Peacekeeping and POC (Protection of Civilians)

Case Studies Haiti & D.R. CongoDr. Walter DornCanadian Forces College

18 June 2014

Evolution of Peacekeeping

Four Types/Generations 1 Observer2 Interposition3 Multidimensional4 Transitional administration

Expanding functions and responsibilities, including use of armed force

Difficult Situations 1993-95SomaliaBosniaRwanda

Twenty-first Century Peacekeeping1999 Report of SG on POCmandates were insufficiently clear or inadequate resources were assigned to the task

SC mandates:protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within capabilities and areas of deployment. Currently: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMA, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI

Peacekeeping budget: from $1B to $8B

Current missions with POC Mandates

MINUSTAH Case:Robust and Intelligence-ledMINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti2004-

Haiti

MINUSTAH Mission MandatePOLITICALPROCESSHUMANRIGHTSSecurity Council Resolution 1542 (2004)Under Chapter VII SECURE &STABLE ENVIRONMENT

Cit Soleil: Gang RuleTaxation, Soldiers, TerrorNo HNP entryJordanian AOR6 killedRoute Nationale No. 1Extortion

Dangerous Patrolling 2005Photo # 105833 UN Photo/S. Paris MINUSTAH Troops Prepare to Patrol Slum of Cit Soleil A United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) battalion of Jordanian soldiers prepares to patrol the slum of Cit Soleil, Haiti. Date: 29 November 2005 Photo # 105837 UN Photo/S. Paris

2005Photo # 85539 UN Photo/Sophia Paris UN Peacekeeping Chief Goes on Patrol in Haiti Jean-Marie Guhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Juan Gabriel Valds, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), accompany a Brazillian patrol in Bel-Air, a hillside slum ravaged by armed bandits. Date: 25 June 2005 Photo # 85543 UN Photo/Sophia Paris UN Peacekeeping Chief Accompanies Peacekeepers on Patrol in Haiti A typical street scene in the slum where Jean-Marie Guhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Juan Gabriel Valds, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (both on the first vehicle), accompany a Brazillian patrol in Bel-Air, a hillside slum ravaged by armed bandits. Date: 25 June 2005

Civilian casualtiesSee description of operation at: http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/un_cracks_down_on_gangs_reside.htmlThe Washington Post later reported that a confidential UN investigation concluded that 'dozens' of civilians were injured. Holt & Berkman, p.98

Public Anger, Jan 2006UN vehicle blocked by crowds in Haiti

At UN Headquarters Crowd refuses to move, throwing water on themLeader of the civil society group, Group of 184, Andre Apeid intervened and cleared the way

16 January 2006Photo # 109530 UN Photo/S. Paris

2006New Head of MINUSTAH Tours Cit Soleil Newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti and Head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Edmond Mulet (centre) visits Cit Soleil neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. UN peacekeepers are working on paving Route 9 which runs through the center of Cit Soleil. Date: 19 June 2006 Photo # 117280 UN Photo/Sophia Paris United Nations VIP Close Protection Team in Training A United Nations Police (UNPOL) VIP Close Protection Team of security officers trains on a soccer field at the Haitian National Police Academy in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. The team consists of UNPOL from France, Chile, Philippines, Senegal, Canada, United States and Brazil, with the primary duty of protecting the Prime Minister, the President, the Haitian National Police Commissioner, and all dignitaries who visit Haiti. Date: 25 April 2006

ElectionsPhoto # 85536 UN Photo/Sophia Paris UN Mission Prepares for Haitian Polls Some 10 generators, 20 solar panels, fans, and inverters are loaded onto a UN MI-8 helicopter to be transported from Port-Au-Prince to Port de Paix, as part of the preparations to install electoral registration bureaus in remote areas in the Northwest department of Haiti by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH Provides Security at Voting Center in Cit Soleil Peacekeepers from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) provide security at a voting center in Cit Soleil, Port-au-Prince, during the second round of the senatorial elections in Haiti. Date: 21 June 2009

Elections 2006Photo # 116992 UN Photo/S. Paris Haitians Vote in Parliamentary Elections Voters trickle in at the voting centre in downtown Port-au-Prince to cast their ballots in parliamentary elections, today in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. Date: 21 April 2006 Photo # 141460 UN Photo/L. Abassi UN Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti Brazilian UN peacekeepers patrol the Cit Soleil neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince during an operation to restore order in the area by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), after three hours of heavy fighting between gangs. Date: 09 February 2007

Security Council Visits; Recommends Intell CapacityUN Photo # 71622 UN Photo/S. Paris Fact-Finding Mission to Haiti, 15 April 2005Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg (left), Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations and Head of the Security Council fact-finding mission to Haiti, meets with peacekeepers of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Second from left is Juan Gabriel Valds, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH. 9. Calls upon MINUSTAH to make the Joint Mission Analysis Cell operational as soon as possible in order to pool and better use the information available to the MINUSTAH military, police and civilian componentsUN Security Council Resolution 1608 (22 June 2005)

Cit Soleil

UN RESTRICTEDBELECOUBOIS NEUFWAFFDROUILLARDBOSTONSOLEIL 4Soleil 19Soleil 13BROOKLINSoleil 9CITE SOLEILTi HaitiLintheau IBlanchard(Cite Gerard)Cite LumiereTroisBebesTi Paul StVolcy StSanon StLintheau IINorwayProjKay Boule(Naboule)Soleil StSoleil StSoleil 9 StSoleil 9 StDrouillard StVulcain StNational #1 RdBoston StSoleil 17Bas ShalomCoastPatrolsCoastPatrolsMINUSTAH Patrolled Areas

Intel: Evens Gang CapabilitiesStrength about 40-50 men

WeaponsMachine gun and many semi-automatic assault riflesStockpiled ammunition a month before the UN offensive on his compound Molotov cocktails and hand grenadesShooters, based at the National School, possessed an infrared scope for night targeting

HUMINT: Paid informantsRich environmentWide-ranging disaffection with gangs Persons close to the gang leaders (including lovers)Low income in Haiti (more than half on less than $1 per day)Toll-free 24/7 hotline in 2005 (tips)

Hazard of false rumours

EVENS JEUNECLAUDE EVENSEVEL ANDOU

Gang Tacticsrobust networks of lookouts using cell phones, rooftop snipers, and gunmen who use women and children as human shields

Funding Sources US$ 25,000 to kill the would-be kidnappers of a prominent Haitian

UN Strategic AssessmentBased on gang psychology: If outnumbered and outgunned, they [gang members] will attempt to delay and escape

UN RESTRICTEDBELECOUBOIS NEUFWAFFDROUILLARDBOSTONSOLEIL 4Soleil 19Soleil 13BROOKLINSoleil 9CITE SOLEILTi HaitiLintheau IBlanchard(Cite Gerard)Cite LumiereTroisBebesTi Paul StVolcy StSanon StLintheau IINorwayProjKay Boule(Naboule)Soleil StSoleil StSoleil 9 StSoleil 9 StDrouillard StVulcain StNational #1 RdBoston StSoleil 17Bas ShalomCoastPatrolsCoastPatrolsMINUSTAH Patrolled Areas

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2006/10/tete_fret_1.html#more

STRONG POINTS

Operation Blue HouseSeized January 2007 using diversionEvens expelled people nearby to set fire to houses so resulting fire and smoke might force the Brazilian soldiers to leave their post. Not carried out.

Operational planning

(Firing positions)

Operational execution

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

Des Casques bleus brsiliens aux aguets aprs des combats intensifs avec des gangs dans le quartier de Cit Soleil dans la capitale de Hati, Port-au-Prince Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Hati (MINUSTAH) Port-au-Prince, Hati, 9 fvrier 2007, Photo ONU/Logan Abassi, 141459

http://www.un.org/french/events/peacekeeping60/exibit/chap14.shtml

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

Personnel line-up

Crowd ControlHundreds of U.N. peacekeepers raided Haitis largest slum Friday to arrest gang members. Ariana Cubillos/Associated Press

http://wordpark.com/pettifog/2007/02/10

UNPOL / FPU280600Feb07FPU DeploymentSoleil 9 2007-02-28_Beloney_AFTER ACTION REPORT 72 HRS - Op LpT NIVO.doc

http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/

Photo # 141460 UN Photo/Logan Abassi UN Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti. Brazilian UN peacekeepers patrol the Cit Soleil neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince during an operation to restore order in the area by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), after three hours of heavy fighting between gangs. Date: 09 February 2007

EvensEscaped Declared he was going to shoot himselfArrested on 13 March 2007 by HNP; transported by MINUSTAH helicopter to a jail in Port-au-Prince Escaped 2010 and rearrested 2012

OutcomeSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Edmond Mulet of GuatemalaWalk freely in Cit Soleil Jubilant crowds Most satisfying moment of my service

Haitian man seriously injured during combat, receiving first aid, told UN officer: I'm injured and maybe I will lose my leg but thank you. I have regained my freedom and my dignity.

Repair and ReconstructionPhoto # 141458 UN Photo/Logan Abassi

2009Photo # 404475 UN Photo/Marco Dormino UN Special Envoy for Haiti Meet MINUSTAH Staff William Jefferson Clinton (third from right), United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti, and former President of the United States of America, accompanied by Ren Prval (second from left), President of Haiti, speaks with the staff of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) during his official two-day visit to the country. Date: 09 July 2009 Photo # 404476 UN Photo/Marco Dormino UN Special Envoy for Haiti Visits Hospital William Jefferson Clinton (left), United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti, and former President of the United States of America, accompanied by Ren Prval (third from left), President of Haiti, greets a child at an emergency hospital during a two-day official visit to the country. Date: 09 July 2009

Police TrainingPhoto # 85555 UN Photo/Sophia Paris UN Mission Helps Train Haiti's Security Officers Picture shows an officer of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) civilian police giving instructions in firearms handling to a recruit - one of the 788 potential police men and women at the Police Academy in Frere being trained by 25 MINUSTAH civilian police. Date: 02 August 2005

ROE Soldiers CardJust causeSelf-defence and defence of UN/international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent (defined as imminent use of force); Protection of civilians [POC] under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance. Last resortEvery reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of using force, including personal contact and negotiation. Strategic level: negotiations and incentives to gangs in 2006 Measures short of force: voice and visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, manoeuvres, charging of weapons, and warning shots. Before opening fire, soldiers are instructed to give a final warning: NATIONS UNIES ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE Proportionality1. The principle of minimum force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances. The minimum use of force is one of the basic principles of peacekeeping.[i] The proportionality principle is further described: force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. The ROE specify: If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill. This is not common in many military ROE but is reflective of the other-than-war conditions in peacekeeping. Legitimate authority The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order. chain of command(s) Necessity if an attack is so unexpected, that a moment's delay could lead to death or grievous injury to oneself or other designated personnel.Proper Conduct: Fire must be aimed and controlled.Avoid collateral damage Not covered: net benefit and probability of success

JWT criteria scalable; [underlining added]

From Dilemmas to LessonsEmbrace intelligencePaid informantsUse of forceHard power versus soft powerOverwhelming forceCollateral damagePolitical legitimacy

D.R. Congo Case:Robust Peacekeeping in the Jungle MONUC/MONUSCO

Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple (CNDP)Laurent Nkunda, chairmanFormer general in FARDC (Forces Armes DRC)81st and 83rd BrigadesBukavu 2004Goma 2006, 2008www.digitalcongo.net/article/74382, www.militaryphotos.netBanyamulenge = ethnic Tutsi Rwandans in KivusEnemy ofFDLR(ex-FAR)Rwandan*

Air-Ground coordination

Mi-35 attack helicopterUN Photo 200146*

*UN Photo

Mi-35 Attack HelicopterFront View;MI-35 in MONUC, No.104 Helicopter Unit of the Indian Air Force, 21 January 2006; URL: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Images/Special/Features/Congo/Photo_2006123102447578.jpg.htmlSide view UN Helicopter on Aerial Patrol An MI-24 [export version: MI-35] helicopter of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on aerial patrol in search of the illegal marijuana plantations. 17 September 2008, Monrovia, Liberia UN Photo, C. Herwig

View of a CNDP rebel running with weapons at the time of the CNDPs attempt to attack Goma. Image is a screen capture from the MI-35s television camera. Video taken at Masisi on 19 September 2008. The effects of rocket fire also shown. (The camera resolution is better than shown in this image.)[Image available upon request]

Forward-looking Infrared (FLIR) camera freeze frame suspected rebels approaching vehicle*

MONUC Case ConclusionsAir power helped save Goma 2006 and 2008

Peace Enforcement requires robust peacekeepingDeterrence

Application of the Peacekeeping Trinity? (a matter of degree)Consent Impartiality Min use of force (defensive offensive)*

Force Intervention BrigadeSC resolution 2098 (2013)

12 (b) Neutralizing armed groups . taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law

3,000 peacekeepers Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi

Robust means

South African Attack Helicopters

Tanzanian contingent of UN FIB in Kiwanja (MONUSCO/Sy Koumbo Singa Gali)

Lessons Wider Peacekeeping*UK Chief of the General Staff, 1994Towards smarter peacekeeping (intelligence-led, technologically enabled)

* ?*

*

A continuing endeavour *

*Lecture prepared for PCS 360Y: The Use of Force for Humanitarian PurposesUniversity College 152 Nov 24: Protection Challenges in Practice

***Resolution *********************************************************************4. The ethical application of force. When should armed force be used? This is an age old question for which one of the most enduring answers is provided by Just War theory (JWT). To what extent were the JWT provisions applied in MINUSTAHs rules of engagement (ROE)?ROE describe to the soldier on the ground when force, including deadly force, can be used. ROE should embody ethical principles, particularly in UN missions. The UN ROE vary between missions and may change with circumstances, but the basics remain. The JWT criteria for the ethical application of force can also be found in the UNs ROE, though both are subject to some degree of interpretation. MINUSTAHs ROE, abbreviated in the Soldiers Pocket Card (2004), illustrates some clear parallels.Corresponding to the just cause category in JWT, the MINUSTAH ROE spell out reasons to use force, including: self-defence and defence of UN/international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent (defined as imminent use of force); protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance. It seems this rule can be applied at the strategic level, as well as the tactical one. The UN mission in Haiti applied force in 2006-07 for the protection of civilians, particularly in Cit Soleil, as well as for its own protection. The last resort criterion of Just War theory is also well represented in the ROE. As well as being explicitly mentioned, the ROE state: Every reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of using force, including personal contact and negotiation. At the strategic level, negotiations and incentives were offered to the gangs in 2006 but these were rejected. On the ROE card, a possible list of measures short of the use of force is offered: voice and visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, manoeuvres, charging of weapons, and warning shots. Before opening fire, soldiers are instructed to give a final warning:NATIONS UNIES ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE (UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I WILL FIRE)The ROE permit a necessity argument for the immediate use of force, if an attack is so unexpected, that a moment's delay could lead to death or grievous injury to oneself or other designated personnel.The proportionality criterion is also covered. It is explicit in the first line: 1. The principle of minimum force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances. The minimum use of force is one of the basic principles of peacekeeping. The proportionality principle is further described: force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. The ROE specify: If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill. This is not common in many military ROE but is reflective of the other-than-war conditions in peacekeeping. The legitimate authority is described in a rule: The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order. The commander gains his authority through the chain of command of the UN mission, which is not always solid and is often bifurcated with separate national commands and mission commands. Nevertheless, the authority comes from the force commander, who in turn is responsible to the mission head (SRSG in the case of MINUSTAH) who reports to DPKO (New York) and thus to the UN Secretary-General. The UN SG has been given operational control of the national contingents by the host nation (through a Memorandum of Understanding) and has been given responsibility over the UN force by the Security Council. Ultimately, it is the UN Charter, signed by the 192 UN member states, that provide the basis in international law. Further rules on the use of proper force include: Fire must be aimed and controlled. Finally, the simple exhortation avoid collateral damage is non-descript but should be obvious to soldiers on UN missions. Thus the rules reflect most of the ethical provisions of just war theory. Missing items, usually applied at the strategic level, are: net benefit and probability of success. Although there is no single definitive source for a statement of the Just War tradition, the principal elements are described in: Reichberg, Greg, Henrik Syse & Endre Begby (eds.), The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2006) and Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books: New York, 1997).The other commonly cited principles of peacekeeping are deployment of the mission with the consent of the main parties to the conflict (spoilers not included) and impartiality, in which the UN treats the parties equally. See the capstone document for DPKO titled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, DPKO, New York: UN, 2008.

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*Fighters of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) soldiers put on Congolese army uniforms during a ceremony held by the Congolese army to bring the CNDP fighters into its ranks, http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?150579-Today-s-Pics-Friday-January-30th-2009

http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/129/Laurent-Nkunda

**Op Taming TurncoatAERIAL MISSION TAKING OFF FROM RUTSHURUsensitize FARDC against desertion to join renegade commander NKundaSpotting groups of soldiers, moving in what direction

*UN Helicopter on Aerial Patrol An MI-24 helicopter of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on aerial patrol in search of the illegal marijuana plantations. 17 September 2008, Monrovia, Liberia (Photo # 200146)

*Caption: Disarming FRPI militiamen in Ituri Operation "Ituri Encourager" aims to disarm FRPI militiamen who have not yet joined the district's disarmament program despite an ultimatum to surrender before 11 January 2006.

Z-3129 / UN-859 One of Mi-25's from MONUC Indian Aviation Contingent at Goma http://www.airliners.net/photo/United-Nations/Mil-Mi-25/0879127/M/

*12 Neutralizing armed groups through the Intervention Brigade In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;

*Rooivalk attack helicopters escorting a UN delegation in the DRC CC BY-SA 2.0MONUSCO/Clara Padovan - Photo of the Day, 20 February 2014Olivier, Darren (2013-11-05). "Rooivalk attack helicopters perform well in first combat action against M23". African Defence Review. Retrieved 2013-11-05.**[Filip Van der Linden Text]This is todays ambitious vision of high tech peacekeeping. The reality is however not close. NEXT Why has not been more achieved over a period of more than 60 years of peacekeeping? What are the main obstacles towards establishing effective military air ops in UN PKO? In order to answer these questions I have to quickly walk you through the history of UN peacekeeping.*[Filip Van Der Linden Text]Pending your questions, this concludes my presentation.