House of Commons

Environmental Audit Committee

Progress on Carbon Budgets

Written evidence

Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee for the inquiry into Progress on Carbon Budgets and accepted as written evidence are included

List of written evidence

Page

1 Daniel Scharf 3

2 BBSRC 7

3 WWF-UK 9

4 RWE npower 23

5 The Government 26

6 EDF Energy 36

7 Mineral Products Association 42

8 Professor Kevin Anderson, Dr John Broderick, Dr Paul Gilbert, Mr Jaise Kuriakose, Dr Mirjam Röder, Dr Alice Bows, Professor Corinne Le Quéré, Dr Annela Anger-Kraavi 45

9 Aldersgate Group 57

10 Friends of the Earth 69

11 Terry O’Connell 75

12 Met Office 79

13 Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute 82

14 Environmental Investigation Agency 133

15 Met Office (supplementary submission) 137

16 Andrew Montford 143

17 Sand bag 145

18 Aubrey Meyer (further submission) 157

19 Dr Ulrich Loening 161

20 Dr Mayer Hillman 163

�

Written evidence submitted by Daniel Scharf

I have worked as a town and country planner for over 30 years in public, private and voluntary sectors. I also work as a trainer and tutor in planning. I have run a transport NGO for the last 15 years concentrating on the environmental impacts of vehicle speeds on both road transport, and the transport system as a whole.

Summary

* Any suggestion that the UK should limit its ambition to reduce carbon emissions in accordance with the Climate Change Act 2008 due to the scale of the global problem should be rejected. It is the responsibility of all sovereign states to do everything in their own power to minimise domestic emissions. This is both a moral and practical imperative if the UK is to engage in international negotiations on this matter.

* The profile of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) should be increased and given proper respect and attention by all Government Departments. The treatment of CCC recommendations by both the DfT and DCLG is deplorable and brings the Climate Change Act itself into disrepute. This is particularly noticeable in respect of recommendations addressing carbon emissions from cars and the construction of new dwellings.

* The Government should defer to the expertise of the CCC in respect of the specific matter on which they have been set up to give independent advice. One of the most important factors which has persuaded British citizens that climate change is not a matter of much importance is the apparent indifference of its Government. One of the most important factors in delaying and inhibiting business investment in low carbon technologies is the equivocation of the Government. The roles of both the CCC and the EAC are critical to changing Government attitudes in this matter.

Evidence

1. Low Carbon Building

1.01 The lack of rigour and urgency in the way in which Government is managing the reduction in carbon emissions can be seen from the regulation of emissions from new housing. Its adopted standards can be found in the Code for Sustainable Homes which contains measures available to be applied voluntarily by local planning authorities and/or developers. Whilst the Government has accepted the target of requiring all new dwellings to be zero carbon by 2016, there have been unexplained delays in the introduction of building regulations that would continue the trajectory of carbon reduction. In the 2013 Budget Speech the Chancellor announced the delayed introduction of Part L will be in May 2013. Although no advances in technology or building methods are expected by 2016 there is no intention of requiring the necessary carbon reductions dependent on a further increase in energy efficiency reflected in a further upgrade to Part L before that date. The housing built to a lower standard will continue unnecessarily to add carbon to the atmosphere until 2050.

1.02 In May 2012 the Committee on Climate Change drew attention to the lack of

progress in reducing carbon in its Report How local authorities can reduce emissions and manage climate risk. Since then Central Government has indicated that it is inclined to rely on building regulations rather than the planning system and the adoption of the Code for Sustainable Homes to manage carbon reduction from dwellings. In fact, this Report from the CCC explained why the building regulations were not “fit for

3

�

purpose" in that respect. The current position is that developers, planning authorities (including those engaged in neighbourhood planning) and other interested parties (including businesses engaged in low carbon technologies) are in a state of confusion. Whilst there is no difficulty in respect of either the cost or technologies in the provision of zero carbon homes (equivalent to CHS6), it is the equivocation of the Government which is primarily responsible for the continuation of the building of sub standard dwellings.

1.03 One of the reasons why CCC wish to see planning authorities engaged in the

process of reducing carbon from buildings is that conditions can be applied to planning permissions addressing the problem identified as the “performance gap" between the design and the end result. Planning conditions can be applied to require the use of low carbon materials and inspections during the building process to ensure the proper installation of insulation and of achieving necessary levels of airtightness. Conditions can also require post-occupation evaluation to assist residents in achieving the design standards and to identify any faults in carrying out the building works. The introduction of Part L of the building regulations will not achieve these necessary improvements to the construction process.

1.04 Another reason for the CCC wanting to see greater efforts in reducing carbon

emissions from buildings is because of the comparative ease with which this could be achieved. Transport is seen as a very difficult sector– partly due to air travel and partly the addiction to personalized motor vehicles (see next section). Manufacturing and associated carbon emissions have largely been exported (this should be accounted for in the UK budgets). Agriculture is extremely difficult without a revolution to low input organic systems. Electricity generation is being put on a fossil fuel path by the current Government. In these circumstances the failure to deal rigorously with the relatively straightforward matter of new buildings is inexcusable. The Code for Sustainable Homes explains that the upgrading of new buildings would be difficult if not impossible and it is indicative of the Government's approach to carbon reduction to be complicit in the erection of new buildings that are adding to the problem rather than being part of the solution.

1.05 Ironically, the DCLG introduced the “presumption in favour of sustainable development" in the National Planning Policy Framework in March 2012. However, it has left the development industry in a state of uncertainty as to whether new buildings must be sustainable, that is emitting the lowest possible level of carbon. Given that zero carbon building is within the capability of the development industry, it is difficult to understand how anything less than zero carbon could satisfy the “presumption". It should be a simple matter of a Government Minister (Mr Pickles and/or Mr Boles) making it clear that any development that continues to emit carbon would not be considered to be sustainable. This would be entirely consistent with the recommendations being made by the CCC. The industry (including responsible developers such as Barratts) would be pleased to see a level playing field where all the developers are brought up to the same and necessary standard.

1.06 Whilst not directly a matter of carbon reductions, energy efficient buildings are an essential part of reducing fuel poverty which is a growing blight on our housing system.

2. Low Carbon Transport

2.01 The EAC should be aware that in 2005/6 (Reducing carbon emissions from transport) it recommended a reduction in the national speed limit. Whilst accepting

4

�

that the Government at that time might be reluctant, to the extent of being, “…running scared of critical tabloid headlines", the committee supported such a reduction on the basis that it would, “…help to raise awareness of the reality of climate change, and of the need for everyone to take action on it.". The corollary of the failure to take this action (repeatedly recommended by the CCC) is that the general public is being made very aware that climate change is not a sufficiently serious problem for their Government to take effective action.

2.02 Extraordinarily, the Government has a proposal to increase the national speed limit on some if not all motorways, reinforcing the view that it is unnecessary or even undesirable to attempt to reduce carbon emissions from transport. In fact, the Department for Transport understand very well the benefits that would accrue to the transport system as a whole, were speeds limited to 60 mph or preferably 50 mph. This would benefit coaches and trains (without the need for increased speeds), planned journey times would be reduced, less fuel would be used, less carbon and other greenhouse gases emitted, wear and tear on vehicles, tyres and passengers would be reduced and the NHS would benefit hugely from the reduction in the number and severity of accidents. The only explanation for maintaining (or increasing) the national speed limit is the very substantial income to the Treasury from fuel duty. However, the Department of Transport has become aware that this will be reduced in any event in the power shift to electric vehicles. It is reasonably clear that a reduction in the national speed limit would facilitate the change from the internal combustion engine to electrical power drives.

2.03 The Government should not place the CCC (or the EAC) in a position where it has to repeat its message in respect of the damaging effect of speed in respect of carbon emissions. A systemic view of transport would show that not only would reducing car speeds encourage low carbon modes of travel but that speed is also a major component in causing congestion and stop-start driving which is disproportionately responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. The variable speed limiting of parts of the motorway system prone to congestion shows that the Government is fully aware that lower speeds increase capacity and efficiency. The case for a reduction in the national speed limit, as recognised by the EAC in 2005/6, is overwhelming, and the failure of its implementation gives the strongest possible signal to the public that this Government, like its predecessor, is oblivious to the problems of climate change or simply afraid of adverse publicity.

2.04 The Government has delegated the issue of lower urban speed limits (normally 30 mph to 20 mph) to local authorities. However, the necessary traffic orders and signing makes this very expensive and the ubiquitous use of overpowered cars results in flagrant abuse and difficulties in enforcement and discrediting these initiatives. A benefit of reducing and enforcing a lower national speed limit would be a power shift to lighter, more efficient and generally smaller vehicles that would also be both easier to drive and less polluting at the lower speeds which are becoming commonplace in urban areas. With this change in technology Central Government could and should make 20 mph the default speed in urban areas.

3. Recommendations

3.01 That the Government accept the recommendations of the CCC in respect of increasing the energy efficiency of new buildings. This should be done by endorsing the Code for Sustainable Homes (and rigorously enforce BREEAM ‘excellent’ for commercial building) and requiring all new dwellings to meet Code 6 (encouraging local planning authorities to identify “allowable solutions" to achieve the highest

5

�

standard). This could be done immediately by making it clear that lower building standards would not benefit from the presumption in favour of sustainable development in the Framework.

3.02 That the Government accept the CCC recommendation that the national speed limit be reduced to 60 mph (or lower, based on evidence in the US and the Netherlands) and that the police receive instructions that this is the level to be strictly enforced. This would be completely equitable (possibly disadvantageous owners of unnecessarily fast and powerful cars) and could be done immediately and at virtually no expense.

3.03 The Prime Minister should take responsibility for preventing the interference of the Chancellor/Treasury in forestalling the delivery of both zero carbon buildings and an integrated, reliable, efficient and low carbon transport system. This interference has done nothing but cause confusion, additional costs and delay in achieving necessary carbon reductions.

29 March 2013

6

Written evidence submitted by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) is the leading funder of non-medical biological research in the UK. Its budget for 2012-13 is around £500M, supporting approximately 1600 scientists and 2000 research students in universities and institutes across the UK. Further details are available at www.bbsrc.ac.uk.

2. This evidence is submitted by BBSRC and represents the Council’s independent

views. It does not include or necessarily reflect the views of the Science and Research Group in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), BBSRC’s sponsoring government department.

3. As a public funder of research, it is not appropriate for BBSRC to make policy recommendations regarding the level, operation or governance of UK Carbon Budgets. This response therefore highlights the importance of bioenergy and industrial biotechnology to carbon budgeting, and outlines relevant BBSRC investments.

RESPONSE

4. Bioenergy and Industrial Biotechnology offer novel low carbon alternatives to the production of energy, materials and chemicals from fossil fuels through the sustainable exploitation of plants, bacterial, algae and fungi. They have an important role in helping the UK to meet the targets for Green House Gas emissions set out in the Climate Change Act and to maintain its energy security in the context of increasing oil prices.

5. The Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME) model1 and Department of Energy and Climate Change Carbon Calculator2 demonstrate that it would be challenging for the UK to meet its carbon reduction commitments without bioenergy. Bioenergy offers a significant and cost-effective contribution to reducing carbon emissions, and its exclusion would significantly increase the cost of decarbonising the UK’s energy system3. In combination with carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy could contribute to achieving negative carbon emissions. 

BBSRC investment in Bioenergy and Industrial Biotechnology

6. In 2009 BBSRC invested £20M in the BBSRC Sustainable Bioenergy Centre (BSBEC)4. Research undertaken by BSBEC spans the bioenergy pipeline from

                                                            1 http://www.eti.co.uk/technology_strategy/energy_systems_modelling_environment/ 2 https://www.gov.uk/2050-pathways-analysis 3 UK Bioenergy Strategy 4 http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/research/biotechnology-bioenergy/bsbec/bsbec-index.aspx

7

biomass crops to fermentation for the production of biofuels and high value chemicals. The Centre brings together world-class research groups and industrial partners to create a network which ensures the translation of its research to practical application.

7. Building on BSBEC, BBSRC is supporting the transition of the UK to a low carbon economy through strategic investment in world class Industrial Biotechnology and Bioenergy (IBBE) research, underpinning the development of sustainable low carbon technologies. As one of BBSRC’s three strategic priorities, IBBE received investment of £28M in 2012-2013.

8. BBSRC’s key interests in Industrial Biotechnology and Bioenergy are5: • The improvement of lignocellulosic feedstocks (non-food crops and waste straw)

and development of biological conversion technologies to generate biofuels and bioenergy

• The exploitation of systems and synthetic biology approaches to generate bacteria capable of producing biofuel, biogas and industrial chemicals

• Multidisciplinary research underpinning the development of biological, chemical and engineering processes for the sustainable, clean, production of chemicals materials and polymers (biorefining)

• The cultivation and engineering of microalgae and cyanobacteria for the production of biofuels and high value chemicals

Bioenergy for the future

9. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, bioenergy has a major role to play in the UK energy mix - contributing to long term greenhouse gas emissions reductions, 2020 renewables targets and the UK’s future energy security.

10. Fully realising bioenergy’s potential will require continued investment in basic and

translational research. To this end, BBSRC have recently announced a further £35M of funding for Industrial Biotechnology and Bioenergy, to create networks and collaborative research between academia and industry leading to translational development to commercialisation, offering a channel for sustainable economic growth for the UK and new 'green’ jobs.

11. BBSRC funded research is contributing to the development a solid body of evidence

to inform decision-making in the development of a low carbon economy.

9 May 2013

                                                            5 http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/priorities/ibb-bioenergy.aspx

8

Written evidence submitted by WWF-UK

Summary

- The latest science indicates that it is still feasible for the world to prevent global average temperatures increasing by more than 2ºC compared to pre-industrial average, the stated objective of the international negotiation process to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. However, the window of opportunity for doing so is rapidly closing and substantial shifts in investment towards energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies have to happen over the next 5 years.

- This is also a critical time for climate and energy policy in both the European and international arena. Despite the poor signal sent to the rest of the world following the European Parliament’s recent vote against a proposal to marginally strengthen the carbon price under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, discussions have started at EU level on a possible package of climate and energy legislation for 2030 (and a Green Paper has been published). Internationally, the objective remains to reach a global deal at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in 2015 on reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the post 2020 period. With two of the next three summits taking place in the EU, pro-active UK and EU leadership is likely to be crucial to the success of these negotiations, as it has been since the inception of the UNFCCC in 1992.

- The UK’s Climate Change Act 2008 is seen by many countries across the world as landmark legislation and it has become a model for similar legislation in countries such as Mexico and South Korea. It is therefore imperative that the UK be seen to take robust action domestically to deliver on its emission reduction commitments, which will give it the credibility and reputation to positively influence critical international developments. On the other hand, being perceived as backtracking on commitments, watering down legislation or ignoring the best available scientific evidence would do untold damage to the UK’s reputation and undermine the much needed momentum required to deliver an ambitious global deal on emissions by 2015.

- This is therefore not the time for the Government to dilute the greenhouse gas emission reduction ambitions set out in the Climate Change Act and the first four legislated carbon budgets set following the advice of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC). It must be recalled that these represent the minimum ambition that the UK needs to aim for as part of a global effort to keep the increase in average temperatures below 2 degrees, which in the case of the European Union has been estimated to require emission reductions of 80% to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. If anything, the UK’s emission reduction commitments should be strengthened and this should certainly be the case for the UK’s second and third interim carbon budgets, as recommended by the CCC.

- The UK economy could greatly benefit from being an early-mover in the transition towards a low-carbon economy. However, Government divisions in recent years over the future direction of climate and energy policy have resulted in a decision to review the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2014. Since the Committee’s previous inquiry, this has also been followed by an agreement to postpone a decision on both a power sector decarbonisation target and the inclusion of aviation and shipping emissions in the UK’s carbon budgets until 2016 at the earliest. This has created significant investment uncertainty in the low-carbon sector, which risks not only undermining one of the very few areas of growth of the UK economy but will also severely undermine the UK’s ability to meet its commitments under the Climate Change Act.

9

- WWF-UK urges the UK Government to accept the CCC’s initial recommendations for the Fourth Carbon Budget in its 2014 review, make a decision now to set a decarbonisation target for the power sector for 2030, accept to include international aviation and shipping emissions into the carbon budgets and increase ambition for non-traded sector emissions from the ‘interim’ to the ‘intended’ level of the second and third carbon budgets, that is, to – 42% by 2020 as in Scotland and comparable to Germany’s target of 40% emission reductions by 2020.

- We agree that any detrimental impacts of climate and energy policy on energy intensive industries should be taken seriously. WWF-UK believes that the risks faced by this small group of companies can be managed through appropriate policy tools and the CCC’s latest report on competitiveness indicates that the UK Government is taking satisfactory steps to address current impacts. However, the UK should learn the lessons from international experience and avoid the mistakes that have occurred in Germany and under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme by ensuring that only those sectors genuinely at risk of carbon leakage are proportionally compensated for any detrimental competitiveness impacts on the basis of firm, publicly available evidence.

- The framing of the policy discourse should also recognise that UK-based energy intensive companies could stand to benefit from the substantial economic growth opportunities created by ambitious UK climate and energy policies. These policies should therefore not just be portrayed as a negative cost on those industries.

Introduction

1. WWF is the largest environmental network in the world, with projects in over 100 countries. One of our key aims is tackling climate change, and we have been active in UK and global energy policy discussions for over a decade. We are strongly committed as an organisation to helping prevent the worst impacts of climate change and in particular preventing temperatures from rising above 2ºC compared to pre-industrial levels.

2. The Climate Change Act 2008 is a fundamental tool to guide the UK’s transition to a low, and eventually zero, carbon economy. It establishes a legally binding target that the UK must reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, underpinned by a framework of five-year carbon budgets, set out on a minimum 15-year time horizon.

3. The closely related Scottish Climate Change Act is another landmark piece of legislation. In some respects, it is superior to the UK Act as it commits Scotland to reduce emissions by at least 42% below 1990 levels by 2020, and unlike the UK budgets, includes Scotland’s share of international aviation and shipping emissions within this ambition. The Scottish Act also includes a requirement for annual, as opposed to five-year, targets.

4. A fair, ambitious and binding international agreement remains essential to adequately address the global nature of climate change. However, given the slow progress towards a legally binding agreement, strong national frameworks are urgently needed not just in their own right, but also to rebuild political momentum and trust in international negotiations. This is particularly important today given the international community’s objective to reach an agreement in 2015 on a global deal to reduce GHG emissions for the post-2020 period.

5. Our response focuses on the following key questions raised by the Committee:

10

• I. Are the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous climate change?

• II. Operation and management of the carbon budgets: have the Environmental Audit Committee’s previous concerns and recommendations been addressed?

• III. What should the Government response be to the CCC’s 2013 progress report and should the carbon budgets be relaxed?

I. Are the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous climate change?

The latest climate change science calls for urgency of action, not further delay

6. A range of reports published at the end of 2012 from the World Bank1, the International Energy Agency2 (IEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)3 and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC)4 show that the challenge of tackling GHG emissions is as urgent as ever. Key points from these reports show that:

• If current trends continue, the world is currently on track for a warming far in excess of 2ºC, with the World Bank warning that “even with the current mitigation commitments and pledges fully implemented, there is roughly a 20 percent likelihood of exceeding 4ºC by 2100” and “if they are not met, a warming of 4ºC could occur as early as the 2060s”5. UNEP notes in particular that current global emissions of GHGs are considerably higher than the maximum level of emissions that could be allowable in 2020 (44Gt CO2e) to stay within a “likely” chance (greater than 66%) of preventing temperature increases of more than 2ºC.

WWF-UK is aware that a recent article published in The Economist6 suggested that the recent apparent slowing down of average global temperatures may indicate that the climate is less sensitive to accumulations of GHGs in the atmosphere than previously thought and that therefore the high upper end of temperature increases contemplated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) models (i.e. with warming in excess of +4.5ºC) are less likely to occur than previously thought. Whilst this is a possibility and further research is required, this article under-estimates that recent warming may have been masked by other factors such as heat being redirected into deep oceans instead of the atmosphere, the temporary cooling impact that aerosols might be having by reflecting sunlight back into space and the fact that only looking back at temperature variations in the last 15 years could mask longer trends in warming which tend to evolve in a step-like rather than linear fashion. In addition, the latest evidence still confirms the validity of the IPCC’s central estimation that a doubling of carbon

1 ‘Turn Down the Heat: Why a Warmer 4ºC World Must Be Avoided’, the World Bank, November 2012: http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf 2 ‘World Energy Outlook 2012’, the International Energy Agency, November 2012: http://iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf 3 ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2012’, United Nations Environment Programme, November 2012: http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/ 4 ’Too late for two degrees?,, PricewaterhouseCoopers, November 2012: http://www.pwc.co.uk/sustainability-climate-change/publications/low-carbon-economy-index.jhtml 5 See World Bank report, page xiii. 6 ‘A sensitive matter’, The Economist, 30th March 2013: http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21574461-climate-may-be-heating-up-less-response-greenhouse-gas-emissions

11

dioxide in the atmosphere compared to pre-industrial levels will result in average global temperatures increasing by a range of 2ºC to 4.5ºC.7

• The current concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is already unprecedented with the World Bank noting that “the present CO2 concentration is higher than paleoclimatic and geologic evidence indicates has occurred at any time in the last 15 million years”8 and UNEP observing that GHG emissions in 2010 were some 20% higher than in 2000.

• The impact of projected levels of global warming would disproportionately impact “many of the world’s poorest regions, which have the least economic, institutional, scientific and technical capacity to cope and adapt”9. These impacts would also severely undermine the provision of ecosystem services on which human society and the world economy are highly dependent. The World Bank notes in particular that “in a 4ºC world climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. (…) Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection coast-line afforded by coral reefs and mangroves)”10.

• The reports all confirm that it is still possible to prevent temperature increases in excess of 2ºC but the window of opportunity for doing so is rapidly closing, with the International Energy Agency warning in its latest World Energy Outlook report that “if action to reduce CO2 emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emissions would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that time.”11 UNEP notes that even if fulfilled, current pledges made by countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 are some 8 GtCO2e12 to 13 GtCO2e above the level of annual emissions allowable in 2020 to stay on track for having a likely chance to meet the 2ºC objective. To put this “emissions gap” into context, the emissions of China in 2010 were in the region of 10 GtCO2e13.

• As made clear by the Stern Review in 200614, taking early action to prevent temperature increase in excess of 2ºC makes economic sense, with UNEP noting in particular that “the increased lock-in of carbon-intensive technologies will lead to significantly higher mitigation costs over the medium- and long-term”15. This point was echoed by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2011 report, which warned that “delaying action is a false economy: for every $1 of investment avoided in the power sector before 2020 an additional $4.3 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for the increased emissions.”16

7 A good summary of the latest evidence is provided in this review by Carbon Brief: http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/04/climate-sensitivity-in-the-media-a-case-of-mistranslation-%281%29 8 See World Bank report, page xiv. 9 See World Bank Report, page xiii. 10 See World Bank report, page xvi. 11 See World Energy Outlook 2012 Report, page 3. 12 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. 13 See the Climate Action Tracker for country by country tracker: http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china.html 14 The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, 2006. 15 See UNEP report, page 4. 16 ‘World Energy Outlook 2011’, International Energy Agency, November 2011: http://www.iea.org/weo/docs/weo2011/executive_summary.pdf, page 2.

12

7. It is therefore clear from a climate change science perspective that despite uncertainties in some areas, now is not the time to dilute the UK’s commitments to reduce its GHG emissions and that the remaining window of opportunity to prevent dangerous levels of climate change should be seized with urgency.

8. It should be pointed out that the carbon budgets proposed by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) fall short of what is needed to be in line with the UK and EU’s longstanding policy objective to keep levels of warming to less than 2ºC above the pre-industrial average with any degree of confidence. The CCC’s recommendations are based on limiting the central expectation of temperature rise “as close as possible” to 2ºC. In practice, its main criterion has been to select a pathway for global emissions which limits the risk that warming will exceed 4ºC to less than 1%.

Too slow and not enough, but the rest of the world is acting

9. Whilst international action to tackle greenhouse gas emissions falls far short of the action required to meet the 2ºC goal, several countries around the world have started taking positive action to reduce their emissions. Within the EU, countries like Germany (through the ‘EnergieWende’)17 and Denmark18 have set themselves ambitious emission reduction goals out to 2050 and embarked on a radical transition towards an energy system based on renewable energy and high levels of energy efficiency.

10. Outside of the EU and whilst recognising that more ambitious action is required, major emitting countries such as South Africa (with the introduction of a new carbon tax in 2015) and China are doing far more than they are regularly given credit for. In its 12th 5-year plan, the Chinese Government has set itself the following objectives for 2015: reducing its energy consumption per unit of GDP by 15% by 2015 compared to 2010 levels, reducing its emissions of CO2 per unit of GDP by 17% compared to 2010 levels (and by 40% to 45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels) and increasing the share of non-fossil fuel energy to 11.4% of its overall primary energy mix by 2015 and 15% by 202019.

11. In many cases, the UK’s Climate Change Act has already had a role in influencing positive developments in other parts of the world, such as the adoption of a new Climate Change Act in Mexico20, the development of the Clean Energy Act in Australia (which legislated an emissions trading scheme, an 80% emissions reduction target by 2050 and a Climate Change Authority closely resembling the Committee on Climate Change)21, a White Paper from the Norwegian Parliament22 committing to investigating the need for a climate change act similar to the UK’s

17 See in particular German Government’s Energy Concept, September 2010: http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/energy-concept,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. See in particular pages 4 and 5 and detailed sections on energy efficiency and renewable energy deployment. 18 See latest Energy Agreement from March 2012. See the summary of Denmark’s climate and energy policy on the Danish Energy Agency website: http://www.ens.dk/en-US/policy/danish-climate-and-energy-policy/Sider/danish-climate-and-energy-policy.aspx 19 See ‘China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change’, The National Development and Reform Commission, The People’s Republic of China, 2012: http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/W020121122588539459161.pdf 20 See Globe International’s 3rd Climate Legislation Study: http://www.globeinternational.org/index.php/legislation-policy/studies/climate 21 See Clean Energy Act 2011, the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011,the Climate Change Authority Act 2011, the Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) Act 2011 at http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Legislation-and-regulations/Pages/default.aspx 22 See the Norwegian Parliament’s White Paper (http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37858627/PDFS/STM201120120021000DD) and the cross-party

13

and recent consideration given by the Danish Government to develop a UK-style climate change act.

12. WWF’s own work in China shows that the UK’s Climate Change Act coupled with engagement on climate change through the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the British Council in China have played an important role in helping build momentum in China towards prioritising climate change mitigation and low-carbon developments on the political agenda, as well as supporting current discussions around running an emissions trading pilot scheme in China and introducing a possible carbon tax.

13. If the UK were to water down the emission reduction and low-carbon development commitments embedded in its Climate Change Act and its first four carbon budgets, this would send a very negative signal to other major economies and would be detrimental to the building of a positive momentum towards a global deal on climate change in 2015.

The rationale behind the Climate Change Act: the need for long-term stability and early domestic action, not constant chopping and changing

14. When considering whether the emission reduction objectives in the Climate Change Act are still valid, it is important to recall the context behind the Act.

15. A major objective of the Climate Change Act, which was enacted through cross-party consensus just over four years ago, “was to set a target which would not vary with the ups and downs of global negotiations, but would provide certainty within which policies and technologies could develop”23.

16. In line with the economic analysis of the Stern Review, which concluded that “the earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be”24, the Act was also developed on the understanding that early domestic action to reduce GHG emissions was more likely to be cost-effective than delaying action towards the end of the period leading to 2050. This is recognised in the Government’s own analysis in its proposal to set the Fourth Carbon Budget, which states that “pathways with early [domestic] action…are more cost-effective over time than pathways which delay action towards meeting the 2050 emissions reduction target.”25

17. The need for early domestic action is all the more important as the CCC’s own analysis shows that as we approach 2050, there will be very little opportunity to purchase international carbon credits to help deliver the UK’s emissions reduction goals if the world is genuinely taking action to prevent a level of warming in excess of 2ºC: “We need to face the reality that in the long term, reductions in emissions will need to be achieved almost entirely through domestic action”.26

18. Recommendations: A dilution of the UK’s emission reduction commitments under the Climate Change Act would clearly run counter to the political, scientific and economic rationale which led to the cross-party support for the Act just four years ago. WWF-UK therefore expects agreement to take forward the development of a new climate change law in Norway (http://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2011-2012/inns-201112-390.pdf). 23 ‘The Fourth Carbon Budget – reducing emissions through the 2020s’, Committee on Climate Change, December 2010, page 17: http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/4th%20Budget/CCC-4th-Budget-Book_with-hypers.pdf 24 The Stern Review, page ii. 25 ‘Implementing the Climate Change Act 2008: The Government’s proposal for setting the fourth carbon budget’, May 2011, paragraph 26. 26 See CCC’s Fourth Carbon Budget Report, page 18.

14

the Government to uphold the objectives of the Climate Change Act and, as explained below, follow the CCC’s recommendations in relation to the second, third and fourth carbon budgets.

II. Operation and management of the carbon budgets: have the Environmental Audit Committee’s previous concerns and recommendations been addressed?

Overview of key issues identified by the Committee in its previous report

19. In its previous report on carbon budgets, the Environmental Audit Committee expressed concerns in relation to the following key issues:

• the climate of investment uncertainty in the low-carbon sector caused by the Government’s decision to review its adoption of the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2014;

• the lack of clarity around the Government’s intentions following the CCC’s recommendations to increase emission reduction ambitions in the non-traded sectors from the “interim” budget level to the “intended” budget level;

• the need to develop a clearer evidence base on the possible detrimental impacts of climate and energy policies on the UK’s energy intensive companies; and

• the current lack of understanding surrounding the treatment and impacts of the UK’s consumption emissions.

20. Each of these issues is addressed in turn below.

The damage caused by the Fourth Carbon Budget review and the delayed decisions on power sector decarbonisation and the treatment of international aviation and shipping emissions

21. In its report on the previous Carbon Budgets inquiry, the Environmental Audit Committee noted that “the prospect of the review changing the budgets in itself undermines the benefit of having a degree of longer-term certainty about Government policy that investors in low-carbon need.”27 This is particularly detrimental given that the CCC has stressed repeatedly that “the level of ambition in this budget should be regarded as an absolute minimum, and more may be both feasible and required as current uncertainties over emissions projections and abatement opportunities are resolved.”28 It should be stressed here that the Fourth Carbon Budget recommended by the CCC, which requires emissions reduction cuts of 46% from 2009 to 2030 (equivalent to emissions in 2030 being 60% below 1990 levels), already pushes back a significant amount of emission reduction actions to the 2030-2050 period (a 62% cut in emissions from 2030 to 2050). Therefore, “any less ambitious target for 2030 would endanger the feasibility of the path to 2050”29 due to the improbable levels of emission reduction actions it would require to be taken in the 2030-2050 period.

22. Whilst the review of the Fourth Carbon Budget is still expected for 2014, the political dynamics behind the Government’s decision to review the budget has led to further detrimental impacts in two key areas since the Committee’s previous inquiry was held. First, following months of political divisions on the development of the Energy Bill, the Government failed to put forward a binding target to reduce the power sector’s carbon intensity down to around 27 ‘Carbon Budgets Inquiry’, Environmental Audit Committee, October 2011: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/carbon-budgets/ 28 Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 12. 29 Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 12.

15

50gCO2/kWh by 2030 as recommended by the CCC and a wide range of businesses, faith groups, trade unions and non-governmental organisations30. Subject to amendments put forward in the context of the Energy Bill, a decision on whether or not to introduce a decarbonisation target for the UK power sector will not be taken until 2016 at the earliest. This is damaging for two key reasons:

• First, by failing to provide a clear sense of direction out to the next investment cycle, the lack of a target risks slowing down the significant investments required to make the transition towards a low-carbon power sector. This is concerning given that the CCC estimates that ‘decarbonising’ the UK’s power sector down to a carbon intensity level of 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 would require investing approximately £10bn annually in the sector throughout the 2020s31. The risk of investment hiatus was made clear in a recent letter by leading international manufacturers to the UK Government, which stated in particular that “postponing the 2030 target decision until 2016 creates entirely avoidable political risk. This will slow growth in the low carbon sector, handicap the UK supply chain, reduce UK R&D and produce fewer new jobs.”32

• Second, this lack of long-term investment certainty also risks resulting in the UK losing out on important economic growth benefits associated with the development of low-carbon infrastructure. A recent report from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) noted that “in trying economic times, the UK’s green business has continued to grow in real terms, carving out a £122bn share of a global market worth £3.3 trillion and employing close to a million people. And in 2014/2015, it is expected to roughly halve the UK’s trade deficit” but lack of policy certainty in the green sector could result in “a risk of losing almost £0.4bn in net exports in 2014/2015”.33

A recent report by Cambridge Econometrics also found that if the UK was to invest steadily in offshore wind out to 2030 instead of relying on gas-fired generation, this would increase its annual GDP by £20bn by 2030, create 70,000 more net jobs, reduce UK gas imports by £8bn/year and produce power sector emissions that would be 3 times lower by 2030. These potential economic benefits, which require a long-term and supportive policy framework to materialise, should also be seen in the light of recent research by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), which suggests that a 2030 decarbonisation target would not result in higher domestic electricity bills in 2030 and would play a key role in reducing their volatility34.

23. The negative political dynamic triggered by the scheduled review of the Fourth Carbon Budget has also resulted in the Government deciding in December 2012 to postpone a decision 30 See in particular the joint statement from 40 organisations covered in the Financial Times’ article “Companies call for carbon-free power” of 20th February 2013 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/29d87c3e-7aad-11e2-915b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2LKjLgdUO and a recent letter from leading international manufacturing companies covered in the Times on 11th March: http://www.vestas.com/Files/Filer/EN/FINAL_Industry_letter_-_2030_target_-_7_March_2013.pdf 31 Fourth Carbon Budget report, pages 40-41. 32 Letter to UK Government from Mitsubishi, Gamesa, Vestas, Alstom, Areva and Doosan dated 7 March 2013: http://bit.ly/ZCQcd7 33 ‘Colour of Growth’, CBI, July 2012: http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/1552876/energy_climatechangerpt_web.pdf. The report also showed how “without green business the trade deficit in 2014/2015 would be around double current government projections” and that a supportive policy environment “could boost the UK’s economy by almost £20 billion by 2014/2015”. 34 ‘Energy Pathways to 2030: An Overview of choices for the Government’, IPPR, March 2013: http://www.slideshare.net/ippr/target-2030-presentation-22-feb13

16

on whether to include international aviation and shipping emissions in the carbon budgets until 201635. This not only undermines the importance that the UK government gives to its commitments under the Climate Change Act but also sends a damaging signal at a critical time where international efforts are trying to influence the adoption of an assembly resolution within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to develop a market-based mechanism to tackle fast growing global aviation emissions.

24. Recommendations: WWF-UK therefore urges the Government to avoid unnecessary and damaging delay, and take the following actions in the very near future:

• fully adopt the emission reduction recommendations of the CCC with respect to the Fourth Carbon Budget;

• set a decarbonisation target in the Energy Bill in line with the CCC’s recommendations; and

• accept the inclusion of the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping emissions in the carbon budgets.

The Government’s lack of progress on tightening up the second and third interim carbon budgets will undermine the UK’s ability to meet the Fourth Carbon Budget recommendations

25. The Environmental Audit Committee noted in its previous report that the Government had rejected other important recommendations from the CCC in 2011, most notably “on making the second and third carbon budgets consistent with the pace of emissions reductions required by the fourth budget”. There has been no movement on the Government’s position on this issue and the emission reduction ambitions for the UK’s non-traded sector (i.e. emissions from sectors of the UK economy that are not covered by the EU ETS) are still set at the levels of the ‘interim’ second and third carbon budgets as opposed to the higher levels set out in the ‘intended’ budgets recommended by the CCC.

26. The continued failure to endorse the CCC’s recommendations on the second and third carbon budgets will make it harder than necessary for the UK to meet the emission cuts recommended in the Fourth Carbon Budget: “the [Fourth] Domestic Action budget recommended for 2023-2027, and the indicative 2030 target, will be difficult to achieve unless the UK enters the 2020s at a level of emissions consistent with the Intended budgets for the non-traded sector, rather than with the less ambitious Interim budgets.”36 As the CCC further points out, “from the third Intended budget to the fourth Domestic Action budget would entail a feasible reduction of 13% over a five-year period: from the third Interim budget to the fourth Domestic Action budget would require a much more challenging 23% reduction.”37

27. As explained above, the insufficient emission reduction ambitions set in the ‘interim’ second and third carbon budgets sit in a context where the CCC’s Fourth Carbon budget recommendations themselves amount to the “absolute minimum” domestic action required of the UK to stay on track for delivering the 2050 emission reduction goal set in the Climate Change Act. In turn, the ambitions of the Climate Change Act amount to the minimum action required of the UK to play its part in a global effort to prevent global average temperature rises in excess of 2ºC.

35 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-carbon-budgets-and-the-2050-target-international-aviation-and-shipping-emissions 36 Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 12. 37 Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 31.

17

28. Recommendations: WWF-UK therefore urges the Government to adopt as soon as possible the CCC’s recommendations with respect to tightening the emission reduction ambitions for the UK’s non-traded sector up to the ‘intended’ levels of the second and third carbon budgets.

Energy intensive industries: the need for transparent and proportionate compensation criteria

29. The Environmental Audit Committee recommended in its previous report that “a comprehensive and robust assessment of the actual risk to each sector affected, on a case by case basis, should be made by departments working in concert” and that “measures to help energy intensive industries must be fair and tailored to each sector affected and should keep a strong incentive to reduce emissions.” 38

30. In its recent analysis on the impact of climate and energy policies on energy bills39, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) estimated that current policies would add between 1% to 14% to the energy bills of energy intensive companies (EIUs) in 2013, with the projected impact of these policies increasing to between +6% to +30% by 2020 and to between +13% to + 60% by 203040. The extent to which EIUs are exposed to bill increases arising out of climate and energy policies varies on a case by case basis depending on the share of a site’s gas and electricity use, whether it has onsite combined heat and power generation capabilities (which are often exempt from the cost of climate and energy policies) and the extent to which production processes can be made more efficient. Importantly, the figures above also do not consider the impact of measures that are being considered by DECC to reduce the transitional impact of the EU ETS, the UK’s carbon floor price (CFP) and the introduction of contracts for differences (CfDs) to support the deployment of low-carbon generation.

31. Before looking at the case for compensating EIUs, it is important to put the impacts highlighted above in context. First, EIUs are defined by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) as companies where energy costs account for at least 10% of their gross value added. Whilst they play an important role in the UK economy, these companies are deemed to represent around 4% of the UK’s total gross value added and around 2% of the UK’s workforce. Second, for the majority of UK businesses, the impact of climate and energy policies on their overall costs is expected to be minimal as energy represents only a small fraction of their costs. DECC estimates for instance that energy represents on average less than 3% of the total business costs of the UK’s manufacturing sector and that therefore climate and energy policies are currently adding less than 1% to the total business costs in that sector41. In its recent report on Household Bill Impacts, the CCC also found that low-carbon policies would add, by 2020, one penny in every £10 spent in the UK commercial sector and six pence in every £10 spent in the UK’s manufacturing sector42.

32. We agree that the risks to UK-based EIUs’ competitiveness should be taken seriously. However, it is important to note that the £250 million compensation fund that was announced by Government for this Spending Review period to protect EIUs against the costs of the EU ETS

38 ‘Carbon Budgets Inquiry’, Environmental Audit Committee, October 2011: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/carbon-budgets/ 39 ‘Estimated Impacts of Climate and Energy Policies on Energy Prices and Bills’, Department of Energy and Climate Change, March 2013: https://www.gov.uk/policy-impacts-on-prices-and-bills 40 DECC Bill Impact Document – paragraphs 25 to 27. 41 DECC Bill Impact Document – paragraphs 23 and 24. 42 Energy Prices and Bills – impacts of meeting carbon budgets, the Committee on Climate Change (December 2012): http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1672_CCC_Energy-Bills_bookmarked.pdf

18

and the CFP were found by the CCC in its recent Competitiveness Risks report43 to provide adequate protection to EIUs for the period running up to 2020. As explained in the CCC’s report, impacts on EIUs for the 2020 to 2030 period is less certain but DECC announced in November 2012 that it was considering exempting some EIUs from additional costs arising from the introduction of CfDs “where these have a significant impact on their competitiveness” (Para 124).

33. It is important that when developing these policies, the UK Government develops transparent and meaningful criteria that will ensure that only those firms genuinely at risk of ‘carbon leakage’ (the phenomenon whereby industrial relocation shifts greenhouse gas emissions to a different jurisdiction) will receive a level of financial support proportionate to the identified detrimental impact caused by climate and/or energy policies.

34. The risk of over-compensating some industries is a very real one as the latest developments in Germany illustrate. According to a recent report from Arepo Consult44, the lack of clear criteria in German legislation to determine whether a firm is genuinely at risk of a loss of competitiveness has resulted in 75% of electricity use from the industrial and agricultural sector receiving varying degrees of compensation. The total amount of compensation provided to these sectors amounted to some €9.1bn in 2012 alone, which the report suggests is significantly out of proportion with the actual impact of climate and energy policies on German industry and is unnecessarily increasing costs for domestic consumers in Germany.

35. A recent report from CE Delft also suggests that the criteria developed by the European Union in 2009 to assess the risk of carbon leakage caused by the EU ETS are far too lax and are resulting in far more firms and sectors receiving compensation (in the form of free carbon allowances) under the scheme than should be the case. The criteria developed in 2009 were based in particular on the assumption that the carbon price in the EU would reach €30 by 2020 (it is now unlikely to exceed €12 by that date) and that carbon emissions from the sectors identified as at risk of carbon leakage would exceed their free allocation of carbon allowances by some 60% (a figure of 20% now seems more likely). As a result, CE Delft argues that “if the 2009 allocation had been based on more realistic assumptions, the sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage would have fallen from the current 60% of sectors representing 95% of industrial emissions, to a mere 33% of sectors accounting for only 10% of emissions.” 45 46

36. Concerns over the robustness of EU criteria to assess carbon leakage are important in the context of this inquiry given that they are influencing the proposals that are being developed in the UK to compensate EIUs for the indirect costs of the EU ETS, the CFP and (potentially) the introduction of CfDs. A recent consultation response from the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the

43 ‘Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks’, Committee on Climate Change, April 2013, see page 10: http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/carbon-footprint-and-competitiveness/ 44 ‘Befreiungen der energieentensiven Industrie in Deutschland von Energieabgaben’, Arepo Consult, March 2012: http://www.arepoconsult.com/index.php?id=46 45 ‘Carbon leakage and the future of the EU ETS’, CE Delft, April 2013: http://www.cedelft.eu/news/273/Carbon_leakage_discussion_may_hold_key_to_reform_of_the_EU_ETS/?PHPSESSID=5b6fec871557481897365d90c3d152f6 46 See also Sandbag’s ‘Losing the Lead?’ report (July 2012), which showed that as at the end of 2012, the EU ETS cap was “carrying over a year’s more allowances than was originally bargained for” and that out of 392 million tonnes of excess carbon permits carried in the scheme as at the end of 2011, “78% of this is made up of surplus free allocations awarded to just ten steel and cement companies”: www.sandbag.org.uk/reports, page 11.

19

Environment47 expressed concern that the UK proposals to focus on a sector’s ‘carbon intensity’ and ‘trade intensity’ as a means of identifying risks of carbon leakage were likely to give rise to over-compensation.

37. Based on a report from the Centre for Economic Performance48, which interviewed the managers of 761 manufacturing firms in six European countries to analyse the effectiveness of the EU’s carbon leakage criteria under the EU ETS, the response recommended that the following issues should be taken into account when developing carbon leakage criteria in the UK:

• “The large heterogeneity among firms in terms of relocation risk suggests that further efficiency gains could be reaped by providing compensation at the firm level, rather than at sector level” 49;

• With the exception of those firms carrying out high levels of trade with emerging economies such as China, trade intensity (the share of exports with third countries in a company’s gross value added) was a poor indicator of vulnerability on its own. The report from the Centre for Economic Performance (which made the following observation from an EU rather than UK perspective) found in particular that “by not exempting trade intensive sectors but the ones that are at least moderately carbon intensive as well, European governments could raise additional auction revenue in the order of €6.7 billion every year”. The report also argued that a change in the definition of the trade intensity criterion in the EU that focused more on a sector’s intensity of trade with emerging economies such as China “would raise an additional €2.8 billion in auction revenues per year.”50

• In order to minimise job losses and prevent an unequal distribution of compensation awarded to different industries, compensation criteria should take into account the size of a firm’s workforce.

38. Whilst the UK’s proposed criteria to compensate UK EIUs for the introduction of the CFP (which results in UK EIUs paying a higher carbon price than their European competitors especially pending a structural reform of the EU ETS) includes both a trade intensity criteria and a carbon intensity criteria, the consultation response from the Grantham Research Institute considers that the proposed threshold for trade exposure for UK EIUs (10%) may be too low and may need to be reviewed upwards.

39. Finally, it is important that UK policy recognises that ambitious climate and energy policy represents an important opportunity for the UK’s energy intensive sector, not just a cost. The most recent figures published by BIS show that the UK low-carbon and environmental goods and services sector had sales of £122.2bn in 2010-2011, growing 4.7%

47 ‘Response to the Consultation on Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme’, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, December 2012 48 ‘CFP Discussion Paper No 1150, Industry Compensation Under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’, Centre for Economic Performance, June 2012: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=4071 49 See Consultation Response, page 4. 50 See page 4 from the report from the Centre for Economic Performance. The report suggests in particular that a restricted compensation package awarded only to the following categories of firms would be cost-effective and have minimal impacts on the risk of carbon leakage: (i) sectors with a high carbon intensity (above 30% of its gross value added), (ii) sectors with high trade intensity (above 30% of its gross value added) and moderate carbon intensity (above 5% of gross value added) and (iii) sectors with high trade intensity (above 30% of gross value added) with emerging economies such as China.

20

from the previous year and placing the UK sixth in the global league table. As highlighted above, a recent report from the CBI also found that the UK’s “green business” could have the country’s trade deficit by 2014/1551. Ambitious domestic climate and energy policies can therefore create a significant market for UK-based energy intensive companies to support the necessary deployment of low-carbon energy supply and energy efficiency infrastructure. This issue, which was recognised in a recent joint report from the TUC and the Energy Intensive Users Group52 and a report from the manufacturers’ association EEF53, should play an important role in the way the UK develops its overall policy towards EIUs.

40. Recommendations: Risks to the competitiveness of UK-based energy intensive companies arising from climate and energy policies should be taken seriously. However, WWF-UK urges the UK Government to avoid the risk of over-compensating some industries by developing meaningful and transparent eligibility criteria as described above. In addition, UK policy on EIUs should recognise that climate and energy policies provide a unique economic opportunity for these companies.

What should be the role of consumption emissions?

41. Following the Environmental Audit Committee’s previous report on carbon budgets, an inquiry by the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee concluded in April 2012 that the UK’s consumption related carbon emissions, which rose by 20% from 1990 to 2009 according to the Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), should be incorporated alongside the UK’s territorial emissions in the policy making process54. As made clear in our submission to that inquiry, WWF-UK agrees with these conclusions but would stress that the conventional production-based approach to emissions accounting and regulation is a well-established and powerful tool to guide the transition to a low-carbon economy in the UK – notably in ensuring that we make a well-managed transition always from fossil fuel dependency.

42. This point was reinforced in the CCC’s latest study on Competitiveness Risks, which stressed in particular that “moving to a consumption-based accounting methodology would be disruptive and impractical given international accounting conventions (which are based on territorial emissions and aim to avoid double counting) and uncertainties over measuring and projecting consumption emissions”55 . The CCC also noted that there were fewer UK policy levers that could be used to reduce imported emissions. Therefore, consumption-based emissions should be taken into account alongside (but not replace) production emissions as part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce the UK’s overall contribution to climate change.

III. What should the Government response be to the CCC’s 2013 progress report and should the carbon budgets should be relaxed?

51 Colour of Growth, CBI, July 2012: http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/1552876/energy_climatechangerpt_web.pdf 52 ‘Building our Low-Carbon Industries’, TUC in association with the Energy Intensive Users’ Group, June 2012: http://www.eef.org.uk/publications/reports/Tech-for-Growth-Delivering-green-growth-through-technology.htm 53 ‘Tech for Growth: Delivering Green Growth Through Technology’, EEF, January 2013: http://www.eef.org.uk/publications/reports/Tech-for-Growth-Delivering-green-growth-through-technology.htm 54 ‘Consumptions-Based Emissions Reporting, Twelfth Report of Session 2010-2012’, Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, March 2012: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/1646/164604.htm 55 ‘Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks’, Committee on Climate Change, April 2013, page 13: http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/carbon-footprint-and-competitiveness/

21

43. As explained in response to question I above, the latest climate change science and economic evidence strongly suggests that the UK Government should follow the CCC’s latest recommendations and should not relax the existing and proposed carbon budgets.

44. In the context of the Fourth Carbon Budget (2023-2027), the CCC made clear that the budget could be delivered at a manageable economic cost representing less than 1% of UK GDP by 2025 (with additional costs in the region of 0.1% of UK GDP if the CCC’s more ambitious global emissions reduction offering was adopted). However, the CCC also rightly warned that “planning for a lower level of ambition would carry three risks. It could result in investment in carbon-intensive assets in the period to 2020 which, while compatible with meeting the first three budgets, would impede further progress in the 2020s. It could fail to develop adequately technologies that will be required in the 2020s. It could also fail to put appropriate policies in place far enough in advance of the fourth budget, resulting in limited investments with long lead times and limited supply chain expansion. It could therefore necessitate scrapping of high-carbon assets and/or the purchase of high-cost carbon credits in the 2020s.”56

45. The review of the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2014 provides the Government with an important opportunity to redress the climate of investment uncertainty which has resulted from two years of Government divisions (often displayed in the media) on the future of the UK’s climate and energy policy and to ensure that the importance of the Climate Change Act on policy making is fully understood in departments across Whitehall.

46. To date, there has been one major legal challenge involving the Climate Change Act – the landmark Heathrow Judicial Review of March 2010. This case made clear that some Government departments – in this case the Department for Transport – had yet to take on board the full implications of the Act in their decisions and approach to policy making. It is an open question whether the lessons from this case have been fully absorbed across Whitehall.

47. In the Heathrow case, the judge ruled that the former Government’s entire aviation policy needed to be changed to ensure that it was consistent with the Climate Change Act. Making aviation policy decisions (such as the decision to expand Heathrow) without making reference to climate change developments – and the Act in particular – was deemed “untenable in law and common sense”. It is very likely it would be even more untenable for the UK Government to make future decisions on other policy areas on the same basis.

13 May 2013

56 Fourth Carbon Budget Report, page 23.

22

Written evidence submitted by RWDE npower Summary

1. We believe that the Carbon Budgets are important but Government needs to be clear what is necessary to achieve the level of ambition set by the targets. It is important to separate out issues around decarbonisation of the electricity sector and what will be needed to meet the emissions reductions set by the fourth carbon budget.

2. The key steps for achieving UK carbon budgets are to;

• Agree EU wide carbon reduction targets and strengthen the EU ETS for the

traded sector, • Focus on emissions reductions in the non-EU ETS sectors to deliver UK carbon

budgets, • Recognise the benefits from moving energy use from the non-EU ETS sectors

to the capped ETS sector (eg electrification of heating and transport). Are the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act still valid?

3. The reduction targets in the Climate Change Act of an 80% reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050 compared with 1990 levels is consistent with the EU policy goals set out in the Energy Road Map 2050. We believe that it is important that Europe should now agree a long-term binding carbon target with intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040. The UK target should take into account interactions with European targets and we would expect the reduction targets as set out in the Climate Change Act to be broadly consistent with future European targets.

Operation and Management of the Carbon Budgets

4. We are concerned that in discussing carbon budgets there seems to be a lack of understanding around the principles used for carbon accounting in relation to reporting against targets. In reporting emissions reductions against all of its targets, the UK takes account of emissions trading through the flexible mechanisms defined by the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol. In particular this reporting takes account of trading under the EU ETS. Taking emissions trading into account within the context of the UK’s reported emissions, affects the results by increasing (or decreasing) the level of emissions by the amount of EU ETS allowances sold (or bought) in a year such that the amount reported against the ‘traded sector’ part of the UK Carbon Budgets always equates to the UK share of the overall EUETS cap and not the total emissions from these sectors.

5. The interaction between Carbon Budgets and the EU ETS needs to be made

clearer. While the EU ETS is in place, any emissions reductions from the sectors in the EU ETS will be constrained by the overall level of the EU ETS

23

cap. Hence the UK’s carbon budgets are linked to the ambition of EU ETS carbon targets and the UK’s pro rata share of the overall cap. The only ways to break this link (assuming the UK continues to be part of Europe and/or the EU ETS) would be for the UK Government to choose not to auction a part of its allocation of EU ETS allowances or to buy and cancel allowances from the scheme.

6. The announcement of this current inquiry talked about the possibility of whether

the fourth carbon budget should be relaxed in light of a weak EU ETS carbon price. However, it is not the carbon price but the level of the EU ETS cap that will impact on meeting the UK carbon budgets – if the EU cap remains as it is the only way for the UK to achieve its carbon budgets is through greater reductions in the non-EUETS sectors (particularly heat and transport). Clearly there is a link between the cap and carbon prices but this just underlines the need for Europe to agree on long term carbon targets and revisions to the EU ETS caps.

7. As an example to illustrate this point, it is worth considering a situation where

the UK has completely decarbonised electricity generation by 2025. In this case although the actual emissions from the sector would be 0 the emissions reported against carbon budgets, according to the Carbon Accounting Regulations (2009)1, are estimated at around 120 MtCO2 (based on 2010 emissions from power stations and following the current EU ETS trajectory for the reduction in the overall cap).

8. If the link between carbon budgets and the EU ETS is not recognised the

debate on carbon budgets will continue to be confused by discussion around decarbonisation of the electricity sector. While decarbonisation of electricity is clearly central to meeting carbon reductions in the long term, unless this decarbonisation also happens at a European level, it will have no impact on achieving UK Carbon Budgets given the over arching nature of EU ETS targets.

9. It is important to separate out the issues around decarbonisation of the

electricity sector and what is needed to meet the fourth Carbon Budget.

10. The cap for the traded sector that is needed for consistency with the fourth Carbon Budget is calculated by the Committee on Climate Change to be 690 Mt (over the 5 year period). If there is no revision to the current EU ETS trajectory the actual cap for the sector is estimated to be around 890 MtCO2 over the same period. The key issue is therefore how to achieve this additional 200 MtCO2 reduction over the period 2023-2027.

11. The important steps for achieving UK budgets are to;

• Agree EU wide carbon reduction targets and strengthening the EU ETS for the

traded sector

1 Guidance on carbon accounting and the net UK carbon account DECC December 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121205174605/http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/Carbon%20Accounting/1_20091211101501_e_@@_guidancecarbonaccounting.pdf

24

• Focus on emissions reductions in the non-ETS sectors to deliver UK carbon budgets

• Recognise the benefits from moving energy use from the non-ETS sectors to the capped ETS sector (eg electrification of heating and transport). As an example DEFRA’s2 greenhouse gas reporting guidelines (which may be used by listed companies reporting under the Climate Change Act requirements to report greenhouse gas emissions) do not currently give any recognition to these carbon benefits from electrification.

Government’s response to the Committee on Climate Change June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance

12. The focus for the June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance should be on the non-traded sector and progress towards meeting reductions in emissions from heat and transport.

13. For the traded sector the focus must be on progress towards agreement of

future targets at EU level. In particular Government should set out progress and timescales for agreement on the 2030 energy and climate change package and structural reform to the EU ETS and what actions it is taking across Europe to deliver this.

16 May 2013

2 DEFRA Guidance on how to measure and report your greenhouse gas emissions https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-how-to-measure-and-report-your-greenhouse-gas-emissions

25

Written evidence submitted by the Government

Summary

The Government welcomes this opportunity to respond to the Environmental Audit Committee’s follow-up inquiry into progress on carbon budgets.

The Government believes that the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act are still an appropriate UK contribution to a global effort to avoid dangerous climate change.

The Government believes that a legally binding global deal would provide the best opportunity of keeping the global temperature increase below 2°C. The challenge and complexity of climate negotiations and the need for a shift of political conditions makes it vitally important that the UK is able to influence and encourage others to take action. The Climate Change Act in its current form enables us to do this.

The Act also provides a robust framework of interim milestones through carbon budgets and an effective system of legal accountability. The Committee on Climate Change report annually on the Government’s progress against carbon budgets and updated annual projections provide a forward look of sector-specific emissions savings.

Meeting the carbon budgets is a cross-Government endeavour, reliant on the actions of all Departments, but in particular 6 key Departments which lead on the majority of policies that affect emissions1. The National Emissions Target (NET) Board is the principal governance mechanism for co-coordinating action across Government and ensuring that departments are accountable for their share of emissions reductions.

We maintain that it was the right decision to abandon Departmental Carbon Budgets (DCBs). The DCBs pilot revealed that departments did not feel able to influence the sector emissions they were held accountable for, and as a result the approach lacked credibility across Whitehall. This is in contrast to the collaborative approach underpinning the current carbon budget management framework which gives departments the freedom to come forward and agree on future cost-effective abatement measures.

We are unable to comment on the Government’s likely response to the CCC’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance assessment. As a body independent of Government, the CCC is not obliged to share its report before publication.

1 The Departments of Energy and Climate Change; Communities and Local Government; Business, Innovation and Skills; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Transport and HM Treasury

26

Inquiry foci

In the light of current climate change assessments, whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act (which underpin the UK Carbon Budgets) are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous global climate change; and if not, whether the Act and/or the Carbon Budgets should be revised

1. Global average surface temperatures have risen by approximately 0.8°C since around 1900, with most of that warming happening in the last 50 years. This long-term rise in temperature is continuing, though more slowly over recent years; 2001 to 2010 was by far the warmest ten year period in the instrumental record, going back to 1850.

2. To avoid the worst effects of climate change, we need to keep global temperature rises to below 2°C. In order to achieve this, urgent action is required to cut global emissions further. At best, the current emissions reductions that have been pledged will only deliver us half the required action to achieve this goal.

3. The 2012 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap report makes clear that meeting this objective is still technically achievable. While acknowledging that existing levels of global mitigation ambition are not enough to put us on a cost-effective 2°C trajectory, it indicates that there is still more than enough global emissions reduction potential to reduce emissions levels by 2020 that would be consistent with 2°C. However, realising this potential will require the political will across all countries to step up action.

4. The global 2°C goal was agreed at the UN Conference of the Parties in Cancun in 2010. The emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act reflect the Committee on Climate Change’s (CCC) views of an appropriate UK contribution to global mitigation action. To remain in line with the effort the UK might be expected to make, the Government accepted the advice received from the CCC on 1 December 2008, and made a statutory commitment to reduce emissions by at least 80% by 2050 relative to a 1990 baseline.

5. The Climate Act gives the UK a solid base on which to push for increased ambition internationally; leveraging greater impact than we would achieve alone.

6. The 80% target in the Climate Change Act demonstrates the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change and taking responsibility for its share of emissions, which will help to maintain our leadership and influence in the international climate change negotiating process. The UK contributes only around 1.2%2 of global emissions, so we need to encourage action from others. The Climate Change Act and the Carbon Plan show UK leadership, making us a credible negotiator, and provides a compelling example to other countries, some of whom are taking forward their own climate legislation based on the UK’s experience.

2 2010 figures from EDGAR database, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php

27

7. The Climate Change Act is structured to provide a degree of flexibility, setting a framework to motivate and enable policy action without being too prescriptive about how the framework should be applied. This is required to address the inherent unpredictability around future emissions projections and to ensure that mitigation is not unnecessarily costly. In this vein, the Climate Change Act allows for a carbon budget level to be amended if it appears to Government that there have been significant changes affecting the basis on which the previous decision was made.

8. We are committed to reviewing the fourth carbon budget in 2014 to ascertain whether the basis on which the budget was calculated has significantly changed. If at that point our domestic commitments place us on a different emissions trajectory than the EU ETS trajectory agreed by the EU, we will, as appropriate, revise up our budget to align it with the actual EU trajectory. In line with the Coalition Agreement, Government will continue to argue for the EU move to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020.

The operation and management of the Carbon Budgets, including: the accountability and governance arrangements, and the extent to which the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations have been addressed; the

effectiveness of the overall management system, including for meeting carbon budgets by sector; and the current status, operation and impact of the National Emissions Target Board.

9. The Climate Change Act provides for an effective system of legal accountability. Each year in June the independent Committee on Climate Change publishes a report in which it scrutinises Government's progress on meeting carbon budgets. The Government has to lay before Parliament by 15 October each year a response to the points raised by the Committee. The Climate Change Act also requires the government to publish an annual statement of emissions and to produce a report on policies after a new budget has been set. The annual statement of emissions for 2011 was published on 25 March 20133.

10. The Climate Change Act requires that carbon budgets are set by certain specified deadlines. The first, second, third and fourth carbon budgets have been set. The Carbon Plan sets out progress and policies in place to meet our first three carbon budgets and scenarios for meeting the fourth carbon budget. It articulates the Government’s vision to 2050 to achieve the 80% reduction target and outlines shorter-term actions the Government commits to undertake and key milestones to keep us on track to delivering our climate change goals. It includes a detailed carbon budgets annex which sets out the emissions savings expected from climate and energy policies. The Carbon Plan also included details of specific actions and milestones that would be undertaken by individual Government Departments.

11. Sector specific policy emissions savings are published annually each October in the energy and emissions projections. These projections take into account the estimated impact of government policies and proposals announced to

3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-statement-of-emissions-for-2011

28

date. They suggest that the UK will meet its first three legislated carbon budgets but that existing policies will not be sufficient to deliver the savings required by the fourth carbon budget4. The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, and 71 MtCO₂e respectively on central forecasts5. The projections are an important tool for guiding our efforts to ensure the carbon budgets are met. As a result, the government is working hard to develop policy options and bridge the projected shortfall over the fourth carbon budget. The Carbon Plan set out scenarios for what action might be required to do this, recognising that Government did not yet have detailed policies agreed for a period that far in the future.

12. Our ability to meet the carbon budgets relies on actions from the whole of Government, but in particular the six Departments that lead on reducing emissions6. We have a robust carbon management (CBM) framework in place to ensure that all policies and enabling actions are sufficiently ambitious and that government departments are held to account. This is primarily delivered through collaborative discussion and analysis with other government departments. Estimated policy emissions savings provided by departments enable progress to be tracked and risks to be monitored. The Government also reports on progress against the actions in the Carbon Plan on a quarterly basis via the No.10 website.

13. The principal governance mechanism of the CBM framework is the National Emissions Target (NET) Board. The Board provides senior oversight of carbon budgets and national climate change policy. Chaired by the SRO for carbon budgets within DECC, membership includes the Directors General for the six key Departments and the Cabinet Office (the Departmental SROs). Specifically, the Board aims to: • Provide senior level oversight of carbon budget management across

Whitehall including ensuring legislative requirements are met; • Monitor cross-Government performance against carbon budgets; • Ensure policies to deliver carbon budgets are identified and delivered,

and to challenge policies that could potentially make budgets harder to meet;

• Consider broader policy on carbon budgets e.g. cost-effectiveness of meeting budgets, balance of policy tools, setting of future budgets, tackling aviation and shipping, financial penalties;

• Be closely plugged into the decision-making process and being an ambassador for Government action on climate change.

It also considers implications of carbon budget policy on other Government priority issues and provides a connection to discussions on international climate change and energy. The Board meets on a biannual basis.

4 The latest projections suggest the UK is on track to meet its first three budgets with current planned policies. The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, and 71 MtCO2e respectively on central forecasts. Based on current planned policies there is an expected shortfall of 205 MtCO2e over the fourth budget reflecting the fact that detailed policy mechanisms have yet to be developed so far into the future. 5 GHG national statistics release 2011 6 These are: the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury, the Department of Energy and Climate Change, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Transport and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

29

14. The NET Board provides a forum for discussion at a senior level enabling action to be collectively agreed and ensuring an appropriate level of oversight. The NET Board takes a particularly active role at key decision points, and for example provided cross-Government scrutiny and sign-off of the analysis and scenarios that underpinned the Carbon Plan, following their development by the working level Carbon Budgets Analysts Group, which brings together the analytical community across Government Departments. Given the expected difficulties in meeting carbon budget four, recent NET Board discussions have focused on identifying and reviewing the main risks to meeting the fourth carbon budget, in particular in buildings (heat), transport, power and industry. At its last meeting, in April 2013, the NET Board considered a “deep dive” analysis of the buildings sector, which examined the scale of action required, what would be delivered by existing policy, and the main barriers to additional deployment of relevant measures.

15. A biannual carbon scorecard is used by NET Board to manage performance. This shows progress against the carbon budgets and key sectoral trends in historical and projected emissions. Where possible, the scorecard also shows progress made in key policy areas against targeted levels and scenarios put forward in the Carbon Plan, and progress and trajectories for deployment of significant technologies.

16. We maintain that it was the right decision to abandon Departmental Carbon Budgets (DCBs). The DCBs pilot revealed that departments did not feel able to influence the sector emissions they were held accountable for, and as a result the approach lacked credibility across Whitehall. This is in contrast to the collaborative approach underpinning the current CBM framework which gives departments the freedom to come forward and agree on future cost-effective abatement measures.

17. The Government has made progress in addressing the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations.7 We have updated our response in regard to the following recommendations: Recommendation 5. The Government's proposed review of the carbon budgets in 2014 may ease the carbon budgets if the EU Emissions Trading System puts too much pressure for emissions reductions on the 'non-traded sector. In the meantime, the developing science and international dialogue is building the case for seeking more ambitious emissions reductions, not less. The latest projections suggest the UK is on track to meet its first three budgets with current planned policies. The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, and 71 MtCO₂e respectively on central forecasts8. Under the Climate Change Act, emissions reductions by the UK’s industrial and power sectors are determined by the UK’s share of the EU Emissions Trading System cap. That protects the UK industrial and power sectors from exceeding EU requirements. However, if the EU ETS cap is insufficiently

7 See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf 8 GHG national statistics release 2011

30

ambitious, disproportionate strain could be placed on sectors outside the EU ET such as transport. To overcome that problem and to provide clearer signals for businesses and investors, the Government will review progress towards the EU emissions goal in early 2014. If at that point our domestic commitments place us on a different trajectory from the one agreed by our partners in the EU under the EU ETS, we will revise up our budget as appropriate to align it with the actual EU trajectory. There is strong scientific evidence that the Earth’s climate is changing – global average temperatures continue to rise decade-on-decade. This consistent picture comes from several independent datasets. The scientific evidence for recent global warming is robust and continues to strengthen each year, and it is likely that most of this warming is largely a result of greenhouse gas emissions due to human activity; and without action, there is a high risk of global warming well beyond a 2°C increase over pre-industrial temperatures, with significant adverse impacts on human society and the natural world. We are already seeing the global, regional, and local impacts of rising temperatures and we now know from attribution studies that the chances of certain extreme weather events have already increased because of human greenhouse gas emissions. For example, research by UK scientists has shown it is very likely that human influence has more than doubled the probability of an extreme European hot summer like that of 2003, which caused up to 35,000 excess deaths9, and that such events are very likely to become commonplace in as little as 40 years10. Likewise, recent attribution work into the devastating UK floods in autumn 2000, which cost the UK insurance industry £1.3 billion11, has indicated that 20th century anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions significantly increased England and Wales flood risk, roughly doubling the chance of that extreme event happening now compared to a century ago12. Taking sufficient action globally to bring us back on track to meeting the 2°C goal to avoid the worst effects of climate change becomes more difficult and costly every year we delay action. Emissions need to peak as soon as possible - almost certainly before 2020 - and decline steeply thereafter in order to meet this goal. Current global emission reduction pledges at best get us less than halfway to this goal, so there is an urgent need for significant additional action. The UK is continuing to press for increased action at the international level and considers that the best chance of securing that is through a legally binding global agreement under the UNFCCC. Recommendation 6. To improve transparency, in future carbon budget-setting rounds the Government should systematically respond to each recommendation made by the Committee on Climate Change, including any which address other actions needed to deliver the budgets.

9 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent: World Disasters Report www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004/chapter2.asp 10 Stott, P. A. et al. Nature 432, 610–614 (2004) 11 Association of British Insurers, Flooding: A Partnership Approach to Protecting People, Page 2 http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/Flooding_A_Partnership_Approach_to_Protecting_People1.aspx 12 P, Aina, T., Stone, D.A., Stott P.A., Nozawa, T., Hilbert, A.G.J., Lohmann, D., Allen, M.R. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to flood risk in England and Wales in autumn 2000. Nature, doi:10.1038/nature09762, 2011.

31

There have been no further carbon-budget setting rounds since the previous EAC inquiry. The next carbon-budget setting round will be in 2016 to agree the level of the fifth carbon budget. Government will take into account the advice of the CCC at the time of taking final decisions. Recommendation 10. We do not share the Secretary of State's reluctance for monitoring consumption emissions. Monitoring UK emissions on a consumption basis would facilitate a more rigorous approach to controlling our contribution The Government should request the Committee on Climate Change to review the scope for measuring emissions on such a basis and how that might be worked into the carbon budgets regime, if necessary to complement the continuing production-based reporting needed internationally. Since the last EAC inquiry, the Government has taken steps to increase the transparency of the emissions reporting process and published, on 18 October 2012, new guidance (‘Alternative approaches to reporting UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions’) on the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s website. This guidance explains why the Government uses different approaches for reporting greenhouse gas estimates and details a comparison of the different methodologies used. The Government is also working closely with the Committee on Climate Change to determine how we might, in the future, take better account of consumption-based emissions in the policy making process. In December 2012, the Government commissioned the Committee on Climate Change to provide analysis of:

Estimates of past and current consumption emissions;

Possible pathways for UK consumption emissions towards 2050;

Data/methodological issues around establishing consumption emissions;

Priority technologies/products in terms of UK consumption emissions;

The merits of a two stage approach for monitoring consumption based emissions - in which input-output data is supplemented with life cycle analysis data for specific priority product groups; and

Implications of current and future consumption emission trends on the design of existing and future policies, but not including the framework of carbon budgets, which we believe should remain as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008.

The CCC published the results of their analysis on 24 April 2013 in Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitive risks13. In this report, the CCC recommended that we retain a territorial basis for emission reductions, stating that ‘it remains appropriate to account for carbon budgets on the basis of production emissions given accounting conventions and available policy levers. However, consumption emissions should be monitored to check whether these are falling in line with global action required to achieve the climate objective, or whether further action is required’. The CCC further noted the importance of securing a global deal as the most effective way of reducing

13 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C-Summary-Rep-web1.pdf

32

imported emissions: ‘there is a need for a global deal to substantially cut global emissions over the next decades and achieve the climate objective, as a consequence of which the UK’s carbon footprint would fall’. The Government agrees with this position. Recommendation 16. We welcome the commitment to set out an approach for monitoring emissions reductions at a local level, reflecting local circumstances and potential for emission reductions. A voluntary approach will not be enough, however, to ensure that all local authorities make a full contribution to emissions reduction. Local authorities should be required to set emission reductions targets. The Government should task the Committee on Climate Change with supporting local authorities in setting such targets, and the Committee should be charged with monitoring progress against those targets. The Government does not agree that local authorities should be required to set mandatory emission reduction targets, for example local carbon budgets. This would be against the Coalition policy of removing burdens and top-down targets on local authorities. There are also significant data and burden issues which would make them difficult to calculate and impose at present. Many local authorities are enthusiastic about playing their part in meeting our carbon mitigation targets and have already set in place stretching ambitions and policies for emissions reductions in their areas. Local authorities that wish to self-impose their own targets (or "budgets") are free to do so. Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between DECC and the Local Government Association (LGA) in March 2011, local authorities are encouraged to set themselves targets for emissions reductions under a new Climate Local initiative launched in June 2012. This initiative succeeds the Nottingham Declaration. The MoU is currently being reviewed by DECC and the LGA, and an updated version will be published shortly. In response to a request from Government the Committee on Climate Change published guidance in May 2012 on what local authorities can do to reduce carbon emissions in their areas. In this report the Committee said it would not be appropriate for local authorities to set (or be set) binding carbon budgets given the multiple drivers of emissions, many of which are beyond their control. There are a number of other initiatives to encourage local authorities to take action to tackle carbon emission in their areas. These include: Local Carbon Frameworks pilot - a £2.5m programme in 2010/11 involving

30 local authorities with the aim of growing capacity. An evaluation and toolkit for the benefit of all local authorities was published on the Energy Saving Trust website in 2011;

Home Energy Conservation Act 199 – see paragraph 17 below. Publishing data on local authority area emissions as National Statistics.

Recommendation 17. An annual review of performance by local authorities should be submitted to Parliament by Ministers, to present as full a picture as possible of emissions reduction performance.

33

The Government has no plans to impose mandatory reporting of performance on local authorities, for the reasons given above. However, the Government has revitalised the Home Energy Conservation Act (HECA) 1995 in England by way of new guidance published in July 2012 requiring LAs to report to the Secretary of State by 31 March 2013 and recommending that their reports explain: i. their local energy efficiency ambitions and priorities; ii. the measures proposed to result in significant energy efficiency

improvements in all residential accommodation in their area; iii. the measures proposed to deliver energy efficiency improvements on an

area based/street by street roll out; and iv. the timeframe for delivery and the national and local partners they are

working with. To provide transparency and accountability LAs are required to publish their HECA reports on their websites. In addition, as stated above, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change signed a MoU with the Local Government Association in March 2011, which sets out how DECC and local government can work together to reduce emissions and help with renewable energy deployment. Under the MoU, councils are invited to declare their energy and climate change ambitions. The new Climate Local initiative (which succeeds the Nottingham Declaration), where local authorities can declare their support for action on climate change and set self-imposed carbon reduction targets, will support councils to make even further inroads into reducing carbon emissions. Recommendation 18. In order to aid transparency and illustrate the contributions that businesses are making, and need to make, to help tackle climate change, we recommend that the Government should introduce mandatory reporting [of emissions] by businesses at the earliest opportunity. Section 85 of the Climate Change Act required the UK Government to introduce regulations requiring the mandatory reporting of GHG emissions information under the Companies Act 2006 by 6th April 2012, or lay a report explaining why this has not happened. Defra laid a report to Parliament in March 2012 explaining that no decision to make regulations had been reached because Ministers were still considering extensive evidence and required some additional time to consider this evidence before coming to a decision. Currently, it is the intention to introduce regulations for all UK quoted companies to report their GHG emissions information in their annual reports, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister at the Rio+20 Summit in June 2012. It is planned that the regulations will come into force on 1st October 2013 and that the regulations will be laid before Parliament, and guidance for quoted companies to assist with complying will be published, in May. Recommendation 19. When setting carbon budgets the Government needs to be mindful that strong action on climate change may result in some production and jobs moving abroad to countries with less

34

stringent policies or carbon-related taxes. Without care, this could harm UK industry and could increase global emissions. A lack of transparency and hard information on the risks to energy intensive industries, and how these should be tackled, need to be resolved to allay fears of lobbying dictating policy. We recognise the importance of policy measures to help energy intensive industries, but before any are introduced a comprehensive and robust assessment of the actual risk to each sector affected, on a case by case basis, should be made. Recommendation 20. Any measures the Government introduce to help energy intensive industries should be fair and tailored to each sector affected, on a case by case basis, reflecting hard evidence on the scale and likelihood of the risk of carbon leakage. Measures should focus on providing incentives to invest in lower carbon infrastructure and should keep a strong incentive to reduce emissions. We appreciate the importance of ensuring any compensation is targeted precisely on those most at risk of carbon leakage; our response to the Committee’s report on the Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme14 sets out what we are doing to do this. In the recently published report Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitive risks15, the CCC note that, ‘our analysis suggests that policies already announced by the Government should be sufficient to address competitiveness risks for energy-intensive industries to 2020. These would continue to be manageable beyond 2020 in a carbon-constrained world where other countries commit to and deliver the emissions cuts required to achieve the climate objective’.

What the Government’s response should be to the Committee on Climate

Change’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance, and

whether the Carbon Budgets should be tightened or relaxed.

18. The CCC is independent of Government and is not obliged to share its report before the date of publication. We are unable to comment on the Government’s likely response to the CCC’s assessment until this time.

16 May 2013

14 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvaud/669/66902.htm 15 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C-Summary-Rep-web1.pdf

35

Written evidence submitted by EDF Energy

Key Points • EDF Energy continues to support the use of Carbon Budgets as important

milestones on the path to meeting the UK’s statutory requirement to reduce its emissions by at least 80% from 1990 levels by 2050.

• Delivering the Government’s Electricity Market Reform (EMR) package will be

a key component in achieving the challenging targets set out in the carbon budgets. We welcome the progress that is being made in the Parliamentary scrutiny of the Energy Bill but we urge that Royal Assent is achieved as soon as possible in 2013 to help provide certainty for investors.

• Gas-fired generation will play an important role in the transition towards a

decarbonised power sector in the 2030s by providing the reliable and flexible backup generation required for balancing the electricity system.

• However, further investment in any unabated gas generation plant, beyond

the minimum that is required to bridge the gap to the transition to low carbon technologies, would introduce significant challenges in meeting the UK’s climate change objectives. Such investment substantially increases the risk that the UK’s long term emissions reduction targets will not be met, or at least not be met in a cost-effective manner.

• We believe that the Government should continue to focus its attention on its

EMR proposals and that it should aim to provide a clear and unilateral commitment of its low carbon intentions to investors.

• We note that the Government’s intended review of the Fourth Carbon Budget,

where it will consider developments in the EU emissions reduction trajectory, will occur in 2014. Although there appears to be a lack of apparent progress in international discussions on climate change, we would highlight that there have been recent advances at the EU level, including the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. It will be important for the UK Government to take into consideration any positive developments at the EU level during the review process. A potential lack of formal resolutions at the EU level at this stage should not in itself be used as a reason to revise the Fourth Carbon Budget. This is because the need for urgent action on climate change has not changed.

• Should the Government find reason to make any changes to the Fourth

Carbon Budget, it is important to note that even a slower path to decarbonise the economy will still require the UK to largely decarbonise the electricity sector by the early 2030s. As such, any review must not undermine the development of a policy framework to decarbonise the electricity sector.

• EDF Energy supports Government proposals to assist those Energy Intensive

Industries (EIIs) exposed to international competition, and therefore the risk of carbon leakage, as a result of the indirect costs of UK and EU climate policies. However, it is important that any financial support is proportionate and time-limited to drive the behavioural change required to permanently

36

reduce emissions. In addition, care will need to be taken to ensure that the integrity of the EMR proposals is not undermined by creating the scope for ad-hoc exemptions.

About EDF Energy 1. EDF Energy is one of the UK’s largest energy companies with activities

throughout the energy chain. We provide 50% of the UK’s low carbon generation. Our interests include nuclear, coal and gas-fired electricity generation, renewables, and energy supply to end users. We have over five million electricity and gas customer accounts in the UK, including both residential and business users.

Introduction

2. EDF Energy has previously expressed its support for the Government’s

decision to adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) on the Fourth Carbon Budget. We maintain the position that a clear and stable long-term policy framework, as provided by the carbon budgets to date, will help inform the priorities for policy development and will assist in providing investors with the certainty they require to accelerate the delivery of low carbon investment.

3. The mainstream consensus of the need for urgent action on climate change

has not changed, despite the lack of apparent progress in international discussions on the topic. It is crucial that the UK continues to make the transition to a low carbon economy in an affordable manner that will also ensure that the competitiveness of UK energy supplies is maintained.

4. There is general agreement within both industry and the Government that

power sector decarbonisation by 2030, or soon thereafter, is necessary to meet the UK’s statutory requirement of an 80% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050. This is because low carbon electricity generation can be a key driver in the decarbonisation of the residential heat and surface transport sectors.

5. We note that the CCC continues to emphasise that “achieving this reduction

[by 2050] will require a step change in the pace of UK production emissions reduction – now needed urgently.”1 It is therefore imperative that the UK Government maintains momentum on delivering Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which we believe will help achieve decarbonisation at least cost. Reform of the existing electricity market arrangements is necessary to ensure the market is capable of delivering the reliable diverse energy mix required to achieve the UK’s energy policy objectives. We believe that the Government’s proposals will provide the investment framework that is crucial for the low carbon investment that the country needs, and will keep costs down for consumers.

6. The planned Contracts for Difference (CfDs) will be a key component of

ensuring value for money for consumers by shielding them from the damaging impacts of high and volatile fossil fuel prices. By reducing risk to investors, they will lead to a lower cost of capital and a reduction in bills compared with alternative mechanisms such as the Renewables Obligation.

1 CCC, Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks, April 2013, p10

37

7. EDF Energy believes that CfDs, in conjunction with the carbon price floor, are

capable of working for all low carbon technologies (including renewables, nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage) and, indeed, are designed to do so. These instruments will give all such projects the stable and reliable revenue they need to support the large upfront investment required. It is important that investors are allowed to make a reasonable return with an acceptable sharing of risk so that the final outcome represents a fair deal for both consumers and investors. We believe that the Government’s plans will help us, and other investors, to deliver secure, affordable and low carbon energy supplies.

Energy Bill

8. EDF Energy welcomes the progress that is being made in the Parliamentary

scrutiny of the Energy Bill but we urge that Royal Assent is achieved as soon as possible in 2013 to help provide certainty for investors.

9. As part of the current Energy Bill debate, EDF Energy supports the

introduction of a 2030 carbon intensity target in secondary legislation, as recommended by the CCC and the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee. This will help ensure that the required pathway to 2050 is both realistic and deliverable and will provide investors with greater confidence in the Government’s commitment to the transition to a low carbon economy. We believe that the target should exist within a range and be consistent with the trajectory of the carbon budgets. It should also be flexible enough to reflect periodic changes in assumptions and costs. However, the requirement for secondary legislation on this, and other points of EMR detail, should not be a reason for delaying the Bill’s progress.

Role of Gas 10. Gas plays a significant role in heating, with 81% of home heating2 fuelled by

this source. We support DECC’s ambitions to move away from fossil fuel heating as over a third of the UK’s carbon emissions comes from the energy used to produce heat (more than from power generation)3. EDF Energy has long supported early action on renewable heat, as we believe that this is a sector which can make a significant and cost effective contribution to the UK meeting its 2020 renewable energy target, especially through the use of heat pumps.

11. EDF Energy is committed to delivering affordable, secure, and low carbon

supplies based on a diverse energy mix, including nuclear and renewables. As part of this, we believe that unabated gas fired generation will play an important role in the transition towards a decarbonised power sector in the 2030s by providing the reliable and flexible backup generation required for balancing the electricity system.

12. Further investment in any unabated gas generation plant (whether fuelled by

conventional or shale gas), beyond the minimum that is required to bridge the

2 DECC, The Future of Heating: A strategic framework for low carbon heat in the UK, March 2012 3 DECC, Government sets out plans to cut emissions from heat, Press Release, 26 March 2012

38

gap to the transition to low carbon technologies, would introduce significant challenges in meeting the UK’s climate change objectives. This is because while gas fired generation has lower carbon dioxide emissions than old coal fired generation, it is still a significant source of carbon emissions in its own right (unless it can be equipped with carbon capture and storage). In addition, as the UK increasingly starts to move to a greater reliance on imported gas, this is likely to lead to greater price volatility and long-term price uncertainty as global demand recovers from the effects of the recession. This will potentially lead to security of supply concerns that will need to be addressed.

13. We are therefore concerned by the Government’s introduction of a new

200gCO2/kWh (in 2030) power sector carbon-intensity scenario in its Gas Generation Strategy4 (equating to 37GW of new CCGT capacity by 2030). Although we note that 200gCO2/kWh is only a sensitivity analysis, we fear that it sends a mixed signal to industry. Investment in unabated gas generation plant substantially increases the risk that the UK’s long term emissions reduction targets will not be met, or at least will not be met in a cost effective manner. This is either because the carbon emissions from these new assets will be ‘locked in’ or, alternatively, because it increases the risk of stranded assets.

14. EDF Energy believes that a 200gCO2/kWh scenario in 2030 (in contrast to a

50g-100g scenario) weakens the signal for low carbon investment beyond 2020. We note that the CCC states that “in this scenario, the share of unabated gas generation expands to approximately 45% of the mix, at the expense of nuclear and renewable generation”5. A 200gCO2/kWh power sector carbon intensity target in 2030 would potentially mean that no low carbon investment would be needed in the 2020s, and the stop/start trajectory of investment would affect the UK’s ability to deliver decarbonisation at the lowest cost. We believe that the Government should continue to focus its attention on its EMR proposals and that it should aim to provide a clear and unilateral commitment of its low carbon intentions to investors.

Review of the Fourth Carbon Budget

15. EDF Energy is aware that the Government intends to carry out a review of the

Fourth Carbon Budget in 2014 to ensure that the UK’s carbon targets are in line with Emissions Trading System (ETS) emissions reduction trajectory agreed by the EU. We believe that it will be essential for the Government to take note of the direction of policy development at that time.

16. Although the European Parliament’s voted recently to reject the proposal to

“backload” 900m carbon allowances, we were pleased to note that MEPs defeated a procedural vote to move immediately to a Legislative Resolution. Since then, we understand that a decision has been made for the Environment (ENVI) committee to hold another vote on the issue in June (and in the plenary session in July). This suggests that the proposal is still a live concern at the European level. We also welcome the fact that that there is a now a strong recognition within Europe of the need for concrete legislative proposals to carry out structural reform of the EU ETS. For example, we note that there has been a recent letter signed by a number of Energy and

4 DECC, Gas Generation Strategy, December 2012 5 Letter from Lord Deben to the Rt. Hon. Edward Davey MP, 25 February 2013

39

Environmental Ministers calling for the European Commission to bring forward proposals by the end of the year at the latest6.

17. The European Commission, through its recent Green Paper, has also started

to consult stakeholders to support the development of a new integrated climate and energy policy framework for the period up to 2030. It is recognised that the framework should ensure that the EU is on track to meet longer term climate objectives (i.e. reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 80-95% by 2050) and build upon the Energy Roadmap 2050 laid out in 2011. We support the efforts being made by the UK Government to move to a tighter 2020 emissions target and to secure a robust agreement for domestic carbon dioxide reductions across the EU that could lead to a binding international agreement on tackling climate change.

18. We note that the Government’s intended review of the Fourth Carbon Budget,

where it will consider developments in the EU emissions reduction trajectory, will occur in early 2014. However, since this comes before the date that the European Commission has stated it is seeking to adopt legally any 2030 package (i.e. by the end of 2014), the Government needs to ensure it has enough information to undertake a complete evaluation of developments. It will be essential for the Government to take into consideration any positive developments at the EU level during the time of the Government’s review. A potential lack of formal resolutions at the EU level at this stage should not in itself be used as a reason to revise the Fourth Carbon Budget. This is because, as stated above, the need for urgent action on climate change has not changed.

19. Should the Government find reason to make any changes, it is important to

note that even a slower path to decarbonise the economy will still require the UK to largely decarbonise the electricity sector by the early 2030s. As such, any review must not undermine the development of a policy framework to decarbonise the electricity sector.

Competitiveness risks of carbon budgets

20. EDF Energy recognises that it is possible that some low carbon policies may

have an indirect impact on energy intensive users through their effect on electricity prices. We therefore support Government proposals to assist those Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) exposed to international competition, and therefore the risk of carbon leakage, as a result of the indirect costs of UK and EU climate policies. However, we would highlight that are many reasons why firms may wish to relocate production and agree with the EAC’s conclusion that “it is the overall cost burden, rather than energy costs in isolation, that help determine the risk of carbon leakage”7. In addition, we note that recent analysis by the CCC suggests that “policies already announced by the Government should be sufficient to address competitiveness risks for energy-intensive industries to 2020”8.

6 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/european-ministers-set-out-timetable-for-eu-ets-reform 7 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme, Sixth Report Session 2012-2013, p11 8 CCC, Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks, April 2013, p10

40

21. We believe that UK Government relief for the indirect costs of the EU ETS and carbon price support mechanism should be targeted at those industrial sectors and installations where the evidence base suggests there is significant risk of carbon leakage and that the levels awarded are proportionate to need. In addition, it is important that any financial support is time-limited in order to drive the behavioural change required to permanently reduce emissions.

22. It is our understanding that the Government is currently examining the

different options to determine eligibility for the exemption from the costs of CfDs for EIIs. While EDF Energy would continue to support targeted relief, we believe it will be critical to ensure that the integrity of the EMR proposals is maintained. We are concerned that if, for example, the primary legislation within the Energy Bill is diluted by creating the scope for ad-hoc exemptions.

23. EDF Energy believes it is also important to consider the time horizon over

which the costs of the CfD regime will evolve. With the Renewables Obligation remaining the key driver for renewables investment in the near future, we believe it will be a long time before consumers will see any CfD related costs feeding into electricity prices. The first projects supported by CfDs are unlikely to have any discernable impact on consumer bills for at least another six or seven years. In such circumstances, we believe there are significant inherent risks associated with prescribing statutory solutions today for uncertain impacts that will arise so far into the future.

24. The Government is right to proceed with measures now to provide targeted

relief against the indirect impact of the carbon price support mechanism (which came into effect in April 2013). However, we believe that it should reserve its position on how other EMR related costs should be dealt with until 2016, by which date the outcome of the post-2020 Durban Platform global climate change agreement should be known. Deferring a decision on EMR-related costs will allow Government to make a much better assessment of the impacts that it believes it should protect against, and also give it a better understanding of the potential for trans-boundary distortions.

16 May 2013

41

Written evidence submitted by the Mineral Products Association

1. Executive Summary

1.1. The evidence is compelling that the UK Carbon Budgets are outdated and no longer entirely fit for purpose.

1.2. Emissions associated with imported goods are increasing and now make up around half of the UK’s carbon footprint

1.3. The Climate Change Act needs revision to ensure that the Carbon Budgets are not met by importing goods and exporting emissions to countries that may be less well equipped to abate.

1.4. The UK Government has a social responsibility to avoid carbon and jobs leakage. 1.5. Consumption based national GHG accounting must be introduced in law to avoid the

slow demise of UK manufacturing. 1.6. Responsible Sourcing Initiatives should be promoted, where locally produced goods

are consumed locally for local economic benefit. 1.7. The Committee on Climate Change has underestimated the environmental and

economic costs of meeting the 4th Carbon Budget. Industry will suffer from unilateral UK energy and Carbon policy costs as other evidence has shown.

1.8. The Committee on Climate Change incorrectly assumes that the EII compensation package is sufficient to protect UK manufacturers. The £250m EII package is a welcome first step but insufficient to prevent carbon leakage resulting from cumulative carbon costs. Government should be prepared to provide additional funds and/or reallocate funds from EU ETS to CPF if there is a need.

2. Introduction 2.1. The Mineral Products Association (MPA) is the trade association for the aggregates,

asphalt, cement, concrete, dimension stone, lime, mortar and silica sand industries. With the recent addition of The British Precast Concrete Federation (BPCF) and the British Association of Reinforcement (BAR), it has a growing membership of 450 companies and is the sectoral voice for mineral products. MPA membership is made up of the vast majority of independent SME companies throughout the UK, as well as the 9 major international and global companies. It covers 100% of GB cement production, 90% of aggregates production and 95% of asphalt and ready-mixed concrete production and 70% of precast concrete production. Each year the industry supplies £9 billion of materials and services to the £120 billion construction and other sectors. Industry production represents the largest materials flow in the UK economy and is also one of the largest manufacturing sectors1.

2.2. This response relates largely to the MPA Cement and British Lime Association activities which are part of the Mineral Products Association.

3. Are the Carbon Budgets still valid? 3.1. In May 2013 the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) released its ‘Reducing the UK’s

carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks’ report. The report states that the UK’s Carbon Footprint has increased over the past two decades and whilst

                                                 1 “Make the Link: The Mineral Products Industry’s Contribution to the UK”, 2012, http://www.mineralproducts.org/documents/MPA_MTL_Document.pdf

42

production emissions have fallen (21% between 1990-2010) emissions embedded in UK imports are estimated to have increased by 40% between 1993 and 2010. So the growth of consumption emissions has more than offset reductions in production emissions. This trend undermines the hard work and investment made by UK operators and even the CCC acknowledges that the UK carbon footprint would have increased more had production emissions not been reduced by fuel switching and energy efficiency by UK operators.

3.2. The evidence is compelling that the UK Carbon Budgets are now too narrowly focused, outdated and no longer entirely fit for purpose. However, by suggesting that the Carbon Budgets remain unchanged, the CCC has failed to properly address the recommendations of the Energy and Climate Change (ECC) Committee’s report2. The ECC select committee recommended that policy makers explore the options for “incorporating consumption-based emissions data into the policy making process”. Furthermore, the ECC Committee concluded that “We are not convinced that consumption based emissions data are too complex or time consuming to gather, as Defra’s work in this area shows”.

3.3. So, if the evidence that consumption emissions are becoming an increasing problem and that collecting the information is not too complex, there is good reason to amend, or supplement, the Climate Change Act Carbon Budgets to account for ‘embedded’ or ‘imported’ emissions related to consumption. By enshrining in law greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting methods that take account of the whole UK footprint, the UK would show leadership in this internationally important policy area and set the benchmark for similar international developments.

3.4. The CCC’s justification for retaining production based emissions is flawed. Firstly, they cite that consumption based reporting would be disruptive to international accounting conventions. Secondly, they claim that production emissions should be the focus because half of the UK footprint is imported emissions and there is less leverage to reduce the imported emissions.

3.5. The future of manufacturing in the UK is at stake so it is vitally important that the UK can properly measure what impact climate change, energy policies and other factors are having on the location of manufacturing. International reporting conventions do not have to be disrupted to properly account for emissions under the UK Climate Change Act and less leverage is not a good reason to ignore around half of the UK carbon footprint.

3.6. Surprisingly, the Committee on Climate Change claims that the cost of energy and climate change policies will not damage the competitiveness of British industry. MPA disagrees. The CCC has underestimated the environmental and economic costs of meeting the Carbon Budgets. UK industry will suffer from both EU and unilateral UK energy and carbon policy costs as other evidence has shown. Research carried out by ICF3 on behalf of BIS shows that climate and energy policy costs will be the highest for UK manufacturers compared to competing nations. ICF sector specific analysis shows that the UK cement industry will pay higher policy costs compared to the manufacturers of the same product in the principle competing economies. The ICF and MPA work is supported by other research carried out by KPMG4 which has shown

                                                 2 House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee: Consumption Based Reporting. HC1646 3 International Comparison of Energy and Climate Change Policies Impacting Energy Intensive Industries in Selected Countries. ICF International for BIS. 2012 4 KPMG Global Green Tax Index: http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/green-tax/pages/default.aspx 

43

                                                

that the UK ranks third in the Global Green Tax Index and first in the carbon and climate change list of 21 countries that are increasingly using green taxes in place of regulation or incentive schemes.

3.7. The energy and climate change policy costs that MPA presented to the Environmental Audit Committee5 shows that for the cement and lime sectors the policy costs increase rapidly over the next few years and that only a fraction of these costs are eligible for compensation under the Government’s Energy Intensive Industries package, thereby dispelling the CCC assumption that the compensation schemes are sufficient to offset the policy costs.

3.8. The Committee on Climate Change incorrectly assumes that the EII compensation package is sufficient to protect UK manufacturers. The £250m EII package is a welcome first step but insufficient to prevent carbon leakage resulting from cumulative carbon costs. Government should be prepared to provide additional funds and/or reallocate funds from EU ETS to CPF if there is a need.

3.9. Exporting the UK emissions problem has wider consequences than simply environmental. There is little doubt that as the UK increases its imported emissions embedded in the goods that it consumes there is an equivalent amount of jobs and economic benefit that is also lost to other nations. The UK Government has a social responsibility to avoid carbon and jobs leakage. This is important in the often rural communities that depend on mineral products industries such as cement and lime production. In this regard ‘Responsible Sourcing’ initiatives6 should be promoted, where locally produced goods are consumed locally for local economic benefit.

3.10. In conclusion, there are compelling environmental, social and economic reasons to adopt consumption based Carbon Budgets in the Climate Change Act.

18 May 2013

 5 Environmental Audit Committee: Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme Sixth Report of Session 2012–13. Ev36 6 BES 6001 Framework Standard is for the Responsible Sourcing of Construction Products 

44

Written evidence submitted by Prof Kevin Anderson, Dr John Broderick, Dr Paul Gilbert, Mr Jaise Kuriakose, Dr Mirjam Röder and Alice Bows, Sustainable Consumption Institute, 

University of Manchester, and Prof Corinne Le Quéré and Annela Anger‐Kraavi, University of East Anglia 

 Summary 

 

UK carbon budgets in the context of international commitments on 2°C 

• The UK’s commitments under the Climate Change Act (short‐term carbon budgets and the 80% reduction pathway) are incompatible and much less challenging than the UK’s explicit international commitment on 2°C. The UK has, in effect, two radically different and conflicting carbon budgets. 

• The UK’s national carbon budget is a highly inequitable proportion of the global budget for 2°C, and contradicts the UK’s assurances of an equitable distribution of emissions under the Copenhagen Accord and similar international agreements.  

• The recent global emissions trajectory is at the high end of IPCC emissions scenarios, and correlates with a central global warming projection of 4.9°C. Such a rise would exceed any warming level thought to have occurred in the past 5 million years. 

 UK emissions in the context of the Climate change Act (2008) 

• The UK’s current emission reductions targets for 2050 remain valid as a minimum requirement for the legal commitments under the 2008 Climate Change Act. 

• UK emissions have remained approximately constant when UK consumption of goods and services produced elsewhere is considered; this is despite a decline in UK territorial fossil fuel emissions of 20% since 1990. In contrast, Germany’s territorial and consumption emissions have both decreased by about 25% at the same time as their economy has continued to grow. 

• Agricultural emissions are an example where consumption‐based accounting is an important and useful complement to production‐based (territorial) accounting. Direct climate impacts and global trade are especially significant in this sector and lead to this accounting vulnerability. 

• Emissions from the UK’s proportion of international shipping and aviation are poorly accounted for. Given that the UK has the ability to influence these sources nationally, it is prudent to incorporate aviation and shipping emissions into short‐term carbon budgets as a matter of some urgency. 

• Given the technical difficulty of securing large reductions in emissions from the agricultural sector, their non‐CO2 GHG emissions are set to become an increasing proportion of the UK’s budgets. Greater rates and levels of decarbonisation may therefore be necessary from the UK’s energy system. 

• The development of further gas generation capacity cannot be reconciled with the UK’s 2°C commitments and has only a very limited role in the UK’s current carbon budgets. Any additional gas capacity will rapidly become a stranded asset unless retro‐fitted with carbon capture and storage. 

• If carbon and capture storage technologies are proven to work at scale and with high levels of capture (90% or higher), gas fired powerstations would be compatible with the UK’s carbon budgets, but remain incompatible with the UK’s 2°C commitments. 

 

 

45

This submission gathers input from a number of Tyndall Centre researchers based at the University of Manchester and the University of East Anglia.  All views contained within are attributable to the specific section authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the other contributors, researchers from the wider Tyndall Centre or either university. With each section we have indicated the relevant lead author for clarity.  Question 1  In light of the current climate change assessments, whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act (which underpin the UK Carbon Budgets) are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous global climate change; and if not, whether the Act and/or the Carbon Budgets should be revised.   Prof C. Le Quéré: Paragraphs 1‐ 6  1.  spite of concerns for climate change, the global emissions of CO2 have increased by 3.1

per year since 2000 on average, three times faster than the 1.0% per year increase observin the 1990s (

In % ed 

 using 

 

T

T

Peters et al., 2013). CO2 emissions were 58% above 1990 levels in 2012 (Le Quéré et al., 2013). We have computed near‐term projections in global CO2 emissionsthe projected World GDP from the International Monetary Fund (IMF; April 2013), and applying the mean improvements in the fossil intensity of the economy of the past decadeas in Raupach and Canadell (2010) (Fig. 1, below).  

2. he observed global CO2 emissions are following the upper end of the emissions scenarios that will be used in the upcoming assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; Fig. 1). Observed emissions are increasingly diverging from the emissions required to limit global warming to the 2oC characterisation of “dangerous global climate change”(Peters et al., 2013). The emissions projections we calculated for 2012‐2018 suggests that the recent trend will persist well into this decade unless improvements in energy efficiency strongly depart from the tendencies observed since 2000, or unless reductions in energy consumption occur.  

3. he upper emission scenario leads to a central global warming projection of 4.9°C above pre‐industrial temperatures at the end of the century (Rogelj et al., 2012), above any warming levels that is thought to have occurred on Earth in the past 5 million years. The uncertainty around this projection is large and depends on the climate sensitivity of the planet. Climate sensitivity is a measure of how much the global temperature would rise for a doubling concentration of CO2. There is a range of climate sensitivity values based on different lines of evidence (both observations and models). However, even if the low‐end of the range is chosen (i.e. 1.5°C for a doubling CO2 concentration), this would still cause a rise in temperature of 3.5°C by 2100 under the high emissions scenario (Fig. 1). Conversely, if the climate sensitivity was at the high end of the range (i.e. of 4.5°C for a doubling of CO2), for instance due to a strong feedback with carbon stored in the natural reservoirs (Previdi et al., 2013), warming could reach as high as 7.9°C by the end of the century. The uncertainties above the central projection are larger than those below due to the many processes that are poorly understood, but could add considerable warming to the planet if the carbon stores were destabilised (e.g. frozen soils, wetlands and gas hydrates). A range of studies suggest that the most likely value of climate sensitivity is around 3°C (Hegerl et al. 2007), even considering global temperature trends of the past 15 years, which can be accounted for by natural variability in the climate (Foster and Rahmstorf, 2011; Guemas et al., 2013). 

 

46

 Figure 1 Global emissions of CO2 (GtCO2/y). The emissions computed from reported energy statistics by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) are shown in black with their uncertainty in gray (Peters et al., 2013). The red dots are projections for these emissions based on World GDP which we computed here using established methods (Raupach and Canadell, 2010). Recent and projected emissions are compared to the scenarios used to project climate change  by  the  upcoming  assessment  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC).  Temperature projections in 2100 above pre‐industrial levels are shown on the graph and are from Rogelj et al. (2012), including in parenthesis the range for a climate sensitivity of 1.5‐4.5°C. 

4. he CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the UK have decreased by 20% since 19when considering territorial emissions only (Fig. 2). However they have remained approximately constant when considering emissions from the consumption of goods and services produced elsewhere but consumed in the UK ((

T 90 

Le Quéré et al., 2013) updating the analysis of (Peters et al., 2011)). In contrast, the emissions in Germany have decreased by about 25% since 1990, for both territorial and consumption emissions, while the German economy has continued to grow. Peters et al. (2013) provide further examples of precedents in emissions reductions (consumption based) sustained over 10 years of about 4 – 5 % per year in Belgium, France and Sweden. These examples highlight the practical and economic feasibilities of transitions towards lower emissions.     

 

 Figure 2 Change in emissions compared to year 1990 in the United Kingdom and in Germany. Full lines show territorial emissions  as  reported  to  the  UNFCCC;  dashed  lines  show  consumption  emissions,  which  take  into  account  the emissions from good and services produced elsewhere but consumed in the UK.  The consumption CO2 emissions are from (Le Quéré et al., 2013) updating the analysis of (Peters et al., 2011). 

 

47

5. O2 emissions from the EU accounted for 11% of global emissions in 2012 and 24% over thperiod 1751‐2010 (C e 

H

Le Quéré et al., 2013). The UK and EU need to maintain and enhance their commitments to emissions reduction in support of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol (to be decided by 2015). Any loosening of the UK commitments could be seen as a weakening of leadership and risk derailing the UNFCCC process and the credibility of the Prime Minister as Chair of the UN committee tasked with establishing the new UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015.    

6. aving established the context and necessity of emissions reductions it then remains to consider the scale of UK action. There are two issues that are pivotal to an evidence‐based quantification of the UK’s carbon budget: 1) the ‘appropriate’ probability for 2°C; and 2) the ‘appropriate’ apportionment of the global carbon budget to the UK. 

 

Prof K. Anderson: paragraphs 7‐ 19   Considering the appropriate probability for 2°C 

7. From the Copenhagen Accord (2009) and subsequent COPs through to the G8 Camp David Declaration (May 2012) the UK has repeatedly committed to making its fair contribution to “hold the increase in global temperature below 2°C, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity”. Moreover, much of the UK Government’s domestic language has, since its 2009 Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2009), been around “must rise no more than 2°C” (p. 5, emphasis added). Whilst this qualitative language of consensus around 2°C has been clear and consistent for many years (“hold below”, “must not exceed”, etc.) there has been no open clarification as to what quantitative probabilities such language represents. Yet, without quantified probabilities it is not possible to determine the accompanying range of twenty‐first century cumulative emissions budgets from which emission pathways can be derived (Anderson & Bows, 2008). 

8. In the absence of any explicit quantification, probabilities may be inferred by adopting the approach developed for the IPCC’s reports, whereby a correlation is made between the language of likelihood and quantified probabilities (IPCC, 2010). Following this approach, the Accord’s, EU’s and UK Government’s statements all clearly imply very low (0%‐10%) probabilities of exceeding 2°C. Even a highly conservative judgement would suggest the statements represent no more than a 33% chance of exceeding 2°C. However in 2013, and with the UK’s preferred probability density (PDF) of temperature increase for a given trajectory (taken from Murphy et al, 2004), a 0%‐10% chance of exceeding 2°C would leave almost no available carbon budget. Stretching the probabilities much further really starts to detract from any reasonable interpretation of the “must not exceed” language; though given the emissions released since 2000, it is now difficult to envisage anything much lower than 30%‐40% chance of 2°C being either physically viable or deliverable in practice. 

9. Set against such a quantitative backdrop, DECC’s choice of a 63% chance of exceeding 2°C is clearly incompatible with the UK’s repeated commitments made at various international forums (Anderson et al., 2009). Consequently, the UK has (at least ‐ see below) two climate change targets. One with budgets related to “must not exceed” (say 0%‐10% ‐ and potentially 30%‐40% chance of 2°C) and the other, with budgets accompanying a 63% of exceeding 2°C. These two budgets are associated with radically different emission pathways and hence provide fundamentally different criteria for judging the appropriateness or otherwise of alternative mitigation options – both individually and collectively. 

Considering apportionment of the global carbon budget to the UK. 

10. Exacerbating the UK’s profoundly inconsistent domestic and international positions on climate change are issues related to how the UK chooses to apportion global emissions to the national level.  In this regard two particular issues arise; a) who is responsible for deforestation emissions; and b) how should global emissions be divided between Annex 1 

 

48

and non‐Annex 1 regions. Both the issues relate to the equity dimension of mitigation and against which the UK’s current domestic position again conflicts with its international rhetoric. 

11. Issue a) deforestation: The UK’s budgets imply all responsibility for emissions from global deforestation accrue solely to those nations deforesting. Whilst, such a position may have merit in terms of increasing the available ‘energy’ budget to the Annex 1 nations such as the UK, it does so at the expense of major reductions in available ‘energy’ emissions space for the poorer, non‐Annex 1, nations (where the deforestation is occurring). Climate change has arisen as an issue principally from the emissions of wealthier, and already deforested, Annex 1 nations (Anderson & Bows, 2011). It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the UK view that responsibility for current deforestation emissions belongs solely to those nations’ deforesting with the explicit equity dimension of various international agreements. In response to this inequity, deforestation could be considered as a global overhead, thereby allocating emissions from deforestation amongst all nations – not only those deforesting. Such a global overhead approach would not absolve non‐Annex 1 nations of responsibility for deforestation emissions, as their available budget for energy‐related emissions, along with the budget for Annex 1 nations, would still be reduced as a consequence of the emissions from deforestation.  Anderson and Bows further defended this position by noting how historical emissions (pre‐2000) are essentially considered a global overhead that favours Annex 1 nations. Ultimately they concluded that “getting an appropriate balance of responsibilities is a matter of judgment that inevitably will not satisfy all stakeholders and certainly will be open to challenge. As it stands, the approach… in which historical and deforestation emissions are taken to be global overheads, is a pragmatic decision that, if anything, errs in favour of the Annex 1 nations.”1 

12. Translating this principle into a quantitative constraint for the UK, Anderson and Bows (2008) estimated a twenty‐first century budget of 266GtCO2 from deforestation, which, disaggregated to the national level equates to about a 20% reduction in the available energy‐emission space in the UK’s budget. However, since Anderson and Bows first proposed the 266GtCO2 budget, deforestation emissions have fallen sharply, with a similar method likely to almost halve the global overhead to around ~150GtCO2.2 In light of this, it is appropriate that the UK budget be reduced by approximately 7% to account for the nation’s ‘fair’ share of global deforestation.  

13. Issue b) apportionment between nations: A much more significant issue relates to assumptions about emissions from non‐Annex 1 nations, and therefore what is a reasonable budget for Annex 1 nations, including the UK? As it stands the UK approach implies a highly inequitable division of emissions – with very little distinction drawn between the two regions. In brief, the UK choice of budgets and pathways is based on a global peak in emissions of around 2016, with non‐Annex 1 nations, on average, peaking around 2 years later. As with the attribution of deforestation emissions, such a division of the global budget between Annex 1 and non‐Annex 1 nations is far removed from both the wording and spirit of the equity dimensions of the various international climate change agreements. 

14. Anderson and Bows (2011) took a different framing of equity than that assumed by the UKstarting with the question “what reduction profiles could non‐Annex 1 nations reasobe expected to achieve if pushed extremely hard in terms of a rapid transition away from their growing emissions, and towards absolute mitigation”. They adopted a range of scenarios, but suffice to say the budget remaining for the Annex 1 nations in all of these was

, nably 

 

                                                       1 It is worth noting that Jiankun, H., Wenying, C., Fei, T., Bin, L., 2009. Long‐term climate change mitigation target and carbon permit allocation.  Tsinghua University. Access  date:    based  on  analysis  undertaken  at  Tsinghua University  in  Beijing, makes  the  case  that  "reasonable  rights  and  interests  should  be  strived  for,  based  on  the  equity  principle,  reflected  through  cumulative  emissions  per capita".  Building  on  this  cumulative  emissions  per  capita  approach,  the  authors  demonstrate  how  China's  historical  cumulative emissions are only one‐tenth of the average in industrial countries and one‐twentieth that of the U.S. 2 This is the subject of a paper currently being developed, and is again based on FAO and other similar data. 

 

49

dramatically more challenging than the proportional budget adopted by the UK government.  

15. In brief, and to put some perspective on the change in the scale of the challenge, if non‐Annex 1 nations can peak by 2025, and reduce emissions thereafter at around 7% p.a. (approximately twice the level Stern et al suggest is possible with economic growth), then there is no discernible emission space remaining for Annex 1 nations. Only if the growth to a 2025 peak in non‐Annex 1 emissions is radically curtailed to just 1% p.a. and subsequently reduced at over 7% from 2025, is there any space for Annex 1 emissions – but still only if the latter’s emissions begin reducing at over 10% p.a. immediately. 

16. As Anderson and Bows (2011) demonstrates, the UK’s proportion of the global carbon budget for a 63% chance of exceeding 2°C is premised on an apportionment regime that is highly partisan and certainly far removed from the UK’s explicit and international commitments on equity.  

Combining probabilities and equity 

17. Far from being a technical and nuanced issue, the disjuncture between the UK’s high prand repeated commitments on 2°C and the Government’s legally binding carbon budgetsprofound and with fundamental repercussions for the framing of carbon‐reduction p

18. The legally binding bu

ofile  is 

olices.  

dgets essentially reject 2°C in favour of maintaining some emission 

f  of 

h its 

uestion 2  and management of the Carbon Budgets, including: the accountability and 

t system, f 

r A. Bows:  Paragraphs 20‐25  

ons will become more significant to UK budgets 

ress towards 

 

c change 

d for by 

 targets in 

space out to 2050 and hence a relatively slow transition to a lower‐carbon society. By contrast, taking Government international statements on 2°C as an honest reflection ocommitments demands immediate behavioural adjustments alongside rapid penetrationlow‐carbon technologies; with complete decarbonisation of the energy system by 2030.  

19. Ultimately, if the UK wants to develop a consistent and evidence‐based framing of its climate change commitments, it needs to match its legally binding domestic budgets witinternational rhetoric on 2°C. 

 QThe operationgovernance arrangements, and the extent to which the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations have been addresses; the effectiveness of the over all managemenincluding for meeting carbon budgets by sector; and the current status, operation and impact othe National Emissions Target Board.  D

As time goes on non‐CO2 emissi

20. The cumulative nature of long‐lived greenhouse gases means that slow progachieving a reduction in one gas must be compensated by greater cuts in another. Cutting the non‐CO2 emissions associated with the agricultural sector is considered to be more challenging than mitigating CO2. Specifically, there is more uncertainty over how to significantly curb and quantify N2O emissions, particularly those associated with soilprocesses, than there is for the CO2 associated with energy consumption.  This is exacerbated when taking into account a rising demand for food and future climati(Flynn et al., 2005, Popp et al., 2010, Reay et al., 2012, Smith et al., 2008, Smith and Olesen, 2010). Having separate sectoral targets, as well as an aggregated ‘carbon budget’ is therefore essential to ensure that limited progress in one sector can be compensategreater progress in another, when budgets are reviewed periodically. Therefore, consideration of sectoral progress should be used to maintain, weaken or strengthother sectors, in order to remain within the overall carbon budget associated with the 2C target. One likely outcome of taking this approach, is that mitigation effort aimed at CO2 

 

50

will need to be strengthened in the short‐term, given technical limits to N2O emissions associated with food production over the longer term (Bows et al., 2012a). 

Present producer based accounting overlooks emissions associated with imports of food 

21. Given that global emissions are in line with the highest projected emission scenarios, climate change will increasingly impact on food production. However, some mid‐latitude regions, such as the UK, may be able to reap greater yields for crops such as wheat, in the short‐ to medium‐term, as temperatures rise (assuming extreme weather events do not counter this effect). If this is the case, it may be less emissions‐intensive on aggregate to grow some crops in the UK than it will be to grow them elsewhere. But, under the current territorial emission accounting framework, the UK would incur greater emissions as a result of high levels of agricultural production coupled with a greater use of fertiliser to benefit from the more favourable climatic conditions (Bows et al., 2012a). Considering the consumption‐based as well as the territorial emissions associated with agriculture in particular, would enable policymakers to make a more considered judgment on setting the emissions budgets for the agriculture sector.  

Shipping & aviation have limited mitigation drivers and continue to be poorly accounted for 

22. ifficulties remain in ascribing emissions from international aviation and shipping to nations. This, combined with the failure of the international bodies charged with mitigating international aviation and shipping emissions (International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)) to put into place measures to tackle those emissions, have led the UK Government to consider international aviation and shipping within long‐term targets, but omitting them from the short‐term carbon budgets. Such an approach to two of the most rapidly growing sectors in terms of greenhouse gas emissions is unacceptable given the UK’s broader commitment to 2°C. However, the arguments surrounding aviation and shipping are somewhat different from each other (

D

A  

S

Bows et al., 2012).  

23. viation: For aviation, emissions can be apportioned to nations on the basis of departures orbunker fuels, providing a close approximation to a ‘fair share’ of the emissions released within international airspace. Furthermore, given the recent collapse of the carbon price governing mitigation effort within the EU ETS, the aviation sector continues to have highly limited drivers towards mitigating emissions, and urgently requires a new approach to incorporating aviation‐related emissions into existing mitigation frameworks, such as the UK’s carbon budgets. Thus at present, and given the known barriers to low‐carbon technology unique to this sector, (Bows, 2010), aviation activity associated with UK residents or UK airlines continues with its privileged position with regard to carbon budgets, potentially jeopardising all of the UK’s efforts towards a decarbonised energy system (as aviation also forms part of that system) (Woods et al., 2012) 

24. hipping: The problem of how to apportion the emissions associated with the shipping sector is a much greater challenge than for aviation, in the main due to shipping generally involving multiple journey legs. However, despite the methodological and data uncertainties in apportioning shipping emissions to the UK (or any nation) (Bows et al., 2012; Gilbert and Bows, 2012), the order of magnitude of emissions is known and is sufficient to at least provide a guide to the scope and scale of necessary mitigation in shipping, as well as other sectors. Nevertheless, to include shipping emissions within the existing budgets, it would be advisable not to use the sales of bunker fuels (as is used when reporting international shipping emissions to the UNFCCC), as they are a poor guide of the emissions associated with trade to and from the UK, but rather indicate that most ships choose to refuel in Rotterdam where fuel is cheap. CO2 estimates based on bunker sales are between 20‐60% lower than the estimate that “relates to the transport of passengers or goods to or from the United Kingdom”, the definition given to international aviation and shipping emissions by the Committee on Climate Change.  Thus consideration of one of the existing estimates 

 

51

based on imports would be a reasonable starting to point towards including shipping within short‐term budgets (Anderson and Bows, 2012). 

25. n the basis of our analysis of shipping and aviation emission apportionment, as well as how to influence these emissions (O

Gilbert and Bows, 2012), and given the now effectively defunct EU ETS, we would urge government to start to incorporate aviation and shipping emissions into short‐term carbon budgets as a matter of some urgency. 

 

Dr P. Gilbert: Paragraphs 26‐31  

D

 

Chemical Industry  

26. Tyndall Manchester have recently completed a report on the chemical industry in the UK considering market and climate change challenges (Gilbert et al, 2013). At the time of writing this submission, the report is not yet in the public domain. The authors will send a copy to this inquiry as soon as it is available. Key findings related to this question are as follows: 

Insufficient evidence that climate policy is responsible for the loss of competitiveness in the chemical industry at present 

27. Parts of the industry are shutting down in the UK and relocating to other regions due to competition and production costs. This is resulting in ‘weak carbon leakage’ and global greenhouse gas emissions are increasing accordingly. Although these regions typically have less stringent rules, or an absence of regulation and policies to address greenhouse gas emissions, evidence suggests that the industry is not relocating due to climate policy. However, the UK’s climate change targets are challenging for the industry and the wider economy. Such targets could impose further pressure on competitiveness in the UK in future and lead to ‘strong carbon leakage’. Alternatively, introduced carefully, they could drive innovative efficiency improvements that also increase resilience to fossil fuel and feedstock price volatility. 

The UK’s carbon footprint associated with chemicals is increasing (consumption basis) 

28. espite UK chemical industry emissions reducing by 70% from direct energy use and processes since 1990, it has not been solely the result of energy efficiency improvements. The reduction in the UK’s chemical industry emissions has largely been a result of the closure of production sites and /or relocation to other nations with lower production costs and energy and feedstock costs. When examining the UK’s carbon footprint from a consumption‐based approach, where the UK would take account of emissions produced in other nations during the manufacturing of the goods it consumes, overall emissions associated with the consumption of chemical‐derived goods and commodities are likely to be increasing (accenture, 2011; Oxford Economics, 2010; KPMG, 2011). 

The chemical industry requires substantial reductions in emission intensities to satisfy UK climate targets  

29. The UK chemical industry anticipates growth in the period up to 2020. Growth rates of 1‐3%may lead, with no change to emission intensity or UK chemical production mix, to the chemical industry accounting for 11‐25% of the total UK carbon budget in 2050. To ensure that the industry reduces its emissions by 80%, the absolute growth rates would require the emission intensity to reduce by ~2‐4% p.a. Historically, technically mature industries reduce emission intensity levels by 1‐1.2% p.a. This point is relevant to the majority of UK industry where growth is anticipated and the sector is required to deliver absolute savings. 

Industry requires an urgent, radical rethink in how it produces chemicals  

30. If the chemical industry is to step up to the challenge of meeting the UK’s climate targets and maintain competitiveness, it will need to move beyond incremental energy efficiency improvements towards more radical, step changes. Although the industry could decarbonise 

 

52

emissions associated with direct energy, this would return us to the argument raised above concerning non‐CO2 emissions. Process emissions from the industry should not be overlooked as they account for approximately one third of the chemical industries emissions (4.3MtCO2e, excluding electricity use, 2010 data). Of this CO2e, 11% is from N2O emissions associated with nitric acid production.  

31. As well as managing processes, there is a requirement to ultimately move away from fossil based hydrocarbons as feedstocks to renewable forms of fixed carbon. Nonetheless, under current emission accounting protocols, where emissions are reported on a producer basis within territorial boundaries, and coupled with issues of feedstock price and competitiveness, there is insufficient economic incentive to justify substantial investment in the new assets required to implement bio‐derived product substitution. Furthermore, as fossil hydrocarbons are the primary feedstock for the chemical industry, it could be argued that their value as a fixed source of carbon is much greater than their energetic value, particularly when renewable wind, wave and solar energy could help decarbonise the energy supply. Options for decarbonised chemical feedstocks are much more limited and costly. Decisions about whether our limited use of fossil fuel emissions associated with a carbon budget should be used for the chemical industry, the transport sector (particularly aviation) or other applications are determined by the complex interplay of legislative, policy and market conditions. To date there have been few policy initiatives which have recognised the unique challenges and potential contributions from this sector; some prioritisation seems likely to be required if the UK is to achieve its carbon reduction targets and retain its valuable and strategic chemical industry. 

 Question 3 What the Government’s response should be to the Committee on Climate Change’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance, and whether the Carbon Budgets should be tightened or relaxed.  Dr A. Anger‐Kraavi:  Paragraphs 32‐37   32. In addition to tightening the targets enshrined within the Act and Carbon Budgets, dis

above, we believe it is worth considering a policy response to the developments in the EU ETS in light of economic and industrial research. We also suggest that the committeeour previous submission to the Energy and Climate Change Committee regarding shale gand other unconventional fossil fuels. 

cussed 

 note as 

                                                      

Stimulating innovation in the ‘Traded Sector’ 

33. The UK’s share of the EU ETS cap is represented as the ‘traded sector’ component of the carbon budgets (EAC, 2011). There is a concern that as the EU ETS cap is set at 20% below 1990 levels,3 and given the UK carbon budget for 2020 is tighter (34%), then the UK ‘non‐traded sector’ will have to take on a greater burden of reductions.  

34. As the ‘non‐traded sector’ is less carbon intensive this is likely to result in emission reductions that are not economically efficient in the strict sense. Furthermore, the current low carbon price at the EU market (about €3 per tonne of CO2e in April 2013) would allow the ‘traded sector’ simply to buy allowances and leave the physical domestic reductions to the ‘non‐traded sector’.   

35. The question here is whether the UK carbon budget at least for ‘non‐traded sector’ should be relaxed. However, as argued previously, in order to achieve climate stabilisation at or around 2°C the budgets need to be even tighter (EAC, 2011). Therefore, we propose that the government should consider subsidising green investments in carbon intensive sectors 

 3 It would be 30% if there were to be an international agreement following Kyoto. Currently no such agreement exists and the EU ETS phase 3 has now started. 

 

53

(‘traded sector’), for instance with finance from the UK Green Investment Bank4. Caps could then be tightened in these sectors further with a domestic commitment without detriment to competitiveness. 

36. The impacts of public and private green investment would be significant (see, Barker et al., 2012). It would help industrial sectors to adopt less‐carbon intensive technologies by compensating the weak price signal from the EU ETS and reduce the risk of leakage by making investments more attractive and compensating for increases in product prices. As every £1 invested is likely to result in an average of £0.60 additional investment (see, Barker et al., 2012) this policy would help to reduce unemployment and help to lift the UK economy out recession. In the longer term such support could also have a positive effect on other countries through the diffusion of low carbon technologies, and for UK industry through the growth of export markets for supported technologies. 

37. However, it is worth noting that the induced investment may also generate some degree of rebound in terms of increased aggregated CO2 emissions. At the very least, if UK ‘traded sector’ is ‘helped’ to reduce emission then it should have a negative impact on the carbon price in the EU ETS. Therefore the UK cap in the EU ETS should be tightened commensurately. 

 Dr J. Broderick. Paragraphs 38‐41  

The impact of unconventional fossil fuels on UK climate and energy policy 

38. We have previously submitted evidence to the Energy and Climate Change Committee ththe development of unconventional fossil fuels, indeed the expansion of fossil fuel production per se, is detrimental to climate change mitigation (Broderick et al, 2012).  

at 

mbusted ass).  nd 

                                                      

39. Whilst gas has a lower carbon intensity per unit of energy than coal, and can be coin more efficient power stations, it is still a high carbon energy source (75% carbon by mThe price effects of increased supply and hence aggregate quantity of emissions suggestthat the prospect of new unconventional gas production in the USA, Canada, Australia aChina will not in and of itself increase the likelihood of achieving a two degrees climate objective.  

40. UK policy, and Carbon Budgets, need to be robust to these new conditions, especially with regards to the common assumption of affordable, timely, high performance, commercial scale CCS. Short term indications of a lack of commitment to decarbonisation, on the prospect of substantial indigenous shale gas production or lower global prices, may jeopardize long term investment. The DECC Gas Generation Strategy is potentially problematic in this regard; a number of the gas rich scenarios presented are incompatible with existing carbon budgets and implied climate targets.  

41. Despite several clear recommendations by the Committee on Climate Change of an advisable carbon intensity of electricity sector for achieving the UK’s 80% by 2050  GHG reduction target, the Energy Bill (2012) is not clear on the intended aim on decarbonisation level. A grid carbon intensity target of 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030 is a prudent policy to assist the delivery of the carbon budgets (though it would need to be considerably tighter for UK’s international commitments around 2°C). Were power sector emissions to exceed their allocation this would place greater pressure on other sectors for reductions, which, as we have outlined in a number of sections above, may be problematic. 

 

4 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121017180846/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business‐sectors/green‐economy/gib 

 

54

References  Accenture (2011) Looking Ahead to 2030. A review of trends and influencers in the European 

chemical industry. http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture‐Looking‐Ahead‐to‐2030.pdf. Access date: 03.12.2012. 

Anderson, K. & Bows, A. (2008) Reframing the climate change challenge in light of post‐2000 emission trends. Philosophical Transactions A 366, 3863‐3882. 

Anderson, K., R. Starkey, and A. Bows (2009) Defining dangerous climate change ‐ A call for consistency. Tyndall Centre Briefing Note 40. 

Anderson, K., and Bows., A. (2011) Beyond dangerous climate change: emission pathways for a new world, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 369, 20‐44, DOI:10.1098/rsta.2010.0290 

Anderson, K., and Bows., A. (2012)  Executing a Scharnow turn: reconciling shipping emissions with international commitments on climate change. Carbon Management 3(6), 615‐628 

Barker, T., A. Anger, U. Chewpreecha, and H. Pollitt (2012) A new economics approach to modelling policies for climate change mitigation, International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, March 2012, pp 205‐221 

Broderick, J., K. Anderson, P. Gilbert (2012) House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, Seventh Report: The Impact of Shale Gas on Energy Markets, Written Evidence Vol II 

Bows, A. (2010) Aviation and climate change: confronting the challenge. The Aeronautical Journal 114, 459‐468. 

Bows, A., Traut, M., Gilbert, P., Mander, S., Walsh, C., Anderson, K. (2012) Aviation and shipping priviledged ‐ again? UK delays decision to act on emissions. Tyndall Centre Briefing Note 47. 

Camp David Declaration (2012) Leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) Camp David, Maryland, United States May 18‐19, 2012. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/2012/05/19/camp‐david‐declaration 

CCC (2008), “Building a low‐carbon economy ‐ the UK‘s contribution to tackling climate change: The first report of the Committee on Climate Change”, HMSO, Norwich 

CCC, (2010), “The fourth carbon budget: reducing the emissions through 2020” Committee on Climate Change, London, UK 

Copenhagen Accord (2009) FCCC/CP/2009/L.7. UNFCCC, Geneva, Switzerland  DECC (2009) The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: national strategy for climate and energy. London: 

HM Government Foster, G., Rahmstorf, S. (2011) Global temperature evolution 1979‐2010. Environ. Res. Lett. 6, 

044022. Gilbert, P., Bows, A. (2012) Exploring the scope for complementary sub‐global policy to mitigate 

CO2 from shipping. Energy Policy 50, 613‐622. Gilbert, P., Roeder, M., Thornley, P. (2013) ‘The chemical industry in the UK – Market and climate 

change challenges’. Tyndall Manchester Report, forthcoming Guemas, V., Doblas‐Reyes, F.J., Andreu‐Burillo, I., Asif, M. (2013) Retrospective prediction of the 

global warming slowdown in the past decade. Nature Clim. Change 3. IPCC (2010) Cross‐Working Group Meeting on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, Jasper Ridge, 

CA, USA 6‐7 July 2010. Table 1. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting‐material/uncertainty‐guidance‐note.pdf 

Jiankun, H., Wenying, C., Fei, T., Bin, L. (2009). Long‐term climate change mitigation target and carbon permit allocation. Tsinghua University. Access date:  

KPMG (2011) The Future of the European Chemical Industry. http://www.kpmg.com/BE/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/201001%20EuroChem_Europe_Final.pdf Access date: 03.12.012. 

 

55

 

Le Quéré, C., Andres, R.J., Boden, T., Conway, T., Houghton, R.A., House, J.I., Marland, G., Peters, G.P., van der Werf, G.R., Ahlström, A., Andrew, R.M., Bopp, L., Canadell, J.G., Ciais, P., Doney, S.C., Enright, C., Friedlingstein, P., Huntingford, C., Jain, A.K., Jourdain, C., Kato, E., Keeling, R.F., Klein Goldewijk, K., Levis, S., Levy, P., Lomas, M., Poulter, B., Raupach, M.R., Schwinger, J., Sitch, S., Stocker, B.D., Viovy, N., Zaehle, S., Zeng, N. (2013) The global carbon budget 1959–2011. Earth System Science Data, 165‐186. 

Murphy, J.M., et al. (2004) Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large ensemble of climate change suimulations. Nature, 429, 768–772. 

Oxford Economics (2010) The economic benefits of chemistry research to the UK. Peters, G.P., Andrew, R.M., Boden, T., Canadell, J.G., Ciais, P., Le Quéré, C., Marland, G., Raupach, 

M.R., Wilson, C. (2013) The challenge to keep global warming below 2oC. Nature Clim. Change 3, 4‐6. 

Peters, G.P., Minx, J.C., Weber, C.L., Edenhofer, O. (2011) Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108, 8903‐8908. 

Previdi, M., Liepert, B.G., Peteet, D., Hansen, J., Beerling, D.J., Broccoli, A.J., Frolking, S., Galloway, J.N., Heimann, M., Le Quéré, C., Levitus, S., Ramaswamy, V., 2013. Climate Sensitivity in the Anthropocene. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 139, in press. 

Raupach, M.R., Canadell, J.G. (2010) Carbon and the Anthropocene. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2, 1‐9. 

Rogelj, J., Meinshausen, M., Knutti, R. (2012) Global warming under old and new scenarios using IPCC climate sensitivity range estimates. Nature Climate Change 2, 248‐253. 

Wood R,F. Bows,A, Anderson,K. (2012) A one‐way ticket to high carbon lock‐in: the UK debate on aviation policy.  Carbon Management 3(6), 537–540 

  23 May 2013 

56

Written evidence submitted by the Aldersgate Group Summary 1. The Aldersgate Group strongly believes that the Climate Change Act and

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets are essential if the UK is to tackle the challenges of dangerous climate change, energy security and commodity price volatility and to secure growth, jobs and competitive advantage.

2. Levels of carbon in the atmosphere have recently reached record levels of over 400

parts per million for the first time on record. Now is not the time for any country to relax its GHG emission reduction targets.

3. Domestic action legitimises the UK’s role in international negotiations and our

domestic policies have been replicated around the world. As international competitors continue to innovate and commit to their own GHG emission targets, it would be regrettable if the UK were to weaken its own emission reduction commitments.

4. There are growth advantages for the UK to be an early mover in the transition to a

low carbon economy. The clear direction of travel provided by the Climate Change Act is already bearing fruit. The UK’s environmental goods and services sector out-performed all other sectors in 2010-2011 and is on course to halve the UK’s trade deficit by 2014-2015. To continue this growth, the Government must ensure that UK businesses have the stable policy framework they need. The Climate Change Act acts as a roadmap for businesses and investors, providing a long-term, stable environment to allow them to make investment decisions with confidence.

5. The UK cannot afford to lose momentum in this low carbon race. While the

industrialised world has led the way in the development of a low carbon economy, international competitors are catching up. Businesses argue that the Climate Change Act has set the direction of travel, so hesitation or delay is now counterproductive and will allow international competitors to seize market share.

6. In 2010 the Coalition Government committed itself to being “the greenest government

ever”, but there has been no overarching strategy to accelerate the shift to a low carbon economy. The Government has made a series of retrospective or short-notice changes to existing policies that have undermined investor confidence. Contradictory messages from Government are coming at a pivotal time.

7. Business requires a long, loud and legal policy framework, supported by Government

messaging, that builds policy coherence. Left to its own devices, the market will fail to respond swiftly enough to the threat posed by global climate change, as it has to previous threats.

8. The systems for operation and management of the carbon budgets are sound. The

Aldersgate Group fully supports the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which is a well-respected body. Management of the carbon budgets cannot, however, be undertaken by the CCC alone; the Government must respond. To ensure the carbon budgets are met, new policies or programmes are required.

9. The Aldersgate Group welcomes a number of developments that have been

undertaken since the EAC’s last inquiry into carbon budgets. We support the Committee on Climate Change’s decision to continue to monitor carbon budgets on

57

the basis of production emissions, reflecting the UK’s sphere of direct control, but welcome ongoing measurement of the UK’s consumption-based emissions.

10. The Aldersgate Group supports the CCC’s recommendation that the second and third

carbon budgets be tightened to ensure the UK can meet subsequent targets. The Government’s failure to implement the CCC’s recommendations will make it harder than necessary to meet the Fourth Carbon Budget, which in itself is a measure to ensure that the UK is on course to meet the 2050 legislated emissions reductions.

11. The Energy Bill represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decarbonise the UK’s power sector. Recent Government statements have seriously challenged the Bill’s clarity of purpose and undermined the investment community’s confidence in the UK as a safe place to build low carbon energy.

12. The Aldersgate Group is calling for the Government to underwrite the carbon budgets by including a carbon intensity target in the Energy Bill for 2030. This would provide a clear, strategic direction with objectives against which policies could deliver. This would build business and investor confidence, which is currently being eroded by mixed messages from Government.

13. The lack of a legislated decarbonisation target risks increasing the costs for renewables to 2020. It would be possible to meet Britain’s legally binding EU 2020 renewables target by largely importing the equipment and materials needed. This would mean spending the money without securing the economic benefit in terms of jobs and growth.

14. The Government should not bet that gas will be cheaper for consumers than renewable sources of power. This is dependent on unknowable future factors. Analysis suggests that although a high gas power system has lower baseline costs under particular assumptions, its sensitivity to these assumptions is far higher than under a high renewables system. Relying too heavily on gas would mean taking the risk that, if CCS is costlier than predicted, or we under deliver on energy efficiency, the Government will be forced either to increase the carbon price sharply, or to abandon its legislative decarbonisation commitments.

15. A target to reduce GHG emissions by 2030 must also be applied at EU level, where

businesses are urging for a progressive regulatory framework. The UK will benefit from an EU GHG emissions target, ensuring that its European partners share the same level of ambition as the UK and providing a market for its low carbon goods and services. Conversely, if the EU delays or weakens its action, it will undermine the confidence of its member states to take action themselves. It will also harm the EU’s reputation as a leader in international climate change negotiations.

Background 16. The Aldersgate Group is an alliance of leaders from business, politics and society

that drives action for a sustainable economy. Its mission is to trigger the change in policy required to address environmental challenges effectively and secure the maximum economic benefit in terms of sustainable growth, jobs and competitiveness.

17. The views expressed in this document can only be attributed to the Aldersgate Group

and not to individual members. 18. The Aldersgate Group is a strong advocate and supporter of the UK’s Climate

Change Act and carbon budgets. In May 2011 we wrote to the Prime Minister and

58

19. We responded to the Environmental Audit Committee’s first consultation on carbon

budgets, in June 2011 and the fourth carbon budget was the topic of our members’ reception in May 2011, where the Chief Executive of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), David Kennedy, addressed our membership.

20. In October 2012, we wrote to the Chancellor in a letter that was signed by over 50

business, industry bodies and NGOs1, calling for a carbon intensity target to be included in the Energy Bill.

21. Our members believe that decisive action on climate change, based on the best

available science and the precautionary principle, is essential for long-term economic growth, jobs and competitiveness. Failure to act at sufficient scale and pace will undermine our prosperity, make the costs of tackling climate change in the future much higher and lead the UK to miss out on commercial opportunities associated with the low carbon economy.

22. In consideration of the climate science, the evolving international framework, feasible

and cost-effective reductions in the UK through the 2020s, plausible paths to the 2050 target of 80% decarbonisation on 1990 levels and the impact on fiscal revenue and competitiveness, we strongly believe that the UK should follow the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendations for decarbonisation and its advice for the adoption of carbon budgets.

Detailed evidence The call for evidence asks respondents to consider: In light of the current climate change assessments, whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous climate change; and if not, whether the Act and/or the carbon budgets should be revised. 23. The Climate Change Act provides the framework for the UK’s transition to a low

carbon economy. It establishes a legally binding target of an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, below 1990 levels, by 2050, which is supported by a series of five-year carbon budgets. These act as stepping-stones to the 2050 goal and are set on a 15-year time horizon.

24. The Aldersgate Group strongly believes that the Climate Change Act and

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets are essential if the UK is to tackle the challenges of dangerous climate change, energy security and commodity price volatility and to secure growth, jobs and competitive advantage.

25. Now more than ever, it is essential for the UK to stick to the targets that the Act has

set. Since the Climate Change Act became law levels of carbon in the atmosphere have continued to rise, recently reaching record levels of over 400 parts per million (ppm) for the first time on record.2 Estimates suggest that the last time atmospheric

1 Aldersgate Group (October 2012) Letter to the Chancellor: http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/asset/download/832/Letter%20to%20Chancellor.pdf 2 Guardian (29th April 2013) “Global carbon dioxide levels set to pass 400ppm milestone”

59

CO2 reached these levels of concentration – three to five million years ago – global average temperatures were three to four degrees higher and as much as 10 degrees higher at the poles. Sea levels were probably between five and forty meters higher than they are today. Of course, 400ppm is not our end destination: global emissions are set to continue rising.

26. With emissions rising at this rate, now is not the time for any country to be relaxing

GHG emission reduction targets. Quite the opposite – a major step-change in most countries’ pre-2020 effort is essential if we are to have any chance of keeping average temperature rise below two degrees.

27. The UK accounts for 2% of global emissions3 (on a production basis), so a reduction

in domestic emissions will have a minor direct impact on global climate change. But the UK’s true impact is far broader than this percentage suggests. The Committee on Climate Change has shown that the UK’s indirect carbon emissions (on a consumption basis), give it a carbon footprint that is 80% larger than if it were measured by production emissions alone4.

28. A binding international agreement, scheduled for 2015 to cover the post-2020 period,

remains essential to tackle global climate change, but progress towards it is slow. National frameworks are thus increasingly important to bridge the gap and revitalise momentum towards a global deal. As the first country in the world to industrialise, the UK has a responsibility to lead the way in tackling climate change and has played a key role in international climate change negotiations thus far.

29. Domestic action legitimises the UK’s role in international negotiations. This was

recognised by the Government, which committed to work towards “a comprehensive, legally binding international climate change agreement”, and noted that, “The right way to do this is through well planned and measurable action right across the UK.”5 The Foreign Secretary, William Hague warned the Prime Minister, “We will not secure a binding climate agreement in 2015 unless the idea of low carbon growth becomes dominant across the major economies before then. We can leverage this. But our diplomacy will only succeed if it is rooted in our own domestic narrative.”6 To have credibility on the world stage, the UK must take robust action domestically to deliver on its emission reduction commitments. Backtracking or ignoring the best available scientific evidence would harm the UK’s reputation and undermine much needed momentum to deliver a global deal.

30. The UK’s domestic policies have been replicated around the world. The UK led the

way in 2008 with its cross-party agreement, which produced the world’s first legally binding 2050 target. Mexico has since introduced a Climate Change Act7, Australia is bringing forward a Clean Energy Act8 which closely resembles the UK’s Act,

3 HM Government (December 2011) The Carbon Plan 4 Committee on Climate Change (April 2013) Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks 5 HM Government (December 2011) The Carbon Plan 6 Letter from William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Office to Prime Minister David Cameron (19th March 2012). http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2012/may/18/william-hague-green-economy-letter 7 See Globe International’s 3rd Climate Legislation Study: http://www.globeinternational.org/index.php/legislation-policy/studies/climate 8 See Clean Energy Act 2011, the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011,the Climate Change Authority Act 2011, the Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) Act 2011 at

60

including an emissions trading scheme, 80% emissions reduction by 2050 and a Climate Change Authority that mirrors the Committee on Climate Change. A White Paper from the Norwegian Parliament9 is investigating the need for a climate change act similar to the UK’s and there is a similar investigation by the Danish Government.

31. But international competitors continue to innovate and commit to their own GHG

emissions targets. South Africa will adopt a new carbon tax from 2015 and China’s 12th Five Year Plan has challenging targets on energy efficiency and carbon intensity10. It would be regrettable if the UK were to weaken its own emission reduction commitments as global competitors commit to their own and would undermine the possibility of a global agreement in 2015.

32. There are growth opportunities for the UK to be an early mover in the transition to a

low carbon economy. Early mover advantage can lead to opportunities for growth and job creation in the lucrative global market for environmental goods and services. The clear direction of travel provided by the Climate Change Act is already bearing fruit. The UK’s environmental goods and services sector out-performed all other sectors in 2010-201111 despite the challenging economic times, winning a £122 billion slice of the global market worth £3.3 trillion and it is on course to halve the UK’s trade deficit by 2014-2015. The opportunities for further growth are strong. The UK has approximately 3.7% market share of the £3.3 trillion global environmental goods and services sector, having outstripped the global green business growth rate in 2010-11.12 Already the UK is the green financing capital of the world, with one third of all global asset deals between 2007 and 2012 receiving both legal and financial advice from the UK13. By 2015, the UK market could be worth as much as £150 billion and employ over 1.2 million people14. This is already making a significant contribution to the UK economy, with the green sector likely to have accounted for one third of the UK’s economic grown in 2011-2012.15 There is therefore a core source of expertise for transforming the whole economy.

33. To continue this growth, the Government must provide the stability that UK businesses need, to compete on the global stage. Leading businesses have warned the Chancellor that their continued investment in the UK is “critically dependent on a long-term stable policy framework.”16

34. The Climate Change Act acts as a roadmap for businesses and investors, providing a long-term, stable environment to allow them to make investment decisions with

http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Legislation-and-regulations/Pages/default.aspx 9 See the Norwegian Parliament’s White Paper (http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37858627/PDFS/STM201120120021000DD) and the cross-party agreement to take forward the development of a new climate change law in Norway (http://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2011-2012/inns-201112-390.pdf). 10 See ‘China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change’, The National Development and Reform Commission, The People’s Republic of China, 2012: http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/W020121122588539459161.pdf 11 CBI (July 2012) The Colour of Growth 12 CBI (July 2012) The Colour of Growth 13 Green Alliance (August 2012) Green economy: a UK success story. 14 Department of Business Innovation & Skills (BIS) (December 2010) Growth Review Framework for Advanced Manufacturing. 15 CBI (July 2012) The Colour of Growth 16 Letter reported in The Telegraph (8th October 2012) “Businesses threaten to withdraw investment if Government does not go green enough.” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9593184/Businesses-threaten-to-withdraw-investment-if-Government-does-not-go-green-enough.html

61

confidence. Even with this in place, the business community has repeatedly cited policy risk as a significant impediment to investment in the UK. John Cridland, Director General of the CBI, noted that, “building confidence in new technologies and markets is essential to get ahead of the game. If we can’t be sure that the policies of today will be the policies of tomorrow, investors will simply spend their money elsewhere.”17 The Climate Change Act underwrites the Government’s commitment to tackling climate change, encouraging investment in innovation for the low carbon economy, reducing policy risk and leading to a reduction in the cost of capital.

35. The UK cannot afford to lose momentum in this low carbon race. While the industrialised world has led the way in the development of a low carbon economy, international competitors are catching up. Many developing countries are winning market share and increasing their carbon productivity. Ernst & Young’s analysis of the relative attractiveness of countries for renewable energy investments demonstrates that “a new world order is emerging in the clean-tech sector with China now the clear leader in the global renewables market”18. HSBC19 predicts that the share of the three largest industrialised low carbon markets (EU, USA and Japan) will fall from 60% in 2009 to 53% in 2020, while the share of the three leading major emerging markets (China, India and Brazil) will grow from 25% to 34%. In the words of Barack Obama, “nobody in this race is standing still”20.

36. Businesses argue that the Climate Change Act has set the direction of travel, so hesitation or delay is now counterproductive and will allow international competitors to seize market share. The UK must ensure it has the right policy framework in place to deliver confidence, growth, innovation and jobs in the future low carbon economy.

37. In 2010 the Coalition Government committed itself to being “the greenest government

ever”. Policies launched since that time, such as the Green Investment Bank, Green Deal and mandatory carbon reporting for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, have been welcomed as evidence of the Government’s desire to drive the transition to a new economy.

38. However there has been no overarching strategy to accelerate the shift to a low

carbon economy and the Government has made a series of retrospective or short-notice changes to existing policies which have undermined investor confidence. It decided to review the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2014, there have been mixed messages from government ministers on a number of vital issues and Budget 2013 offered tax breaks for shale gas, but largely ignored the UK-based green businesses that are already creating a trade surplus of £5 billion21. The CCC has noted the “high degree of uncertainty about development of the power system beyond 2020 [which] threatens fundamentally to undermine the EMR [Electricity Market Reform]. Unless this is addressed, projects coming on to the system before 2020 are likely to be at high cost and there could well be an investment hiatus for projects coming on after 2020. Therefore, Government action is necessary to resolve these uncertainties in order that the UK can gain maximum economic and employment benefit from the move to a low-carbon economy.”22

17 John Cridland writing in the Foreword of CBI’s publication (July 2012) The Colour of Growth 18 Ernst & Young (November 2010) Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices. 19 HSBC (September 2010) Sizing the Climate Economy. 20 The White House (26th May 2010) Remarks by the President on the Economy. 21 CBI (July 2012) The Colour of Growth 22 Committee on Climate Change (May 2013) Next steps on Electricity Market Reform – securing the benefits of low-carbon investment

62

39. The Aldersgate Group is deeply concerned by the uncertainty created by the Government’s Gas Generation Strategy23. This contemplates three ‘pathways’ for gas generation and the carbon intensity of the grid by 2030. One of these proposes a grid average of 200g of CO2 per kilowatt hour, which is four times the level recommended by the Committee on Climate Change, to put the UK on the most cost-effective path to decarbonise. By the Government’s own admission, this pathway would be incompatible with current legislated targets and would require the Fourth Carbon budget to be revised upwards. “Only if the world were to abandon attempts to limit the risk of dangerous climate change would there be significant cost savings from a strategy focused on investment in gas-fired generation.”24

40. Contradictory messages from Government are coming at a pivotal time. Projections from the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) show that investment in renewables will hit a cliff in 2020, if access to the Renewables Obligation is closed in 2017, as currently planned25. SSE warns that “Sufficient certainty that renewables will be a long-term part of the energy system, well beyond the current 2020 cliff edge, is needed in order to allow the industry to mature and put renewables on a path of cost reduction that will steadily reduce and eliminate the need for support.”26 The CBI warned Government prior to publication of its gas strategy, that an “over-reliance on new gas would leave us exposed to global price and supply fluctuations and jeopardise our carbon targets, so we need to build more of everything, including renewables, nuclear and CCS.”27

41. Business requires a long, loud and legal policy framework, supported by Government messaging, that builds policy coherence.

42. It is not feasible to ‘let the market decide’, to tackle market failure. The Executive Director of UNEP, Achim Steiner argued, “There’s a perception that climate change legislation is about government running the economy, but the fact of the matter is that much of what we talk about in terms of climate change legislation is to set targets, within which the economy then makes choices.”28 Left to its own devices, the market will fail to respond swiftly enough to the threat posed by global climate change, as it has to previous threats: “Markets also malfunction if there are information problems, if firms have monopolistic power or if innovation is not properly rewarded.”29 The Climate Change Act and its carbon budgets provide the framework, which must be supported by Government statements, in response to which businesses make choices.

23 Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) (December 2012) Gas Generation Strategy. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65654/7165-gas-generation-strategy.pdf 24 Committee on Climate Change (May 2013) Next steps on Electricity Market Reform – securing the benefits of low-carbon investment 25 See analysis presented by SSE here: http://news.sse.com/listing/2013/02/blog-why-the-uk-needs-a-2030-decarbonisation-target/ 26 SSE’s Keith Maclean quoted in the Guardian, 25th Oct 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/25/uk-renewables-2030-wwf 27 The Guardian (14th October 2012) “Business bosses attack George Osborne’s policy of ‘dash for gas’”. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/14/george-osborne-dash-for-gas 28 Achim Steiner interviewed by RTE Radio 1 on 22nd April 2013: http://www.rte.ie/radio/utils/radioplayer/rteradioweb.html#!rii=9%3A20192627%3A83%3A22%2D04%2D2013%3A 29 Bowen and Fankhauser (26th August 2012) Blog: ‘Green Growth’ is an attractive concept for analysts and policy makers alike, but to be effective it must be backed up by effective collection action, not spin.

63

The operation and management of the carbon budgets, including: the accountability and governance arrangements, and the extent to which the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations have been addressed; the effectiveness of the overall management system, including for meeting carbon budgets by sector; and the current status, operation and impact of the National Emissions Target Board. 43. The systems for operation and management of the carbon budgets are sound. The

Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was established under the Climate Change Act 2008, as an independent body to advise Government on the UK’s progress in reducing carbon emissions and preparation for climate change. The Aldersgate Group fully supports the CCC’s recommendations and management of the carbon budgets. It is a well-respected body that provides expertise in climate change targets and is a credit to the UK’s policy landscape.

44. The CCC’s carbon budgets are based on the best possible evidence and assessment, which help Aldersgate Group members to plan for a decarbonised future. Data is made publicly available, which provides a common point of reference for discussions between government, business and civil society. The CCC provides consistency and independence, helping to smooth out the sudden policy shifts from Government, which are destabilising for business and investors.

45. Management of the carbon budgets cannot, however, be undertaken by the CCC alone; the Government must respond. The CCC has called repeatedly for a step change to address the gap between the UK’s long-term environmental ambitions and the policies in place to address them. To ensure the carbon budgets are met and the UK maximises the economic opportunities, new policies or programmes are required. For example we recommend that the Government:

• incorporates a major overarching, low carbon element into its industrial strategy • takes the opportunity to explore how long-term trends (such as resource

insecurity and climate change) will affect competitiveness across the priority sectors

• adopts an overlaying strategy that seeks to maximise economic opportunities. The strategy should be accompanied by a set of economic and environmental indicators against which progress towards a low carbon and resource efficient economy may be measured.

46. The Aldersgate Group welcomes a number of developments that have been undertaken since the EAC’s last inquiry into carbon budgets. In our 2011 response, we recommended that the Government address issues of competitiveness for energy intensive industries, that the CCC should review the Fourth Carbon Budget and make a recommendation to Government, prior to the Government’s own review in 2014, and that consumption-based emissions should be considered for inclusion in the UK’s carbon footprint. All these recommendations were included in the EAC’s report to Government, and have subsequently been actioned.

47. We welcome the CCC’s review of consumption-based emissions, which found that the UK is now one of the world’s largest net importers of emissions, “with a carbon footprint that is around 80% larger than its production emissions.”30 We support the Committee’s decision to continue to monitor carbon budgets on the basis of production emissions, reflecting the UK’s sphere of direct control, but welcome the

30 Committee on Climate Change (April 2013) Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks

64

ongoing measurement of the UK’s consumption-based emissions and recommend that these be regularly reported. If a global deal is not forthcoming, other means of pricing in carbon should be considered.

What the Government’s response should be to the Committee on Climate Change’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance, and whether the carbon budgets should be tightened or relaxed. 48. The carbon budgets represent the minimum ambition if the UK is to meet its

legislated target of 80% reduction of emissions on 1990 levels by 2050. As described above, in the context of the climate science, the evolving international framework, the impact of the UK’s domestic policies and the benefits of clear policy to business, the carbon budgets should not be relaxed.

49. The Aldersgate Group supports the CCC’s recommendation that the second and third

carbon budgets be tightened to ensure that the UK can meet subsequent targets. “The [Fourth] Domestic Action budget recommended for 2023-2027, and the indicative 2030 target, will be difficult to achieve unless the UK enters the 2020s at a level of emissions consistent with the Intended budgets for the non-traded sector, rather than with the less ambitious Interim budgets.”31 The CCC further notes, “from the third Intended budget to the fourth Domestic Action budget would entail a feasible reduction of 13% over a five-year period: from the third Interim budget to the fourth Domestic Action budget would require a much more challenging 23% reduction.”32

50. The Government’s failure to implement the CCC’s recommendations will make it

harder than necessary to meet the Fourth Carbon Budget, which in itself is a measure to ensure that the UK is on course to meet the 2050 legislated emissions reductions. In turn, the ambitions of the Climate Change Act amount to the minimum action required of the UK to play its part in a global effort to prevent global average temperature rises in excess of 2ºC.

51. The Energy Bill represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decarbonise the

UK’s power sector, attracting £110bn into an economy that badly needs investment; providing a hedge against fossil fuel price volatility (which hits businesses and households), and lowering the cost of capital for the UK to meet is carbon budgets. Recent Government statements have seriously challenged the Bill’s clarity of purpose and undermined the investment community’s confidence in the UK as a safe place to build low carbon energy.

52. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) made this clear in an open letter to Ed

Davey on 13 September 2012: “The apparently ambivalent position of the Government about whether it is trying to build a low-carbon or a gas-based power system weakens the signal provided by carbon budgets to investors. It makes more pronounced the perceived risk that the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) will perpetuate the current stop-start approach to investment in low-carbon technologies. As a result, the cases for low-carbon business development, capital allocation, innovation and supply chain investment are undermined, damaging prospects for required low-carbon investments.”33

53. In response to this uncertainty, the Aldersgate Group is calling for the Government to

underwrite the carbon budgets by including a carbon intensity, or decarbonisation

31 Committee on Climate Change (December 2010) Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 12. 32 Committee on Climate Change (December 2010) Fourth Carbon Budget report, page 31. 33 http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/EMR%20letter%20-%20September%2012.pdf

65

target in the Energy Bill for 2030. The decarbonisation target must be set by 2014 in time to be embedded into the architecture of the Electricity Market Reform, and met by 2030. Advice must be sought from the CCC in setting the target and planning for how it would be achieved.

54. A decarbonisation target would provide a clear, strategic direction, with objectives

against which policies could deliver. This would build business and investor confidence, which is currently being eroded by mixed messages from Government.

55. The Government has postponed the decision on a decarbonisation target until 2016,

while the target that may be decided would not have to be met by 2030. This decision is not required to take account of the CCC’s advice and there is no guidance on how any target that is set, would be met, or would interact with the other electricity market reform proposals. This creates a high degree of uncertainty, which “will adversely impact on supply chain investment decisions and project development, therefore undermining implementation of the Bill and raising costs for consumers.”34

56. Neil Bentley, Deputy-Director General of the CBI, said just before the Bill’s

introduction that, “The Energy Bill must deliver the pace of decarbonisation required to achieve [the carbon budgets]. The link to the existing Climate Change Act targets should be enshrined in the Energy Bill”35. The Government’s own impact assessment of the Energy Bill found that early decarbonisation of the power sector would result in significant net benefits to the economy: £5.5 billion under a 50g/kWh pathway and £4.5-7.8bn under a 100g/kWh pathway – in contrast to only £2.2bn under a 200g/kWh pathway.36 A group of leading businesses argued that to secure further investment in low carbon power generation, a decarbonisation target by 2030 should be included in the legislation and “postponing the 2030 decision until 2016 creates entirely avoidable political risk. This will slow growth in the low carbon sector, handicap the UK supply chain, reduce UK R&D and produce fewer new jobs.”37

57. The lack of a legislated decarbonisation target risks increasing the costs for

renewables (as well as nuclear and CCS) to 2020 that have already been largely agreed; contracts for difference for renewable power, nuclear power, and CCS will come from the Levy Control Framework, capped at £7.6 billion in 2020. It would be possible to meet Britain’s legally binding EU 2020 renewables target and issue contracts for difference using the Levy Control Framework by largely importing the equipment and materials needed. In other words, we would be spending this money without securing the economic benefit from the investment in terms of jobs and growth. A 2030 decarbonisation target in 2014 would provide greater long-term certainty that would help to ensure that the money spent this decade would build a competitive domestic supply chain. This would both lower the cost of electricity generation and give a much-needed boost to British manufacturing.

34 Letter from Lord Deben, Chair of the Committee on Climate Change (25th February 2013) to DECC Secretary of State, Ed Davey: http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ed-Davey-February13.pdf 35 Speech by Neil Bentley, CBI Deputy Director General (18th October 2012) “The future of UK energy policy”. http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/1797512/the_future_of_uk_energy_policy_-_neil_bentley_speech_oct_2012.pdf 36 DECC Impact Assessment (8th May 2013) Electricity Market Reform – ensuring electricity security of supply and promoting investmetn in low carbon generation. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197904/cfd_ia_may_update.pdf 37 Letter to the Chancellor from Alstom, Areva, Doosan, Gamesa, Mitsubishi and Vestas (7th March 2013) “2030 Carbon Intensity Target for the Electricity Sector.” http://www.vestas.com/Files/Filer/EN/FINAL_Industry_letter_-_2030_target_-_7_March_2013.pdf

66

58. Government has argued that gas would be cheaper for consumers than renewable

sources of power. This is impossible to know with any certainty, because it is dependent upon unknowable future factors, such as the future price of gas, the cost of CCS and learning rates for renewable technologies. Intuitively, as Lord Deben notes, “to invest in low-carbon technologies to 2020, then to focus on investment in gas in the 2020s, and to move back to investment in low-carbon generation in the 2030s simply doesn’t stand up. Such an approach is likely to drive up costs.”38

59. The Government’s policy challenge is to manage these uncertainties by hedging

against the risk of being wrong. Analysis39 suggests that although a high gas power system has lower baseline costs under particular assumptions, its sensitivity to these assumptions is far higher than under a high renewables system. Under certain circumstances, the costs of a gas intensive power sector could be up to 98% higher than the forecast central scenario, which, in practice, would almost certainly result in the Government being forced to abandon its low carbon policy initiatives. Relying too heavily on gas would mean taking the risk that, if CCS is costlier than predicted, or we under deliver on energy efficiency, the Government will be forced either to increase the carbon price sharply, or to abandon its legislative decarbonisation commitments. Relying too heavily on gas means backing the UK into a position where we stand a chance of having to choose between affordable or low carbon energy further down the line. This would not be responsible governance.

60. The robust case and overwhelming support for a binding 2030 power sector target has been made absolutely clear. It is now time for the Government to step up to the task. Failure to do so would deliver another severely damaging blow to investor confidence.

61. A target to reduce GHG emissions by 2030 must also be applied at EU level, to

provide certainty to pan-European businesses and drive investment. With low carbon goods and services being traded across borders, environmental policies across the Common Market must align to create a level playing field. The European Commission is now consulting on the framework for climate and energy policies to 203040 and businesses are urging for “an ambitious policy on climate and energy targets [that] will drive investment.”41

62. The UK will benefit from the EU’s GHG emissions reductions targets reflecting its

own. The EU bloc is the UK’s largest trading partner and “eurozone economies do more business with the UK than any other country, including the US.”42 Aligned environmental policies will ensure a market for the UK’s low carbon businesses that, as discussed above, have already carved out 3.7% share of the global market43.

38 Lord Deben’s Foreword in Committee on Climate Change (May 2013) Next steps on Electricity Market Reform – securing the benefits of low-carbon investment 39 E3G (October 2012) Risk managing power sector decarbonisation in the UK. Avoiding the risks of a new “Dash for Gas”. 40 European Commission (March 2013) Green Paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0169:FIN:EN:PDF 41 Vestas press release (21st May 2013) “Engel encourages EU leaders to adopt 2030 climate and energy targets that will change the balance of incentives to favour green energy investments. http://www.vestas.com/en/media/news/news-display.aspx?action=3&NewsID=3277 42 Stephanie Flanders (21st January 2013), “Trading places: The UK, Germany and France”. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21127037 43 CBI (July 2012) The Colour of Growth

67

63. The EU must equal the ambition shown by its member states. The UK Chancellor, George Osborne, announced that, “We’re not going to save the planet by putting our country out of business”, and committed to “cut our carbon emissions no slower but also no faster than our fellow countries in Europe.”44 If the EU delays or weakens its action on GHG emissions reduction commitments, it will undermine the confidence of its member states to take action themselves.

64. If the EU backpedals or stalls in its action on climate change, it will undermine its

reputation as a leader in international climate change negotiations. With two out of the next three UN climate change conventions to be held in Europe, it has never been more important for the EU to show leadership and provide an ambitious, transparent, stable and predictable pathway to decarbonisation.

23 May 2013

44 George Osborne’s conference speech, October 2011. Read the full speech here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/georgeosborne/8804027/Conservative-Party-Conference-2011-George-Osborne-speech-in-full.html

68

Written evidence submitted by Friends of the Earth

Summary Our response covers four points. All four should be seen in the context of extreme urgency on climate change – global concentrations of greenhouse gases are now 400ppmv and risingi, and nations’ current pledges, even if met, would likely only limit temperature rises to around 3.5 degreesii – which would be likely to have devastating consequences for humanity. Action from almost all nations needs to be ramped up; global emissions need to peak as soon as possible, and then fall rapidly.

• The UK’s carbon budgets and Climate Change Act are seen internationally as a sign of collective cross-party political leadership, transcending day-to-day party politics, which has been a huge boost to British climate diplomacy, and a stimulus for climate legislation around the world. Attempts to weaken the carbon budgets or Act would have negative consequences internationally as well as nationallyiii. We urge that the Review must strengthen, not weaken, the UK’s climate response.

• The UK needs to tighten its territorial carbon budgets so that they are commensurate with the threat of climate change, and the UK’s fair share of responsibility for tackling it. Current budgets fall short of this on both counts.

o UK 2030 target should be an 80% cut on 1990 levels at the least.

• The UK’s policies are not adequate to tackle even current carbon budgets, and need substantial strengthening:

o Power sector progress is hampered by Treasury refusal to allow a 2030 decarbonisation target, and its hostility to carbon budgets; this is damaging investor confidence

o The Government is overly focussed on energy supply and does not look adequately at tackling demand

• The UK needs a broader strategy for doing its part in tackling climate change,

which goes beyond territorial emissions, and delivers a much greater leadership role internationally to tackle climate change.

o We suggest that the Committee should launch a wide-ranging inquiry into the role of the UK financial sector in tackling climate change, particularly fossil-fuel finance, given the major role played by UK financial institutions in financing investments globally.

o Support for fracking and tax breaks for new North Sea Oil and Gas exploration are at odds with climate change policyiv. It is adding to an already huge “unburnable carbon”v problem, and sending confusing signals to investors on the UK Government’s attitude towards tackling climate change.

o The UK’s proposals for an EU 2030 target should be based on a fair share for the EU in keeping emissions below 2 degrees: this would be an 80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions on 1990 levels.

69

Main response

1) The Review should seek to strengthen, not weaken, the Climate Change Act

It is damaging for the Treasury to be forcing a review of the 4th carbon budget, with a view to weakening it. The signals this sends to the investor community are poor, and will drive up the cost of capital and delay investment in the UK: the opposite of what Treasury should want. The National Audit Office’s 2013 report for Treasury on infrastructure said that: “Electricity generating companies and investors we spoke to were concerned by what they perceived as a lack of clarity over the types of electricity generation projects government wishes to promote, and the price support mechanisms and levels for different generation methods. As a result, the electricity generating companies were holding back on some potential investments”vi. It also sends a poor signal globally, when the UK’s Climate Change Act and carbon budget process has been described as “one of the main stimuli for climate legislation around the world”vii. The only advantage of this review is that it offers the opportunity to tighten carbon budgets to the level required to tackle climate change adequately, rather than the Treasury’s seeming intention to weaken the carbon budgets. We hope that the EAC would invite the Chancellor to give evidence to the Committee on the Treasury’s views on carbon budgets.

2) Tightening UK carbon budgets:

• The UK’s carbon budgets are based on a global carbon budget which has a

greater than 50% chance of exceeding two degrees, and also a 10% chance of exceeding three degrees:

o 50% is very high risk for a temperature rise we “must…not exceed”viii. Reducing the risk to 33% (the IPCC definition of “unlikely”) would reduce the carbon budget considerably.

o 2 degrees is in any case already very risky – James Hansen in May 2013 evidence to the EAC describes it as “an upper bound” of what is acceptable; Tyndall Centre describe 2 degrees as “the boundary between dangerous and extremely dangerous”ix. Many countries advocate a 1.5 degree target.

o Above 2 degrees increases risks of irreversible tipping points, as well as worse droughts, floods and other impacts. A 10% chance of exceeding three degrees seems an extremely risky course to accept.

• They are based on an unreasonably large appropriation of that global carbon budget for the UK

o The CCC’s first report in 2008 discusses different countries’ responsibilities, and advocate that only by 2050, there should be equal per capita emissions

o This is an extremely pro-developed country position to take, appropriating far more than an equal share of the remaining global carbon budget to developed countries.

70

o Developed countries no longer have the excuse that they need time to adjust – discussions on equitable approaches to climate change have been ongoing for two decades.

o Other countries would give lower shares to developed countries, allowing developing countries greater “emissions space” to develop and make the transition to low-carbon economies.

o The CCC also state that “it is not part of the Committee’s remit to propose a specific methodology for the purposes of international negotiations” and “nor do we make a judgement about which methodology is ethically preferable to another”x.

o However, they have had to make such a choice, in setting the UK budget, and have explicitly chosen one which benefits the UK greatly at other countries’ expense. We hope that the Committee would look into the position the CCC and Government have taken regarding the UK’s responsibility on climate change as reflected in carbon budgets.

• These two assumptions mean the UK’s carbon budgets are in our view far too lax at present. An equal per capita share of the remaining carbon budget for a likely chance of avoiding two degrees would mean UK cuts of 80% in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, on 1990 levels. This focus solely on remaining carbon budgets also ignores all historical responsibility for climate change, so is still very generous to the UK.

• The CCC’s budget analysis is also based on assumptions around dates for global peaking of emissions which now look unlikely to occur. If this is the case, this means greater global emissions cuts will be required in future. This, coupled with increased understanding of the science of climate change and the likely impacts of 2 degree warming, suggest that these are further reasons for tightening the UK’s carbon budget.

3) Stronger policies

Within the UK, we have major concerns over progress towards meeting even existing carbon budgets.

• The Carbon Planxi notes that existing policies, even if implemented, are not sufficient to keep within the 4th Carbon Budget

• The CCC have repeatedly stated in their annual reviews that a policy “step change” is required.

• There are weak institutional arrangements in the power sector. The National Policy Statements on energy infrastructure contain guidance that climate change mitigation cannot be considered in the final planning decision; and the Emissions Performance Standard is too weak to prevent new high carbon infrastructure. In this context, there is a strong risk that high carbon investment will crowd out low-carbon. A 2030 decarbonisation target in the Energy Billxii currently before Parliament would send a necessary signal to potential investors that the UK is genuinely committed to low-carbon investment in the power sector beyond 2020.

• The attitude of the National Policy Statements to climate change is symptomatic of a broader concern that the overarching carbon budgets may be seen in some quarters of Government as a type of “carbon-magic” – whereby

71

the impact of a particular decision on climate can be disregarded because policies elsewhere will ensure that carbon budgets will be adhered to.

• We are very concerned that the Government’s attitude is to (grudgingly) support low-carbon infrastructure, but AT THE SAME TIME still support large amounts of high-carbon infrastructure – such as more roads, gas-fired power stations, oil and gas exploration and airports. This is not credible or consistent – it is akin to a healthy eating strategy promoting fruit and veg while also opening a chain of deep-fried-pie shops.

• There is a heavy overemphasis on supply, and underemphasis on demand, right across the economy, most evident in the fossil fuel sector:

o The Government’s fossil fuel strategy is “to continue maximising the recovery of indigenous hydrocarbon resources – on land and at sea”xiii.

o By contrast, the Government expects almost no progress at all in cutting oil or gas consumption between now and 2030. Its energy projections see oil consumption falling by 3%, and gas consumption falling by 0.3%xiv.

o If the UK wants to reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports, a strategy to minimise use of fossil fuels, rather than maximising domestic extraction, would be far more suited to tackling climate change.

o Carbon Tracker estimate that only 20% of current global fossil fuel reserves can be safely burnedxv. The UK policy to add it to its own reserves – for example through fracking or through tax breaks to exploit North Sea heavy oils is simply adding to a vast quantity of already unburnable carbon.

o New analysisxvi from Friends of the Earth argues that the UK has already extracted its fair share of safely burnable carbon.

• Local carbon plans are needed to drive emissions reductions – there needs to be a strong relationship between national carbon budgeting and local action. The CCC have summarised the situation in their May 2012 reportxvii.

• Aviation and shipping should be included in carbon budgets, with much stronger policies to tackle their emissions. It is poor policy to make decisions about airport expansion without properly measuring and having a plan to reduce this sector’s emissions.

• We repeat our concern expressed to the EAC’s previous carbon budget inquiry that the Government should adopt the CCC’s recommendation that the 4th carbon budget should be met within the UK, without credit purchase. The potential to use credit purchases has long been a gaping loophole in the Climate Change Act – the EUETS is not a capped system as it allows vast quantities of credits to be purchased from countries without emissions caps.

4) The UK’s global role

The purpose of the UK Climate Change Act is to ensure the UK plays its part in preventing dangerous climate change. The Act focuses on the UK’s territorial emissions. However, there are other major effects the UK can have on preventing climate change, beyond its territorial emissions. In keeping with the spirit and intention of the act, these other effects should be addressed as well. For example:

72

• UK has a major role through its globally dominant financial sector: the FTSE 100 has a high-fossil fuel intensity; the UK has a $2 trillion pension sector; UK based banks have a major role in financing energy investments. We suggest that the Committee should conduct a wide-ranging inquiry looking at the UK financial sector’s role in preventing dangerous climate change, with a focus on fossil fuel investment.

• The UK’s inputs to the forthcoming EU 2030 Greenhouse Gas targets – the UK is likely to propose around 40-50%, when again an EU wide target of 80% is more appropriate. The UK should be clear about what its proposal is assuming for emissions reductions for other countries, and what chance of exceeding 2 degrees.

• UK’s consumption of products, for example from net imports such as agricultural produce and manufactured goods, makes us effective net imports of GHGs. These fall outside the scope of the Climate Change Act, but have real climate implications. The UK needs to implement a strategy to tackle these emissions.

• Leadership role on core technologies –offshore wind is one example of an area where the UK is leading, and where there could be major, faster deployment in other countries, if the UK leads the way. The same applies for other marine technologies.

• Leadership role on carbon budgeting. The UK’s Climate Change Act and its carbon budgeting process is a world first - this can be replicated elsewhere, so attempts to weaken it should be strongly resisted.

• Leadership in international negotiations. We are heading for 3.5 degrees plus. As James Hansen argued in his May 2013 oral evidence to the EAC, the UK has the highest per capita historical responsibility for climate change - the UK must lead, and do this by advocating and implementing clear, fair positions and policies which would keep temperatures below 2 degrees.

24 May 2013 i See Keeling curve data at Scripps Institution of Oceanography ii See http://www.climateactiontracker.org/ iii See John Ashton former special representative for climate change to the UK Government. Speech “Cometh the hour”, May 2013. iv See Friends of the Earth, 2013. UK fossil fuel tax breaks. May. v Carbon Tracker, 2013. Unburnable Carbon 2013. vi NAO, 2013. Planning for economic infrastructure. vii John Ashton speech “cometh the hour”, op.cit. viii Eg, EU Council, 2007. Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius The way ahead for 2020 and beyond. “The EU must adopt the necessary domestic measures and take the lead internationally to ensure that global average temperature increases do not exceed pre-industrial levels by more than 2°C.” ix Tyndall Centre, 2011. Written evidence to Environmental Audit Committee on Carbon Budgets. 27th June x CCC, 2008. Building a low-carbon economy. Page 30. xi HM Govt, 2011. The Carbon Plan. Annex B. xii See Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, 2013. The need for a decarbonisation target. April xiii Ed Davey, 2013. Green Growth, Green Jobs: The success of renewables in Scotland. 18th March. xiv DECC, 2012. Energy and Emissions projections. Annex C. xv Carbon Tracker, 2013. Unburnable Carbon 2013.

73

xvi Friends of the Earth, 2013 (forthcoming). Unburnable carbon – how much fossil fuel can the UK fairly extract? xvii CCC, 2012. How local authorities can reduce emissions and manage climate risks.

74

Written evidence submitted by Terry O’Connell The Climate Change Act and its budgets need revision. They are inadequate because: -

1. The Committee on Climate Change gives only 44% odds for success in avoiding more than a 2°C temperature rise. Once ‘feedback effects’ are included, emissions contraction should be complete by 2050 if we are to give better than 50:50 odds for keeping within the 2°C rise.

2. The CCC prescribes 2016 as the peak emissions year and 2050 as the International ‘Convergence’ year, foregoing the need for international negotiation of these dates.

3. The CCC and UKMO omit major feedback effects from calculation of their

‘Contraction & Concentrations’ scenario.

1. Committee on Climate Change review of carbon budgets

1.1 Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change - 2006

4. The need for proper accounting for climate-carbon cycle feedbacks was recognised by UK government well before the Climate Change Act was adopted. Following the 2005 Exeter scientific conference, the government published "Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change". Amongst its conclusions is clear recognition of the importance of feedbacks:

5. "We conclude, therefore, that any mitigation or stabilisation policy which aims

to prevent ‘dangerous’ climate change through stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 levels must take into account climate-carbon cycle feedbacks and their associated uncertainty. Failure to do so may lead to a significant underestimate of the action required to achieve stabilisation". (Chapter 34.4 Conclusions).

1.2 Building a Low Carbon Economy - 2008

6. The Committee on Climate Change was established later under the 2008 Climate Change Act. With the Hadley Centre, the Committee produced the global and UK carbon budgets published in "Building a Low Carbon Economy" at the end of 2008.

7. Feedbacks were recognised as a major consideration in the approach to

setting climate policy objectives (Part 1, Chapter 1 Setting a 2050 Target). In summary, feedback loops were divided into two categories:

8. - Those that determine the overall temperature response to a given

increase in GHG concentrations. The overall strength of this temperature feedback is often measured as ‘climate sensitivity’.

75

9. -Those that further alter GHG concentrations in response to climate change. In particular, carbon cycle feedbacks are likely to add to CO2 concentrations and are incorporated into the latest model projections as mentioned in Section 1.

10. Other feedback processes were suggested such as release of natural methane

from northern wetlands or from oceans, not currently incorporated in models. It was thought possible that as temperatures rise the climate system could show new and altered feedback processes, not included in current model projections and that this could make it more difficult to stabilise concentrations and temperatures.

11. In Chapter 1.6, "Responding to developments in science and future emissions

growth: possible future adjustments to objectives", the door was opened to future adjustment of budgets in response to a list of possible influences:

12. "Actual achieved emissions could diverge from our modelled trajectories. If, for

instance, emissions do not peak in 2016 but continue to rise, or if emissions increase at a faster rate than anticipated before the peak, then the probability of keeping below a given temperature will be reduced. To maintain these probabilities cumulative emissions from now to 2050 will need to be in line with those implied by the recommended targets, and overshoots in the early years will need to be matched by more rapid reduction later. In this case Kyoto gas emissions in 2050 would need to be lower than 20-24 GtCO2e".

13. This would include making provision for known and potential feedbacks.

Already, it is also necessary to account for the change in peak emissions year from 2016 to 2020 agreed in Durban.

14. Later, in Chapter 2, the following ambiguous statement is made:

15. "Our approach to judging the desirability of the emissions reduction strategy

which we recommended in Chapter 1 does not therefore rest on IAM results. Rather we believe that the dangers of significant climate change set out in Chapter 1, and in particular the danger of self-reinforcing feedback loops and irreversible effects, can reasonably be judged to be so great that if they can be avoided by a small sacrifice of GDP they should be. We believe that the case for action is clear". (Part 1, Chapter 2, Page 75)

16. Here, there is a stated preparedness to change the emissions reduction

strategy in response to dangerous feedback loops, but quantified only in terms of "a small amount of GDP". No further elaboration on the case for action is given. This conclusion is also given in the Technical Appendix to Building a Low Carbon Economy:

17. "The Committee believes that in particular the danger of self-reinforcing

feedback loops and irreversible effects can reasonably be judged to be so great that if they can be avoided by a small sacrifice to GDP they should be". (Technical Appendix Chapter 2)

18. No further statement on the quantification of feedbacks was made in this first

report of the Committee on Climate Change.

76

1.3 Fourth Carbon Budget Report - 2010

19. The above references seem to represent the published position within the CCC from 2008 until the Fourth Carbon Budget Report came out in December 2010.

20. This report repeatedly refers to continuing uncertainty in the science, the

climate models and the global carbon budgets that are derived from them. In particular, concern is expressed about potentially important processes cited in 2008 that are known still to be missing from leading model projections. These included additional CO2 and CH4 release from large natural reserves in wetlands, permafrost and oceans. It states that early results suggest that these sources may add additional warming of the order of several per cent, but that large uncertainties remain.

21. However, in the Executive Summary the following reaffirmation of the 2008

budgets is given:

22. "Global emissions pathways. We have assessed the latest climate science and the international context. Our conclusion is that the climate objective and the global emissions pathway underpinning our first report recommendations remain appropriate".

23. In its Policy Statement of May 2011, again the government stated that the

proposed level of the fourth carbon budget is consistent with what the UK needs to do to play its part in international efforts to limit the expected increase in global temperature above pre-industrial levels to two degrees Celsius, consistent with scientific advice on avoiding the dangerous effects of climate change.

24. This fourth budget report states that from December 2010, CCC budget advice

reports will be delivered every five years (i.e. advice on the fifth carbon budget, covering the period 2028-2032, will be provided in 2015). Proper provision for feedbacks and other uncertainties must be made as soon as possible before then.

1.4 UKMO website current view on feedbacks (last updated 29-11-2010)

Feedbacks that aren't included in the models

25. There are some feedbacks they have recognised but there remain big uncertainties. Not enough is known about them to include their effects in climate models. However, they are potentially very serious so there is still a lot of work going on to try to understand them and get them into our projections.

26. Methane hydrates (positive feedback) are potentially a very big deal which could change our whole understanding of climate change, but it's very uncertain.

27. Permafrost methane (positive feedback) is a big question mark but also potentially a very big deal. When the soil thaws due to rising temperatures,

77

these gases could become unlocked and be released as CO2 or methane. At the moment they don't know how much of the CO2 is stored away or to what extent it would be released when the soil thaws.

28. They need to figure out how to resolve them on a global scale in a climate model before this effect can be included in their projections. Within the next five years they hope to know enough about this process to start including its effects.

Other feedbacks they don't yet know about

29. They assume there are hidden feedbacks in the system, but as long as we keep climate change relatively small we can be confident these unknown issues won't come into play.

30. However, as we move further away from the present climate, we are exposing ourselves to more risk about these unknowns. Even only taking into account the climate feedbacks we are aware of now, they pose a great incentive for us to quickly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to keep global temperature rises to a minimum.

1.5 Conclusion

31. Despite the reassurances in the Fourth Carbon Budget Report and the government's 2011 policy statement, it is clear from the above sources that the current carbon budgets are inadequate. This is in part due to the lack of recognition and accounting for a number of known feedbacks. The question remaining is by how much? Until this is addressed, we cannot have a UNFCCC-compliant mitigation strategy.

32. COP 17 in Durban agreed to increase ambition immediately and to negotiate a new legally binding international climate agreement by 2015 for implementation from 2020. This gives a later peak emissions year than the government's 2016 date upon which UK carbon budgets are based.

33. In apparent contradiction of the current peak of 2016, the CCC posted the following on its website in March 2013: "Modelling work with the Met Office Hadley Centre in 2008 showed that global emissions therefore ought to peak by 2020 and halve by 2050".

34. The later the peak, the faster global emissions reduction must be to stay within a given global temperature limit and carbon budget . 2016 4% Low now requires change in light of this.

35. The CCC has said that the next IPCC report covering warming projections is expected to be published this Autumn (WG1 September 2013) and that they will consider any implications in their review of the Fourth Carbon Budget at the end of this year. There is already much to be done.

23 May 2013

78

Written evidence submitted by the Met Office

1. The UK approach to carbon budgets The general approach to setting carbon budgets for the United Kingdom involves several stages. The first is to select a climate target based on an assessment of the consequences of different levels of future climate change. The Committee on Climate Change has focused on an approximately 50% chance of a global average near surface temperature increase of 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, and a much higher probability, >90%, of limiting warming to less than 4ºC above pre-industrial levels. Based on this climate constraint a set of global emissions pathways were then derived. These typically show a peak in CO2 equivalent emissions in the next decade followed by a long-term decline. The Committee then estimates an equitable share of emission reductions for the UK in the long-term and a transition pathway for the UK towards this long-term emission target.

2. Previous contributions to the work of the Committee on Climate Change The Met Office Hadley Centre has provided evidence to inform various aspects of the Committee on Climate Change's mitigation targets. Ahead of the first budget period it provided probabilistic simulations of global average near surface temperature change for a range of emissions scenarios provided by the Committee and by the Office of Climate Change. The Committee on Climate Change’s 2016:4%low scenario corresponds to an equivalent CO2 global emission reduction of around 50% on 1990 levels by 2050. The Met Office Hadley Centre calculated this corresponds to a median warming of a little over 2ºC, with a probability of around 50% of exceeding 2ºC. Additionally, several members of the AVOID consortium (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) provided advice to the Committee on Climate Change ahead of the fourth budget period on the science of large-scale climate system change and climate impacts. This concluded that whilst understanding of these issues had increased in several ways the evidence for setting a climate target based on the regional and system specific consequences of a 2ºC and a 4ºC global average rise above pre-industrial levels was still valid. However, a big regional spread in consequences was noted.

3. Met Office view on needs for climate science updates The original simulations performed by the Met Office for the first budget periods included uncertainties in the relationship between radiative forcing and temperature response, including the heat taken up by the ocean, along with uncertainty in the climate-carbon cycle feedback.

The science involved in modelling global emission scenarios of multiple gases to provide temperature projections is complex but new understanding of key processes and interactions mean climate models continue to become more physically realistic. For instance, a current version of the Met Office Hadley Centre Earth system model provides a three dimensional representation of the climate and carbon cycle, including simulating vegetation changes, atmospheric chemistry and a wider range of aerosol species, which are important for both climate change issues and air quality.

The latest simulations using this model reinforce the Met Office’s confidence in the earlier simple climate model simulations performed for the Committee on Climate Change. They indicate a reduction in emissions of the order of 50% on 1990 levels by 2050 corresponding to a global average warming of just over 2ºC during the 21st century, falling back below 2ºC by 2100.

79

Even with the improvements in modelling many uncertainties in future projected warming and climate change still remain. These include uncertainty in the precise magnitude of the response of clouds to a warming climate, uncertainty in the response of vegetation to CO2 increases in combination with climate change, and uncertainty on how climate change will alter the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Some processes, such as loss of carbon from melting permafrost, is not yet included even in the latest complex climate models. We recommend that the science of climate change and variability, and its impacts is periodically reviewed and at more frequent intervals then the usual IPCC timetable. Such a review should take account of the latest literature on the consequences of continued climate change, the relationship between emissions of climate forcing agents and the eventual climate response, and on additional earth system feedbacks as the science matures to a level at which they can be credibly included in the calculation of global carbon budgets.

We also note that current climate targets focus on average warming on the global scale. However, as the underpinning science develops, understanding grows and model resolution and complexity increase there is, and will be, increasing benefit from focusing at the regional level – particularly when considering changes in severity and incidence of extreme weather, and rapid changes in key systems such as the Arctic.

3.1 Specific issues of recent relevance Climate sensitivity (sometimes referred to as equilibrium climate response) is relevant to studies that focus on very long-term change and, in particular, long-term stabilisation. The precise value of climate sensitivity is not known, but a probability distribution can be estimated using a variety of methods including: the recent energy balance of the planet, complex climate models, complex climate models constrained by observations, paleo observations. However, different methodologies lead to a range of probability distributions and it would be useful to take stock of the implications of these. It is fair to say that the most likely value has changed little over the last few years. Transient climate response provides a better constraint on warming over the coming decades, and is particularly relevant to scenarios with increasing forcing. A number of recent estimates of the uncertainty in transient climate response have been made and these should be considered alongside the equilibrium climate sensitivity estimates above. The effect of the slowdown in recent global average near surface temperature change has been noted by many commentators, although other aspects of climate continue to change in a manner consistent with our understanding of a warming world. Furthermore, there is evidence from both observations of the past and from climate models that temporary periods with less global average near surface warming than the long-term trend have happened before and are expected again in the future. Recent research has started to examine how the most recent period influences our view of parameters such as equilibrium climate sensitivity and transient climate response and it would be useful to consider implications of this for carbon budgets. The interaction between climate change and the carbon cycle was factored into the first assessment of budgets. However, understanding of additional Earth system feedbacks, including from melting permafrost, was not sufficient to include in the first budget assessment. Whilst it is still limited there is a growing understanding that could now be considered. The Met Office Hadley Centre is already doing this in a number of projects. A recommendation is to consider the implications of the latest understanding on climate-carbon cycle interaction and additional earth system feedbacks.

80

Results from the AVOID programme have shown that whilst a 2°C global warming limit (with 50% probability) does appear still feasible, delays in global action make it more difficult to achieve. Whilst attention continues to focus on this target, the global role that might be played by permanent removal of CO2 from the atmosphere, referred to as negative emissions, merits further study. This is particularly true when considering the impacts of geo-engineering options on a local or regional scale on the global and total Earth system. In addition, some geo-engineering options may prove to have irreversible effects in the long term and, even when considering short term options, may act only to mask, rather than reverse, the warming climate. For example, the use of aerosols in solar radiation management would act to cool the earth while CO2 is still being emitted. Finally, the local consequences of climate change, which are likely to affect people, infrastructure and natural systems should be periodically reviewed. Newer models with higher spatial resolution and a greater vertical extent are providing improved skill at simulating many aspects of the dynamic behaviour of the atmosphere and oceans and offer advantages for looking at future climate variability and change. Additionally, the ability to simulate some impacts within climate models is opening up the prospect of improved assessments of quantities relevant to impacts. 4. Conclusion There are some new developments in climate science that are appropriate to take into account when considering carbon budgets. Such developments are a normal part of the scientific progress.

As the science and understanding of the Earth’s physical, chemical and ecosystem processes continue to develop and mature, carbon and climate change policies generally should be flexible enough to accommodate breakthroughs in both modelling and in the underlying science. Consideration of how science developments in one area impact on another are also important.

5 June 2013

81

Written evidence submitted by Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute

“The inquiry will examine whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act (which

underpin the UK carbon budgets) are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding

dangerous global climate change.

The Committee will explore recent climate change science developments and what these mean for

the UK’s Carbon Budget regime.”

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

‘Rapidly Inter Acting Feedback Effects’ [RIAFE]. New Approach needed to meet dangers of doing too

little too late.”

“As the planet warms, a steady rate of feedback acceleration in the years ahead makes it possible to

contemplate a scenario where positive feedback is driving the system as a whole from a point after

which ‘human-budget-emission-control’ becomes irrelevant.

To continue, after twenty years, to ignore this anywhere, let-alone in ‘climate-science-policy

modeling’ community is another form of ‘climate-denial’.

Doing this unintentionally provides assistance to ‘climate-deniers’ against whom James Hansen has

already and rightly leveled the charge of crimes against humanity for willing dangerous rates of

climate-change upon the future.

For UNFCCC-compliance, the struggle is now between control & a loss of control. To deal with this

we need a new approach that will be precautionary, prevention-based and strategically goal-

focused. It will distinguish between ‘budget-emissions’ which we can control and ‘feedback

emissions’ and effects which we can’t. The approach will quantify as best we can, the runaway

potential of rates of change that result from ‘Rapidly Inter Acting Feedback Effects’ [RIAFE] and the

dangers of doing too little too late.”

82

Carbon Budget Climate Change Policy for UNFCC-Compliance

the battle of the Rates is about the potential for RIAFE or curves Keeping Control versus those Losing

Control

The UK Climate Act

‘ . . . as the Planet warms . . . . ‘

Budget-Emissions we can control while . . . accelerating Feedback-Emissions from RIAFE we cannot.

83

CONTENTS

New Approach needed; statement about RIAFE Page 1

Imagery Keeping/Losing Control Page 2

Contents Page 3 & 4

UKMO Feedback Omissions

Preface re omission of feedbacks from climate-models Page 5 & 6

Keeping Control Imagery Page 7

Losing Control Imagery Page 8

Contiguity of Permafrost with collapsing Artic Page 9

Illustrative estimate of Permafrost CO2 release rate Page 10

Summary re opaque UKCA Science-Policy Hybrid Page 11

Recommendations/Statements re Omissions Page 12

UKMO Statements admitting Feedbacks Omissions Page 13 & 14

Statement UNEP re AR5 & omitted Feedbacks Page 15

Statement Stern to IMF re omitted Feedbacks Page 16

6-Point Analysis of UK Climate Change Act [UKCA]

1. Budget/PPMV 2016 4% Low, 10%-ile, 90%-ile, Median Page 17

Image showing Fractions Retained and Returned Page 18

2. UKMO falsely claims carbon-cycle-coupling is in UKCA Page 19

Imagery showing UKMO’s claim of coupling in UKCA Page 20

3. PPMV Array [Fractions of Budget Retained/Returned] Page 21

Imagery PPMV Array [Fractions Retained/Returned] Page 22

4. Budget array rebased to Median Path, Page 23

84

Imagery Budget rebased to Median PPMV array Page 24

5. Sensitivity & Convergence Page 25

Sensitivity & Convergence Page 26

6. ‘Bulge and Trend’ – arbitrary UKMO array Page 27

Imagery ‘Bulge and Trend’ – arbitrary UKMO array Page 28

UKMO persists repeatedly with Feedback Omissions

UKMO Advance paper aligning HADGEM2-E5 Model & RCPs Page 29

Imagery of Advance/RCP alignment Page 30

Detail of Advance Page 31

Imagery for Advance detail Page 32

Lowe et al in Nature Climate February 2013 Page 33

Imagery Lowe et al in Nature January 2013 Page 34

NATURE Meinshausen $100-$1,000 Carbon Tax Page 35

Imagery of what Nature left out [Peer Review Bathos] Page 36

Arctic Bomb Page 37

Imagery Arctic Bomb Page 38

Carbon Budget Analysis Tool [CBAT] with Feedback Emissions

CBAT – a heuristic device in four domains

Draft description Pages 39 & 40

CBAT Domain 1 still imagery, with UKCA on/off switch for comparisons

Contraction & Concentrations Low Page 41

Contraction & Concentrations Medium Page 42

Contraction & Concentrations High Page 43

online at: - http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

UKCA in relation to Carter, Hansen, GDR Budgets Page 44

85

UKMO FEEDBACK OMISSIONS - EAC Enquiry; the validity of Carbon Budgets in Climate Act

GCI welcomes this new EAC enquiry into the adequacy of the carbon-budgets in the UK Climate Act.

In the previous enquiry in 2009, the UKMO gave misleading information to the EAC claiming that all

relevant feedback effects were in the climate-model underpinning the Climate Act. They were not.

From the outset, GCI has constantly warned of feedback effects being omitted from climate-models.

Starting in 1989, GCI proposed the thesis of “Equity & Survival” to the UN 1990-92. Through 1993-94

we countered its ‘economic’ antithesis of ‘Efficiency with No-Regrets’ as the ‘Economics of

Genocide’. In a document requested of GCI by IPCC in 1993 for the Second Assessment Report [SAR],

GCI warned about the possibility and the dangers of positive feedback effects: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Nairob3b_.pdf

THE “CONSTANT AIRBORNE FRACTION” (CAF)

“During the period 1860 to 1990 a constant fraction of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere in the

order of 50% remained ‘airborne’. However, given the possibility of enhanced positive feedback in

the future, the fraction may not remain constant. In the face of continued industrial emissions and

declining terrestrial sink-capacity, it will probably increase.”

At the 2nd ‘Conference of Parties’ [COP-2] to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

1996, GCI tabled the Contraction and Convergence (C&C) model for achieving UNFCCC-compliance.

At COP-2, GCI defended C&C at rates consistent with a 350 ppmv atmospheric stabilisation target.

Again, we warned about the possibility of positive feedback: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/ZEW_CONTRACTION_&_CONVERGENCE.pdf

WHICH CONTRACTION BUDGET? WHICH CONVERGENCE DATE?

“These are the two main questions that arise once the twin-policy approach is accepted in principle.

We will address ‘which budget?’ first, as the imperative of convergence only arises as a derivative of

the imperative of contraction even if in turn, contraction is only practically achievable once global

convergence has been accepted, agreed and configured.

Also, most known feedback mechanisms are not modelled into these runs. And while their

interactive effects on climate forcing are still too complex to simulate in the models, the feedback

signs are predominantly assumed positive - i.e. giving increased warming.”

The Paper was presented to the ZEW conference in Mannheim Germany in June 1997. We continued

the defence of 350 ppmv and the paper was ultimately published by ZEW through Springer Verlag in

an updated form but where this defence was edited out: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/papers/zew.pdf

From 1995 onwards GCI has advocated the synthesis of ‘Contraction & Convergence’ [C&C] at the

UN, continuously making the case for realistic feedback-averse rates of C&C to be adopted: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/rates.html

86

Since that time C&C has become the most widely internationally recognized, cited and arguably the

most widely supported methodology in the process: - http://www.gci.org.uk/news.html

http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements.html

C&C has also had considerable cross-party political support in the UK: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Full_House.html

A campaign summary is here: - http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Campaign_Summary_.pdf

In 2008, Adair Turner, Chairman of the UK Climate Change Committee, recognized C&C as the basis

of the UK Climate Act: - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1ampI1XAzs

“In the UK Climate Act we have endorsed the C&C principle. It is pretty strong support for what

Aubrey Meyer has said.”

However, throughout and concomitant with all this, the UKMO has routinely excluded these

feedback effects from the Climate Model underpinning the UK Climate Act. Indeed, in the EAC

Enquiry in 2004, the UKMO made these inaccurate and misleading remarks about C&C and the

Brazilian Proposal in their evidence about “Responsibility for mitigation”: -

“The Brazilian proposal and other similar mechanisms provide frameworks that could be used to

assign future responsibility for mitigation to those with greatest responsibility for past climate

change. The Hadley Centre and other scientists around the world are working together to come up

with a robust methodology to quantitatively estimate how future emissions reductions might be

divided between nations in an equitable way, should such approaches be adopted by the

international community. This information will underpin negotiations post Kyoto, and inform

negotiations on contraction and convergence.”

The problem with this as a statement about C&C was that from a policy perspective, there is no

meaningful feedback measurement in the Brazilian Proposal whatsoever. When IA for that reason,

GCI lodged a complaint about these remarks, the EAC chair accepted GCI’s C&C definition statement

and the UKMO told us to “get a trademark”. We did and two years later they agreed to respect it.

On June 23 2009, UKMO claimed to the EAC Enquiry that all relevant feedbacks were in the climate

modelling behind the UK Climate Act: -

“The models will take into account all the feedbacks we are aware of that we think are important.”

This was and remains an ambiguous and misleading statement and the carbon budget in the UK

Climate Act is a product of it. In November 2010 the UKMO put an admission of this on its website: -

http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks

At that time, UKMO claimed in the EAC 2009 Enquiry to have included coupled-carbon cycling [as in

IPCC AR4] in the model used for the Act. However, what they actually introduced in the carbon-cycle

was the first projection of negative – not positive – feedback in the twenty year history of climate-

modelling in the IPCC’s record. This claimed more than 100% ‘Carbon-Sink-Efficiency’ by 2050 in the

carbon ‘Contraction:Concentrations’ budget [2016 4% Low] in the UK Climate Act.

87

The UKMO ignored challenge on this but especially in the light of feedback omission, this projection

remains and untrustworthy basis for policy development. This is analysed in some detail in this

evidence.

Overall, the ‘science/policy-hybrid’ created by the UKMO and the CCC renders the Act itself opaque

and falsely reassuring. Moreover, the problem remains as the UKMO are still omitting feedback

effects from their model, having aligned it with the RCP projections in IPCC AR5, despite comments

from other eminent sources. As UNEP said in “Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost” [2012]: -

“All climate projections in the IPCC 5th Assessment, due for release in 2013-14, are likely to be

biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include Permafrost

carbon feedback. So targets based on these projections would be biased high.”

Nicholas Stern told the IMF last month, “Feedbacks and tipping points such as Permafrost melt are

omitted in the scientific models. We need a new approach.”

Because of RIAFE, dealing with this ‘modelling challenge’ is intractable, but in this evidence, GCI also

offers a draft suggestion of what this new approach needs and might begin to look like: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

88

89

90

91

The EAC Enquiry is into Global, International and UK Carbon Budgets as defined by the UK Climate

Act [UKCA]. The Act consists of the: -

a. Global CO2 Emissions ‘Contraction & Concentrations’ scenario [’2016 4% Low’ 2000-2100]

which came from the UK Meteorological Office [UKMO] and

b. UK share of this using the ‘Contraction & Convergence’ [C&C] methodology which came

from the UK Climate Change Committee [CCC].

1. The Act needs revision. As it stands, as it is inadequate, opaque, prescriptive and

misleading because of the: -

a. UKMO’s omission of major feedback effects from calculation of ‘Contraction &

Concentrations’ scenario & CCC giving only 44% odds for success avoiding more than a 2°

temperature rise.

b. Emissions ‘Contraction’ should be complete globally by 2050 if, once ‘feedback effects’ are

included, we are to give better than 50:50 odds for keeping within the 2° rise.

c. CCC also prescribing 2050 as the International ‘Convergence’ year, foregoing the need for

any international negotiation of this date.

2. Together, these UKMO-CCC components present an opaque ‘science-policy’ hybrid where

the: -

a. Climate-model is an opaque ‘black-box’ obscuring the error of feedback-omission and

b. Economic-model comes from a suite of opaque ‘black box’ models based on this, which in

turn conceals incomplete, contestable and misleading economic computations of ‘price and tax-

signals’ and also contains no damage function at all.

3. On the science side of the hybrid, the UKMO: -

a. Omitted major feedback effects from ‘2016 4% Low’. Even now this is still not corrected and

also appears likely to inform IPCC AR5 Working Group One due this year or next;

b. Gave retained airborne fraction of anthropogenic emissions greater than 100% by 2050. In

the light omitted feedbacks. In the light of ‘a’, this is an untrustworthy result;

c. This was ignored when pointed out by GCI to UKMO in the EAC Enquiry 2009: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Document/GCI_EAC.pdf

d. UKMO/CCC gave a 56% probability for failing to keep UNFCCC-compliance as temperature

rose to and then beyond 2° Celsius;

e. A UKMO spokesman has implied since then that the figures and values were actually for

‘illustrative purposes only’.

92

4. On the policy side, the Climate Change Committee: -

a. Uncritically accepted the UKMO’s feedback-free Contraction:Concentration projections;

b. Super-imposed on that international budgets derived from a prescription for a convergence

date of 2050 [C&C 2050] and with this prescribed rate, helped to cause a major international

incident at COP-15 in December 2009, over the perceived unfairness of this rate of Convergence by

2050 and its prescription;

c. This issue was pointed out to UKMO/CCC in EAC’s Enquiry in 2009 well before COP-15.

d. The Chinese Government had offered to negotiate from immediate convergence: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/UNFCCC_Submission.html

e. However, this rate of ‘C&C-2050’ supported by other Europeans is now prominent in IPCC

AR5 Working Group Three. At present C&C 2050 is written into the Summary for Policy Makers in

WGIII which persistently and wrongly attributes this convergence rate to GCI, misquoting the source

literature cited.

5. The misleading effect of this ‘science-policy hybrid is to project the idea that: -

a. We only face only the inconvenience of ‘control-curves’ – or deceleration curves – when

feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially catastrophic consequences of ‘loss-of-control-

curves’ – or acceleration curves.

b. An opaque and feedback-omitting climate-science model is a sufficient basis on which to

reliably predict future rates of climate change and UNFCCC-compliance.

c. The UK share of this model using convergence as described by the Climate Change

Committee [CCC]: - http://www.climateconsent.org/flash2/turner.html

is a fair and sufficient basis upon which to prescribe the year 2050 for the future convergence to

equal per capita sharing arrangements for UNFCCC-compliance.

d. This in turn is a sufficient basis on which to use opaque and contestable economic models to

estimate the ‘price of carbon’ or rates of ‘carbon-tax’ as a function of that procedure.

It would be extremely foolish to continue to deceive ourselves about these matters. To recover, we

must be precautionary and not run risks we cannot afford to run. The rates of CO2 emissions and

concentrations contemplated in this study, recognize that a steady rate of feedback acceleration in

the years ahead makes it possible to contemplate a scenario where positive feedback is driving the

system as a whole from a point after which ‘human-budget-emission-control’ becomes irrelevant.

Consequently, there are two simple messages here. We need to: -

1. Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground, all things considered it is ‘cheaper’;

2. Get on with the C&C organised control of ‘human-budget-emissions’ as quickly as possible.

93

6. So we urge EAC to recommend to the Government the need to: -

a. “Understand the need for education to the scale of the challenge for the whole of the

planet;” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1ampl1XAzs [Turner Walley EAC 2009]

b. Be strategically goal-focused on the absolute priority of UNFCCC-compliance [safe and stable

GHG concentrations];

c. Be seen to be committed to solving the problem faster than we are creating it;

d. Recognize that the UK’s transition to a net-zero-carbon future must be accelerated;

e. Represent and include all feedback effects and the potential for RIAFE in climate models;

f. However difficult, these feedbacks can no longer credibly be modelled as ‘zero’;

g. Separately, measure rates of feedback-emissions as distinct from budget-emissions;

h. Integrate these measurements into future science-policy models for UNFCCC-compliance

noting, while the former accelerate and are uncontrollable, only the latter are controllable and that

the former have a growing potential to overwhelm efforts to control the latter the longer we delay

that control;

i. Develop, from that safe and stable ppmv value, an inclusive, transparent & precautionary

C&C-based policy strategy at rates consistent with UNFCCC-compliance;

j. Transparently negotiate and not prescribe an accelerated rate of international convergence

to a year that is ‘agreed-by-the-majority-to-be-fair’ within that C&C scenario;

k. Move beyond models of ‘carbon-pricing’ in a ‘Carbon-Market-Based Framework’ where

global climate is simply seconded to being a derivative of the global economy.

l. Make all ‘tax-rating’ and ‘carbon-pricing’ a function of that ‘Precautionary-Framework-

Based-Market’, in other words . . .

m. Make efforts towards ‘green growth’ and ‘ecological recovery, ‘C&C-led’ not ‘price-led’;

n. Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground as it is both safe and cheaper;

o. Get on with the control of ‘human-carbon-budget-emissions’ and the conversion to non-

carbon alternatives as quickly as possible.

94

THE UKMO ADMIT FEEDBACKS ARE OMITTED FROM THEIR MODEL

In June 23 2009 Professor Mitchell of the UKMO claimed to the EAC Enquiry that all relevant

feedbacks were in the climate models behind the UK Climate Act: -

“The models will take into account all the feedbacks we are aware of that we think are important,

then we can quantify that we understand, and to that extent the Climate Change Committee has

obviously done that.

Science being science, we uncover new feedbacks and there is a delay in being able to incorporate

those in the complex models.

One can use simple models to get, if you like, a fast-track estimate of what the effect would be, but

one would have to refer to the more complex models to make sure that when you add that

additional feedback you are actually taking into account all the processes that are important.”

This was an incorrect and misleading statement. The UK Climate Act is a product of this and in

November 2010 the UKMO put the following admission on its website: -

http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks

Are there feedbacks that aren't included in the models?

“There are some feedbacks we have recognised but remain big uncertainties. We don't know

enough about them to include their effects in climate models. However, they are potentially very

serious so there is still a lot of work going on to try to understand them and get them into our

projections.”

Methane hydrates (positive feedback)

“These are potentially a very big deal which could change our whole understanding of climate

change, but it's very uncertain.

There are very large stores of methane locked away at depth in the ocean. We know the stability of

these stores is dependent on temperature. As the oceans get warmer it's possible this balance could

be upset and the stores released — which would be very serious. Methane is more than 20 times as

potent as CO2 as a greenhouse gas.

There's some evidence to suggest that going back over a very long historical period (more than

millions of years), the release of these methane stores may have played a big role in abrupt and

severe changes to past climate. How close we are to any possible threshold is very much an open

question.”

Permafrost methane (positive feedback)

“This is a big question mark but also potentially a very big deal. There are very organic rich soils in

certain parts of the world. At higher latitudes, these are frozen over by permafrost, and those

greenhouse gases are effectively locked away. When the soil thaws due to rising temperatures,

these gases could become unlocked and be released as CO2 or methane. At the moment we don't

95

know how much of the CO2 is stored away or to what extent it would be released when the soil

thaws.

These are two key questions, and we need to figure out how to resolve them on a global scale in a

climate model before this effect can be included in our projections. Within the next five years we

hope to know enough about this process to start including its effects.”

Could there be other feedbacks that you don't yet know about?

“Yes, we assume there are hidden feedbacks in the system, but as long as we keep climate change

relatively small we can be confident these unknown issues won't come in to play.

However, as we move further away from the present climate, we are exposing ourselves to more

risk about these unknowns. Even only taking into account the climate feedbacks we are aware of

now, they pose a great incentive for us to quickly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to keep

global temperature rises to a minimum.”

Last Updated: 29 November 2010

Aligning itself with the RCP scenarios apparently now the base of IPCC AR5, UKMO published the

‘Advance Paper’ in 2010 last updated 29/04/2013: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/advance.pdf

The climate-modelling in this paper continues to omit the feedbacks listed on page 18 of the

‘Advance’ document, as do the RCP scenarios with which UKMO aligned itself

“We will continue to improve the representation of processes included in our model.

There are also a number of processes not currently included that could potentially have a major

impact on the degree of warming for a given emissions scenario, quite apart from their impact on

local and regional climate. Some of these processes have been discussed here and we are actively

working on including them in the model: -

• The impact of ozone on plants reduces their ability to take up carbon. Given their major

implications for international technology and economic development, policy decisions on climate

change must be underpinned by the best possible evidence.

• The deposition of black carbon on snow changes the reflectivity of the surface leading to

more warming at high latitudes. Other processes are less well understood but are actively being

researched with a view to including them in future models.

• The ability of plants to take up carbon may be limited by the supply of nitrogen available

naturally, but may be enhanced by man-made sources of nitrogen. Climate change itself may also

increase available nitrogen and stimulate plant growth.

• The thawing of permafrost may lead to large amounts of carbon release, but these processes

are not well understood.

96

• Dynamic ice processes could speed up freshwater supply from glaciers into the ocean.

• The processes that affect methane in the Arctic Ocean could lead to increased methane

release (the science is poorly understood so may take longer to include in models).

The international science community is working hard to understand and narrow the uncertainties in

future climate projections — and it is doing this primarily through model inter-comparison projects,

comparison with observations, and the synthesis of results by the next IPCC report.

Understanding the interactions within the Earth system is critical.”

“All climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, due for release in 2013-14, are likely

to be biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include the

permafrost carbon feedback.”

In 2012, UNEP published “The Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost.”

In the executive summary it made the following statements about IPCC AR5 and the omission of

carbon feedback in the climate models that under-pin AR5.

“All climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, due for release in 2013-14, are likely to

be biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include the

permafrost carbon feedback.

Consequently, targets for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions based on these climate

projections would be biased high.

The treaty in negotiation sets a global target warming of 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures by

2100.

If anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions targets do not account for CO2 and methane emissions

from thawing permafrost, the world may overshoot this target.”

UNEP [2012]

“Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost.”

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/permafrost.pdf

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

As things stand, this message from UNEP confirms the danger, indeed the likelihood that IPCC AR-5

will continue the pattern established over the past twenty years of under-estimating and under-

representing the real risks we face.

Sir Robert Watson [a former Chairman of the IPCC at the time of the IPCC Third Assessment Report]

said in a public session in San Francisco in December 2012: -

“We were careful and conservative. If we had a strong statement subsequently proved wrong, we

would lose all credibility as a scientific community. I thought we should always be slightly on the side

97

of conservative. Otherwise we were going to get ripped apart by climate-deniers even for the

simplest mistake.”

This is not just erring towards ‘conservatism’. That suggests we face merely the inconvenience of

‘control-curves’ – or deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially

catastrophic consequences of ‘loss-of-control-curves’ – or acceleration curves.

James Hansen has already warned the Environmental Audit Committee that the 2 degree target in

the UK Climate Act is not safe and that it should be 1.5 degrees.

This is why we make the assertion that omitting feedbacks from the models: -

“ . . . unintentionally provides assistance to ‘climate-deniers’ against whom James Hansen has

already and rightly levelled the charge of crimes against humanity for willing dangerous rates of

climate-change upon the future.”

Nicholas Stern, author of the 2006 Stern Report, made a presentation in DAVOS in January this year

saying: - “I got it so wrong on climate change, its far, far worse.”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/27/nicholas-stern-climate-change-davos

Who advised him at the time of the original report? Who advises him now when tells the IMF: -

”The scientific models mostly leave out dangerous feedbacks/tipping points. We need new

generation of models.”

In May 2013, the IMF published slides from a presentation there by Nicholas Stern.

On slide 9 and 10 Stern also points to the omission of melting Permafrost feedbacks and tipping

points: -

”The scientific models mostly leave out dangerous feedbacks/tipping points. At 6°, 5°, 4° C or below,

the probability of passing some tipping points, such as melting of permafrost, may be high. If

modellers cannot capture or model effects ‘sufficiently clearly’ they are omitted. But best guess

surely not zero.

The models are not built in a way that help us describe the impacts on people:

At sea level (SL) 2m higher a few hundred million might have to move (Nicholls, et al., 2011);

–At 3-4-5°C may see radical monsoon changes in India and substantial changes in flows of major

rivers off the Himalayas (a billion plus people depend on them). Desertification of southern Europe?

Models should focus on understanding probabilities of events with severe consequences for people

rather than on those bits which (on narrow assumptions) seem more tractable, such as change in

agricultural output, relative to those effects that can be modelled more easily.

We need new generation of models.”

Nicholas Stern to IMF May 2013

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Stern_IMF.pdf

98

What follows is an assessment of the ‘Feedback-Free’ Contraction:Concentrations Budget – or the

opaque science/policy hybrid – that is the UK Climate Act

1. Opposite is an image showing the primary features of the Global ‘CO2-carbon-emissions-

contraction-budget’ in the UK Climate Act which: -

• Is called ‘2016 4% Low’

• Flows from 2010 to 2110

• Peaks in 2016 at 11.8 Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C]

• Declines on average thereafter at 4% per annum

• Until by 2110 it has reached an output value of 0.3 Gt C per annum

• Weighs a total of 395 Gt C between 2010 and 2110.

This is identical to the CBAT Medium Carbon-Emissions-Budget: -http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-

domains/Domains.swf

The image also shows the range of atmospheric CO2 concentration values calculated by UKMO as in

the UK Climate Act.

They are measured in: -

• Parts Per Million by Volume [PPMV]

• And also as Weight in Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C].

This ranges through: -

• 10%-ile [the lowest]

• To 90%-ile [the highest]

• With the ‘Median’ case in between

• Median is what UKMO call, ‘the most probable’

• UKMO calculate that Median concentrations

• peak at 445 PPMV or 949.38 Gt C in 2050 and

• fall to 426 PPMV or 910.24 Gt C by 2100.

• this means that with the Median case, 19 PPMV or 39.14 Gt C

• was removed from the atmosphere 2050-2110 [equivalent to negative feedback]

• this also means that in total over the period 2010-2110

• while the human budget emissions in 2016 4% Low totalled 395.95 Gt C

99

• with Median only a net total of 35.35 Gt C was added to the atmosphere

This result is very questionable, even without feedback fully integrated in UKMO’s model.

When feedbacks omitted are added, UKMO’s Median result is wholly implausible.

• In 2009, UKMO claimed to EAC that all relevant feedback effects were in their model

• UKMO admitted in 2010 various feedback effects had been left out of their model

• Saying in 2010 that they were committed to including them in

• However, nothing substantive has been done until now [2013]

• As the planet warms the net effect of these will be positive [not negative] feedback

• If feedback effects are added to the model - which they urgently need to be – UKMO’s

concentrations results are seen as under-estimates and misleading.

• It would be appropriate for the EAC to cross-examine UKMO closely on this.

These results are not the same as the CBAT Medium Carbon-Concentration-Profiles, as CBAT begins

to lay out the basis for adding feedback effects in a measured and structured way.

However, CBAT enables users to switch-on and super-impose the UK Climate Act Emissions Budget &

Atmospheric Concentrations on output from the CBAT methodology for the purposes of comparison

see pages 39 – 43 and here: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

100

2.Here are two images detailing how UKMO stated in a supplement to the EAC Enquiry in 2009

[‘answering GCI’] to have incorporated the Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modelling in IPCC AR4 from the

C4MIP programme, into the global ‘CO2-carbon-emissions-contraction-budget’ on which the UK

Climate Act is based.

This is what UKMO stated in the memo: -

101

“The models used by the Committee on Climate Change did include a coupling between climate and

the carbon cycle & took full account of the ‘coupled’ model research presented in the AR4 WG1

report, the C4MIP study and related research.”

UKMO/Hadley’s ‘Uncoupled Carbon Budget’ for 450 PPMV published in IPCC SAR and TAR: -

• Starting in 2010 at over 11.2 Gt C

• It peaks at around 13 Gt C around 2020

• Shrinks on average by ~ 3% a year by 2110

• When it has reached an output value of ~ 1.5 Gt C per annum

• Between 2010 and 2100 it weighed around 520 Gt C

• Giving an outcome value for CO2 concentrations of ~450PPMV or 960 Gt C.

This is similar to the SRES range of Carbon-Emissions-Budgets for 450PPMV in SAR % TAR: -

UKMO/Hadley’s ‘Coupled Carbon Budget’ for 450 PPMV published in IPCC SAR and TAR: -

• Starting in 2010 at around 9 Gt C

• It peaks at around 10 Gt C around 2020

• Shrinks on average by over 4% year

• And by 2070 has gone to nearly zero emissions

• Which is continued into the 22nd Century

• Between 2010 and 2100 it weighed around 295 Gt C [a reduction of over 50%] but

• Giving an outcome value for CO2 concentrations of ~450PPMV or 960 Gt C.

Median CO2 concentration value calculated by UKMO in the UK Climate Act measured in: -

• Parts Per Million by Volume [PPMV] and as Weight in Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C].

The UKMO memo stating how the Carbon Budget modelling in the UK Climate Act reflected

‘Coupled‘, compiled a Carbon Budget: -

• That starts in 2010 at 10.9 Gt C

• Peaks in 2016 just under 12 Gt C

• Shrinks on average by 4% a year

• Reaching an output value of 0.3 Gt C by 2100

• Weighing 395 Gt C 2010 – 2100

• Giving a peak value for CO2 concentrations of PPMV as 445.72 or 949 Gt C in 2050

102

• With an outcome value lowered to 427 PPMV or 910 Gt C in 2100

GCI’s answer to this ‘memo’ is to point out that to, ‘take full account of the Coupling’ [in their words]

in the UKCA Carbon Budget, what the UKMO did was: -

• To add over 114 Gt C or 25% to their ‘Coupled Budget’ but also . . .

• To subtract nearly 60 Gt C from their atmospheric concentration outcome [!]

This concentration result is negative feedback. It misled everyone. It was a result that contradicts all

the models in the C4MIP study reported in the IPCC AR4, even before addressing the other positive

feedback effects. While they subsequently admitted the omission of these, no attention was drawn

to the negative feedback UKMO were now claiming for coupled carbon cycling, a totally opposite

result.

103

104

105

3. UKMO claims that by 2050 atmosphere concentrations of CO2 are falling as ‘most

probable’. This is because they claimed that CO2 sinks are removing more than 100% of human

source emissions from 2050. With feedbacks omitted this is ‘most improbable’.

Here, the ‘Stock’ array of atmosphere concentrations of CO2 is converted to weight so it can more

easily be compared with the annual ‘Flow’ of CO2 emissions in the ‘carbon-budget’.

This way we can easily assess a 13-step range for the changing ‘Airborne Fraction of Emissions’ in the

different concentration pathways from: -

• The 10%-ile, the lowest concentration returning to 390 PPMV, adding 4 steps to the

• Median - UKMO’s ‘most probable’ pathway to 427 PPMV, with a further 7 steps to

• The highest concentration, the 90%-ile rising to 516 PPMV.

With UKMO’s ‘Median’ case, the model states that by 2050, concentrations are falling as sinks are

re-absorbing more than the sources of human emissions coming from the Climate Act’s ‘carbon-

budget’ from 2050. With feedbacks omitted this is ‘most improbable’.

We have chosen to call this result, ‘greater than 100% sink-efficiency by 2050’. The UKMO are

welcome to disagree with this term and to call it whatever they choose. However, changing the

name won’t change what is revealed in the numerical analysis of what they published in the UK

Climate Act – i.e. that sinks are absorbing more than sources by 2050.

The carbon-budget is primarily fossil-carbon. Once burned it has to go somewhere. What doesn’t

stay in the atmosphere [the fraction retained] goes into the biological sinks on land and in the ocean

[fraction returned]. In reality, that is true only to the extent these sinks hold up and can absorb this

huge and sudden addition of carbon. With various feedbacks omitted from UKMO’s model, this

result is unrealistic and untrustworthy as a basis for strategic and precautionary global climate

policy. Moreover, the UK Climate Act CO2 ‘Sink Function’ from 10%-ile to 90%-ile covers the extreme

range of: -

• 0% - 70% Fractions-Retained or

• 100% - 30% Fractions-Returned

Depending on the position selected, the whole budget is re-absorbed [returned in position 1]

through to three quarters of it remaining in the atmosphere [retained in position 13]. This is not a

small range of possibilities [uncertainties] it is huge. In policy terms it’s like saying the car-speed-limit

is somewhere between plus and minus 50 mile an hour.

Moreover, GCI is of the view that UKMO climate-modellers have overestimated the capacity of the

terrestrial and oceanic sinks to absorb the emissions consequences of burning huge amounts of

fossil carbon [oil, coal and gas] that were not in the biological carbon-cycle until they were minded,

burned and sent as greenhouse-flue-gas to the atmosphere.

All the extra carbon being dumped in the ocean, as a result of UKMO’s Median ‘sink-efficiency’

would raise CO2 concentration in the oceans, instead of in the atmosphere, lowering pH. UKMO says

106

this will not lower pH as the ‘biological pump’ will remove it as the build-up accelerates. This is

unsound as the pump operates on a timescale of Decades to Centuries and not the Years to Decades

necessary to achieve what UKMO claim.

At this point it is also worth noting that the CO2 from Permafrost melt is not fossil carbon. However,

until the Permafrost melts it is not in the biological carbon-cycle either. As it is released due to

melting, it is biological and this is augmented by the soils themselves becoming biologically active

and generating more yet more CO2 from this as well. Estimates in AAAS Science for the scale of just

this CO2 are in the region of an extra 1.9 trillion tonnes of carbon [1.5 Tt C] – see Arctic Bomb AAAS

permafrost melt chart.

4. Based on the ‘Median’ case as in UKCA ‘2016 4% Low’, here is the ‘carbon-budget’

adjusted to the array of concentration pathways - either up or down - so the budget levels are

adjusted always to return Median Concentrations whichever of the 13 levels of ‘probability’ is

chosen. So if the Median concentration pathway is not as-stated the ‘most probable’, UKMO’s

huge range creates a policy maker’s nightmare. UKMO’s approach is perhaps at best ‘illustrative’

as it is certainly not precise or precautionary.

107

With the ‘Stock’ of atmosphere concentrations of CO2 converted to a weight array, these are easily

compared with the annual ‘Flow’ of CO2 emissions in the ‘carbon-budget’.

Like this we can also adjust the carbon budget for the 13-step array of the changing ‘Airborne

Fraction of Emissions’ in the different concentration pathways in UKCA: -

• From 10%-ile,

• Through Median

• To the 90%-ile

Since the commitment at COP-15 was not to exceed 2 degrees, which of UKMO’s

Contraction:Concentrations pathway should we trust?

Based on UKMO’s ‘Median’ being the ‘most probable’ being in their words, values that give us just a

‘44% chance’ of keeping to 2 degrees, we can set these values as the reference-concentrations-case,

and adjust UKMO’s Carbon-Budget for all 13 positions so that these ‘Median’ PPMV values are

always the outcome. The range of values is huge.

As the chart shows, while a: -

• ‘10%-ile adjusted budget’ could be increased from 395 Gt C to 473 Gt C, a

• ‘90%-ile adjusted budget’ needs to be decreased from 395 Gt C to just 204 Gt C

• Here is the full set of budget-integrals for adjustments against the array given.

In reality, we need to fix the safe and stable concentration level and be transparent about the

precautionary - and the likely - need to accelerate emissions-contraction to achieve it.

As is the UK Climate Act does the reverse. It fixes the budget and presents a huge array of possible

concentration outcomes. Moreover, this it should be remembered is before a full ensemble of

feedbacks has been included in the climate models.

So, even in the absence of these major feedback effects in the UKMO’s model, from a policy-makers

viewpoint, UKMO’s huge range of variation on PPMV outcomes renders their approach an

implausible basis on which to develop and then internationally negotiate the sharing of a

precautionary carbon-budget with a policy framework aimed at the imperative of UNFCCC-

108

compliance. Once again, UKMO’s incomplete approach ‘illustrative’ as it is not ‘precautionary.

Perhaps seeing it more as ‘aspirational’ than ‘rational’ is the best that can be said for it.

109

5. Using the UKMO’s ‘2016 4% Low scenario’ the Climate Change Committee prescribed

‘2050’ as the year for completing international Convergence to equal per capita budget sharing

globally. “It wasn’t just inadequate, it was unfair.”

While the principle of distributing the Contraction-Event with the Convergence procedure to equal

per capita sharing globally is widely now accepted, prescribing the date – let-alone that date [2050] -

of Convergence is not.

HMG were repeatedly advised by MPs, Select Committees, GCI and others from 2000 onwards to

negotiate and not to prescribe the convergence date. The urgency that arises when the feedback

omissions are addressed, shows [as addressed in the previous chart] that a ‘90%-ile version of the

2016 4% Low Carbon Budget’ needs to be shrunk from 395 Gt C to half that size at 204 Gt C*, i.e.

achieving less than zero emissions globally after 2060.

In the light of this, offering to negotiate a convergence date by 2040, or 2030 or even by 2020 would

have been a more politically realistic way, and a more propitious way, to engage at COP-15 with Less

Developed Countries [LDCs], whose per capita emissions are still on average, much lower than those

of the Developed Countries [DCs] like the UK and the US. The Chinese Government proposed this

prior to COP-15 and there is diverse and considerable support for this approach: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/UNFCCC_Submission_Co-Signatories.html

Authors of the UK Climate Act know the prescription of 2050 had a disastrous effect at COP-15. With

the ‘carbon-budget’ adjusted to the concentration array so the budget always returns the Median

path, the CCC’s prescription of Convergence by 2050 was doubly provocative – it was inadequate

and it was unfair. As Adair Turner agreed to Colin Challen in the DECC Committee enquiry in 2009, “if

the rate of contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, the rate of convergence must be

accelerated for reasons of equity.”

James Hansen observes a higher level of Climate Sensitivity than UKMO [Hadley]

This is why Hansen advocates a level of human emissions-control that would return us to 350 PPMV

and told the EAC that the 2 degree target in the UK Climate Act and agreed at COP-15 is not safe. As

presented in GCI’s evidence to EAC in 2009, he argues for a carbon-budget between 124 and 320 Gt

C http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Hansen.pdf & this is nearer the range advocated by GCI [see

pages 25/6 & 41]. He calculates this as necessary, arguing that we are dealing with a considerably

higher level of climate-sensitivity than the level used by UKMO, as in this ‘Climate Sensitivity-

Progression’ [after D Wasdell] shows: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Climate Dynamics2.pdf

110

111

6. ‘Bulge and Trend’ – UKMO’s opaque and arbitrary array of ‘feedback-emissions’

112

In August 2012, the UKMO-led AVOID programme published a paper titled ‘Emissions Pathways to

Limit Climate Change’: - http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/avoid6_flyer.pdf

CO2 budget-emissions and temperature paths were shown as similar to the Climate Act. However,

both CO2 concentration imagery and data were omitted from the paper.

The Director of the AVOID programme was asked to supply that data. He declined saying that there

was too much data [‘several tens of thousands of pathways’] and that the data had not been

retained. He was finally forced to provide it under an FOI request where he said that the emissions,

concentrations and temperature images were only for ‘illustrative purposes’. However, the same

feedback-free modelling picture emerged from this.

Moreover, analysis of his paper in Nature [02 2013], ‘A global assessment of the effects of climate

policy on the impacts of climate change’ reveals once again, the same ‘greater than 100% sink-

efficiency by 2050’ between emissions and concentrations [see pp. 33/34] and: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/UKMO_Nature_Climate.pdf

The Director strongly resisted the suggestion that the UKMO’s modelling results in the UK Climate

Act were just for ‘illustrative purposes’. But on the evidence, perhaps that’s all that can be said for

UKMO’s approach generally. As-is it means the UK Climate Legislation is just, “for illustrative

purposes only” – and as-is, these ‘purposes’ mislead.

UKMO’s approach misleads because it implies we only face the ‘control-curves’ – in other words,

deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we may face is ‘loss-of-control-curves’ – acceleration

curves.

Growth of the Annually Averaged Increments of PPMV CO2 ‘increase’ 1980-2012 & projected to the

year 2060 is @ 2.1% a year. If feedback emissions are already happening, this trend curve will

include these. However, it will not suddenly ‘bulge’ upwards as the UKMO curves show. The growth

of these feedback emissions and their effect on, concentrations will be gradual & progressive, as the

planet warms over the 21st Century.

Consequently, the 90%-ile, Median [& slightly the 10%-ile] ‘bulge’ over that trend-curve, starting in

2010, is unrealistic. The trend average of the ‘growth increments’ has been at 2.1% per annum. At

the outset, UKMO’s curves for Median & 90%-ile upwardly violate this trend. This too makes UKMO’s

concentration curves arbitrary and unrealistic.

The growth of feedback emissions will not [as shown here] suddenly ‘balloon up’ and then stop and

reverse further increase, holding in line with the ‘Median adjusted Budget’.

The way the UKMO have treated feedbacks they regarded as relevant, is to have created this quite

arbitrary ‘bulge’ above the CO2 concentrations growth trend, in order to then portray that the

curves slow & come down sharply.

This means that UKMO’s curves are ‘control-curves’. These imply we will keep control of

concentrations overall. However, feedback-effects and particularly feedback-emissions, imply that

what we face is not-so-much ‘control-curves’, as ‘loss-of-control-curves’.

113

The point being that feedback emissions and their knock-on effect on concentrations – as in the case

of CO2 emissions from Permafrost melt for example - are non-human, accelerate, start gradually

[see page 24] but once under way the rate of increase is uncontrollable.

Unless these feedbacks are ‘in the model’ and leading to precautionary policy consequences,

UKMO‘s results are implausible and irresponsible, rendering their present approach as generically

misleading & an inappropriate basis upon which to develop precautionary climate policy for

UNFCCC-compliance.

114

What we face is not so much the inconvenience of ‘control-curves’ as the potentially catastrophic

consequences of ‘loss-of-control-curves’. In the face of this UKMO continues to model growing

‘Sink-Efficiency; [see ‘Advance’ paper; 2010].

As with the UK Climate Act, in UKMO’s ‘Advance’ Paper, the atmosphere CO2 Concentrations trend

accelerates upwards but then accelerates downwards. In ‘Advance’ CO2 Concentrations & CO2

Emissions-Budget show the Fraction of the Carbon Emissions-Budget returned to the sinks by 2050

[or ‘sink-efficiency’] is greater than 100% after that year.

But RCPs in UKMO & probably IPCC AR5 ‘are careful & conservative.’ [Bob Watson]

In the Advance paper, UKMO formally aligned itself with the RCP scenarios in 2010. These show the

same feedback omissions are in the ‘Representative Concentration Pathway [RCP] scenarios where

CO2 Concentrations & CO2 Emissions-Budget show the Fraction of the Carbon Emissions-Budget

returned to the sinks by 2050 [or ‘sink-efficiency’] is greater than 100% after that year. It is

understood that these RCP scenarios are being made the basis of the drafts of the forthcoming IPCC

AR5 [due 2014/15]. If so, it suggests that these feedback omissions are likely to inform AR5 on

publication.

So, after twenty years of IPCC Assessments, the danger is that the Fifth Assessment will again fail to

address the issue of feedback effects being omitted from the climate models.

If that happens, as the Advance paper suggests, they will have been assisted to that outcome by the

UKMO and the blinkered climate-modelling underpinning the UK Climate Act.

Sir Robert Watson [a former Chairman of the IPCC at the time of the IPCC Third Assessment Report]

said in a public session in San Francisco in December 2012: -

“We were careful and conservative. If we had a strong statement subsequently proved wrong, we

would lose all credibility as a scientific community. I thought we should always be slightly on the side

of conservative. Otherwise we were going to get ripped apart by climate-deniers even for the

simplest mistake.”

IPCC’s credibility problem is due to this ‘conservatism’

In fact it is not just erring towards ‘conservatism’. That suggests we face merely the inconvenience of

‘control-curves’ – or deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially

catastrophic consequences of ‘loss-of-control-curves’ – or acceleration curves.

115

Image Wasdell – ‘Feedback Dynamics, Sensitivity & Runaway Conditions’: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Climate_Dynamics2.pdf

116

In ‘ADVANCE’, UKMO’s comment on feedback omission reads: -

We will continue to improve the representation of processes included in our model.

There are also a number of processes not currently included that could potentially have a major

impact on the degree of warming for a given emissions scenario, quite apart from their impact on

local and regional climate. Some of these processes have been discussed here and we are actively

working on including them in the model: -

• The impact of ozone on plants reduces their ability to take up carbon. Given their major

implications for international technology and economic development, policy decisions on climate

change must be underpinned by the best possible evidence.

• The deposition of black carbon on snow changes the reflectivity of the surface leading to

more warming at high latitudes. Other processes are less well understood but are actively being

researched with a view to including them in future models.

• The ability of plants to take up carbon may be limited by the supply of nitrogen available

naturally, but may be enhanced by man-made sources of nitrogen. Climate change itself may also

increase available nitrogen and stimulate plant growth.

• The thawing of permafrost may lead to large amounts of carbon release, but these processes

are not well understood.

• Dynamic ice processes could speed up freshwater supply from glaciers into the ocean.

• The processes that affect methane in the Arctic Ocean could lead to increased methane

release (the science is poorly understood so may take longer to include in models).

The international science community is working hard to understand and narrow the uncertainties in

future climate projections — and it is doing this primarily through model inter-comparison projects,

comparison with observations, and the synthesis of results by the next IPCC report.

Understanding the interactions within the Earth system is critical.”

Yet, aligning itself with the RCP scenarios now at the base of IPCC AR5, UKMO again publishes

negative feedback in the ‘Advance Paper’ of 2010.

The paper set out the alignment of UKMO HADGEM2-ES with the RCP scenarios that have replaced

the SRES scenarios in previous IPCC Assessment Reports.

An analysis of the RCP 8.5 & 2.6 scenarios for airborne fractions of emissions shows the same rate of

reabsorption as increasing to more than 100% of the budget by 2050 in the case of RCP 2.6 and

decreasing to around 20% of the CO2 budget by 2100 for RCP 8.5.

This is therefore true of the HADGEM2-ES runs as well and that the projections continue to be made

on the basis of the continuing omission of major feedback effects in RCPs, currently drafted to

inform IPCC AR5.

It was updated by UKMO April 29th 2013: - http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/advance.pdf

117

118

UKMO’s Feedback Omissions are in ‘NATURE CLIMATE’, February 2013

“A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change”

By UKMO’s J. A. Lowe and other authors from the UKMO-led AVOID project, a global carbon budget

weighing around 90 Gt C [or about twice the weight of the budget in the UK Climate Act] projects

carbon emission, concentrations and temperature from 200 to 2100.

While temperature is projected to rise throughout to approaching 3 degrees above pre-industrial,

and emissions fall in this case from 2030 onwards, CO2 concentrations peak at 600 PPMV and then

fall from 2050 onwards to around 550 PPMV by 2100.

This projects yet again that according to the UKMO, CO2 sinks are greater than Budget CO2 sources

[or more than 100% ‘sink-efficiency’ is projected] by 2050. This is yet further evidence of the fact

that UKMO continues to use a climate-model that omits major feedback effects.

The conclusion that has to be drawn from all this is that use of this model as it is, results in

unrealistic and misleading results.

Malte Meinshausen, a principal author of the RCP scenarios now likely to be the basis of the IPCC

Fifth Assessment [AR5], co-authored a paper ‘Probabilistic cost estimates for climate change

mitigation’, published in Nature [January 2013]: -

119

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Nature_Meinshausen_et_al.pdf

The paper argued that a ‘carbon-tax’ of $100/Tonne now would help to avoid the $1,000/Tonne that

would be necessary later if the delay in emissions-control continues.

A range of 27 CO2-emissions-contraction-events for the period 2000-2100 were published.

The contraction-events continued over the period 2100-2200 were omitted as were the atmospheric

concentrations outcomes of these over two Centuries.

When concentrations are added and values for 2100-2200 are added, the range of CO2 budget-

integrals, CO2 concentration-outcomes go from lowest to highest with the nominally associated Tax-

Rates are shown in the following table of values: -

Position Emissions Contraction-Budget Integrals [Gt C]

Atmospheric Concentration Outcomes [PPMV]

Atmospheric Concentration Outcomes [Gt C]]

Tax Rate

1 711 Gt C 493 1,051 Gt C $100

2 745 Gt C 497 1,058 Gt C $135

3 779 Gt C 506 1,078 Gt C $169

4 812 Gt C 516 1,099 Gt C $204

5 844 Gt C 526 1,121 Gt C $238

6 874 Gt C 537 1,145 Gt C $273

7 904 Gt C 549 1,169 Gt C $308

8 935 Gt C 561 1,195 Gt C $342

9 967 Gt C 574 1,223 Gt C $377

10 1,016 Gt C 591 1,259 Gt C $412

11 1,074 Gt C 611 1,301 Gt C $446

12 1,132 Gt C 632 1,346 Gt C $481

13 1,194 Gt C 656 1,397 Gt C $515

14 1,254 Gt C 681 1,450 Gt C $550

15 1,311 Gt C 707 1,506 Gt C $585

16 1,375 Gt C 737 1,570 Gt C $619

17 1,451 Gt C 772 1,644 Gt C $654

18 1,554 Gt C 817 1,741 Gt C $688

19 1,676 Gt C 872 1,857 Gt C $723

20 1,831 Gt C 943 2,010 Gt C $758

21 1,993 Gt C 1024 2,180 Gt C $792

22 2,162 Gt C 1115 2,376 Gt C $827

23 2,344 Gt C 1220 2,599 Gt C $862

24 2,514 Gt C 1327 2,827 Gt C $896

25 2,677 Gt C 1439 3,065 Gt C $931

26 2,855 Gt C 1565 3,334 Gt C $965

27 3,008 Gt C 1642 3,497 Gt C $1,000

As positions 1 – 27 go progressively towards a climate catastrophe, which no amount of carbon-tax

could obviate or avoid, nothing more clearly shows the cul-de-sac of carbon- price-led climate-policy

formulation.

120

This is an ‘ideological-selection-bias’ that we do not need. It misleads in favour of being led by ‘price-

signals’ and calls the whole process of peer-reviewed articles on climate-economics in supposedly

eminent journals into disrepute.

121

“Ticking Arctic Carbon Bomb May Be Bigger Than Thought.” Science 7th 12, 2012: -

http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/12/ticking-arctic-carbon-bomb-may-b.html

AAA’s article in Science [07 12 2012] argues the melt and CO2 release has already begun.

The next image portrays the effect on the atmosphere of releasing the extra 1.9 Trillion Tonnes

Carbon from CO2 from Perma Frost melt in a defendably calculated time-frame.

It is now estimated that another 1.9 trillion tonnes of carbon is stored in the ‘perma-frost’.

In 2009, the estimate was at 1.4. This permafrost has already started slowly melting due to

enhanced global warming.

Simply weighed on a scale of Billions of Tonnes of Carbon [Giga Tonnes or Gt C] it is easy to calculate

the effect on CO2 concentrations. It is a potential release. Once under way, it is impossible to stop.

So, if we are to prevent this, the potential rate of release of this extra CO2 to the atmosphere is on a

time-frame that needs - however difficult - to be calculated.

The weight reaches the top of this yellow shape at around 3 trillion tonnes of atmospheric carbon, or

1400 ppmv carbon [only]. IPCC estimates 1000 CO2-e is equal to a temperature rise of 4-8°. So the

worst-case of perma-frost melt alone, dwarfs human emissions control and presage a climate

holocaust.

Atmospheric CO2 concentrations could increase within the rate range suggested here. What is

important to note is that this rate of growth is initially slower than the 90%-ile rate which was given

as top rate of concentration build-up in the UK Climate Act. Moreover, it now also appears

increasingly unlikely, due to the lack of fossil-source-emissions-control, that the Carbon Budget

‘2016 4% Low’, cited in the UK Climate Act, will actually be adhered to.

Consequently, if CO2 emissions, from Perma Frost melt, became part of this 90-ile rate - the highest

rate above the Carbon Budget ‘2016 4% Low’ (or higher) on which the UKCA is based, we are looking

at the potential for a catastrophic runaway process of climate-change.

UKMO already specified that temperature will increase for the next 100 years. UKCA had just 44%

odds for holding to a two degree temperature rise, even if the ‘median case’ for CO2 concentration

rise were to evolve.

Since, omitting feedback from melting permafrost, Climate Act authors is acknowledged the lined

‘grey’ areas in ‘Emissions’ and ‘Concentrations’ shown here are from CBAT. These mathematically

relate the former to the latter in forty theoretical steps downward & upwards from ‘the budget’ with

concentrations at CAF 50-% for Budget + ‘feedback’ in each of the steps. So these are showing the

hypothetically possible rates of negative & positive feedback covering the process of carbon-cycling -

including permafrost melt - as a whole.

122

In the cause of UNFCCC-compliance, the world might theoretically hold to the ‘2016 4% Low’ Carbon

Emissions Budget [as in the UKCA]. However, positive feedback in the carbon cycle may release more

CO2 than sinks can absorb, forcing atmosphere concentrations up.

Consequently the rates of CO2 emissions:concentrations calculated in ‘2016 4% Low’ suggest a rate

of acceleration across the Century ahead is possible where by mid-Century a scenario with the

consequences of positive feedback is driving the system as a whole to a point after which ‘human-

budget-emission-control’ becomes completely futile and irrelevant.

There are two simple messages - we need to: -

3. Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground

4. Get on with the control of ‘human-budget-emissions’ as quickly as possible.

123

Carbon Budget Analysis Tool [CBAT]

124

A Heuristic Device in ‘Four inter-active Domains’ [draft only]

A draft and incomplete version of this user-inter-active model is already on-line at: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

Domain One ‘Contraction and Concentrations’ governs the commitment to UNFCCC-compliance.

In this sense, the C-BAT analysis isn't simply 'outcome-based' it is ‘outcome-driven’ by that goal.

C-BAT is an analysis tool. It is also a policy-planning model. This may seem deterministic, but

proceeding this way is deliberate. Faced with the possibility of runaway rates of climate change

taking hold, there is no point in achieving 'outcomes' that are 'inadvertently' the result of doing too

little too late. We are in danger of doing this by simply continuing an inadequate ‘climate-policy’

discussion that has so far depended on the combination of opaque and inadequate climate models,

ideologically confused and contestable policy models and risk-obtuse economic models that are

dense with highly contestable economic assumptions and computations.

We must face this challenge of being UNFCCC-compliant on the basis of organising so that we are

globally determined to do enough, soon enough to be UNFCCC-compliant. This means goal-focused

C&C or being in-tune and in-time together, determined to be UNFCCC-compliant.

The detail of this work is still in progress. However, the calculating sequence goes from One to Four

through FOUR DOMAINS starting with and crucially governed by: -

DOMAIN ONE: - Contraction and Concentrations

This domain is 'global' and deals with the 'Common Good'. It directly addresses the 'objective' of the

UNFCCC [the reason why the UNFCCC exists]. Here, the spread of changing concentration

possibilities on any given future carbon-budget is mathematized in the light of certainly changing

[and probably lessening] future sink-performance.

The primary numeraire in Domains One Two Three and Four is one tonne of carbon. The carbon in

one part per million atmospheric CO2 by volume [ppmv] equals 2,130,000,000 tonnes carbon or 2.13

Gigatonnes Carbon [i.e. Gt C or 2.13 Billion Tonnes Carbon]. Conversely, 1 tonne carbon equals

0.00000000046948357 ppmv atmospheric CO2. Using this numeraire for both CO2 emissions &

concentrations makes Carbon-Budget Analysis easily doable.

In Domains Three and Four the *the dollar-numeraire is governed by CBAT’s carbon-numeraire.*

Overall, there are three Budgets in all [High, Medium & Low] though any weight/rate/date budget

can be introduced as a new xml data sheet and the model will respond accordingly.

As things stand with CBAT model development so far, 400 different carbon-path-integrals have been

computed using this numeraire. These are being animated in a user-friendly way with all these

derived details that have been quantified and this makes risk analysis of all the future rates of

change much easier to visualize, compare and evaluate.

125

There are two ways of measuring feedbacks in Domain One. These are Integrated [as in UKCA] &

Segregated [as now proposed by GCI]. The difference between accelerating and decelerating

curvature can easily be seen and the ‘runaway-climate’ inferences easily drawn.

An on/off switch enables all results to be compared with the Contraction:Concentrations Budget in

UK Climate Act [2016 4% Low]. The animated version of this gives users 'Budget Control' with the

drag up/down slider on the right-hand side. This takes the carbon-emissions budget and

concentrations above the budget and concentrations @ CAF-50% in 40 steps up [positive feedback]

and below the budget and concentrations @ CAF-50% in 40 steps down [negative feedback].

Concentrations, temperature, sea-level rise and ocean CO2 deposition/acidification are visible

'consequences' of this 'Budget Control' and all values [sourced] for these are shown on clocks that

will move in synch with the slide use for 'Budget Control'.

5 levels of ‘climate-sensitivity’ are programmed in against these budgets and users can select each of

these levels to see the results from low to high.

Domains two, three and four are governed by user choices made in domain one and these Domains

will exchange with the centre-stage of position [here of Domain one] when their icons on the left are

touched. Then the Slider over the years becomes active e.g. selecting and measuring and weighing

the convergence-rates/weights/dates for the contraction rate chosen from Domain one.

Domain ‘icons’ on the left are mouse-sensitive and will come centre-stage when ‘mouse-touched’,

moving the Domain at the centre to the left where it remains inter-active. Users can select the

Domain One path-integral they feel is relevant to achieving UNFCCC-compliance and to hold this

choice as they then progress through Domains two, three and four. As twenty years of negotiations

at the UNFCCC now clearly show, not proceeding in a manner governed by this sequence generates

an increasingly chaotic process that is less and less governed by the demands of UNFCCC-

compliance.

DOMAIN TWO: - Contraction and Convergence

This domain is international. It addresses the 'Common but Differentiated Good' of negotiating to

share what is left in the future global carbon budget in a rational manner. For all the contraction

rates in Domain One, all convergence rates are being computed and animated as between

consumers above and below the global per capita average arising.

Population growth rates and the effect of a population base-year in the C&C accounts are addressed

here. Also convergence procedures derived from C&C such as Common but Differentiated

Convergence, Cap and Dividend, Cap and Share and Greenhouse Development Rights are compared

with C&C.

Users are invited to select the convergence-rate they feel relates to the path-integral already chosen

in Domain One and so successfully achieving UNFCCC-compliance and hold this choice through

Domains three and four.

DOMAIN THREE: - Contraction and Conversion

126

This domain is technological and economic and will explore the options for sustaining or not

sustaining present levels of production and consumption. It is in essence the position where C&C

without 'Green Growth' of some kind is useless, but 'Green Growth' without C&C is dangerous.

Users can evaluate in this Domain subject to the choices already made in Domains One and Two.

DOMAIN FOUR: - Damages and Growth

Domain Four is really where economics is relevant. It is the domain of climate-damages versus

conventional 'growth', based on forward projecting Munich Re trends as recorded over the last forty

years. All rates shown are functions of results and choices made in Domain One. So users can see

whether their efforts have passed the crucial test of doing enough soon enough to achieve UNFCCC-

compliance. If not they can go back and re-run their analysis based on different choices being made

in Domains One Two and Three.

The overall animation in still in preparation but a taster is here [load and re-load this file]: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

CBAT is an elaboration of: - http://www.gci.org.uk/Animations/BENN_C&C_Animation.swf

127

CBAT Domain One

Contraction and Concentrations - Low Budget

Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

128

CBAT Domain One

Contraction and Concentrations - Medium Budget

Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

129

CBAT Domain One

Contraction and Concentrations – High Budget

Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated

http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf

130

Past Emissions & Climate Act Budget in Relation to Hansen and other Budgets

131

5 June 2013

132

Written evidence submitted by the Environmental Investigation Agency   1. Introduction to the EIA Founded  in  1984,  the  Environmental  Investigation Agency  (EIA)  is  an NGO  and has been  actively involved in the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission policy debate for over 20 years.   2. F‐gas Background F‐gases  (fluorinated gases) are a  suite of GHGs  containing  fluorine. Used  in various  industrial and commercial processes  (predominantly refrigeration, air conditioning, foams and fire extinguishers), the most  common  F‐gases  are  hydrofluorocarbons  (HFCs),  although  perfluorocarbons  (PFCs)  and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) are also included. F‐gases currently account for 3% of total GHG emissions in  the  UK  (CCC,  2013,  p.1),  yet  unlike  other  GHGs, most  F‐gases  are  1,000–20,000  times more powerful than CO2 (Defra, 2012, p.1) in terms of Global Warming Potential (GWP). Furthermore, UK F‐gas emissions have grown significantly in the past two decades, rising from 2 MtCO2e in 1995 to 12 MtCO2e in 2008 (CCC, 2010, p.131). HFCs in particular are growing the fasted, with associated CO2e emissions  swelling by 8% per year  from 2004–2008  (UNEP, 2011, p.9).   Spiralling HFC production, consumption and emissions must be addressed as a matter of urgency.  Estimates project that global HFC emissions will increase to 3.6–8.8 GtCO2e yr‐1 by 2050 (Velders et al., 2009; Gschrey & Schwarz, 2009). The higher end of these projections means that HFC emissions will equal 19% of all predicted CO2 emissions in 2050 in the absence of a CO2 stabilisation target.   3. EU Policy Recognising the rising influence that F‐gases such as HFCs were having on the global climate, the EU introduced EC Regulation 842/2006 on certain fluorinated greenhouse gases (the F‐Gas Regulation) which came into force in 2007 and focused on containment and recovery of F‐gases. In 2011, the EU Commission contracted the Öko‐Recherche research institute in Germany to produce a preparatory study, in part to assess the effectiveness of the existing F‐Gas Regulation and also to advise on future amendments to the Regulation. This study found that even with full implementation of the existing F‐Gas Regulation,  annual  F‐gas  emissions  in  the  EU would  actually  increase  by over  7%  between 2008 and 2050, from 103,104 to 110,824 kt CO2e yr‐1 respectively (Schwarz et al., 2011, p.158). This runs in stark contrast with the UK’s obligation under the Climate Change Act 2008 (which underpins the UK Carbon Budgets) to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050, compared with a 1990 baseline.   4. Future EU Policy Following the Öko‐Recherche study, in November 2012 the EU Commission released a proposal for a revised F‐Gas Regulation (EC, 2012a). Amendments to this Regulation will go to a vote in the plenary session of the European Parliament  in  late 2013 and the associated ENVI Committee voted  in June 2013 to support bans on new HFC‐based equipment in a wide range of sectors, in recognition of the fact  that safe, cost‐effective and energy efficient alternatives are already available. The Lithuanian presidency and Member States intend to have several ‘Working Party on International Environment’ (WPE) meetings throughout 2013 on the existing proposals,  in order to determine the EU Council’s position. During  this  stage,  it  is essential  that  the UK’s position  (coordinated via Defra)  fully  takes into account the scientific and technological evidence available.  

133

5. Introducing Bans on New Equipment in the F‐Gas Regulation The  EU  Commission’s  own  preparatory  study  showed  that  new  HFC  equipment  bans1  can  be implemented in all the key sectors by 2020 (Schwarz et al., 2011, p.264), being replaced instead with technologies that rely on greener cooling chemicals including CO2, hydrocarbons or ammonia, all of which possess much lower (or zero) GWPs than HFCs. Such bans form part of the key amendments proposed  by  the  European  Parliament  (and  agreed  by  the  ENVI  Committee)  as  changes  to  the existing  Regulation  and  it  is  important  to  note  that  Schwarz  et  al.’s  analysis  restricted  possible alternatives  to  HFC  equipment  to  technologies  that  exhibit  equal  (or  better)  life‐cycle  energy efficiency ratings and are proven to be safe. Bans on new equipment using HFCs provide chemical producers, manufacturers and end‐users with genuine regulatory certainty. They send clear market signals  with  concrete  timeframes  for  companies  and  investors  in  each  subsector,  spurring  the necessary planning and capital  investments. Furthermore their use  is historically proven, with bans having been  integral policy tools to enable the phase‐out of ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol.  6. SMEs and the Green Economy The  EU  Commission’s  impact  assessment  on  the  review  of  the  existing  Regulation  found  that  a “strengthened  policy  approach… …would  provide  opportunities  for  small  innovative  companies,” particularly  if “bans of production, use or placing on the market of F‐gases  in certain applications” were  included  (EC,  2012b,  p.44).  In  the  UK  alone,  there  are  over  40  SMEs  providing  HFC‐free solutions  to  the  country’s  refrigeration  and  air  conditioning  needs,  including  manufacturers, component  suppliers,  contractors,  installers,  and  research  &  training  institutes  (Shecco,  2012, pp.156‐165).  Encouraging  this  shift  towards HFC‐free  technologies –  through  introducing bans on new  equipment where  safe,  energy  efficient  and  cost‐effective  alternatives  exist  – would benefit these  SMEs  by  providing  them  with  policy  certainty  and  support  the  green  economy,  avoiding locking the UK into unnecessarily high future F‐gas emissions.  In the current economic climate, clear market direction is needed to enable our green economy to flourish. Some companies have warned that without bans there will not be enough certainty to  invest  in  low‐GWP technology production. Additionally, the associated reduction in HFC emissions would provide the UK with added flexibility in the way that it chooses to implement its Carbon Budget objectives. In short, introducing bans on certain HFC equipment represents an easy win for UK SMEs and well as the UK’s climate objectives more broadly.  7. UK Government Position on Bans The  UK’s  current  position  on  the  review  of  the  F‐Gas  Regulation,  headed  by  Defra,  includes  a misconception  that  additional  bans  will  place  an  unfair  burden  on  UK  industry  and  entail disproportionate  costs.  In  reality,  failing  to  introduce  bans  for  sectors  in which  alternatives  are readily available – such as  for commercial refrigeration equipment – would actually guarantee  the continued market dominance of American and Japanese multinationals at the expense of UK SMEs. In  the  commercial  refrigeration  sector, Waitrose  has  committed  to  phase  out  HFCs  in  new  and existing equipment by 2020, with Sainsbury’s, Marks & Spencer and The Co‐operative set to follow suit  by  2030  (EIA,  2012).  Supporting  this,  Richard  Benyon MP,  Parliamentary Under‐Secretary  of State for Defra, recently claimed that “Restrictions on HFCs  in commercial refrigeration equipment 

                                                            1 EIA’s call for bans only affects new equipment and does not extend to existing equipment 

134

would  provide  market  opportunities  for  manufacturers  of  natural  refrigeration  equipment” (Hansard, 2012). As the real‐world experience of UK retailers and the Öko‐Recherche study carried out on behalf of  the EU Commission  show,  switching away  from HFCs can  lead  to  significant cost savings  over  the  lifetime  of  refrigeration  and  cooling  equipment.  As  the  market  develops  and widespread applications of alternative technologies generate economies of scale, costs will fall even further whilst energy efficiency gains are likely to increase.  8. Recommendations for Action As one of the more influential Member States, the UK’s willingness to push for an effective policy at EU  level will be  crucial  to ensuring  that  the EU’s domestic  ambition  complements  its progressive position at international level. It is important to note that failure to address F‐gases meaningfully at EU  level will have a hugely detrimental  impact on  talks currently  taking place within  the Montreal Protocol  and UNFCCC.  The UK  should  follow  the  example  of  progressive Member  States  such  as Germany, France and Denmark, who have made clear their preference for sector bans on HFCs and have  flourishing  domestic  alternatives  industries.  Implementing  feasible  bans  on  new  equipment containing HFCs would strengthen the UK’s overall Carbon Budgets as such bans represent an easy win for emissions reductions, whilst supporting SMEs and the green economy.   9. Assisted Questions/Topics to Raise with the CCC and DECC a.) In the context of the UK government reviewing the Carbon Budgets in 2014, do you recognise that HFC reductions offer a least‐cost opportunity if they are banned in sectors where climate‐friendly, cost‐effective, safe and proven technologies already exist?  b.) Given  the need  to  stimulate  the  green  economy  and  find  cost‐effective  emissions  reductions, would you support the  introduction of placing on the market restrictions (bans) on HFCs  in sectors where numerous  independent studies have shown  low GWP alternatives  to be cost‐effective, safe and energy efficient?  c.) Do you recognise that placing on the market restrictions (bans) on HFCs provides UK‐based green technology equipment manufacturers with opportunities for growth?  References  CCC (Committee on Climate Change), 2013, Other non CO2 factsheet, UK, available: http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/other‐non‐co2/.  CCC (Committee on Climate Change), 2010, The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s, UK, available: http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the‐fourth‐carbon‐budget‐reducing‐emissions‐through‐the‐2020s‐2/.  Defra (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2012, Guidance: F Gas and Ozone Regulations – Information Sheet GEN 2: Fluid Uses, UK, available: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182571/fgas‐gen2‐fluid‐uses.pdf.   EC (European Commission), 2012a, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases: COM(2012) 643, available: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/f‐gas/legislation/documentation_en.htm. 

135

  

 EC (European Commission), 2012b, Impact Assessment: Review of Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 on certain fluorinated greenhouse gases, available: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/f‐gas/legislation/docs/swd_2012_364_en.pdf.  EIA (Environmental Investigation Agency), 2012, Chilling Facts IV: HFC‐Free Cooling Goes Mainstream, available: http://www.eia‐international.org/wp‐content/uploads/EIA_ChillFactsIV_FINAL_lo‐res.pdf.  Gschrey, B. and Schwarz, W., 2009, Global Projection of F‐gas Emissions Shows High Increase Until 2050, available:  http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/produkte/dokumente/Flyer_F_gase_global.pdf.  Hansard, 2012, UK Commons Debates – Written Answers: Refrigeration – Job Creation, available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130603/text/130603w0004.htm#13060415001768.  IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2000, IPCC Special Reporton Emissions Scenarios: Summary for Policymakers, available: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special‐reports/spm/sres‐en.pdf.  Schwarz, W., Leisewitz, A., Gschrey, B., Herold, A., Gores, S., Papst, I., Usinger, J., Colbourne, D., Kauffeld, M., Pedersen, H. and Croiset, I., 2011, Preparatory study for a review of Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 on certain fluorinated greenhouse gases: Prepared for the European Commission in the context of Service Contract No 070307/2009/548866/SER/C4, available: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/f‐gas/docs/2011_study_en.pdf.  Shecco, 2012, Natural Refrigerants Market Growth for Europe, available: http://guide.shecco.com/GUIDE‐Natural‐Refrigerants‐Europe‐2012.php.  UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), 2011, HFCs: A Critical Link in Protecting Climate and the Ozone Layer – UNEP Synthesis Report, available: http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/HFC_report.pdf.  Velders, G., Fahey, D., Daniel, J., McFarland, M. and Anderson, S., 2009, The Large Contribution of Projected HFC Emissions to Future Climate Forcing, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10:1073, available: http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/06/19/0902817106.abstract.  

20 June 2013 

 

136

Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Met Office Supplementary evidence on carbon uptake in future climate scenarios During the evidence session of 12 June 2013, Dr Jason Lowe offered to provide a more detailed explanation of what may happen to the future atmospheric CO2 burden following a peak in anthropogenic emissions and subsequent rapid decline. Summary

• Climate models coupled to carbon cycle models are used to study the uptake of carbon by the atmosphere, ocean and land surface for potential response to future emissions scenarios. They include both climate and CO2 concentration feedbacks on to the carbon cycle.

• A range of different models show that when carbon emissions are reduced rapidly following a peak in the near future, it is plausible that atmospheric CO2 concentrations will peak before the anthropogenic emissions have reached zero.

• The latest complex earth system model results from CMIP5 reinforce the findings from a simpler (traceable) climate model set up and used in 2008, which also showed this behaviour.

• However, the Met Office also considers it prudent to repeat the assessment of budgets as new understanding of how the earth system works becomes available and can be quantified.

Idealised case of zeroing emissions

1. Climate model experiments using idealised emission or concentration pathways are useful to better understand complex changes in the earth system, and to bound a range of future responses before more credible and policy relevant pathways are considered. Several studies have performed an experiment in which anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide are instantaneously set to zero – the so called “zero emission commitment” experiment. This provides useful understanding of the manner in which carbon sinks evolve, and global temperatures respond, following a rapid reduction in anthropogenic emissions. The results from three different models are reported in Matthews and Weaver (2010), who conclude that “in response to an abrupt elimination of carbon dioxide emissions, global temperatures either remain approximately constant, or cool slightly as natural carbon sinks gradually draw anthropogenic carbon out of the atmosphere”.

2. In the study of Lowe et al. (2009) the evolution of simulated carbon sinks were examined in detail. Following cessation of emission, the atmospheric CO2 concentration declined at a rate of between around 20 and 75ppm per century. The relative contributions to the reduction of atmospheric CO2 from land and ocean sinks, and from different parts of the land sinks, varied depending on the timing of the emission reduction and the level of atmospheric CO2 when emissions were reduced. These studies highlight that carbon sinks can continue to take up carbon at significant rates after the magnitude of the emissions has been reduced, and that the uptake is affected by the state of the carbon cycle components prior to the cessation of emissions. In turn, this depends on the pathway of earlier emissions.

3. This is not surprising and is entirely consistent with our understanding of fundamental carbon

cycle processes which can continue to respond to past changes or emissions for many years and

137

are not purely determined by emissions from a single year. Rapid reduction in emissions can lead to periods of time where significant natural sinks exceed emissions and lead to CO2 reductions even while anthropogenic emissions are still positive.

The policy relevant scenarios used in the recent IPCC assessments

4. Numerous studies have produced scenarios or emissions pathways that peak carbon dioxide emissions early in the 21st century and have rapid declines following the peak. These studies then use a variety of climate models and carbon cycle models to understand the evolution of atmospheric CO2 and global temperatures. We present these to demonstrate the credibility of the situation where atmospheric CO2 concentration is no longer rising, or is even declining slowly, despite non-zero anthropogenic emissions.

5. Plattner et al. (2008) examined the climate and carbon cycle response for eight models and a

number of stabilisation scenarios. One of those models is the BERN2.5CC model, which clearly simulates a number of cases where CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere level off or even peak but anthropogenic emissions remain above zero (see their Figure 11). Furthermore the authors state that “allowable emissions for stabilization at 450 ppm (SP450 and OSP450) remain above zero throughout the simulation in all of the EMICs”, where EMICs refers to the models considered.

6. The most recent climate model inter-comparison exercises have tended to use the, so called,

Representative Concentration Profiles (RCPs; Moss et al., 2010) as input. These provide another opportunity to examine the response of the climate-system when atmospheric CO2 is declining slowly following a peak. We focus on RCP2.6, which is the most similar case to the global pathway considered by the Committee on Climate Change that gives approximately a 50% chance of limiting global average near-surface warming to 2°C. RCP2.6 was produced using the IMAGE model (e.g. van Vuuren et al. 2011) and shows a peak CO2 concentration occurring in 2050 followed by a decline. The emissions of CO2 in 2050 and 2060 (a decade after CO2 concentrations started to decline) were 3.4 GtC/yr and 2GtC/yr respectively, compared to a 1990 value of 7.5GtC/yr.

7. Using the CMIP5 ensemble of more complex earth system models, a recent study by Jones et al.

(2013) examined the relationship between atmospheric CO2 concentrations, carbon sinks and implied anthropogenic emissions in more detail. The study found that when models were constrained to follow the concentrations of the RCP2.6 pathway the implied anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2050 (the time of atmospheric CO2 concentration peak) were still positive and had reduced from 1990 levels by between 14 to 96% depending on the model. A decade later the emissions were also clearly still above zero in the majority of the models. The requirement for negative emissions to achieve this CO2 decline is mixed – for some models emissions stayed positive for the whole of the 21st century.

138

Figure: Compatible fossil fuel emissions for the peak-and-decline RCP2.6 scenario plotted with 10-year smoothing from multiple CMIP5 GCMs. Historical fossil fuel emissions for the 1990s are shown by the black and yellow bar.

8. In terms of carbon storage, the land carbon store increased throughout the 21st century in RCP2.6 in the majority of models, with the amount of increase varying with model. Uptake by the ocean also continued during the 21st century simulations in all of the models, but with a decreasing rate during the 21st century. The cumulative airborne fractions evaluated for the model ensemble between 2006 and 2100 were less than the values estimated for the 1990s for the same models for RCP2.6.

The simple model calculations used for the first carbon budget calculations

9. The modelling philosophy applied for the global scenarios used to inform the first carbon budget calculations is well documented1 and the model outputs are available on the website of the Committee on Climate Change. The ability of the model to credibly emulate the C4MIP simulations is included in the documentation. When this modelling approach is applied to the 2016R4L pathway, which peaks CO2 emissions in 2016 and has a long-term decline rate of 4% per year, a range of atmospheric CO2 concentrations can be simulated depending on the choice of key model parameters within the chosen uncertainty ranges. The median simulated atmospheric CO2 concentration shows a peak in the mid-21st century (peaking at around 445ppm in 2050) followed by a small decline (of around 15ppm over 50 years) later in the 21st century during a period when the anthropogenic emissions have declined significantly, but are still above zero. This is consistent with the behaviour of more recent and complex models reported above. It is important to note that during this (2050 to 2100) period the median temperature response does not show a decline, with the reduction in forcing being buffered by the top of the atmosphere energy imbalance built up during the earlier part of the experiment when atmospheric CO2 concentrations and forcing were increasing. It is also important to note that the precise behaviour of the climate system and the carbon cycle remain uncertain. Narrowing this uncertainty is a key challenge of climate science.

1 http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/docs/Ch1%20technical%20appendix%20v1.1%20-%20projecting%20global%20emissions,%20concentrations%20and%20temperatures.pdf

139

Supplementary evidence on climate sensitivity Summary

• Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and Transient Climate Response (TCR) are two measures of the sensitivity of the climate to changes in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, such as CO2.

• Precise values of ECS and TCR are not known but ranges of certainty can be estimated.

• There are many different ways to estimate ranges of ECS and TCR, each with different advantages and disadvantages.

• The HadGEM2-ES model is at the higher end of complex climate model estimates of ECS and TCR but within the range estimates from a number of different approaches.

• Climate policy advice from the Met Office draws on a range of models and on observations. It is

tailored to address relevant issues. Background

10. The Met Office Hadley Centre has used a number of climate models over the period 2008 to present, in order to provide evidence to inform policy and decision making. These include the HadCM3, HadGEM1 and HadGEM2-ES models. Additionally, traceable simple climate models have been used for some purposes. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and Transient Climate Response (TCR) are two measures of the sensitivity of the climate to changes in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, such as CO2. The ECS and TCR of several complex Met Office GCMs are:

GCM ECS °C TCR °C HadCM3 3.3 2.0 HadGEM1 4.4 1.9 HadGEM2 4.6 2.5

11. The simple climate model used to provide information for the original carbon budgets in 2008

used a distribution of ECS based on Murphy et al. (2004) which had a 5th to 95th percentile range of 2.4 to 5.4°C. This distribution was considered in the IPCC 4th assessment. The overall “likely”2 range presented by the IPCC 4th assessment for ECS was 2 to 4.5°C, with a best estimate of 3°C and a note that values substantially higher than 4.5°C cannot be excluded. TCR was concluded to be “very likely” to be greater than 1°C and “very unlikely” to be greater than 3°C.

12. Recent research shows that we still can not yet estimate a single precise value of ECS, but

improved uncertainty ranges can be estimated using a variety of techniques. These techniques include: using the recent measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated

2 IPCC 4th assessment uses “likely” to mean >66% probability, “very likely” to be >90% probability and “very

unlikely” to be <10% probability.

140

radiative forcing, using palaeo climate measurements, using complex models, and using a combination of models and observations. No single method can be identified as being the best approach and there are pros and cons for each approach. Within a particular class of approach, such as using the recent measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated radiative forcing, there are still methodological issues of debate, such as the type of assumed priors3.

13. There have been a number of recently published estimates of ECS and TCR based on

measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated radiative forcing. These typically focus on the energy balance of the earth. The study by Otto et al. (2013) presented a number of estimated ranges based on considering various recent periods. When only the 2000 to 2009 period was used to represent near present day conditions the 5th to 95th percentile ranges of ECS and TCR were 1.2 to 3.9°C and 0.9 to 2.0°C, respectively. However, the article highlights that whilst there are advantages of using the most recent period because it is somewhat better observed than earlier periods, there are limitations to using a single decade too. The authors state that “caution is required in interpreting any short period, especially a recent one for which details of forcing and energy storage inventories are still relatively unsettled: both could make significant changes to the energy budget. The estimates of the effective radiative forcing by aerosols in particular vary strongly between model-based studies and satellite data. The satellite data are still subject to biases and provide only relatively weak constraints”. The numerical values in the article also clearly demonstrate the variability in ECS and TCR estimates when using a single decade. When the longer 1970 to 2009 was used (which includes data from the most recent decade alongside earlier data) in the calculation, their 5th to 95th percentile estimates for ECS and TCR were 0.9 to 5.0°C and 0.7 to 2.5°C respectively.

14. Forster et al., 2013 calculates that for the CMIP5 set of models (the recent models used in the

forthcoming IPCC 5th assessment) there is a range of ECS from 2.1 to 4.7°C. TCR varies in the range 1.1 to 2.5°C. A recent comprehensive estimate using the palaeo climate approach (Palaeosense, 2013) estimates a likely range for ECS to be 2.2 to 4.8°C (noting that this covers a probability range of 68%). A recent estimate by the MOHC (Harris et al., 2012) using a combination of climate model results and observational constraints together gives a 5th to 95th percentile range of 2.4 to 4.3°C.

15. Thus, we conclude the HadGEM2-ES model is at the upper end of the range from current models

for both ECS and TCR. However, we also conclude that it falls inside the ECS and TCR 5th to 95th percentile ranges estimated by a number of different approaches - including from a method that includes the recent observations. The climate sensitivity uncertainty distribution used by the Met Office in earlier carbon budget analyses within a simple climate model framework also has a significant overlap with many newer estimates.

16. Finally, we highlight that when considering the utility and skill of climate models it is prudent to

consider more than their global average temperature response to atmospheric CO2 concentration changes. The spatial behaviour of complex climate models, such as HadGEM2-ES, are rigorously evaluated against observations for numerous variables. Natural variability and long-term response to external forcings of different types are considered. The HadGEM2-ES

3 Bayesian approaches can be used to refine prior estimates of climate sensitivity but typically contain a

subjective element. There is continued debate about the appropriate choice of prior information, such as whether it should be informative or uninformative. See for instance Efron, 2013.

141

model provides one of the most comprehensive platforms for studying a wide range of earth system processes. We have also combined HadGEM2-ES with observational constraints to estimate ranges of future climate change for particular pathways of future greenhouse gas concentration increase.

References Jones et al. J Climate, 2013 Lowe et al, Env Res Lett, 2009 Matthews and Weaver, Nature Geoscience 3, doi:10.1038/ngeo813, 2010 Moss et al., Nature, 2010 Plattner et al, J Climate, 21, 2008 Van Vuuren et al. Climatic Change, 109, 2011 Elfron, Science, 380, 2013 Forster et al., JGR- atmos, 2013 Harris et al., J Clim, 2013 Murphy et al, Nature, 2004 Otto et al., Nature GeoSci, 2013 Palaeosens project members, Nature, 2013 26 June 2013

142

Written evidence submitted by Andrew Montford

In her evidence to the committee on 12 June 2013, Professor Julia Slingo answered a question from Dr Offord about climate sensitivity as follows:

It’s also really important that we do use observations in some ways to check if our climate models are within sensible bounds. It is still the case that even with the latest updates to what we think what the transient climate response is or the equilibrium climate sensitivity using the last decade of observations, the models – certainly the models we use – and many of the leading models around the world are still within the range of those estimates.

This is misleading. The graph below shows probability density functions for recently published instrumental-observation constrained estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), and the only purely observational study for which an estimated PDF for ECS was included in the last IPCC assessment report, all peer reviewed. Studies including the last decade of observations are in green. Those relying on slightly earlier data, but which use objectively valid methods, are in blue.1 The grey band represents the range of model estimates. It is obvious that there is little overlap between the observationally constrained estimates and the models, the former suggesting a value of climate sensitivity that is considerably less alarming.

1 The Ring et al 2012 study, which gave best estimates for ECS varying between 1.45 and 2.0°C depending on the surface temperature dataset used, has not been included since it did not give estimated PDFs.

143

Recent observationally constrained estimates of climate sensitivity – Lindzen and Choi 2011, Forster and Gregory 2006, Aldrin et al 2012, Lewis 2013, Masters 2013, and two estimates from Otto et al 2013 (using data from 2000–09 and from 1970–2009). The Lindzen and Choi PDF was not shown in that paper but was calculated from its results by Lewis. The only way Professor Slingo could conceivably make the statement she did in relation to equilibrium climate sensitivity would be to include studies which used a Bayesian prior that biased their results to high ECS values. That includes studies based on using a uniform Bayesian prior distribution for ECS, an approach that is known to give a warm bias and has been shown in the scientific literature to be invalid.2,3It also includes studies using a non-uniform Bayesian prior distribution that substantially downweights low ECS values before any observational evidence is introduced. Neither approach would be supported by any reputable statistician. In relation to the models used by the Met Office, its website states that the HadGEM2-ES model in particular is used for policy advice.4 The HadGEM2-ES model has an ECS of 4.6°C and a transient climate response (TCR) of 2.5°C, the highest TCR and second highest ECS among the 23 CMIP5 models analysed in Forster et al., 2013.5 By comparison, the best observationally constrained estimate of TCR from the recent Otto et al paper was 0.9–2.0°C. I would urge the committee:

to write to Professor Slingo, asking her to rebut the points made above, stating what published studies she relied on for her assertion regarding the models used by the Met Office and confirming what models she referred to

to take evidence from a reputable statistician with expertise in objective Bayesian statistical inference.

18 June 2013

2 Annan JD and Hargreaves JC. On the generation and interpretation of probabilistic estimates of climate sensitivity, Climatic Change 2009; DOI 10.1007/s10584-009-9715-y. 3 Lewis N. An objective Bayesian improved approach for applying optimal fingerprint techniques to estimate climate sensitivity, J. Climate 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-12-00473. 4 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/policy-relevant/advance. 5 Forster, P. M. et al. Evaluating adjusted forcing and model spread for historical and future scenarios in the CMIP5 generation of climate models. J. Geophys. Res., 2013; doi:10.1002/jgrd.50174).

144

Written evidence submitted by Sandbag 

 

Sandbag is a UK‐based NGO campaigning for environmentally effective carbon budgets and carbon markets. In the document which follows we: 

• critically examine the way the UK’s long term emissions pathway was set under the UK Climate Change Act and the carbon budgets currently set by the CCC; 

• propose and suggest the UK adopt an alternate effort sharing model as a more equitable alternative to the model on which the UK Carbon Budgets are currently based; 

• evaluate the ambition of the UK against Europe using this new effort‐sharing model; • critically examine the basis for the reviewing the 4th carbon budget in 2014, based on 

developments in Europe; and • propose that the UK unshackle its carbon budgets from the allocations set for it under the EU 

ETS by cancelling excess ETS allowances.  

1. Introduction: the importance of the 2008 Climate Change Act 

1.1 We wish to start by acknowledging the ground‐breaking importance of the 2008 Climate Change Act, the first legislation of its kind anywhere in the world to legally bind a state to 2050 emissions reductions and to set periodic budgets to ensure those targets are met. 

1.2 The UK’s ambition here has, undoubtedly, been an important factor encouraging other G8 countries and other EU Member States to make similarly ambitious pledges for 2050 emissions reductions and to start to passing legislation to meet those pledges. 

1.3 Ground‐breaking and progressive as the 2008 Climate Change Act was, we will argue in this submission that both the headline target in the Act and, more specifically, the budgets set beneath it by the Climate Change Committee describe an environmentally inadequate and inequitable emissions pathway for the United Kingdom.  

1.4 We propose that the global emissions pathway chosen allows for an unacceptable level of climate risk and, more importantly, the effort sharing model used to determine the UK’s pathway under this global trajectory is highly inequitable. That model is extremely preferential to rich countries with large emissions and small populations like the UK, and highly prejudicial against poor countries with low emissions and large populations like Bangladesh.  

1.5 We will advance here an alternative effort‐sharing framework, based on work by the German Advisory Council on Global Change and our own published research, which implies a much more ambitious emissions pathway for the United Kingdom than that envisaged by the Climate Change Committee. 

1.6 Moreover, we will argue that current plans to review the 4th Carbon Budget against the levels of climate ambition in Europe and specifically in the EU ETS are firstly premature, insofar as they are scheduled to take place before the European decisions relating to that 2023‐2027 budget period are agreed, but are also misplaced insofar as climate ambition in the EU, though environmentally inadequate, is outpacing that in the UK. 

1.7 Finally, we discuss how the UK’s carbon budgets should be unshackled from the allocations set under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to provide the government with more freedom in determining the emissions path it would like to pursue, without being beholden to EU legislation and 

145

legislative timetables. This can be readily performed through the cancellation of ETS allowances from UK auctions. 

 

2. A critical assessment of the methodology behind the current UK emissions pathway  

2.1 The logic by which the 80% target was determined and by which the carbon budgets towards it have been set it is eloquently laid out in a letter from the former Chair of the Committee, Adair Turner, to then Energy and Climate Secretary, Ed Miliband on 7th October 2008.1 

2.2 Firstly, it is clear from that letter that the global emissions pathway envisaged by the Committee, and within which the UK pathway is set, has less than a fifty percent chance of avoiding 2˚C.  

“We therefore believe that global policy should seek to limit the central expectation [i.e. 50% probability] of global temperature rise to, or close to, 2°C and that it should ensure that the probability of crossing the extreme danger threshold of 4°C is reduced to an extremely low level (e.g. less than 1%).” (Emphasis added). 

2.3 The Climate Change Committee hesitates between setting a global emissions pathway with an even chance of hitting 2 degrees (requiring global emissions to drop by 60% in 2050) and a pathway with an even chance of hitting 2.2 degrees (requiring global emissions to halve by 2050) seeming to hover somewhere in between. For the astute observer, this acceptance of a less than 50% chance of avoiding 2 degrees is apparent from the Climate Change Committee’s own charts which visibly show the central estimate line landing slightly above the 2 degrees threshold.2 

Figure 1: Global Temperature stabilisation under the envisaged global pathway 

 

2.4 We propose that committing to a global pathway which has a less than fifty‐fifty chance of avoiding two degrees Celsius poses unacceptable climate risks, and is also a disingenuous application of the UK’s commitment under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, which states:  

“We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as 

                                                            1 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2013/03/Interim‐report‐letter‐to‐DECC‐SofS‐071008.pdf 2 P.65 http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/4th%20Budget/CCC‐4th‐Budget‐Book_plain_singles.pdf 

146

to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity”3 

2.5 A global pathway that is “very likely” (>75% chance) or, at the least, “likely” (>66% chance) to avoid two degrees seems to us far more consistent with this international pledge and seems a more appropriate reaction to the economic and environmental dangers posed by climate change. We also note that the science on emissions budgets has advanced since this global emissions pathway was modelled for the Climate Change Committee by the Hadley Centre. 

2.6 But the most critical parts of that letter are the following two sections. Firstly Lord Turner wisely points out that it is not the Committees role to make ethical judgements about the UK’s share of global emissions on behalf of the international community. 

“The appropriate UK share of a global emissions target involves ethical judgements and will be the subject of international negotiations….It is not part of the Committee’s remit to propose a specific methodology for the purposes on international negotiations. 

2.7 But in the absence of a national or international political decision about the effort sharing approach that should be used in the international negotiations, the Climate Change Committee effectively defaulted to the effort sharing model used to decide the original ‐60% 2050 target in the Climate Change Bill, but updated to reflect more recent science in the 4th IPCC assessment report. The Committee has always been careful not to condone this particular effort sharing methodology, but presents this as the minimum conceivable effort that the UK might adopt. Continuing on from the paragraph quoted above, Lord Turner says: 

“[W]e believe that it is difficult to imagine a global deal which allows the developed countries to have emissions per capita in 2050 which are significantly above a sustainable global average. In 2050 the global average, based on an estimated population of 9.2 billion, would be between 2.1 to 2.6 tonnes per capita, implying an 80% cut in UK Kyoto GHG emissions from 1990 levels.” 

2.8 It is indeed difficult to imagine a global deal that is worse for developing countries and better for developed ones. The UK trajectory described in the 4th carbon budget report finds the UK consuming 1.1% of global emissions under the modest pathway used by the Climate Change Committee for 1990‐20504, and this before accounting for its international aviation and shipping emissions. While this number looks small, the UK currently accounts for around 0.9% of the world’s population, and is expected by the Committee to represent 0.8% of the global population in 2050. This suggests that the UK intends to exceed its fair share of the emissions space by more than a quarter. 

2.9 By comparison, Bangladesh, which accounts for 2.2% of currently global population rising to 2.9% in 2050 receives only 0.5% of the 1990‐2050 emissions space. In effect, Bangladesh risks having three quarters of its emissions space expropriated by richer countries under this approach. 

   

                                                            3 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf 4 The CCC uses two scenarios from the Hadley Centre’s MAGIC 4.11 model: a 2,423 Gt scenario and a 2,536 Gt scenario. See page 14 of http://downloads.theccc.org.uk/docs/Ch1%20technical%20appendix%20v1.1%20‐%20projecting%20global%20emissions,%20concentrations%20and%20temperatures.pdf 

147

Figure 2: UK vs. Bangladesh under the CCC’s post 2020 convergence model 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

MtCO2e

Bangladesh

UK

 

2.10 The current UK emissions pathway is doubly compromised then. It allows for an unacceptably high risk of passing 2 degrees, and it applies an effort‐sharing framework that is unacceptably prejudicial against poor countries. 

2.11 It is clear from Lord Turner’s remarks that this was not a realistic effort‐sharing model to form the template for a global climate deal. From the outset this was captured in the Committee’s recommendation that “the emissions reduction target for those sectors covered by the Climate Change Bill should be at least 80%”. The emphasis, here, is the Committee’s own.5  

2.12 Instead it is clear that the Committee expected its placeholder expectations about both the acceptable volume of global emissions, and the share of emissions to which each country was entitled to be adjusted in the light of a more ambitious offer from the UK government as part of the international negotiations. Instead, the tail is wagging the dog. These highly conservative Climate Change Committee budgets have defined the government’s starting position on ambition, with the threat, if anything, of being further weakened by government intervention to review the 4th carbon budget if the government decides there have been insufficient advances in the EU’s climate ambition.  

2.13 We note, however, that the UK Government currently lacks an agreed yardstick by which to measure its own and Europe’s efforts. In the following sections we scrutinize the placeholder effort sharing model applied by the Commission in more detail and present our own effort‐sharing model which we suggest should be used as a fairer template for the government to apply as part of such an exercise. 

3. Political compromise in the effort‐sharing methodology selected by the Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution  

3.1 The placeholder methodology used by the Climate Change Committee to determine the UK’s effort sharing methodology was, as noted above, inherited from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, who are very explicit in the approach that they endorsed: “the UK                                                             5 Page 1. http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2013/03/Interim‐report‐letter‐to‐DECC‐SofS‐071008.pdf 

 

148

should be prepared to accept the contraction and convergence principle as the basis for international agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions”.6 This endorsement, however, seems to have been reached because of the Commission’s excessive fears about the potential cost of mitigation if a fairer system were embraced. 

3.2 The Royal Commission were acutely aware that there were important moral issues at stake. They reject outright the methodology by which emissions rights were awarded under the Kyoto Protocol because: 

“…the Kyoto Protocol was based on negotiated reductions from each developed nation’s level of emissions in 1990. This approach gives those nations which have produced the most greenhouse gases to date an unfair advantage, in the shape of ‘grandfather rights’ to continue making the largest emissions. That does not seem a fair basis on which to proceed in the long term, nor one likely to win widespread support in the developing world.” 7 (Emphasis added) 

3.3 With equal moral insight, the Royal Commission expressed the view that “an effective, enduring and equitable climate protocol will eventually require emission quotas to be allocated to nations on a simple and equal per capita basis.” (Emphasis added). The Commission seems to be on the brink of endorsing a genuinely equitable effort‐sharing model, but their hesitation in doing so is clearly telegraphed from the use of the word “eventually”. Instead of proposing a global emissions budget based on a pure per capita approach, they endorsed Contraction and Convergence® instead. As the Commission explains: 

“Over the coming decades each nation’s allocation would gradually shift from its current level of emissions towards a level set on a uniform per capita basis. By this means ‘grandfather rights’ would gradually be removed” (emphasis added). 

3.4 At what point did the Royal Commission argue that developing countries should finally gain parity of access to the global emissions space? Not until 2050 when the vast majority of the global emissions space will have been exhausted by rich countries like the UK. 

3.5 In other words, the Contraction and Convergence® model continues to favour the largest historical emitters in rich developed countries by awarding them a disproportionate share of the emissions space at the expense of poor populous ones. Just like the Kyoto framework rejected by the Royal Commission, it is an approach which “grandfathers” emissions rights to the biggest polluters, deferring the point at which low emitting developing countries gain equivalent access to the global carbon space. It is by inheriting this model that the Climate Change Committee prescribes a UK pathway under which the UK uses a share of the global emissions space 120% times larger than its population seems to merit. 

3.6 The disenfranchisement of developing and emerging economies under this model makes it as unlikely a candidate for a global climate deal as the methodology dismissed under the Kyoto Protocol. There is little chance that such a framework will be embraced by populous, emerging economies such as the BASIC countries8, or by developing countries in the G77 group9. 

3.7 But how did the Royal Commission reach this position? On this they were surprisingly frank: a fairer approach just looked too hard for states like the UK. Political expediency won out over fairness: 

                                                            6 http://web.archive.org/web/20070104105415/http://www.rcep.org.uk/pdf/chp4.pdf 7 Page 56 http://web.archive.org/web/20070104105415/http://www.rcep.org.uk/pdf/chp4.pdf 8 Brazil, South Africa, India, China 9 Now incorporating 132 developing countries, including some “emerging economies” like China 

149

“A system of per capita quotas could not be expected to enter into force immediately. At the same time as entitling developing nations to use substantially more fossil fuels than at present (which they might not be able to afford), it would require developed nations to make drastic and immediate cuts in their use of fossil fuels, causing serious damage to their economies.” 

3.8 This analysis also seems to underestimate the extent to which trading of emissions rights could reduce the need for high emitters to cut their domestic emissions, lowering their mitigation costs and softening the economic impact by buying spare emissions rights from developing countries or paying for cheap abatement opportunities elsewhere in the world. It also neglects that developing countries should be entitled to grow their economies through the sale of emissions space that is rightfully theirs.  

3.9 While we share the understanding expressed in Contraction and Convergence® that a just transition will inevitably involve a gradual convergence of emissions between developed and developing countries, we argue that this should not be taken to imply a deferred convergence of emissions rights. Poor countries should not be disenfranchised from their fair share of a new global resource by virtue of being low emitters. Equivalent access to emissions rights under a 2°C emissions budget should be conferred to developed and developing countries from the outset. 

4. A fairer effort sharing model for the UK carbon budgets and targets: The Sovereign Emissions Rights Framework 

4.1 At Sandbag, we have published our own effort sharing model as part of the European Commission Consultation on a 2015 International Climate Agreement: The Sovereign Emissions Rights Framework.10 Our approach seeks to provide a fair model of how emissions rights might be awarded to ensure that all countries internalise their fair share of the costs involved in mitigating global emissions within a global carbon budget compatible with a “likely” chance (>66%) of cost‐effectively avoiding 2 degrees. We propose that:  

• The total global greenhouse emissions budget to 2050 should be back‐calculated from 1990, when the dangers of climate change were first globally acknowledged following from the IPCC’s first assessment report. 

• This 1990‐2050 budget should be divided between nations based on their share of global population in 1990 at that particular moral and epistemological milestone. 

• This new agreement should supersede previous agreements and all historic territorial emissions produced since 1990 should be counted against these national budgets, as well any as awarded emissions rights or offset credits issued under the Kyoto Protocol.  

• All fossil and industrial CO2 emissions under those national budgets should be tradable between countries, either at state level or through devolved cap and trade schemes, to allow cost‐effective emissions reductions to be realised while ensuring ultimate financial responsibility for these reductions is appropriately apportioned. 

4.2 We emphasise that Sandbag is not unique in advocating this kind of budgets approach. The German Advisory Council on Global Change published a very similar approach in a landmark paper in 

                                                            10 Damien Morris, The Sovereign Emissions Rights Framework (Sandbag, June 2013) http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/The_Sovereign_Emissions_Rights_Framework.pdf 

150

2009,11 and as early as early as 1989 Professor Michael Grubb, founding member of the Climate Change Committee argued that: 

“There is only one really solid basis for allocation. That is to recognize equal per capita entitlements to carbon emissions: and, consequently, initially to allocate carbon emission permits in proportion to national population. The moral principle is simple, namely that every human has an equal right to use the atmospheric resource.”12 

4.3 By following the approach outlined above, we find that the UK is 66% of the way (16 billion tonnes) through its 25 billion tonne budget for 1990‐2050. That leaves it just over 8 billion tonnes to use out to 2050. The UK will exhaust its remaining equitable budget under this framework by 2017 without a step‐change in its domestic and internationally traded effort. 

5. Comparing UK and European effort under the 4th Carbon budget using the SER framework 

5.1 In the table below we explore how far the UK has progressed through this budget compared with the EU27 and the world as a whole, noting that the UK is further through its budget, owing to its high rate of emissions since 1990 relative to its 1990 population.  

Table 1: Emissions budgets under the Sovereign Emissions Rights Framework 

Country/region  Share of 1990 global popn 

1990‐2050 budget under 66% chance of avoiding 2˚C  (Gt CO2e) 

Emissions produced 1990‐2012E (Gt CO2e) 

Share of budget already used 

Global budget   100% 2,274 1,024  45%EU27 budget   9% 204 116  57%United Kingdom  1% 24.6 16.3  66%Sources: UNEP 2012 Emissions Gap report gives a 1,890Gt global budget for 2000‐2050 of which 640 is estimated to have been used by 2012. To both figures we have added in 384Mt of estimated 1990‐1999 emissions from Stockholm Environment Institute 1990 population figures taken from the CIA World Factbooks UK and EU27 emissions for 1990‐2012 taken from the European Environment Agency as reported to the UNFCCC (net emissions including LULUCF and bunker fuels and early 2012 estimates from Eurostat. Figures are approximate and have been rounded

 

5.2 Europe, then, is also dangerously close to exhausting its equitable emissions budget, and will exhaust its emissions space by 2033 under the budgets implied by the 2020 framework and the milestones in the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap without a step change in its domestic and international effort. While this suggests that Europe needs to go much further, the UK has considerable catching up to do if it even to match Europe’s inadequate levels of climate ambition. Using an equitable per capita approach, the UK, then, will compare unfavourably in any test of its climate efforts against Europe for the period governing the 4th carbon budget. 

5.3 With Europe as a whole committed to much higher levels of abatement relative to its historic emissions, and therefore streaks ahead of Britain in terms of its climate ambition, we can easily predict the outcome of such an effort comparison, but we note that, strictly speaking, a precise comparison cannot take place until the European Emissions pathway for 2023‐2027 is completed. 

                                                            11 WBGU, Solving the Climate Dilemma (2009) http://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/veroeffentlichungen/sondergutachten/sn2009/wbgu_sn2009_en.pdf 12 Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989) 

151

This is especially true in relation to the budgets set under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme as we explore below.  6. Generous carbon budgets in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme are holding back UK effort 

6.1 As we seek to demonstrate above, it is not a problem with EU ambition that is blocking ambition in the UK as is sometimes proposed. Instead this is an artefact of differences in the way that ambition in the UK carbon budgets and the EU emissions trading scheme are currently determined.  

6.2 When setting the carbon budgets for the UK, the Climate Change Committee initially decided to separate out the component of that budget to be reached by the sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (e.g. power stations, factories, airlines) against those that weren’t (e.g. transport, heating, agriculture). Emissions in traded sectors were deemed to be equivalent to the levels of allocations in the ETS with any physical emissions over or under these allocations deemed to have been ‘offset’ with tradable permits. 

6.3 The decision to account for traded emissions in this way was based on the support for flexible policies such as the ETS which enabled least‐cost compliance. But having embarked on this accounting methodology it has become very difficult for the Climate Change Committee to recommend budgets which depart from those set under the ETS.  

6.4 Unfortunately, the EU methodology for awarding emission rights under the EU ETS is far more generous to the UK than Britain’s own effort sharing methodology. While the EU has not displayed less ambition than the UK, its harmonised methodology for awarding emissions rights under the Emissions Trading Scheme is more advantageous to the UK than to other countries. This is because, while the UK’s budgets are set under a model based on Contraction and Convergence, Emissions rights under the EU ETS have largely been awarded by “grandfathering” which, as the Royal Commission noted, is even more favourable to the largest emitters. As the UK is the second largest emitter in the EU ETS after Germany it is has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of this allocation methodology. The UK has received 12% of the ETS allowances awarded to all 30 participating countries over 2008‐201213, it will receive 11% of all ETS allowances available for auction from 201314, and it will also be awarded free allocations on the same basis as countries like Sweden and Norway who have a much lower responsibility for historic emissions and have also been more successful in limiting their greenhouse gas pollution. 

6.5 Ironically, because the current accounting methodology for the UK carbon budgets is fixed to the incompatible allocation methodology in the EU, Europe’s generosity to Britain under the ETS threatens to derail the ambition of the UK carbon budgets. 

6.6 This has already been observed with the first three carbon budgets. Recognising that UK ambition was in many ways tied to that of the EU as a whole, the CCC recommended two proposed levels for these budgets – the ‘Intended Budgets’ and the ‘Interim Budgets’. The CCC hoped that the Intended budgets would be adopted in the event of an increase in ambition at an EU level as part of a new global deal being reached in Copenhagen. This deal never materialised which lead to the Interim Budgets remaining in place. This “interim” pathway now                                                             13 Phase 2 of the EU ETS, corresponding to first Carbon Budget and the first Kyoto Commitment Period 14 88% of future auctioning rights are awarded on the basis of national shares in EU27 emissions in 2005. The UK accounts for 237Mt (12%) of ETS emissions in that baseline year. See article 10 of the ETS Directive  http://eur‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0087:20090625:EN:HTML 

152

threatens to take the UK dangerously off track from its desired trajectory, demanding a steeper and costlier abatement path later on if it is to get back on track. 

Figure 3:Future emissions reductions required against the interim and intended budgets15 

 

6.7 Observing this danger, as part of its advice to the government, the Climate Change Committee has recommended that the first three budgets now be reduced to the level of the Intended Budgets in recognition of the fact that the Interim Budgets are no longer very challenging after the recession, and therefore represent an unnecessary deviation from the desired trajectory. This has not, however, been accepted by Government thus far. 

6.8 Even here, the Committee has been hamstrung in the level of ambition it can suggest for these three budgets by the way emissions from the traded sector are currently fixed against the allowances awarded to the UK under the EU ETS. It has therefore only been able to propose that the non‐traded sections of the first three budgets be tightened: 

   

                                                            15 Figure 10 CCC 4th budget report 

153

Figure 4: The CCC’s propose tightening of the non‐traded sections of the first three budgets 

 

6.9 To prevent UK ambition from continuing to be hamstrung in the future, the Climate Change Committee has now proposed that the 4th carbon budget should be a “Domestic Action” budget of 1,950 million tonnes, accounted separately from any emissions traded in under the EU ETS: 

“This budget should be legislated in the first instance, with the aim to achieve it through domestic emissions reductions only (i.e. without recourse to purchase of credits in international carbon markets, including through the EU ETS).” 

6.10 We fully concur with the Climate Change Committee that the 4th and future carbon budgets need to be disaggregated from the EU ETS to ensure a minimum level of ambitions is reached, and also to allow the UK to set its budgets without being beholden to the timescales of EU legislation. However, we note it is not within the power of the Climate Change Act to deprive UK installations in the ETS from meeting their compliance obligations under that policy through traded effort. Consequently, new accounting techniques will be necessary to protect UK budgets from excess UK allowances awarded under the EU ETS and to protect any environmental gains made through increased UK ambition. 

7. Unshackling the UK carbon budgets from the EU ETS 

7.1 As it is Europe’s excessive generosity to the UK under the ETS that is holding back ambition in the UK’s carbon budgets, rather than any shortfall in EU ambition, this offers Britain a fairly straightforward solution: cancel any ETS allowances awarded it by Europe which exceed those it feels is appropriate for its own traded sector for the relevant budget period. 

7.2 Retiring allowances scheduled for auction in the years corresponding to future UK carbon budgets would readily allow the UK to maintain its desired levels of national ambition without being held back by the allowances distributed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. At the same time it would still afford the UK all of the flexibilities afforded by Emissions Trading to meet these national budgets. 

7.3 An alternative to this ex ante methodology would be an ex post adjustment where the UK would seek to purchase and cancel any ETS emissions rights above and beyond its desired internal budget at the end of each UK carbon budget period using receipts from ETS auctions and from the Carbon Price Support. 

154

 

7.4 Both of the options described above would serve to unshackle UK ambition from the EU ETS, without losing the flexibilities afforded by that policy. Furthermore, they ensure that the additional climate ambition of the UK results in real emissions reductions. A Domestic Action budget, as proposed by the Climate Change Committee, will not change the total volume of emissions allowances issued under the ETS, unless unused UK allowances are cancelled in a manner similar to those we have described above. Some form of ETS cancellation is paramount to ensure that any additional efforts from the UK do not simply serve to take the pressure of other states participating in the EU ETS. 

7.5 Cancellation of allowances under both of these proposals would imply a loss of revenue to the Treasury, but in both instances this loss stems from the UK rejecting allowances it feels are incompatible with its desired level of ambition, and to which the government feels it is not entitled. We also note that these revenue losses could be considerably diminished if other large emitters in the EU ETS, most notably Germany, were encouraged to adopt similar measures. If sufficient allowances were cancelled by large emitting member states, the market price of ETS allowances would rise, making this cancellation revenue neutral to the treasuries involved. A similar proposal has been persuasively argued in the past by Professor Michael Grubb, founding member  of the Climate Change Committee.16 

8. Conclusion  

8.1 While in these last sections we have argued that the UK carbon budgets should be liberated from the EU ETS, to allow them to reduce national emissions faster, this should not be taken to suggest that that the UK’s current pathway is adequate, or that its ambition is outpacing Europe’s. 

8.2 The ETS has waylaid the UK ambition because it has diluted the UK’s weak effort sharing methodology (Contraction and Convergence) with a weaker one (grandfathering) that is even more preferential to Britain. It is not, we emphasize again, a result of UK ambition outstripping Europe’s.  

8.3 As we prepare to agree a new climate deal in 2015 which might be the world’s last realistic chance of avoiding dangerous climate change, the UK should look to support a global emissions pathway that is likely to avoid two degrees, and should promote and adopt an effort sharing system which has a realistic chance of gaining the support of developing and especially emerging economies like China. An environmentally adequate global deal is unlikely to be reached while rich industrialised countries seek to expropriate emissions space from poor developing ones. 

8.4 In this paper we have presented an effort sharing model which we feel represents an equitable framework that might serve as a reference point for the political negotiations towards a new pledges in a new climate deal. 

8.5 Our recommendations in summary are that the Government should: 

• Embrace a global pathway which involves at least a 66% chance of avoiding two degrees of warming against pre‐industrial levels. According to the UN the UN 

                                                            16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8000156.stm#comments 

155

Environment Programme this leaves 1,250 billion tonnes over 2013‐205017 and implies a 1990‐2050 budget of 2,274 billion tonnes18. By contrast the global pathway currently assumed by the UK assumes 2,423 ‐ 2,536 billion tonnes of emissions19  

• Support an effort sharing model which equitably divides up the 2 degree emissions space on an equitable per capita basis. We argue that the fairest approach would retroactively apply this per capita division to 1990 when the dangers of climate change were widely globally recognised.   

• Unshackle the UK carbon budgets from the EU ETS, which is waylaying UK ambition by awarding the UK too many allowances. This can be achieved through an ex ante cancellation of UK allowances scheduled for auction, or an ex post purchase of ETS allowances by the government.   

11 July 2013 

                                                            17 UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2012 (UNEP, December 2012) 18 Sandbag calculations using UNEP and historical emissions data from the Stockholm Environment Institute 19 MAGICC 4.1 as appearing in the Technical Appendix to the Climate Change Committee’s first Carbon Budgets report 

156

Further written evidence submitted by Aubrey Meyer, GCI

The previous memo from GCI to EAC stands. With a view to strengthening what has already been written and said by GCI to the EAC 2013 Enquiry, the following information is added: -

1. A corrective point on the exchange between EAC and Juliet Slingo on the 12th of June 2013: -

a. First point - Martin Caton’s question to Juliet Slingo: “Aubrey Meyer said that the Met Office claimed to include all feedback effects in its projections on global emissions when it had not. Would you like to respond to that assertion?” This is simply wrong. GCI said no such thing. However, GCI’s evidence to EAC 2013 did point at two specific things: - 1. GCI pointed out that the UKMO - without disclosing this to the EAC Enquiry 2009 - completely reversed their own stated meaning of ‘coupled-carbon-cycle’ modelling from a positive to a negative feedback [see major point two below]; 2. GCI also pointed out that UKMO’s own disclosure of other feedback effects they had omitted only occurred after pressure was brought to bear in the EAC Enquiry 2009. UKMO’s disclosure did admit that they had indeed left out major feedback effects from their climate-modelling [which they described as potentially ‘a big deal’] and it is also now true that they continue to omit these to this this day [all the way into IPCC AR5] preparation due to ‘uncertainties’ and ‘complexity’. To this GCI adds now two more points: - 3. Given what is already now years of delay in doing this including these other feedback effects – i.e. accomplishing the task of effectively and comprehensively modelling rates of global climate change on this global scale in the face of these omissions due to uncertainties and complexities - it is possibly [and some would say even probably - see statements below] in fact an insurmountable task. 4. And therefore that in these circumstances, it is at the very least misleading to the policy community, to continue to hold out the hope that this comprehensive ‘climate-modelling’ may yet emerge and will be accomplished in any meaningful time-frame in any useful way, when there is an even likelihood that it will not.

b. UKMO’s [Julia Slingo’s] reply to Martin Caton’s question is meaningless: - ”Yes, it is absolutely untrue. To say that we don’t include them is absolutely wrong.” Her reply: - 1. Avoids again the UKMO’s own admission of the omitted feedback effects. 2. Restates what UKMO did with coupled-carbon feedbacks, but again with no reference to having turned what was a positive feedback into a negative feedback between IPCC AR4 [2007] and UK Climate Act [2008]!

157

3. Confirms that UKMO has now put this package as stated above into the IPCC AR5 preparations: - “We have, as I think has already been made clear for the fifth assessment report, entered the fifth assessment with a full earth system model that includes feedbacks associated with the terrestrial carbon cycle. It includes dynamic vegetation, so this is the long-term changes in forests and shrub land and so on, ocean bio-geochemistry and interactive atmospheric chemistry. To which she conspicuously adds: - “we have probably contributed more model simulations than virtually any other group in the world, so we take the IPCC process very seriously.” To all this GCI now adds two more obvious points which one would expect were obvious even to the UKMO: - 4. Modelling negative feedback into the coupled carbon cycle is only theoretically plausible as long as UKMO’s ‘climate-modelling’ continues to omit all the other larger scale feedback effects [as they have already admitted], and 5. Actually doing this, would probably recognize a degree of increased concentrations and temperature rise that would make it even theoretically implausible for that coupled carbon cycle positive feedback to have been turned into a negative feedback effect as they now have modelled into the coupled carbon-cycle, in the first place.

2. Some further points clarifying the what is the iterative but undisclosed about-face on ‘coupled-carbon-cycle’ modelling performed by the UKMO in a trail that goes through the following sequence: -

a. After some years of development through the C4MIP programme led by Betts Cox et al, results of the UKMO/C4MIP work was published in IPCC AR4 [2007] where UKMO’s ‘coupled-carbon-cycling’ showed that concentrations would be significantly higher and rising than with ‘uncoupled-carbon-cycling’.

b. The reverse of this was then made into law in the UKCA [2008] where UKMO’s ‘coupled-carbon-cycling’ showed that concentrations would be significantly lower and falling than with ‘uncoupled-carbon-cycling’ [as was shown in IPCC AR4].

c. If this was ‘true’ [realistic accurate] it is something to which the UKMO would have been conspicuously drawing attention, as in terms of UNFCC-compliance [achieving safe and stable atmospheric concentrations of GHG] it was ‘good news’ in the sense that ‘the problem was not as bad as we thought’.

d. However, when the matter was then addressed by UKMO in the EAC Enquiry [2009] and on this very point, Jason Lowe reported that concentrations would be significantly higher and rising than with ‘uncoupled-carbon-cycling’ – see the evidence given.

e. Consequently, in doing this, GCI consider that it is not inaccurate to say that the UKMO were concealing in the EAC Enquiry [2009] this very point [in other words specifically not reporting] the ‘good news’ that concentrations were portrayed in the UK Climate Act as significantly lower and falling than with ‘uncoupled-carbon-cycling’ then http://www.gci.org.uk/images/Volta_Face_UKMO_.pdf

158

f. Finally, two years after the Climate Act became law and three months after UKMO/Lowe had given this evidence to the EAC Enquiry 2009, UKMO [Lowe Betts et al] were presenting their work at a conference in Oxford in September 2009. In this presentation UKMO again contradicting the coupled carbon cycle modelling in the UK Climate Act that clearly modelled negative feedback, they presented a truly massive positive feedback effect in the coupled carbon cycle modelling shown [from forest die-back] as this summary graphic unambiguously indicates.

159

Mr Richard Betts, a civil servant at the UKMO, seems to have led the UKMO’s whole programme on coupled carbon cycle modelling through C4MIP to the results published in IPCC AR4 [2007]. When all these example of their work and the dates of its presentation were put to him, he explained the UKMO’s contradictions away publicly [and on a well-known ‘climate-contrarian website’ - Bishop’s Hill] in the following manner. For simply pointing out these discrepancies, omissions and contradictions in the UKMO’s output, this civil servant mounted the UKMO’s defence of it all by stating there simply that GCI: - [a] was a ‘well-known alarmist scare-monger’ [b] ‘did not understand climate-science’ [c] ‘failed to recognize that these were all different models’ [!] Moreover, he: - [d] refused to recognize any discrepancies in the UKMO performance [e] and refused to discuss the matter further.

g. All-in-all, the UKMO’s performance in this matter is remarkable. For the contrarians it now all represents evidence of UKMO coming round to their way of thinking. For the record it is evidence of an extraordinary attitude and deterioration in the UKMO’s noticeably unreliable and even erratic performance standards.

3. As a living demonstration of the fact that CH4 release from the already melting permafrost and is combustible, this video from a year or two ago is a striking demonstration of a present reality: - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YegdEOSQotE A statement from Dr Ulrich Loening about this matter (see separate submission)

4. A statement from Dr Mayer Hillman about this matter (see separate submission) Others have been asked for their views and in due course I expect there to be more statements.

10 July 2013

160

Written evidence submitted byDr Ulrich Loening, former Director of the Centre for Human Ecology, University of Edinburgh

I write at the suggestion of Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute to give my reaction to key climate-feedbacks in the UKMO's UK-Climate-Act.

My justification for being nvolved in this is that I was for many years close to several research groups on resource modelling, (these include the Balaton Group who make a feature of not publicising their deliberations but helping participants in their understanding, and the Edinburgh EU funded resource accounting programme) including climate scientists who were authors or co-authors of IPC reports. I am not in any way a climate scientist; I did consult some Edinburgh climate modellers.

I have examined the submission that Aubrey Meyer has made to your Committee, and understood the issues but not the detail.

As I understand it, the Climate Act is based on modelling information of projected global temperature rises that omit some possibly key feedbacks from the models; and that the Met Office has more recently explained that this is indeed the case. There is therefore a discrepancy between the terms in the Act and the realities of scientific understanding.

The terms negative feedback and positive feedback tend to be used with equal abandon. It is important first to stress that these are not just opposites but effectively very different phenomena. Negative feedback exerts self-control and is therefore limiting and becomes predictable; positive feedback is self-propagating and is therefore likely to grow out of control without limit and become unpredictable.

The MO's omission of positive feedbacks from the modelling that is used to estimate emission budgets is therefore very serious.

My first reactions were that this omission was poor science, with the consequence that the conclusion would be misleading. However, there are real problems: firstly because of the uncertainties about the scale of positive feedbacks, like the melting of permafrost, they are too difficult to model properly. Indeed one might justifiably argue that large positive feedbacks cannot be modelled because of their very nature; more research would improve the situation but not solve it sufficiently to allow coupling into the climate models.

Secondly, the resulting errors in the modelling could have serious political and implementation consequences. It is for this reason that IPCC has repeatedly under-estimated the likely effects of rising greenhouse gas concentrations, (as can be seen from the lengthy discussions about detailed wording)

These two problems and others like them are, as the MO explained, why the more long term and difficult positive feedbacks were omitted.

161

However, this situation cannot be left to stand. Budget emission scenarios must be realistic; otherwise the consequences can become worse. At the very least positive feedbacks must be coupled into the models sufficiently to give a budget which avoids the onset of the largest potential positive feedbacks; once they start in earnest, it is too late to stop them.

My understanding is that the Climate Act would require updating to accommodate the coupling. The question then becomes how to deal politically with this frightening "inconvenient truth." To continue as at present knowing that full coupling would entail a stricter carbon budget, would expand the position into a wider context. The solution is of course up to your Committee, but I can suggest that a reasonable guess about what to budget can be made, such that warming remains limited to below what would set positive feedbacks in train. In other words, the position can be avoided by being honest about it, and presenting the best plausible carbon budget.

The scenarios proposed by Aubrey and the Global Commons Institute to remain within these limits, seem realistic and achievable. The essential fairness in the C&C process would one would think and hope, enable all nations to join in. I have over many years supported the GCI initiatives, and still hope that this would allow the UK to set the tone and agenda.

10 July 2013

162

Written evidence submitted by Dr Mayer Hillman, Senior Fellow Emeritus at Policy Studies Institute, University of Westminster.

Comments on The Question of positive feedback in climate modelling. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere is clearly linked to climate change. It is not only rising alarmingly but, it would appear, doing so exponentially. It has now reached a level not experienced on the planet for millions of years. One does not have to be a climate scientist to understand that there are contributory factors to this other than the direct one of fossil fuel burning. It is recognised, not least by the UKMO, that a major one is the process of feedback from this burning which is resulting in higher temperatures and thus leading to the level rising still further. The melting of the polar ice caps and loss of snow cover in the tundra regions of Russia and Canada, for example, is seriously diminishing the albedo effect of that cover and releasing growing volumes of methane, a far more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Higher temperatures, as well as deliberate felling of significant areas of tropical rainforests, are a source for extreme concern about the consequences of the loss of their ‘sink’ function in limiting the rising level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It stands to reason that policy formation employed in determining reliable targets to counter the worst effects of climate change are wholly unreliable unless all the feedback effects are incorporated into the modelling process, as far as is at all possible. And insofar as they cannot be incorporated owing to the unavailability of research evidence, that should be made explicit so that this omission is fully reflected in the advice given to policy makers. To date, the UKMO has not done this. The outcome of the omission is seriously misleading. Given that there are growing grounds for realising that emissions from the feedbacks may well be exceeding those from the direct burning of fossil fuels, this grave aspect of policy needs to be satisfactorily and transparently rectified as a matter of extreme urgency. Otherwise, politicians, within and outside the Coalition, civil servants within the various government departments, local authorities, the business community and those active in the various fields of relevant policy will continue to take as the received scientific wisdom that the target agreed by the main political parties of an 80% reduction by 2050 on carbon dioxide emissions on the 1990 level (as contained in the Climate Act) - whilst hugely challenging - nevertheless represents a target that reliably reflects the level of concentrations of the emissions in the decades ahead, thus enabling determination of adequate policy changes needed to prevent irreversible climate change. 15 July 2013

163