psychology, existentialism, and religion

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Psychology, Existentialism, andReligionJoseph R. Royce aa Department of Psychology , University of AlbertaPublished online: 06 Jul 2010.

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The Journal of General Psychology, 1962, 66, 3-16.

PSYCHOLOGY, EXISTENTIALISM, A N D RELIGION*'

Dtparlment of Psychology, University of Albrrta

JOSEPH R. ROYCE

A. INTRODUCTION Science and religion have a long and well known history of mutual in-

difference and, at times, animosity. Such animosity has been most apparent whenever it has been necessary for man to incorporate a major change in his Weltanschauung. Consider, for example, the upheavals which followed the Copernican Revolution, the Darwinian Revolution, and the Freudian Revolution. In all three of these examples it w a s religion which received the major body blow and had to effect a recovery. It is highly significant that religion has always been able to do this.

Science, on the other hand, has been riding the crest of the wave of success. W e of the twentieth century may be in the middle of an interesting switch in the science-religion controversy. For in many ways the usual roles have been reversed. Whereas in earlier centuries religion held the hearts and minds of men, and science had to struggle for recognition, now we see science emerging as the new religion in many quarters. Whereas religion had to be shown the error of its ways by the scientific insights of a Copernicus, a Darwin, and a Freud, we may now be in the situation where science has to be shown the error of its ways by religious insights. For the possible errors of science without religion have never been so obvious to man as they have since the advent of the atomic bomb.

The history of the rift between science and religion indicates that a rapprochement can occur. As in the case of other apparently contradictory approaches in life, such rapprochement follows automatically when each contender comes to the realization that his position, while formidable, is not sufficient in isolation. Wi th the door thus opened, each is more ready to learn from the other. Each contender is thereby rendered more able to see the positive contributions of -the other, and because of this, each is more

Received in the Editorial Office on March 7. 1960. 1 An invited address delivered at the Seventh Summer Conference of the Insti-

tute on Religion in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, on Augurt 3, 1960. Portions of this paper were presented in a symposium on Existentidim and Psychotherapy at the annual convention of the Western Psychological Ansociation in San Diego, 1959.

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4 JOURNAL OF GBNISRAL PSYCHOLOGY

ready to join forces as complementary rather than contradictory approaches to truth.

T h e uncooperative relationship between psychology and religion is part of the traditional science-religion controversy. Psychologists, concerned with the scientific status of their discipline, have felt that identification with a humanistic discipline such as religion would sell out psychology’s cause before it had a chance to come into existence as a science. Religionists, on the other hand, followed the traditional pattern of rejecting scientific advances in psychology as further evidence of encroachment on the part of alien fields. But there are signs that the beginnings of a rapprochement between psychology and religion are occurring. Perhaps the outstanding development along these lines is that of pastoral psychology. However, it must be admitted that this development is due more to the openness of the religionists than it is to the combined effort of both disciplines. Perhaps the recent establishment of an APA committee to study relationships between religion and mental health represents an official declaration of better intentions on the part of American psychologists. It is to be hoped that these expressions of a more positive attitude on the part of both religion and psychology represent a beginning of more intensive and open study of problems of mutual interest12 one capable of leading to the development of an all-encompassing theory of man. Such a goal will require the insights of all students of man, whether they come from the scientific or the humanistic camp.

In addition to the practical developments mentioned above, there are also certain intellectual developments which point to a convergence of thought in psychology and religion. In religion I have in mind the thinking of Paul Tillich, particularly as exemplified in his book T h e Courage t o Be (30), and his recent article on psychoanalysis, existentialism, and theology (32). I n psychology we have the reminders of Gordon Allport (2, ,3) and others, such as Paul Johnson (15) and W. H. Clark (4), but there has been no sustained, unified concern on the part of psychology comparable to that in religion. T h e psychiatrists (e.g., Jung) and social psychoanalysts (e.g., Frommj have been much more open to religious thought than have the psychologists. However, I predict a change in psychology along these

2 A recent development within psychology is encouraging, namely, the establishment of a “working group” with a growing interest in studying the basic presuppositions of psychology and religion, and the relations between the two. The current membership of this group is as follows: Walter H. Clark, Charles Curran, Joseph Havens, Keith Irwin, Robert Kimhall, Robert MacLeod, Paul Pruyser, and Joseph R Royce.

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 5

lines in the near future. This prediction is based primarily on the impact of existentialism on 20th century thought. There are indications that this approach to man is not being taken lightly in spite of its essentially non- systematic form, and that it contains religious insights which make sense to both religionists and scientists. The purpose of this paper is to point up the relevance of existentialism to both psychology and religion, with the idea of offering it as ag inteliectual bridge between the two. A major working assumption is that psychology, in its study of man’s ultimate concerns: will find the phenomenological approach of existentialism more palatable than the typically non-empirical approach of the religionist, and further, that it may be possible to tackle certain aspects of existential or religious questions empirically.

B. TOWARD A COMMON THEORY OF MAN Because of the richness of each domain, the potential lines of converg-

ence between psychology, existentialism, and religion are many. However, at the initial stage of our inter-disciplinary inquiry it must be admitted that the points of overlap are fuzzy and confused. T h e material which follows, therefor, is to be regarded as primarily suggestive and exploratory. Further- more, stress will be placed on a discursive exposition of the contributions from existentialism which may be common or at least relevant to the other two. No attempt will be made to exhaustively and systematically interrelate all three domains. It should be obvious that even this relatively limited task is beyond the capabilities of an exponent from only one of the three domains,

Let us begin with several observations of common concern to all three approaches. Perhaps the idea which all three disciplines share most completely is that for self-realization man must live authentically. Here we

8 This will be my working definition of religion, taken from Tillich. This point raises the question of what 1 mean by existentialism, for this domain is perhaps as chaotic as the domain of religion. Let me simply say that I do not mean the existential atatements of any one man such as Sartre, Camus, or Kierkegaard. As a working definition I have in mind all questions and propositions concerning the meaning of life, not in the abstract, but in terms of subjective existence. Similarly, by psychology I mean the science of the behavior (which is meant to include subjective behavior or experience) of organisms, particularly man. The diaunity which pervades all three disciplines here considered makes an inherently difficult task all but impoisible. The writer wishes to stress the point that definitions should not bind un unnecessarily at this early point of inquiry, and should, therefor, be accepted in the spirit in which they were offered-namely, as rough, 6rnt statements which might provide a common basis for subsequent departure. For a more complete state- ment of the sense in which I am using the term religion, please see my paper on The rearch for meaning (26).

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6 JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

are dealing with the problem of values, and what it means to live out one’s life in terms of them. Perhaps this concern is most obviously identified with religion, with its traditional stress on investing in those values which have the potential of supplying sufficient meaning to sustain the full life. A similar concern, however, lies behind the therapist’s goal of client self- acceptance and is perhaps best represented in psychology by Carl Roger’s natural growth process, Jungls concept of individuation, and Maslow’s concept of self-actualization. T h e existentialists deal with authenticity and value by demanding that we live our lives honestly, that we make our choices with as much consciousness as possible, that we be aware of the values that lie behind such choices, and that we not rationalize our way out of the consequences which ensue. I n short, they make a plea for responsible decision making. Inter-disciplinary statements on authenticity, values, and self-realization are most clearly stated in the existential religious views of Tillich, who has written a book on the courage to become one’s self (30), in the existential psychological views of Wolff who states that “the task of existential therapy is to give the individual insight into his existential reality, to unify his individuality, and to make him able to face the responsibilities of the existential risk” (34, p. 53), and in the psycholpgical-religious views of Allport (2, 3).

A second area of convergence deals with the importance of irrational processes as determinants of man’s behavior. T h e prominence of Freudian psychology on this issue is obvious and pre-eminent. What is not so obvious is that existential thought on unconscious processes actually preceded that of psychoanalysis in the writings of literary men such as Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, and in the works of such philosophers as Nietsche and Kierkegaard (4, 18). T h e contemporary existentialist concern for the non-rational aspects of the universe in contrast to unconscious mental processes is perhaps most obvious in the works of Camus (5, 6), who describes behavior which should be thought of not as a protest against reason, but as a protest against mere reason.‘ T h e concern for the irrational side of man in religion is best seen in its realization that human existence is impossible without some kind of faith (31). T h e religionist has long recognized the necessity for commitment in order to live, and that such commitment may not necessarily be a rational or a conscious one. Note, for example, that the commitment to rationality as a basis for living is not necessarily a rational decision. Thus, the shortcomings of mere rationality are implicit in the religious concern

4 The same protest as Nietsche’s, in his will to power concept.

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 7

for faith. This concern represents an item of great wisdom which religion shares with psychology and existentialism in their common pointing up of the irrational in man.

A third area of common concern is that of anxiety. While it is true that the anxiety of the existentialists and the religionists is more metaphysical than that of the psychologists it is, nevertheless, anxiety. Both the religionists and the existentialists speak of the anxiety which accompanies alienation- separation from fellow man, society, and nature. While the religionists stress the anxiety which accompanies separation from God, the existentialists speak of the threat of non-being. A t this point we see the linkage with the more pedestrian anxiety of the psychologist. For the existentialist concept of non-being might be physical death, psychological inadequacy, or severe ego threat, and the immortality concern of religion might be thought of as a psychological security measure. Otto Rank (25) has developed this point most convincingly with his suggestion that man, unable to accept physical death, unconsciously makes his bid for continued being by the creation of great works of art and science, and by the preservation of political and social ideologies. Unable to manage physical immortality, he at least tran- scends himself by achieving psychological or spiritual immortality. T h e relevance of Rank’s thesis to existential and psychological anxiety is sten in his exposition of how the urge to immortality lies behind our social and political revolutions and wars, for people are willing to die on behalf of such ideologies (e.g., note the contemporary situation of communism versua capitalism) if it represents a projected self-perpetuation. At this juncture note the tie-up to our earlier discussion on authenticity. For if there is an imminent threat of non-being, that is, of not becoming what one should become in terms of one’s individuality and in terms of the highest reaches of what it means to be human, then the threat to the self is severe, and dread, or anxiety, is a natural consequence. One reason for the recent emergence of existential psychotherapy (see references 21, 11) is the growing realization of the legitimacy of the existential anxiety of meaninglessness in addition to the free-floating anxiety of the neurotic. Frankl (11) speaks of such severe existential frustrations as a noogenesis or spiritual neurosis in contradistinction to a psychogenic neurosis.

Perhaps the most important example of common concern is that of symbolic processes. From the point of view of psychology it is unfortunately true that Jung has stood practically alone in his prophetic writings on the importance of symbolic manifestations for the understanding of both psychological and religious matters, His position is that modern man is in search of a

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soul (i.e., integrated personality) because the traditional religious symbols have lost their meaning (16). Jung interprets the increase of neuroticism in our time and the mass psychosis of modern totalitarianism as symptomatic of spiritual starvation. H e interprets these mental disturbances as the natural compensatory activity of unconscious processes. H e claims there is always an increase in “symbolizing” when the. contemporary symbols fail to convey meaning. T h e result is an increase in symbolic representations in individual men’s fantasies and dreams and an increase in mythmaking at the group or collective level. T h e most meaningful symbolic manifestations of man, whether observed at the individual level or in the analysis of myths, are the archetypes, These recurrent themes are so meaningful because they reflect the eternal needs of the psyche; they reflect the tendency toward wholeness, they reveal man’s searching for the unity of his psyche. T h e most powerful of these universal expressions of psychic need is the archetypal symbol of god.

In general, the psychologists have branded Jung as mystical and have essentially ignored his as unscientific, whereas the religionists have not been too happy with his interpretation of god in symbolic rather than literalistic terms. T h e discipline of religion has been reluctant to see the power and the deep insight of this view, although the recent indirect support from the writings of Cassirer (7, 8), Langer (19), and other philosophers on symbolic forms, has begun to have a very salutary impact on contemporary religious thought. Cassirer points out that all forms of knowledge, the sciences, the humanities, and the arts, are symbolic manifestations of man’s cultural evolution, and that the history of the development of the human psyche lies symbolically hidden in the major myths of mankind. For example, as the content of the myth progresses from many gods to one god, man moves from relative unconsciousness to relative consciousness. In short, polytheism symbolically represents a multitude of fragmented ego projections which moves toward a more unified “self” as man’s conceptualization approaches monotheism. Taken together, Jung and Cassirer present a complementary exposition of the nature of symbolic forms. Their difference comes in the fact that Cassirer gives us an essentially conscious theory of symbolization, whereas Jung gives us an essentially unconscious theory.6

T h e social psychological implications of Jungian thought is brought out in a recent book of Progoff’s (24), who makes the major point that a living

5 The complementary nature of the thought of Jung and Cassirer is developed more fully in Ch. VIII Symbol, Myth, and Reality of the writer’r forthcoming book The Enca$ruIatcd Man.

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 9

religion is the dominant force which holds a social structure together. Since it is the core around which people build the meaning of their lives, by definition its symbols represent what a people value most.

To ray that an individual has “faith” is to say, psychologically, that he can live his symbols, that they are dive within him; and to say that an individual ir “sceptical” means that the symbols are no longer spontaneously active or alive within him” (24, pp. 209-210).

T h e existential temper of this quote is obvious-without authenticity, one’s religion or faith is dead. Symbols, whether religious or otherwise, must carry an existential impact in order to be effective as determinants of man’s beliefs and behavior. T h e theologian Schaer is in complete sympathy with Jung’s analysis of symbols, including the stress on unconscious processes.

Religion is the acknowledgement of the things that consciousness fails to realize . . . religion contributes substantially to man’s social structure, and a living religion is needed for full development of personality (27, p. 136) .

H e accepts individuation as the essence of rebirth and suggests that “the task of religion is to do what the symbol does; bring opposites together” (27, p. 110).

But it is in the work of the existential theologian Paul Tillich, especially in his magnum opus, Systematic Theology (29) , that we see the complete, integrative treatment-in terms of psychology, existentialism, and religion- of symbolism. For here we see the existential concern for the meaning which is invested in a religious symbol, the religious idolatry which is the lot of those who literalize such symbols, and the awareness that it is important not to speak psychological nonsense about such matters.

Now let us turn to several ideas which are central to existential thought, and which may be shared in part by one or both of the other two disciplines, but which are not clearly common to all three. These ideas are presented because they are fundamental to an eventual theory of man, and it may be that either or both psychology and religion ought to be more cognizant of these views. I shall present the first two points together because they are interrelated. They are as follows: (1) existence is not essence and (2) man is not a machine. First, the existential view that existence is not essence. This view holds that the way things are is not necessarily the way they ought to be, or the way they “really” arc. Therefor, statistical descriptions of man’s behavior, for ,instance, do not constitute a standard for the existentialist. Rather, the existentialist stresses the potential or the demand of what man can become.

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Secondly, the existentialists say that man cannot be understood as a machine or robot. A given man at a given time does not know what he will do a t the next moment, his essence is still evolving. Furthermore, he is not always rational. What’s more he does not follow .a certain set of rules or principles. In short, man is not a thing, and therefor, scientific prediction regarding man will not work. However, contemporary man is bcing treated as if he were a thing, for he is being pushed around by masses, big organkitions, and urban industrialization, and he is being compartmen- talized by educational and occupational specialization. Finally he gets to the point where he ses himself, not as man, a whole person with a diversity of needs and purposes, but only as a plumber, a teacher, or a salesman. That is, he sees himself functionally rather than as a human being. Such a de- humanized or fragmented man, treated essentially as a thing, is existentially dead. Man in such a state is not free, he is simply a robot. Existential man, on the other hand, is free.

Thesc two v i m are interrelated by the existential assumption that man is free, not determined. Here is a position diametrically opposed to that of scientific psychology. For psychology, in order to play the scientific game, was forced to accept the assumption of determinism, and is proceeding as rapidly as possible with an electronic brain as the current model for man. While it must be admitted that psychology has learned much about man on the basis of this assumption, it must also be admitted that existentialism and religion have also gained insights into man’s nature by proceeding with the opposite assumption. As so often happens with either-or dichotomies, I suspect the difficulty here arises if one insists that the answer must be one way or the other. Doesn’t our best available evidence suggest that there is potent truth on both sides? Is it not true that many aspects of man’s behavior are in fact, machine-like? And is it not equally true that such an approach to man is too reductive and will leave too much unaccounted for? Does this not suggest that psychology, for example, become more humanistic, and a t least go so far as to use the model of an organism rather than a machine? And isn’t it also true that man as a completely free being is equally preposterous? T h e dilemma of freedom versus determinism as far as man’s behavior is concerned is generally recognized as one of the perennial, and perhaps unresolvable, issues of philosophic thought. I see the position of both the existentialists (i.e., for complete freedom) and the scientific psychologists (i.e., for complete determinism) as extremist in that they arch fly their banner in the face of obvious and overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and I have concluded that this dilemma can best be resolved

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 11

by discarding both of the extreme positions, and settling for a position of probabilistic determinism.e

Another existential view which I want to call to your attention is the stress which is placed on the value and meaning of the immediately apprehendable aesthetic experience. This is one of the positive by-products of their protest against “mere” reason, and a further reminder of the artistic aspect of man’s nature. It is related to the existentialist’s stress on living in the moment, maximizing one’s awareness, existing fully. This view overlaps Zen (28, 33) and other Eastern philosophic and religious views, and it is consistent with Northrop’s (22, 23) plea that Western man needs to balance his identification with the rational or theoretic approach to life by the Eastern concern for the aesthetic. While it is doubtful that psychology has any objection at this point, it is also true that as a discipline it hasn’t had much to say on this issue. Perhaps the only systematic exposition within psychology which has stressed the aesthetic or intuitive component is that of Jung, whose fourfold typology requires that a healthy psyche balance the rational and the intuitive, along with the sensory and the fee1,ing functions. Perhaps the main point to be made here is that Western culture, including Western therapeutic practice, could profit greatly by openness to the ancient therapeutic practices of Eastern culture.? Close examination of such procedures would certainly result in confirmation of much that is being done today in psychotherapy as well as point the way to new insights which could be applied to currently over-rational, aesthetic-deprived Western man. Such an approach might even lead to a broader view of the role of the therapist, namely, as more of a sage and guide, in other words, as the archetypal “wise old man,” rather than the more restrictive adjustor-to-society or mind-healer prototype ,which is currently the mode.

The final concept I want to bring to your attention is that of existential truth. I confess to having had great difficulty in ferreting out this view, and I’m not certain to what extent it contains my own projections. But the basic idea is clearly in the existential atmosphere. It is not stated ex- plicitly in existential writings, but for that matter, neither are most of the

6 This point receives more complete development in a forthcoming paper on Philosophy, Theory, and Psychology.

7 See, for example, the journal of oriental psychology PJychoIogia, especially Vol. 1, No. 4, 1958, and Vol. 2, NO. 2, 1959. And what could be more consistent with recent existential and phenomenological writings than the following quote concerning the purpose of Zen training? “Such awareness is a lively attention to one’i direct experience, to the world as immediately sensed, 00 as not to be. misled by namea and labels. (Samadhi) . . . is the perfection of the . . . pure experience, pure awareness . . . (33 , p. 52).

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other views. Just as Jacobi (14) has done us a great service by pulling together the scattered and unsystematic writings of Jung, so somebody needs to organize existential writings into a reasonably systematic and understand- able summary. Such a step will be slow in coming because of the essentially anti-systematic bias of most existentialist writers ; however, it is bound to come as the non-existential professional philosophers come to grips with it more and more seriously. What is meant by existential truth? I have dis- cussed this concept more fully in another paper (26) , and am currently pursuing its epistemological implications at greater length elsewhere: but I can summarize it as follows. Existential truth refers to those insights or awarenesses which emerge from concerns which have a transforming effect on one’s existence. Conversely, if one’s concerns are detrimental to life, then the implied insights are invalid. I n addition to investing one’s life in meaningful conqerns, existential validity also requires total involvement of the individual. T h a t is, not only the rational or the intuitive, but the sensory and the feeling functions as well. This concept is very much akin to the insightful or “aha” experience of the client who has successfully undergone psychotherapy. Such an experience reflects a new awareness, a reintegration of the personality, a more insightful understanding of the meaning of one’s existence. A purely intellectual insight or the verbalization of certain psychiatric terminology does not result in a “cure.” In short, the person’s existence is not affected unless there is emotion or feeling at the core of his experiences. There is a requirement of total involvement or emotional reliving before the rebirth can occur. T h e relevance of this concept to religious inquiry is obvious. It is, in fact, crucial to the problem of religious truth, and provides as potent a foundation for truth in the religious domain as I am aware of. This is particularly true when the concept of existential truth is tied to Tillich’s conceptualization of religion as ultimate concern (see references 3 1 and 26).

C. CAN WE VALIDATE EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONS?

How can we validate existential insights? If our ultimate goal is to understand man, on what grounds shall we accept insights concerning his nature, and on what grounds shall we reject them? In spite of the existential protest concerning the over-scientizing of man, let us first examine this question from the point of view of the usual empirical criteria. T h a t is, let us ask ourselves whether we can translate existential propositions into empirically testable procedures? Let us begin where it is easiest to answer,

8 In a paper in progreas on “Epistemology and existential validity.”

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 13

with the four ideas shared by psychology, existentialism and religion, for considerable progress has already been made in these areas. Unconscious processes and anxiety, for example, have been empirically investigated at great length. Similiarly, a great mass of evidence has been accumulated in the areas of symbolic processes and self-realization. While it is true that most of these observations have been made in the clinic, there actually have been laboratory experiments performed on three of the four problems, including, for example, the investigation by J. G. Miller on unconscious conditioning, the work on sub-liminal perception, the valueaiented research of Bruner on symbolic processes, and the induced anxiety procedures of Silvan Tomkins. Now there is no claim being made here that such matters as metaphysical anxiety have been experimentally studied. But we are pointing out that while this very difficult problem is currently not amenable to experimental study, it is subject to empirical observation in the clinic, and that earlier views regarding unconscious processes were similarly regarded as not subject to experimental verification. The point is very simply that we need to remain entirely open on the issue of what can and what cannot be studied empirically, including the highly philosophical propositions of existentialism, for we may be able to investigate them once we give them acceptable philosophical status.

Let us look at the four non-shared existential propositions. Perhaps the easiest of these to investigate empirically is the third one on the impact of the aesthetic experience. T h e small band of psychology’s students of aesthetics has already made sufficient inroads in assessing aesthetic sensi- tivity, although they have not conducted cross cultural psychological studies of relatively “pure” aesthetic types from the East as contrasted with relatively “pure” Western rational man. The existential proposition concerning the robotizing and dehumanizing of man has also been loosely verified empirically by social psychologists such as David Riesman and social psychoanalysts such as Erich Fromm. Thus, the empirical research from the behavioral sciences and the conceptual insights of religion add weight to the existential proposition that man is not a machine. Since the proposition that existence is not essence entails concern about the difference between conditions as we find them and what one ought to become, the earlier references to the empirical researches of Rogers, Jung, and Maslow are relevant.

T h e last proposition, that having to do with existential truth, moves us to consider the problem of non-empirical, or a t least non-traditional- empirical, validation of truths concerning the nature of man. A t this juncture we see a most important 1,ink between the highly subjective phenomena

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of existentialism and religion on the one hand, and the problem of verification which scientific psychology demands on the other hand. For there is overwhelming evidence from the psychological clinic to the effect that men have had experiences in therapeutic sessions (although the experiences are not necessarily public or reproducible), which have changed them-in short, there is psychological evidence for subjective or existential truth. It is in the clinic, then, where the verities of existence can best be observed and checked into, whether they be finally checked out in terms of the usual empirical criterion or the criterion of existential truth. I n this connection we need to be reminded of the considerable work which has already been done in Europe under the banner of what has come to be known as existential analysis (21 ) . Many astute observations concerning the psychology of existence have already been made in the psychological clinic, and one trans- planted European existential psychologist, Werner Wolff (34), has developed a significant theoretical framework which combines existential thought with traditional therapy and the psychology and philosophy of values.

Considerations of this kind, where we mix such disparate approaches as psychology, existentialism, and religion, force us to consider the philosophic presuppositions which undergird each discipline, particularly as they relate to the problem of establishing truth. T h e debate within psychology on idiographic versus nomothetic laws is a case in point. If we insist on the traditional conception of the scientific enterprise we shall be forced to confine ourselves to nomothetic principles. But Gordon Allport ( 1 ) and others have presented convincing arguments and demonstrations for idiographic principles in addition to nomothetic principles. T h e phenomenologists have made a similar plea in their insistence that we cannot understand behavior without a clear understanding of the perceptual framework of the individual (e.g., see references 20 and 10). T h e recent experimental research on the interrelations between projection, value, and motivation represents a firm link between personality and perception, a development which provides some degree of empirical confirmation for the phenomenological approach. T h e point to be made in this connection is that the perceptual, phenomenological, and idiographic currents of contemporary thought insist on getting at the inner psychology or subjective meanings of men. T h i s means that such tradi- tionally tabooed subjects as beauty, love, and religious behavior are not only rendered admissible, but become primary targets of investigation. I n short, such currents of thought would allow the psychologist to freely and legiti- mately investigate existential questions, even though some of these questions cannot be handled within the usual scientific epistemology. This point of

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JOSEPH R. ROYCE 15

departure raises serious questions concerning the definition of psychology, and carries with .it equally serious consequences for its future developmart.*

D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Psychology and religion have a long and well known history of'mutual indifference, and, at times, animosity. There are signs that the beginnings of a rapprochement between psychology and religion are occurring. T h e purpose of this paper is to point up the relevance of existentialism to both psychology and religion, with the idea of offering it as an intellectual bridge between the two. Four ideas or concepts are presented which are seen as being common to all three approaches. These are: (1 ) for self-realization each man must live authentically, (2) the importance of irrational procarses as determinants of man's behavior, (3) the concept of anxiety, and (4) the problem of symbolic processes. Four additional ideas, central to existential thought, were presented as food for thought for the disciplines of psychology and religion. These are: ( 1) existence is not essence, (2) man is not a machine, (3) man's need for the immediately apprehendable aesthetic experience, and (4) the concept of existential truth.

T h e point of the paper is that existential questions, which are clearly important aspects of human nature, should be seen as central to the concerns of psychology, and that they can be validly Investigated, some in accordance with the usual scientific criteria, and some according to the as yet unexplored but promising criterion of existential validity.

REFERENCES 1. ALLPORT, G. A. The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science. New

2. - . The Individual and His Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1950. 3. -. Becoming. New Naven: Yale Univ. Press, 1955. 4. B A M E ~ , W. Irrational Man. Garden City: Doubledny, 1958. 5. CAMUS, A. The Stranger. New York: Knopf, 1946. 6. - . The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Knopf, 1955.

York: Social Science Research Council, 1942.

0 Underlying this thought is the question of the adequacy nnd relevance of exis- tentinl validity for the establishment of psychological truths. Both of these important issues, the definition of psychology, and the nature of existential validity, lie beyond the scope of the present paper and are being investigated more fully in other papers. Perhnpr it will suffice at this juncture to state my bias in favor of a bmad conception of psychological science, and to look with favor on the possibility of new avenues of approach via the pathway of existential vnlidity. At the same time, I hope it has been clear that, while my position is one of openness to the insighhb of existentialism, I am of the opinion that psychology must continue to evaluate u- perience with rigor. I presume the problem is to proceed with rigor, but without rigor mortis!

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16 JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOCY

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f iomr, E. Psychoanalysis and Religion. Ncw Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. JACOBI, J. The Psychology of C. G. Jung. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1943. JOHSSOX, P. E. Psychology of Religion. (Revised edition). Nashville: Abingdon

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Department of Psychology tiniversity of Alberra Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

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