forthcoming in G. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard, eds. Studies in Porphyry

Porphyry and Plotinus’ Metaphysics Steven K. Strange

Emory University

As editor and popularizer of his teacher Plotinus, as a founding figure of Neoplatonism,

and as an important commentator on Plato and Aristotle, Porphyry deserves to be considered a

major figure in the history of philosophy. But though a first-rate scholar of philosophy as well as

of other fields—and as such a worthy successor to his first tutor in Platonic philosophy, the

learned Longinus—it is much less clear to what extent Porphyry can be considered an original

contributor to the development of ancient philosophy.1 Indeed, much of Porphyry’s extant work

consists of excerpts, often extensive verbatim excerpts, from earlier writers: this is true of his De

abstinentia, of his Pythagoras biography,2 and of his philosophical epistle to his wife, the Ad

Marcellam, and it seems to hold as well of his extant commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories

and on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, neither of which make any claim to originality and both of which

seem only to wish to present older material in readily accessible form. Porphyry’s principal

extant metaphysical work, the so-called Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, in Greek

!"#$%!& '$#( )! *#+)! (which might more precisely be rendered as “resources for

approaching the intelligible world”) appears to be an attempt at a sketch of the main points of

Plotinian Neoplatonism, and might usefully be compared with the Encheiridion, the collection of

excerpts made by Arrian of Nicomedia from his Discourses of Epictetus. Certainly, as A. C.

Lloyd once remarked, the notion that a student looking to Porphyry’s Sententiae will find in it an

easy introduction to the philosophy of Plotinus will not survive experiment,3 but the chapters of

the work do present well-defined discussions of crucial points upon which one who wished to

make progress in Plotinus’ thought might do well to meditate. The material of the Sententiae is

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for the most part purely Plotinian and often taken verbatim or nearly so from the Enneads, as can

be seen from the excellent apparatus fontium in Lamberz’s Teubner edition:4 what is supplied by

Porphyry himself seems intended to help clarify and only occasionally to expand upon his

Plotinian basis.5 If this picture of the Sententiae as a sort of handbook, like the Encheiridion of

Epictetus, intended for Plotinian progressors, is correct, then any originality or innovation to be

found in the work will have been unintentional on the part of its author, and it is therefore not

surprising to find the work cited somewhat rarely in discussions of Porphyry’s own thought.

A.C. Lloyd in his important article in the Cambridge history of later Greek and early medieval

philosophy6 did claim to find in the Sententiae a new conception of the soul’s return to the

intelligible realm (by abstracting in thought from all logical particularity),7 but he admits that this

conception seems to have been suggested to Porphyry by the final chapter of Ennead VI.4-5,

Plotinus’ treatise on the omnipresence of Being in the sensible world (VI.5.12). We should thus

not look to the Sententiae for any specifically Porphyrian as opposed to Plotinian metaphysics.8

Porphyry’s originality vis-à-vis Plotinus, if any, must be found in other works. But is it in

fact to be found? I wish to approach this question by examining some of Porphyry’s apparent

disagreements with Plotinus in metaphysics, to see whether they really are disagreements or

merely further cases where, as in the Sententiae, Porphyry is merely expanding upon or trying to

explicate Plotinus. It is of course possible that where Porphyry thinks he is explicating Plotinus

he is really disagreeing with him, but before we decide that this is so, we should first make sure

we understand Porphyry’s point of view on the supposed disagreement in question. Thus I will

first try to define somewhat more precisely how I think we should see Porphyry’s attitude toward

agreement with Plotinus. Following that, I will focus specifically on what Porphyry has to say

about the Plotinian Hypostases in some of his attested fragments.9 Here he will reveal himself as

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exegete of his master to a greater degree than has heretofore been recognized. I will close with a

few rather sketchy remarks about the relevance of this material to the fragments of the

Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides that has been attributed to Porphyry by Pierre

Hadot. Various features of this text turn out to reflect Porphyry’s discussion of the Plotinian

Hypostases, and this appears to buttress Hadot’s controversial attribution of it to Porphyry.

We certainly do find areas of metaphysics where Porphyry is an innovator at least in the

sense that he rejects views that were held by his teacher Plotinus. One such area, as was pointed

out by P. Hadot in his classic article “La métaphysique de Porphyre”,10 concerns the very notion

of metaphysics itself as a special field of inquiry, that is, metaphysics conceived on analogy with

Aristotle’s ‘theology’ or ‘first philosophy’, as the science that deals with supersensible reality,

literally ‘beyond’ physics or the science of nature. It is apparent from Plotinus’ treatise On

dialectic (Ennead I.3) that Plotinus did not accept this Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of the status

of metaphysics. For Plotinus, what deals with intelligible reality is rather Dialectic, conceived on

the model of the dialectical method of Plato’s late dialogues, the Sophist, Statesman and

Philebus, which employs collection, division and definition in order to induce contemplation of

the Ideas as the contents of Nous or the Divine Intelligence.11 Dialectic, that is, the method of

Collection and Division, is for Plotinus the genuine method of inquiry of the philosopher: an

excellent example of his application of it is his official treatment of the overall structure of the

intelligible world in the second book of his treatise On the kinds of Being, Ennead VI.2. Dialectic

is opposed for Plotinus to Aristotelian metaphysics because he sees that Aristotle conceives them

as opposed as well: Aristotle’s science of being qua being or first philosophy is explicitly a

replacement and rejection of Plato’s conception of dialectic as the method of the true

philosopher—for Aristotle thinks Platonic dialectic can only yield probabilities and opinion, not

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genuine apodeictic knowledge. Plotinus on the other hand asserts that dialectic, the developed

ability or power to properly employ collection and division, just is what philosophical knowledge

or epistêmê is (Enn. I.3.5,1). This is an example of Plotinus’ rather deep understanding of

differences between Plato and Aristotle, a rather important point, since Porphyry’s disagreements

with his master are often seen in terms of Porphyry’s ‘harmonizing’ tendency to defend

Aristotelian views and attempt to fit them with Platonist ones, while Plotinus tends to reject

them.

Porphyry, as Hadot points out, adopts from pre-existing Platonist speculation a conception

of the ‘parts’ of philosophical inquiry that classifies them in the order ethics—physics—theology

or metaphysics, that is, the study of the divine, which is also sometimes called epoptic after the

visionary aspect of the mysteries.12 This conception of the structure of philosophy is consistent

with Porphyry’s greater continuity with Middle Platonist traditions, in contrast to Plotinus’ more

pronounced radicalism, though of course Porphyry was often willing to follow Plotinus’ more

radical innovations as well, as in the case of the theory of Hypostases and the transcendence of

the first One, or the placement of the Platonic Ideas within Nous, where he was first induced by

Plotinus to break with the views of his earlier, more traditional teacher Longinus (Vita Plotini

§18).13 Porphyry employs the threefold division of philosophy into ethics, physics, and

metaphysics to order the treatises of Plotinus in his edition of them, the Enneads: the first

Ennead concerns ethics, the second and third physics, and the fourth through sixth the divine

hypostases:14 the fourth Ennead soul, the fifth nous, and the sixth (although Porphyry does not

explicitly say so in the Life of Plotinus) more advanced topics—in metaphysics, category theory

and number—and the One (VP §§24-26).15 Through the very arrangement of the treatises of the

Enneads, therefore, Porphyry has imposed upon the reading of Plotinus a not wholly appropriate

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Aristotelian element—for Platonic/Plotinian dialectic is not merely another term for Aristotelian

metaphysics, nor in fact does Plotinus in fact anywhere directly address the question of the

division of the parts of philosophy.16 Porphyry’s ordering of the Enneads also introduces the

somewhat misleading suggestion—which is also the generally accepted view—that the real goal

of Plotinian philosophy is contemplation of and union with the One, the principal topic of the last

three treatises of Ennead VI, whereas it is clear from Plotinus’ treatise on eudaimonia, Ennead

I.4, that he instead conceives of the telos or goal of life as the sage’s identification with the

Divine Intelligence or Nous.17 The effect on our reading of the Enneads by Porphyry’s

arrangement of the treatises deserves, I think, more attention than it has received.

This raises again the issue of Porphyry’s alleged Aristotelianism and his tendency to

harmonize Aristotle with Platonism, points on which he is usually thought to have differed

significantly from his master. In my view, however, it is easy to make too much of this. I have

argued previously,18 following fundamental work of A. C. Lloyd,19 that at least in the area of

logic and metaphysics, it is Plotinus rather than Porphyry who should be seen as originating this

‘Aristotelianizing’ tendency within Neoplatonism. For Porphyry treats the criticisms that

Plotinus directs against the text of Aristotle’s Categories in Ennead VI.1 as aporiai to be

solved,20 and solves them in such a way that the Categories is seen precisely to be a work of

logic and not of metaphysics, a work whose untoward metaphysical implications—concerning

the diminished reality of Platonic genera and species, for example—can be defused and the text

and the Organon as a whole made safe for use by Platonists.

This has usually been construed as Porphyry’s response to an attack by Plotinus’ on

Aristotle’s Categories, but in pursuing this project Porphyry was not necessarily being untrue to

Plotinus’ intentions. No doubt many of the criticisms of the Categories that Plotinus retails in the

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first book of On the kinds of Being were intended by their originators, such as the 2nd century CE

(?) figures Lucius and Nicostratus, as hostile critiques of Aristotle. But in Plotinus that they can

be seen as directed not against Aristotle himself, but rather against the standard interpretation of

Aristotle’s Categories as found in Peripatetic commentators: one could mention Alexander of

Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the work as among Plotinus’ possible or even likely targets.21

For example, many of the arguments in Ennead VI.1 are directed against the assumption that the

ten categories are to be construed as metaphysical summa genera. But it is very far from clear

that Aristotle could have intended this interpretation, since for example he states in the

Categories itself that quality is a homonym (§8 init., 8b25-26), which would be impossible if the

category of quality were a genuine genus, which by definition is predicated synonymously of its

species. I think that we should assume that Plotinus is suggesting that this standard interpretation

of the Categories is wrong, and not that it is Aristotle who is wrong on this point.22 Porphyry

responds to this critique by assuming that Aristotle’s categories are intended to be a classification

of sensible items and properties only, i.e., he accepts the main point of Plotinus’ critique, that the

categories cannot be a complete classification of everything that exists. Porphyry certainly does

disagree with Plotinus about whether the ten categories of Aristotle are actually applicable to

sensible reality: Plotinus denies that they are, but Porphyry accepts them.23 So on this point at

least Porphyry thinks Aristotle can be harmonized with Platonist metaphysical truth, whereas

Plotinus doubts that complete harmony is achievable, but still sees the disagreement as not being

the flat-out opposition that it has often been taken to be. In another essay, P. Hadot has shown

how Porphyry (via Dexippus) argued that Plotinus’ critiques of the Aristotelian category of

substance (ousia) in On the kinds of Being can be read in a way that brought out the fundamental

harmony of the philosophies of Plotinus and Aristotle.24 Again, I would want to argue that what

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this shows is not so much Porphyry’s harmonizing tendency in opposition to Plotinus more hard-

line attitude, but Porphyry’s understanding of some of Plotinus’ deeper motivations.

Nevertheless, Porphyry is surely fully aware that Plotinus does have metaphysical

disagreements with Aristotle, some of them rather fundamental, such as over Aristotle’s view in

Metaphysics , that the divine Nous is the highest God, rather than the One or Good, with Nous

relegated to the status of the second Hypostasis (cf., very explicitly on this point, Ennead

V.1.9,16ff.). Porphyry probably himself held that Aristotle’s philosophy could not completely be

reconciled with Platonism, since we are told that he wrote a work with the title On the dissension

of Plato and Aristotle (P29 Smith)25, but he must have thought that this disagreement was not

fundamental, since he apparently also wrote a work in three books On the unity of the sect of

Plato and Aristotle (P30 Smith)—if this indeed is not just an alternate title for the same work,

which would not substantially affect the point I am trying to make.26 But this reflects the attitude

toward Aristotle that we saw in Plotinus, and that as we saw Porphyry too recognized in him. We

also know that Porphyry wrote a work against the earlier Peripatetic Boethus defending the

immortality of the human soul against Boethus’ version of the entelechy-theory of Aristotle’s De

Anima (P32 Smith: extensive fragments). Plotinus also criticizes Boethus’ view in his early

treatise on the soul’s immortality (Ennead IV.7), but we cannot be certain whether Porphyry

thought that Boethus’ interpretation of Aristotle was the correct one.27 Certainly there were later

Platonists who thought that Aristotle could be read as not attacking the immortality of the

rational soul—essentially, by identifying Aristotle’s passive intelligence with rational soul, and

defending its imperishability—though there is no sign that Plotinus read Aristotle in this fashion,

or that Porphyry thought that he did (the harmonizing interpretation of Aristotle on this point

could descend from Porphyry, though I think that Iamblichus is more likely as its source).

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What I would suggest, then, is that Porphyry sees himself as a fairly faithful but not wholly

uncritical follower of Plotinus and an adherent of Plotinus’ new or revived brand of Platonism, in

rather the same way as (in his view) Aristotle was a not uncritical follower of Plato himself.28 In

any case Porphyry seems to have been a far more ‘orthodox’ Plotinian than his rival Amelius

Gentilianus, Plotinus’ other main student, whom Porphyry seems to portray himself in the Life as

supplanting as Plotinus’ designated successor. We know that Amelius disagreed with Plotinus on

a number of important points and we may sometimes see Plotinus criticizing in the Enneads, for

instance on the topic of the unity of soul (Enn. IV.3.1-8).29 This impression of Porphyry as self-

consciously the philosophical heir of Plotinus is reinforced by the evidence of Porphyry’s treatise

De abstinentia, the longest of his surviving philosophical works.30 This defense of vegetarianism

and ‘animal rights’ (i.e., that brutes can rightly be considered subjects of justice) is addressed to

Castricius Firmus, a former student of Plotinus whom Porphyry indeed seems to have inherited

as an object of professorial concern. Castricius had abandoned the (Pythagorean) practice of

vegetarianism that had also been followed by Plotinus (VP §2), and Porphyry is in this work

attempting to recall him to the true path. There are a number of appeals to Castricius’ loyalty to

and piety towards the teachings of the school—which Porphyry even refers to as “ancestral laws

of the philosophy to which you were committed” (I.2.3: trans. G. Clark).31 This seems

principally to mean the Pythagorean variety of Platonism that Plotinus had taught, but also may

involve personal loyalty or commitment to the figure of Plotinus himself. Certainly the ascetic

ethics and the moral psychology upon which it is based that is laid out in chs. 27-47 of Book I of

the De abstinentia and elaborated in various passages later in the work seems essentially to be

that of Plotinus, and especially of his great treatise on happiness, Ennead I.4. The goal of this

ethics is to rejoin or become fully identified with one’s personal nous or true self in the

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intelligible world, from which one’s soul has descended into Becoming and embodiment, to

reverse the process of descent by detaching oneself mentally from material conditions and from

the emotions they provoke. Strict simplicity of diet, including vegetarianism, is one of the main

elements in the ascetic regimen advocated by Porphyry: this is something that Plotinus never

argues for (though according to Porphyry he did practice it), but the metaphysical and

psychological assumptions upon which Porphyry builds his case for it are throughout

recognizably Plotinian, especially the notion that one reverts to one’s true intelligible self via

uninterrupted contemplation of the spiritual realm.32 Along with the Sententiae, we can take the

De abstinentia as an example of Porphyry’s ‘Plotinian’ work, where he is concerned to present,

not to criticize, Plotinian thought.

Let us move on to the central question of Plotinus’ theory of hypostases. The extent to

which Porphyry accepted the Plotinian metaphysical hierarchy of hypostases, One, Nous and

Soul, and in particular the Plotinian distinction between One and Nous, is somewhat

controversial and hard to determine. If we look only at the fragments of the fourth book of

Porphyry’s Philosophical history (220F-223F Smith, all cited by Cyril of Alexandria in his tract

against Julian) it seems that Porphyry does accept Plotinus’ theory. Some apparent differences do

arise, but I shall suggest that what we see occurring is once more Porphyry attempting to

explicate and expanding upon Plotinus. The four fragments in question all come from Porphyry’s

discussion of Plato’s doctrine of principles,33 and they reveal, as we will see, that Porphyry

wishes to accept Plotinus’ hypostases in this work (the Philosophical history) as an interpretation

of Plato’s doctrine. This indeed is what Plotinus intended them to be, as he declares explicitly in

the first treatise introducing his theory of the Hypostases, On the three hypostases that are

principles (Ennead V.1.8,1-14). Porphyry’s endorsement of Plotinus’ theory is particularly

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evident from fragment 221F, which is connected closely with this particular passage of the

Enneads: indeed, I shall argue that all four of the Porphyrian fragments on metaphysics from

Book IV of the Philosophical history are very closely connected with Ennead V.1.

Fragment 221F opens with Porphyry’s statement that “Plato claims that the substance of

the divine extends to three hypostases” (ll. 2-3),34 which is a paraphrase of the last clause of

Ennead V.1.7, which closes Plotinus’ extensive discussion of the Hypostases that occupies the

first seven chapters of this treatise: “And as far as [!"#$% in place of Porphyry’s &#$%] these [=

One, Nous, Soul] the divine things extend” (V.1.7,49).35 Plotinus here calls his Hypostases “the

divinities” or “divine things” (ta theia), whereas Porphyry has instead the apparently by now

standard term hupostaseis, which Plotinus nowhere uses in this technical sense and which

Porphyry perhaps was responsible for introducing. It occurs in the well-known title of Ennead

V.1 already cited, On the three hypostases that are principles ('($) *+, *$%+, -$#%.+,

/012*32(4,). There is another reminiscence of the same Plotinian phrase a few lines below in

Porphyry’s fragment 221: “[Plato says that] divinity (theôtês) reaches to the [level of] Soul” (ll.

5-6).36 Porphyry’s immediately following statement that Plato says that “the rest is the un-divine

(atheon), starting with corporeal differentiation” (ll. 6-7),37 which has puzzled commentators, is

just an amplification of and expansion through contrast and contrariety upon the Plotinian claim

that the Hypostases are the ‘divine things’ that Porphyry is glossing. While Porphyry here

identifies the Second Hypostasis with the Demiurge (line 5) rather than with Nous, this is an

echo of Plotinus’ own phrase “Nous is the Demiurge for Plato”38 (Enn. V.1.8,6). The only

obvious disagreement in this fragment with Plotinus’ strict doctrine lies in Porphyry’s

identification of the Cosmic Soul (5 *16 .72!18 98#:), that is, the World-Soul of the Timaeus,

with the Plotinian Third Hypostasis, since in Plotinus’ mature doctrine anyway, the Hypostasis

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Soul is definitely to be distinguished from the soul of the universe, as is explicit for instance in

Ennead IV.3, where Plotinus argues for just this claim against his pupil Amelius.39 As nothing in

Plotinus’ early treatise Ennead V.1 requires us to take the Hypostasis Soul to be the World-Soul,

Porphyry would seem to have either over-interpreted or misinterpreted Plotinus on this point, or

else he has deliberately introduced a subtle variation into the doctrine here.40 But in any case, the

doctrine of this fragment as a whole is Plotinian and taken from a central Plotinian text, and it

endorses Plotinus’ theory of Hypostases as a reading of Plato’s metaphysics.41

Given the close connection of fragment 221F with the beginning of Ennead V.1.8, we may

suspect that fragment 222F too is connected with the same Ennead chapter, where Plotinus cites

(Enn. V. 1.8,1-4) the same passage of the Pseudo-Platonic Epistle II concerning the ‘Three

Kings’ (312e) that Porphyry quotes in 222F. However, Porphyry unlike Plotinus quotes Plato’s

text directly rather than paraphrasing (and does so fairly accurately, with only minor variation

from our received text of the Epistle) and makes clear what Plotinus does not, that the three kings

are the same as the ‘three gods’ of Numenius of Apamea42, whereas Plotinus picks out only a

few key phrases from the Epistle. Cyril’s remark following the direct quotation of Porphyry’s

citation of the Epistle in fragment 222 is his gloss on what Porphyry is saying: “He [i.e.,

Porphyry] shows that Plato also indicates their coming into existence (hupostasis!) from one

another, and the descent and diminution of those that follow upon the First, by saying

‘primarily’, ‘secondarily’ and ‘thirdly’, and that all things come from One and are preserved by

it” (ll. 8-12).43 If this remark by Cyril is correct, as seems plausible, then Porphyry is endorsing

Plotinus’ idea of the procession of the Second and Third Hypostases from the First (as well as,

presumably, the Third from the Second), what is usually and somewhat misleadingly called

‘emanation’. This procession is of course not to be found explicitly anywhere in Plato’s

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dialogues, which is why Plotinus and Porphyry, following Numenius, from whom Plotinus

seems to have gotten the idea, are obliged to cite Epistle II, as here, as textual support of it.44 The

Timaeus, however, does present Cosmic Soul as produced by the Demiurge (= Nous), which may

help account for Porphyry’s insistence, noted above, against Plotinus that the Third Hypostasis is

to be taken as Cosmic Soul and not Universal Soul.

An earlier chapter of Ennead V.1, chapter 5, cites the reports of Plato’s so-called Unwritten

Doctrines concerning the derivation of the Dyad from the One in support of the procession of

Nous (identified with the Definite Dyad) from the First Principle. My suspicion is that Plotinus

has taken this too from Numenius—perhaps from his best-known work, On the Good—and we

know from Porphyry’s notorious citation of Dercyllides’ On Plato’s philosophy in Simplicius

(fr.146F Smith) that Porphyry too was interested in Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines. In the earlier

passage, Plotinus notes (Enn. V.1.5,6-9) that Plato’s Dyad has the One as its ‘definer’ (horistês,

8), which agrees with Aristotle’s report of the Unwritten Doctrines in Metaphysics A, but

Plotinus adds that the Dyad first proceeds, in its indefinite form, from the One, by which it is

then informed and transformed into Number (= the realm of the Ideas). That the Indefinite Dyad

itself proceeds from the One is a feature of the account that is not found in the reports of Plato’s

Unwritten Doctrines—we should recall that the 1st century BCE ‘Academic’ Pythagorean-

Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria wished to add it to the report of Plato’s views in Aristotle’s

Metaphysics A6 (988a10-11)—but it is ubiquitous in the versions passed down in the

Neopythagorean tradition,45 of which Numenius was an adherent and from which Plotinus has

inherited it as the basis for attributing the procession to Plato.

In the first fragment of Philosophical history IV cited by Cyril, fr.220F, which comes a

little before fr.222 in Cyril’s text, Porphyry discusses Plato’s view on the First Principle itself,

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and attributes to him a sophisticated version of apophatic or negative theology, very much along

the lines of that found in Plotinus.46 Cyril here represents Porphyry as claiming for Plato a belief

in the One God (= the One as highest god), who can (following Parmenides 142a) neither be

fittingly named or known by humans, so that the designations that we do use for God can only be

predicated improperly or katakhrêstikôs of him. That being said, the names that are most

properly (or least improperly) used of God are “One” and “Good”, i.e., the terms that Plato

himself uses of the First Principle in Republic VI and in the Parmenides respectively. “One”

indicates the divine simplicity and self-sufficiency, while “Good” communicates insofar as is

possible that God is the source of all good things, in that all things strive for the good by

imitating God (or his “so-to-speak characteristic”,47 as Porphyry puts it in line 14) and are

preserved by God. Of the two designations, therefore, “Good” reveals the most about the (strictly

inexpressible and unknowable) divine nature, its as-it-were proper characteristic (idiôtês). This is

because things are made good by imitating God, who must therefore be good in some sense, at

least paradigmatically so. If we could assume that Porphyry, like some later Neoplatonists,

associated the goodness of things with their existence or being, this would also help explicate the

notion that all things derive from the Good as first principle.

Finally, let us turn to the fourth report of Porphyry’s Philosophical history on Plato’s

doctrine that Cyril cites, fr.223F Smith (which is actually cited third by Cyril, a little after 222F).

This is in several ways the most interesting and puzzling of the four Cyril fragments. I think that

it too is connected with a particular passage from Plotinus’ early treatise on the Hypostases,

Ennead V.1, though it has so far as I am aware not previously been discussed in this regard.

Discussion of the fragment has focussed rather on its strange distinction between eternity and

pre-eternity, which looks to be a definite innovation by Porphyry over Plotinus. However, I think

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a proper understanding of this passage in its Plotinian context may call this assumption into

question.

Fr.223 again concerns Plato’s conception of the procession of Nous (here given its proper

Plotinian name for the Second Hypostasis) from the Good as First Principle. It begins as follows:

“From this [= the Good, as can be gathered from Cyril’s opening remarks], in a way

inconceivable to humans, there comes to be Nous whole and on its own, in which are contained

the really real beings [= the Ideas] and the whole essence (ousia) of beings. This is also primary

Beauty and Beauty-Itself, having the form of Beautifulness from itself…” (ll. 3-7)48

So far this looks to be standard Plotinian doctrine, including the notion that Nous is the

primary Beauty,49 save for the claim that the manner of the procession is inconceivable to

humans. Now Plotinus himself clearly does not think that it is wholly inconceivable to humans,

since he tries to explain it in Ennead V.1 chapters 6 and 7, though not, it must be said, very

successfully. In fact much scholarly ink has been spilled over the details of his attempted

explanation.50 Porphyry may have had trouble making sense of Plotinus’ explanation as well, and

this may account for his characterization of it as ‘inconceivable to humans’. It also seems that the

details of Plotinus’ explanation are what Porphyry has in mind in the difficult passage

concerning pre-eternity and eternity that follows next (ll. 7-20):

“[Nous] has proceeded pre-eternally,51 starting from God as its cause, being self-generated

(autogennêtos) and Father of itself (autopatôr). For it is not the case that the generation has taken

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place when the former (ekeinos = the Good) moved toward the generation of this one (toutos =

Nous), but rather this one has come forth self-generated from God. And it (Nous) has not come

forth from any temporal beginning.52 For time did not yet exist, nor yet when time has come to

be is time at all related to it.53 For Nous is always54 timeless and solely eternal. Just as the First

God is always one alone55 even if all things come from him, in virtue of the fact that he is not

counted in with them nor is their value (axia) able to be compared with [literally: is not at the

same level as] his existence (huparxis),56 so too Intelligence has come to be solely eternal and

timelessly, and is itself time for the things that are in time, remaining in the sameness of its own

eternal existence [hupostasis: cf. Timaeus 37d6 on eternity ‘remaining in unity’]” (ll. 7-20).57

It seems clear that Porphyry has in mind here, and is in fact glossing, the controversial and

extremely obscure passage Enn. V.1.6,15-27, where Plotinus attempts to explain the generation

of Nous from the One.58 The allusion in Porphyry’s phrase 1; <=$ >.(?,18 .%,18!",18 0$@A

<",(2%, *B, *1C*18 at lines 9-10 to Plotinus’ denials of motion (towards something) to the

One at V.1.6,16-17 and 22-23, as well as the parallels between Plotinus’ explanation why time is

irrelevant to his account and Porphyry’s lines 11-13 especially are sufficient to establish the

existence of this allusion. If this be accepted, we can then ask how Porphyry is reading the

disputed Plotinus passage. The central issue, notoriously, is a grammatical one: what is the

subject of the participle epistraphentos at Plotinus’ line 18?59 Is the subject of this participle

Nous, or is it the One? In other words, is Plotinus saying that since it is impossible for the One to

move towards Nous—which at this point does not ‘yet’ exist, so to speak—in order to generate

it, that it must revert upon itself to accomplish the generation of Nous (since, clearly, it can’t

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move toward anything else), or is he saying that since the One is barred by its nature from doing

anything at all in order for Nous to be generated, that Nous must in effect generate itself, by

reverting (in its preliminary indefinite state of ‘pre-intellect’60) toward the One? Once the

question is posed, it becomes clear, I think, that Porphyry here is adopting the second reading of

epistraphentos, with its subject being Nous.61 Thus ‘reversion’ (epistrophê) is being treated as a

kind of motion towards something else: there is hence no notion here of any self-reversion of the

One, in Porphyry’s view. The idea is that Nous must ‘first’ generate or constitute itself (again, in

an indefinite state) so as to be able to revert upon the One and so become definite (the stage that

Plotinus thinks of as corresponding to the One ‘defining’ the Indefinite Dyad in Plato’s

Unwritten Doctrines).

This line of thought leads naturally, in both the Plotinus and the Porphyry passages so

interpreted, to the problem of ‘when’, so to speak, these stages of generation are supposed to be

taking place, i.e., to the problem of the apparent essential temporality of the process. There is

also an apparent contradiction lurking—in that it would seem that Nous has first to generate itself

in order to revert upon the One, i.e., in order to generate itself—but apparently this is supposed

to be resolved for Plotinus at least by distinguishing the two stages of Nous, indefinite and

definite: neither Plotinus or Porphyry is explicit in dealing with this problem here, though

Plotinus is more so elsewhere.62 In fact, it may be the puzzling nature of this latter problem that

led Porphyry to declare the whole process to be, strictly, incomprehensible to humans. In his

response to the general issue about temporality, Porphyry is satisfied merely to deny that the

process is temporal. Plotinus adds the somewhat helpful point that the stages in the temporal

account are supposed to be analogues of (eternal) relations of causality and effect/product among

the items in the account, that is, to reflect the fact that the One is the cause of the generation of

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Nous (6,18-22). Plotinus seems to be thinking here of what might be called a process of ‘eternal

generation’, but Porphryry goes farther and speaks of it as being ‘pre-eternal’.63 If Porphyry’s

notion of ‘pre-eternality’ is supposed to explain anything here, I think it must be that the process

is supposed to account for the generation of eternity itself, so that talk of eternal generation is out

of place. But if this is so, we see Porphyry attempting to clear up a difficult point in Plotinus’

account by expanding on it.

How can the One be called the cause (aition, fr.223F7-8) of the generation of Nous, if Nous

is self-generated? The answer to this must again lie in the two stages of generation: the One is

the cause of the outflowing of the indefinite pre-Nous (cf. Enn. V.2.1, the image of the fountain

overflowing), which then ‘generates itself’ or bootstraps itself into existence in reverting on the

One. Our Porphyry fragment, however, appears innocent of all these complexities, perhaps

because he thought them to be incomprehensible to the human mind. What Porphyry does add to

the Plotinian picture is the distinction between pre-eternity and eternity, which seems intended to

express the idea that the generation of Nous (identified with eternity) takes place, not only before

time, but so to speak ‘before’ eternity as well.64

Now the concept of pre-eternity is also found in the unique fragment of Porphyry’s On

principles from Proclus’ Platonic theology (fr.232F Smith), which speaks of the pre-eternal

element within the eternal Nous and connecting it with the One, rather than as here in fr.223F of

its procession from the One or First Principle before eternity. This would seem to be linked to the

notorious difficulty about Porphyry’s having posited the One as Father of the so-called First

Intelligible Triad Being/Existence-Life-Intelligence (Nous) (Damascius Prin. I.86 Ruelle, cf. also

Proclus In Parm. 1070.15 and Anon. In Parm fr.IX init.)65 Note that in our fr.223 of the

Philosophical history, Nous is said to be its own father, while in the On Principles fragment the

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pre-eternal element (presumably to be somehow identified with the One and perhaps also with

pre-Nous) is within the Hypostasis Nous, so that as it were Nous contains its father within itself.

We also see in our fragment the important and seemingly opposed notion that the One is not to

be ‘counted in with’ (sunarithmeisthai) other things. This has already come up in the perhaps

Porphyrian sequel to fr.221 (ll. 6-12), which I omitted to discuss above, where certain unnamed

and mysterious66 persons are said to object to the Plotinian account of the Hypostases that the

First Principle should not be counted in with the other two Hypostases (line 9). This echoes

known criticisms of Porphyry elsewhere for counting in the First Principle as the Father of the

First Intelligible Triad (cf. the Damascius passage), and may represent Porphyry himself stating

this objection against his own view, or against his own interpretation of Plotinus’ metaphysical

view.

This paradox, concerning the One in Porphyry’s thought both being conceived as somehow

a constituent of Nous and on the other hand as strictly transcending it as its source, has been

connected by Hadot and Dillon with similar themes in the Anonymous Parmenides commentary

(fr. XI-XII) concerning the dual status of the One of the Second Hypothesis, as both somehow

being identical with the strictly transcendent One of the First Hypothesis and as also having its

role as constituent of the One-Being of the Second Hypothesis, which on the Neoplatonic

interpretation is to be identified with the Hypostasis Nous.67 In my view, as in Hadot’s, these

parallels provide rather strong evidence in favor of his attribution of the Anonymous

Commentary to Porphyry, and I do not think that they have been sufficiently appreciated in

recent controversies over this attribution. Proper discussion of this issue, however, would take us

far beyond what I have tried to do here. There are also rather striking resemblances in both

language and doctrine between the Anonymous Commentary and the fragments from Book IV of

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Porphyry’s Philosophical history that we have been discussing. Most or all of them were pointed

out by Hadot in his monumental Porphyre et Victorinus,68 but they also have not been made

enough of in the recent controversies over the authorship of the Commentary. Let me just

mention here two points from fragment 220F. First is the term prosegoriai for the designations or

denominations of the First God, which—though a common technical term of the period—occurs

in the same context in Anonymous fr. I.18.69 The doctrinal point is similar there too, concerning

the applicability of the name “One” to the First Principle.70 Much of the text of the

Commentary’s fragments as we have them is concerned with ‘negative theology’, the difficulty

of talking sensibly about the first God, identified with the One of the First Hypothesis of Plato’s

Parmenides. The main point of Anonymous fr.1 seems to be, as in Philosophical history fr. 220,

that “One”, though in some ways quite inadequate as a designation of the First, is nonetheless

most appropriate among human names for this role: in particular it is the cause of the being of

other things (fr.I.10-12, cfr. fr.II.9-1071). Elsewhere the One is also said to be responsible for the

‘preservation’ (sôteria, fr. V.672) of other things, recalling 220F15. Another striking parallel

comes at the end of the first fragment of the Commentary, where it is denied that the One can be

conceived in terms of activity, thought or simplicity, recalling the statement of fr.220F10-12

(which however affirms the One’s simplicity and denies its need of parts).73 There are other

linguistic and doctrinal parallels noted by Hadot, but the general impression certainly seems to

support Hadot’s identification of the Anonymous with Porphyry.

However Hadot, like other commentators, fails to note the close connection I have pointed

to between Philosophical history fr.223F and Plotinus’ account of the generation of Nous from

the One in Ennead V.1.6, where Porphyry seems to be identifying his own account of Nous’s so-

called self-generation with Plotinus’ account. Instead, Hadot is on record as advocating the other

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main reading of the Ennead V.1.6 passage, according to which the One generates Nous by itself

moving towards its generation.74 This does not much affect his case for identifying the

Anonymous Commentator with Porphyry, since he does call attention to the parallels between

the account of the relationship between the First and Second Ones of the Parmenides in the

Anonymous Commentary, frs. XI-XII75 and Porphyry’s account of the self-generation of Nous in

Philosophical history fr.223F, as well as between the discussion of the relation of the One to the

First Intelligible Triad in fr.IX,1-7 and fr.223F and the Damascius passage. Does my new

reconstruction of Porphyry’s interpretation of Plotinus’ account of the generation of Nous

increase the probability that the Anonymous Commentator is Porphyry? This remains an open

question, but certainly it seems to bring the Anonymous into closer proximity to Plotinus.76

1 See on this point Andrew Smith, Porphyry’s place in the Neoplatonic tradition (The Hague

1974), Introduction xii ff. Part One of Smith’s book, chapters 1-5, deals extensively with the

question of Porphyry’s originality vis-à-vis Plotinus in psychology, rather than in metaphysics in

general, with which I will be concerned here. 2 The Life of Pythagoras originally formed part of the first book of Porphyry’s Philosophical

history, from which come the fragments on Platonic metaphysics which will be discussed in the

last part of this paper. 3 “The Later Neoplatonists”, in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge history of later Greek and

early medieval philosophy (Cambridge 1967) 286. 4 Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz (Leipzig 1975). 5 A good example is Sententiae ch.32 on the scale of types of virtues, which presents an

interesting rational reconstruction of Plotinus’ discussion of the same topic in his tractate on the

virtues, Ennead I.2. 6 Ibid. 288-291. 7 Ibid. 289. 8 M. Zambon, Porphyre et le Moyen-Platonisme (Paris 2002) 19-20 mentions two supposed

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differences between the metaphysics of the Sententiae and that of Plotinus: a stronger contrast

between being and non-being, approaching a dualism, and a rigidifying of the differences

between the various hierachical levels. But if these are indeed genuine disagreements with

Plotinus (which I doubt) they amount at most to differences of emphasis, or would not have been

seen as disagreements by Porphyry himself. 9 There is quite a bit about the Hypostases in the Sententiae as well, but I will not have anything

more to say about this work. 10

Porphyre (Entretiens Hardt 12 [1965]) 125-164. 11 Contrast on this point A. C. Lloyd, The anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford 1990) 164-165, who

in my view fails to distinguish Plotinus’ Platonic dialectic sufficiently from Aristotelian logic. 12 Cf. Hadot, op. cit. 127-129. Politics is presumably to be classified with ethics. This

arrangement is Aristotelian only in that it distinguishes physics from metaphysics, which it

places ‘above’ physics: it does not, for instance, respect Aristotle’s fundamental distinction

between practical and theoretical philosophy (and much of ethics would perhaps count as

theoretical). But it does seem to be connected with the idea that logic, as in Aristotle, is an

instrument or organon of philosophy, not a part of philosophy, as it had been for the Stoics, a

view that Plotinus certainly also accepts: cf. Enn. I.3.4-5, where formal logic is compared to

learning grammar as a propaedeutic study. 13 Cf. Zambon, op. cit., on Porphyry’s continuity with Middle Platonism. I do not wish to deny

that Plotinus’ thought is generally continuous with Middle Platonism as well, but at least on the

issues mentioned, Plotinus seems to exhibit a notable degree of innovation. On the transcendence

of the Plotinian One as an innovation, see especially P. Meijer, Plotinus on the Good or the One

(Enneads VI,9): an analytical commentary (Amsterdam 1992). 14 See below on Porphyry’s interpretation of Enn. V.1.7 fin. 15 Hadot, op. cit. 128 16 An exception is Enn. I.3.5-6, where dialectic is connected with wisdom (sophia, 6,12-13) as

the highest and most valuable part of philosophy and distinguished from physics and ethics,

while logic of the Aristotelian sort is declared not to be a part of philosophy or a concern of the

real philosopher—probably, not even as an organon (cf. 5,10). 17 Porphyry actually asserts at Vita Plotini 23,15-16 that the telos for Plotinus was union with the

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One. Insofar as Ennead I.4 can be taken as a definitive statement of Plotinus’ ethics, this does not

seem to be the case. 18 “Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Categories”, Aufstieg und

Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987) 955-974. 19 “Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic”, Phronesis 1 (1955-56) 58-72, 146-160. See also

especially F. J. De Haas, “Did Plotinus and Porphyry disagree about Aristotle’s Categories?”,

Phronesis 46 (2001) 492-526 and “Context and strategy of Plotinus’ treatise On the genera of

Being VI.1-3” in V. Celluprica and C. D’Ancona, eds., Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici

(Naples 2004), pp. 39-53. I find myself in in general agreement with De Haas’s view of the

attitude of Plotinus and Porphyry to Aristotle: I only wish to emphasize here a few salient points.

For a thorough defense of the more traditional view of Plotinus’ attitude to Aristotle, see most

recently R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza movimento analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele (Naples

2002). 20 As is also seen, more explicitly, in the slightly later Categories commentary by the

Iamblichean Dexippus. 21 Again, see the above-cited works of De Haas. He notes the view of the Categories as being

about the genera of being, which is attacked by Plotinus, as being Alexander’s, but does not, I

think, sufficiently stress this. De Haas also sees that Plotinus seems to be attributing to Aristotle

the view—which he thinks is correct—that the category-classes of the Categories are what

Plotinus calls katêgoriai and not genera of being. 22 A similar situation arises with respect to Plotinus’ critique of Aristotle’s theory of time in his

treatise on eternity and time, Ennead III.7. In chapter 9 and following of this treatise, Plotinus

subjects Aristotle’s proposed definition of time from Physics IV as ‘the number of motion

(kinêsis)’ to a devastating critique, but later explains that he does not actually think that Aristotle

meant to propose this characterization as a definition, and that the tradition has misunderstood

him on this point: he meant instead that time is what is measured by motion, not what measures

it, and we misunderstand him because his text was intended to be esoteric, and only read by

students who had been attending his lectures, who would have been able to comprehend what he

was up to (III.7.13,10-18). On Plotinus’ critique here, see my essay “Plotinus on the Nature of

Eternity and Time”, in Lawrence Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity (Washington, DC

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1994) 22-53. 23 On all this, see now J. Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction (Oxford 2003), Additional Note G. 24 “L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de

Déxippe sur les Catégories”, in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome

1974), 31-47: English translation by V. Caston in R. Sorabji, ed., Aristotle transformed: the

ancient commentators and their influence (London 1990) 125-140. 25 Porphyry’s fragments will be cited in the edition of Andrew Smith, Porphyrii philosophi

fragmenta (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1993). The title of the present work is reminiscent of Numenius

of Apamea’s polemic against the skeptical Academy, On the dissension [also D%32*E2%A] of the

Academy with Plato. 26 George Karamanolis argues persuasively in his forthcoming book that they were indeed

different works, but both upheld the essential agreement of Plato and Aristotle. I am grateful to

Karamanolis for allowing me to see his unpublished work on this topic. 27 I say this even though I assume that title reported in the Suida lexicon Against Aristotle

concerning whether the soul is an entelechy (P31 Smith) refers to the same work of Porphyry

against Boethus, for the report could be confused about the work’s contents (see Smith’s

apparatus to P31 for this possibility). See also A. Smith, “A Porphyrian treatise against

Aristotle?”, in F. X. Martin and J. A. Richmond, eds., From Augustine to Eriugena : essays on

Neoplatonism and Christianity in honor of John O'Meara (Washington, D. C. 1991) 183-186.

The principle issue regards whether frs.245F and 245F Smith are directed against Aristotle

himself, or against members of the Peripatetic tradition (i.e., Boethus). 28 It should be noted that according to the fragments of On providence of the 5th century

Alexandrian Neoplatonist Hierocles (apud Photius codd. 214 and 251), the essential harmony of

the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle was a basic tenet of the school of Ammonius the teacher

of Plotinus. This testimony, though isolated, is perhaps not to be lightly dismissed, since it seems

to come through the Academy of Plutarch of Athens and may derive from the above-mentioned

work or works of Porphyry on the agreement or disagreement of Plato and Aristotle. See now on

Hierocles’ work H. Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford 2002). 29 See the commentary on this text by W. Helleman-Elgersma, Soul sisters: a Commentary on

Enneads IV 3 (27), 1-8 of Plotinus (Amsterdam 1980), who is convincing on this point.

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30 I exclude Porphyry’s commentary on the Harmonics of Ptolemy, which does however contain

passages of considerable philosophical interest. Only the very end of Book IV of the De

abstinentia is missing. The work is now conveniently accessible in an excellent English

translation, with copious notes, by Gillian Clark: Porphyry, On abstinence from killing animals

(London 2000). 31 Compare Amelius’ reference in his letter to Porphyry (Vita Plotini 17,39) to Plotinus’

philosophy as “our spiritual home” (5 1F.(GE H2*?E, trans. A. H. Armstrong). 32 There is a problem in that Porphyry seems to think of the full accomplishment of the ethical

goal in terms of complete detachment from worldly concerns, and even from awareness of this

world, whereas Plotinus appears to think that the sage will be able to be active in the world even

while retaining his unbroken contemplation of the intelligible (and in fact Porphyry describes

Plotinus in such terms in the Life). I am indebted to Kelly E. Arenson for calling this problem to

my attention. The solution is perhaps that Porphyry in De abstinentia I is discussing the

conditions under which the re-ascent and rejoining with the higher self can be accomplished, and

not what would be possible for the ‘ascended’ sage after he has reached the stage of eudaimonia

described in Ennead I.4. 33 There are actually five fragments of Book IV preserved by Cyril, but the first one (219F

Smith) concerns only details of Plato’s biography, not metaphysics. 34 &#$% <=$ *$%+, /012*32(4, IJK 'L3*4, *B, *16 M(?18 0$1(LM(G, 1;2?E,.

Translations of the fragments of the Philosophical History are my own. 35 NE) !"#$% *1C*4, *= M(GE, Enn. V.1.7, 48. 36 &#$% <=$ 98#OA *B, M(7*K*E 0$1(LM(G,. This second parallel, though not the earlier one,

is noted by Smith in his apparatus. 37 L1%07, DP *@ &M(1, -0@ *OA 24!E*%.OA >,O$#ME% D%EJ1$QA. 38 DK!%18$<@A <=$ R ,16A E;*S. 39 See n27 above. 40 This may be connected with Porphyry’s claim elsewhere that the Demiurge for Plotinus (not

Plato!) is the immanent nous of the World-Soul, which suggests that the alteration to Plotinus’

formulation in our fragment may be deliberate on Porphyry’s part. See W. Deuse, “Der Demiurg

bei Porphyrios und Jamblich”, in C. Zintzen, ed., Der Philosophie des Neuplatonismus

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(Darmstadt 1977) 238-280. Note also that Numenius of Apamea’s Third God, which is

associated with the Plotinian soul or at least with dianoia (Numenius fr.22), is particularly

closely connected with the sensible cosmos (Numenius fr.21). Plotinus’ reference to his

hypostasis Soul as to dianooumenon (Enn. V.1.7,24) seems to be an allusion to Numenius’ third

god. See further below on Plotinus dependence on Numenius’ theology. On Numenius’ Three

Gods, cf. M. Frede, “Numenios”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987)

1044, 1055-1056. 41 The mention of cosmic soul indicates that the parallel passage at Eusebius PE XI.20 is

probably derived from Porphyry and not directly from Plotinus, as W. Theiler held, against P.

Henry (see Smith’s apparatus to 221F3ff.). 42 As in Numenius’ reading of the Epistles passage, which Plotinus and Porphyry are both

following here: cf. Numenius frs. 21 and 22, and fr.24.51, attributing the belief in the three gods

to Socrates. I believe that fr.22 shows that Numenius’ three gods corresponded closely to the

Plotinian hypostases One, Nous and Soul, although Numenius identified them all with types of

nous, and that fr. 21 from Proclus, identifying the third god with the cosmos rather than its soul

represents some sort of confusion (as E. R. Dodds also thought, see his “Numenius and

Ammonius” in Les sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V [1960]) 13-14). 43 D(D:L4.( DP >µ-.?,4, .E) *B, >b -LL:L4, ;072*E2%, -$#1!",K, -0@ *16

fE2%L"4A .E) *B, /07fE2%, .E) dJ(2%, *+, !(*= *@ 0$+*1, D%= *16 ‘0$U*4A’ .E)

‘D(8*"$4A’ .E) ‘*$?*4A’ (F0(G,, .E) V*% >b H,@A *= 03,*E .E) D%’ E;*16 2gh(*E%. 44 He also cites the closing passage of Epistle VI (323d) for this, concerning the ‘Father of the

Cause’ (Enn. V.1.8,4), connecting it in a passage of the Sixth Ennead (VI.8.14,37-38) with the

causality of the Idea of the Good with respect to the Ideas in Republic VI. 45 As reported in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos /.261 and Diogenes Laertius

VIII.25. This tradition is very much concerned to avoid attributing a dualism of principles to

Plato. It is interesting, however, that Numenius, though a Neopythagorean Platonist, does

maintain a dualist interpretation of Plato and Pythagoras with regard to the independence of

Matter from the First Principle—a dualism that Plotinus wishes to reject. We may perhaps

suspect here the influence of Plutarch of Charoneia on Numenius. 46 Smith’s apparatus ad loc. collects some of the relevant passages from the Enneads illustrating

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this, but misses, I think, an especially apt one at Enn. III.8.9,15-18, which says precisely, as

Porphyry will also say in fr.220, that calling the One the Good and most simple

(T0L1C2*E*1,), though true, conveys nothing clear about it to our minds. 47 *B, >.(?,18, (F #$B J3,E%, FD%7*K*E 48 -0@ DP *1C*18 *$701, *%,= -,M$U01%A -,(0%,7K*1, ,16, <(,"2ME% *( VL1, .E) .EM'

HE8*@, /J(2*+*E, >, W DB *= X,*4A X,*E .E) 5 0Q2E 1;2?E *+, X,*4,. Y DB .E)

0$U*4A .EL@, .E) E;*1.EL@, 0E$' HE8*16 *OA .ELL1,OA I#1, *@ (ZD1A 49 Cf. Ennead V.8. 50 The fullest and perhaps most illuminating discussion is still that of A.C. Lloyd, “Plotinus on

the genesis of thought and existence”, Oxford studies in ancient philosophy 5 (1987) 155-186.

See also K. Corrigan, “Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One: A

reappraisal”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987) 986-991, who

discusses the Anonymous Parmenides commentator in connection with these Ennead passages,

but not this fragment of the Philosophical history. 51 Accepting Hadot’s conjecture 0$1E%4,?4A at line 7. 52 *%,1A in line 12 should probably be retained, contra Smith. 53 I.e., presumably, time is not relevant to it. 54 This is the ‘timeless always’, as at Enn. III.7.4, fin. 55 Omitting Smith’s comma in line 15. 56 Note the parallel here with the terminology of the Anonymous Parmenides commentary for the

‘existence’ of the First God, fr.XIV.6. 57 0$1OLM( DP 0$1E%4,?4A -0' EF*?18 *16 M(16 [$!K!",1A, E;*1<",,K*1A \, .E)

E;*103*4$] 1; <=$ >.(?,18 .%,18!",18 0$@A <",(2%, *B, *1C*18 5 0$71D1A <"<1,(,,

-LL= *1C*18 0E$(LM7,*1A E;*1<7,4A >. M(16, 0E$(LM7,*1A DP 1;. -0' -$#OA *%,1A

#$1,%.OA] 1^04 <=$ #$7,1A _,. -LL' 1;DP #$7,18 <(,1!",18 0$@A E;*7, >2*? *% R

#$7,1A] &#$1,1A <=$ -() .E) !7,1A EFU,%1A R ,16A. `20($ DP R M(@A R 0$+*1A (FA .E)

!7,1A -(?, .a, -0' E;*16 <",K*E% *= 03,*E, *S !B *1C*1%A 28,E$%M!(G2ME% !KDP *B,

-b?E, 28<.E*E*3**(2ME% DC,E2ME% *c >.(?,18 /03$b(%, 1d*4 .E) R ,16A EFU,%1A

!7,1A .E) -#$7,4A /012*3A, .E) *+, >, #$7,e E;*@A #$7,1A >2*?,, >, *E8*7*K*%

!",4, *OA HE8*16 EF4,?EA /012*32(4A. 58 Not noted by Smith ad loc. or by other commentators.

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59 A perhaps related question concerns the referent of auto, the subject of epistrophê in the

following chapter, V.1.7,6, though Lloyd, “Plotinus on the genesis of thought and existence”,

161, following J. Igal, “La genesis de la inteligencia en un pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino

(V.1.7,4-35)”, Emerita 39 (1971) 133n2, argues that the two passages should be taken to be

about different subjects. 60 Corresponding to the Indefinite Dyad: see Lloyd, op. cit. 61 This is the more traditional interpretation, opposed to that accepted by Hadot (see below, n70)

and Lloyd, op. cit., which takes the One to be the subject of the participle in question. That it was

also the interpretation in later Neoplatonism may be suggested by Proclus, Elements of Theology

props. 26-27. See on this point J. Whittaker, “The historical background of Proclus’ doctrine of

the !010'#()!)!”, in De Jamblique à Proclus (Entretiens Hardt XXI [1975]) 219-220 and

228-230. 62 Again, cf. Lloyd, op. cit. 63 Cf. J. Dillon, “Porphyry’s doctrine of the One”, in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et al., eds., !"#$%!

&'$%(")*! 'Chercheurs de sagesse': Hommage à Jean Pépin (Paris 1992) 363-364, who

connects this passage of Porphry with the Plotinian notion of pre-Nous; also J. Dillon “Porphyry

and Iamblichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides” in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and

Byzantine studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink, (Buffalo, NY 1988) 42. 64 This point was already made by Hadot in his discussion of the fragment in “La mêtaphysique

de Porphyre” 147, who sees the passage as concerning Porphyry’s theory of the generation of

Nous, with parallels in the Anonymous Parmenides commentary, but not Plotinus’ theory of the

generation. Another non-Plotinian feature here is that Nous or eternity is claimed to be time for

those things in time. This role in Plotinus would be played instead by the life of the soul (Enn.

III.7.11-13). 65 See Hadot, in “La mêtaphysique de Porphyre”, passim, as well as his “Être, Vie, Pensée chez

Plotin et avant Plotin”, in Les sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V [1960]) 105-141. It is not

clear if this is a feature of Porphyry’s own conception of the Triad, or of his interpretation of the

Chaldaean version of it, or (perhaps) both. Cf. also Dillon, “Porphyry’s doctrine of the One”

(above, n59). 66 “The aforementioned ones” (2i 0$1(%$K!",1%) in line 7 of fr.221 refers back to nothing in

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Cyril’s text, and thus presumably comes from his source, and therefore plausibly reproduces

Porphyry’s own words. 67 Cf. “La métaphysique de Porphyre” and his commentary in Porphyre et Victorinus. 68 P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris 1968). See the parallels listed in the “Index des textes

cités” of that work, v2 144. For Dillon, see the works cited in n59 above. 69 Hadot, op. cit. v2 67n1. 70 The name “Good” is not at issue here, since we are dealing with a commentary on the first two

Hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, where according to the Neoplatonic reading

the First Principle is referred to as “the One”, not as in the Republic as “the Good”. 71 Hadot, op. cit. v2 69n9. 72 Hadot, op. cit. v2 79n2. 73 Hadot, op. cit. v2 69n2. 74 Taking the One as the subject of epistraphentos at Enn. V.1.6,8, see above: cf. Hadot’s review

of v.2 of Henry and Schwyzer’s OCT editio minor of the Enneads, Revue de l’histoire des

religions 164 (1963) 92-96. This review is in fact the origin of the modern controversy about the

interpretation of Enn V.1.6-7. 75 Cf. also fr.II.5-10, where the First One is said to be cause of the being of the other things. 76 Insofar as the details of the generation of Nous represent a speficially Plotinian departure from

Numenian theology, my reconstruction may also count against recent suggestions that the

Anonymous Commentary predates Plotinus.

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