prosecution memorial

AARRMMYY IINNSSTTIITTUUTTEE OOFF LLAAWW MMOOOOTT CCOOUURRTT CCOOMMPPEETTIITTIIOONN,, 22001122

BEFORE THE LD. SESSIONS JUDGE

CCaassee NNoo.. SSCC 2244 && 3311 ooff 22001122

OOrriiggiinnaall CCrriimmiinnaall JJuurriissddiiccttiioonn

UUnnddeerr SSeeccttiioonn 2266 rr//ww

SSeeccttiioonn 2288 rr//ww SScchheedduullee II

ooff tthhee CCooddee ooff CCrriimmiinnaall

PPrroocceedduurree,, 11997733

SSTTAATTEE PPrroosseeccuuttiioonn

v.

DDUUSSHHYYAANNTT TTEEJJIIPPAALL && MMAANNNNAA WWAAZZAARREE DDeeffeennccee

&&

SSTTAATTEE PPrroosseeccuuttiioonn

v.

KKAAVVIITTAA BBHHEEDDII && MMAANNNNAA WWAAZZAARREE DDeeffeennccee

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

MMoosstt RReessppeeccttffuullllyy SSuubbmmiitttteedd ttoo tthhee LLdd.. SSeessssiioonnss JJuuddggee

22001122

--TTAABBLLEE OOFF CCOONNTTEENNTTSS-- PPaaggee ii ooff xxiiiiii

-- MM EE MM OO RR II AA LL OO NN BB EE HH AA LL FF OO FF TT HH EE PP RR OO SS EE CC UU TT II OO NN --

TT AA BB LL EE OO FF CC OO NN TT EE NN TT SS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................. VII

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... VIII

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... XII

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO MURDER UNDER

SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE? ...................................................................................... 1

1.1 That the Accused had an intention of murdering Mr. Jaykant Shikre ....................................... 1

1.2 That the offence under section-307 was committed ................................................................... 5

2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC? 6

2.1 That Accused is liable under section 326 of ipc ........................................................................ 6

2.2 That the accused cannot claim the right of private defence .................................................... 10

3. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 11

4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE ........................................................................... 13

4.1 That there is enough evidence on record to prove that the victim committed suicide. ............ 13

4.2 That the Deceased had become extremely distressed due to the protests ................................ 14

5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE ....................................................................... 15

5.1 That the accused had a clear intention to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. ............. 15

5.2 That the accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide. .................................................. 17

5.3 That the accused are also liable under other provisions of the Indian Penal Code ................ 19

6. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 19

6.1 That the accused had common intention .................................................................................. 19

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. XIII

--IINNDDEEXX OOFF AAUUTTHHOORRIITTIIEESS-- PPaaggee iiii ooff xxiiiiii


II NN DD EE XX OO FF AA UU TT HH OO RR II TT II EE SS

CASE LAWS

Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa, 82 (1996) CLT 576............................................................. 6

Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 512 ...................................................... 18

Asha Shukla v. State of U.P., 2002 CriLJ 2233 ....................................................................... 19

Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1977 CriLJ 164 ................................................................... 12

Baishali Hom Chauduri v. U.O.I. & Ors., (2009) ILR 2 Cal 311 ............................................. 9

Bappa alias Bapu v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., AIR 2004 SC 4119 ......................... 6

Basu Harijan v. State of Orissa, 2003 CrLJ 2270 ................................................................... 14

Brij Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR 1989 SC 1661 ........................................................................... 19

Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 CriLJ 2246 ............................... 12

Chilankur Nagireddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 1998 .................................. 10

Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 ..................... 19

Dharshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 333 ............................................... 11

Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 527 ........................................................ 19

Dwarkanath Goswami, 1932 60 Cal 427 ................................................................................. 20

Emperor v. Amiruddin, (1922) 24 Bom LR 534 ...................................................................... 18

Emperor v. Lavji Mandan, AIR 1939 Bom 452 ...................................................................... 20

Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte, I.L.R(1932) 56 Bom. 434 ............................................... 4

Gandaram Taria v. State, 1982 CrLJ 1229 (Orissa) .................................................................. 3

Gangadhar v. State of Maharashtrsa, 1981 CrLJ 1725(Bom.) ................................................. 3

Girija Shankar v. State of U.P., (2004) 3SCC 793 .................................................................... 6

Gopi Nath v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 2493 ....................................................................... 13

Hammu v. State of MP, AIR 1979 Sc 1755 ............................................................................... 9

Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2127 .................................................. 3

Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand, (2004)12 SCC 220 .............................................. 1

Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2002 SCC (Cri) 1518 ............................................................ 22

Hingu v. State of U.P, 1998 CrLJ 4154 (All.) ............................................................................ 3

In Re: Konda Satyavatamma, (1932) ILR 55 Mad 90. ............................................................ 20

James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004)2 SCC 203 ................................................................ 11

Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 1808 ........................... 18

Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797 ................................................................... 18

Krishnan v. State, AIR 2003 SC 2978 ..................................................................................... 13

--IINNDDEEXX OOFF AAUUTTHHOORRIITTIIEESS-- PPaaggee iiiiii ooff xxiiiiii


Kulamani Sahu and Anr. Vs. State of Orissa, 1994 CriLJ 2245 ................................................ 6

Kumar Majhi v. State, 1981 CrLJ 1787 (Orissa) ....................................................................... 3

Kunduru Dharua v. State, 2002 CrLJ 1757 (Ori) .................................................................... 14

Mathai v. State of Kerala, 2005 (3) SCC 260 ............................................................................ 9

Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 1929 ................................................................ 20

Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar, 2003 SCC (Cri) 177 .......................... 21

Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab, AIR1961SC1782 ............................................................. 1

Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P., 2006 CriLJ 2168 .......................................... 3

Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2004 SC 132 ............................................ 20

Parimal Chatterji v. Emperor, 140 Ind. Cas.787 .................................................................... 19

Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 ..................................... 1

Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 2944 ............................................. 15

Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 745 ........................................................... 9

Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 134 ................................. 6

Pran Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1982 ALJ 519 .................................................................. 3

Pratap Tigga v. State of Bihar, 2004 CrLJ NOC 86(Jhar) ...................................................... 14

Prema Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11 ............................................................. 19

R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27.................................................................. 1

Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188 ........................................................................ 21

Shivabhai v. Emperor, (1926) 50 Bom 683 ............................................................................. 15

Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 98 ..................................................................... 3

State of Kerala v. Unni & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 819 .................................................................... 9

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr, AIR 2005 SC 3996 ....................... 6

State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 305 ................................ 5

State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1532 ................................................................. 19

State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik, 2002 (2) ACR 1935 (SC)..................... 20

State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha, 2000 Cri. L.J. 4663 ............................................... 10

State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418 .................................................... 14

Tatigari Durgaiah S/o. Lakshmaiah v. The State of A.P., 2007 CriLJ 524 ............................... 6

Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker. 301 .............................................................. 9

Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra, (2004 )9 SCC 31 ............................................... 1

--IINNDDEEXX OOFF AAUUTTHHOORRIITTIIEESS-- PPaaggee iivv ooff xxiiiiii


BOOKS

Batuk Lal, “Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860”, Ed. R. P. Kataria and S. K. A.

Naqvi, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 300), (Orient Publishing Company, 1st Edn. New Delhi) (2006-

07).

Dr. Hari Singh Gour, “The Penal Law of India”, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 120), (Law Publishers

(India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th

Edn.) (2006).

Field’s “Commentary on Law of Evidence”, Ed Gopal S. Chaturvedi, Vol-I & II, (Delhi

Law House, 12th

Edn.) (2006).

Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol-32, “Criminal Procedure – I & II”, (Lexis Nexis

Butterworths, New Delhi) (2007).

Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol-5(I), “Criminal Law – I & II”, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths,

New Delhi) (2004, Reprint 2006).

K. D. Gaur, “Commentary on Indian Penal Code”, (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt.

Ltd., New Delhi) (2006).

Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure”, Vol-I & II,

(Wadhwa and Company, 18th

Edn., Nagpur) (2006).

Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Law of Crimes”, Vol-I & II, Ed. Justice C. K. Thakkar, (Bharat

Law House, 25th

Edn., New Delhi) (Reprint 2006).

Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “The Law of Evidence”, (Wadhwa and Company, 21st Edn.,

Nagpur) (2004, Reprint 2007).

S. K. Sarkar and Ejaz Ahmad, “Law of Evidence” Vol-I, (Section 1 to 90A), (Ashoka Law

House, 6th

Edn., New Delhi) (2006).

S. P. Joga Rao, “Evidence: Cases & Materials”, Student Series, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths,

2003).

--IINNDDEEXX OOFF AAUUTTHHOORRIITTIIEESS-- PPaaggee vv ooff xxiiiiii


DICTIONARIES

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (WEST PUBLISHING GROUP 7TH

EDN.) (1999)

P. RAMANATHA AIYAR’S, “ADVANCED LAW LEXICON”, VOL-I TO IV, (WADHWA AND COMPANY,

3RD

EDN., NAGPUR) (2005).

STROUD’S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES, VOL-I TO III, EDITOR DANIEL

GREENBERG, (SWEET AND MAXWELL LTD., 7TH

EDN., 2006, REPRINT 2008) LONDON.

WHARTON’S LAW LEXICON, BY A. S. OPPE, (SWEET AND MAXWELL UNIVERSAL LAW

PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD.,14TH

EDN., 1997).

STATUTORY COMPILATIONS

THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (2 OF 1974)

THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (10 OF 1897)

THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (1 OF 1872)

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (45 OF 1860)

INTERNET SITES

http://www.manupatra.com

http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com

http://www.scconline.com

http://www.judis.nic.in

http://www.heinonline.com

http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/myncbi/

--LLIISSTT OOFF AABBBBRREEVVIIAATTIIOONNSS-- PPaaggee vvii ooff xxiiiiii


LL II SS TT OO FF AA BB BB RR EE VV II AA TT II OO NN SS

A.I.R. ALL INDIA REPORTER

AC APPEALS CASES

All ALLAHABAD

AP ANDHRA PRADESH

Art. ARTICLE

Bom BOMBAY

Cal DELHI

Co. COMPANY

Comm. COMMISSIONER

Del DELHI

e.g. EXEMPLUM GRATIA (FOR EXAMPLE)

Ed. EDITION

JT JUDGMENTS TODAY

KB KING’S BENCH

LR LAW REPORTER

Mad MADRAS

MANU MANUPATRA

p. PAGE

Para. PARAGRAPH

Pun PUNJAB AND HARYANA

QB QUEEN’S BENCH

SC SUPREME COURT

SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER

SCW SUPREME COURT WEEKLY

Sec. SECTION

Supp SUPPLEMENTARY

U.O.I. UNION OF INDIA

--SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT OOFF JJUURRIISSDDIICCTTIIOONN-- PPaaggee vviiii ooff xxiiiiii


SS TT AA TT EE MM EE NN TT OO FF JJ UU RR II SS DD II CC TT II OO NN

TTHHEE PPRROOSSEECCUUTTIIOONN HHAASS AAPPPPRROOAACCHHEEDD TTHHEE LLDD.. SSEESSSSIIOONNSS JJUUDDGGEE UUNNDDEERR SSEECCTTIIOONN 2266 RR//WW

SSEECCTTIIOONN 2288 RR//WW SSCCHHEEDDUULLEE II OOFF TTHHEE CCOODDEE OOFF CCRRIIMMIINNAALL PPRROOCCEEDDUURREE,, 11997733,, WWHHIICCHH RREEAADDSS AASS

HHEERREEUUNNDDEERR::

SS.. 2266.. CCoouurrttss bbyy wwhhiicchh ooffffeenncceess aarree ttrriiaabbllee::

SSuubbjjeecctt ttoo tthhee ootthheerr pprroovviissiioonnss ooff tthhiiss CCooddee,,--

((aa)) AAnnyy ooffffeennccee uunnddeerr tthhee IInnddiiaann PPeennaall CCooddee ((4455 ooff 11886600)) mmaayy bbee ttrriieedd bbyy--

((ii)) ……

((iiii)) TThhee CCoouurrtt ooff SSeessssiioonn

((iiiiii))……

SS.. 2288.. SSeenntteenncceess wwhhiicchh HHiigghh CCoouurrttss aanndd SSeessssiioonnss JJuuddggeess mmaayy ppaassss::

((11)) ……

((22)) AA SSeessssiioonnss JJuuddggee oorr AAddddiittiioonnaall SSeessssiioonnss JJuuddggee mmaayy ppaassss aannyy sseenntteennccee aauutthhoorriisseedd bbyy llaaww;;

bbuutt aannyy sseenntteennccee ooff ddeeaatthh ppaasssseedd bbyy aannyy ssuucchh JJuuddggee sshhaallll bbee ssuubbjjeecctt ttoo ccoonnffiirrmmaattiioonn bbyy

tthhee HHiigghh ccoouurrtt

((33)) ……

--SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT OOFF FFAACCTTSS-- PPaaggee vviiiiii ooff xxiiiiii


SS TT AA TT EE MM EE NN TT OO FF FF AA CC TT SS

Manna Wazare has been heading a populist movement spreading across the country

which has created a political upheaval in India. His methods have been hailed across

the world as the second coming of Gandhi, credited with using peaceful agitation to

secure his goals, which nowadays, include efforts to pressurize the government at the

Centre to enact stronger laws to effectively deal with the matters of corruption, black

money, election reform etc.

In early 2012, Manna announced at a rally that it was time that the people took

matters into their own hands and that he and members of his core Team had taken

steps which would soon expose the most corrupt politicians of the country and that all

would be revealed on the 26th of January 2012 at the Parade Ground, New Delhi.

The media and the social networks were all abuzz with excitement about what could

possibly be revealed by Manna in his address.

On the 26th morning more than two lakh people were present to listen to Manna.

Manna delivered the following address: “To wipe out the menace of corruption and

black money, and to get the country out of the vicious problems of poverty, inequality

and unemployment, it is me, your chosen leader who has had to take matters into my

hands….Ladies and Gentlemen, it is time this country breaks free of this corrupt

political system that has kept us from achieving our true place in the world.”

Manna further continued that he had hired Plasma Inc., the best investigating agency

in the world to thoroughly probe 10 of the most corrupt politicians in his opinion.

Then he revealed that the Sports Minister, Kumar Maalmadi had mis-appropriated

funds amounting to about 150 Crores and Chakbir Singh had fraudulently

appropriated flats meant for soldiers died in war.

He further said about the Chief Minister of Haryana that she had an illegitimate

daughter, now 25 years in age, who, along with her father had been abandoned by

Chayawati for the rich and powerful Virat Singhania of Singhania Steel. “…A woman

who abandons her own daughter has no right to even live, let alone contest elections

in our glorious nation.” Manna said that Singhania, through numerous shell

companies has been getting tender after tender in Chayawati’s state of Haryana, in

return of which he gave her presents. He continued “…Dear friends, I say this again, a

woman who sold out her would be family for money and fame, has no right to live. If

she even has a modicum of shame, she herself should commit suicide…Heavens

forbid, if you voted for her it is time for you to send her a message that she is not

welcome in our world anymore and only in death can she redeem her sins…”

Next, Manna mentioned that his team could not find anything on Vijender Lodhi,

whom he had believed to be corrupt .

--SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT OOFF FFAACCTTSS-- PPaaggee iixx ooff xxiiiiii


Manna next announced that Delhi’s Jayakant Shikre has been involved in human

trafficking and is also the kingpin behind the drug and prostitution racket in Delhi.

“…If we can remove this one man from the equation completely, I can assure you

Delhi will be a different city altogether…Today it is your beholden duty to act, to

once and for all put a stop to all the wrongdoing this man continues to indulge in. If

rogues like Jaykant Shikre can flourish for so long, the police and the judiciary have

clearly failed us, and you the people of India have to take matters in your own hands.

You must act purposefully, and decisively, without caring for the consequences of

your actions…Today, you must pledge your allegiance to this movement. Promise me

that you will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will go

unpunished. Today, the people of this country will send a clear message out…”

Manna’s speech became the most watched live event of all time in India. A large

section of the crowd headed towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse on the outskirts of

Gurgaon. Manna spoke with his aide and core Team Manna member, Dushyant

Tejipal and directed him to go to Jaykant’s house. The crowd began chanting slogans,

climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and shoes.

At around 3:00 pm Jayveer Shikre, Jaykant’s son, tried to drive out of the farmhouse;

on being stopped by the crowd, he fired two shots from his 9mm pistol into the air to

disperse the crowd. Jaykant came running out of the farmhouse and immediately, on

assessing the situation, called the police. At seeing Jayakant, Dushyant who was

trying to calm the crowd till then, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it.

It is now or never!’

At 3:20 pm by the time the police reached, the entire house was being ransacked.

Jayveer Shikre was severely injured, and the police had to intervene to stop the

rampaging crowd from causing more harm. Jaykant Shikre was found in an

unconscious state with multiple internal injuries and was rushed to the hospital. The

mob immediately disintegrated, rendering any arrests impossible. Eyewitnesses

present at the scene could only reliably identify Dushyant Tejipal coming out of

Shikre’s farmhouse with blood on his shirt, which was later identified as that of

Jaykant Shikre.

News about the attack on Jaykant’s farmhouse spread across the country. Protests,

vigils and marches started picking up pace, many of them being organized by

Members of Team Manna. One such venue for protest was setup outside Chayawati’s

mansion by core Team Manna member and top Wazare confidant Kavita Bhedi. At

the site angry protestors, carrying morphed photos of Chayawati and Virat Singhania

and her daughter along with other defamatory and offensive material, raised slogans

and goaded Chayawati to commit suicide. Manna’s speech was screened on large

screens right outside her house for days together and the pressure kept mounting on

her.

--SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT OOFF FFAACCTTSS-- PPaaggee xx ooff xxiiiiii


By the end of the week, some members of Team Manna had started sending her books

on how to commit suicide and on some days objects like knives, rope, sleeping pills

and kerosene oil were also received in the mail from all over the country. It was

reliably reported that Chayawati had become extremely distressed and had started

seeing a psychiatrist.

On February 22nd 2012 against the wishes of her security agents, a visibly tormented

Chayawati, left her house after telling her housekeeper that she wanted to go for a

drive alone. Around three hours later the car was found in a ditch by the banks of a

river. It had apparently crashed through the barricades on the sides of the bridge and

fallen down. Chayawati died before she could be treated. Her dead body was sent for

a post mortem examination and the police impounded the car for further investigation.

A case under Section 307, 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was

registered against Dushyant Tejipal and Manna Wazare for the incident at jayakant

Shikre’s house.

Also, the police, believing that Chayawati’s death was a case of suicide charged

Manna Wazare and Kavita Bhedi under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code.

On Manna Wazare’s request, the court has ordered a joint hearing with regard to both

the offences which have been listed together for final arguments before the court of

the Sessions Judge, Gurgaon.

--QQUUEESSTTIIOONNSS OOFF LLAAWW-- PPaaggee xxii ooff xxiiiiii


QQ UU EE SS TT II OO NN SS OO FF LL AA WW

TTHHEE PPRROOSSEECCUUTTIIOONN RREESSPPEECCTTFFUULLLLYY AASSKKSS TTHHEE HHOONN’’BBLLEE CCOOUURRTT::

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

MURDER UNDER SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE

UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?

3. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE HAD COMMON

INTENTION?

4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE?

5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE?

6. WHETHER MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI HAD COMMON

INTENTION?

--SSUUMMMMAARRYY OOFF AARRGGUUMMEENNTTSS-- PPaaggee xxiiii ooff xxiiiiii


SS UU MM MM AA RR YY OO FF AA RR GG UU MM EE NN TT SS

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

MURDER UNDER SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

1.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD AN INTENTION OF MURDERING MR. JAYKANT

SHIKRE

1.2. THAT THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION-307 WAS COMMITTED

2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE

UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?

2.1. THAT ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC

2.2. THAT THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENSE

3. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE HAD COMMON

INTENTION?

4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE?

4.1. THAT THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT THE

VICTIM COMMITTED SUICIDE.

4.2. THAT THE DECEASED HAD BECOME EXTREMELY DISTRESSED DUE TO

THE PROTESTS

5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE?

5.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD A CLEAR INTENTION TO INSTIGATE THE

DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

5.2. THAT THE ACCUSED INSTIGATED THE DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

5.3. THAT THE ACCUSED ARE ALSO LIABLE UNDER OTHER PROVISIONS OF

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

6. WHETHER MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI HAD COMMON

INTENTION?

6.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD COMMON INTENTION

--AARRGGUUMMEENNTTSS AADDVVAANNCCEEDD-- P a g e | 1 of 21


AA RR GG UU MM EE NN TT SS AA DD VV AA NN CC EE DD

11.. WWHHEETTHHEERR DDUUSSHHYYAANNTT TTEEJJIIPPAALL11 CCAANN BBEE CCOONNVVIICCTTEEDD FFOORR AATTTTEEMMPPTT TTOO MMUURRDDEERR UUNNDDEERR

SSEECCTTIIOONN--330077 OOFF IINNDDIIAANN PPEENNAALL CCOODDEE??

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that after the investigation into the

incident at Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse, a case under Section 307, 326 read with Section 34 of

the Indian Penal Code2 was registered against Accused and Manna Wazare

3.

Section-307 provides “Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under

such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,

and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender

shall be liable either to 1[imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore

mentioned.”

It is submitted that to constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence

must be present:-

(i) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and

(ii) the doing of an act towards it.4

1.1 THAT THE ACCUSED HAD AN INTENTION OF MURDERING MR. JAYKANT SHIKRE

1.1.1. It is most humbly submitted that Accused had an intention of killing Mr. Jaykant Shikre,

which is clearly reflected in the following statements made by Mr. Manna Wazare5 at the

Parade Ground on the 26th

of January. The statements have been reproduced in the factual

matrix:

“Today it is your beholden duty to act, to once and for all put a stop to all the wrongdoing

this man continues to indulge in. As I speak, Jaykant Shikre is at 420, Plutonium Avenue,

Gurgaon, where he indulges in all sorts of morally corrupt acts in the confines of his secret

1 Hereinafter “Accused”.

2 Hereinafter “I.P.C”.

3 Factsheet ¶ 13.

4 Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab AIR1961SC1782; Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar

AIR2004 SC 5068; Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar (2007);R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9

SCC 27; Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004)12 SCC 220; Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of

Maharashtra (2004 )9 SCC 31.

5 Hereinafter “Co-Accused”.



farmhouse. This evil must be killed. If rogues like Jaykant Shikre can flourish for so long, the

police and the judiciary have clearly failed us, and you the people of India have to take

matters in your own hands. You must act purposefully, and decisively, without caring for the

consequences of your actions. Who knows, if you go to his farmhouse right now, who all you

might be able to rescue. Today, you must pledge your allegiance to this movement. You

cannot just come here, listen to what I have told you and go back home. Promise me that you

will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will go unpunished. Today, the

people of this country will send a clear message out, we must declare in one voice that we

will not go quietly into the night, we will not give-in without a fight. Today is our Republic

day, and the politicians must be made to realise the true meaning of this word. Jai Hind!”6

1.1.2. It is further submitted that Co-Accused’s speech went down as the most watched live event of

all time in India, breaking all records. The people present at the venue were specially charged

and a large section of the crowd began to head towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse on the

outskirts of Gurgaon. Co-Accused called on his aide and core Team Manna member,

Accussed and after speaking with him briefly, directed him to go to Jaykant’s house. Very

soon over 500 people gathered outside Jaykant Shikre’s location and began chanting slogans,

climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and shoes7.

1.1.3. The mere sight of Shikre sent Accused, who had till then tried to calm the aggressive crowd,

into a tizzy. Accused at the top of his lungs, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is

it. It is now or never!’8

1.1.4. It is most respectfully submitted that it has been held that “The Code uses the word intention,

in the sense that something is intentionally done if it is done deliberately or purposely, in

other words is a willed though not necessarily a desired result or result which is the purpose

of the deed.9 It is a settled law that whether a person intended to kill another would depend on

the facts and circumstances of each case.10

6 Factsheet ¶ 7.

7 Factsheet ¶ 8.

8 Ibid.

9 Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 98.

10 Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra (2004)9SCC31; Gandaram Taria v. State, 1982 CrLJ 1229

(Orissa).



1.1.5. It is submitted that intention cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be detected from

the facts and circumstances of case. There are various relevant considerations like the nature

of weapon used, the place where the injuries were reflected, the nature of the injuries caused,

the opportunity available which the accused gets etc.11

1.1.6. In the recent judgment of Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P.12

, it was observed

by the Court that: “The intention is to be gathered from various circumstances and not

merely form the consequence that ensures. The prosecution should place and prove all the

facts and circumstances as mentioned in Section 300, IPC. Unless it can be said that the

intention or knowledge of the accused was to cause such a bodily injury as would come

within the scope of Section 300, IPC, the accused cannot be found guilty under Section 307,

IPC when there is attempt to cause injury. It must be proved that if the act complained of

would have culminated in the death of the victim, the offence would have come within the

ingredients as envisaged in Section 300, IPC. Mere giving a blow does not raise an inference

of attempt to murder.”

1.1.7. Section 30013

requires that there should be an intention of committing an act that the persons

knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

1.1.8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors14

observed

that:

“Under Section 307 IPC what the Court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its

result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in that

section. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary constitute

murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of "attempt to

murder". Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore,

the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences

11 Gangadhar v. State of Maharashtrsa, 1981 CrLJ 1725(Bom.); Hingu v. State of U.P, 1998 CrLJ 4154 (All.);

Pran Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1982 ALJ 519; Kumar Majhi v. State 1981 CrLJ 1787 (Orissa).

12 Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P.2006 CriLJ 2168.

13Section 300 of IPC provides that” Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if

the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—

Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all

probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any

excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”

14 Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 2127.



that ensue. The nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime,

severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the factors

that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention.”

1.1.9. The Supreme Court upheld the opinion of Strait J., in the landmark judgment of Om Prakash

v. The State of Punjab15

:"It seems to me that if a person who has an evil intent does an act

which is the last possible act that he could do towards the accomplishment of a particular

crime that he has in his mind, he is not entitled to pray in his aid an obstacle intervening not

known to himself. If he did all that he could do and completed the only remaining proximate

act in his power, I do not think he can escape criminal responsibility, and this because his

own set volition and purpose having been given effect to their full extent, a fact unknown to

him and at variance with his own belief, intervened to prevent the consequences of that act

which he expected to ensue, ensuing."

1.1.10. In the same judgment16

SC followed the law laid down in the case of Emperor v. Vasudeo

Balwant Gogte17

in which a person fired several shots at another. No injury was in fact

occasioned due to certain obstruction. The culprit was convicted of an offence under s. 307.

Beaumont, C.J., said:"I think that what section 307 really means is that the accused must do

an act with such a guilty intention and knowledge and in such circumstances that but for

some intervening fact the act would have amounted to murder in the normal course of

events".

1.1.11. Further, in the recent judgment of Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar18

, It was

held that: “For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge

and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention.

Section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which

fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The

intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In

the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there

can be no offence 'of attempt to murder'. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by

precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some

15 Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1782.

16 Ibid.

17 Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte I.L.R(1932) 56 Bom. 434.

18 Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 5068.



of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries

were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took

place.”

1.1.12. It is most respectfully submitted that when the Police arrived at the site of incident, the entire

house was being ransacked and Police tried to intervene and stop the rampaging crowd from

doing the further harm. Jaykant Shikre was found in unconscious state with multiple injuries.

Eyewitness present identified Accused coming out of the house with blood on his shirt.

Forensic examination conducted by the Police revealed that the blood belonged to Jaykant

Shikre19

.

1.1.13. Thus, in light of the prevailing circumstances and the relevant considerations like the

intervening act by police and the opportunity given to the accused, it can be clearly concluded

that Accused had the required murderous intention.

1.2 THAT THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION-307 WAS COMMITTED

1.2.1. It is most humbly submitted that in the landmark judgment of State of Maharashtra v.

Balram Bama Patil and Ors.20

, it was held by the SC:

“To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of

causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may

often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused,

such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases,

be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction

between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any

result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the

culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused

to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the

death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its

result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this

section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in

law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.”

1.2.2. The interpretation given in Balram Bama Patil has been followed in catena of judgments21

.

Further, in the matter of Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa22

, it was observed by the Court

19 Factsheet ¶ 8.

20 State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors., AIR1983SC305.



that: “The question, however, remains as to whether it can be said beyond all reasonable

doubt that an offence under Section 307, I.P.C, has been made out. In order to bring home the

charge under Section 307, the prosecution has to establish the following :- (i) death of human

being was attempted to be caused by or in consequence of the act of the accused;

(ii) such act was done by the accused with intention of causing death or with intention of

causing such bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or was sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that by doing such an act as the accused knew

to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury

as is likely to cause death.… In a given case offence under Section 307, I.P.C. can be said to

have been committed even without the slightest injury. It is the nature of the act and not the

result thereof that is the determinative factor.”

1.2.3. It is most humbly submitted that there was an overt action by Accused towards commission

of murder when he uttered the words after seeing Jaykant Shikre coming out of the

farmhouse “My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!” And when the

Police arrived at the scene the farmhouse was being ransacked by the crowd. Accused was

seen coming out with Jaykant Shikre’s blood on his shirt.

1.2.4. Thus, it is submitted that above stated facts clearly prove beyond doubt that death of Mr.

Jaykant Shikre was attempted which couldn’t be accomplished because the Police arrived at

the scene and isolated the victim.

1.2.5. Hence, it is most respectfully submitted that Accused should be convicted for Attempt to

murder under Section-307 of the IPC.

22.. WWHHEETTHHEERR AACCCCUUSSEEDD AANNDD CCOO--AACCCCUUSSEEDD AARREE LLIIAABBLLEE UUNNDDEERR SSEECCTTIIOONN 332266 OOFF IIPPCC??

2.1 THAT ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC

2.1.1. It is submitted that the incident took place after the speech delivered by Co-Accused. After

which people present at the venue were specially charged and a large section of the crowd

began to head towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse. Accused after speaking with Co-Accused

came to the farmhouse. Over 500 people gathered outside Jaykant Shikre’s location and

21 Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 5068; Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of

Bihar and Ors. (2007)13SCC134; Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra (2004)9SCC31;R. Prakash v.

State of Karnataka (2004)9SCC27; Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004)12SCC220; State of

Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr AIR2005SC3996.; Girija Shankar v. State of U.P.

(2004)3SCC793; Bappa alias Bapu v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR2004SC4119; Kulamani Sahu

and Anr. Vs.: State of Orissa 1994CriLJ2245 ;Tatigari Durgaiah S/o. Lakshmaiah v. The State of A.P. the rep.

by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.2007CriLJ524.

22 Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa 82(1996)CLT576



began chanting slogans, climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and

shoes. Jayveer Shikre, Jaykant’s son, tried to drive out of the farmhouse but was stopped by

the hoard of people right outside the gate. Jaykant also came out of the farmhouse after

sometime. The mere sight of Shikre sent Accused into a tizzy. Accused at the top of his

lungs, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!23

2.1.2. It is further submitted that Jayveer Shikre was severely injured and Jaykant Shikre was also

found in an unconscious state with multiple internal injuries and was rushed to the hospital.

Eyewitnesses present at the scene could only reliably identify Accused coming out of

Shikre’s farmhouse with blood on his shirt. Forensic examination conducted by the police

later revealed that the blood belonged to Jaykant Shikre.

2.1.3. It is submitted that Section 326 of IPC states

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by

means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a

weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by

means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or

by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body inhale, to swallow, or to

receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for

life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and

shall also be liable to fine.

2.1.4. It is submitted that Section 320 IPC defines “Grievous hurt”, which read as follows:

The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"-

First - Emasculation.

Secondly - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Thirdly - Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.

Fourthly - Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly - Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any members or joint.

Sixthly - Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

Seventhly - Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Eighthly - Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space

of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits."

23 Factsheet ¶ 8.



2.1.5. It is submitted that in the present case as it has been stated earlier that Jayveer Shikre was

severely injured and Jaykant Shikre was found in an unconscious state with multiple

injuries.24

Therefore it is contended that Accused is liable under Section 326 of IPC.

2.1.6. It is submitted that the heading of the Section provides some insight into the factors to be

considered. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are: (1) voluntarily causing a hurt;

(2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by

dangerous weapons or means.

2.1.7. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the accused has voluntarily caused hurt

to the victims.

2.1.8. It is submitted that accused was present at the place where the incident took place and at the

time when the incident took place.25

2.1.9. The lines ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!’ clearly show the

intention of the accused to cause harm to the victims.26

2.1.10. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’le court that the hurt caused by the accused to the

victims were grievous.

2.1.11. It is submitted that the injuries caused to both Jayveer and Jaykant are not known, what is

known is that Jayveer was severely injured and Jaykant was found in an unconscious state

with multiple injuries.

2.1.12. It is submitted that Section 320 provides the definition for ‘grievous hurt’ which has been

covered in eight points. The eighth point clearly states that ‘any hurt which endangers life or

which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or

unable to follow his ordinary pursuits’ would be considered as ‘grievous hurt’.

2.1.13. It is submitted that it can be construed from the above facts that both of them were grievously

hurt. In the case of State of Bihar v. Govind Singh & Ors.27

, the victim was severely injured

by the accused and the accused was convicted under Section 326 of IPC by the court.

2.1.14. Therefore it is submitted that the injuries caused to both the victims would be covered under

Section 320 and hence under Section 326 of IPC.

24 Factsheet ¶ 9.

25 Factsheet ¶ 8.

26 Ibid.

27 State of Bihar v. Govind Singh & Ors., Crim. App. No. 388 of 1995 (Patna).



2.1.15. It is submitted that Supreme Court in the case of Hammu v. State of MP28

, held that, in

absence of definite finding about fatal injury accused persons acting in union with common

intention and causing grievous hurt can be convicted under Section 326/34 of IPC. Therefore

the accused here can be convicted under Section 326 of IPC.

2.1.16. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the grievous hurt caused by the accused

was caused by dangerous weapon.

2.1.17. It is submitted that the injuries to both the victims were caused by stones. Stones if in large

quantity used for injuring a person can be dangerous. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Mathai v. State of Kerala29

, that the expression “any instrument which,

used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death”, has to be gauged taking note of

heading of section. What would constitute a “dangerous weapon” would depend upon the

facts of each case and no generalisation can be made.30

2.1.18. It is submitted that the Kerala High Court held in Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala31

, that

granite stone with rough edge will come under “instruments which, used as a weapon of

offence, is likely to cause death.”32

2.1.19. It is submitted that tooth is an instrument for cutting and serves as weapon of offence and

defence. Where the petitioner bit off the tip of his wife’s nose by his teeth, he can be

convicted under Sec. 326 of IPC.33

This proves that any instrument can be dangerous and that

would be covered under Section 326 of IPC.

2.1.20. It is submitted that Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha34

held that

there is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that

matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous

hurt or injury has to be determined factually.

28 Hammu v. State of MP, AIR 1979 Sc 1755.

29Mathai v. State of Kerala, 2005 (3) SCC 260.

30 Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 745; State of Kerala v. Unni & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 819;

Baishali Hom Chauduri v. U.O.I. & Ors., (2009) ILR 2 Cal 311.

31 Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker. 301.

32 Ibid.

33 Chilankur Nagireddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 1998.

34 State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000 Cri. L.J. 4663.



2.1.21. The evidence used in this case clearly shows that the hurt or the injury that was caused was

covered under the expression ‘grievous hurt’ as defined under Section 320 IPC. The

inevitable conclusion is that a grievous hurt was caused. It is not that in every case a stone

would constitute a dangerous weapon. It would depend upon the facts of the case. At this

juncture, it would be relevant to note that in some provisions e.g.

Sections 324 and 326, expression "dangerous weapon" is used. In some other more serious

offences the expression used is "deadly weapon" (e.g. Sections 397 and 398). The facts

involved in a particular case, depending upon various factors like size, sharpness, would

throw light on the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not.

2.1.22. Therefore it is submitted that the injuries are caused by the use of stones to both the victims.

And it has been proved above that stones can be used as dangerous weapon as per Section

326 of IPC. Hence the accused has committed an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt

to the victims and therefore is liable.

2.2 THAT THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE

2.2.1. It is submitted that the accused cannot claim the right of private defence in this matter.

2.2.2. It is submitted that Section 96 of IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the

exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression ‘right of

private defence’. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise

of such right.

2.2.3. The Supreme Court in the case of James Martin v. State of Kerala35

held that, whether in a

particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of

private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each

case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining

this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances.

2.2.4. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need

to defend no longer survived.36

2.2.5. It is submitted that in the present matter the victim fired two shots from his 9mm pistol into

air in an effort to disperse the crowd.37

From the given facts it is very much clear that there

35 James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004)2 SCC 203; Dharshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2010) 2

SCC333.

36 Ibid.

37 Factsheet ¶ 8.



was no intention of harming anyone from the side of the victim, he just fired the shots in air

and not in the direction of the crowd or accused.

2.2.6. It is therefore submitted that the accused cannot claim the right of private defence.

33.. WWHHEETTHHEERR TTHHEE AACCCCUUSSEEDD PPEERRSSOONNSS HHAADD CCOOMMMMOONN IINNTTEENNTTIIOONN

3.1.1. It is most humbly submitted that Co-Accused shared a common intention to murder Jaykant

Shikre. Before the incident at farmhouse took place, he made speech instigating the crowd

and also mentioned the address of Jaykant Shikre. His speech which has been reproduced in

the factual matrix which is cited above clearly exhibits the murderous intention.38

3.1.2. The Supreme Court while dealing with the question of conviction under Section 307

alongwith Section 34 in the matter of Girija Shankar v. State of U.P.39

held that:

“Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.

The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The

distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one

person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by

several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a

common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common

intention is seldom available and, therefore such intention can only be inferred from the

circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In

order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by

evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the

accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34,

be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the

commission of the crime. The true concept of Section is that if two or more persons

intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done

it individually by himself.”

3.1.3. Further in the matter of Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab40

, it was observed that “the

existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element

for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged

with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may

38 Factsheet ¶ 13.

39 Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004)3SCC793.

40 Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab 1977 CriLJ 164.



be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention

in order to attract the provision.”

3.1.4. It was further observed by the Court in the matter of GirjaShankar41

: “The Section does not

say "the common intention of all", nor does it say "and intention common to all". Under the

provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a

common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance

of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when

an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the

accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it

was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult

to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the

common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.”

3.1.5. In the matter of Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh42

, it was held that:

“Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself.

For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the

accused.”

3.1.6. It is submitted that the common intention or plan may be proved either from conduct,

circumstances or from incriminating facts.43

3.1.7. It is submitted it can be inferred from the instant facts that the co-accused had the common

intention as made speeches instigating people to kill Jayakant Shikre. Moreover, the factsheet

provides that Manna called on his aide and core Team Manna member, Accused and after

speaking with him briefly, directed him to go to Jaykant’s house.44

3.1.8. The fact that Co-accused spoke to main accused before the act exhibits that there was a plan

or meeting of mind between them. Further, when accused saw Jaykant Shikre coming out the

house, he uttered the words “My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!”45

41 Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793

42 Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 CriLJ 2246.

43 Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978: (2003) 7 SCC 56; Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 2001 SC 2493:

(2001) 6 SCC 620.

44 Factsheet ¶ 8.

45 Ibid



he acted in furtherance of common intention of murdering and causing grievous hurt to

Jaykant Shikre.

3.1.9. In light of the above, it can be rightly construed that Co-accused had the common intention to

kill and cause grievous hurt to Jaykant Shikre as all the ingredients required under Section 34

are satisfied. It is humbly submitted that Accused and Co-Accused are liable to be convicted

under Section 34 read along with Section-307 and Section-326.

44.. WWHHEETTHHEERR CCHHAAYYAAWWAATTII CCOOMMMMIITTTTEEDD SSUUIICCIIDDEE??

4.1 THAT THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT THE VICTIM COMMITTED

SUICIDE

4.1.1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that evidence of the suicide has to be drawn

from the post-mortem report of the victim, forensic report of the car and the mental condition

of the victim. It is humbly submitted that as per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act46

,

Evidence includes all documents produced for the inspection of the Court.47

Both the post-

mortem report of the victim and the Forensic Report of the car are documents within the

meaning of Section 3 of the I.E.A.48

These documents are admissible in court as expert

opinion under Section 45 of the I.E.A.

4.1.2. It is respectfully submitted that the post mortem report submitted by the doctor conducting

autopsy of the dead body is admissible in evidence even without examining the doctor in

court.49

The Apex Court has admitted as evidence and relied on post mortem reports in a

catena of cases.50

4.1.3. It is deferentially submitted that according to the post-mortem report, victim died due to

excessive bleeding from a deep incised wound on the left arm. She was found clutching a

small pocket knife in her right hand. It is pertinent to note that while the forensic examination

of the car, a large pool of blood was found around the hand brake area and under the driver’s

seat.

46 “Hereinafter I.E.A.”

47 " Evidence" means and includes-- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it

by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all

documents produced for the inspection of the Court; such documents are called documentary evidence.

48 " Document" means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or

marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of

recording that matter.

49 Basu Harijan v. State of Orissa 2003 CrLJ 2270; Pratap Tigga v. State of Bihar 2004 CrLJ NOC 86(Jhar).

50 State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal AIR 1994 SC 1418, Kunduru Dharua v. State 2002 CrLJ 1757 (Ori).



4.1.4. It is most deferentially submitted that according to the Oxford Dictionary; incise means to cut

(skin or flesh) with a surgical instrument. An ‘incised wound’ is a cut or incision on a human

body - a wound made by a cutting instrument, such as a razor.51

Thus, it appears that the

wound which caused the victim’s death was made by a sharp instrument, which in this case,

would be the pocket knife found in the deceased’s hand.

4.1.5. It is humbly submitted that it can be rightly inferred from the above facts that the deceased

cut her wrist with a knife while driving, which led to bleeding ultimately causing her death.

4.2 THAT THE DECEASED HAD BECOME EXTREMELY DISTRESSED DUE TO THE PROTESTS

4.2.1. It is humbly submitted that a protest was setup right outside the deceased’s mansion by core

the accused. The speech of co-accused had been screened outside her house. Protestors,

carrying defamatory and offensive material about her, raised slogans and goaded her to

commit suicide. This scenario continued for days together, unabated. Moreover, by the end of

the week, some members of the team of the accused had started sending her books on how to

commit suicide also some objects like knives, rope, sleeping pills and kerosene oil.52

4.2.2. It is respectfully submitted that as result of this, the deceased had become extremely

distressed and had started seeing a psychiatrist.53

It is pertinent to note that on the fateful day,

a visibly tormented Chayawati told her housekeeper that she wanted to go for a drive alone.54

4.2.3. This statement is admissible in court under Section 32(1)55

of the I.E.A as it is spoken by the

deceased ‘as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death…’

With regard to this clause, it has been held that “the wide words used in the clause show that

it is intended to cover statements other than ‘dying declarations’ i.e statements made by a

dying person as to the cause of his death. The clause covers also other statements made by a

deceased person, such as a conversation between the deceased and another person…”56

51 Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Group, 7th Edn. (1999).

52 Factsheet ¶ 11.

53 Ibid.

54 Factsheet ¶ 12.

55 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant

- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead…are themselves relevant facts in

the following cases : (1) When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the

circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person' s death

comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the

time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in

which the cause of his death comes into question. or is made in course of business;

56 Shivabhai v. Emperor (1926) 50 Bom 683.



4.2.4. In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat57

it was held that “The words ‘statements as to

any of the circumstances’ are by themselves capable of expanding the width and contours of

the scope of admissibility. When the word ‘circumstances’ is linked to ‘transaction which

resulted in his death’, the subsection casts the net in a very wide dimension. Anything which

has a nexus with his death, proximate or distant, direct or indirect, can also fall within the

purview of the sub-section.”

4.2.5. Moreover, this fact is also relevant under Section 658

of the I.E.A, as it forms part of the same

transaction that resulted into the deceased committing suicide.

4.2.6. The fact that the deceased left her house against the wishes of her security agents, after

expressly telling her housekeeper that she wanted to be alone coupled with the fact of her

being extremely distressed point to the inference that she had made up her mind to commit

suicide.

4.2.7. It is humbly submitted that in the context of the facts of the case, it can be seen that the

accused persons instigated the deceased to commit suicide and in fact left her no other option.

55.. WWHHEETTHHEERR TTHHEE AACCCCUUSSEEDD AABBEETTTTEEDD TTHHEE SSUUIICCIIDDEE

It is most deferentially submitted before this Hon’ble Court that for a person to be convicted

of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code59

, two essential

ingredients must be established:

1. The deceased committed suicide

2. The accused abetted her in committing suicide.

The first has already been established above.

Abetment contemplated in section 306 must conform to the definition given in section 107 of

the Indian Penal Code, according to which abetment can be brought about in three ways: by

instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid to the deceased.

5.1 THAT THE ACCUSED HAD A CLEAR INTENTION TO INSTIGATE THE DECEASED TO COMMIT

SUICIDE.

57 Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat AIR 2001 SC 2944.

58 6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected

with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time

and place or at different times and places.

59 306. Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall

also be liable to fine.



5.1.1. It is most deferentially submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the intention of co-accused is

relevant here. As per Section 14 of the I.E.A60

, facts showing the existence of a state of mind

such as intention are relevant when the existence of such a state of mind is in issue or

relevant. Therefore certain excerpts from the speech of co-accused, which clearly indicate his

intention to instigate the victim to commit suicide, are relevant in the present case. There are

four distinct instances61

in his speech whereby he clearly expresses his opinion that

Chayawati should die:

A woman who abandons her own daughter has no right to even live, let alone contest

elections in our glorious nation.

Dear friends, I say this again, a woman who sold out her would be family for money

and fame, has no right to live.

If she even has a modicum of shame, she herself should commit suicide…..

Heavens forbid, if you voted for her it is time for you to send her a message that she is

not welcome in our world anymore and only in death can she redeem her sins……

5.1.2. Further, his aggressive ideas can be ascertained not only from the final speech but also from

his previous speeches. At a rally in early 2012, he announced that it was time people took

matters into their own hands.62

In fact he expressly declares that to wipe out the menace of

corruption etc, he has taken matters into his hands.63

These would also be admissible in court

under Section 864

of the I.E.A.

5.1.3. It is deferentially submitted that the character and circumstances of the act of the accused

strongly suggest an intention to abet the suicide of the deceased; hence if at all there was

60 14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body, of bodily feeling - Facts showing the existence of

any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill- will or good- will towards

any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the

existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling, is in issue or relevant.

61 Factsheet ¶ 7.

62 Factsheet ¶ 5.

63 Factsheet ¶ 7.

64 8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct - Any fact is relevant which shows or

constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any

agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact

in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any

proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and

whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.



some other intention with which he acted, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

This is in keeping with Illustration (a) to Section 10665

of the I.E.A.

5.2 THAT THE ACCUSED INSTIGATED THE DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

5.2.1. It is most deferentially submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused ‘abetted’ the

suicide of the deceased by instigating her to commit suicide. The accused brought about the

instigation in two ways, firstly by himself suggesting her to commit suicide in his speech and

secondly, by calling upon the public to instigate her to commit suicide. The speech delivered

by the co-accused 2 was being telecast live all over the country and was being heard by

millions of people. He expressly announced that “You must act purposefully, and decisively,

without caring for the consequences of your actions. Today, you must pledge your allegiance

to this movement. You cannot just come here, listen to what I have told you and go back

home. Promise me that you will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will

go unpunished.”66

5.2.2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the nature of the protest against the

deceased was not political. The accused and the public were protesting against the deceased

not in the capacity of the Chief Minister of a State but in her personal capacity. The accused

was not entitled to point his finger at the deceased’s personal life in the garb of political

protest. Statements made by him were calculated to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.

5.2.3. Moreover, it was not under a fit of emotion that the accused uttered words to the effect that

the deceased should go and die. On the contrary there was a persistent effort on the part of

both the accused persons to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. A venue for protest was

setup right outside the deceased’s mansion by the co-accused 1, where the angry protestors

raised slogans and goaded her to commit suicide. Protestors carried photos of her daughter,

morphed pictures of her and Virat Singhania and other defamatory and offensive material.67

Further, the speech delivered by the co-accused 2 on 26th

January was screened on large

screens right outside her house for days together to not let her forget what was said in the

speech about her. This pressure was too great for the deceased to bear, as a result of which

she committed suicide.

65 106. Burden of proving fact specially within knowledge - When any fact is specially within the knowledge

of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

66 Factsheet ¶ 7.

67 Factsheet ¶ 10.



5.2.4. In Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat68

the Apex Court has held that the

word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to

do anything. A person is said to instigate another to act, when he actively suggests or

stimulates him to the act by any means of language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the

form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement.69

5.2.5. It is humbly submitted that the law regarding offence of abetment to commit suicide is clear.

A person can be said to instigate another when he incites or otherwise encourages another,

directly or indirectly, to commit suicide70

The word instigate means to goad or urge forward

or provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act.71

5.2.6. It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court upheld conviction under section 306 of

Indian Penal Code when the accused by his acts produced an atmosphere which forced the

deceased to commit suicide.72

5.2.7. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P.73

mental harassment and pressure put on the

deceased were held to be amounting to instigation to commit suicide.

5.2.8. In Brij Lal v. Prem Chand74

, where the deceased stated in despair that she had enough of

torment and that she preferred death to living, the accused added fuel to fire by saying that

she may put an end to her life the very same day and she need not wait till the next day to quit

this world; such an utterance by the accused was held to be an instigation to her to commit

suicide.

5.2.9. The Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State held that “Each person's suicidability

pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-

respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any strait-jacket formula in dealing with such

cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.”75

68 Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat AIR 2009 SC 1808; Kishori Lal v. State of M.P (2007)

10 SCC 797; Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal AIR 2010 SC 512.

69 Emperor v. Amiruddin, (1922) 24 Bom LR 534.

70 Asha Shukla v. State of U.P. 2002 CriLJ 2233.

71 Parimal Chatterji v. Emperor 140 Ind. Cas.787.

72 State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh AIR 1991 SC 1532.

73 Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P. AIR 2008 SC 527; Prema Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao AIR 2003 SC 11.

74 Brij Lal v. Prem Chand AIR 1989 SC 1661.

75 Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605.



5.2.10. It is respectfully submitted in the context of the facts of this case, a clear case of instigation to

commit suicide has been made out.

5.3 THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO-ACCUSED ARE ALSO LIABLE UNDER OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE

INDIAN PENAL CODE

5.3.1. It humbly submitted that the co-accused abused the charismatic authority he had over the

public to instigate them to abet the suicide of the deceased.

5.3.2. It is humbly submitted that Section 11776

of the IPC makes it an offence to abet the

commission of an offence by the public. Under this section it will be sufficient to show any

instigation or other mode of abetment, though neither the effect intended, nor any other effect

follows from it.

5.3.3. In Emperor v Lavji Mandan77

, the instigation of the Hindu public to murder the complainant

was held to be within the ambit of Section 117.

5.3.4. In State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik78

, where editorials of a daily were

alleged of containing statements of abetting/instigating people of State to murder of

Government officers, the Apex court upheld the framing of charges under Section 117 of the

IPC.

5.3.5. The gravamen of a charge under Section 117 is the abetment itself, the instigation to general

lawlessness, not the particular offence of which the commission is instigated.79

5.3.6. Thus, it is submitted that the accused persons are liable to be convicted under section 306

read with section 117 of the IPC.

66.. WWHHEETTHHEERR TTHHEE AACCCCUUSSEEDD PPEERRSSOONNSS HHAADD CCOOMMMMOONN IINNTTEENNTTIIOONN??

6.1 THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO-ACCUSED HAD COMMON INTENTION

6.1.1. It is deferentially submitted that the co-accused 1 accused was a team of the co-accused 2 and

also his top confidant.80

It was she who started the protest outside the house of the deceased.

6.1.2. Also, she got the speech of the deceased screened on large screens.

76 Section 117. Abetting commission of offence by the public or by more than ten persons - Whoever abets

the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall

be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or

with both.

77 Emperor v. Lavji Mandan AIR 1939 Bom 452; Dwarkanath Goswami, 1932 60 Cal 427.

78 State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik 2002 (2) ACR 1935 (SC).

79 In Re: Konda Satyavatamma (1932) ILR 55 Mad 90.

80 Factsheet ¶ 10.



6.1.3. It is humbly submitted that section 3481

of the IPC establishes joint liability of persons acting

in concert. The main ingredients of the provision are:

(1) there must be a criminal act

(2) committed by more than one person,

(3) each act cumulatively resulting in the commission of the criminal offense must be

been in furtherance of the common intention.82

6.1.4. The common intention required under Section 34, IPC need not, however, be identical with

the guilty intention or ‘mens rea’ which is the ingredient of the substantive offence.

6.1.5. Under this section a pre concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan need not be proved.

The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required.83

6.1.6. Russel, in his book on Criminal Law says: “It indicates some kind of aid or assistance

preceding an effect in future and that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the

ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken for the purpose of effecting the felony."

6.1.7. In Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh84

it was held that the provision is

intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual

members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly

what part was taken by each of them.

6.1.8. In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab85

it was held that it is not necessary that the acts of the

several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or

identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by

one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.

6.1.9. In Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar , the Supreme Court held that the

common intention refers here to the ultimate crime intended thus each person need not

81 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention - When a criminal act is done by

several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the

same manner as if it were done by him alone.

82 Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 1929: (2001) 4 SCC 193;Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of

A.P. AIR 2004 SC 132; Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. AIR 2004 SC 1808.

83 Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188.

84 Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 1899.

85 Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109.



commit each act, or even know of the others’ actions, so long as the intention to commit the

ultimate crime is commonly intended.86

6.1.10. It is respectfully submitted that because direct proof of such an agreement is often

unavailable intention can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.87

The common intention

or plan may be proved either from conduct, circumstances or from incriminating facts.88

The

Apex Court has held in Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab that common intention is a state of

mind and can be inferred objectively from one’s conduct as well as from prior or subsequent

attendant circumstances.89

6.1.11. In light of the above, it can rightly be inferred that the accused persons had a common

intention to abet the deceased to commit suicide as all the ingredients required under section

34 are satisfied.

6.1.12. It is humbly submitted that conviction under section 306 read with section 34 of the IPC

requires three ingredients:

1. That the deceased committed suicide.

2. The accused abetted the deceased to commit suicide.

3. The accused were acting according to their ‘common intention’.

6.1.13. It is humbly submitted that the evidence on record proves all these factors conclusively and

beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is submitted that the two accused are liable under

Section 306 read with section 34 of the IPC.

86 Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar 2003 SCC (Cri) 177.

87 Justice M.R. Mallick, Criminal Manual (Criminal Major Acts) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), p. 8 (2009).

88 Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978: (2003) 7 SCC 56; Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 2001 SC 2493:

(2001) 6 SCC 620.

89 Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab 2002 SCC (Cri) 1518.

--PPRRAAYYEERR -- P a g e | xiii


PP RR AA YY EE RR

WWHHEERREEFFOORREE IINN TTHHEE LLIIGGHHTT OOFF TTHHEE IISSSSUUEESS RRAAIISSEEDD,, AARRGGUUMMEENNTTSS AADDVVAANNCCEEDD,, RREEAASSOONNSS GGIIVVEENN

AANNDD AAUUTTHHOORRIITTIIEESS CCIITTEEDD,, TTHHIISS HHOONN’’BBLLEE CCOOUURRTT MMAAYY BBEE PPLLEEAASSEEDD TTOO::

II.. HHOOLLDD MMAANNNNAA WWAAZZAARREE AANNDD DDUUSSHHYYAANNTT TTEEJJIIPPAALL JJOOIINNTTLLYY LLIIAABBLLEE FFOORR AATTTTEEMMPPTT

TTOO MMUURRDDEERR;;

IIII.. HHOOLLDD MMAANNNNAA WWAAZZAARREE AANNDD DDUUSSHHYYAANNTT TTEEJJIIPPAALL JJOOIINNTTLLYY LLIIAABBLLEE FFOORR CCAAUUSSIINNGG

GGRRIIEEVVOOUUSS HHUURRTT;;

IIIIII.. HHOOLLDD MMAANNNNAA WWAAZZAARREE AANNDD KKAAVVIITTAA BBHHEEDDII JJOOIINNTTLLYY LLIIAABBLLEE FFOORR AABBEETTMMEENNTT OOFF

SSUUIICCIIDDEE..

AANNDD AANNYY OOTTHHEERR RREELLIIEEFF TTHHAATT TTHHIISS HHOONN’’BBLLEE CCOOUURRTT MMAAYY BBEE PPLLEEAASSEEDD TTOO GGRRAANNTT IINN TTHHEE

IINNTTEERREESSTTSS OOFF JJUUSSTTIICCEE,, EEQQUUIITTYY AANNDD GGOOOODD CCOONNSSCCIIEENNCCEE

AALLLL OOFF WWHHIICCHH IISS RREESSPPEECCTTFFUULLLLYY SSUUBBMMIITTTTEEDD..

CCOOUUNNSSEELLSS FFOORR TTHHEE PPRROOSSEECCUUTTIIOONN

prosecution memorial

Documents