Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper
Post on 09-Apr-2017
Embed Size (px)
Psychoanalysis, science and the seductivetheory of Karl Popper
Don C. Grant, Edwin Harari
Objective: To present a critique of the ideas of Karl Popper, the philosopher of science,whose depiction of psychoanalysis as a pseudoscience is often used to justify attacks onpsychoanalysis.Method: Published sources are used to provide a brief intellectual biography of Popper, asummary of his concept of science and a summary of criticisms of Poppers view of science.His depiction of psychoanalysis and Freuds reply are presented. Clinical, experimentaland neurobiological research which refutes Poppers view is summarized.Results: There is a vast scholarly published work critical of Poppers falsifiability crite-rion of science. Less recognized is Poppers misunderstanding and misrepresentation ofpsychoanalysis; his argument against it is logically flawed and empirically false. Even ifPoppers theory of science is accepted, there is considerable clinical, experimental andneurobiological research in psychoanalysis which meets Poppers criterion of science.Conclusion: Attacks on psychoanalysis based on Poppers theory of science are ill-founded and reflect inadequate scholarship.Key words: evidence, falsifiability, philosophy of science, psychoanalysis, science.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 2005; 39:446452
Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapiesderived from it, have enjoyed a long history and muchpublicity . Yet, the justification for such attackshas been challenged on many grounds, including theirmethodology  and the empirically demonstrable va-lidity of core psychoanalytic concepts [6,7]. Also, bur-geoning neuroscience research, some of which is sum-marized below, indicates likely neurological correlatesfor many key clinically derived psychoanalytic conceptssuch as self-coherence , repression  and projectiveidentification .
Furthermore, the effectiveness of psychoanalysis andits derivative therapies has been supported by empiri-cal research [11,12], particularly for patients with DSM
Don C. Grant, private practice (Correspondence)
1021 Malvern Road, Toorak, Melbourne, Victoria 3142, Australia.Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Edwin Harari, Consultant Psychiatrist
St. Vincents Hospital Area Mental Health Service, Melbourne, Australia
Received 9 May 2004; revised 7 September 2004; accepted 13 September2004.
axis II pathology. Despite this evidence, the attacks onpsychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from somepsychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels ofpolitics and health bureaucrats , although what ex-actly is being attacked is often unclear.
An equally unfocused reply hardly constitutes a schol-arly discourse, so before proceeding further, we wish toclarify our focus when discussing psychoanalysis in thispaper. The term psychoanalysis encompasses several dis-tinct but related domains. First, it is a method of observa-tion of mental functioning; second, it is a group of theoriesof the mind; and finally, it is a method of psychotherapy.In this contribution, we are limiting our discussion ofpsychoanalysis to one issue in the first domain, namelyPoppers misunderstanding of Freuds method of verifi-cation of psychoanalytic interpretations. We inevitablytouch upon other aspects of psychoanalysis, but they arenot our focus here.
Popper believed that psychoanalysis could not befalsified and was therefore not scientific. This much-publicized view of Popper, uncritically accepted, oftenseems to be coupled with the assumption that it is also
D.C. GRANT, E. HARARI 447
acceptable not to bother looking at the actual evidence.Before discussing in detail Poppers belief about falsifia-bility in psychoanalysis, we shall briefly outline some ofthe influences on the development of his thinking.
Karl Popper and his theory of science 
Karl Popper was born in Vienna in 1902, into a dis-tinguished legal family. He studied at the University ofVienna to become a teacher and youth worker beforebeing drawn to mathematics and philosophy. A youth-ful flirtation with a rather extreme form of Marxism wassoon replaced by what might be described as Fabian-style socialism. Psychoanalysis, particularly the ideas ofAlfred Adler, was considered by these democratic social-ist reformers to be relevant for workers and intellectualsseeking to understand the shared difficulties they facedin trying to improve society. Popper grew disillusionedwith socialism, apparently disappointed by the equivo-cation of the Viennese democratic socialists who werereluctant to ally themselves with the bourgeoisie againstthe emerging forces of fascism in the 1930s [16, pp.328329]. Later, he adopted a form of small-l liberalism whichrejected grand political or social revolutions and central-ized government-sponsored 10-year plans in favour ofwhat he termed piecemeal social engineering, whereinsmall social changes for the betterment of society are im-plemented and their effects reviewed before attemptingfurther change.
Poppers Logic of scientific discovery  was pub-lished in 1935, though it received little attention at thetime. Having unsuccessfully sought an academic posi-tion in the UK, he left Vienna for New Zealand shortlybefore the outbreak of the Second World War and settledin Christchurch, where he lectured at the then CanterburyCollege of the University of New Zealand and from wherehe wrote his influential The open society and its enemies. He finally went to the UK in 1947 and spent mostof his remaining professional life at the London Schoolof Economics. He died in 1994.
Popper [18, pp.3738] recounts that while in Vienna in1919, he was overwhelmed by a lecture he attended, givenby Albert Einstein, which described some of the amazingdiscoveries in the New Physics of the atom and quantummechanics. It was in the same year that Eddingtons ex-pedition conducted observations during an eclipse of thesun to test Einsteins general theory of relativity using thepredictions that theory made about the effects of gravityon light waves. Eddingtons observations supported therisky predictions made by the theory. Popper contrastedthis with what he claimed were theories of Marx, Freudand Adler, then in vogue in Vienna, theories which Popperclaimed were always confirmed irrespective of whether
or not the predictions which followed from the theoryactually occurred.
The philosophers, scientists and mathematicians whoconstituted the Vienna Circle had proposed a theory ofmeaning based on the idea that a statement is meaningfulif it can be verified by experience. This doctrine of log-ical positivism held that verification of a (theoretical)statement by experience (observation) was the hallmarkof science. Central to such an understanding of sciencewas the role of inductive reasoning (i.e. generalizing fromknown observables to as-yet unobserved situations).
Unlike the Vienna Circle, Popper argued that the ver-ification of predictions derived from a theory is not thedistinguishing feature of science. Rather, it is the pos-sibility of specifying what observations, if they were tooccur, would stand as a refutation of a given theory whichis the hallmark of the scientific method. For Popper, it isdeductive (i.e. reasoning from observation which maydisconfirm a theory) rather than inductive reasoning (rea-soning from any number of observations which appear tohave confirmed a theory) which is the characteristic of ascientific theory.
Popper [21, pp.3435] writes:
I found that those of my friends who were admirersof Marx, Freud and Adler, were impressed by a num-ber of points common to these theories, and especiallyby their apparent explanatory power. These theories ap-peared able to explain practically everything that hap-pened within the fields to which they referred. The studyof them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual con-version or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truthhidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes werethus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere;the world was full of verifications of the theory. What-ever happened always confirmed it . . . every conceivablecase could be interpreted in the light of Adlers theory,or equally of Freuds. I may illustrate this with two verydifferent examples of human behaviour: that of a manwho pushes a child into the water with the intention ofdrowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his lifein an attempt to save the child. Each of the two exam-ples could be explained with equal ease in Freudian andAdlerian terms. According to Freud the first man sufferedfrom repression (say of some component of his Oedipuscomplex), while the second man achieved sublimation.I could not think of any human behaviour which couldnot be interpreted in terms of (either) theory. It was thisfact, that they always fitted, that they were always con-firmed which in the eyes of their admirers constitutedthe strongest argument in favour of those theories. Itbegan to dawn on me that this apparent strength was infact their weakness.
448 PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCIENCE AND THE SEDUCTIVE THEORY OF KARL POPPER
What Popper has described here is the attribution ofunconscious motives to people on the basis of a theory,with no supporting clinical evidence. That is not psycho-analysis! It is, in fact, a caricature of psychoanalysis of atype specifically condemned by Freud  as wild psy-choanalysis, that is, coming to conclusions about uncon-scious motives, without going through the long painstak-ing process of overcoming the specific defences usedby that individual, in order to be in a position to under-stand their particular unconscious motives. Indeed, it wasonly by ignoring the way psychoanalytic theorizing pro-ceeds from transference and defence analysis in the clin-ical situation that Popper could construct his caricatureof psychoanalysis, which he was then able to demolishwith such ease. Mistaking wild psychoanalysis for realpsychoanalysis, Popper incorrectly concluded that realpsychoanalysis claimed to be right about everything andcould not be falsified.
Poppers falsifiability criterion of science is seductivein its simplicity, but its simplicity is achieved by itsfailure to address not only the clinical issues but alsothe many philosophical issues, which have been raisedin the extensive scholarly published work critical ofPoppers account. Curiously, this published work is ig-nored by those who invoke Popper to criticize psycho-analysis. The main criticisms may be summarized as:
1 Historians of science [23,24] using the case-studymethod of theory change in science, including psy-choanalysis , have shown the inadequacy of Pop-pers criterion as a description of how scientists ac-tually work and how theories change in the practiceof science. In these accounts, inductive reasoning andthe verification of hypotheses play a crucial role.
2 Some medical scientists describe Poppers criterionas counterproductive in the real world . For ex-ample, in formulating epidemiological hypothesesconcerning the spread of HIVAIDS, which havepublic health and clinical implications, a Popperianapproach which insists on strict falsification of hy-potheses is less useful and less frequently used inactual practice than one which uses induction to gen-eralize from observations in a professionally disci-plined way.
3 Popper neglected the crucial role played by conceptsand models in scientific theorizing [24,26]. Conceptsand models (including ideational, mathematical andmaterial models) are not epiphenomena produced asan incidental by-product of scientific thinking, butactively shape the way scientists think about theirfield and the questions they ask. Watson and Cricksuse of a material model to discover the double helixstructure of DNA is a well-known example.
4 The probability calculus posed difficulties forPopper as did Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principlewhich challenged a strict falsificationist view of sci-ence and led to some personal friction between Pop-per and Heisenberg [16, pp.257259].
5 Popper insisted that there is but one scientific method,equally applicable to the natural sciences (mathemat-ics, physics, biology, astronomy, geology) social sci-ences (anthropology, linguistics, sociology, ethnol-ogy, history) and all other endeavours which claim tobe scientific [27,28].
6 Popper misrepresented historicism in general andMarxist theory in particular [29,30]. The term his-toricism was used by historians long before Popper torefer to the historians attempt to empathize with peo-ple about whom they were writing so as to understandthem and their social conditions as they understoodthemselves and which gave rise to certain actionsand events, that is, a contextualist, empathic methodof historical scholarship. Popper used the term his-toricism in an idiosyncratic way to mean a belief indeterministic or teleological laws governing histor-ical change which he attributed to Plato, Marx andHegel. Thus, Popper claimed that some of Marxspredictions, such as the increasing pauperization ofthe working class under capitalism which would cre-ate the conditions for revolution, were clearly falsifiedby the time he (Popper) was writing, almost a cen-tury after Marx. In response, some scholars have ar-gued that two World Wars and the rise of the WelfareState served to distract the working class in devel-oped society from its lack of economic and politicalpower, while the pauperization that Marx predictedhas occurred in the so-called underdeveloped coun-tries. Other commentators believe that the pauperiza-tion of the working class has in fact occurred, relativeto the advance of other socioeconomic groups. Stillothers hold that the Welfare State was a direct re-sponse to Marxs theory, raising the question of howhuman will operates in the social sciences in waysthat make them radically different from the naturalsciences. So social sciences may still claim to bescientific but Poppers falsification criterion is irrele-vant/inappropriate to social science.
7 Contrary to Poppers claim against psychoanalysis,the use of a theory to save itself from apparently fal-sifying instances does not, prima facie, render it un-scientific. Most scientific theories include so-calledauxiliary statements, including those which guide theuse of instruments and methods of observation thatmay be relevant to the apparent falsification of thetheory in question . Thus, the fact that an aero-plane crashes on take-off is not a valid refutation
D.C. GRANT, E. HARARI 449
of the Newtonian mechanics which were applied tothe design of the aeroplane. On the contrary, auxil-iary hypotheses to do with wind resistance, surfacefriction and metal fatigue are invoked to explain theaccident, explanations which are themselves derivedfrom Newtonian mechanics.
Beginning in the 1970s, several alternative models (toPoppers) of scientific practice and theory change wereproposed, including those of Kuhn , Feyerabend ,Lakatos  and Bloor , which, to varying de...