLEVE is fairly localised but can cause significant damage to immediate equipment.

A BLEVE occurs sometime after the vessel has been engulfed in flames. Should an incidentoccur that could result in a BLEVE, people should be evacuated to beyond the 1% fatality line.



Risk Analysis

Background

It is important to understand the difference between hazard and risk.

A hazard is anything that has the potential to cause damage to life, property and theenvironment. Furthermore, it has constant parameters (like those of petrol, chlorine, ammonia,etc.) that pose the same hazard wherever present.

On the other hand, risk is the probability that a hazard will actually cause damage and goesalong with how severe that damage will be (consequence). Risk is therefore the probability thata hazard will manifest itself. For instance, the risks of a chemical accident or spill dependsupon the amount present, the process the chemical is used in, the design and safety featuresof its container, the exposure, the prevailing environmental and weather conditions and so on.

Risk analysis consists of a judgement of probability based on local atmospheric conditions,generic failure rates and severity of consequences, based on the best available technologicalinformation.

Risks form an inherent part of modern life. Some risks are readily accepted on a day-to-daybasis, while certain hazards attract headlines even when the risk is much smaller, particularlyin the field of environmental protection and health. For instance, the risk of one-in-ten-thousandchance of death per year associated with driving a car is acceptable to most people, whereasthe much lower risks associated with nuclear facilities (one-in-ten-million chance of death peryear) are deemed unacceptable.

A report by the British Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), entitled ‘Safetyin Numbers? Risk Assessment and Environmental Protection’, explains how public perceptionof risk is influenced by a number of factors in addition to the actual size of the risk. Thesefactors were summarised as follows in Table 15-4.

Table 15-4: Influence of public perception of risk on acceptance of that risk, basedon the POST report

ControlPeople are more willing to accept risks they impose upon themselvesor they consider to be ‘natural’ than to have risks imposed upon them

Dread and Scaleof Impact

Fear is greatest where the consequences of a risk are likely to becatastrophic rather than spread over time

FamiliarityPeople appear more willing to accept risks that are familiar rather

than new risks

TimingRisks seem to be more acceptable if the consequences are

immediate or short term, rather than if they are delayed (especially ifthey might affect future generations)

SocialAmplification

and Attenuation

Concern can be increased because of media coverage, graphicdepiction of events or reduced by economic hardship

Trust

A key factor is how far the public trusts regulators, policy makers orindustry; if these bodies are open and accountable (being honest as

well as admitting mistakes and limitations and taking account ofdiffering views without disregarding them as emotive or irrational),

then the public is more likely consider them credible



A risk assessment should be seen as an important component of ongoing preventative action,aimed at minimising or hopefully avoiding accidents. Reassessments of risks should thereforefollow at regular intervals and after any changes that could alter the nature of the hazard, socontributing to an overall prevention programme and emergency response plan of the facility.Risks should be ranked with decreasing severity and the top risks reduced to acceptable levels.

Procedures for predictive hazard evaluation have been developed for the analysis ofprocesses when evaluating very low probability accidents with very high consequences (forwhich there is little or no experience) as well as more likely releases with fewer consequences(for which there may be more information available). This would address both the probabilityof an accident as well as the magnitude and nature of undesirable consequences of thataccident. Risk is usually defined as some simple function of both the probability andconsequence.

Predicted Risk

Physical and consequence modelling addresses the impact of a release of a hazardouscomponent without taking into account probability of occurrence. This merely illustrates thesignificance and the extent of the impact in the event of a release. Modelling should alsoanalyse cascading or knock-on effects due to incidents in the facility and the surroundingindustries and suburbs.

During a risk analysis, the likelihood of various incidents is assessed, the consequencescalculated and finally the risk for the facility is determined.



Generic Equipment Failure Scenarios

In order to characterise various failure events and assign a failure frequency, fault trees wereconstructed starting with a final event and working from the top down to define all initiatingevents and frequencies. Analysis was completed using published failure rate data. Equipmentfailures can occur in tanks, pipelines and other items handling hazardous chemicalcomponents. These failures may result in:

Release of combustible, flammable and explosive components with fires or explosionsupon ignition;

Release of toxic or asphyxiant components.

Storage Vessels

Scenarios involving storage vessels can include catastrophic failures that would lead toleakage into the bund with a possible bund fire. A tank-roof failure could result in a possibletank-top fire. The fracture of a nozzle or transfer pipeline could also result in leakage into thebund.

Typical failure frequencies for atmospheric and pressure vessels are listed, respectively, inTable 15-5 and Table 15-6.

Table 15-5: Failure frequencies for single containment atmospheric vessels

EventLeak Frequency

(per item per year)

Small leaks 1x10˗4

Severe leaks 3x10˗5

Catastrophic failure 5x10˗6

Table 15-6: Failure frequencies for pressure vessels aboveground

EventFailure Frequency(per item per year)

Small leaks 1x10˗5

Severe leaks 5x10˗7

Catastrophic failure 5x10˗7

The failure frequencies for below ground atmospheric tanks are listed in Table 15-7.

Table 15-7: Failure frequencies for atmospheric vessels below ground

EventFailure Frequency(per item per year)

Instantaneous failure of tank and soilcover, release of entire contents

1x10˗8



Transport and Process Piping

Piping may fail as a result of corrosion, erosion, mechanical impact damage, pressure surge(water hammer) or operation outside the design limitations for pressure and temperature.Failures caused by corrosion and erosion usually result in small leaks, which are easilydetected and corrected quickly. For significant failures, the leak duration may be from 10–30 minutes before detection.

Generic data for leak frequency for process piping is generally expressed in terms of thecumulative total failure rate per year for a 10 m section of pipe for each pipe diameter.Furthermore, failure frequency normally decreases with increasing pipe diameter. Scenariosand failure frequencies for a pipeline apply to pipelines with connections, such as flanges,welds and valves.

The failure data given in Table 15-8 represents the total failure rate, incorporating all failuresof whatever size and due to all probable causes. These frequencies are based on an assumedenvironment where no excessive vibration, corrosion, erosion or thermal cyclic stresses areexpected. For incidents causing significant leaks (such as corrosion), the failure rate will beincreased by a factor of 10.

Table 15-8: Failure frequencies for process pipes

Description

Frequencies of Loss of Containment for ProcessPipes

(per meter per year)

Full Bore Rupture Leak

Nominal diameter < 75 mm 1x10˗6 5x10˗6

75 mm < nominaldiameter < 150 mm

3x10˗7 2x10˗6

Nominal diameter > 150 mm 1x10˗7 5x10˗7

For scenarios and failure frequencies no distinction is made between process pipes andtransport pipes, the materials from which a pipeline is made, the presence of cladding, thedesign pressure of a pipeline or its location on a pipe bridge. However, a distinction is madebetween aboveground pipes and underground pipes. The scenarios for aboveground pipesare given in Table 15-9 ,and those for underground pipes are given in Table 15-10.

Transport pipelines aboveground can be compared, under certain conditions, withunderground pipes in a pipe bay. The necessary conditions for this are external damage beingexcluded, few to no flanges and accessories present and the pipe is clearly marked. In veryspecific situations the use of a lower failure frequency for transport pipes aboveground can bejustified.



Table 15-9: Failure frequencies for aboveground transport pipelines

Description

Frequency (per meter per annum)

NominalDiameter< 75 mm

75 mm >Nominal

Diameter >150 mm

NominalDiameter> 150 mm

Full bore rupture 1x10˗6 3x10˗7 1x10˗7

Leak with an effective diameter of 10% ofthe nominal diameter, up to a maximum of50 mm

5x10˗6 2x10˗6 5x10˗7

Table 15-10: Failure frequencies for underground transport pipelines

Description

Frequency (per meter per annum)

Pipeline in PipeLane7

Pipeline Complies withNEN 3650

OtherPipelines

Full bore rupture 7x10˗9 1.525x10˗7 5x10˗7

Leak with an effectivediameter of 20 mm

6.3x10˗8 4.575x10˗7 1.5x10˗6

7 A pipeline located in a ‘lane’ is a pipeline located with a group of pipelines on a dedicated route. Loss-of-containment frequencies for this situation are lower because of extra preventive measures.



Pumps and Compressors

Pumps can be subdivided roughly into two different types, reciprocating pumps and centrifugalpumps. This latter category can be further subdivided into canned pumps (sealless pumps)and gasket (pumps with seals). A canned pump can be defined as an encapsulated pumpwhere the process liquid is located in the space around the rotor (impeller), in which casegaskets are not used.

Compressors can also be subdivided roughly into reciprocating compressors and centrifugalcompressors.

Failure rates for pumps and compressors are given in Table 15-11 and Table 15-12.

Table 15-11: Failure frequency for centrifugal pumps and compressors

EventCanned (No Gasket)

Frequency(per annum)

GasketFrequency

(per annum)

Catastrophic failure 1.0x10˗5 1.0x10˗4

Leak (10% diameter) 5.0x10˗5 4.4x10˗3

Table 15-12: Failure frequency for reciprocating pumps and compressors

EventFrequency

(per annum)

Catastrophic failure 1.0x10˗4

Leak (10% diameter) 4.4x10˗3

Loading and Offloading

Loading can take place from a storage vessel to a transport unit (road tanker, tanker wagon orship) or from a transport unit to a storage vessel. The failure frequencies for loading andoffloading arms are given in Table 15-13.

Table 15-13: Failure frequencies for loading and offloading arms and hoses

Event

Frequency (per hour)

Loading andOffloading Arms

Loading andOffloading Hoses

Rupture 3x10˗8 4x10˗6

Leak with effective diameter at 10% ofnominal diameter to max. 50 mm

3x10˗7 4x10˗5



Road or Rail Tankers within the Establishment

Road or rail tankers are transport vehicles with fixed and removable tanks. In addition, theyinclude battery wagons and, insofar as these are fitted on a transport vehicle, tank containers,swap-body tanks and MEGCs (multiple element gas containers).

The failure rate of tankers on an establishment is dependent on the pressure rating of the tankand is given in Table 15-14 and Table 15-15.

Table 15-14: Failure frequencies for road tankers/rail tank wagons with anatmospheric tank

EventFrequency

(per annum)

Instantaneous release of the entire contents 1x10˗5

Release of entire contents from the largest connection 5x10˗7

Table 15-15: Failure frequencies for road tankers/rail tank wagons with a pressurisedtank

EventFrequency

(per annum)

Instantaneous release of the entire contents 1x10˗7

Release of entire contents from the largest connection 5x10˗7

Points for consideration:

1. If compartmentalising atmospheric tanks, for the scenario involving the release of theentire contents from the largest connection, each compartment must be considered asbeing a separate tank, in which case the failure frequency of 5 x 10-7 per annum isdivided by the number of compartments. For instantaneous scenarios thecompartmentalised tanker must be considered to be a single tank.

2. It should be noted that no scenarios are included for loss of containment as a result ofexternal damage to tanker or fire in the surrounding areas. It is assumed that sufficientmeasures are taken to prevent external damage to the tanker.



Warehouse Fires

A fire scenario describes a phase in the development of a fire and is defined by a combinationof factors that determine the burn rate.

The size of a fire is determined by:

Fire area (that is floor area);

Ventilation rate of the space per hour;

Fire duration (that is exposure time; maximum 30 minutes).

The probability of a fire scenario occurring is determined by:

The size of the fire compartment;

The fire-fighting system operating in the fire compartment.

For storage quantities greater than 10 t, fire-fighting systems are broken down into threeprotection levels for fire prevention and containment of effluent from fire extinguishing:

Protection Level 1 provides effective detection of a fire outbreak and rapid initiation ofan automatic or semi-automatic extinguishing system;

Protection Level 2 also enables the control and extinction of a fire by well-preparedextinguishing actions:

o However, it is acceptable, in such situations, if the extinguishing action is notinitiated automatically;

Protection Level 3 covers situations in which the nature of the stored substances meansthere is only a small probability of a significant fire building up:

o Any further measures for fire prevention and extinguishing water containmentcannot therefore reasonably be required and it is sufficient to institute measures inthe preventive sphere, which measures also apply to Protection Level 1 andProtection Level 2.

The frequencies per annum for toxic releases from fires in storage facilities for the threeprotection levels are given in Table 15-16.

Table 15-16: Fire in a storage facility

Scenario

Frequency (per annum)

Protection Level 1Protection Level 2

Protection Level 3

Release of toxic combustion products 8.8x10˗4 1.8x10˗4

Release of toxic or highly toxicnoncombusted substances during the fire

8.8x10˗4 1.8x10˗4



Human Failure

Human error and failure can occur during any life cycle or mode of operation of a facility.Human failure can be divided into the following categories:

Human failure during design, construction and modification of the facility;

Human failure during operation and maintenance;

Human failure due to errors of management and administration.

Human failure during design, construction and modification is part of the generic failure givenin this subsection. Human failure due to errors of organisation and management are influencingfactors. Some of the types of tasks that have been evaluated for their rates of human failureare given in Table 15-17.

Table 15-17: Human failure rates of specific types of tasks

TasksHuman Failure

(events per year)

Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likelyconsequences

0.55

Failure to carry out rapid and complex actions to avoid seriousincident such as an explosion

0.5

Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16

Failure to respond to audible alarm in control room within 10 minutes 1.0x10˗1

Failure to respond to audible alarm in quiet control room by somemore complex action such as going outside and selecting onecorrect value among many

1.0x10˗2

Failure to respond to audible alarm in quiet control room by pressinga single button

1.0x10˗3

Omission or incorrect execution of step in a familiar start-up routine 1.0x10˗3

Completing a familiar, well-designed, highly-practiced, routine taskoccurring several times per hour, performed to highest possiblestandards by a highly-motivated, highly-trained and experiencedperson totally aware of implications of failures, with time to correctpotential error but without the benefit of significant job aids

4.0x10˗4



Ignition Probability of Flammable Gases and Liquids

Estimation of probability of an ignition is a key step in assessment of risk for installations whereflammable liquids or gases are stored. There is a reasonable amount of data available relatingto characteristics of ignition sources and effects of release type and location.

Probability of ignition for stationary installations is given in Table 15-18 long with classificationof flammable substances in Table 15-19). These can be replaced with ignition probabilitiesrelated to surrounding activities. For example, probability of a fire from a flammable release atan open flame would increase to a value of 1.

Table 15-18: Probability of direct ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009)

Substance CategorySource-TermContinuous

Source-TermInstantaneous

Probability ofDirect Ignition

Category 0Average to highreactivity

< 10 kg/s10 – 100 kg/s

> 100 kg/s

< 1000 kg1000 – 10 000 kg

> 10 000 kg

0.20.50.7

Category 0Low reactivity

< 10 kg/s10 – 100 kg/s

> 100 kg/s

< 1000 kg1000 – 10 000 kg

> 10 000 kg

0.020.040.09

Category 1 All flow rates All quantities 0.065

Category 2 All flow rates All quantities 0.00438

Category 3Category 4

All flow rates All quantities 0

Table 15-19: Classification of flammable substances

SubstanceCategory

Description Limits

Category 0Extremelyflammable

Liquids, substances and preparations that have aflashpoint lower than 0°C and a boiling point (or thestart of the boiling range) less than or equal to 35°C

Gaseous substances and preparations that mayignite at normal temperature and pressure when

exposed to air

Category 1Highly

flammableLiquids, substances and preparations that have a

flashpoint of below 21°C

Category 2 FlammableLiquids, substances and preparations that have a

flashpoint equal to 21°C and less than 55°C

Category 3Liquids, substances and preparations that have a

flashpoint greater than 55°C and less than or equalto 100°C

Category 4Liquids, substances and preparations that have a

flashpoint greater than 100°C

8 This value is taken from the CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999). RIVM (2009) gives the value of delayed ignitionas zero. RISCOM (PTY) LTD believes the CPR 18E is more appropriate for warmer climates and is aconservative value.



Risk Calculations

Maximum Individual Risk Parameter

Standard individual risk parameters include: average individual risk; weighted individual risk;maximum individual risk; and, the fatal accident rate. The lattermost parameter is moreapplicable to occupational exposures.

Only the maximum individual risk (MIR) parameter will be used in this assessment. For thisparameter frequency of fatality is calculated for an individual who is presumed to be presentat a specified location. This parameter (defined as the consequence of an event multiplied bythe likelihood of the event) is not dependent on knowledge of populations at risk. So, it is aneasier parameter to use in the predictive mode than average individual risk or weightedindividual risk. The unit of measure is the risk of fatality per person per year.

Acceptable Risks

The next step, after having characterised a risk and obtained a risk level, is to recommendwhether the outcome is acceptable.

In contrast to the employees at a facility, who may be assumed to be healthy, the adoptedexposure assessment applies to an average population group that also includes sensitivesubpopulations. Sensitive subpopulation groups are those people that for reasons of age ormedical condition have a greater than normal response to contaminants. Health guidelines andstandards used to establish risk normally incorporate safety factors that address this group.

Among the most difficult tasks of risk characterisation is the definition of acceptable risk. In anattempt to account for risks in a manner similar to those used in everyday life, the UK Healthand Safety Executive (HSE) developed the risk ALARP triangle. Applying the triangle involvesdeciding:

Whether a risk is so high that something must be done about it;

Whether the risk is or has been made so small that no further precautions arenecessary;

If a risk falls between these two states so that it has been reduced to levels as low asreasonably practicable (ALARP).



This is illustrated in Table 15-6.

ALARP stands for ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. As used in the UK, it is the regionbetween that which is intolerable, at 1x10˗4 per year, and that which is broadly acceptable, at1x10˗6 per year. A further lower level of risk, at 3x10˗7 per year, is applied to either vulnerableor very large populations for land-use planning.

Figure 15-6: UK HSE decision-making framework



It should be emphasised that the risks considered acceptable to workers are different to thoseconsidered acceptable to the public. This is due to the fact that workers have personalprotection equipment (PPE), are aware of the hazards, are sufficiently mobile to evade orescape the hazards and receive training in preventing injuries.

The HSE (UK) gives more detail on the word practicable in the following statement:

“ In essence, making sure a risk has been reduced to ALARP is about weighingthe risk against the sacrifice needed to further reduce it. The decision isweighted in favour of health and safety because the presumption is that theduty-holder should implement the risk reduction measure. To avoid having tomake this sacrifice, the duty-holder must be able to show that it would begrossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction that would beachieved. Thus, the process is not one of balancing the costs and benefits ofmeasures but, rather, of adopting measures except where they are ruled outbecause they involve grossly disproportionate sacrifices. Extreme examplesmight be:

To spend £1m to prevent five staff members suffering bruised knees is obviouslygrossly disproportionate; but,

To spend £1m to prevent a major explosion capable of killing 150 people isobviously proportionate.

Proving ALARP means that if the risks are lower than 1x10˗4 fatalities perperson per year, it can be demonstrated that there would be no more benefitfrom further mitigation, sometimes using cost benefit analysis. “



Land Planning

There are no legislative land-planning guidelines in South Africa and in many parts of the world.Further to this, land-planning guidelines vary from one country to another, and thus it is noteasy to benchmark the results of this study to international criteria. In this instance, RISCOMwould only advise on applicable land planning and would require governmental authorities tomake final decisions.

Land zoning applied in this study follows the HSE (UK) approach of defining the area affectedinto three zones, consistent to the ALARP approach (HSE 2011).

The three zones are defined as follows:

The inner zone is enclosed by the risk of 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year isopleth;

The middle zone is enclosed by the risk of 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year and therisk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleths;

The outer zone is enclosed by the risk 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year and the riskof 3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year isopleths.

The risks decrease from the inner zone to the outer zone as shown in Figure 15-7 andFigure 15-8.

Figure 15-7: Town-planning zones for pipelines



Figure 15-8: Town-planning zones

Once the zones are calculated, the HSE (UK) methodology then determines whether adevelopment in a zone should be categorised as ‘advised against’ (AA) or as ‘don’t adviseagainst’ (DAA), depending on the sensitivity of the development, as indicated in Table 15-20.There are no land-planning restrictions beyond the outer zone.

Table 15-20: Land-use decision matrix

Level of SensitivityDevelopment in

Inner ZoneDevelopment in

Middle ZoneDevelopment in

Outer Zone

1 DAA DAA DAA

2 AA DAA DAA

3 AA AA DAA

4 AA AA AA

The sensitivity levels are based on a clear rationale: progressively more severe restrictions areto be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed development increases.

There are four sensitivity levels, with the sensitivity for housing defined as follows:

Level 1 is based on workers who have been advised of the hazards and are trainedaccordingly;

Level 2 is based on the general public at home and involved in normal activities;

Level 3 is based on the vulnerability of certain members of the public (e.g. children,those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger);

Level 4 is based on large examples of Level 2 and of Level 3.

Refer to Appendix H for detailed planning advice for developments near hazardousinstallations (PADHI) tables. These tables illustrate how the HSE land-use decision matrix,generated using the three zones and the four sensitivity levels, is applied to a variety ofdevelopment types.



Societal Risk Parameter

Risk criteria discussed so far have been for individual risks. There is also a need to considerincidents in the light of their effect on many people at the same time. Public response to anincident that may harm many people is thought to be worse than the response to manyincidents causing the same number of individual deaths. Compliance with an individual riskcriterion is necessary but not always sufficient. Even if it were sufficient, societal risk wouldalso have to be examined in some circumstances.

Societal risk is risk of widespread or large-scale harm from a potential hazard. The implicationis that consequence would be on such a scale as to provoke a major social or political responseand may lead to public discussion about regulation in general. Societal risk therefore takes intoaccount the density of the population around a Major Hazard Installation site and is theprobability in any one year (F) of an event affecting at least a certain number (N) of people(also known as an FN curve).

Societal risk used in this study are based on SANS 1461 (SABS (2018a)).



Assessment Rating of Potential Impacts

Impact Rating Procedure

The assessment of impacts will be based on the professional judgement of specialistsat SRK Consulting, fieldwork, and desk-top analysis. The significance of potentialimpacts that may result from the proposed development will be determined in order toassist DEA in making a decision.

The significance of an impact is defined as a combination of the consequence of theimpact occurring and the probability that the impact will occur. The criteria that areused to determine impact consequences are presented in Table 15-21 below.

Table 15-21: Criteria used to determine the Consequence of the Impact

Rating Definition of Rating Score

A. Extent– the area over which the impact will be experienced

None 0

Local Confined to project or study area or part thereof (e.g. site) 1

Regional The region, which may be defined in various ways, e.g. cadastral, catchment,topographic

2

(Inter) national Nationally or beyond 3

B. Intensity– the magnitude of the impact in relation to the sensitivity of the receiving environment

None 0

Low Site-specific and wider natural and/or social functions and processes arenegligibly altered

1

Medium Site-specific and wider natural and/or social functions and processes continuealbeit in a modified way

2

High Site-specific and wider natural and/or social functions or processes are severelyaltered

3

C. Duration– the time frame for which the impact will be experienced

None 0

Short-term Up to 2 years 1

Medium-term 2 to 15 years 2

Long-term More than 15 years 3

For the purposes of determining the impact of hazardous materials the following criteriahave been defined:



Extent:

Local - confined to the BAIC site;Regional - impacting neighbouring sites and residential areas.

Intensity: The intensity of the impact is related back to the sensitivity of specific receivinggroups/environments.

Low – workers on site, who are trained to handle hazardous materials and on-siteenvironmental incidentsMedium – the general public and offsite environmental issuesHigh – vulnerable members of the public (e.g. children, the aged and the disabled), andsensitive impacts on the environment

The combined score of these three criteria corresponds to a Consequence Rating, as follows:

Table 15-22: Method used to determine the Consequence Score

Combined Score(A+B+C)

0 – 2 3 – 4 5 6 7 8 – 9

Consequence RatingNot

significantVery low Low Medium High Very high

The potential calculated consequence scores based on the defined criteria are set outin Table 15-23.

Table 15-23: Potential Calculated Consequence Scores Based on Criteria

Consequence Rating

Project Duration <2 years 2-15 years >15 years

General Public/Environment Very Low Low Medium

Vulnerable Populations Low Medium High

Once the consequence has been derived, the probability of the impact occurring will beconsidered using the probability classifications presented in Table 15-24.

Table 15-24: Probability Classification

Probability– the likelihood of the impact occurring

Improbable < 40% chance of occurring

Possible 40% - 70% chance of occurring

Probable > 70% - 90% chance of occurring

Definite > 90% chance of occurring

The aggregated risk for all the incidents at a site involving hazardous material affectingthe public typically have a probability that is many orders of magnitude less than thosecontemplated in Table 15-24. In all instances they would be considered improbable(probability < 40%) which is consistent with low frequency events.



The overall significance of impacts will be determined by considering consequence andprobability using the rating system prescribed in the table below.

Table 15-25: Impact Significance Ratings

SignificanceRating

Possible Impact Combinations

Consequence Probability

InsignificantVery Low & Improbable

Very Low & Possible

Very Low

Very Low & Probable

Very Low & Definite

Low & Improbable

Low & Possible

Low

Low & Probable

Low & Definite

Medium & Improbable

Medium & Possible

Medium Medium & Probable

Medium & Definite

High & Improbable

High & Possible

High

High & Probable

High & Definite

Very High & Improbable

Very High & Possible

Very High Very High & Probable

Very High & Definite



The potential calculated Impact Significance Ratings based on the defined criteria areset out in Table 15-26.

Table 15-26: Potential Calculated Consequence Scores Based on Criteria

Impact Significance Rating

Duration

Receptor Probability <2 years2-15

years>15 years

General Public/Environment < 40% - Improbable Very Low Low Low

VulnerablePopulations/Environments

< 40% - Improbable Low Medium High

Finally, the impacts will also be considered in terms of their status (positive or negativeimpact) and the confidence in the ascribed impact significance rating. The system forconsidering impact status and confidence (in assessment) is laid out in the table below.

Table 15-27: Impact status and confidence classification

Status of impact

Indication whether the impact is adverse(negative) or beneficial (positive).

+ ve (positive – a ‘benefit’)

– ve (negative – a ‘cost’)

Confidence of assessment

The degree of confidence in predictionsbased on available information, SRK’sjudgment and/or specialist knowledge.

Low

Medium

High

The impact significance rating should be considered by authorities in their decision-making process based on the implications of ratings ascribed below:

Insignificant: the potential impact is negligible and will not have an influence on thedecision regarding the proposed activity/development.

Very Low: the potential impact is very small and should not have any meaningfulinfluence on the decision regarding the proposed activity/development.

Low: the potential impact may not have any meaningful influence on the decisionregarding the proposed activity/development.

Medium: the potential impact should influence the decision regarding the proposedactivity/development.

High: the potential impact will affect the decision regarding the proposedactivity/development.

Very High: The proposed activity should only be approved under specialcircumstances.

Practicable mitigation measures will be recommended and impacts will be rated in theprescribed way both with and without the assumed effective implementation ofmitigation measures.



Impact Assessment Matrix

The significance of identified impacts, rated according to the method above, issummarised in Table 15-28.

Potential Impact No.:

Brief description of the potential impact.

Table 15-28 Significance rating of impact No. and mitigation measures

SpatialExtent


-Confidence

BeforeManagement

Management Measures

AfterManagement



16 APPENDIX F: PHYSICAL PROPERTIES

Relevant physical properties for the significant hazardous substances are summarised in thefollowing subsections.

Propane

Propane Constants

Constant Unit Value

Acentric Factor 0.1523

Acid Association Flag Not modelled

Aerosol Class Number 8

Combustion At 0.9612

Combustion Ct 0.04032

Critical Pressure bar 42.48

Critical Temperature °C 96.68

Emissive Power Length Scale m 2.75

Flammable/Toxic Flag Flammable

Heat of Combustion kJ/kmol 2.04E+06

Immediate Ignition Category Average

Laminar Burning Velocity m/s 0.464

Lower Flammability Limit ppm 2.00E+04

Luminous/Smoky Flame Flag Luminous

Maximum Burn Rate kg/m2·s 0.12

Maximum Surface Emissive Power kW/m2 160

Melting Point °C -187.7

Molecular Weight 44.1

Normal Boiling Point °C -42.04

Pool Fire Burn Rate Length m 2

Reaction with Water Model None

Reactivity with Atmosphere Not strongly reactive



Propane Coefficients

ParameterEquation

No.

LowerTemp.Limit(°C)

UpperTemp.Limit(°C)

CoefficientA

CoefficientB

CoefficientC

CoefficientD

CoefficientE

Vapour Viscosity 102 -187.7 726.9 2.50E-07 0.6861 179.3 -8255

Vapour Thermal Conductivity 102 -42.04 726.9 -1.12 0.1097 -9835 -7.54E+06

Vapour Pressure 101 -187.7 96.68 59.08 -3493 -6.067 1.09E-05 2

Trimer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Surface Tension 106 -187.7 96.68 0.05092 1.22 0 0 0

Second Virial Equation Coefficient 104 -88.24 1227 0.1127 -99.2 -4.51E+06 3.09E+17 -7.05E+19

Saturated Liquid Density 105 -187.7 96.68 1.376 0.2745 369.8 0.2936

Octamer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Liquid Viscosity 101 -187.7 86.85 -17.16 646.3 1.11 -7.34E-11 4

Liquid Thermal Conductivity 100 -187.7 76.85 0.2676 -0.0006646 2.77E-07 0 0

Liquid Heat Capacity 114 -187.7 86.85 62.98 1.14E+05 633.2 -873.5 0

Ideal Gas Heat Capacity 107 -73.15 1227 5.19E+04 1.93E+05 1627 1.17E+05 723.6

Hexamer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Dimer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0



Diesel Modelled as n-Dodecane

n-Dodecane Constants

Constant Unit Value








Flash Point °C 73.85


Heat of Solution kJ/kg 0


Liquid Water Surface Tension dyne/cm 0

Lower Flammability Limit ppm 6000

Luminous/Smoky Flame Flag Smoky

Maximum Burn Rate kg/m2·s 0



Normal Boiling Point °C 216.3

Pool Fire Burn Rate Length m 0.1

Solubility in Water 0

TNT Explosion Efficiency % 0

Triple Point Pressure bar 6.15E-06

Triple Point Temperature °C -9.582

Upper Flammability Limit ppm 4.90E+04

Water Heat Transfer Coefficient W/m2·K 0



n-Dodecane Coefficients

ParameterEquationNumber



CoefficientA

CoefficientB

CoefficientC

CoefficientD

CoefficientE

Vapour Viscosity 102 -9.58 726.9 6.34E-08 0.8287 219.5 0

Vapour Thermal Conductivity 102 216.3 726.9 5.72E-06 1.47 579.4 0

Vapour Pressure 101 -9.58 384.9 137.5 -1.20E+04 -16.7 8.09E-06 2

Trimer Coefficients 0 0

Surface Tension 106 -9.58 384.9 0.05549 1.326 0 0 0

Second Virial Equation Coefficient 104 55.85 1227 0.88 -1091 -5.03E+07 -5.49E+21 1.50E+24

Saturated Liquid Density 105 -9.58 384.9 0.3554 0.2551 658 0.2937

Octamer Coefficients 0 0

Liquid Viscosity 101 -9.58 216.3 -18.8 1839 1.062 0 0

Liquid Thermal Conductivity 100 -9.58 216.3 0.2047 -0.000233 0 0 0

Liquid Heat Capacity 100 -9.58 56.85 5.08E+05 -1369 3.102 0 0


Hexamer Coefficients 0 0

Dimer Coefficients 0 0



ULP Modelled as Heptane

Heptane Constants

Constant Unit Value



Aerosol Class Number 8






Flammable/Toxic Flag Flammable

Flash Point °C -4.15


Immediate Ignition Category Unknown


Lower Flammability Limit ppm 1.00E+04

Luminous/Smoky Flame Flag Smoky

Maximum Surface Emissive Power kW/m2 140



Normal Boiling Point °C 98.43

Pool Fire Burn Rate Length m 0.7

Reaction with Water Model None

Reactivity with Atmosphere Not strongly reactive

Solubility in Water 0

SRK Alpha Calculation Flag Soave

Triple Point Pressure bar 1.83E-06

Triple Point Temperature °C -90.58

Upper Flammability Limit ppm 7.00E+04

Water Heat Transfer Coefficient W/m2·K 500



Heptane Coefficients

ParameterEquationNumber



CoefficientA

CoefficientB

CoefficientC

CoefficientD

CoefficientE

Vapour Viscosity 102 -90.58 726.9 6.67E-08 0.8284 85.75 0

Vapour Thermal Conductivity 102 66 726.9 -0.07003 0.3807 -7050 -2.40E+06

Vapour Pressure 101 -90.58 267.1 87.83 -6996 -9.88 7.21E-06 2

Trimer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Surface Tension 106 -90.58 267.1 0.05414 1.251 0 0 0

Second Virial Equation Coefficient 104 -3.05 1227 0.2746 -291 -4.42E+07 -8.80E+19 1.29E+22

Saturated Liquid Density 105 -90.58 267.1 0.6126 0.2621 540.2 0.2814

Octamer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Liquid Viscosity 101 -90.58 100 -24.45 1533 2.009 0 0

Liquid Thermal Conductivity 100 -90.58 98.43 0.215 -0.0003 0 0 0

Liquid Heat Capacity 114 -90.58 246.9 61.26 3.14E+05 1825 -2548 0


Hexamer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0

Dimer Coefficients 101 0 0 0 0 0



17 APPENDIX G:

Site layout Drawings

quantitative risk assessment of the baic sa …...the baic facility in coega consists of process...

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