qinghai tang, pacsec english-version-final

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1 Speaker: Qinghao Tang Title360 Marvel Team Leader Vulnerabilities mining technology of Cloud and Virtualization platform

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Page 1: Qinghai Tang, pacsec english-version-final

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Speaker: Qinghao Tang �

Title:360 Marvel Team Leader

Vulnerabilities mining technology of Cloud and Virtualization platform

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360 Marvel Team As the first virtualization security team in China, 360 marvel team focus on attack and

defence technology on virtualization and cloud platforms, aiming to lead the reaearch on

vulnerability mining and defecing on these platform, providing tools and solutions for mian

stream hypervisors:

● Virtualization fuzz framework.

● Guest OS escape tools.

-Support Docker, Xen,KVM,VMware

● Hypervisor strengthen solutions

-block Guest OS escape

-Scan Guest OS agentless

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Agenda

•  Brief intruduction of hypervisor security

•  Fuzzing framework

•  Analysis of network device vulnerability

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Brief intruduction of hypervisor

security

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Hypervisor

Major

Xen

Kvm

Vmware

Functions

Quantitative distribution

Flexible scheduling

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Cloud Computing

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Distinction

OS

Physical Devices

Guest OS

Device emulator

Hypervisor

Physical Devices

Guest OS

Device emulator

Normal Server Virtualization Server

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Escape form Guest OS

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•  Typical virtualization security vulnerability

•  Can cause the virtual machine escape

•  Exist in floppy device emulator Code

•  More Venoms? Yes!

Venom

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Fuzzing Framework

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•  More underlying target

•  More Particular of Test Data

Features of Virtualization Vulnerability Mining

IE

flash

server

System Kernel �

Hypervisor �

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•  Unconventional method

HOOK Driver function

Change Kernel files.

•  Relate to the context

Test Pocess of Emulation Device

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Features

• Commonness of hypervisors

• Features of solution

Coding Langurage

Operating System Type

Coding Style

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os

Control Center

Architecture

Hypervisor Hypervisor

os os os os os

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Fuzzing-Collect device information

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•  Device IO Methods

•  Controller Data Structure

•  Device State Machine

Test - Integrated Test Data

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Fuzzing-Attack emulation device

kernel_agent

fuzz_client

•  User Space

•  Kernel Space

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Feedback

•  No effect

•  Blue Screen

•  Implicit Result

•  Crash

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Feedback-VM manage automation

•  Snapshot

•  Reboot

•  Virtual Device Edit

•  Debugging Mode on Start

•  Load Debugging Plugin

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Feedback- Monitoring technology

•  Dynamic

•  Static

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コントロール センター

テスト フィード

バック

解析

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Control Center-Process

Step 2

Step 1 Step 3 �

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Control Center-Statistics&Optimization

• Total test count

• Fuzz coverage

• Optimize test data

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Achievement

•  120 days

•  2 platforms

•  10 vulnerabilities

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Analysis of network

device vulnerability

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Principle of QEMU

User Space •  Send

Kernel Space

•  Syscall •  tcp_* •  ip_* •  dev_* •  e1000_*

Device Emulator

•  Network devices •  hub •  slirp

APP

APP

APP

Network Devices

Kernel

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• Initialization Port Allocation,Address Mapping

Device Status Setting, Resource Allocation

• Data Transfer 'Write Command' to device TDT register

process of descriptor

3 types descripror:context,data,legacy

data xfer

set status,wait for next instruction

• Processing Details Circular Memory

TSO:tcp segmentation/flow control.

Principle of Network Device

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•  Qemu e1000 Network Device •  Vmware e1000 Network Device

E1000 vulnerability analysis

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Summary

Pay continuous attention to virtualization security and follow Marvel Team

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Q & A

Email:[email protected] QQ:702108451