practically equal: an analysis of the practical nature of equality and incomparability

14
Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature of Equality and Incomparability David Pinkowski Received: 9 January 2012 / Accepted: 9 November 2012 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012 Abstract There exists an ongoing debate about the nature of incomparability. In this paper, I argue that incomparability is most usefully seen as a practical, rather than a metaphysical, issue. When confronted with an important choice between two options, an agent often will be at a loss as to how to decide between them. A common response to this problem is to assert that the options must therefore be equal, and that it is perfectly rational to be indifferent and decide between them in some arbitrary fashion. Contrary to this common view, this paper shows that equality should be seen as the result of indifference and not the cause of it. I will show that the judgment between whether options are either equal or incomparable is actually a decision, made by an agent, that can in turn be judged as more or less rational. Keywords Incommensurability . Incomparability . Trichotomy thesis . Equality . Rationality . Practical reasoning 1 Introduction A commonly held belief about practical reasoning is that the trichotomy thesis is true. According to the trichotomy thesis, for any two options A and B: A is either better than, worse than, or equal to B. The common view is that in this context equality is a precise relation. To say that two things are equal is to say that they are valued precisely the same. In opposition to this view, I will argue that the nature of equality in the practical realm has been misunderstood by showing that equality often is not a precise relation. It is typically thought both that equality is discovered and that the appropriate response to it is indifference: if I am faced with equally good options, it does not matter how I decide between them. As Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit put Acta Anal DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0180-2 D. Pinkowski (*) Bryant and Stratton College, 56 Clinton Avenue, Albany, NY 12210, USA e-mail: [email protected]

Upload: david-pinkowski

Post on 15-Dec-2016

212 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Natureof Equality and Incomparability

David Pinkowski

Received: 9 January 2012 /Accepted: 9 November 2012# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract There exists an ongoing debate about the nature of incomparability. In thispaper, I argue that incomparability is most usefully seen as a practical, rather than ametaphysical, issue. When confronted with an important choice between two options,an agent often will be at a loss as to how to decide between them. A commonresponse to this problem is to assert that the options must therefore be equal, and thatit is perfectly rational to be indifferent and decide between them in some arbitraryfashion. Contrary to this common view, this paper shows that equality should be seenas the result of indifference and not the cause of it. I will show that the judgmentbetween whether options are either equal or incomparable is actually a decision, madeby an agent, that can in turn be judged as more or less rational.

Keywords Incommensurability . Incomparability . Trichotomy thesis . Equality .

Rationality . Practical reasoning

1 Introduction

A commonly held belief about practical reasoning is that the trichotomy thesis is true.According to the trichotomy thesis, for any two options A and B: A is either betterthan, worse than, or equal to B. The common view is that in this context equality is aprecise relation. To say that two things are equal is to say that they are valuedprecisely the same. In opposition to this view, I will argue that the nature of equalityin the practical realm has been misunderstood by showing that equality often is not aprecise relation. It is typically thought both that equality is discovered and that theappropriate response to it is indifference: if I am faced with equally good options, itdoes not matter how I decide between them. As Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit put

Acta AnalDOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0180-2

D. Pinkowski (*)Bryant and Stratton College, 56 Clinton Avenue, Albany, NY 12210, USAe-mail: [email protected]

it: “It can be obvious that when you are in equipoise, you might as well pick; it simplyis not worthwhile to go through the process of choosing, with its high cognitive oremotional costs” (Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit 1999). Similarly, James Griffinargues that if we investigate options sufficiently and discover that they are roughlyequal, “we might, in effect, toss a coin” when deciding between them (Griffin 1997).It is my contention, however, that the judgment that options are equal is often theresult of a practical strategy employed by the agent when confronted with competingoptions. When an agent claims that two options are equal, she is not making ametaphysical claim about something discovered; rather, she is saying that in thisparticular situation she is unwilling to explore the options further, and is willing totreat them as if they were equal. Contrary to the popular view, it is not equality thatleads to indifference, but indifference that leads to equality. When we understandequality like this, the way we view the rationality of an agent changes: her decision toview options as equal can be critiqued and we can determine if that decision itself wasrational.

This understanding of equality (what I’ll call practical equality) has implicationson our understanding of the much-debated phenomenon of incomparability (orincommensurability, as it is sometimes called). Figuring out whether options shouldbe considered equal or incomparable is an important step in judging the rationality ofan agent. Where options are equal, it looks perfectly rational to make a decision usingsome sort of randomizing procedure. Take the somewhat trivial example aboutwhether I should have coffee or tea with breakfast. It is reasonable to think that Imay naturally have no preference between the two options, but I nevertheless make achoice. How is it that I don’t end up paralyzed like Buridan’s Ass? In such a situation,it seems reasonable for an agent to simply judge the options equal, and make adecision in the absence of definitive reasons. Because of the trivial nature of thechoice, it seems rationally acceptable to decide on the basis of non-definitive reasonsin the interest of making a decision and acting.

When more important decisions must be made, however, it does not seem ratio-nally appropriate to judge options as equal and decide on the basis of some random-izing procedure. For example, when deciding which career one should pursue, itlooks decidedly irrational to choose on the basis of a coin toss. It is in these situationsthat the agent is right to see the options as incomparable, and in these situations that aproblem for practical reason arises. Rationality demands that I choose for reasons, butthe nature of incomparability is such that I have no definitive reason to choose.

I believe that there are conditions under which it is rationally necessary to regardchoice options as incomparable rather than equal. This paper will be dedicated toshowing how and when this new understanding of incomparability (what I will callpractical incomparability) arises, and will show the importance of finding a solutionto the problem of practical incomparability.

Section 1 will illustrate why many philosophers believe that incomparability is areal problem for practical reason. In section 2, I analyze attempts by Ruth Chang(1997, 2002) and Derek Parfit (1984) to deny incomparability and their attempts toestablish that a fourth value relation exists. Then, in section 3, I will introduce Nien-HeHsieh’s idea of clumpiness (Hsieh 2005). The notion of clumpiness explains how thetrichotomy of relations can be plausibly maintained while dealing with the sort ofproblem case explored in section 1 (and without resorting to a fourth value relation).

D. Pinkowski

Hsieh’s account shows that the solutions of both Chang and Parfit are inadequate, buthe leaves some unanswered questions and difficulties. I will take the notion ofclumpiness to its logical conclusion, showing how its acceptance should fundamentallyalter the way we look at equality and incomparability.

2 Incomparability

My approach to incomparability is novel in that I view it as a purely practicalproblem faced by an individual agent in a particular situation. I hope to show thatalthough the truth (or falsehood) of metaphysical incomparability makes for aninteresting theoretical question, it is not one with practical importance. I believethat when confronted with a choice, it is unfruitful to attempt to compare valueson a purely metaphysical level without considering the role of the agent (doing thecomparing) or the context (of the comparison). On a practical level, however, it isentirely possible that an agent may be in a position where she cannot reasonablycompare options.

Whatever one’s metaphysical inclination, the practical account of incomparabilitythat I will provide is useful. On the one hand, it may be the case that values aremetaphysically comparable, and incomparability is just the result of lack of informa-tion on the part of the agent. This position might be held by a realist who argues thatthere is an objectively best answer as to which option, in any choice situation, willlead to the best objective future for the agent. Incomparability arises for the agentbecause she does not have enough information to determine which option is, in fact,the best.

On the other hand, it may be the case that there is no objective fact of the matter asto which option is best for an agent at the time of choice. This position may be heldby a realist or a constructivist. A realist may argue that incomparability, at times, is ametaphysical fact and that agents may recognize this fact and be forced to respond toit. Alternatively, a constructivist about value could similarly conclude that becausevalues are constructed by agents, there may be no best option at the time a choice ismade.1 Inspired by Kant, the constructivist would argue that rational choice itselfcreates value. Incomparability arises for the constructivist because she seemingly hasno way to compare options.

Whatever metaphysical position is correct, it seems as if the same practicalproblem exists: decisions often must be made, despite the fact that options areincomparable for the agent at the moment. If the realist is right, practical incomparabilityexists because the agent lacks information, or because of the brute fact that metaphysicalincomparability exists. If the constructivist is right, practical incomparability existsbecause the agent has no means of deciding between competing options in the absenceof a metaphysically best solution; she has no well worked-out covering value2 thatallows her to decide between options. In both cases, the agent is faced with the sameproblem: how do I make a decision between options that are, for all practicalpurposes, at the moment incomparable?

1 For a constructivist account of incomparability see: Millgram (1997).2 I’ll have more on covering values in the next section.

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

To shed light on this practical problem, I will be looking at the relationshipbetween incomparability and equality. It is my contention that equality and incom-parability are two different ways to look at the same choice between options. Whetheroptions should be judged as equal or incomparable is a function of the situation.When it is rationally acceptable to be indifferent between options, one should judgethem as equal; when it is rationally unacceptable to be indifferent between options,one should judge them as incomparable.

The strongest form of incomparability would hold that there is no means whatsoeverthat could be employed to compare two values. This, surely, is too strong a claim. Itseems that any two items are comparable as long as we put them in the right sort ofcontext. Determining the context of the situation involves figuring out the relevantmeans of comparison. For example, when looking at a painting and a sculpture, it seemsas if there are a number of ways they might be compared. They could be compared interms of weight (if one were concerned with shipping costs), popularity (if one wereconcerned with selling tickets), or even something like show-ability at my particulargallery (if one were trying to decide which piece to put on display). The means ofcomparison depends on a number of such factors, all of which are directly influenced bythe context of the comparison. Ruth Chang says, “Every comparison must proceed interms of a value. A ‘value’ is any consideration with respect to which a meaningfulevaluative comparison can bemade. Call such a consideration the covering value of thatcomparison” (Chang 1997). Incomparability is thought to occur in the context ofcovering values. It arises when an agent cannot decide between two options on thebasis of the relevant covering value.

One alternative to accepting incomparability is to judge options as somehow equal.That is, my inability to decide that one is better than the other perhaps should be takento mean that the two options are equally valuable in my eyes. An example will help:imagine I am faced with a choice between attending law school or medical school. Ihave weighed the costs and benefits of each option, I have acquired all of the relevantdata that might help me make a decision, and yet I am still at a loss as to how tochoose between the two. A philosopher may at this point enter the picture and pointout that the items are just incomparable. The choices are so different that it isimpossible to make a reasonable comparison between the two and decide that oneis better than the other. Alternatively, accepting trichotomy, I might think that theoptions are simply equal. I cannot judge that one option is better than the other, andthe only remaining possibility is equality. The reason that I have difficulty making achoice between them is that they are both equally good choices for the position inwhich I currently find myself.

The most commonly cited example purporting to show the failure of the trichotomythesis (and why many seemingly equal options in fact are not equal) involves anargument involving small improvements.3 Imagine a comparison between a greatpainting and a great symphony. Someone who is asked about which piece is to bepreferred in terms of aesthetic beauty might reasonably reply that neither piece issuperior. It is not the case that one is better than the other. According to the trichotomythesis, then, we must conclude that the items are of equal aesthetic value. But we might

3 For more detail on this and other small improvement arguments see Chang, “Introduction”.

D. Pinkowski

want to resist this conclusion and thus deny that trichotomy is true. Suppose we take aslightly better painting than the first and compare it to the same symphony; we stillmight not rank that second painting above the symphony. If this is true then the originalitems could not have been equal in value after all; if they were equal then the slightlybetter painting would clearly also be slightly better than the symphony (because therelation “better than” is transmitted across equals). Since neither item is better than theother, nor are they equal, the trichotomy thesis for these two items seems to be false (andincomparability seems to be true).

Attempts to resolve incomparability come in a variety of flavors. Typical“solutions” to the problem of incomparability involve either denying that the problemexists at all, or accepting the problem but weakening our ordinary understanding ofrationality in an attempt to save rational choice. Although I will not attempt to solve theproblem of incomparability in this paper, I hope that by drawing attention to its practicalnature the path to its resolution may become clearer.

3 Fourth Value Solutions

If incomparability were true, it would have negative ramifications on practicalreasoning. How could one make a reasonable decision between options if there isno way to compare those options? One way to avoid this consequence of the failureof trichotomy (and to maintain comparability) is to assert the existence of a fourthvalue relation. In “The Possibility of Parity”, Ruth Chang (2002) argues that twoitems can be comparable even if they do not fit into any of the trichotomous relations.She uses an example involving Mozart and Michelangelo to make this point. Mostpeople would agree that it would be a mistake to consider Mozart and Michelangeloperfectly equal in terms of a value like creativity. They exhibit creativity in two vastlydifferent ways, and a small increase in the estimation of one would not suddenlymake him better than the other. Although they do not seem to be related by any of thetrichotomous relations, Chang uses what she calls a ‘Chaining Argument’ to showthat they are nevertheless comparable. If Michelangelo and Mozart are comparable bya non-trichotomous relation she has evidence for her fourth value relation that shecalls “parity”.

The ‘Chaining Argument’ works by imagining a composer who is nominallyworse than Mozart in only one dimension of creativity. Surely this small one-dimensional difference is not enough to bring about incomparability; this secondcomposer is comparable to Mozart.4 We may then continue to imagine another andanother composer, each of whom is only slightly worse than the previous until we endup with a terrible composer whom Chang calls Talentlessi. Talentlessi, the argumentgoes, is clearly comparable to Mozart (since he is comparable to the composer a littlebetter than him and he is comparable to the composer just better than him, etc.). Italso seems, however, that Michelangelo is comparable to Talentlessi in terms ofcreativity (he is much more creative), and thus is also comparable to each of thecomposers on the scale leading up to Mozart. Chang concludes that Mozart and

4 Chang calls this the “Small Unidimensional Difference Principle”.

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

Michelangelo are comparable because there is a chain of creatively comparablepeople between them. Since Michelangelo and Mozart are comparable, but neitheris better than the other, nor are they precisely equal, Chang believes she has shownthat there is a fourth value relation, one she calls parity: Mozart and Michelangelo arenot equal but are “on par” with one another.

In “Reasons and Persons”, Derek Parfit (1984) argues for a position similar toparity that he calls ‘rough comparability’. He argues that “not worse than need notimply at least as good as” (Parfit 1984). Parfit gives an example of a comparisonbetween a novelist and two poets. In this example, of the first poet and the novelist wemight say that one is not worse than the other. We might then judge a second poet tobe slightly better than the first, but nevertheless maintain that second poet is not betterthan the novelist (nor that the novelist is worse than the second poet). The novelistand the poets are related by what Parfit calls rough comparability. Rough comparabilitydoes not imply incomparability as I’ve described it. Parfit says, “We are claiming ofthese two [the novelist and first poet] that something important can be said about theirrespective merits. Neither is worse than the other. They are in the same league” (Parfit1984). Rough comparability works because in situations like this not worse than isnot a transitive relation.

Parfit is explicit that rough comparability as he has described it is not necessarilythe result of ignorance (though it might sometimes result from a lack of information).Rather, “the rough comparability is here intrinsic….Must it be true, of Proust andKeats, either that one was the greater writer, or that both were exactly equally asgreat? There could not be, even in principle, such precision. But some poets aregreater writers than some novelists, and greater by more or less. Shakespeare is amuch greater writer than P.G. Wodehouse, but Swinburne is, at best, not muchgreater” (Parfit 1984). Parfit is here introducing a fourth value relation, that of roughcomparability, where the operative comparison is a non-transitive relationship whereone thing may be not better, worse, or equal to another, but, rather, not worse thananother.

Even if a fourth value relation metaphysically exists, it does little to resolve thepractical problem of incomparability. An agent, faced with a hard choice between twooptions, might deem them incomparable or might come to the conclusion that theoptions are ‘or par’ (or roughly equal). At this point, the agent still has no means ofmaking a rational decision between the options. Whether or not one buys themetaphysical picture provided by both Chang and Parfit, we are still left with thedilemma of how to make a reasonable choice when faced with roughly equal, on par,or incomparable options.5 In the next section I hope to show that, relying on argu-ments from Nien-He Hsieh, a practical account of incomparability can do away withthis fourth value relation. I will show that there is a better way to deal with smallimprovement arguments that doesn’t violate the trichotomy thesis.

5 Even if we accepted the 4th value “solution,” Chang admits that it doesn’t resolve the incomparabilityissue. She says, “The argument has application in those cases in which the respects relevant to thecomparison can be balanced against one another, and in those cases, it concludes that we have parity.This leaves room for incomparability when the relevant respects cannot be so balanced….Whether theargument applies in a given hard case, then, is a matter of case-by-case examination” (Chang, “Parity”,p. 677).

D. Pinkowski

4 Clumpiness

Nien-He Hsieh makes a compelling argument against fourth value options like parityand rough-comparability. In “Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability” (Hsieh2005), he argues that some covering values have the character of being clumpy,and though two things may seem to be roughly equal or on par, they are betterthought of as equal in the trichotomous sense. Hsieh says, “a clumpy coveringconsideration sorts items into classes, or clumps, based upon the degree to whichthe items possess each of the relevant respects that comprise the covering consideration”(Hsieh 2005). He gives the example of grading undergraduate student papers, wherethe clumps are letter grades A, B, C, D and F. Papers are given letter gradesdepending on which clump they fit into, in relation to the other papers. The reasonclumps become necessary is that the overarching covering value (what Hsieh calls aholistic comparison) ‘goodness as an undergraduate paper’, is composed of multiplecontributory values (what Hsieh calls component comparisons). A componentcomparison between papers involves comparing the papers on any one of a numberof respects, “including originality, construction of argument, effectiveness of prose, andgrasp of course material” (Hsieh 2005). A holistic comparison takes these componentcomparisons and finds a way to put them together to assign a letter grade. Forexample, one article may be strong in originality but weakly argued, while anothermay be just the opposite. “A holistic comparison translates the individual componentcomparisons into a single evaluative comparison with regard to the covering consider-ation, ‘goodness as an undergraduate student article for a given course’ ” (Hsieh 2005).Clumpiness is exhibited when two articles with different component considerationsare judged to fit into the same “clump”. In this way, two papers exhibiting vastlydifferent component considerations could both be assigned a letter grade of ‘B’.

Comparisons between items can be made at different resolutions. That is, theclumps into which items are differentiated may be smaller or larger, depending on thepurpose of the differentiation. Hsieh distinguishes between grading an introductoryessay at the beginning of the course and a final paper. In the second case, a fine-grained resolution may be necessary to properly evaluate students, while in the firstcase a less finely grained resolution is needed to give students an idea of the standardsof the course. Hsieh’s view allows for the possibility that two papers may fall into thesame clump, even if one is better than the other in all respects (by every componentconsideration). If one is grading at a rough resolution, even though a paper is slightlybetter in every respect, it may still turn out to be in the same clump as the slightlyworse paper. A finer grained resolution, however, would leave room for these twopapers to be sorted into different clumps. Hsieh says, “What differs in each instance isthe task at hand for which the comparisons are invoked, which in turn determines theresolution of the comparison” (Hsieh 2005).

Hsieh uses the idea of clumpiness to criticize both Chang and Parfit. Hsieh drawson Chang’s Michelangelo/Mozart example to criticize her idea that there is a fourthvalue relation. Hsieh argues that Mozart and Michelangelo are best thought of asbeing in the same clump in regards to creativity, while someone like Talentlessi is bestregarded as being in a lower (or worse) clump. This means that we can compareMichelangelo and Mozart in terms of the trichotomy thesis: they are equal in terms ofcreativity. They belong to the same clump: that of creative people in the tops of their

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

respective fields. This is true even though the clumps are made up of a wide range ofcomponent considerations that make up the holistic covering value of creativity.Although we usually think of equals in terms of something more precise, by recognizingthe clumpy nature of a covering value like creativity, we can see that trichotomy is notviolated in this case and there is no need to posit a fourth value relation.

To criticize Parfit, Hsieh turns to Parfit’s example of the novelist and two poets(reminder: the second poet is better than the first, but they both look roughly equal tothe novelist). Hsieh argues that “comparing novelists6 with regard to literary meritbears similarities to grading student articles. Both kinds of comparisons involvecovering considerations comprised of a number of respects that do not readilycombine into a single judgment” (Hsieh 2005). When Parfit says that the Novelistand First Poet should be thought of as in the same league, Hsieh takes this to meanthat they are in the same clump. “The fact that neither the Novelist nor the First Poet isbetter than the other can be understood to mean that they do not belong to clumps thatare better than one another. Instead, they can be said to belong to the same clump,thereby making them equally good” (Hsieh 2005).

What about the Second Poet who is better than the First Poet, but seeminglyequally as good as the novelist? Hsieh argues that even Parfit admits ‘when comparingtwo poets, our judgments can be less rough’. Hsieh takes this to mean that a finerresolution is possible in the comparison between two poets than is possible between anovelist and a poet. The component comparisons match up better in this case and allowfor a more finely tuned comparison. So while it is possible to judge one poet better thanthe other using a finely grained resolution, it is also possible to judge each poet equal tothe novelist via a rough resolution. To solidify this reading, Hsieh argues that ‘roughlygood’ is a relation that can only be made when more than two items are undercomparison (three items are necessary to get us the problem that leads to this ‘new’relation). He argues that this “raises a question about the nature of ‘roughly equal’ as acomparative relation” (Hsieh 2005). Hsieh is thus able to broaden the realm ofcomparability by introducing the idea of clumpy values. When two things fit intothe same clump, it makes sense, Hsieh thinks, to call them equal in the trichotomoussense.

Hsieh goes on to argue that “although the account I advance extends the range ofitems thought to be comparable, the account leaves open the possibility that items canbe incomparable” (Hsieh 2005). Why is it sometimes the case that options are deemedequal (of the same clump), but other times they should be considered incomparable?Hsieh argues that the problem is one of covering values. He claims that there isn’talways a covering consideration when we need it. He draws on an example given byJoseph Raz7 of a career choice between radically different professions: a clarinetistvs. a lawyer. Hsieh imagines a second law career that offers an additional $1,000 insalary. He argues, in standard fashion (at least standard in this line of thinking): “if theinitial legal career and musical career are equally good, by transitivity, the improvedlegal career should be better than the musical career. Because it seems incorrect tohold that the improved legal career is better than the musical career, the initial legal

6 I think he means writers here. There is only one novelist in the example, and when Hsieh refers to him/her‘Novelist’ is capitalized.7 See Raz, J. (1986). The morality of freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 332.

D. Pinkowski

career and musical career are held not to be equally good. The failure of one of thestandard trichotomy of relations to obtain in this example is taken to be one of thestrongest illustrations of the possibility of incomparability” (Hsieh 2005). But how,exactly, is this case any different than the above cases of Michelangelo and Mozart, orthe Novelist and Poets? That is, why is this a case of incomparability and not a case ofequality?

Hsieh’s account of incomparability, like those offered by Chang and Parfit, isgrounded in the assumption that there is usually a metaphysically best answer waitingto be discovered in cases of incomparability. Although this very well may be the case,this assumption isn’t necessary to understand the nature of practical incomparability.In the next section, I will show that whether one is a realist or a constructivist aboutvalue, the bottom line is that incomparability, practically speaking, is something thatis decided on, rather than discovered by, an agent.8 Both realists and constructivistsshould agree, I think, that the practical problem of incomparability itself results froma decision made by an agent, and furthermore that this decision can be made inrationally appropriate (or inappropriate) ways. In the next section, I will arguethat the difference between the judgment that options are “clumpy equals” and thejudgment that options are incomparable depends on two things: the importance, forone’s future life, of the choice at hand, and the ease of formulating a workingcovering value.

5 Practical Equality

While it is theoretically possible that two things are equal in terms of every possiblecomponent value, it seems very unlikely that this is ever practically the case. So,although it is possible that the agent who cannot compare two options may just beconfronted with precise equals, it is much more likely that the covering value beingemployed by the agent is not as precise as it could be. For example, if I were trying todecide which of two identical twins (of equal height in centimeters) was taller, Iwould naturally be more precise and look at their height in millimeters.9 The same istrue even if my options (and the component values of those options) are vastlydifferent. If a career choice between a lawyer and a clarinetist seems to be a choicebetween equals, surely I should go into more detail and figure out which career I’dactually prefer. In each of these cases, the initial judgment of equality can be doneaway with through finer precision. If I arrived at the conclusion that two things areequal, and I then find that I need to choose between them, I of course would attemptto become more precise and differentiate between them more carefully. In a casewhere a decision is important enough, it may be irrational simply to call the optionsequal and decide in some arbitrary manner; what initially appears to be a choicebetween equals may be amenable to a more finely tuned comparison that leads to theemergence of the definitively better option. This further comparison is called for in

8 I believe this approach strengthens rather than weakens my position. It allows me to solve a problemwhile remaining neutral on the metaphysical question of incomparability. This makes my account appealingto a wider range of belief systems.9 This example is from Hsieh, p. 198.

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

situations where a choice is especially important to the life of the agent, or, in lessimportant situations, where the finer comparison is easily made (I will discuss this ingreater detail below).

Alternatively, if I see options as equal for my purposes (practically equal), equalitymay rationally lead to action, especially when the choice isn’t of much consequence.It is often thought that if things are equal, then one can rightly be indifferent betweenthem. But, in actuality, it seems that it is my indifference that leads me not to be moreprecise in deciding between two options, thus leading to my conclusion that they areequal. For example, when deciding between two seemingly identical ice creamsundaes, it may seem that I judge that they are equal and therefore I am indifferentbetween the two of them. Of course, it is highly unlikely that they are precisely equalin the things that matter to me in evaluating sundaes (in the component values that areimportant to me): one surely has more ice cream, hot fudge, or nuts. They are equalonly because the level of precision needed to decide which sundae to choose is notworth the effort (and is probably self-defeating in that by the time I was donemeasuring, my sundae would be a melted mess).10 Contrary to the perceived orderof events, it is my inability to be more precise in a reasonable time frame that leadsme to indifference and then to judge them as equal. I believe that most equality in thepractical realm is determined primarily by the cost of information. Where the cost ofinformation outweighs the benefits of that information, I may rationally be indifferentbetween two options and judge them as equal.

On the other hand, where the importance of the choice outweighs the cost ofinformation, judging options as equal could very well be irrational. For example,imagine that my choices for a caffeinated morning beverage at a certain hotel arecoffee and tea, and the things that matter to me when deciding between coffee and teaare temperature, freshness, and flavor. It appears it is perhaps rational for me toinvestigate when it comes to some of these issues (temperature would be easy todetermine), and not in the case of others (determining freshness would involve aseries of somewhat pretentious sounding questions, and it is unclear to whom I wouldaddress them). Since a decision between coffee and tea is not very important for myoverall life goals, the slightest difficulty in determining which one best satisfies mydesires when making a choice between the two of them gives me reason to judgethem simply as equal and to make a decision. Conversely, when I’m faced with adecision of more import, judging two things as equal when there is more informationto be had is a mistake. I don’t look at my choice of a career in the same way that Ilook at the choice between morning beverages. The difference is that the importanceof the choice makes it irrational to view the options as equal.

What these examples show is that the relationship between the cost of informationand the importance of the choice plays a direct role in determining how I mayrationally choose. On a scale of choices, the more important the choice, the morereason one has to investigate the options further. The judgment that one is indifferentbetween the options and that they should be considered equal has less rational meritwhen the decision is important to one’s life. I may rationally judge coffee and tea asequally good breakfast options, while it would be rationally inappropriate to judge a

10 A similar example involving cans of Campbell’s soup is used by Ullman-Margalit and Morgenbesser(Ullman-Margalit and Morgenbesser 1977).

D. Pinkowski

choice between careers as equal. On the other hand, as it becomes clear that moreinformation will not resolve the issue, one is more likely to deem the choice optionsas equal and less likely to see the choices as worthy of further investigation. Forexample, one of the reasons I can judge the coffee and tea as equal is because there isno easy way to determine that one is better than the other. If there were, it wouldcertainly be irrational to jump to the conclusion that I’m indifferent between them.The relationship between the importance of the choice and the ease of finding moreinformation is not a direct one; that is, sometimes a choice is so important that Ishould not judge options as equal even when I cannot find any further informationthat would help me make a reasonable decision between them. That such extremecases of incomparability may arise is, I believe, one of the reasons that we need asolution to the problem of practical incomparability.

The Michelangelo/Mozart example can make my point clearer. The reason theaverage person is willing to call Michelangelo and Mozart equal in terms of creativityis that the decision is not one of great import to their everyday lives. One can imaginethis sort of discussion taking place at a cocktail party, or in an art class, but in thegrand scheme of things the person choosing between the two on the basis of creativitymost likely has little need (or not enough time or desire) to delve any deeper into thequestion of which great is greater. They can be deemed equally creative because thereis no reason to take the time to make a finer distinction between the two of them. Thechoice between the two simply isn’t important enough. Furthermore, the worknecessary to determine which of Michelangelo or Mozart is more creative seemsextremely demanding; that is, the effort necessary to come up with a workingcovering value containing a sufficiently detailed account of the componentconsiderations in this case seems rather large (involving much research and potentiallyyears of schooling). In this case, one is likely to classify Mozart and Michelangelo asequals because the choice is not that important and forming a working covering valuelooks decidedly difficult.

In the case of an esteemed expert in fine arts, however, the stakes areconsiderably higher. This is the sort of decision that affects of a person’s careerand that is typically not taken lightly. It is commonly argued that incompara-bility arises in such a situation because the considerations involved are sodifferent. The agent simply doesn’t know how to compare the musical acumen ofMozart against the artistic mastery of Michelangelo. What people have overlooked,however, is a further reason these options are difficult to compare: the importance ofthe choice. Difference alone does not lead to incomparability, even when thatdifference is between options for which I have no preference. That’s because in manysituations I am indifferent between options and am happy to make a decision betweenthem as if they were equal. Incomparability, on the other hand, requires that thedecision be important to the agent. When an agent is having a hard time making adecision, it is a good sign that it might be inappropriate to deem the options equal; insuch situations rationality will often require that the agent work to find the bestsolution.

Of course, as pointed out above, the easier it is to formulate a covering value insuch a situation, the more likely it is that the agent will be able to resolve the situationand avoid the judgment that the options are equal or incomparable. As the coveringvalue becomes harder to formulate, however, it becomes more and more likely that

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

the agent will not be able to resolve the issue and will be faced with a seeminglyintractable case of incomparability.

What these examples show is the difference between my viewing two options asequal and my viewing them as incomparable involves purely practical considerationsabout the cost of information and the importance of choice. When a choice is of littleimportance to an agent, and when more information that might resolve the issue isdifficult to come by, that agent is right to judge the options as equal. However, when achoice is more important to an agent, it would often be irrational of that agent toproceed as if options were equal. This may be true for a very important decision, evenwhen the cost of information is rather high. This leads to the conclusion that equalityand incomparability are best viewed as practical matters. Given one set of practicalconsiderations, it is rationally appropriate to view options as equal, while givenanother set of practical considerations, it would be rationally appropriate to viewoptions as incomparable.

With this groundwork laid, I believe I can now comment on what leads to a certainclass of errors in decision-making. When deciding whether to judge options as equalor incomparable, an agent can make a mistake in two ways. First, an agent may judgeoptions as incomparable, when the judgment of equality would do. At times, it issimply not in the agent’s interest to take the time and effort needed to figure out thebest option (and this is true not just of the ice cream case, where hesitation defeats theagent’s ends; sometimes, because of the trivial nature of the choice, it just isn’t worththe time or effort necessary to determine the best option). Second, an agent is makinga mistake when she judges options as equal in a situation that is too important. In sucha case, to be indifferent and decide as if the options were equal is irrational.

As pointed out above, indifference is often thought to go hand in hand withequality in the practical realm. If it turns out that a choice between a career as alawyer and a career as a clarinetist are equal (in the clumpy sense), then one mightsuggest that I can rightly be indifferent about the choice between the two. JamesGriffin (1997) says, “we should, if wise, delve deeply into the content and theconsequences of each way of life to see what is at stake. The lack of that sort ofindifference is appropriate to any decision that is both important to one’s life anddifficult…. If, in the end, we do understand what each life is like, and we do decidethat they are roughly equal, we might, in effect, toss a coin–say, take whichever jobcame along first—and so be indifferent in that quite different sense” (Griffin 1997).Indifference, Griffin is saying, enters the picture in two ways. On the one hand, itseems foolish to be indifferent about a choice that makes such a qualitative differencein my life. The decision between becoming a lawyer or a clarinetist is one that Irightly should investigate. However, if it turns out that these options are roughly equalin quantitative terms, it seems that Griffin has no objection to being indifferent aboutwhich is chosen (or about the method by which it is chosen). The important part, forGriffin, is making sure the options truly fit the standards necessary to call themroughly equal.

I believe that even this second sort of indifference is a problem when dealing withan important choice. Do I really want to decide the course of my life on the basis of acoin toss? Is this the best I can do when faced with options that are not even preciselybut only ‘roughly equal’? I do not share Griffin’s intuition that indifference in the faceof rough equality is a reasonable way to make important decisions. If the above

D. Pinkowski

analysis is correct, most cases of equality in the practical realm exist because the costof information is too high to warrant further investigation. In a situation of vastimportance to one’s life, however, an agent needs to recognize that the options arebest seen as practically incomparable and find a reasonable way to make a decision.

Ways of deciding between practically incomparable options come in many flavors.Although I do not have the space here to discuss in detail how one might go aboutmaking a decision in the face of practical incomparability, there are a few options thatseem especially promising. Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit argue that a good way tosimplify a difficult situation between apparently incommensurable elements is to take“small, reversible steps first” (Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit 1999). This allows theagent to try out a decision before committing to it. Another possibility involves theuse of what I call ‘decision-making methods’. By having a stock of tested higher-ordermethods for making decisions, an agent can simplify the process of dealing withincomparable options.11

Although the above section has focused on situations where the agent lacksinformation in the traditional sense, I believe that a similar strategy should beemployed when an agent is faced with options that she correctly believes to bemetaphysically incomparable or to someone with a constructivist world view (shouldsuch a view be correct). In such cases, it might be said that the agent lacksinformation in a different sense. Even if it is true that there is no metaphysically bestoption, I still have reason to decide by a non-randomizing procedure. This is becausea non-randomizing procedure allows me the opportunity to recognize features of thesituation that I may have originally missed. It is certainly often the case that an agent,even after carefully exploring her conception of how to live, may be insensitive tocertain features of that conception that could make a difference in a decision-makingsituation. Using a method that brings non-random information to the situationrecognizes this possibility and is more likely to lead an agent to a decision thatcorresponds with her conception of how to live.

Also, even if we are devoutly committed to the idea that there is no metaphysicallybest option, we can never be sure that this is the case. The mere possibility that theremight be a best option and a best objective future gives the agent a reason to strive forthat best objective future. Even if this is just remotely possible, which it seems to be,an agent would be remiss to decide that options should be treated as equal in animportant situation. It is reasonable to think that judging options to be practicallyincomparable is pragmatically reasonable, no matter one’s metaphysical commitments.

6 Conclusion

What I have shown in this paper is that incomparability is best seen as a practicalrather than a metaphysical issue. It arises when an agent encounters options neither ofwhich is better than the other, but it would nevertheless be inappropriate to judgethem as equal because of the importance of the choice at hand (or, in a choice of lessimportance for one’s life, because of the relatively low cost of information). Myintuitions about rationality tell me that while it may be perfectly acceptable to decide

11 This is an idea I’m working on, and hope to express more completely in the near future.

Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature

between chicken and fish on the basis of some randomizing procedure (or by justarbitrarily picking), it would be decidedly unacceptable to choose my mate in thesame way. Contrary to the received view, it is not equality that leads to indifference,but indifference that leads to equality: when an agent has no further reason toinvestigate the decision between two options (when the cost of further investigationoutweighs the benefits of the information), she may rightly be indifferent betweenthem and judge them equal. In a situation that is of greater importance to an agent,such indifference (and the resulting label of equality) surely is not appropriate, and anagent may be criticized for making a decision prematurely. To judge incomparableoptions as equal is to throw one’s hands in the air and say that difficult choices can bemade with the toss of the coin. Although I cannot here present a detailed solution tohow, exactly, we can make reasonable decisions in the face of incomparability, what Ihope to have shown is that this is a practical problem that is worth addressing. Just asthe importance of certain practical decisions may drive us to forgo indifference andequality, the importance of rationality in the realm of practical reason can drive us tofind a rational solution to the problem of practical incomparability.

References

Chang, R. (1997). Introduction. In R. Chang (Ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practicalreasoning (pp. 1–34). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chang, R. (2002). The possibility of parity. Ethics, 112, 659–688.Griffin, J. (1997). Incommensurability: What’s the problem. In R. Chang (Ed.), Incommensurability,

incomparability, and practical reasoning (pp. 35–51). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Hsieh, N. (2005). Equality, clumpiness and incomparability. Utilitas, 17(2), 180–204.Millgram, E. (1997). In R. Chang (Ed.), Incommensurability and practical reasoning (pp. 151–169).

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Sunstein, C., & Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1999). Second-Order decisions*. Ethics, 110, 5–31.Ullmann-Margalit, E., & Morgenbesser, S. (1997). Picking and choosing. Social Research, 44(4), 757–785.

D. Pinkowski