principled moral reasoning v. moral imagination: seven steps v. seven habits

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PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING v. MORAL IMAGINATION: SEVEN STEPS v. SEVEN HABITS* Sara Ann Reiter** INTRODUCTION This paper explores the implications of Johnson’s (1993) theory of moral imagination for business ethics education. Individual-level busi- ness ethics education is currently dominated by application of prin- cipled moral reasoning to short cases studies. Johnson’s concept of moral imagination critiques the philosophical and conceptual bases of the principled moral reasoning approach and presents an approach to moral thinking that is consistent with current psychological knowl- edge about how people think. The exercise of moral imagination calls for a more character-based and more conceptual approach to business ethics education which is consistent with virtue ethics. First, an overview of the principled moral reasoninglseven-step model approach widely used in business ethics education is presented. The philosophical and psychological underpinnings of this approach are briefly reviewed. Next, an alternative approach, which Johnson (1993) calls moral imagination, is discussed which represents a differ- ent paradigm for approaching ethical decision-making. Emphasis in the moral imagination approach is on personal and character devel- opment as enhanced by moral imagination rather than application of ethical principles. Practices, such as role playing and use of literature, that can be used to enhance moral imagination skills are reviewed. * An earlier version of this paper under the title, “Stories in Accounting Ethics Education,” was presented at the Second International Conference Promoting Business Ethics, “From Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey.,” spon- sored by St. Johns University in November 1995 and the Northeast Regional meeting of the American Accounting Association in April 1996. I am grateful for supportive and helpful comments from participants at these conferences. ** Ax. Professor, SUNY at Binghampton.

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Page 1: PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING v. MORAL IMAGINATION: SEVEN STEPS v. SEVEN HABITS

PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING v. MORAL IMAGINATION: SEVEN STEPS v. SEVEN HABITS*

Sara Ann Reiter**

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the implications of Johnson’s (1993) theory of moral imagination for business ethics education. Individual-level busi- ness ethics education is currently dominated by application of prin- cipled moral reasoning to short cases studies. Johnson’s concept of moral imagination critiques the philosophical and conceptual bases of the principled moral reasoning approach and presents an approach to moral thinking that is consistent with current psychological knowl- edge about how people think. The exercise of moral imagination calls for a more character-based and more conceptual approach to business ethics education which is consistent with virtue ethics.

First, an overview of the principled moral reasoninglseven-step model approach widely used in business ethics education is presented. The philosophical and psychological underpinnings of this approach are briefly reviewed. Next, an alternative approach, which Johnson (1993) calls moral imagination, is discussed which represents a differ- ent paradigm for approaching ethical decision-making. Emphasis in the moral imagination approach is on personal and character devel- opment as enhanced by moral imagination rather than application of ethical principles. Practices, such as role playing and use of literature, that can be used to enhance moral imagination skills are reviewed.

* An earlier version of this paper under the title, “Stories in Accounting Ethics Education,” was presented at the Second International Conference Promoting Business Ethics, “From Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey.,” spon- sored by St. Johns University in November 1995 and the Northeast Regional meeting of the American Accounting Association in April 1996. I am grateful for supportive and helpful comments from participants a t these conferences.

** A x . Professor, SUNY a t Binghampton.

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Finally, I suggest that Covey’s (1990) The 7 Habits of Highly Effectiue People represents an framework for development of a char- acter-based approach to moral reasoning which is consistent with Johnson’s moral imagination concepts and accessible to instructors and students.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL BUSINESS ETHICS EDUCATION

Business ethics can be studied on three levels - the social system level, the institutional level, and the individual level (Steidlmeier, 1992). Focus on individual-level thought and action with an instru- mental focus is common in business schools and there is considerable pressure to teach students how to solve ethical problems. The goals of business ethics education according to Paine (1991) include devel- oping “ethical sensibility,” which is the “capacity to impose ethical order on a situation . . . to identify aspects of the situation that have ethical importance” (p. 77-78). ”Ethical reasoning,” which is application of various approaches or frameworks to problems should operate to “enhance integrity by insuring better decisions in complex cases, by providing a secure foundation for intuitively held ethical principles, and by contributing to consistency between ethical principles and practice” (ibid., p. 80) Reasoning using ethical philosophy is important in business ethics education. Upon reviewing twenty-five business ethics texts, Derry and Green (1989) conclude that most texts base their approach on philosophical theories and often present several different theoretical ethical frameworks. Paine (1991) also maintains that business ethics education should prepare “ethical conduct” by exposing “students to the characteristic ways . . . pressures and temptations manifest themselves in the business world..” (p. 81).

The Short Case lDihma Approach

Ideally, ethics education provides students with “tools”, “frame- works”, and “models” “to help analyze issues and resolve dilemmas” (Paine, 1991, p. 69). The short case/dilemma approach is prevalent in individual-level business ethics education. As an example of this approach, I present a case from Arthur Andersen’s multi-million dollar Business Ethics Program in the Appendix. The Arthur Ander- sen (&I) approach to business ethics education was developed by experts in the field, materials were produced, and the resulting pedagogical plan was disseminated to business faculty through a series of seminars at Arthur Andersen world training headquarters. AA cases present a problem situation and then pose a dilemma for a particular individual through directions to the student asking, for example, “What should Mary do?”. Teaching notes guide the instruc- tor through discussion of the case using a seven-step decision model

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which asks “What Are the Relevant Facts?,” “What Are the Ethical Issues?,” “Who Are the Primary Stakeholders?,” “What Are t h e Possible Alternatives?,” “What Are the Ethics of the Alternatives?,” “What Are the Practical Constraints?,” and “What Actions Should Be Taken?.” Three different philosophical approaches are presented, the “utilitarian,” “rights,” and “justice” perspectives, and the teaching materials elicit analyses of the problem from each perspective (Arthur Andersen, 1992). This approach, called “methodological pluralism” by Derry and Green (1989), handles the potential tensions and conflicts between different ethical theories by using multiple perspectives. As is common in business ethics texts (see Derry and Green, 1989)’, no attempt is made to reconcile the different theories or provide rules for choosing between them to come to the “correct” conclusion.

Rationale for the Short CaselDiEemma Approach

The AA dilemmas establish a cognitive moral dissonance between a correct ethical choice and the possibly costly personal consequences that may result from “right action”. Students are encouraged to identify with the party making the decision, thereby taking on the role of the moral agent rather than moral critic (Whitbeck, 1991). Placing the student in the nexus of the decision creates personal discomfort which can be alleviated through the application of prin- cipled moral reasoning. As Hiltebeitel and Jones (1991) explain:

(Dlilemmas imposed by one’s employer or client . . . create great risk. There is a risk of losing one’s job in some cases and having one’s professional reputation tarnished in other cases. Business ethics educators can hope that ethics training teaches students t o recognize these dilemmas as early as possible and that their personal integrity helps them to re- solve these dilemmas (p. 273).

One rationale for the emphasis on formal decision models is that many business professors feel unqualified to teach ethics and are reassured by the precision of the seven-step models (Langenderfer and Rockness, 1989; Armstrong, 1990). Another reason is that the seven step model develops ethical and analytical reasoning skills. The reasoning method used in the seven-step model is theoretically con- sistent with cognitive moral development theory.

Cognitive moral development (CMD) theory was developed by Lawrence Kohlberg using theories of t h e developmental psychologist

Deny and Green (1989. p. 531) criticize business ethics texts for their “persistent unwillingness to grapple with the fundamental differences between theories”.

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Piaget. Kohlberg classifies the ways people justify moral reasoning while classifying hypothetical moral dilemmas into three hierarchical, integrated systems of thought called “levels of moral development”. Social perspective is the basic structural element - the three levels represent different relationships between the self and society’s rules and expectations (Kohlberg, 1984).

In the CMD model, moral training proceeds through group discus- sion of hypothetical moral dilemmas. CMD theory assumes that in- dividuals progress upward in the hierarchy one stage at a time, and that exposure to higher stage reasoning provides the impetus for moral change (Trevino, 1992). Internal cognitive conflict results from hearing higher level moral reasoning. This leads to a restructuring of cognitive patterns resulting in moral development. In addition, principled moral reasoning teaches the process of solving difficult problems by autonomous reflection on ethical rights and principles. Behavioral changes are assumed to follow changes in moral reasoning level, again because the individual seeks to reduce cognitive disso- nance. Therefore, group discussion which exposes students to higher level thought is a key ingredient of the process.

Problems with the Short CaselDilemma Approach

The short caseldilemma approach can be criticized as an effective approach to ethics education for three reasons: limitations of princi- pled moral reasoning: narrow framing of ethical problems; and failure t o deal constructively with disastrous potential consequences of phil- osophically “right actions”. Principled approaches to moral reasoning often attempt to achieve a scientific type of understanding, seeking to develop principles that have characteristics such as “generality of form, universal applicability, disinterestedness, publicness, and over- ridingness” (Tierney, 1994, p. 4). To date, however, no single approach to ethics has been judged to have succeeded at this task. Brenkert (1994) notes that few today would claims that they had or could discover absolute and exceptionless principles. In practice, business ethicists take various pragmatic stances toward tensions and conflicts between theories, such as asking theory to highlight issues rather than resolve them, combining theories, developing social choice schemes to choose between conflicting theories, and emphasizing cases instead (Derry and Green, 1989).

Johnson and Sommers object t o the narrow scope and lack of moral vision in dilemma cases. Johnson (1993) explains that one “problem with this conception of morality is that it presents ethical problems as if they were like technical problems, where one calculates the most efficient means to some preestablished end.. .But moral prob- lems axe often about the ends themselves, about what we ought to

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choose and pursue’’ (p. 253). Johnson (1993) argues that approaches like the AA cases are problematic because ethics is presented as separate from regular business. “It makes ethics just one more module . . . t h e fact is that ethics pervades every aspect of business” (p. 253). Sommers (1993) complains that while a dilemma may “engage the students’ minds; it only marginally engages their emotions, their moral sensibilities (p. 12)..(T)aken by itself, dilemma ethics provides little or no moral sustenance” (p. 13).

Hauerwas and Burrell (1977) argue that the dilemma approach incorporates a strong conservative bias. Case discussions stay neatly within the confines of the seven-step model, focused on individual behavior. The societal and institutional causes of ethical problems are not explored. The seven-step model does not allow the discussion to stray to issues such as whether the firm’s policies promote uneth- ical behavior. The approach does not lead to identification of appro- priate institutional changes which could help prevent or resolve problems. The status quo is not challenged. French (1994, p. 90) argues that:

what is wrong with most attempts to talk about business ethics is that the central players in the game . . , are ignored or misrepresented due to the set of biases . . . related to the adoption of atomistic, reductionistic individualism. The enti- ties in question are . . . corporations.

Whitbeck (1991) criticizes dilemma approaches to ethics education for misrepresenting moral conflicts in business settings as philosoph- ical dilemmas and focusing on developing criteria for moral judgments rather than acquisition of skills, understanding, and political wisdom necessary to resolve conflicts. True moral dilemmas are situations where all of the available courses of action lead to similarly dire consequences for some party. Whitbeck (1991) asserts that problems faced by professionals rarely qualify as true dilemmas? The effect on students of these (pseudo-)dilemma cases may be to reinforce the futility of acting on the basis of personal ethical standards. Cuilla (1991) describes a common effect of the study of dilemma cases:

Students often think that taking a moral or socially respon- sible stand requires either individual or corporate martyr-

There is a philosophical debate about whether dilemmas truly exist (Sinnott- Armstrong.. 1988). Ethical dilemmas act as vehicles for testing and arguing moral principles more than guides for practical action.

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dom.. .They feel powerless and sometimes prefer t o mortgage their ethics until they are CEO of a company because they think that only those at the top can effectively take a moral stand. However, the really creative part of business ethics is discovering ways t o do what is morally right and socially responsible without ruining your career and company (p. 215).

Whitbeck argues that depicting business conflicts as complex prob- lems, rather than hopeless moral dilemmas, is more useful for devel- oping professional decision-making skills.3

New Directions for Individual-level Business Ethics Education Weakness in principle-based approaches expose the “central prob-

lem in the development and understanding of business ethics” which is “the relation between moral principles and laws and particular cases” (Brenkert, 1994, p. 196). This problem has two dimensions. One questions how well principles “work” and the other questions how principled reasoning is related to subsequent action. Both of these problems have been illustrated in the critique of short cases1 dilemmas. New approaches to individual-level business ethics educa- tion which address these problems in more satisfactory ways may come from a different paradigm or way of looking at how individuals should approach ethical decision-making.

MORAL IMAGINATION

Paine explains that business ethicists can use two very different models of moral choice and action. In the first model, principle-based moral reasoning, “the agent tests available actions against a rationally derivable theory ... which ... serves as a tool or standard for evaluating possible choices” (Paine, 1991, p. 70). Paine notes that a “(a) persistent problem for this conception is the gap between delib- eration and action: the connection between the application of moral theory and the decision to do what theory prescribes . . ,” (ibid., p.

Armstrong (1990) points out that, a t least in accounting, cases using the Arthur Andersen approach underplay the importance of professional guidance for solving ethical conflicts. For example, accounting cases often involve contemplation of whis- tleblowing behavior but provide little discussion of the professional guidance on whistleblowing and proper ways of resolving conflicts available to public and private accountants through their respective codes of ethics. Codes of ethics represent the collective wisdom of how to act a s an professional. Cases and teaching notes downplay these discussion of professional rules, however, presumably because they are more concerned with development of philosophical moral stances. The heavy influence of Kohlberg in accounting ethics education leads toward encouraging individuals to follow their own moral principles rather than (lower level) peer group rules.

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71). The second model proposes a different relationship between the agent and moral choice where “many actions and choices are seen to flow naturally from the agent’s character - her habits of thought and action, and her commitments and concerns - without the interjection of consciously applied theory” (ibid., p. 71). The second model builds on the Aristotelian tradition by seeing “the cultivation of virtue rather than the application of decision criteria as the core of morality” (ibid., p. 71). It is with this second model that moral imagination is concerned. As business ethicists have become increasingly concerned with the potential gap between moral thinking and moral action, attention has turned to these virtue ethics approaches as the key to linking moral intention with moral action (see for example Solomon, 1994; Werhane, 1994). Moral imagination is necessary for an individual to develop virtues of character and translate them into virtuous actions.

Ethicists have become frustrated with difficulties in finding abso- lute right answers for specific situations through theoretical reason- ing. The gap between theory and practical application is growing (Tierney, 1994). The approach to overcoming these problems using Paine’s second model is to reunite moral philosophy with psychology, or an understanding of how people think and react, and to legitimize moral thinking arising from this perspective. This approach is called “moral imagination” by Johnson (1993) and “imaginative idealization” by Tierney (1994). First, the concept of moral imagination and its use as a critique of principled moral reasoning is explored. Then, I discuss how moral imagination can work.

Limitations of Moral Law Folk Theory

The moral imagination approach to business ethics differs from the traditional approach which Johnson (1993) calls “Moral Law Folk Theory.” Moral Law Folk Theory reflects the objectivist belief that human beings are rational animals with a dual nature of reason and animal desire. Under this model, moral reasoning consists of rationally determining the correct moral stance and then summoning up the willpower to act. Reason is seen as the distinguishing essence of the rational self. Rationality is fixed, universal and ahistorical. The es- sence of acting morally is extracting the self from particular claims of culture, affiliation, and self-preservation (ibid., p. 1268). But, John- son explains, the metaphors of the split self and the atomic rational ego do not square with modern knowledge about cognitive processes. People are not divided into rational and animal selves, they do not approach complex problem solving through rule systems, and moral deliberation is not ahistorical or acultural.

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Johnson criticizes principled moral reasoning and utilitarian ap- proaches to moral deliberation often used in short casesldilemmas as too abstract and too reductionist. The notion that reason alone can solve moral problems presupposes a universal abstract structure that transcends any particular social and historical context. The goal of principled moral reasoning and utilitarian calculation is to distance the moral reasoner from the influences of culture and associated biases. The problem with this approach is that moral understandings are fundamentally imaginative. Reasoning uses conceptual metaphors, image schemas, and prototype structures which are socially and culturally determined. Instead of applying fixed principles to partic- ular situations, one actually reasons through an open-ended construc- tive process using moral imagination to rehearse projected actions (ibid., p, 108). There are, in any case, irresolvable conflicts among competing moral claims which cannot be hierarchically ordered. John- son asserts that:

Our task as moral agents cannot be merely to discover the right rule for a particular case, the rule that supposedly specifies ‘the right thing to do,’ because the nature of the case might well preclude such a possibility, insofar as genuine moral conflicts of goods, values, and obligations exists. What we need in such cases is a cultivated moral imagination for exploring the various courses of action open to us, for re- hearsing possible relationships and forms of action, and for doing our best t o harmonize our often conflicting values and conceptions of reason (ibid., p. 125).

The Moral Law Folk Theory presumes that individuals have free- dom to act, unconstrained by contextual circumstances or other external sources. Human beings are not free in this way. Actions are constrained by many factors, such as resources, personal histories, and familial situations. Finally, Moral Law Folk Theory constrains morality to considerations of “doing the right thing’’ rather than consideration of living a good and productive life (ibid., p. 245-6). Business persons are continuously engaged in moral actions in busi- ness dealings not just when moral “dilemmas” arise. Figure 1 sum- marizes differences between Moral Law Folk Theory and Johnson’s approach of moral imagination.

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Figure 1

Moral Law Folk Theory v. Moral Imagination (adapted from Johnson, 1993)

Moral Law Folk Theory Moral Imagination

Assumptions about the nature of man:

Dual animal and rational nature of humans

View of moral processes: Rational stance

plus willlpower to act

Need to extract self from culture, affiliation, self- preservation

Individuals have radical freedom to act

Emphasis on doing the right thing

No cognitive psychology basis to rational/animal nature split

People don't solve complex problems with rule systems, moral deliberation uses concep- tual metaphors, image sche- mas, and prototype structures that are socially and culturally determined Moral deliberation is within the context of affiliation, culture, personal narrative

Individuals bound by their own history, culture, etc.

Emphasis on living a good and productive life

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Characteristics of Moral Ima.ginatio?z

Moral imagination can be articulated as a reaction against the traditional philosophical approaches to ethical thinking. However, the concepts of moral imagination can also be viewed in terms of what moral imagination is rather than what Moral Law Folk theory is not, Johnson uses new scientific understandings about how people think to explain the psychological bases of moral deliberation. Imagination is a key component of this process.

Johnson (1993) explains that, in addition to moral insight and strength of will, the imagination plays a fundamental role in con- structing moral lives. He explains that “(o)ur moral understanding depends in large measure on various structures of imagination, such as images, image schemas, metaphors, and narratives..“ (p. ix). The self engages in imaginative exploration of possibilities embedded in complex social interactions and relationships. A number of shared understandings underlie this process in the form of image schemas, prototype structures, semantic frames, and conceptual metaphors. Prototypes represent basic types of situations. Moral and social schemas are subconscious communal ways of thought. Our culture conveys to us deep systemic metaphors that control behavior, shape expectations, and establish expecations. Moral decision-making con- sists of exploring these possibilities through moral imagination.

Tierney (1994, p. viii) finds in moral imagination “an adequate account of the passage, within the structure of the person, between theoretical understanding and concrete theoretical motivation to eth- ical action”. Tierney does not reject the importance of clear moral reasoning, but considers that moral maturity consists of “intellectual clarity” plus an “insight of a more therapeutic . . . kind, which alters life and action” (ibid., p. viii). He calls for “concrete reflection” and maintains that “(i)t is possible to treat ethical thinking as an evolving, historically grounded, and psychologically structured activity without either denigrating it as irrational or replacing the category of theo- retical understanding with a mysteriously primitive notion of practical understanding” (ibid., p. 15). Since modern psychology has demon- strated the importance of schemas and prototypes in human thinking, “moral learning may occur more profoundly through the incorporation into the self of exemplars and examples that fit the prototype than through the learning and application of moral rules” (ibid., p. 51). Tierney focuses on the importance of ethical ideals in this process. Imagination is crucial to this process because ‘%)deals are envisionings of the selfs good life and they are products of imagination rather than the apprehension of the truth of principles” (ibid., p. 16). Ideals play a dual role because “(p)sychologically . . . ideals . . . operat(e1. . .

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as both a structure of interpretation and a structure of motivation” (ibid., p. 59). Ideals can represent a “form of reflected self-understand- ing which can translate, within the structure of the self, into moti- vation” (p. 61). Tierney (1994, p. 72) concludes that we should focus on three principle moral relations between persons - relations of respect, responsibility, and concern for the dignity, welfare, and happiness of others. These values are the touchstone for judging the ethicality of ideals:

Ideals are ethical to the degree that the schemata of inter- pretation which prompt us to respond to our world in a manner characterized by respect, responsibility, and concern are perceived by conscience to be restorative of the continuity and integrity of the concrete self (ibid., p. 126).

TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL BUSINESS ETHICS

What approaches to business ethics education would be consistent with the theoretical perspectives of moral imagination? One could argue that the short case/dilemma approach stimulates imaginative exploration of alternatives. However, the seven step approach is a rational, rule based approach. The listing, valuing, and ranking of alternative actions in step 6 is a very constrained form of imagining. Johnson (1993) suggests that moral deliberation should be less con- strained:

(Chltivated moral imagination . . . can allow her to examine her present difficulties in a broader perspective, to explore how various actions might affect the lives of others as well as her own, to criticize her values and attitudes, and to glimpse possibilities for meaningful action (ibid., p. 183). If we are imaginative enough, committed enough, and coura- geous enough, we may actually find it possible to transform our roles, social practices, and cultural values in creative ways (ibid., p. 151).

Pedagogical Approaches

A number of pedagogical approaches have been suggested to en- hance the moral imagination content of business ethics education. Peek et al. (1994) explain how cooperativelcollaborative learning tech- niques, which involve imaginative exercises, can be used to enhance

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group discussions of ethics cases. Another activity that can be used to teach business ethics is role playing. Mintz (1995) proposes that the “direct involvement of students in the learning process through role playing. . .can facilitate the virtues by having students experience virtue first hand” (p. 21). Johnson’s (1993) theories suggest that role playing is a powerful way of involving students in imaginative ex- ercises that are part of moral deliberation. Brown (1994) explains how role playing exercises provide students with the freedom to engage in moral imagination and suggests that this may lead to private reflection after class. However, Brown warns that role play exercises must be rich enough to sustain moral exploration and that the scenarios must be skillfully constructed by the instructor.

Solomon (1991) argues that reading literature‘ develops business ethics because “..the activity of reading books. . .requires an exercise of the imagination and the use of a critical facility” (ibid., p. 195). It also exercises the emotions, which are a critical component of moral imagination. Solomon explains that “books are an important source of shared emotions as well as a means for understanding emotions in other people and providing a safe and central vehicle for hawing emotions..’’ (hid., p. 195). Literature can engender a level of emotional intensity greater than short cases/dilemmas:

Written case studies are a useful vehicle for conveying the types of pressures and temptations found in the workplace. But the usual case falls short in conveying the intensity of the feelings and emotions involved. Novels, plays, well-written biographies, and films are often superior in this respect, and can be a valuable part of an ethics program (Paine, 1991, p. 82).

In addition to stimulating emotional development, literature pro- vides paradigms and exemplars of the consequences of good and bad behavior. The study of literature reaches back to an “..older approach to moral education, which often used tales and parables to instill moral principles” (Sommers, 1993, p. 11). De George (1994, p. 23) notes that “(i)n literature and the humanities there are classics- great works- that cross time and national boundaries” and that “(t)hese works can be used effectively in business education because they provide useful paradigms”. These lessons are reinforced by their

‘ McAdams and Koppensteiner (1992) and McAdams (1993) discuss the use of classical literature in the study of business ethics and suggest particular novels and plays.

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emotional content. “(T)he heart of literature is and has always been stories, narratives that provide not only examples of virtue and vice but also the opportunity to enter into a shared and established emotional world” (Solomon, 1991, p. 197).

Moral imagination, as exercised by t,he study of literature, is also important in developing the link between ethical thought and behav- ior:

Ethical behavior can be seen to encompass prescriptive and creative functions. The prescriptive . . . is explicit and seeks to put certain limits on human behavior. The creative involves inventing ways to live up to moral prescriptions, given the practical constraints of the world (Cuilla, 1991, p. 215).

Clausen (1986, p. 8) suggests that poetic truth, discovered through experiences with literature, helps determine our actions:

Poetic truth is not usually capable of scientific verification. In a less formal sense, however, poets and good readers alike test it constantly against their knowledge and experience of life. What better principle of verification have we for most of the truths on which we base our most important decisions?

Experience with the lives and emotions of others, which can be greatly expanded by experiences with good literature, is vital to development of mature moral sense:

I suspect that the best man is the one best able to expand his experiences of others, . . . he is the man who has developed a complicated moral sense, which ironically, allows him to come to simple moral decisions. But such moral reflection and conversation are impossible without moral imagination (Tiv- nan, 1995, p. 266).

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People

Role playing and literature-based approaches may not seem accessible to the nonexpert instructor or as systematic as principled reasoning based approaches. Moral imagination is an exciting concept, but there has been little discussion of how to apply it. Instructors may feel uneasy about the lack of guidance on how to use, develop, and judge moral imagination. Stephen Covey’s best-selling management book, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People (19901, offers promise as a well-

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articulated character-based approach to ethical reasoning and behavior. Covey presents a character-based ethic for managers which embodies the principles of moral imagination. The seven habits are habits of effectiveness based on promoting sound ethical principles and goals. Covey defines habits as the intersection of knowledge, skill, and desire with the following explanation: “Knowledge is the theoretical paradigm, the what to do and the why. Skill is the how to do. And desire is the motivation, the want to do” (ibid., p. 47).

Covey’s (1990) first three habits enable a person to move from the state of dependence to independence. Dependence means dependence on other persons’ approval and actions. Independence is a more self- contained state. The second three habits facilitate the move from independence to interdependence. Interdependence is appreciation of the interlocking aspects of human life. The interdependent person seeks to foster relationships that work. However, interdependence cannot be sought until independence is achieved. The seventh habit represents continual self-improvement. The seven habits are sum- marized in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (Covey, 1990)

Habits of Independence:

1. Be Proactive

2.

3. Put First Things First

Begin with the End in Mind

Habits of Interdependence:

4. Think WinlWin

5.

6. Synergize

Seek First to Understand.. .Then to be Understood

Habit of Renewal:

7. Sharpen the Saw

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The seven habits are ways of implementing character-based ethical principles into our daily lives. The first habit, t o be proactive, can be used to avoid many ethical conflicts. Proactivity involves realizing that the individual is free to choose how he or she reacts to events. The short caseldilemma approach encourages reactivity - situations force individuals to react. Proactive individuals are subject to exter- nal events, but they can actively choose a value-based response (ibid., p. 72). The habit of proactivity involves taking the initiative to avoid negative circumstances and create positive circumstances.

Proactivity creates opportunities to respond in more positive ways. Instead of framing ethical conflicts as eitherlor situations, Covey presents a model for proactive action (ibid., pp. 81- 88). The model consists of working with the difference between one’s “circle of concern,” the actions and events one is concerned about, and one’s “circle of influence,” the things one can do something about. The circle of concern is greater than the circle of influence, and there are many things that one cannot do anything about. Many individual- level ethical conflicts initially seem to fall into this category. One can, however, work proactively to enlarge one’s circle of influence. Planning actions that work toward expanding one’s circle of influence may be the best one can hope for in some situations.

The second habit is to begin with the end in mind. It involves personal values clarification and positive affirmation of character- based values. Educators can motivate students to want to pursue ethical goals by affirming values. “Once the student becomes engaged with the problem of what kind of person to be, and how to become that kind of person, the problems of ethics become concrete and practical” (Sommers, 1993, p. 8). The character-based principles that Covey embraces are easy to agree on. They include fairness, integrity and honesty, human dignity, service, quality or excellence, potential and growth, patience, nurturance, and encouragement (Covey, 1990, p. 34).

Using character-based principles as a guide to action helps in identifying ethical problems and in reacting to ethical problems from the appropriate point of view. Tierney (1994, p. 126-7) explains that “regardless of our degree of self-understanding, we have no other moral authority than our own conscience: even when we turn to others for guidance, that guidance must be filtered through our self- understanding”. The practice of articulating personal values and goals and continuous contemplation of whether our actions are working toward achieving those goals facilitates early identification of situa- tions that could develop into ethical conflicts. This practice also helps develop a perspective for making choices consistent with one’s per- ceptions. For example, retaining lucrative clients with a moral focus

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that differs from one’s own may not seem desirable in the long term. Covey suggests using techniques of visualization, a form of moral

imagination, to align one’s actions with one’s visions and values (p. 132). This visualization is a form of moral imagination and exemplifies the type of imaginative self-exploration considered vital to moral self- development. “Morality defines the arena of commitment, reflection, and engaged exploration of possible actions in which the self struggles continually both to find and to form its identity within the mass of ends it finds itself pursuing” (Johnson, 1993, p. 147). Moral maturity is achieved, in part, through imaginative self reflection.

The three habits of interdependence enhance our relationships with others. Relationships with others are clearly important to moral development. Covey suggests six ways to facilitate interactions, in- cluding: understanding the individual, attending to little things, keep- ing commitments, clarifying expectations, showing personal integrity, and apologizing when you make a mistake (Covey, 1990, pp. 190-1991. These represent ways of being proactive in relationships. They should help avoid ethical conflicts and create a positive relationship that one can draw on if conflicts occur.

The fourth habit is to think win-win in interactions with others. True win-win outcomes are not always available, but pursuit of this goal is often successful t o some degree. In the long run, even unsatisfactory relationships may be mended as other parties come to see that they do not “win” by imposing their will on others. Win- win is in contrast with the AA approach which encourages lose-lose solutions to ethical conflicts because of its adherence to principled moral reasoning. The student is encouraged t o do what is “right” without regard to context or consequences.

The fifth habit, “to seek first to understand, then to be understood”, promotes the practice of empathic communication. Empathy is at the heart of moral imagination. To pursue win-win strategies, it is nec- essary to truly understand the point of view of the other party. Covey’s book presents exercises by which students can be taught empathic listening techniques. Only when one understands the other party can one effectively communicate one’s own position. Covey explains that the Greek philosophy of “ e t b s , pathos, logos - your character, and your relationships, and then the logic of your pres- entation” (ibid,, p. 255) expresses the right sequence for a win-win strategy. The sixth habit, “to synergize”, is also an essential element of creating win-win situations. This involves the practice of searching for alternatives in solving problems. This is allied to the practice of moral imagination. For example, Johnson (1993) explains that empa- thetic projection is important technique of imaginative exploration.

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The envisioning of possibilities for fruitful, meaningful, and constructive action requires moral imagination. Our ability to criticize a moral view depends on our capacity for imagining alternative viewpoints on, and solutions to, a particular moral problem. In order to adopt and grow, we must be able to see beyond our present vantage point and to grow beyond our present selves. We must be able to imagine new dimensions for our character, new directions for our relationships with others, and even new forms of social organization (p. 203).

In the short caseldilemma approach to ethical conflicts, the student is placed into a situation without a chance to develop character or context, to act proactively to avoid problems, or to work with the other parties to achieve a win-win solution. The tool generally pro- vided to the student is principled moral reasoning using the seven- step model. The use of Covey’s approach to developing seven habits for effectiveness would be a valuable pedagogical supplement. One of the crucial ways that the seven habits approach differs from the traditional approach is the expansion of narrative possibility. Indivi- duals are involved in business ethical conflicts over a long time horizon, with many options for prevention and intervention. These incidents take place in the context of the narrative of the life of the individual and the firm. Placing discussion of individual level business ethics in this wider context enhances the possibility that moral imagination can be used to find constructive solutions to ethical problems. The seven habits approach provides guidance for thinking about and working through these problems.

CONCLUSION

A number of problems have been noted with the principled moral reasoning approach to individual-level business ethics problems. These include failure of philosophical frameworks to come to definitive and reconcilable solutions when applied to concrete situations, promotion of a narrow individualistic view of ethical problems, and poor links with behavioral outcomes. Moral imagination theories provide solu- tions to these problems by shifting the focus of business ethics education from principled moral reasoning to self development. Moral imagination springs from an Aristotelian paradigm about how to make and validate moral decisions, where individual character and context are of principal importance. Moral imagination emphasizes the role of cultural and individual context in determining how indi- viduals make moral decisions and proposes that exercise of moral imagination can enhance personal moral development.

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The moral imagination framework provides a perspective that moves beyond t h e individual, philosophical focus which has been prominent in business ethics education and provides a way to link institutional, societal, and firm behavior with individual ethical be- havior. Actual moral reasoning is embedded in numerous culturally conditioned schemas, metaphors, and narratives and cannot be prac- ticed or understood in isolation from these factors (Johnson, 1993). Moral imagination represents a focus on individual moral development that is coordinated with investigation of cultural, societal, and work- place-related imperatives.

While instructors have developed considerable expertise in apply- ing principled moral reasoning approaches to business ethics educa- tion, they generally have little experience in enhancing moral imagination. Activities such as role playing and reading good litera- ture may be used to enhance moral imagination. Covey’s (1990) 7 Habits of Highly Effective People presents a well-articulated frame- work for personal moral development which is consistent with moral imagination concepts.

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APPENDIX

“Something’s Rotten in Hondo” by John Fraedrich (Arthur Ander- sen, 1992, Case MGMT - 05) is an example of a short caseldilemma from the Arthur Andersen materials. The case is a page long and is accompanied by three pages of teaching notes for applying the seven step decision model. Briefly, the relevant facts of the case are that George, the manager of a small plant, has a family and close ties in the community. George’s plant consistently has smokestack emissions above EPA guidelines and the EPA has started imposing fines. Corporate headquarters will not fix the problem and tells George that he must avoid fines by increasing emissions during periods when the EPA is not monitoring or the plant will be moved to Mexico where it would have to employ Mexican workers. The case asks, “What should George do?.”

The first question in the decision model is “WHAT ARE THE REL- EVANT FACTS?’. In addition to the facts reviewed above, the teaching notes point out that the relocation of the plant would devastate the economy of the town of Hondo and would continue to contaminate the air since the Mexican location is only 15 miles away. George’s wife is upset a t the possibility that he may be responsible for the loss of jobs in town. The second question is “WHAT ARE THE ETHICAL ISSUES?’. George must decide whether to mislead the EPA, capitalize on Mexico’s weaker laws or destroy the economy of his community. The third question is “WHO ARE THE PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS?’. These include George and his family, the people of Hondo, the EPA, people affected by the pollution from the plant, and the Mexican site. The fourth question is “WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES?”. George could pollute a t off-hours, relocate to Mexico, look for another job, or discuss the problem with someone in higher management.

The fifth question is “WHAT ARE ‘THE ETHICS OF THE ALTERNA- TIVES?”. This is explored in the teaching notes from three perspec- tives - “utilitarian”, “rights”, and “justice”. From the utilitarian perspective questions include “(w)hich alternative provides the great- est net benefit to the greatest number?’, “(h)ow would costs be measured in this situation . . . ?’, and “(d)o benefits of moving the plant to Mexico outweigh the costs of loss of jobs or continued high emissions?’. Questions from the rights perspective include “(wlhat rights does each stakeholder have in this situation?” and “(wlhich alternativeh) would not respect your rights if you were a plant worker? A citizen of Hondo? A stockholder in Ardnak Plastics Inc.? George?”. Questions from the justice perspective include “(wlhich alternative distributes the benefits and burdens most fairly among the stakeholders?’, “(wlhich stakeholders carry the greatest burden

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if the plant moves to Mexico? If heavy emissions occur at night?”, and “(i)s it fair for manufacturing plants to find expedient ways to avoid reducing levels of pollution?”.

The sixth question is “WHAT ARE THE PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS?”. In this case it is unlikely that George can seek a costly solution such as upgrading the anti-pollution equipment a t the plant. The seventh question asks “WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN?”. The teaching notes ask variously ‘‘(wlhat action steps should George take?” and “(w)hat alternative would you choose if you were George?”.

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