politicka 24.indd

str. 1Godina 6, br. 24, dekemvri 2008, Skopje

Values of political pluralism

This is the season of elections: parliamentary elections in Macedonia in June, presidential elections in the United States in November, local and presidential elections in Macedonia in March 2009, elections to the European Parliament in June 2009 and parliamen-tary elections in Germany in September 2009. Elections refl ect the most elementary power the citizens have to determine the course of their country and to realize the fundamental principle of democracy: the rule of the people. Elections provide the citizens with a choice between different political ideas and leaders, as well as between different arguments and programs proposing the best ways to move the country forward. This choice stands for the political pluralism of the country, with politicians and parties competing for the vote of the people with their set of proposed priorities, ranging from conservative, liberal, social-democratic to green views and beyond.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung pro-motes political pluralism and democracy in Germany and worldwide, knowing that these principles are not a western concept that can be imposed similarly in every country, aware that they have to refl ect the social, economic, cultural and ethnic situation in each individual coun-

Henri Bohnet

try. In more than its 70 offi ces world-wide, the KAS promotes activities to strengthen democratic party structures and a democratic, pluralistic political system. In our understanding, political parties and democratic pluralism are indelible components of a modern nation state: democratic parties offer important channels between state and society to

participate and to commu-nicate; thus, so that the citi-zens can take active part in shaping their social and po-litical environment. Political parties, however, also stand for particular values. These values are debated within the party and also in public, in the media and with other parties. Elections determine which of these values will affect the domestic and for-eign policy of the country. In Germany, as in Macedonia

and many other countries, the voter usually prefers a combination of political ideas and values, thus making compro-mises and coalitions between parties necessary to form a government – and optimally, an opposition - coalition. That is why, in my view, political pluralism is one of the main ingredients in shaping successful politics.

In this context, this new issue of Political Thought presents to you the views of the main political parties in Mac-edonia. We have asked eleven parties to contribute their opinion on what con-stitutes the values and main elements

Politi~ka mislastr. 2

Henri Bohnet

Rezime

of political pluralism: the responses we have received are published here without any changes by the editorial board1. The reader is thus presented with a comprehensive overview of the

1 Please note that the opinions presented by the authors do not necessarily represent the views of the editorial board. The ed-itors do not bear any responsibility for the content of the arti-cles.

political landscape in Macedonia on the eve of the upcoming elections, showing the progress this country has made to-wards its democratic transformation and towards joining the European Union.

Izborite se odraz na osnovniot oblik na vlasta {to gra|anite ja imaat vo odreduvaweto na nasokata vo koja nivnata zemja }e se dviì i preku koi moàt da vlijaat vrz ostvaruvaweto na osnovnoto na~elo na demokratijata, a toa e vladeeweto na narodot. Izborite im davaat na gra|anite mo`nost za izbor pome|u razli~ni politi~ki idei i voda~i, kako i mo`nost za izbor pome|u razli~ni argumenti i programi vo odnos na pra{aweto za toa koj e najdobriot pat kon napredokot na zemjata. Vakvata mo`nost za izbor go pretstavuva politi~kiot pluralizam, vo koj politi~arite i partiite se natprevaruvaat za glasovite na gra|anite preku ponudata na prioritetite sodràni vo nivnite programi, koi{to se dviàt od konzervativni, liberalni, socio-demokratski, pa s¢ do zelenata opcija itn.


SODR@INA / CONTENTS

Voved / Voved / IntroductionIntroduction

Values of political pluralism ......................................................................... 1Henri Bohnet Vrednosti na politi~kiot pluralizamAnri Bone

Aktuelno / Aktuelno / CurrentCurrent

Kratka (i)storija za makedonskiot pluralizam: Blogot gi pobedi polit-komesarite ....................................................... 9Vladimir \or~ev

A short (hi)story of Macedonian pluralism: The blog has defeated the polit-commissarsVladimir Gjorčev

Vistinskiot politi~ki dijalog – {ansa za stabilna demokratija .............................................................................. 13Zoran Zaev

Genuine political dialogue: A chance for a stable democracyZoran Zaev

Vrednostite na politi~kiot pluralizam vo pluralnite op{testva ............................................................................. 17Ermira Mehmeti

Values of political pluralism in pluralistic societiesErmira Mehmeti

Partnerstvo za razvoj .............................................................................. 23Tito Petkovski

Partnership for developmentTito Petkovski

Politi~kiot pluralizam kako fundamentalna vrednost na liberalizmot – pluralizmot vo Makedonija ..................................... 27Imer Selmani

Political pluralism as a fundamental value of liberalism: Pluralism in MacedoniaImer Selmani


Ocenka na kapacitetot na Makedonija za politi~ki dijalog ......... 35 Liljana Popovska

An evaluation of the capacity of Macedonia for political dialogueLiljana Popovska

Makedonija i EU / Makedonija i EU / Macedonia and EUMacedonia and EU

Izborite na patot kon evropskata integracija ................................ 41Zagorka Tnokovska

Elections on the road to European integrationZagorka Tnokovska

Predizvici i perspektivi / Predizvici i perspektivi / Challenges and perspectivesChallenges and perspectives

Electoral systems in pluralistic societies: The cases of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania................................................................................. 47Nataša HroneskaIzbornite sistemi vo pluralisti~ki op{testva - primerite na Makedonija, Bugarija i RomanijaNata{a Hroneska

Amerikanskite politi~ki partii – problemi, promeni, predizvici ................................................................................................. 55Velimir Delovski

American political parties: Problems, changes, challengesVelimir Delovski

Cultural pluralism: The key component of the contemporary international relations ............................................. 65Ljuben TevdovskiKulturen pluralizam: klu~nata komponenta na sovremenite me|unarodni odnosiQuben Tevdovski


Teorija / Teorija / TheoryTheory

Why thinking too much really hurts: Schmitt and Figgis on the consciousness/sovereignty nexus ............................................................ 73Adrian GramaZo{to od mnogu mislewe boli glava: [mit i Figis za vrskata me|u svesta i suverenitetotAdrian Grama

Problemot na vrednuvaweto vo makedonskiot politi~ki pluralizamili zaProblemot na politi~kiot pluralizam i negovoto aksiolo{ko vrednuvawe ......................................................................... 81Dejan Donev

The problem of evaluation in Macedonian political pluralism: The problem of political pluralism and axiological evaluationDejan Donev

Another chance for party pluralism:The logical positivist challenge to Duverger’s law .................................. 87Sergiu GherghinaU{te edna {ansa za partiski pluralizam: logi~ko pozitivisti~ko problematizirawe na zakonot na DuvergerSergiu Gergina

Novite „vrednosti# od politi~kiot pluralizam kako izvor na frustracii ...................................................................... 99Aleksandar Dimitriev

The new „values“ of political pluralism as a source of frustrationAleksandar Dimitriev

Recenzii / Recenzii / ReviewsReviews

„[efot na dr`avata i nadvore{nata politika# od Aleksandar Spasenovski ................................................................ 105Vasko Naumovski

The Head of State and Foreign Policy by Aleksandar SpasenovskiVasko Naumovski


Dokumenti / Dokumenti / DocumentsDocuments

Izboren zakonik na Republika Makedonija – Sproveduvawe na izbori / Zакон за изменување и дополнување наизборниот законик .................................................................................. 109

Electoral Code of the Republic of Macedonia: Conducting the Elections / Law on changes and amendments to the Electoral Code

Za avtorite /Za avtorite /About the AuthorsAbout the Authors ....................................... 127


Godina 6Br. 24dekemvriSkopje, 2008ISSN 1409-9853

Spisanie za politi~ko-op{testveni temi

Izdava~:Anri Bone

Osnova~i:d-r \orge Ivanov

m-r Andreas KlajnUrednici:

m-r Vladimir MisevEmilija Tuxarovskam-r Nenad Markovi}

m-r Ivan Damjanovskim-r Vladimir Bo`inovski

Goce Drtkovski

Adresa:Fondacija "Konrad Adenauer#

ul. Maksim Gorki 16, kat 3MK - 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 32 31 122Faks: 02 31 35 290

E-mail: [email protected]: www.kas.de

Institut za demokratija"Societas Civilis# Skopje

ul. Kragueva~ka br. 2MK - 1000 Skopje

Tel./Faks: 02 30 94 760E-mail: [email protected]: www.idscs.org.mk

Makedonska asocijacija na politikoloziE-mail: [email protected]

Pe~at:Vinsent grafika

Dizajn:Natali Nikolovska

Organizacija:Daniela Trajkovi}

Tehni~ka podgotovka:Pepi Damjanovski

Prevod i jazi~na redakcija na angliski:

Rajna Ko{ka Jazi~na redakcija na makedonski:

Mihail Loparski

Year 6Nº 24

DecemberSkopje, 2008

ISSN 1409-9853

Magazine for Political and Societal IssuesPublisher: Henri BohnetFounders: Dr. Gjorge IvanovAndreas Klein M.A.Editors: Vladimir Misev M.A.Emilija Tudzarovska B.A.Nenad Markovic M.A.Ivan Damjanovski M.A.Vladimir Bozinovski M.A.Goce Drtkovski B.A.

Address: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftungul. Maksim Gorki 16/3MK - 1000 SkopjePhone: 02 32 31 122Fax: 02 31 35 290E-mail: [email protected]: www.kas.de Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" Skopjeul. Kraguevacka 2MK - 1000 SkopjePhone/fax: 02 30 94 760E-mail: [email protected]: www.idscs.org.mkMacedonian Political Science AssociationE-mail: [email protected]

Stavovite izneseni vo spisanieto ne se sta-vovi na Fondacijata "Konrad Adenauer#

i Institutot za demokratija "Societas Civilis# Skopje, tuku se li~ni gledawa na avtorite.

Izdava~ite ne odgovaraat za gre{ki napraveni pri prevodot.

Spisanieto se izdava 4 pati godi{no i im se dostavuva na politi~kite subjekti,

dr`avnite institucii, univerzitetite, stran-skite pretstavni{tva vo

Republika Makedonija.

The views expressed in the magazine are not the views of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis Skopje. They are personal views of the authors. The publishers are not liable for any translation errors.The magazine is published 4 times a year and it is distributed to political subjects, state institutions, universities and foreign representatives in the Republic of Macedonia.

Printing: Vinsent Grafi kaDesign:Natali NikolovskaOrganization: Daniela TrajkovicTechnical preparation: Pepi DamjanovskiTranslator and English language editor: Rajna Koska Macedonian language editor: Mihail Loparski


Kratka (i)storija za makedonskiot pluralizam: Blogot gi pobedi polit-komesarite

Vladimir \or~ev

Dodeka Evropa ode{e napred i se razviva{e, kaj nas se organiziraa {tafeti i sletovi. Povremeno ima{e nedostig na benzin i koloni pred pumpite.

Pluralizmot e rezultat na demokratijata. Demokratijata sama po sebe e pluralisti~ka. No, demokratijata ne e rabota koja se podrazbira sama po sebe. Taa ne e garantirana. Za nea gra|anite se izboruvaat, ja gradat, ja neguvaat.

Ne be{e taka odamna 1988 godi-na. Holan|anite Van Basten – Gulit – Rajkard stanaa evropski {am-pioni. Bea podobri od germanskoto trio Mateus – Breme – Klinsman. Paolo Maldini be{e na po~etokot na karierata vo Milan. Amerika ima{e milioni kompanii, Italija desetici politi~ki partii, a Ger-manija ima{e stotici vesnici i televizii.

A SR Makedonija? Kaj nas ima{e EDNA partija. Komunisti~ka. Ako nekoj saka{e da formira druga partija, se ode{e vo zatvor. Denes ima pove}e od 50 partii.

Na televizija imavme 2 programi. Prva i Vtora. Dràvna. Tolku. Denes ima okolu 13 nacionalni televizii, 30-ina lokalni televizii, nebroeno radija, a skoro sekoj dom ima ka-

bel ska televizija so 60 programi. Zamislete kako bi bilo da se vratime na 2 programi na televizija.

Vo supermarketite (Slavija, Cen-tro, ZEM promet) mleko vo kesa ima {e od 7 do 8 sabajle. Posle toa nema{e. Denes znaete kako e.

Ima{e 2 vesnika, sredno{kolcite 100 „doj~# marki preku granica gi pre-nesuvaa vo ~orap kako investicija za Karera farmerki vo Trst, a za tele-fonska linija od PTT monopolot se ~eka{e 6, 12 ili 24 meseci.

A posle toa se ~eka{e linija poradi „dvojnik#. 90 Otsto od kolite bea zastava, jugo, {koda, lada i vart-burg. Pove}eto od patikite bea Si-mod, a trenerkite Jasa. Denes toa iz-gleda kako romanti~na razglednica za na{eto detstvo, no toa zna~e{e ekonomska stagnacija dodeka evrop-skite zemji odea napred. Dodeka Ev-ropa ode{e napred i se razviva{e, kaj nas se organiziraa {tafeti i sletovi. Povremeno ima{e nedostig na benzin i koloni pred pumpite. Da, nevrabotenosta be{e 10-15 otsto, no vo golem del od op{testvenite pretprijatija vaè{e maksimata „tie ne moàt da me platat tolku malku kolku {to jas moàm malku da rabotam#. Neproduktivnosta nose{e ekonomska stagnacija.

Nekolku decenii pred toa crk-vite bea pretvorani vo {tali i ma-

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Vladimir \or~ev

gacini, a za peewe makedonski pesni se ode{e vo zatvor ili mora{e da se odi vo emigracija.

I taka natamu.[to e poentata? Deka toa se

slu ~uva koga nema pluralizam. Ed-no partiskiot politi~ki sistem i monizmot bea „temelna vrednost# vo tekot na 50 godini. Tokmu taa „te-melna vrednost# producira{e edin-stveno monisti~ko odnesuvawe koe isklu~uva{e kakva bilo politi~ka mobilizacija, osven vo funkcija na golemiot voda~ koga 7-godi{ni deca poloùvaa zakletvi za vernost do krajot na ìvotot, a posle toa u~itelkata za raka toptan gi nose{e da mavtaat na {tafetata.

Sli~na be{e neslobodata i vo drugi sferi. Denes toa se ~ini kako dale~no minato, no toa bea na{ata realnost i propu{tenite mo`nosti. Vistina e, i toga{ ima{e ubavi i vedri raboti, no lu|eto imaat tendencija pove}e da se se}avaat na dobrite raboti, a te{kotiite se zaboravaat. No, toga{niot sistem pokaà ogromni slabosti i ima{e golemi potfrluvawa.

Denes go imame i ekonomskiot pluralizam preku pazarnata eko-nomija. Na{ata ekonomska zaostana-tost se dolì tokmu na otsustvoto na pazarni mehanizmi, dràvniot intervencionizam i gu{eweto na pazarnata ekonomija, a ne poradi samata pazarna ekonomija. Katastro-falnata tranzicija ne zna~i deka komunizmot be{e podobar, tuku deka kaj nas ima{e kriminalna priva-tizacija koja ja sozdade oligarhijata. Slo venija, ̂ e{ka, Polska, Baltikot i Ungarija imaa kolku-tolku nor-malna privatizacija i tranzicija. Gledame denes kade se. No, i vo

ekonomskiot ìvot rabotite bavno se podobruvaat. Izborot e pogolem, investiciite se zgolemuvaat, a dràvnata rabota ne e edinstvenata alternativa.

Vo mediumite se slu~i revolu-cija. Ve}e ne moè da se sokrie informacija zatoa {to polit-bi-roto i komesarite taka odlu~ile. Da ostane{e komunizmot, denes iljadnici blogeri ili nema{e da pi{uvaat, ili }e bea vo zatvor. Zvu~i nevozmo`no? E pa, vo pora-ne{niot sistem ako nekoj dobie{e „premnogu# razglednici (dene{ni e-mailovi) „od stranstvo#, vedna{ za nego se po~nuva{e dosie, go vi-kaa vo „milicija# da objasni koj toa mu pi{uva i se po~nuva{e is-traga. Zvu~i nevozmo`no? Vo de-ne{na Kina internet policijata ima 45-50.000 ~lenovi koi sekoj den, sekoj den nadgleduvaat {to i kako ~itaat Kinezite na Internet. Vo Kina ako nekoj premnogu go ima na demokratskite sajtovi ili napi{e ne{to {to ne treba, narodnata mi-li cija mu doa|a na vrata, mu sudi narodniot sud, a na krajot odi vo zatvor kako naroden neprijatel. Vo imeto na narodot, poradi tekst na Internet. Vo 2008 godina.

Pluralizmot e rezultat na de mo-kratijata i rezultat na ednakvite {ansi za site. Demokratijata sama po sebe e pluralisti~ka. No, demokrati-jata ne e rabota koja se podrazbira sama po sebe. Taa ne e garantirana. Za nea gra|anite se izboruvaat, ja gradat, ja neguvaat. Demokratijata e proces, natprevar, tolerancija, mnoèstvo, pluralizam. No, toj pat ne e pravoliniski.

Modernizmot vo Iran vo 1979 go dina be{e sopren. Vo Alìr


Kratka (i)storija za makedonskiot pluralizam: Blogot gi pobedi polit-komesarite

1992 godina ekstremizmot nad-vladea nad demokratijata i se dobi srednoro~na destabilizacija. Vo Rusija vo 90-tite „demokratijata# prvi~no donese osiroma{uvawe, anarhija i oligarhija, a sega imame „demokratski# apsolutizam. Samiot ~in na izbori ne zna~i deka taa dràva e demokratska. Nitu, pak, pove}epartizmot samiot po sebe zna~i pluralizam. Sepak, nema demokratija bez izbori. I nema plu-ralizam bez pove}epartizam.

Demokratskoto vladeewe denes e nezamislivo bez postoeweto na politi~kite partii. Iako ne se edin stvenite, politi~kite partii se dvigatel na ideite i promotor na vrednostite, koi sami po sebe ne moàt da se realiziraat izo-lirano.

Spored izve{tajot na londonski Ekonomist (http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf), samo 28 zemji so 16 otsto od svetskata populacija ìveat vo polna demokratija. 38 otsto od svet skata populacija ìvee vo de-mokratii so nedostatoci, 10 otsto vo hibridni reìmi, a 38 otsto vo avtoritarni reìmi. Zna~i, okolu po lovina od planetata, t.e. 3 mili-jardi ̀ iteli ̀ iveat vo avtoritarni i hibridni reìmi.

Dali ve}e si go postavivte pra-{aweto: koj i kako vladee so tie lu|e? Kako ̀ iveat tie lu|e? Avtori-tarnosta i neslobodata sè u{te se prisutni na premnogu mesta. Za sre-}a, nie ve}e ne sme tamu. Bevme tamu pred 20 godini, no ne pove}e. Imame u{te mnogu da rabotime, osobeno vo ekonomijata, no tamu ve}e nema da se vra}ame. Demokratijata i plura-lizmot baraat pogolema odgovornost

i li~en anga`man na poedinecot. Aktivna participacija. Toa nosi i pogolema neizvesnost i gr~. No, i po-ve}e mo`nosti i pove}e natpre var. Dokolku dràvata go pravi sekoj iz-bor za poedinecot, toga{ atrofira negovata samoinicijativa.

U{te ne{to – okolu kolektivno-to nosewe odluki. Vo demokratijata i pluralizmot krupnite odluki se donesuvaat na izbori ili refe ren-dum. Ponekoga{ i na sud. Da, onoj koj ja ima odgovornosta sekoga{ treba da vodi smetka za pravata na site. No, odlukite i zakonite se obvrzuva~ki za site. Toa e kultura na zakonitosta. Demokratijata i plu-ralizmot ne zna~at deka toj koj ne se soglasuva so nekoj zakon ili odluka, ne e obvrzan da gi po~ituva. Op{tata soglasnost naj~esto ne e vozmo`na, a odlukite mora da se nosat. Da, sekoja grupa moè da se bori za kakvi bilo promeni i kauza koi gi smeta za pravedni i ispravni, no odlukata donesena na izbori, referendum ili sud e toa {to treba da se po~ituva. Sekoja promena za tie koi {to ja pro-moviraat e pravedna, no taa stanuva del od ureduvaweto duri koga }e se prifati preku demokratska proce-dura. No, op{testvoto taa promena niz ista takva procedura moè i da ne ja prifati, a promotorite treba da go prifatat toa. Moàt da se obi-dat povtorno po demokratski pat, no zakonot i ponatamu vaì za site.

I za kraj, mislam deka makedon-skiot pluralizam napreduva dobro. Premnogu e baven, no se dviì vo vistinska nasoka. Imame problemi i ne sme Norve{ka, no odime napred. Vo parlamentot se zastapeni 20-ina politi~ki partii, okolu edna tre-tina od na{ite pratenici se èni,


Vladimir \or~ev

Abstract

While Europe was moving forward and developed, we were organizing baton carrying through the country and mass youth festivities to celebrate the president’s birthday. Occasionally, there were shortages of petrol and long queues at petrol stations.

Pluralism is the result of democracy. Democracy is in and of itself pluralist. However, democracy is not something that should be taken for granted. It cannot be guaranteed. Citizens fi ght for it, they build and nurture it.

mediumskot prostor dopolnitelno se pluralizira{e so otvorawe novi nacionalni televizii, ekonomijata raste so okolu 5 otsto, sekoja godina se otvoraat nekolku iljadi firmi i nevladini organzacii.

Dinamizmot ja pobeduva stati~-nosta, konkurencijata gi pobedi mo-nopolite, demokratijata nadvladea nad totalitarizmot. Prodol`uvame ponatamu.


Vistinskiot politi~ki dijalog – {ansa za stabilna demokratija

Zoran Zaev

Na po~etokot od mojot prilog kon debatata za politi~kiot pluralizam i politi~kiot dijalog vo Makedonija bi sakal da go iskaàm svoeto za-do volstvo i blagodarnost kon re-dakcijata na spisanieto "Po liti~ka misla# i Fondacijata "Kon rad Aden-auer# za izborot na temata i po-kanata da u~estvuvam so svoe raz-misluvawe.

Politi~kiot pluralizam e edna od osnovnite vrednosti bez koi ne mo-è da se zamisli funkcioniraweto na sovremenata pretstavni~ka de-mo kratija. Koga pred 17 godini se konstituira{e nezavisna Republi ka Ma kedonija verojatno ne postoe{e nitu eden relevanten subjekt koj se protive{e na{ata tatkovina da bi-de organizirana kako demokratska dràva kade {to politi~kiot sis-tem funkcionira vrz osnova na prin cipite na sovremenata pret-stavni~ka demokratija. Za toa be{e nuèn politi~kiot pluralizam, od nosno mo`nosta za postoewe na pove}e politi~ki partii koi so svoite programi i politiki }e se natprevaruvaat da ja osvojat do verba-ta na glasa~ite. Osobeno sa kam da ja naglasam va`nosta na po liti~kite partii koi razli~no od svoite celi zastapuvaat oddelni ce lni grupi, a se trudat da ja osvojat doverbata na {to e mo`no pogolem broj glasa~i.

I pokraj vakvite uslovno kaàno maksimalisti~ki celi na sekoja

politi~ka partija (da ja osvoi do-ver bata na {to e mo`no pove}e gla sa~i), sepak, sekoja demokratska politi~ka partija vo pluralisti~ko op{testvo treba da smeta deka i vo vreme na najdobar rezultat na iz bori i vo vreme na najgolema poddr{ka, ako se sudi spored ispi-tuvawata na javnoto mislewe, gi zastapuva interesite na samo eden del od gra|anite. Toj del, so ogled na na{eto ne taka kuso iskustvo so pretstavni~kata demokratija, ni -koga{ ne bil pogolem od okolu 30% od vkupnoto glasa~ko telo vo vre me na najgolema poddr{ka bilo za SDSM ili za VMRO-DPMNE.

Zemaj}i ja predvid ovaa situaci ja, os tanuva okolu 70% od glasa~koto te lo koe ili svojata poddr{ka im ja dava na partiite koi ja zastapuvaat najgolemata malcinska zaednica (zaednica koja ne e vo mnozinstvo), a toa e albanskata (naj~esto okolu 17-18% od vkupnoto glasa~ko telo) ili poddrùvaat nekoja druga pomala partija (okolu 5-6%). Najgolemiot del od glasa~ite (osven neposredno pred izborite koga brojot se namaluva, naj~esto nad 40%) izjavuvaat deka ne poddrùvaat nitu edna politi~ka par tija ili voop{to ne gi interesira politikata.

Ovie podatoci se osobeno va`ni za vistinskoto funkcionirawe na demokratijata. I pokraj oblicite na neposredno demokratsko iz jas-

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Zoran Zaev

nuvawe (najvaèn me|u niv e se-kako referendumot) jasno e de ka sovremenata pretstavni~ka de mo-kra tija se odviva preku dejnosta na politi~kite partii. Toa zna~i deka preku politi~kite partii se artikulira politi~kata volja na mnozinstvoto od gra|anite (ili ba rem na mnozinstvoto od tie {to se izjasnuvaat deka gi interesira politikata). Taka e sekade vo raz-vi enite demokratii, taka treba da bide i kaj nas.

Do 2006 godina, i pokraj site propusti vo demokratskiot razvoj, vo Makedonija se razvi kultura na demokratsko komunicirawe me|u politi~kite partii i politi~arite. Osobeno dolgo, me|utoa sigurno, sozreva{e svesta kaj sekoja vlast deka opozicijata ima osobeno mes-to vo dijalogot. Politi~kiot di-ja log sekoga{ zna~e{e dijalog za naj va`nite pra{awa za dràvata, mnogu ~esto (osobeno vo periodot 2002–2006) i koga glasovite na opo-zicijata (tehni~ki gledano) ne bea nu`ni za da bide donesena nekakva odluka. Toga{nata vlada na SDSM, LDP i DUI so ednakvo uvaùvawe komunicira{e i so VMRO-NP (ko-ja, barem vo parlamentot, be{e naj golema opoziciona partija) i so VMRO-DPMNE koja i pokraj toa {to uìva{e pogolema poddr{ka me|u gra|anite od NP, be{e pomala par lamentarna grupa. Golem broj po li ti~ki odluki bea doneseni so konsenzus i koga toj, tehni~ki, ne be{e nuèn. Da se potsetime samo na procesot na evrointegraciite. Ce lokupniot proces, po~nuvaj}i od podnesuvaweto na aplikacijata za polnopravno ~lenstvo, preku uso-glasuvaweto na zakonodavstvoto,

pa s¢ do strate{koto planirawe na idnite ~ekori, be{e plod na do govor i zaemna sorabotka vo in teres na dràvata i gra|anite. Fakt e deka iako toga{noto vla de ja~ko mnozin-stvo odgovornosta za eventualniot neuspeh ja sno se {e celosno samo, samo se ograni ~uva{e svesno za interesite na opozicijata.

Taa odluka ne be{e slu~ajna. Ne moàm da kaàm deka SDSM mnogu pove}e gi saka{e svoite protivnici otkolku tie denes nego (ako voop{to postoi qubov vo politikata). Taa odluka be{e rezultat na zreeweto na de mo kratskata svest i politi~-ka ta kultura. SDSM i toga{ i sega e svesen deka i so najdobar rezultat ja dobiva poddr{kata na samo eden del od gra|anite i toa naj~esto na mal cinstvoto od vkupnoto izbira~-ko te lo. Istoto treba{e da vaì i za na{ite politi~ki protivnici od VMRO-DPMNE.

Sepak, posle izborite vo 2006 go-dina, bi rekol, ~udni i retrograd ni pro cesi zapo~naa vo komunikacijata me|u partiite. I pokraj toa {to be{e svesen deka politi~kiot dijalog vo Makedonija nema samo ideolo{ka tuku i etni~ka dimenzija, toga{niot mandatar Nikola Gruevski re{i da ja ignorira voljata na sogra|anite Albanci i ja vklu~i pomalata DPA vo Vladata. Vladata, od po~etokot na mandatot vo avgust 2006 pa s¢ do predvremenite izbori na 1 ju-ni 2008 postojano stimulira{e tenzii i vnatrealbanska presmetka, pottiknuvaj}i gi frustraciite kaj mnozinstvoto Albanci. Kaj Make-doncite, pak, razviva{e ~uvstvo na za dovolstvo od haosot vo albanski ot po li ti~ki spektar. Rezultatot za Vladata be{e povolen (glasa~ite


Vistinskiot politi~ki dijalog – {ansa za stabilna demokratija

Ma kedonci vo pogolem broj poveru-vaa na noviot kvazipatriotizam i ja dadoa svojata poddr{ka na 1 juni), a za dràvata katastrofalen. Ubis-tvo, povredeni, naru{en izboren proces, kra`ba na glasovi, seto toa be{e rezultat na takvata politika. Ottamu, ne treba da za~uduvaat na ru{eniot me|unaroden ugled i unazadenata demokratija. Na krajot, no viot patriotizam splasna vo de lot na Albancite i g. Gruevski ja izbra DUI za svoj koalicionen partner vo novata vlada, otkako ovaa par-tija po vtor pat postigna podobar rezultat od DPA. Makedonija go plati danokot na neodgovornata politika so negativen izve{taj od Evropskata komisija (vo noemvri 2008) i blokirani evrointegrativni procesi.

Mnogu pointeresen za mojov pri-log e odnosot na vladeja~koto mno-zinstvo kon SDSM, koja e najgolema opoziciona partija. Od za nas ne-poz nati pri~ini, vlasta zapo~na da {iri idei deka SDSM ne e re le vantna i deka demokratijata }e se razviva vo t.n. direkten di ja log so narodot. Neposrednosta vo komunikacijata so gra|anite e mnogu pozitivna, osven ako ne stanuva zbor za zaobikoluvawe na institucionalnata demokratija, od-nosno, institucionalnite garancii za demokratijata i demokratijata ne se pretvora vo svojata farsa – t.n. plebiscitarna demokratija.

Plebiscitarnata demokratija (koja e vsu{nost kvazidemokratija) e najlo{iot vid izopa~uvawe na demokratijata i poigruvawe so nej-zinata smisla. Preku t.n. ple bisci-tarna, direktna poddr{ka od narodot, se ru{i ugledot na instituciite, se promovira majorizacijata, odnosno

nepo~ituvawe na malcinstvoto i, kone~no, nerazumno se veli~aat ulogata na liderot i negovata vol ja. Toa ne e nepoznat primer vo is to-rijata. Mnogu takvi eksperimenti zavr{ile tragi~no. Istoriskoto is-kustvo od 20 vek e prepolno so takvi primeri. Duri i koga postoi najdobra namera, ~esto pati ovie politiki vodat kon politi~kiot pekol. Sekoja od dràvite koi pominale niz fa {isti~koto i komunisti~koto iskustvo (koi, da ne zaboravime, ja imaa vo po~etokot poddr{kata na mnozinstvoto), na krajot se vra -tija kon institucionalnata pret-stavni~ka demokratija, za{titata na politi~kata opozicija i tole rancijata na razli~nostite. Samo, ova vra -}awe be{e otkako ovie zem ji platija ogromna cena: vo ~ove~ki ìvoti, uni{tena ekonomija, izolacija i uni{tena idnina za mnogu generacii. Gazimestanskiot kompleks (kako bi go narekol so vre meniot populizam) e siguren pat kon samouni{tuvaweto.

Vladeja~kata VMRO-DPMNE i osobeno nejziniot lider moraat da nau~at deka dijalogot so politi~kite pro tivnici ne e aritmetika za gla-sovi vo Sobranieto. Ne e nitu nu`no zlo onaka kako {to ne se nu`no zlo stotici iljadi gra|ani koi svojot glas £ go dadoa na opozicijata. Toa e su{tinata na sovremenata de mokratija. Kompromisot e pat kon pobaven, no siguren progres. Toa e garancija za stabilnost i raz voj na tolku posakuvanoto ~uv-stvo na patrotizam i pripadnost i lojalnost kon dràvata. Koga opozicijata kritikuva toa ne e an-tidràvno, toa e glasot na drugite gra |ani – onie koi ne ja poddrùvaat vladata, a ja sakaat dràvata. Koga


Zoran Zaev

vladeja~koto mnozinstvo po~nuva svoite interesi da gi identifikuva so nacionalnite, toga{ po~nuva i zalezot na demokratijata.

Zatoa smetam deka politi~kiot pluralizam ima efekt samo ako po liti~kite partii se priznavaat me |u sebe za relevantni sogo vor -ni ci. Toa ne e negacija na di rek t -nata demokra ti ja, vpro~em i legi-ti mitetot na partiite izvira od

direktnoto izjasnuvawe na gra|anite na izbori. Napredokot e mo`en pre ku kompromisot. Na toj na~in Vladata }e ja dobie po sa kuvanata lojalna opozicija, a opozicijata prostor za artikulacija na ideite. S¢ sprotivno na ova, go pretvora politi~kiot pluralizam vo fraza, mrtvo slovo na hartija, odnosno, po-liti~ka iluzija.

AbstractThe author analyzes the development of the political pluralism in Macedonia

through the processes of development of the political dialogue and political culture. The author underlines that until 2006 (especially in the period 2002-2006) the main political parties understood the importance of the political opposition and the dialogue between the government and the opposition when defi ning the policies of national interest. He stresses that no political party until 2008, even in periods of greatest victories in the election, won more than approximately 30 % of the votes of the entire electoral body. This fact shows that even winners only partially represent the national interest.

The author expresses his disagreement with the political practice of the ruling party (VMRO-DPMNE and the Prime Minister) of abandoning institutional democracy, marginalizing the opposition and promoting the so-called direct dialogue with the people, another phrase for quasi-democracy based on plebiscite. He refers to the fl awed examples in Europe in the early 20th century and Serbia in the 1990s and stresses that these practices can lead to the suppression of the minority and development of dictatorship.

The author concludes that the ruling majority cannot present its own interest as national interest and must recognize the relevance of the opposition. This is the true meaning of political pluralism. Otherwise, political pluralism will become a phrase and political illusion.


Ermira Mehmeti

Vrednostite na politi~kiot pluralizam vo pluralnite op{testva

"Vo demokratskite dràvi nau-kata na zdruùvaweto e majka na naukata; celokupniot natamo{en progres zavisi od progresot {to (zdruùvaweto) go postignalo.#1 Va ka Aleksis de Tokvil go opi{uva zna~eweto {to asocijaciite, koi se razlikuvaat od vlasta i dr ̀ a-vata, go imaat vo amerikanskoto op{testvo vo prvi~nata faza od nejziniot razvitok. Voodu{even od toa kako Amerikancite osnovaat asocijacii prakti~no za sekakva cel, od zabava do osnovawe bolnici i u~ili{ta,2 De Tokvil zaklu~uva: "Dokolku maìte sakaat da osta-nat civilizirani, ili da stanat takvi, umetnosta na zdruùvaweto mora da raste i da se podobruva vo proporcionalen soodnos so zgole-muvaweto na ednakvosta#.3 Denes, so pravo se smeta deka fascinira-nosta na De Tokvil so kulturata na zdruùvawe so koja se sre}ava vo tekot na negovoto patuvawe vo Amerika vo prvata polovina od XIX vek, ja dava osnovata za ide-jata na pluralizmot kako politi~ka misla od po~etokot na XX vek, koja silno go istaknuva zna~eweto na ~ovekovoto zdruùvawe vo asoci-

1 De Tocqueville, Alexis, „Democracy in America“, The Complete and Unabridged Volumes I and II, Bantam Classics, New York, 2002, str. 632.

2 Vo De Tocqueville, Alexis, „Democracy in America“, The Com-plete and Unabridged Volumes I and II, Bantam Classics, New York, 2002, str. 628.

3 De Tocqueville, Alexis, „Democracy in America“, The Complete and Unabridged Volumes I and II, Bantam Classics, New, York, 2002, str. 632.

jacii razli~ni od dràvata.4 Kako model na demokratija vo moder-nite op{testva, pluralizmot se smeta kako odgovor na potrebata od limitirawe na silata na vlasta i dràvata. Po kolapsot na komuniz-mot vo Centralna i Isto~na Evropa, voveduvaweto na demokratskiot pluralizam, vgraden kako osnoven princip vo novite ustavi na ovie dràvi, se postavi kako odgovor na opasnosta od apsolutisti~ka vlast. Denes, so pravo moè da zaklu~ime deka pluralizmot go predizvika i go porazi totalitarizmot.

Pluralisti~kata misla akcentot go stava vo potrebata od postoewe na avtonomni asocijacii na gra|ani, kako pozitivna pridobivka za op-{tes tvoto, na dekoncentracija na vlasta, kako za{titen mehanizam od voveduvawe apsolutna kontrola na dràvata vrz op{testvoto, kako i na pogolem pristap na samite gra|ani do instituciite, kako mehanizmi za zacvrstuvawe na demokratijata, no i za~uvuvawe na ona {to denes vo politi~kata teorija e nare~eno proverka i balans (Checks and Ba-lances) nad vlasta. Vo svojata su{-tina, idejata na pluralizmot ja nosi zalo`bata za pogolema sloboda na ~ovekot i gra|aninot. Ottuka, bi moèlo da se tvrdi deka pluraliz-mot, vsu{nost, e mehanizam na kon-

4 „The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World“, edited by Joel Krieger, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1993, str. 704.

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Ermira Mehmeti

trola na demokratskite institu-cii koj n¢ potsetuva deka i samata demokratija ima potreba od postoja-no i kontinuirano korigirawe, una-preduvawe i usovr{uvawe, bidej}i i demokratskite institucii ne bi bile dovolno demokratski dokolku i za niv ne bi postoela alternativa. Od svojata pojava, idejata na plu-ralnata demokratija predizvikuva debata me|u britanskite i amerikan-skite teoreti~ari. Spored prvite, idejata na pluralizmot treba da ja ograni~i silata na vlasta, dodeka vtorite pove}e ja smetaat kako sis-tem na indirektna demokratija koja ja karakterizira konkurencijata na interesnite grupi i potrebata od balans na silite. I dvete {koli, me|utoa, se soglasni deka pluraliz-mot nudi pove}e mo`nosti i ottuka, pove}e izbor, a postoeweto izbor e klu~ na demokratijata.

Vo pluralni op{testva politi~-kiot pluralizam dobiva poinakva forma: vo etni~ki organizirani dràvi, pluralizmot ima i etni~ki predznak. Ovoj tekst gi istraùva tokmu vrednostite na pluralizmot vo pluralnite op{testva vo koi kon-solidiraweto na demokratijata, po-radi nejzinata specifi~na priroda, pretstavuva pokompleksen proces. Liny i Stepan se sosema vo pravo koga tvrdat deka "vo op{testvata koi te`neat kon demokratija, vnat-re{nata kriza e isprepletena so razlikite okolu pra{aweto koj tre ba da bide ~len na politi~kata za ednica vo dràvata#.5 Ottuka, legitimno e da se tvrdi deka po padot na komunizmot, monokultur-

5 Linz, J. and Stepan, A., „Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation“, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, str. 16.

nite dràvi mnogu polesno go biraa noviot politi~ki sistem, trgnuvaj}i od principot deka edniot etnitet ja so~inuva nacijata. Od druga stra-na, tranzicijata vo pluralni te op -{testva gi otfrli kako nelegitim-ni takvite principi i ja nametna potrebata od iznao|awe nov model.6 Analiziraj}i gi predizvicite na funkcioniraweto na pluralen po-liti~ki sistem vo edno pluralno i fragmentirano op{testvo, ovoj prilog pretstavuva obid da se do-kaè deka najdobriot odgovor za funkcionalnosta na pluralnite op{testva, vsu{nost, e pluraliz-mot, negovata logika, negovata naj-os novna ideja. Raznovidnosta na idei, mislewa, gledi{ta i nivnoto kontinuirano protivstavuvawe go vodi op{testvoto napred, toa pret-stavuva kanal preku koj gra|anite ~uvstvuvaat deka op{testvoto im ovozmoùva da gi artikuliraat i organiziraat nivnite idei i da gi realiziraat nivnite potrebi, pri-toa ne zagrozuvaj}i ja celinata (vo kontekst na debatata vo pluralnite op{testva taa celina e tokmu integ-ritetot na dràvata).

Vo mladite (postkomunisti~ki) op {testva, moè da se kaè deka pluralizmot pretstavuva vrednost koja s¢ u{te e vo sozdavawe. Toa verojatno i ne e tolku stra{no do-kol ku se trgne od pretpostavkata deka vo demokratija gradeweto demokratski institucii nikoga{ ne se smeta za zavr{en, zaokruèn pro-ces. Naprotiv, toa e proces koj pos-tojano evoluira i se prilagoduva na potrebite na op{testvoto koe pos-

6 Za podetalna analiza na ovoj proces vidi vo Töpperwien, Nicole, „Nation-State and Normative Diversity“, Institut du Fed-eralisme, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2001.



tojano se menuva. Vo taa smisla Dal, eden od najgolemite poddrùva~i na pluralnata demokratija, tvrdi deka vo pretstavni~kite demokratii denes, vsu{nost, postoi eden poina-kov sistem nare~en poliarhija: toa e "istoriski ishod na naporite da se demokratiziraat i liberalizi-raat politi~kite institucii na nacionalnite dràvi...#.7 Spored toa, moè da se konstatira deka vo mladite demokratii, sozdavaweto demokratski i ottuka i pluralni institucii ne e mal predizvik. Naprotiv, politi~kata teorija od krajot na 20 vek pokaùva deka kon-solidiraweto na demokratijata vo Isto~na i Centralna Evropa, sepak, se karakterizira so niza nedostato-ci koi gi prosleduvaat instituciite i po zapo~nuvaweto na procesot na evropeizacija: teoreti~arite posto-jano predupreduvaat na postoeweto politizirana administracija, ne-efikasno sudstvo, korupcija, ne-vla dini organizacii kontrolirani od vlasta, nedostig na nezavisni mediumi i sli~no.

Republika Makedonija e tipi~na fragmentirana dràva vo koja et-ni~kata pripadnost pretstavuva osnovna linija na podelba, odnosno organizacija na op{testvoto. Od taa pri~ina, sosema e legitimno da se tvrdi deka i prirodata na pluralisti~kata ideja go nosi et -ni~kiot predznak. Ottuka, se po-sta vuva dilemata: dali na{iot plu ralizam e etni~ki pluralizam? Ka ko takov, dali toj bi trebalo da bide prednost ili nedostatok na na{eto op{testvo? Kako }e se soo~ime so predizvikot na frag-

7 Dahl, Robert A. „Democracy and Its Critics“, Yale University Press, New Heaven and London, 1989, str. 218.

mentacijata? Dali }e uspeeme da ja menaxirame istata i dali pluraliz-mot moè da bide odgovor na na{ite napori da ja nadmineme etni~kata podelenost? Spored Klimovski, "[pluralisti~kata] demokratijata se opredeluva preku postoewe i mo`nosta za participacija na site interesni grupi vo op{testvoto vo sferata na politikata#.8 Pona-tamu, toj tvrdi deka "vo temelite na ova sfa}awe e i sfa}aweto za ograni~uvawe na mo}ta na mnozin-stvoto so pravoto na malcinstvoto, odnosno baraweto za disperzija na dràvnata vlast na pove}e centri na odlu~uvawe#.9 I Dal istaknuva deka politi~kiot pluralizam vo demokratija se karakterizira so pove}e centri na mo} od koi nitu eden ne moè da bide suveren.10

Po ustavnite promeni od 2001 godina, Republika Makedonija spa|a vo redot dràvi vo koi politi~kite eliti postojano se zalagaat za me-naxirawe so fragmentiranosta na op{testvoto, na toj na~in izbegnu-vaj}i ja opasnosta od eventualna dezintegracija na zemjata. Vovedu-vaweto na supstancijalna decen-tralizacija koja prenesuva golemi i zna~itelni nadle`nosti od cen-tralnata vo lokalnata vlast, ima za cel da obezbedi u~estvo na nemno-zinskite zaednici vo donesuvaweto odluki, na toj na~in zgolemuvaj}i go nivnoto vlijanie vrz politi~kiot proces vo dràvata voop{to. Ot-tuka, moè da se konstatira deka za politi~kata i op{testvenata realnost na na{ata dràva, tokmu

8 Klimovski, Savo, "Ustaven i politi~ki sistem#, Pros-vetno delo, Skopje, 1998, str. 590.

9 Isto, str. 590.

10 Dahl, Robert A., „Pluralist Democracy in the United States“, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1967, str. 24.


Ermira Mehmeti

decentralizacijata e mehanizmot preku koj }e se postigne pogolema identifikacija na zaednicite so instituciite, istovremeno imaj}i predvid deka tie institucii ne se centralnata vlast. Na toj na~in, obezbedena e za{tita od apsolutna-ta vlast, no i u~estvo na nemnozin-skite zaednici vo praktikuvaweto na vlasta. Ovoj balans, potoa, e od isklu~itelno zna~ewe dokolku se ima predvid faktot {to vode~kite pozicii vo dràvata – Pretse-datel, Pretsedatel na Sobranie, Premier i klu~nite ministerstva, ostanuvaat i ponatamu rezervirani za pretstavnicite na dominantnata etni~ka zaednica, bez razlika {to ne postoi normativna odredba koja obvrzuva na takva institucionalna praktika. Gledano od toj aspekt, silnata decentralizacija moè da se smeta kako pluralisti~ki mehanizam koj, sepak, }e postigne ramnoteà vo soodnosite, bila taa i od simboli~no zna~ewe.

Vsu{nost, decentralizacijata, vo kontekst na op{testvenoto i politi~ko organizirawe vo Repub-lika Makedonija, pretstavuva eden vid sredno re{enie: taa ja unapredu-va politi~kata i ekonomskata sila na op{tinite do toj stepen {to, od edna strana, ne ja deli, no, od druga strana, nitu ja federalizira dràvata. Vo taa smisla, moè da se zaklu~i deka na{iot model na decentralizacija, vo kontekst na obezbeduvawe demokratski plu-ralizam, pretstavuva kompromis na mnozinstvoto so malcinstvo to vo izborot me|u logikata na drà-vata kako celina, i podelbata na vlasta vo ramkite na dràvata. Osven etni~ki pluralizam, na{eto

op{testvo go karakteriziraat i kulturen pluralizam, i jazi~en pluralizam, no i religiozen plu-ralizam. Vospostavenite mehanizmi koi se zagarantirani so Ustavot, a ~ija {to cel e ohrabruvawe na u~es-tvoto na nemnozinskite grupi vo javniot ìvot – vo instituciite, vo politi~kiot natprevar preku izbori i sli~no, garantiraat deka na{ata dràva ostanuva pluralna, no ne podelena. Tokmu tuka e i ume{nosta na na{iot specifi~en demokratski pluralizam: na{ata raznovidnost n¢ pravi pokompleksni, no tokmu za~uvuvaweto na taa raznovidnost preku institucionalni, legitimni mehanizmi, ja ~uva celinata, integ-ritetot na dràvata. So drugi zbo-rovi, decentralizacijata na siste-mot go ohrabruva policentrizmot, no vo nitu eden slu~aj ne go zagrozuva integritetot na dràvata.

Ako se navratime na definici-ite i voop{to na teoriite za zdru-ùvaweto i gi prilagodime kon na-{ata pluralisti~ka realnost, to ga{ mo ̀ e da zaklu~ime deka edna od klu~nite vrednosti na pluralizmot vo pluralnite op{testva e prepoz-navaweto na raznolikosta (diversity) i ovozmoùvaweto taa raznolikost da bide otslikana preku organi-ziraweto i funkcioniraweto na dràvata. Takvoto prepoznavawe i prifa}awe na raznolikosta }e n¢ do vede do ednakvosta na lu|eto za kakva {to se zalaga De Tokvil. Plu-ralizmot se pokaà kako su{tes tven ele ment za menaxirawe na razliki-te vo etni~ki podelenite op{testva. Vo veduvaweto na pluralizmot i prepoznavaweto na razlikite preku instituciite odgovorija na krizata na legitimitet vo koja bea za-



fateni dràvite od porane{niot komunisti~ki blok. U{te pozna~aen e verojatno faktot {to pluralizmot ne se pokaà edinstveno kako meha-nizam so koj mnozinstvoto go povi-kuva malcinstvoto da participira, tuku mnogu pove}e kako mehanizam

preku koj malcinstvoto prifati da bide vklu~eno vo op{testvoto. Toj kompromis okolu principite i uslovite za celosna inkluzivnost, se ~ini, e klu~en preduslov za unap-reduvaweto na demokratijata vo pluralnite dràvi.

Abstract

As a model for democracy in modern societies, pluralism is expected to answer the need to limit the power of authority and the state. After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the introduction of democratic pluralism, embodied as a basic principle in the new constitutions of these states, was put forward as the answer to absolute power. Today, we can rightly conclude that pluralism challenged and defeated totalitarianism. Pluralism, in essence, is a mechanism of control of democratic institutions which reminds us that democracy itself has a need to be permanently and continually corrected, advanced and perfected, because even democratic institutions would not be that democratic if alternatives to them did not exist. In that sense, analysing the challenges of the functioning of a plural political system in a plural and fragmented society, this article represents an attempt to show that the best answer to the functioning of plural societies is essentially pluralism, its logic, and its basic ideas.


Povtoruvaweto na gre{kite i bavnoto sfa}awe na lekciite od strana na politi~kite partii, mnogu-mina se podgotveni da gi prepi{at na na{ata mlada demokratija. Mis-lam deka se neosnovani opravduva-wata od tipot, s¢ u{te sme malo-letni, imame samo 17 godini i gi preìvuvame detskite bolesti na politi~kiot pluralizam.

Sloènite pra{awa so koi vo ovoj stadium od svojot razvoj e so-o~eno makedonskoto op{testvo, bez somnenie baraat konsolida cija na ma kedonskata politika kako predus-lov za izveduvawe na op{testvenite pro meni. Tie ne moàt poinaku da se na pravat osven da bidat zasnovani i izvedeni po demokratski pat.

Demokratijata ne zna~i samo izbori i demokratsko ureduvawe na formalnite institucii. Taa, me|u drugoto, podrazbira i otvoren, javen dijalog za razni pra{awa ne samo me|u politi~kite partii tu ku i so zainteresiranite grupi na civilniot sektor, socijalnite partne ri i lokalnata samouprava. Va`ni elementi na demokratijata se i javnost vo rabotata i odgovor-nost na partiskite i dràvni funk-cioneri, sloboda na javnoto izrazu-vawe i pluralnost na mediumite.

Vremeto vo koe ìveeme i celta da staneme ramnopraven del na me|unarodnata zaednica, kako i potrebata od mnogu podinami~en

Partnerstvo za razvoj

Tito Petkovski

razvoj, baraat me|usebno usogla-suvawe i relativno visok stepen na soglasnost me|u u~esnicite vo op{testveniot ìvot na site nivoa. Na toj na~in }e se zgolemi op{testvenata odgovornost za efek -tivniot razvoj i }e nadvladeat javnite nad li~nite interesi i koristi. Vo toj proces, politi~kite partii imaat uloga na moderator na op{testveniot dijalog i so infor-macii i argumenti }e bidat vo sos-tojba da izgradat svest za potrebata od pogolema dinamika na reformite na makedonskoto op{testvo.

Moèbi skromnata tradicija (17 godini) vo praktikuvaweto na pove}epartiskata demokratija i, voop{to, na politi~kiot plurali-zam i niskoto nivo na politi~ka kultura se osnovnite pri~ini za dosega{niot neuspeh na dijalogot kako forma na komunikacija me|u politi~kite partii od vlasta i od opozicijata. Tokmu toa ja nametnuva potrebata od eden poinakov pristap vo nivniot me|useben odnos, pred s¢ poradi odgovornosta {to ja imaat za idninata na zemjata. Vo ovoj moment mislam deka e potreben mehanizam {to }e gi stavi vo ramnopravna polo`ba politi~kite partii i }e im go zgolemi ~uvstvoto na pripadnost kon dràvata i griàta za nejzinata idnina. ]e gi zgolemi mobilnosta na lu|eto i nivnata sposobnost da odgo-varaat na predizvikot na vremeto.

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Vo edna prigoda toa go narekov partnerstvo za razvoj. Potpisnici na takvoto partnerstvo bi bile po liti~kite partii, socijalnite partneri i edinicite na lokalnata samouprava. Za da dejstvuvaat or-ganizirano partnerite treba da vostanovat partnerski sovet, koj }e deluva kako sovetodavno telo. Takvoto partnerstvo moè da us-pee samo dokolku se doìvuva kako izraz na potreba i na politi~ka mo}, a ne na slabost. Promotor na partnerstvoto dobro bi bilo da e samata vlada na Republika Make-donija. Dokolku se opredeli za vakva forma na komunikacija me|u politi~kite partneri, Vladata }e treba da ja promeni i postapkata za podgotvuvawe i predlagawe za-konski proekti i drugi akti so koi se ureduvaat odnosite me|u site op{testveni strukturi, osobeno onie od sferata na me|uetni~kite odnosi. U{te od samiot po~etok na vladinata procedura, na site partneri treba da im se dostavi zakonskiot koncept, ovozmoùvaj}i, na toj na~in, ednovremeno vo nego-voto oblikuvawe ramnopravno da se vklu~at i socijalnite partneri, in-stitucii i nevladini organizacii, a za oddelni pra{awa i edinicite na lokalnata samouprava.

Moèbi na toj na~in }e ja nadmi-neme sostojbata vo koja se nao|ame. Stanavme zemja vo koja mnogu te{ko se nosat zaedni~ki odluki, a u{te pote{ko se sproveduvaat vo delovi. Dominantni kategorii i kaj partiite i kaj politi~arite se vlasta i mo}ta kako celi sami za sebe, a ne kako sredstvo za op{testven progres. A ìvotot n¢ u~i deka èlbata za mo} i vlast nema koreni vo

si lata, tuku vo slabosta. Tokmu ne kreativnata i neproduktivna mo} i vlast vo na{i uslovi ja dis-kreditiraat politikata. Toa e i vistinskata pri~ina za na{eto zaostanuvawe, a ne demokratijata so nejzinata spora procedura. Ne e poznato nekade vo svetot da us-pe ala demokratija bez kreativni inicijativi {to obedinuvaat i bez akcii. Za takvo ne{to neophodni se konstruktivni debati i me|usebna po~it na politi~kite konkurenti. Za àl, vo na{iot politi~ki ìvot s¢ u{te dominiraat siroma{tijata na duhot i prizemno nivo na polemiki polni so obvinuvawa kon site {to mislat poinaku od nas. Takviot pristap, od svoja strana, gi pravi ne~uvstvitelni politi~arite kon problemite na lu|eto i potrebata od mnogu podinami~ni reformi vo site sferi na ìvotot. Bez isklu~ok, site partii demonstriraat upornost vo sproveduvaweto na sopstvenite nameri. Faktite kako da ne gi inte-resiraat mnogu. Kako rezultat na toa imame i premnogu lo{i odluki i nesre}no izbrani alternativi. Za site niv, kako i za lo{ite po-stap ki sekoga{ imame zborovi na opravduvawe, bidej}i kako slobod ni lu |e smetame deka i na toa imame pravo vo imeto na demokratijata. Kako da ne sme svesni deka seto toa e porast na na{iot kolektiven um. Kolku samo ima vistina vo edna arapska mudrost koja veli: "Za onoj {to edna{ vladeel nad drugite, nepodnosliva e vlasta na drugite nad nego#.

A nam vo ovoj moment ni tre-ba tokmu sprotivnoto. Ni treba kolektivna svest za istoriskiot predizvik. Ni treba kreativen an-


Partnerstvo za razvoj

ga`man na site institucii na sis-temot. Delbite, netrpelivosta, frustraciite i netolerantnosta se krajno neproduktivni kategorii.

Abstract

Porazot definitivno }e bide na{ zaedni~ki, nezavisno koj vlo`il pove}e a koj pomalku vo nego.

The modest tradition in practicing multiparty democracy, as well as the low level of political ethics among the political fi gures are the basic causes for the failure of the political dialogue between the parties from the government and the opposition. Of course, we should not exclude the strong infl uence of the desire for power at any cost.

This situation has imposed the necessity of fi nding a different approach to building mutual relations, primarily due to the responsibility that they hold for the future of the country. A new mechanism is needed that will place the political parties on an equal level and enhance their sense of belonging primarily to the state, not just to the party.

We need to establish a certain level of partnership in this direction with precisely specifi ed responsibilities regarding mutual relations.


Imer Selmani

Toa {to praktikuvaweto na demokratijata go stava na piedes-tal, e akcentot na pluralizmot vo artikuliraweto na interesite na razli~nite grupi i op{testva, kako i insistiraweto na faktot deka redot i stabilnosta }e bea nevozmo`ni ako sekoja od tie grupi ima{e politi~ko vlijanie

Dvaesettiot vek pokaà kol ku ~uvstvitelni i skr{livi se op-{testvata i ~ove{tvoto, koga vlasta vrz lu|eto ja zemaat ideologiite. Toj pokaà i kolku golemi i dlaboki se predizvicite pred koi se nao|a ~ove{tvoto vo dvaesettiot vek, kako po sledica na novite tehnologii i ekonomskiot, politi~kiot i kul-turniot globalizam. Ideolo{kata arhitektura na dvaesettiot vek nesomneno ja karakterizira i libe-ralizmot, ~ii koreni datiraat pred 200 godini i e poznat kako prvobiten liberalizam, za razlika od socijal-niot i moderen, koj se pojavuva kako potreba za reforma vo socijalniot sektor i za intervencii vo ekonomi-jata, {to stana praktika vo krajot na minatiot vek. Elementite na libera-lizmot kako: INDIVIDUALIZMOT, koj verbata ja potpira na kulmi-nantnata va`nost na individuata; LI^NATA SLOBODA, koja prirodno

Politi~kiot pluralizam kako fundamentalna vrednost na liberalizmot – pluralizmot vo Makedonija

proizleguva od verbata vo individu-ata i ̀ elbata na sekoj ~ovek da mu se ovozmoì da postapuva na na~inot koj samiot go izbral; RAZUMOT, koj n¢ naso~uva kon racionalnata struktura na svetot kako proekcija na ~ovekoviot razum i analiti~koto istraùvawe za odobruvawe na nis-kite re{enija (odluki) vo interes na ~ove{tvoto; PROGRESOT, kako sposobnost na ~ove~koto su{testvo da gi usoglasi razlikite preku dijalog i debata, a ne preku vojna i krvoprolevawe; EDNAKVOSTA, {to podrazbira fundamentalna ednakvost deka site lu|e „se rodile ramnopravni#, sled stveno na ova „ednakvi pred zakonot#, politi~kata ram nopravnost (eden ~ovek – eden glas), na ednakvite pravila na ig-rata vrz na~eloto na meritokratija, koja kako sposobnost go smeta ta-lentot vo korelacija so neumor-nata rabota; TOLERANCIJATA, kako volja na lu|eto da im ovozmoàt na drugite da razmisluvaat, da mis lat i da postapuvaat vo soglas-nost so na~eloto na bogat stvoto na pluralisti~koto op{testvo. Zna~i, liberalite se ubedeni deka plu-ralizmot vo oblik na moralnoto, kulturnoto i politi~koto {arenilo, ini cira debati i intelektualno na preduvawe, taka {to gi osigu-

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ruva site ubeduvawa vo slobodniot pazar na ideite. Tolku pove}e {to, liberalite, vo ovoj kontekst, glavno veruvaat vo ekvilibrium, odnosno vo prirodnoto harmonizirawe na sprotivnite gledi{ta i interesi i tokmu vrz ova na~elo, liberalite gi otfrluvaat ideite za nere{livite kon flikti.

Poznatiot amerikanski ana-li ti~ar i politi~ki komentator, Fransis Fukujama, vo negovata kniga „Krajot na istorijata i posledniot ~ovek#, zaklu~uva deka istorijata zavr{uva so pobedata na LIBERAL-NATA DEMOKRATIJA, kako posled-na forma na ~ovekovoto vladeewe i deka ovaa pobeda e definitivna. Na eden na~in, ovaa pobeda na li-beralnata demokratija ja pokaà trajnosta na zapadnite gledi{ta na svetot. Slikata na svetot za li-beralnata demokratija podrazbira poseben model na zapadniot raz-vitok, osnovan, moè da se kaè, ekskluzivno vrz primerot na SAD, vo poddrùvaweto na vrednostite na liberalnata demokratija, kako univerzalno primenlivi. Edinstve-niot kontekst na ovoj model se smeta deka e faktot {to liberalnite demokratii ne bea i ne se vo sostojba da ja prepoznaat va`nosta na islam-skite i konfu~ijanskite politi~ki formi, koi, voobi~aeno, gi smetaa kako mali isklu~oci i neprinci-pielni otpori na demokratijata.

Glavnite atributi na liberal-nata demokratija, svetski priz-naena kako model, i pokraj nekoi kontradiktorni gledi{ta, se jasni, zatoa {to:

liberalnata demokratija e ne-– posredna forma na demokratsko-to u~es tvuvawe (zastapuvawe),

za {to politi~kite pozicii se do -stignuvaat preku uspehot na iz bori i se baziraat na formalnata politi~ka ednakvost;osnovata na liberalnata de mo -– kratija se NATPREVAROT i MO@-NOSTA na izborot. Ova se postig-nuva preku poli ti~ kiot plurali-zam, tolerancija ta kon {irokiot spektar na raz nite ubeduvawa, vli-janieto na razli~nite i sprotiv-nite op{testveni filozofii i sprotivstvuvawata na dvièwata i politi~kite partii;vo liberalnata demokratija jas-– no e postavena razlikata po me|u DR@AVATA i GRA\ANSKOTO OP[TESTVO. Ova se po stignuva so postoeweto na avtonomnite grupi na interesot i kapitalisti~koto organizirawe na pazarot i na trgovskiot ìvot.Pluralisti~kata ideja moè

da se sledi od prvite politi~ki filozofi na liberalizmot. Zna~i, patot na sistematiziraweto na plu ralizmot se identifikuva so vremeto koga se pravele analizi i sogleduvawa na transformacijata na blagata amerikanska konfedera-cija vo federalni dràvi na SAD. Problemot e fokusiran vo faktot deka nekontroliranato demokratsko vla deewe (so soodvetni mehanizmi) moè da promovira majorizacija, so isklu~uvawe na individualnite prava i, na krajna instanca, kon-fiskuvawe na imotot vo imeto na narodot.

Toa {to praktikuvaweto na de-mo kratijata go stava na piedesta-lot, e akcentot na pluralizmot vo artikuliraweto na interesite na razli~nite grupi i op{testva, kako i insistiraweto na faktot deka redot



i stabilnosta }e bea nevozmo`ni ako sekoja od tie grupi ima{e politi~ko vlijanie. Tokmu tuka proizleguva i potrebata i sistemot za podelba na vlasta, sistemot na dvodomen parlament i federalizam, koi ovoz moùvaat razli~ni celi vo pristapot na op{testvenite grupi, koi me|u sebe se vo protivre~nosti. Obi~niot gra|anin, a ne vladeja~kata elita, treba da bide vo situacija „da go kontrolira# politi~kiot proces, iako pogolemata mo}, fakti~ki, ja imaat politi~ki privilegiranite i ekonomski posilnite. Tuka se krie i doktrinata na sovremeniot demokratski sistem, koj na golemo se razlikuva od klasi~nata demokrati-ja. Elementarnata karakteristika na ovoj sistem na pluralisti~ka demokratija e silnata vrska pome|u vladata i tie {to se vladeat, kako i postoeweto na komunikaciskite kanali pome|u niv. Ova doa|a vo izraz preku me|upartiskite natpre-varuvawa vo vremeto na izborite i mo`nostite, grupite na interesi, odnosno grupite na „pritisokot#, na sloboden na~in da gi izrazat nivnite stavovi. Iako ova moè da e daleku od idealnoto narodno vladeewe, odnosno i pretstavni-cite na pluralisti~kata demokrati-ja mislat deka vakviot pristap osiguruva zadovolitelen stepen na odgovornost i pozitivna percepcija od strana na narodot, za da se smeta navistina demokratska.

Problemite koi moàt da se pojavuvaat vo praktikuvaweto na demokratskiot sovremen plura-lizam se sostojat vo opasnosta, vla-deja~kiot sistem od eden pogolem broj mali grupi da bide sredstvo so koe moè da se popre~i mnozin stvo-

to vo vladeeweto na politi~kata vlast. Ovaa „stagnacija na plura-liz mot# moè da se predizvika i koga malite organizirani grupi stanuvaat tolku silni {to ekonom-skite interesi se tolku golemi, {to predizikuvaat blokadi na vladee-weto zaradi „preoptovarenosta# na vladata. Ako, kako rezultat na poseduvaweto neednakov ekonom-ski imot i na ekonomskite resursi, politi~kata vlast se koncentrira vo racete na eden broj grupi, toga{ avtomatski mnozinstvoto se za-menuva od istata politi~ka vlast. Ovie gledi{ta }e otvorat pat za po-javuvaweto na neopluralizmot kako potreba klasi~niot plura lizam da go otvori spektarot na sta vovite i gledi{tata, ze maj}i gi predvid sovremenite trendovi na modern-izacija i pojavuvaweto na postindus-triskoto i postkapitalisti~koto op {testvo.

Pluralizmot

Pluralisti~kiot pristap i plu-ralistite stojat vrz ubeduvaweto deka vo svetot na me|usebnata me|unarodna zavisnost }e bide nevozmo`no da £ se protivstavat na potrebata za sorabotka, {to na mnogu ilustrativen na~in moè da se vidi vo primerot na Evropa

Pluralisti~kite stavovi vo me |unarodnata politika se pojavu-vaat vo sedumdesettite godini na dvaesettiot vek, pred s¢ vo SAD, i nejzinata su{tina ja pretstavuvaat idejata i liberalnata vrednost. Vo tradicionalnata smisla, plura-lizmot pretstavuva edna socio-politi~ka teorija koja navestuva


Imer Selmani

na podelbata na mo}ta me|u odre-den broj organi ili grupi. Zna~i, pluralizmot se pojavuva kako ogra-ni~uvawe na centralisti~kiot pri s tap na politi~koto vladeewe. Deneska, vo me|unarodnata politika, sve doci sme na enormnoto vlijanie na nadnacionalnite faktori vo na-cionalnite politiki, isto kako {to vlijaat multinacionalnite kom pa-nii i nevladinite organiza cii, kako i zavisnosta na dràvite vo aspekt na ekonomskata sorabotka.

Zatoa, pluralisti~koto gledi{te ka ko napreden produkt nudi eden model na me{ani determinira~ki faktori, vo koj, ne zanemaruvaj}i gi nacionalnite vladi, potencira deka me|unarodnata politika ja formiraat po{irokite interesi na grupite. I toa, vo poniski instanci, akcentiraweto na nadvore{niot suverenitet treba da se zameni so najskromniot poim na avtonomijata. Trgnuvaj}i od ova, slobodno moème da kaème deka organizaciite ka ko Grinpis, Osloboditelnata organizacija na Palestina, Koka kola ili Vatikan, treba da se prifatat kako me|unarodni faktori, kako i, na pr. Francija ili Argentina. Posta-vu vaj}i go akcentot na podelbata na vlijatelnata mo}, pluralisti~kiot model go stava vo somnevawe samiot fundamentalen ~initel, istaknuvaj -}i deka site subjekti (vladini i nevladini) postapuvaat vo ramkite na kontrolata i me|usebnoto ogra-ni ~uvawe, koi gi preventiraat vo-luntaristi~kite postapki.

Mislam deka edna od destinaci-ite na pluralisti~kiot pristap kon me|unarodnata politika e toa {to potencira oddale~uvawe od politi~kite doktrini na silata i

na ekspanzija na dràvite. Zatoa, pluralisti~kiot pristap i plu-ralistite stojat vrz ubeduvaweto deka vo svetot na me|usebnata me |unarodna zavisnost, }e bide ne vozmo`no da £ se protivstavat na potrebata za sorabotka, {to na mnogu ilustrativen na~in moè da se vidi vo primerot na Evropa.

Pluralisti~kiot model

Site grupi i interesi se sposobni da se organiziraat i da sozdadat pristap so vladata, dodeka politi~koto vlijanie e spored goleminata i mo}ta na poddr{kata {to tie grupi ja imaat vo op{testvoto

Pluralisti~kite teorii, vo naj-dobro svetlo go pokaùvaat u~es-tvoto na grupite vo politikata. Vo niv se razlikuva sposobnosta na grupite da ja za{titat individuata od vlasta, kako i da pridonesat vo demokratijata. Osnovnata teza na pluralizmot e {to politi~kata sila e podelena i {iroko rasprostrane-ta. Odlukite se donesuvaat vo eden kompleksen proces na pregova rawa i odnosi, koi imaat za cel da se ze-maat predvid gledi{tata i intere-site na eden pogolem broj grupi.

Spored pluralisti~kite na~ela, u~estvoto na grupite vo politikata e fundamentot na demokratskiot pro-ces. Vo realnosta, pluralisti~kata demokratija ja nadminala konven-cionalnata demokratija, zatoa {to organiziranite grupi i inte resi gi zamenile politi~kite partii kako elementarna vrska me|u vla-data (vlasta) i tie so koi se vladee. Spo red ova, site grupi i interesi



se sposobni da se organiziraat i da sozdadat pristap so vlada-ta, dodeka politi~koto vlijanie e spored goleminata i mo}ta na poddr{kata {to tie grupi ja imaat vo op{testvoto. Zna~i, mo}ta i vlijanieto se ograni~uvaat me|u sebe, taka {to niedna od grupite ili interesite na nieden na~in ne moè da se nadvladeat. Taka, politikata na grupata ja karakte-rizira pribli`nata mo}, koja dobro ja ekvilibira.

Mnogupartiskiot sistem

Mnogupartizacijata podrazbira sozdavawe koalicioni vladi koi ovozmoùvaat i soedinuvawe na politi~kite akteri, koi se vo protivre~nosti

Karakteristika na mnogupar-tiskiot sistem e politi~kiot nat-prevar na edna ili pove}e partii, so toa {to se namaluva mo`nosta za sozdavawe ednopartiska vlada. I pokraj ova, te{ko e da se defini-ra ednopartiskiot sistem samo na osnova na brojot na golemite partii, za{to vo pluralizam ovie sistemi funkcioniraat blagoda rej- }i na koaliciite, vo ~ii formacii u~estvuvaat pomali partii, sozdade-ni zaradi nivnite isklu~uvawa od vladata i od strana na pogolemite partii. Zna~i, mnogupartizacija podrazbira sozdavawe koalicioni vladi koi ovozmoùvaat i soedi-nuvawe na politi~kite akteri, koi se vo protivre~nosti. Vo ovoj kontekst, potsetuvam deka treba da se diferenciraat mnogupartiskite sistemi, po nivniot karakter. Blagi-te pluralisti~ki sistemi gi karak-

teriziraat zemjite kako Belgija, Holandija, Norve{ka, kade {to pos-tojat mali ideolo{ki razliki po me|u relevantnite partii, fakt {to rezultira so afinitetot za sozdavawe koalicii i na postignu-vawe kompromis. Od druga strana, polariziraniot pluralizam se po-javuva tamu kade {to pogolemite ideolo{ki razliki gi podeluvaat najgolemite partii vo dva razli~ni pola vo politi~kiot sistem na zem-jata.

Prednostite na mnogupartiskite pluralisti~ki sistemi stojat vo faktot deka osiguruvaat kontrola i politi~ki ekvilibrium vo ramkite na vladata, so afinitet za debata, re{enie i kompromis. Procesot na sozdavawe na koaliciite i na~inot na koj tie se neguvaat podrazbira i osiguruva golema transparentnost, taka {to treba da se smeta i za ra-zlikite i gledi{tata na razli~nite (sprotivnite) interesi.

Najgolemata slabost na mnogupar-tiskiot pluralisti~ki sistem stoi vo faktorot na rizikot i pre~kite vo soz davaweto na koaliciite. Postiz-bornite pregovori i neprincipiel-nite kompromisi moè da traat so nedeli i meseci, rezultiraj}i so nestabilnost i protivre~nosti kaj samite partneri vo koalicijata.

Prirodno, politikata na koali-cijata, pred s¢, se karakteriza so spogodba i kompromis, baraweto na zaedni~kite celi, a ne ubedu-vawata i politi~kite na~ela. Se razbira, treba da se vnimava vo te kot na ovoj proces na natpreva-ru vawe za dobivawe na vlasta, da ne se oddale~ime od konkretnite politi~ki principi.


Imer Selmani

Pluralizmot vo Makedonija

Vo politi~kiot horizont na Makedonija se etabliraa dva politi~ki tabora, podeleni na nacionalna osnova: politi~kiot tabor koj gi pretstavuva{e interesite na albanskiot narod i drugiot, koj gi pretstavuva{e interesite na makedonskiot narod, koj pretendira{e na institucionalnata i dràvna ekskluzivnost

Vo Republika Makedonija, od nejzinata nezavisnost, nejzinite gra|ani ìveat vo demokratski pluralizam i vo eden mnogupartiski organiziran politi~ki proces. Kako i vo sekoja druga zemja, koja izleze od isto~niot blok, kako rezultat na urivaweto na komunisti~kata ideologija i ruskite i jugosloven-skite federacii, i vo Makedonija se doìveaja recidivite na mi-natoto. Vo politi~kiot horizont na Makedonija se etabliraa dva politi~ki tabora, podeleni na na-cionalna osnova: politi~kiot tabor koj gi pretstavuva{e interesite na albanskiot narod i drugiot, koj gi pretstavuva{e interesite na make-donskiot narod, koj pretendira{e na institucionalnata i dràvna eks-kluzivnost. @ivotot i politi~koto pluralisti~ko organizirawe vo Republika Makedonija ozna~uva i podreduvawe na politi~kite par-tii vo dvete najgolemi etni~ki za ednici, kako i vo drugite pomali zaednici, formiraj}i politi~ki partii so dva prefiksa. Edniot, koj ja ozna~uva{e etni~kata pri-padnost i, drugiot, koj aludira{e na ideolo{kata orientacija na

partiite. Ottoga{, ovaa praktika na pluralisti~koto organizirawe vo Makedonija ne e promeneta.

Koga se raboti za praktikuvawe na mnogupartiskiot pluralisti~ki sistem vo albanskiot politi~ki ta-bor vo Republika Makedonija, toga{ hronologijata na sozdavaweto, raz vitokot i transformiraweto na albanskite politi~ki partii datira u{te vo prvite denovi na sozdavaweto na dràvata. Vo po-liti~kata scena vo toa vreme se pojavi PDP, koja, vo nedostatok na drug albanski politi~ki subjekt, se etablira pove}e kako sealbansko politi~ko dvièwe, otkolku kako pluralisti~ko vnatre{no orga-nizirawe. Nabrgu, ovaa praznina }e ja nadopolni pojavuvaweto na Narod-nata partija i Demokratskata parti-ja na Albancite, koi }e ja zbogatat politi~kata scena vo albanskiot ta-bor. Gra|anite Albanci to~no deset godini se svedoci na politi~kite nesoglasuvawa vo dve dimenzii: ednata, koja se karakterizira{e so me|usebna netolerantnost vnatre vo albanskiot blok; i drugata, koja gi otslikuva{e me|unacionalnite raz-liki pome|u Albancite i Makedon-cite. Se misle{e deka ovie nesogla-suvawa }e izgasnat so pojavuvaweto na partijata koja pretendira da bide ekskluziven sukcesor na Vojnata vo 2001 godina, DUI. Vo ovoj slu~aj, Al-bancite imaa iluzija deka poglavje-to na me|ualbanskite nesoglasuvawa se zatvoreni, isto kako i razlikite me|u Albancite i Makedoncite, deka nivoto na ̀ ivotot i nivnoto u~estvo vo op{testveniot-politi~ki ìvot vo multietni~kata dràva sega e ve}e realnost i osnova za integ-rirawe na Republika Makedonija vo



visokite me|unarodni institucii, EU i NATO.

Predvremenite parlamentarni izbori 2008 i te{kite i nere{enite sporovi na me|unarodnata politika na dràvata, isfrlija na videlina edna serija devijantni pojavi, kako posledica na pogre{nata poli-tika vo minatoto. Poziciraweto na gra|aninot Albanec vo op{tes-tvenite-politi~ki tekovi vo Re-publika Makedonija, s¢ u{te ne ja dobilo potrebnata fizionomija. Stagnacii se zabeleùvaat re~isi vo site sferi na ìvotot, kako: na-cionalnite prava, obrazovanieto, kulturata, raspredeluvaweto na dràvnite sredstva, individual-nite prava, soodvetnata zastape-nost, infrastrukturniot razvitok, administrativno-sudskata dis-kriminacija itn. Neizleguvaweto na pogolem procent na Albancite na poslednite izbori (65%), zboruva dovolno za da bide{ svesen vo kon-statiraweto deka tie se premnogu nezadovolni od nivnata pozicija vo op{testvoto, od vnatrealbanskoto politi~ko organizirawe, od nivnoto ekonomsko nivo, od politi~kiot tretman i, sledstveno na ova, se zagrièni za nivnata i idninata na nivnite potomci.

Zabeleùvaj}i gi ovie pojavi, zabeleùvaj}i gi vnatre{nata i nadvore{nata netransformacija i nereformacija na albanskite politi~ki partii vo Republika Makedonija, svesni za predizvici-te i promenite koi se slu~uvaat so mnogustranata globalizacija na vrednostite, gledaj}i ja imanent-nata potreba na vremeto, svesni

za intelektualniot i inovativen kapacitet na mladite, ocenuvaj}i gi ~ove~kite resursi, intelektu-alniot i op{testven kapacitet na albanskoto op{testvo, celej -}i kon multietni~ka Makedonija, imaj}i gi predvid perspekti vite na gra|aninot na Republika Make-donija vo golemite semejstva kako EU i NATO, zemaj}i predvid deka politi~koto organizirawe na Al-bancite treba da se modernizira spored barawata i novite perspek-tivi, vo mnogu spontan i priroden na~in, se pojavi potrebata za for-mi rawe nov politi~ki subjekt, so sosema nov demokratski profil, koj }e gi stavi vo dvièwe site resursi, vrednosti, kapaciteti, sozdava~kata mo} na Albancite na Republika Makedonija. Nie ceni-me deka so pojavuvaweto na Nova demokratija (Demokracia e re) vo politi~kata scena, }e se zbogati op {testveniot-politi~ki ìvot vo Makedonija, }e se zgolemi nivoto na demokratskata svest na gra|aninot, }e se namalat tenziite na site vnat-realbanski nesoglasuvawa i }e se osovesti makedonskata politika za site nejzini postapki i gre{ki.

Cenime deka Nova demokratija (Demokracia e re) }e dade nova fizionomija na sfa}aweto na vnat-re{nite i nadvore{nite politiki na Republika Makedonija, politika koja e potrebna za nadminuvawe na golemite predizvici koi ja ~ekaat Makedonija i regionot, kako pri-dones vo zbogatuvaweto na diver-zitetite izrazeni preku vrednos-tite koi gi reflektira politi~kiot pluralizam.


Imer Selmani

If we follow through the chronology of the development of the globalization processes and the interdependences among the governmental and nongovernmental subjects in the international domain, we will see that pluralism appears as the basic element in determining the supranational factors and their impact on the national (state) policies. Thus, the pluralistic approach in executing political power decentralizes it to the extent of replacing the outer state sovereignty with the wider interests of international cooperation in all spheres of life. This global commitment to cooperation and unity can be seen in the example provided by the European Union.

Abstract


Liljana Popovska

Ve}e treta godina vo izve{taite za napredokot na Republika Ma-ke donija vo procesot na evro in te-gracija stoi zabele{ka za ne do s tig na politi~ki dijalog vo zemjava. Toa se ocenuva kako na{ demokratski deficit i kako neispolnuvawe na mnogu va`nite politi~ki kriteri-umi, poradi {to zemjava formalno ne moè da dobie datum za zapo~nuvawe pregovori so Evropskata Unija. Kako ilustracija za otsustvoto na politi~ki dijalog se poso~uvaat povremenite blokadi na Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija od strana na opozicijata, ili nejzinoto otsus-tvo od rabotata na ovaa institucija, kako i neusoglasenosta vo stavovite po va`ni dràvni pra{awa pome|u Pretsedatelot na dràvata i Pret-sedatelot na Vladata.

Kako e ocenet politi~kiot dijalog vo posledniot izve{taj na Evropskata komisija?

Vo ovogodi{niot izve{taj na Evropskata komisija se konstatira deka vo izve{tajniot period se postignal dijalog, no, kako {to ve-lat, "docna#. Dopolnitelno, vo nego se naveduvaat i neregularnostite na predvremenite parlamentarni izbori kako pre~ka za dobivawe datum za pregovori. Taka se slu~uva Makedonija ve}e tri godini da ne

Ocenka na kapacitetot na Makedonija za politi~ki dijalog

dobiva unapreduvawe vo svojot status, iako e nesporen postojaniot napredok vo reformite vo razli~ni sektori. Vo poslednive tri godini duri so brzina i efekti kakvi {to ne bile zabeleàni vo prethodniot period, osobeno vo ekonomijata i borbata so organiziraniot kriminal i korupcijata.

Kako dojde politi~kiot dijalog vo izve{taite na Evropskata komisija?

Politi~kiot dijalog za prv pat be{e apostrofiran kako problem na makedonskata politi~ka scena od nekolku diskutanti od opozicionite partii, na sednica na Sobrani-eto na Republika Makedonija pred neceli tri godini, koga se izbira{e nova vlada po parlamentarnite izbori 2006 godina. Toga{, bez nekoja vidliva realna podloga, se pu{ti vo optek edna konstrukcija za dramati~na sostojba vo Makedonija poradi otsustvo na politi~ki dija-log i najava za moèn me|uetni~ki konflikt (!). Ova be{e lajtmotivot na celata rasprava. Podocna ovaa konstrukcija se doraboti mediumski i se povtoruva{e vo periodot s¢ do toga{niot izve{taj na Evropskata komisija.

Imeno, tezata be{e ilustrirana so bojkot na sednicite na Sobrani-

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Liljana Popovska

eto vo razni formi i so razni po-vodi, kako i so kombinirano u~estvo na toga{nite tri opozicioni par-lamentarni partii. Ponatamu, vo nekolku navrati slede{e blokada na sobraniskite sednici preku pod-nesuvawe iljadnici amandmani: na pr. nad 2800 amandmani na predlogot za izmena na Delovnikot za rabota na Sobranieto od samo eden ~len, koj predviduva{e definirawe na diskusiite na pratenicite na deset minuti; ili nad 4000 amandmani za predlog-izmenite na Izborniot zakonik i sl. Ova be{e dopolneto so napu{tawe na sednicite vo sekoj moment koga vladinata koalicija }e dojde{e na rabot na kvorumot. Na krajot, istite formulacii mo`ea da se pro~itaat vo izve{tajot.

Zatoa, na pra{aweto: kako dojde politi~kiot dijalog vo izve{taite na Evropskata komisija? odgovorot e sledniov: Kako uspe{no realiziran proekt na opozicijata vo poslednive tri godini. Kako uspe{no kreirana, inicirana i menaxirana politi~ka kriza, koja evropskite nabquduva~i ja zabele`aa i pedantno ja opi{aa. (Da se nadevame deka nikoj nema tolku seriozno da si ja sfati rabo-ta ta, pa da go ostvari i vtoriot del od tezata za me|uetni~kite konf-likti.)

Ima li Makedonija kapacitet za politi~ki dijalog?

Tvrdam deka Makedonija imala i ima kapacitet za politi~ki dijalog, kako i za koalicirawe, do {to pov-torno se doa|a preku dijalog. I pora-no i sega makedonskite vladi funk-cioniraat niz {iroki koalicii, od koi nekoi se napraveni pred izbori.

Na pr. na parlamentarnite izbori 2002 godina pobedi "Koalicijata ZA# so deset politi~ki partii, a na izborite vo 2006 godina "Koalici-jata za podobra Makedonija# so duri dvaeset politi~ki partii, od levi, preku zeleni i centristi~ki, do desni, vklu~itelno i so site mal-cinski partii, osven albanskite. Podocna, ovaa koalicija se na-dogradi so u{te dve parlamentarni partii. Apsurdno e da se tvrdi deka otsustvuva politi~ki dijalog vo vakvi okolnosti.

[to se odnesuva, pak, do poli-ti~ki dijalog pome|u vlasta i opozi-cijata, toj ne e prekinat vo nieden mo ment, nezavisno dali opozi ci oni partii sedat vo salata za sed ni-ci, yirkaat zad vrata, ili u~es-tvuvaat vo pove}epartitni razgo-vori za razli~ni temi. Nikoj ne treba da o~ekuva opozicijata i vlasta da se unisoni vo pogled na politi~kite pra{awa i na~inot za nivno tretirawe. Zatoa i pos-toi politi~kiot pluralizam kako edinstvena demokratska ramka za izgradba na civilno op{testvo. No, treba da funkcioniraat instituci-ite i da postoi volja za me|usebno islu{uvawe, prifa}awe argumenti od "drugata# strana, koja i da bila, s¢ do spremnost za postignuvawe konsenzus po odredeni pra{awa.

]e ja ilustriram najnovata poli-ti~ka sostojba {to be{e tema na opservacija i ocenka od Evropskata komisija vo Izve{tajot od 2008 go-dina. Za prv pat e izbran potpretse-datel na Sobranieto od redovite na opozicijata (ne deka ne bilo dosega nudeno, tuku ne bilo prifa}ano i toa vo razli~ni vladi), postojat redovni, najmalku nedelni, koor-



dinacii za rabotata na Sobrani-eto, najva`nite zakoni i ustavni izmeni se usoglasuvaat na nivo na rakovodstva na partiite od vlasta i opozicijata, na takov na~in se diskutira i za pregovorite za imeto na na{ava zemja, a Vladata prifa- }a golem broj amandmani podneseni od opozicijata, so {to ovozmoùva pro{iruvawe na demokratskata baza na u~esnici vo politi~kiot proces na odlu~uvawe.

Smetam deka vo analizata za politi~kiot dijalog vo Makedonija treba da se spomene i kontinuira-nata sorabotka pome|u site partii, nevladiniot sektor i ekspertskata javnost okolu temi {to ne se smetaat za "è{ki#: rodovata ednakvost, licata so posebni potrebi, ekologi-jata, semejnoto nasilstvo, decata i semejstvoto i sl. Ne slu~ajno, ve}e so godini vo makedonskiot Parlament funkcioniraat trite lobi grupi – Klub na èni parla-mentarki, Interparlamentarnata interpartiska lobi grupa za licata so posebni potrebi i Zelenoto lobi. Vo niv ~lenuvaat pretstavnici na prakti~no site politi~ki partii. Fokusirani okolu zaedni~ki temi, uspevaat da pokrenat i realiziraat redica inicijativi {to zavr{uvaat so izmeni na zakoni, podzakonski akti, buxeti, no i so kampawi za podigawe na svesta, kako i drugi aktivnosti.

Mislam deka me|u najubavite promocii na Republika Makedoni-ja vo stranstvo kako sovremena demokratija spa|aat tokmu nekoi od aktivnostite na ovie politi~ki he-terogeni grupi koi preku politi~ki dijalog zaedni~ki realiziraat proekti od interes za dràvata i

nejzinite gra|ani. Da se nadevame deka nikoj nema da dobie ideja da gi "vè{ti# ovie i nekoi sli~ni temi {to se prirodna spojna to~ka na site nas.

Dali i ne{to drugo stoi zad odloèniot datum za po~etok na pregovori so EU?

Zna~i, ako e o~igledno deka Makedonija napreduva vo refor-mite, ima kapacitet za politi~ki dijalog i moè da go postigne, {to vpro~em e i konstatirano posled-niov pat (so zabele{ka deka ne e konstanten), toga{ poradi koja pri~ina Evropskata Unija ne ni gi podotvora vratite?

Se razbira, nie sme im blagodar-ni na izgotvuva~ite na izve{tajot za iscrpnite analizi i za site do-bronamerni ukaùvawa. Tie se dob-ra stimulacija za nas da gi podob-rime sostojbite i da go dovr{ime zapo~natoto. Makedonskite gra|ani se sosem spokojni i sigurni vo pogled na odlukata za na{ite evro-atlantski integracii i tuka nema dilemi.

No, ne moème da se ottrgneme od vpe~atokot deka zad odloèniot datum stoi i ne{to drugo {to ne se spomenuva nikade vo tekstot. Imeno, Republika Makedonija ima zada~a da se pribliì do standardite i pravilata na igra na Evropskata Unija niz eden zadaden proces so ve}e proverena dinamika od nekolku godini. Da se pribliì, a ne da se poistoveti. Sega se borime samo za datum za po~etok na pregovori za ~len-stvo, a ne za dobivawe ~lenstvo.

Povtorno so dol`na po~it kon izgotvuva~ite na izve{tajot, no sme


Liljana Popovska

~itale i tu|i izve{tai, za drugi zemji {to bile ili se kandidati za ~lenstvo. Neizbe`no e ~uvstvoto deka od Makedonija se bara da bide odli~en u~enik so site petki, dode-ka drugite se pu{tile i se pu{taat napred i so poslabi ocenki. Dali vo ova nemaat udel i vnatre{nite konstitutivni problemi na Evropa, vo koja e porasnat skepticizmot za pro{iruvawe na Unijata, kako i pritisokot na Grcija da bideme usloveni so promena na imeto ako sakame datum na pregovori?

Site sme svedoci na potrebata od silno edinstvo na evropskite zemji, za da se izgradi zaedni~ka strategija i programa kon ekonomski i bezbednosno pojaka Evropa. Tokmu poradi vakvoto edinstvo, se dozvo-li na samitot na NATO vo Bukure{t Makedonija da dobie veto od strana na edna zemja ~lenka. Ona {to gi pla{i gra|anite vo Makedonija sega e analogijata {to se izvlekuva za perspektivite za ~lenstvo vo Ev-ropskata Unija.

Koja e perspektivata na Republika Makedonija?

Republika Makedonija }e pro-dolì po patot koj e zacrtan odamna, kon evro-atlantskite integracii. ]e gi dovr{i site potrebni reformi, }e gi doizgradi standardite i }e go za-jakne kapacitetot na instituciite. Za ova ima politi~ka i gra|anska volja. No, neophodna i e politi~ka poddr{ka odnadvor. Prvo, zaradi nea, za da ne se razo~araat gra|anite vo pravi~nosta i po~ituvaweto na pravniot me|unaroden sistem. Makedonskite gra|ani o~ekuvaat Evropskata Unija da blesne so svo-

jot demokratski sjaj i da gi za{titi svoite institucii od dvojni stan-dardi i licemerie. O~ekuvaat da opstoi na pravilata i poredokot {to samata gi kreirala i izgra-dila. Da ne ni se slu~at ve}e dvojni standardi vo me|unarodnata poli-tika, edni za pojakite, drugi za poslabite.

Potreben ni e pozitiven signal, znak, ni{an. Za da prodolìme da veruvame vo pravi~nosta i pravniot poredok koj zasega se smeta za ideal. Da ne se dozvoli edna zemja, pottiknata od tesni nacionalni i nacionalisti~ki pobudi na svoeto politi~ko vodstvo, da go uriva i ponatamu toj poredok, toj ideal. Za{to taka Evropa }e po~ne da se potkopuva sebesi i temelite na koi stoi.

[to se odnesuva do politi~kite zabele{ki za sostojbite vnatre vo zemjata, bespredmetno e da se pra{uvame dali Makedonija ima kapacitet za politi~ki dija-log. Apsolutno ima. No, ima edno drugo pra{awe: Vo koja merka se politi~kite subjekti vo Makedonija zreli da gi prifatat izbornite rezultati, da prifatat izboren poraz i da prifatat da bidat vo opozicija, s¢ duri gra|anite ne odlu~at poinaku. Za{to, sekoja uloga {to }e im ja dodelat gra|anite na politi~kite partii, ovie treba da ja ispo~ituvaat. Vremeto pominato vo opozicija moè da se ispolzuva za konstruktivna kritika i pri-dones za podobro zakonodavstvo i pojaka kontrola na vlasta, kako i za jaknewe i restrukturirawe na partiite. Nesoodvetno e nekoe politi~ko vodstvo da e spremno na s¢ samo da vleze vo vlasta, pri-



Abstract

menuvaj}i razni modeli, od {iroka koalicija za "spas na zemjata# s¢ do politi~ki krizi so {tetni pos-ledici vnatre vo zemjata i nadvor na me|unaroden plan.

Verojatno vo izminatiov pe-riod imalo i postapki od strana na vlasta {to moèle "pomeko# da se odigraat, so pove}e ume{nost i takt. No, ne e lesno da se ima takt koga se sre}avate so otvoreno lobirawe za polo{i evropski izve{tai i povici za nova monitoring misija. Iskreno se nadevam deka nieden politi~ki subjekt ne se raduva zlurado na neubavite ishodi od zapo~natite procesi.

No, verojatno vo poslednive godini vo Makedonija nedosti-gaat kriti~na masa lu|e na vrvni pozicii vo politikata i vlijatelni lu|e od javniot ìvot {to }e gi sta vat na podolg rok nastrana po-li ti~kata pripadnost, li~niot in-teres i suetata, zaradi op{to dobro. Kriti~na masa se postignuva samo so pretstavnici od SITE faktori vo zemjata. Za{to, dovolno e edna

zna~itelna grupa da se odlu~i za bojkot ili za nekakvi incidenti, pa dijalogot da izostane.

]e mora da se nadmineme sebesi i da go primenime pozitivnoto is-to risko iskustvo na Makedonija, kade dijalogot me|u razli~nite bil osnova za skokovi napred. Primer se Kru{evskata Republika, deloto na Misirkov, NOB, ASNOM, izgradbata na Republika Makedonija so site nejzini ustavni izmeni, re{avaweto na voeniot konflikt i postkonf-liktniot period, procesite na ev-ro-atlantskite integracii s¢ do neodamna.

Vo gra|anskiot sektor toj dijalog funkcionira{e so godini, a oso-beni rezultati dade vo ènskoto dvièwe, kade racionalni i obedi-neti okolu "ènskata# kauza, ̀ enite vo pove}egodi{en period menu-vaa zakoni i sostojbi. Ako moèla da funkcionira taa kauza, toga{ dràvnata kauza treba da profunk-cionira povtorno so mnogu pogolema sila. Veruvam deka Makedonija ima kapacitet za ova.

For the past three years, the absence of political dialogue in the Republic of Macedonia has been identifi ed as one of the obstacles in getting the negotiation date with the EU. It was part of the successful project of the opposition, its creation, promotion and realization. The fi nal result was a political crisis followed by boycotts and blockades in the parliament for two years, which was noted by the European observers and became part of the fi nal reports. In fact, the Republic of Macedonia possesses the capacity for political dialogue, and this has been proved through its history. It is practiced even now, and can be illustrated through many examples. The point is that every political subject should take its responsibility to act for the wellbeing of its country in this historic time, when our objective is Euro-Atlantic integration.


Zagorka Tnokovska

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Vistinska studija na politikata e ne da se prou~uva ~ovekot, tuku instituciite.

Xon Plamenac

Iskustvata koi se steknuvaat so godini, pa vo taa smisla i izbornite pravila, treba da go pominat testot na vremeto zaradi sozdavawe etab-liran izboren sistem. Toa e pro-ces koj se nadgraduva zaradi soz-davawe povolna klima za slobodni i demokratski izbori i nivno ostva-ruvawe vo praktika, {to e slu~aj i vo na{ata zemja.

Od tuka, pra{aweto kako da se organiziraat i sprovedat regularni izbori stana predmet na interes na brojni subjekti involvirani vo izborniot proces, no i na po{irokata ekspertska javnost koja ja sledi ovaa problematika.

Kako rezultat na ova izraboteni se brojni izve{tai so preporaki i upatstva, koi gi afirmiraat stan-dardite koi treba da bidat vgradeni vo zakonite, kako garant na fer i demokratski izbori.

Vakviot pristap ja ima svojata opravdanost {to legitimitetot na nositelite na vlasta ne proizleguva samo od ishodot na izborite, tuku i od odne suvaweto na klu~nite politi~ki subjekti vo tekot na sproveduvaweto na izborite. Za slobodni izbori ne moè da se zboruva ako ne se ispolnat pretpostavkite za kompetenten gra-

|anski sektor, nezavisno sudstvo i javno mislewe kako korektor za eti~nost na izborniot proces. Ova podrazbira obezbeduvawe standardi preku soodvetna zakonska ramka, obu-~ena izborna administracija i ednakov tretman na izbornite sub jekti.

Imeno, izborite vo zemjite so re-lativno kusa demokratska tradicija ja aktualiziraat legitimnata funk cija na izborniot proces. Ova pra {awe gi nadminuva ramkite na na cionalniot suverenitet, odnosno, pretpostavuva dopolnitelna ve ri fikacija na de-mokratskiot ka rak ter na izborite i od strana na me|unarodnite institucii. Stanuva zbor za mnogu va`na ocenka koja ima reperkusii vrz aspiracijata za evroatlanska integracija na ovie zemji, pa i na na{ata.

Od toj aspekt, ocenkite na na b-qu duva~kite misii se zna~aen fak -tor vo kreiraweto na izbornata re-gulativa. I vo na{iot praven sis tem kreiraweto i brojnite izmeni na izbornata legislativa se praveni vrz osnova na preporakite na doma{nite i me|unarodnite organizacii.

I vo Kone~niot izve{taj na Misi-jata za nabquduvawe na izbori na OBSE/ODIHR ima opredeleni pre-poraki za predvremenite par la men-tarni izbori koi se odràa na 1 juni 2008 godina.

Vo izve{tajot e sodràna re-tro spektivata na nastanite po ras-pi{uvaweto na izborite, a na krajot od

Izborite na patot kon evropskata integracija


Zagorka Tnokovska

izve{tajot ima set na preporaki koi bi imale vlijanie vo izborniot proces. Spored niv, „op{to zemeno Iz borniot zakonik obezbeduva cvrs ta osnova za sproveduvawe na de mokratski izbori. Me|utoa, is ti ot sodrì odredeni ne celosni i protivre~ni odredbi osobeno vo delot koj se odnesuva na pri go vorite i ̀ albite. Ponatamu za-ko no davstvoto koe se odnesuva na fi-nansirawe na izbornata kam pawa ne bara potvrduvawe na po da tocite za finansirawe na kam pawata podneseni od strana na u~es nicite vo izborite. Na denot na izborite, organiziranoto na sil stvo i zastra{uvawe go popre~i glasaweto vo oblastite so prete`no etni~ko albansko naselenie pri {to edno lice go zagubi ìvotot, a nekolkumina bea povredeni. Ova pridonese za brojni neregularnosti i slu~ai na izborna izmama. Site ovie slu~ai zaedno vlijaeja na slobodata na glasa~ite da go dadat svojot glas bez zastra{uvawe, nasilstvo i strav od odmazda. Ministerstvoto za vnat re{ni raboti pri povtoruvawe na glasaweto na 15 juni uspea da ja kontrolira bezbednosnata sostojba i obezbedi glavno pomirna atmosfera.#.

Vo periodot po odrànite izbori vo 2008 godina, a pritoa imaj}i gi vo vid preporakite na spomenatiot izve{taj, se napravija izmeni na Iz-borniot zakonik, koi od strana na So-branieto na Republika Makedonija bea doneseni vo oktomvri 2008 godina. So ovie izmeni celosno se implementira-ni preporakite na Kone~niot izve{taj na nabquduva~kata misija na OBSE/ODIHR od odrànite predvremeni parlamentarni izbori na 1 juni 2008 godina.

Politi~kite signali koi ni bea isprateni vo izminatiov period od

strana na na{ite partneri na patot kon Evropa, jasno ni stavija do znaewe deka, za da prodolìme po patot po koj trgnavme so steknuvaweto na statusot kandidat za ~lenstvo vo EU, impera-tivno mora da gi ostavime zad sebe neregularnostite i incidentite pri sproveduvawe na izborite.

So izmenite se nadmina sudirot na nadle`nosti na sudovite vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo, a pri toa se napravi i usoglasuvawe vo odnos na izbornite prekr{oci so Zakonot za prekr{ocite.

Na zabele{kite vo odnos na iz-bornata kampawa, dostavuvaweto na izve{taite za izborna kampawa, vklu~uvaj}i gi i definiraweto na iz-vorite na finansirawe na izborna kampawa i revizijata na finansiskite izve{tai, se stavi poseben akcent i tie dobija posebno mesto vo Izborniot zakonik so pro{iruvawe na negovata sodrìna za ovie pra{awa.

Ostanatite nedoslednosti koi bea navedeni vo Preporakite, a se odnesu-vaa na nepreciznosta vo povtoruvawe na glasaweto, odnosno poni{tuvawe na glasaweto na opredeleni izbi-ra~ ki mesta i prigovorite vo ovaa postapka se uredeni vo delot na za {tita na izbira~koto pravo so jas no precizirawe na uslovite za poni{tuvawe, odnosno povtoruvawe na glasaweto i procesot na pravni lekovi vo ovoj del od postapkata.

Isto taka, se napravi dopre ci zi-rawe na odredbite vo procesot na su mi rawe na rezultatite od strana na izbornite organi, i se definira pravoto na direkten pristap na nab quduva~ite i na ovlastenite pretstavnici vo celiot izboren pro -ces, {to isto taka be{e edna od pre-porakite.



Zabele{kite koi se odnesuvaa na izbornata kampawa se nadminati so definirawe na dejstvijata koi pretstavuvaat izborna kampawa, no i so doprecizirawa na odredbite koi se odnesuvaat na informaciite za nara~atelot i davatelot na uslugi koi podocna moàt da se proverat, preku finansiskite izve{tai koi se so sodrìna prethodno utvrdena.

Vo odnos na zabele{kite za me-diumite, vo izmenite na izborniot zakonik se obezbedi ramnopraven pri-stap vo mediumite na site u~esnici vo izborniot proces, so ednakva cena za site u~esnici vo izborite pri nivnoto izborno reklamirawe. Procedurite za efikasno i ramnopravno mediumsko pretstavuvawe se obezbedeni preku donesuvawe akt koj ne e povrzan so vremeto na raspi{uvawe na izborite, so {to se ovozmoùva navremeno in-for mirawe za mediumskoto pret-stavuvawe, no i efikasno sank ci-oni rawe na radiodifuzerite vo slu ~aj na prekr{uvawe na utvrdenite pravila.

Vo periodot po izborite prezemeni se niza merki za incidentite na na-silstvo i zemawe na odgovornost na prekr{itelite na izborniot proces.

Vo periodot {to sledi izbornite organi treba da se fokusiraat na edu-kacija na izbornata administracija, no i na edukacija na izbira~ite zaradi nadminuvawe na konstatiranite ne-doslednosti.

Glasawe na licata na privremena rabota i prestoj vo stranstvo

Vo na{iot praven sistem pra{awe-to za izborite e uredeno so Izborniot zakonik. So nego se obezbeduva

cvrs ta osnova za sproveduvawe na demokratski izbori.

So izmenite na Izborniot zakonik, koi bea doneseni vo oktomvri ovaa godina, kako novina e toa {to se reguli-ra pra{aweto povrzano so glasawe na dràvjanite na Republika Makedonija na privremena rabota i prestoj vo stranstvo, odnosno, nivnoto pravo na glas da go ostvarat vo diplomatsko-konzularnite pretstavni{tva na Re-publika Makedonija vo zemjata kade {to prestojuvaat.

Soglasno predloènoto re{enie, dràvjanite na Republika Makedonija koi se na privremena rabota i prestoj vo stranstvo }e u~estvuvaat vo izborot na pretsedatel na Republikata i iz-bor na 3 pratenici vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija.

Glasaweto na ovie lica za izbor na pretsedatel na Republika Makedonija i za pratenici }e se vr{i vo diplo-matsko-konzularnite pretstavni{tva na Republika Makedonija vo Evropa i Afrika, vo Severna i Ju`na Amerika i vo Avstralija i Azija spored propor-cionalniot model.

Podgotvuvaweto na spisocite za glasawe na dràvjanite na Republi-ka Makedonija koi se na privremena rabota ili prestoj vo stranstvo }e se vr{i vrz osnova na evidencijata od nadle`niot organ kade, spored zakon, tie se dol`ni da go prijavat svojot prestoj vo stranstvo. Isto taka, ovaa kategorija gra|ani, ako sakaat da go ostvarat svoeto izbira~ko pravo, se dol`ni da se prijavat vo diplomatsko-konzularnite pretstavni{tva na Re-publika Makedonija.

Samo taa kategorija gra|ani koi }e dostavat prijava i gi ispolnuvaat us-lovite za zapi{uvawe vo Izbira~kiot spisok }e bidat zapi{ani vo poseb-


Zagorka Tnokovska

ni izbira~ki spisoci za glasawe vo stran stvo.

Zna~i, onie dràvjani koi nema da se prijavat za glasawe vo diplomatsko-konzularnite pretstavni{tva na na{ata zemja, vo zemjata kade presto-juvaat ne }e moè da glasaat, no nema da bidat izbri{ani od izvodite na izbira~kiot spisok na koi se glasa vo Republika Makedonija, so toa {to vo zabele{ka }e ima odbeleùvawe deka se otsutni od Republika Makedonija, {to be{e praktika i dosega.

Za ova glasawe postapkata za for-mirawe izborni organi e identi~na kako i onaa predvidena za glasaweto vo zemjata. Pravo da podnesat kandi-datska lista imaat pokraj politi~ki partii i grupa izbira~i koi }e soberat 200 potpisi na teritorijata na koja go predlagaat kandidatot.

Vo procesot na sproveduvawe na glasaweto postoi razlika vo odnos na glasaweto vo zemjata so toa {to sekoe glasa~ko liv~e po glasaweto se stava vo plik, a toj vo glasa~kata kutija. Rezultatite od glasaweto vo stran-stvo gi sumira i utvrduva Dràvnata izborna komisija, a izbira~kiot od-bor sostavuva zapisnik samo za bro-jot na zapi{ani izbira~i i brojot na izbira~i koi glasale.

Vo naredniot period Minister-stvoto za nadvore{ni raboti, vo so rabotka so Dràvnata izborna ko-misija, treba da ja ima glavnata uloga za afirmacija na glasaweto vo stran-

stvo no i na pottiknuvawe na eviden-cijata za dràvjanite na Republika Makedoni ja, so {to }e se sozdadat pravni osnovi za sproveduvawe na glasaweto vo DKP na Republika Make-donija.

Sekako deka glavna komponenta e i kampawata za edukacija na izbira~ite vo stranstvo, za da moè uspe{no da se realizira ovoj proces.

Vremenskiot period vo koj se predlagaat izmenite odi vo prilog na toa i ostava mo`nost za podgotovka i za dosledna implementacija na pred videnite zakonski re{enija, odnosno, negova primena od narednite pretsedatelski ili parlamentarni izbori.

Mora da se soglasime deka kre-iraweto na izbornoto zakonodavstvo e sloèn proces koj vo su{tina gi obe dinuva najglavnite stolbovi, vla-deewe na pravoto i demokratskite procesi vo institucionalnite ramki na edna zemja. Po~ituvaweto na pro-cedurata, odnosno na pravilata na igra, normalno, rezultira so le-gi timen parlament, a izbornite sub jekti vo svoeto dejstvuvawe da bidat oslobodeni od kakov bilo pri-tisok. Vo ovaa smisla, izborite ne se sveduvaat samo na normirawe na izbornite pravila, tuku vklu~uvaat i opredelena politi~ka kultura na izbornite akteri za sproveduvawe na fer i demokratski izbori.



Creating an electoral system is a complex process which includes complex processes in the drafting phase and in implementing international standards for conducting fair and democratic elections. International standards are part of international documents for conducting democratic elections and they are part of the recommendations included in documents which, as a rule, are produced by the international monitoring mission. After the conclusion of an election, they become in a certain sense a “source of law” in the regulation of the electoral process. The criteria and defi nition of the electoral laws depend on the electoral model in the legal system of a country. However, an important factor in determining the electoral laws is the will of the political actors. In our country, the proportional electoral model is used for electing the deputies to the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia and for electing members to the municipal councils. In defi ning the electoral laws best practices are taken into consideration. Allowing citizens of the Republic of Macedonia to vote from abroad is a step forward in allowing them to exercise the rights which are guaranteed to them by the Constitution. In this context, elections are not only comprised of electoral laws, but they also include the political culture of electoral actors for conducting free and democratic elections.

Abstract


Introduction

One of the major issue that marked the democratization process of the South East European countries in the 1990s was the search for the best institutional mechanisms and practices for peaceful accommodation of the ethnic cleavages in order to maintain the security of the state and stabilize the young democra-cies in nascent. The democratization presented an ongoing process, parallel to the management of the ethnic issues and the resolution of the ethnic confl icts that spread through the region after 1989. In the reality of these conditions, the often-posed question was: how is it possible to design a political system that would avoid ethnic confl icts and promote instead inter-ethnic accommodation, a stabile party system and a functioning democracy in divided societies?

Starting from the idea that the con-solidation of the democracy in the transi-tion countries depends to a high extent on the correlation between the design of the electoral system and the minority representation, the paper will discuss the choices of the electoral system in the post-communist multiethnic societ-ies of South East Europe during the democratization period. In these new democracies with emerging political pluralism and multiparty elections, the choice of the electoral system has been one of the most important issues for the stabilization of the democratic regime

Electoral systems in pluralistic societies: The cases of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania

Nataša Hroneska

and the integration of the ethnic minori-ties in the political system. The paper focuses on the relationship between the parliamentary representation of the largest ethnic minorities and the elec-toral system of proportional represen-tation (PR) in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania, countries that had a rather peaceful path during the transition years of the 1990s, where the relative stabil-ity of the political system has allowed for experimental electoral engineering in the search for the best practice of accommodation of the minority ethnic groups in the state and establishment of a viable democratic regime.

The electoral systems of Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria in comparative perspective

The problems of the recognition of the minorities and the protection of their rights preoccupied the decision-makers and the politicians in Macedonia, Bul-garia and Romania in the early 1990s. The stability of their political regimes depended upon the solution of these issues and the successful integration of ethnic minorities in the political sys-tem. In this process, two factors had a decisive role. The fi rst factor was the character and the intensity of the ethnic tensions. The second factor that had a decisive role in the stabilization of the political system and the successful integration of the ethnic minorities was

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Nataša Hroneska

the process of institutional engineering. The electoral system, as part of the insti-tutional design of the new political elites, played a crucial role in the integration of the ethnic minorities in these countries during the democratization process. Furthermore, the level of development of the parliamentary democracy was conditioned by the freedom of political mobilization of all ethnic groups in the society and their constructive participation in the political system of the country.

Macedonia In Macedonia, the political stabil-

ity defined as “preserving the sys-tem, citizen loyalty, legitimacy and effectiveness,”1 was largely conditioned by the Macedonian experience of the institution-building process in the reality of a multiethnic society and imported democracy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Macedonian electoral system has evolved around two major axes. The fi rst one is the pluralization of the politi-cal sphere of the society, meaning the pluralization of the political party system after the abolition of the one-party sys-tem. This party pluralism in Macedonia, expressed in the legitimacy and legality of the political parties in power and in opposition, in the beginning of the 1990 set the scene for the fi rst multiparty democratic elections in the country after the former era of socialist democracy2. The second axis was the ethnifi cation of the political system with the emergence of political parties of ethnic background that took active participation in all follow-

1 Arendt Lijphart, cited in Gjorge Ivanov, “Albanskoto prašanje vo Makedonija do 2000: makedonskata perspektiva” in Zbornik vo čest na Nikola Sotirovski i Vladimir Kartov (Law Faculty: Sko-pje, 2001), 371-399.

2 See more in Svetomir Škarić, Makedonija na site kontinenti (Union Trade: Skopje 2000), 182-195.

ing elections in the state. The political parties in Macedonia coincided with the segmental overlapping in the soci-ety and created two political blocks on the party scene, “the Macedonian and Albanian blocks of political parties.”3 This ethnifi cation has been present on a permanent basis in the Macedonian political life since the country’s inde-pendence in 1991, achieving its peak during the 1998 post-electoral coalition and the following elections in 2002. In this process, the political mobilization of the Albanian ethnicum was especially important because it played a signifi cant role in the airing of its demands for equal “constitutive status,” administrative de-centralization, the offi cial status of the Albanian language on local and state levels and an Albanian-language uni-versity.4 The electoral system has been the crucial institutional mechanism that allowed for the legitimizing and legaliz-ing of these demands in the Macedonian political system.

The fi rst parliamentary elections in Macedonia were held in 1990 under the majoritarian electoral model, with two consecutive electoral rounds.5 The elections had a great impact on the stability of the political system and the interethnic relations in the fi rst years of the democratization of the country. Con-cerning the political system, contrary to the expectations of the proponents of the majoritarian model, the outcomes of

3 The two dominant overlapping segments in Macedonia ba-sed on ethnicity, language and religion are: the ethnic Mace-donian identity, the Orthodox Christian religion and the Mace-donian language, and the Albanian ethnic identity, the Muslim religion and the Albanian language. Gjorge Ivanov,“Albanskoto prašanje vo Makedonija do 2000: makedonskata perspektiva” in Zbornik vo čest na Nikola Sotirovski i Vladimir Kartov (Law Faculty: Skopje, 2001), 375.

4 Eben Friedman, “Electoral system design and minority repre-sentation”, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov. 2005): 387-88.

5 “Zakon za izbor na pratenici na SRM”, Služben vesnik na Re-publika Makedonija, No. 28, Skopje, 1990.



the election showed the disadvantages of the former in under-representation of the political parties which, in turn, infl uenced the legitimacy and the po-larization of the legislative body. The parliamentary seats gained by the po-litical parties did not correspond to the percentages of electoral votes won by those parties. This led to the creation of a “manufactured majority” in the Macedonian parliament.6 The unstable government formed afterwards, the extreme polarization of the Macedonian party system, the lack of consolidation of the inter-party democracy, all presented additional disadvantages of the majori-tarian electoral model after the fi rst par-liamentary elections in Macedonia. The political consequences of the majoritar-ian electoral model also had negative infl uence on the minority representation in the legislative body and indirectly infl uenced the development of the in-terethnic relations in Macedonia, putting the accent on the Albanian-Macedonian ethnic relations. The ethnic Albanian political parties were under-represented in the fi rst parliament. This undermined the legitimacy of the parliament in the eyes of the Albanian electorate and the legitimacy of its normative role, primar-ily the legitimacy of the Constitution of Macedonia as the highest legal act in the hierarchy of the legal system of the country.7

6 VMRO-DPMNE with 24 % of the electoral votes received 31% of the parliamentary seats, while SKM-PDP won 25% of the parliamentary seats compared to 24% of the electoral votes. Tanja Karakamiševa, Izbori i izborni sistemi (Kultura: Skopje, 2004), 250-255.

7 The fi rst Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia was adop ted on 17 November 1991. The Albanians boycotted the referendum for independence held in September 1991. Still, the re fe rendum passed with an overwhelmingly major-ity of the 65%, a turnout which practically equals the eth-nic Macedonians’ share in the total population. See Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 177.

The second democratic elections in Macedonia in 1994 did not bring any increase of ethnic representation in the political system of the country. In contrast to the actual intensifi ed ethnic political mobilization of the political parties, the second elections under the majoritarian electoral model produced a large ethnic Macedonian majority in the parliament. The disproportion between the electoral votes and the seats in the parliament has been a major disadvan-tage that led to a decrease of the value of the individual vote and contested the legitimacy of the legislative body. Hence, the fi rst experience with the majoritarian electoral model in Macedonia did not give the expected results of creating stable position-opposition relations and stable majoritarian governments. Instead, it failed to provide equity rep-resentation to all political forces in the Macedonian legislative body and smoth-ered the airing of the societal and ethnic differences among its population.

The third democratic parliamentary elections in Macedonia followed a pro-cess of reforms in the electoral system of the country. The new debates in the political system in Macedonia raised the question of the need for a more proportional representation of all political subjects, especially larger representa-tion of the political parties of ethnic minorities. This was partially achieved with the alteration of the electoral system and introduction of the mixed electoral model for the parliamentary elections in 1998.8 This mixed (parallel) electoral model brought for the fi rst time a greater proportionality in the distribu-tion of the parliamentary seats and the

8 “Law on the Election of Members for the Parliament of Republic of Macedonia”, http://www.izbori98.gov.mk/eng-lish/html/low_on_elections.htm (accessed 10 September 2007);


Nataša Hroneska

voters’ preferences. The composition of the new parliament refl ected a more balanced representation of the political parties and especially, for the fi rst time in the electoral experience of Macedonia, provided for a larger representation of the Albanian ethnic parties in the Mace-donian parliament. The pre-election coalitions (10 coalitions entered the election campaign), combined with the proportional representation and the traditional voting along ethnic lines, increased the share of mandates of the Albanian political parties.

However, the ethnic confl ict of 2001 showed that, among the other issues, the under-representation of the Albanian politicians in the parliament was still high on the Albanian ethnic agenda. Hence, the ethnic factor was decisive in the alteration of the electoral system in the post-confl ict political environment in the Republic of Macedonia in 2002. The new electoral model of proportional representation was one of the institu-tional devices that aimed at bringing about the accommodation of the ethnic tensions in the country by reforming the very core part of the democratic politi-cal system - the electoral system. The origin of this new electoral model was an effort by the political forces in the state to improve the quality of the democracy in the country, starting from the reform of the most democratic institution, the representative house of the people - the parliament. The electoral model of pro-portional representation in Macedonia was established with the new Law on Elections passed directly before the parliamentary elections in 2002.9 The new electoral law introduced for the

9 See “Zakon za izbor na pratenici vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija,” Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 42, (2002).

first time a clear proportional model for the election of the deputies in the Macedonian parliament. The design of the electoral law of 2002 provided for a larger and more proportional represen-tation of the political parties of the ethnic minorities in Macedonia. The balance of the electoral geography in the electoral law also provided for higher represen-tation of the Albanian political parties in the country. The size of the electoral districts was balanced in order to secure the equality of every vote and, accord-ingly, the equality of every mandate in the parliament. The choice of a closed party list was an advantage, avoiding many possible frauds and abuses of the electoral vote by the politicians. Under these new electoral rules, the outcomes of the parliamentary elections in 2002 brought about a completely new struc-ture of the Macedonian parliament. The results of the parliamentary elections in Macedonia in 2002 affi rmed that PR electoral system performs better for more balanced representation of the political parties in the legislature. The representation of the Albanian political parties in the Macedonian parliament after the 2002 elections has increased, in comparison to the election results from the previous elections under the pure majoritarian or mixed elec-toral system. Another importance of the electoral model of PR in Republic of Macedonia is in its correlation with the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The new electoral system of proportional representation was an indispensable institutional step towards the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement. A parliament with more proportional representation of the ethnic Albanian parties was an electoral engineering mechanism for



a stable parliament that will have the democratic legitimacy to legislate new laws aimed at the accommodation of the ethnic differences in the country.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria was one of the few coun-tries in SEE that experienced a peaceful democratic transition from the com-munist regime. The Roundtable talks between the communist political forces and the opposition drafted the future institutional structure of the Bulgarian democratic political system. The elec-toral system has been shaped by two laws legislated at the Roundtable, the Law on Political Parties and the Elec-tion Law, which tracked the beginning of the democratization of the electoral system in the name of the parliamentary democracy and the political pluralism. The settlement of the ethnic issues in the Bulgarian society after 1990 was made along the lines of the interrela-tion of the Bulgarian electoral system and the political representation of the Turkish minority in the country. The two main characteristics of this period are the moderate ethnic policy of the Turk-ish political organization, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), as well as the specifi c features of the Bulgarian electoral system that allowed for a wide parliamentary representation of the members of the MRF and prompt ac-commodation of the ethnic issues in Bul-garia during the democratization years. Starting in 1989, the democratization process presented the breaking point for the discontented Turkish minority to organize itself. The pluralization of the society and the political system allowed for the ethnic political mobilization of the Turks and contestation of their place

in the emerging plural party system in Bulgaria. This mobilization was embod-ied in the moderate organization of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, whose aim was to enjoy benefi ts by participating in a well-functioning politi-cal system. It had a valuable share in the entire process of the democratization of the Bulgarian political system. The most important role of the MRF was, fi rstly, the consolidation of the electoral system in the country and the normal function-ing of the parliamentary democracy in Bulgaria and secondly, in the peaceful integration of the Turkish minority in the Bulgarian society, as well as the suc-cessful accommodation of the ethnic demands within the political system in Bulgaria.

The fi rst free democratic elections in post-communist Bulgaria were held in 1990. Without overvaluation, they remained a huge step forward in the qualitative development of the Bulgar-ian political system. The mixed electoral system in the fi rst parliamentary elec-tions in Bulgaria provided for a high percentage of proportionality in the parliament. With the seats won, the MRF become the third force in the fi rst post-communist elections in the Grand National Assembly, thus gaining a sig-nifi cant bargaining power.10 This was a very important factor for the stabilization of the political system in the country during the democratization process. The high percentage of representation of the Turkish minority in the legislative body since the fi rst post-communist pluralistic elections was promising a more moder-ate ethnic policy and accommodation of the demands of the numerous Turks in Bulgaria through the political system of

10 Karakamiševa, Izbori i izborni sistemi, 167.


Nataša Hroneska

the country. The constructiveness of the opposition after the fi rst parliamentary elections and the fear of losing the next elections put the pressure on the ruling BSP to reform the electoral system and to introduce a clear proportional repre-sentation model for the new elections scheduled in 1991. This has been one of the most important reforms in the political system of Bulgaria because it led to the fi rst clear proportionality in representation of the political parties in the parliament and opened the way of substantial consolidation of the democ-racy in the country. Moreover, the insti-tutional choice of proportional represen-tation facilitated minority representation within the choice of the parliamentary framework in the political system.11 The electoral model of PR increased the parliamentary representation of the political party of the Turkish minority and consequently, has led to a more constructive role of the Turkish political factor in the political system of Bulgaria. Under the PR electoral system, the MRF has become the third most powerful po-litical party in the Bulgarian parliament, coalition partner in the government and an infl uential force in the political life in the country. Under the electoral system of proportional representation, the politi-cal party of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria has participated in every parliamentary structure since the fi rst elections.12 In all the consecutive elections in Bulgaria under the PR electoral system, the MRF

11 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transi-tion and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Uni-versity Press, 1996), 342.

12 At the elections in 1994, the MRF won 5% of the vote, in 1997 it was a coalition partner in the pre-election coalition Alliance for National Salvation with former UDF members, the Green Par-ty and the Agrarian Party. At the turning point in the Bulgarian political arena, the elections in 2001, when the National Move-ment of Simeon II won a sweeping electoral victory, the MRF succeeded in retaining its votes by gaining 21 seats in the par-liament and allied the NMSII in the government.

has maintained wide support and held a central role in the Bulgarian politics. The parliamentary representatives of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria have fully legitimized themselves within the public opinion in the country and have consecutively legitimized the parliament as a representative body of all the citi-zens in Bulgaria.13

Romania

Post-communist Romania has faced many challenges with the institution-building and regime change during the process of democratization of the coun-try after 1989. The fi rst free democratic parliamentary elections took place in an unstable political environment, even before the real processes of pluraliza-tion of the society and political system had emerged.14 The Romanian electoral system has been an institutional mecha-nism for the accommodation of the Hun-garian minority in the political system of the country. The Hungarian minority in Romania has been an important politi-cal factor for the stability of the country, drawing from its historical heritage and the demographical characteristics. When analyzing the accommodation of the Hungarian minority in Romania during the democratization period, we have to take into consideration the eth-nic political mobilization that preceded their parliamentary representation. It was expressed in the performance of the Democratic Union of the Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) as their political repre-sentative. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Hungarian minority mobilized itself

13 See CSCE Report, Human Rights and Democratiza tion in Bul-garia 1993, http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm? FuseAction=Files.Download&FileStore_id=350 , (accessed 18 September 2007).

14 Karakamiševa, Izbori i izborni sistemi,174.



in an ethnic political party, the UDMR.15 The “autonomy” became a key concept in the ethnic policy of the UDMR, refl ect-ing the common fear of the assimilation policy by the Romanian state. The de-mands of the ethnic Hungarians from the beginning of their political mobilization were directed towards greater cultural and educational autonomy, as well as “local self-government” and “regional” autonomy of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The fulfillment of these demands depended on the political participation of the Hungarian minor-ity in the decision-making institutions. However, playing the “ethnic national-ism” card radicalized the attitudes on both sides (Romanian majority and Hungarian minority) and deteriorated the security and the political situation in the country, creating a bipolar model of ethnic relations on the political scene before the fi rst parliamentary elections in 1990. The fi rst democratic elections in Romania were held in.1990, in a po-litically unstable environment. The fi rst elections were conducted under the electoral law included in the presidential decision in 1990. The law introduced an electoral system of proportional repre-sentation, with party lists for nominating of candidates and a proportional formula for translating votes into parliamentary seats. The political party of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania, the Demo-cratic Union of the Hungarians (UDMR), achieved an electoral success and came second, after the NFL, in the parlia-mentary seats won.16 With the electoral

15 For a more explicit analysis of the role of the Hungarian minor-ity in the democratization of the political system of Romania, see Daria Ioana Miria, Lazaresku, “The Hungarian minority in Romania: an example of confl ict transformation.” (MA Thesis, National University of Athens, Athens, 2006).

16 In the Chamber of Deputies, the UDMR won 29 mandates, the same number of seats as the National Liberal Party. In the Sen-ate, the UDMR won 12 seats.

system of proportional representation, the Romanian decision-makers tried to accommodate the ethnic division in the country and manage in peaceful and democratic way the demands of the ethnic political parties. Larger rep-resentation of the Hungarian minority in the parliament meant greater legitimacy of their political representative which, in turn, led to increased political power of the party in the decision-making pro-cess. The political representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania had the legal power to infl uence the ethnic policy of the Romanian government and to accommodate the demands of their political program within the political and legal system of Romania. Although this process was shadowed with ethnic na-tionalisms and majoritarian oppression, in the period after 1992, the Romanian parliament and government conducted a more accommodative ethnic policy. This can be seen in the major laws that were legislated in this period and which fulfi lled the demands of the Hungarian minority.17 The choice of the electoral system of proportional representation in Romania has brought an effi cient minor-ity representation, stable and legitimate political institutions and a peaceful de-mocratization path.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to argue that the type of electoral system had an important infl uence as an institu-tional device for the accommodation of the ethnic minorities in the ethnically divided, post-communist countries of South East Europe during the democ-

17 E.g. the bilingualism in the territories inhabited by Hungarians, Law on Education of 1995, Law on Local Public Administra-tion of April 2001.


Nataša Hroneska

ratization period. The paper’s focus is the correlation between the electoral systems and parliamentary represen-tation of the largest ethnic minorities in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania. It demonstrates that among the other factors, the electoral system of pro-portional representation increases the parliamentary representation of ethnic political parties and presents the best institutional choice. The analysis of the consecutive elections that took place in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania throughout the democratization period illustrates that the PR electoral system performs better than the majoritarian and mixed electoral systems in enhanc-

ing the parliamentary representation of the ethnic political parties in these countries.

Taking the electoral system as a refl ection of the relations between the ethnicity and the maturity of the repre-sentative democracy, this paper upholds the thesis that in ethnically divided soci-eties, ethnicity plays an important role in the choice of the electoral system. The experience of the countries analyzed in this paper showns that the successful electoral system will be the one that ac-commodates ethnic differences through parliamentary representation of the ethnic political parties in a proportional manner.

Rezime

Izborot na najdobri institucionalni mehanizmi za miroqubivo re{avawe na etni~kite problemi e eden od najgolemite predizvici koi go odbeleàa procesot na demokratizacija vo zemjite na Jugoisto~na Evropa. Vo ovoj region demokratizacijata se odviva{e paralelno so menaxiraweto na etni~kite razdori i re{avaweto na etni~kite konflikti. Ovie uslovi sami po sebe go nametnaa pra{aweto na dizaj-nirawe na politi~ki sistem koj }e uspee da gi nadmine etni~kite konflikti, promoviraj}i me|u-etni~ka sorabotka, stabilen partiski sistem i funkcionalna demokratija vo etni~ki podeleni op{testva. Vo ovie novi demokratii so politi~ki pluralizam vo ra|awe, izborot na izboren sistem se smeta za eden od glavnite faktori za stabili-zacija na demokratskiot reìm i integracija na etni~kite malcinstva vo politi~kiot sistem. Fokusot e staven na tri zemji od Jugoisto~na Evropa, Makedonija, Bugarija i Romanija, kade {to relativnata stabil-nost na politi~kiot sistem ovozmoì uslovi za izboren inènering. Od osoben interes vo tekstot e vrskata pome|u proporcionalniot izboren sistem i parlamentarnata zastapenost na najgolemite etni~ki malcin-stva vo ovie tri zemji.


Amerikanskite politi~ki partii – problemi, promeni, predizvici

Velimir Delovski

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Prikaznata za amerikanskite politi~ki partii zapo~nuva ne po -sredno po steknuvaweto na ne za vis-nosta vo 1776 godina koga do a|a do polarizacija na dve sprotivstaveni politi~ki grupacii – federalisti~ka, na ~elo so A. Hamilton, koja se zalaga za mo} na centralisti~ka dràva, go poddrùva protekcionizmot, se bori protiv ropstvoto i gi pretsta-vuva interesite na industrijalcite, trgovcite i bankarite od severot, od koja }e proizleze Republikanskata partija i antifederalisti~ka ili republikanska, na ~elo so T. Xeferson, ~ii{to privrzanici se zastapnici na idejata za slaba centralna dràva, koi baraat pogolema avtonomija na dràvite i se pobornici na slo-bodnata trgovija, gi pretstavuvaat plantaèrite i farmerite od jugot i so toa se smetaat za pret hodnici na Demokratskata partija.

Poznati kako frakcii, za raz-lika od mnogu drugi demokratski dràvi, niv Ustavot na SAD voop{to ne gi tretira i tie pretstavuvaat vonustavna kategorija; istite bile smetani za neizbe`ni, no i opasni.1 Modernite partii se sozdavaat vo uslovi na globalna polarizacija i pro{ireno izbira~ko pravo, koga razli~nite op{testveni formacii imaat mo`nost za artikulacija na sopstvenite politi~ki pozicii. Naj-prvo Xeferson vo tekot na 1790-tite

1 Taka, prviot pretsedatel na SAD Xorx Va{ington niv gi opi{uva kako najgolemi neprijateli na narodot.

}e ja sozdade demokratsko-republi-kanskata partija kako prethodni~ka na dene{nata Demokratska partija, so {to taa e najstarata partija koja postoi vo svetot. Podocna istata se rascepuva na Xeksonovi demokrati i vigovci koi, pak, }e is~eznat od politi~kata scena vo 1852 godina. Dve godini podocna }e bide osnovana Re-publikanskata partija koja gi pribira vo svoite redovi nekoga{nite vigovci, disidentite od Demokratskata parti-ja, ~lenovite na nekoi vidovi tajni dru{tva i sl. Po secesionisti~kata vojna me|u severot i jugot demokratite se dlaboko podeleni po pra{aweto za ropstvoto, kako posledica na {to }e dojde do niven rascep na dve partii – ju`no krilo i severno krilo koe go zadrùva imeto Demokratska partija, a so toa }e se ovozmoì prvata pobeda na republikancite i izborot na Linkoln za pretsedatel na SAD vo 1860 godina. Izborite od 1860 godina politi~ki ja podelija zemjata pome|u severnite dràvi ~ii{to glasa~i prete`no glasaat za republikancite i ju`nite demokrati i se smetaat za prvi vo nizata kriti~ni izbori koi sozdavaat ostra promena vo partiskite lojalnosti pome|u grupite glasa~i i gi zacementiraat Demokratskata i Repub-likanskata partija kako dominantni vo dvopartiskiot sistem. Zajaknatata dominacija na republikancite, pod vlijanie na nivniot tesen link so biznisot vo periodot od 1896 do 1930 godina }e trae s¢ do krahot na Vol


Velimir Delovski

strit2 za da, otkako Franklin D. Ruz-velt vo 1932 ponudi novi re{enija za nevrabotenosta i ekonomskata kriza na Golemata depresija, demokratite go osvojat primatot na mnozinska partija s¢ do 1969 godina.3

Amerikanskiot dvopartiski sis tem se temeli vrz razli~nite sfa}awa za vlasta, a ne vrz ideolo{ki, verski ili sociolo{ki osnovi, ka ko {to e toa slu~aj so golem broj par tiski sistemi vo evropskite zem ji, pa zatoa bezuspe{ni bile obi dite za sozdavawe na kakva bilo socijalisti~ka, komunisti~ka ili rabotni~ka partija. Odgovorot na pra{aweto, zo{to amerikanskiot politi~ki sistem pove}e od sto godini e dominiran od dve glavni partii – Republikanskata (G.O.P. – Grand Old Party) i Demokratskata partija, koi na sekoi pretsedatel ski izbori voobi~aeno sobiraat pove}e od 95% od glasovite, leì vo (1) mnozinskiot izboren model so uninominalni izbori (single-memner district), koj gi favorizira golemite partii za{to vo nego vaì praviloto „winner takes all#, soglasno koe za izbran se smeta onoj poedinec koj }e dobie mnozinstvo glasovi vo distriktot odnosno dràvata, dodeka gubitnikot ne dobiva ni{to, kako i vo (2) procesot na politi~ka socijalizacija – imeno, dvete partii ima at mo{ne silno vlijanie vo strukturiraweto na glasovite, na {to se nadovrzuvaat i tradicijata i postoeweto na silni bazi na edna ili druga partija vo oddelni delovi na SAD. Dotolku pove}e, malite partii gi demotiviraat i krutite

2 Edinstven prekin vo vladeeweto na republikancite ima vo dvata posledovatelni mandati na Vudro Vilson od 1913 do 1921 koga i politikite na demokratite do ne-kade se menuvaat – dotoga{ tie generalno go odob ruvale strogoto tolkuvawe na Ustavot na SAD i se za la gale za ograni~uvawe na federalnata vlast.

3 Po isklu~ok, republikancite }e dobijat pretsedatel sko mesto vo vremeto na Ajzenhauer od 1952 do 1961.

zakonski odredbi koi gi obvrzuvaat da soberat iljadnici potpisi za da bidat staveni na glasa~koto liv~e, kako i zakonskata pre~ka koja se sostoi vo toa {to, dodeka dvete glavni partii prakti~no av to matski se kvalifikuvaat za jav no finansirawe na nivnite pret sedatelski kampawi i sredstvata gi dobivaat vo tekot na samata kam pawa, malite partii moàt da dobijat del od fondovite samo ot-kako }e bidat poznati rezultati te i ako osvoile najmalku 5% od vkup niot broj glasovi.

Sepak, politi~kiot razvoj na So-edinetite Dràvi beleì mnogu obidi za sozdavawe na treti mali partii koi ne se odrùvaat dolgo na politi~kata scena i glavno se naso~uvaat kon eden poedinec vo tek na pretsedatelskite izbori, dodeka nivnoto vlijanie na izborite za Kongresot e re~isi nikak-vo.4 Tie dejstvuvaat na periferijata na dvopartiskiot sistem, no sepak se smeta deka imaat realen efekt vrz politikite koi gi usvojuvaat glavnite partii; ènskoto pravo na glas, stepenestoto odano~uvawe na dohodot kako i neposrednite izbori za senatori izviraat tokmu od malite partii. Prvi~no sozdadeni so cel da go izrazat nesoglasuvaweto na nekoi glasa~i so ponudata na glavnite par-tii, malite partii moàt da bidat od ~etiri tipa: 1) partii na begalci/disidenti od nekoja od glavnite partii,5 2) partii na farmerskiot

4 Interesen e primerot na Ros Perot koj na pretseda-telskite izbori vo 1992 osvoi duri 16% od glasovite, {to ukaùva na slabeewe na Republikanskata i na De-mo kratskata partija, a tokmu negovite glasovi bile odlu~uva~ki za pobedata na Bil Klinton.

5 Pove}e pati se slu~i voda~ite na novoformiranite partii da se borat so nivnite porane{ni partii, no, so isklu~ok na Progresivnata partija na Tedi Ruzvelt vo 1912 i Amerikanskata partija na nezavisnosta na Xorx Valas vo 1968, tie ne vlijaeja bitno vrz ishodot na pre-tsedatelskite izbori iako dvapati osvoija po ve }e od 10% od glasovite.



trud koi go zastapuvaat stanovi{teto spored koe farmerite i urbanite rabotnici ne go dobivaat nivniot del od op{testvenoto bogatstvo,6 3) partii na ideolo{ki protest koi odat ~ekor podaleku vo kritikuvaweto na vostanoveniot sistem odbivaj}i gi preovladuva~kite doktrini i pred-lagaj}i radikalno razli~ni principi, ~esto vo nasoka na zgolemen vladin aktivizam7 i 4) ednotematski partii formirani zaradi promovirawe na eden edinstven princip ili filo-zofija na vladeewe.8

Vakviot sistem na tvrd bipartizam go ~inat dve (spored stepenot na vnatre{nata organiziranost) meki partii koi, vsu{nost, pretstavuvaat labavi koalicii na partii koi postojat vo oddelnite dràvi i se zdruùvaat edna{ vo ~etiri godini, toga{ koga treba da se izbere zaedni~kiot kandidat za Pretsedatel, dodeka vo me|uvreme nivnata aktivnost se odviva isklu~ivo vo ramkite na od-delnite dràvi. Tie nemaat svoja jasna ideologija nitu cvrsta organizacija i formalno ~lenstvo, pa ottuka ne moè da stane zbor nitu za postoewe na partiska disciplina vo smisla na obvrska za pridrùvawe kon platfor-mite na partijata koi, pak, za razlika od programite na mnogu partii od drugi zemji, se premnogu voop{teni i anomi~ni so ogled na nivnata he-

6 Na primer, Populisti~kata partija, formirana vo 1892, no i Progresivnata, osnovana vo 1924 i koja is ~ezna edna godina podocna.

7 Socijalisti~kata partija, kako desna partija koja te` ne-ela da ja spori vladinata akcija vo op{testvoto, ka ko i Libertarijanskata partija, koja ja akcentira slo bodata pred poredokot i ednakvosta.

8 Vo ovaa grupa spa|aat Antimasonskata partija, Partija-ta na slobodnata zemja, Prohibicionisti~kata par tija, Partijata na prirodnoto pravo, no i Republikanskata koja nastanala kako ednotematska partija koja se proti-vi na ropstvoto vo novite teritorii, za da na izborite vo 1856 godina go prezeme vtoroto mesto, is tisnuvaj}i gi pritoa vigovcite, {to }e pretstavuva silen pottik za sozdavaweto na treti partii.

te rogena struktura, koegzistiraj}i kako grupacii vo koi se ostvaruva kompromis na razli~nite interesi.9 Pritoa, partiskite platformi se glavno izborni programi za akcii, so namera za nivno sproveduvawe vo pretstojniot period, koi imaat za cel da privle~at {to pogolem broj izbira~i nezavisno od toa na koi slo-evi ili grupi pripa|aat i istite ne gi obvrzuvaat politi~kite izbranici da se pridrùvaat kon nivnite odredbi. Za toa pridonesuva i visokiot stepen na personalizacija na vlasta koj vo amerikanskiot sistem e daleku poizraen odo{to vo drugite razvieni zemji – samata li~nost na kandidatot e po pravilo od pogolemo zna~ewe za opredeluvaweto na izbira~ite otkolku negovata politi~ka programa odnosno ideologija.

Iako sli~ni, demokratite i re-publikancite imaat mnogu razli~ni ideolo{ki orientacii koi vo ekonom-skata sfera moàt da se uvidat preku analiza na nivnite pozicii po ~etiri pra{awa – sopstvenosta na sred-stvata za proizvodstvo, ulogata na vladata vo ekonomskoto planirawe, redistribucijata na bogatstvoto i obezbeduvaweto na socijalna blago-sostojba. Taka, osnovnite programski pozicii na Republikanskata partija se: pogolemo naglasuvawe na ekonomskata kompetitivnost, ograni~ena rolja na dràvata, niski danoci, balansiran buxet i kastrewe na socijalnite iz-datoci, favorizirawe na povisokite sloevi, silna odbrana i golem voen buxet, postojano jaknewe na pozici-ite na SAD vo svetot preku vodewe

9 Obete glavni amerikanski partii spa|aat vo kate go ri -jata koja Oto Kirhajmer ja narekuva catch-all parties (se -opfatni ili masovni partii koi otfrlaat golem del od ideolo{kiot tovar za da bi bile privle~ni za {to e mo`no pogolem broj glasa~i).


Velimir Delovski

poagresivna nadvore{na politika, za~uvuvawe na starite institucii i sprotivstavuvawe na reformite, pa zatoa taa se tretira kako konzerva-tivna, za razlika od Demokratskata partija koja, kako liberalna politi~ka formacija na leviot centar, se zalaga za unapreduvawe na rabotni~kite i potro{uva~kite prava, poaktivna uloga na dràvata vo ekonomijata, popravedna raspredelba na dohodot, jaknewe na federalnite fondovi za zdravstvena za{tita, socijalna si-gurnost i obrazovanie, podobruvawe na polo`bata na najsiroma{nite, intenzivno apeliraj}i na nu`nosta od promeni.

Ottuka proizleguvaat i klu~nite determinanti na partiskata identi-fikacija10 kako najvaèn indikator na izborniot ishod, imaj}i predvid deka polovinata od elektoratot odlu~uva kako }e glasa pred par-tiskite konvencii, dodeka na kus rok izvesno vlijanie imaat atributite i politi~kite pozicii na kandidatite. Uslovno, Republikanskata e partija na krupniot kapital, a Demokratskata gi zastapuva interesite na srednite slo-evi i prose~niot gra|anin. Vrz osnova na edno predizborno istraùvawe na javnoto mislewe, sprovedeno vo 2002 godina, koe ja analizira relativno stabilnata struktura na izbi ra~-koto telo vo SAD vrz osnova na ne-kolku socioekonomski kriteriumi – prihod, obrazovanie, religija, pol, rasa, region i vozrast, moè da se zaklu~i deka za republikancite tradicional no glasaat izbira~ite so pogolem i podobar op{testven status i pogolemi prihodi, obrazovanite i povozrasnite, ̀ itelite na ruralnite

10 ûvstvo na psiholo{ka privrzanost na glasa~ot kon odredena partija.

sredini i gradovi so sredna golemina, Anglosaksoncite i potomcite na doselenicite od severna i zapadna Evropa. Obratno, pripadnicite na poniskite sloevi, koi imaat poniski primawa i pomalo obrazovanie, sred-nite slo evi, rabotnicite i golem del na intelektualcite, mladite ̀ iteli na golemite gradovi, pripadnicite na pomalite etni~ki grupi, potomcite na doselenicite od ju`na i isto~na Evropa, katolicite, Evreite, ̀ enite, Hispano- i Afroamerikancite11 ima pogolemi izgledi da se smetaat za demokrati otkolku za republikan ci. Studiite pokaùvaat deka re~isi polovinata od Amerikancite ja pri -svojuvaat partijata na nivnite ro-diteli – jugot i severoistokot se izrazito demokratski, a sredniot zapad i zapadot – prete`no repub-likanski.12

Po~nuvaj}i od 1960-tite SAD }e gi zafati pojavata na slabeewe na partiskata identifikacija – namalu-vawe na privrzanosta na lu|eto kon politi~kite partii, so istovremeno zgolemuvawe na brojot na nezavisnite ili nestabilni izbira~i.13 Osobeno izrazena kaj belata populacija, pom-lada od 30 godini, koja ne e premnogu vrzana za tradicijata i neretko glasa za kandidati na razli~ni partii, taa go otslikuva s¢ pogolemoto razo~aruvawe od konvencionalnata politika i neuspehot na partiskiot sistem da odgovori na potrebite na

11 75-80% od amerikanskite crnci glasaat za demokra-tite koi patem go poddràa zakonodavstvoto za pogo-lemi gra|anski prava vo 1960-tite.

12 Spored starosnata struktura, najmladata grupa gla sa ~i e ponezavisna, dodeka lu|eto od srednite 20-ti do sred-nite 40-ti, koi bea socijalizirani vo vremeto na Regan i Bu{, se te{ki republikanci, najstarata gru pa ne samo {to e silno demokratski nastroena tu ku pokaùva i naj-golema partiska angaìranost i lojalnost.

13 Od 9% vo 1920 na pribli`no 30% vo osumdesettite go-dini na 20 vek.



postindustriskoto op{testvo i e po-kazatel na neophodnosta od refor mi vo partiite i partiskiot sistem. Na ova se nadovrzuva i apstinencijata izrazena osobeno me|u siroma{nite, crncite, mladite farmeri i ̀ enite.14 Sli~nata ideolo{ka platforma i labavata organizacija na partiite, kade ~esto sli~nostite me|u oddel-nite krila na ednata i drugata partija se pogolemi odo{to sli~nostite na levoto i desnoto krilo od istata partija, ovozmoùvaat transfer na del od partiskite privrzanici od edna kon druga partija. Najgolemata preraspredelba na glasovi se slu~i vo periodot od 1928 do 1936 godina koga dojde do premin na golem del od izbira~koto telo kon Demokratskata partija i Republikanskata partija ja zagubi svojata dominantna polo`ba kako posledica na ekonomskata kriza koja go obedinuva izbira~koto telo okolu programata New Deal.

Iako se daleku od hierarhiskata i centralizirana organizacija na ev-ropskite politi~ki partii, sekoja od partiite vo SAD ima svoi tela i organi kako na nacionalno i lokalno nivo taka i na nivo na oddelnite dràvi. Tie gi reflektiraat fundamental-nite principi na podelba na vlasta i federalizmot i se organizirani kako stratarhija {to podrazbira difuzija na vlasta pome|u i vnatre vo ramkite na nivoata (strata) na partiskata organizacija sprotivno na piramidalniot oblik. Najgolemo par-tisko telo e Nacionalnata partiska konvencija koja se sostoi od nekolku iljadi delegati izbrani od partiskite

14 Sepak, strukturata na izbira~koto telo ostanala re-la tivno stabilna u{te od 1930-tite. Dokaz za toa e istraùvaweto na javnoto mislewe od 1986 godina na koe 40% od Amerikancite se izjasnile sebesi kako de -mo krati, 26% kako republikanci i 33% kako nezavisni.

organizacii na dràvite i se svikuva sekoja ~etvrta godina letoto pred pretsedatelskite izbori, a na koja £ prethodat konvencii koi se odrùvaat vo oddelnite dràvi.15 Nejzinite osnovni zada~i se nominirawe na kandidat za pretsedatel (koj istovre-meno stanuva i lider na partijata za naredniot ~etirigodi{en period) i potpretsedatel (na predlog na iz-braniot kandidat za pretsedatel), usvojuvawe na izbornata platforma i konstituirawe na Nacionalniot komitet kako rakovoden organ pome|u dve konvencii, koj se sostoi od po dva pretstavnika od sekoja dràva i aktivno raboti samo vo godinata na pretsedatelskite izbori.16 Sekoja od partiite odrùva i odvoeni kongresni partiski konferencii vo obata doma na Kongresot, koi se zanimavaat samo so kongresni pra{awa i nemaat kakva bilo strukturalna vrska pome|u sebe i so nacionalnite komiteti.17

Amerikanskite partii imaat i re lativno mal broj t.n. partiski rabotnici (partyworkers) – aktivisti koi na odreden na~in se angaìrani vo partiskite organi na razni nivoa i poddrùva~i na partijata (party supporters), koi glasaat za oddelnite partii, kako i odredeni statutarni pravila koi se donesuvaat glavno pred svikuvawe na konvenciite i os tanatite partiski tela, pokaùvaj-

15 So ogled deka, po~nuvaj}i od 1972 godina, konvenciite sluàt edinstveno za ratifikacija na rezultati te na kompleksniot proces na selektirawe na delega ti, tie se smetaat za farsa, pa odredeni avtori duri ja nagla-suvaat potrebata od nivno ukinuvawe.

16 Efektivna uloga vo rakovodewe so partijata vo me|u-vreme ima Centralniot partiski {tab kade rabotat po-golem broj profesionalci so uloga vo podgotovkata na izborite i davawe pomo{ na partiskite kandidati vo izbornata kampawa.

17 Tie imaat organizaciska uloga i ostvaruvaat izvesna or-ganizaciona kontrola vo pogled na aktivnostite na po-edini ~lenovi na Kongresot so cel da se spre~i ne ~ie nesoodvetno ili ekstremno odnesuvawe vo tekot na za-konodavniot proces.


Velimir Delovski

}i na toj na~in postoewe na odreden stepen na organiziranost i povrzanost na poedini delovi na partijata vo edinstvena celina.

So nizata vnatrepartiski reformi od 1970-tite, najprvo vo Demokratska-ta, a potoa i vo Republikanskata partija }e bide vospostavena vlast na upravuvawe na Nacionalniot komitet, koja vklu~uva i kontrola nad postapkata za izbor na delegati za Nacionalnata konvencija.18 Celta bila da se oslabne mo}ta na loka-lnite partiski voda~i za smetka na jaknewe na ulogata na obi~nite ~lenovi. I pokraj toa, tie u{te dolgo }e se potpiraat vrz silnite lokalni partiski organizacii, osobeno vo golemite gradovi kade e o~igledno odlu~uva~koto vlijanie na partiski ma{inerii i nivnite bosovi koi dominiraat so lokalnata politika – nekoga{ so ilegalni sredstva, preku niza, pred s¢, materijalni pottici koi bi trebalo da ja stimuliraat partici-pacijata na gra|anite vo partiskata organizacija (obezbeduvawe na rabotni mesta i preferencijalen tretman pri davaweto uslugi ili snabduvaweto na vladinite slu`bi). So postepe-noto sosekuvawe na praktikata na patronaà i funkciite na socijalni servisi, mnogu lokalni organizacii go gubat vlijanieto vrz izborite, za {to pridonesuva rasprostranuvaweto na primarnite izbori kako osnoven metod na nominacija na kandidati za javna slu`ba.

18 Na Demokratskata konvencija odràna vo 1972 se for-mulirani novi upatstva za selekcija na delegati, vklu~uvaj}i go i praviloto spored koe se bara parti-ite na dràvite da prezemaat „afirmativna akcija#, a so cel za pogolema vklu~enost na ̀ enite, malcinstvata i mladite. Vo taa smisla, na mo}nata delegacija na Ili-nois, predvodena od gradona~alnikot na ̂ ikago Ri~ard Dali, £ bilo odbieno u~estvoto na Kon vencijata poradi nepridrùvawe kon obvrskata za polovi, rasni i sta-rosni kvoti.

Vpro~em, nominiraweto na kandi-dati i strukturiraweto na izborot na glasa~ite se dvete klu~ni funkcii na partiite vo SAD, so ogled deka tie se pove}e izborno otkolku programski orientirani i imaat prvenstveno iz-borna, a ne vladeja~ka uloga.19 Dodeka vo po~etokot predlagaweto na kandi-dati im bilo dovereno na nekolkute partiski voda~i koi se sostanuvale vo mali, tajni grupi nare~eni caucus (odbor),20 podocna partiskite glasa~i gi izbiraat kandidatite za pret-stojnite oficijalni izbori po pat na preliminarni, t.n. primarni izbori.21 Vo pove}eto amerikanski dràvi se odrùvaat zatvoreni primarni izbori na koi moàt da u~estvuvaat samo onie poddrùva~i ili privrzanici na partijata koi pred samite izbori }e se registriraat vo izbira~kiot spisok na odnosnata politi~ka partija ili }e dadat izjava deka }e glasaat za nejzinite kandidati, odnosno }e ja poddrùvaat partiskata poli-tika, dodeka na otvorenite primarni izbori moàt da u~estvuvaat site izbira~i bez obyir na partiskata pripadnost.

Primarnite izbori ovozmoùvaat pogolema demokratizacija na iz-borniot proces i se javuvaat kako ne koj vid protivteà na mo}ta na

19 Amerikanskiot pretsedatelski reìm, za razlika od parlamentarniot, ne doveduva do partisko vladeewe. Po izborite za Pretsedatel se govori za republikan ska ili demokratska administracija, no toa e samo govorna konvencija – na vlast ne e nitu Republikanskata nitu Demokratskatata partija, a Pretsedatelot ne dejstvu-va kako lider na edna partija za{to negovite mo`nosti za dejstvuvawe se usloveni od negovata nezavisnost od sopstve nata partija i sorabotkata so protivni~kata partija.

20 Na ovoj na~in bil izbran i Xorx Va{ington kako prv Pret sedatel na SAD vo 1789. Deneska samo vo u{te de-setina dràvi nominiraweto se vr{i po pat na caucus.

21 Za prvpat primarnite izbori bile upotrebeni pri iz-borot na delegati za Nacionalnata konvencija vo Wu Hemp{ir vo 1912 godina, kade i denes tradicionalno se organiziraat prvite primarni izbori, dodeka prvi-ot caucus se svikuva vo Ajova.



partiskata ma{inerija i na sil nite privatni asocijacii koi neretko imale dominantno vlijanie vo pro-cesot na kandidirawe, no se smeta deka evolucijata na izbornite kam-pawi od partiski centrirani kon kandidatski centrirani i visoko personalizirani, koi se sproveduvaat nadvor od kontrolata na partiskite organizacii, bi moèla da ima se ri-ozni implikacii po demokratskoto vladeewe. Decentraliziranata priroda na procesot na nominirawe na kandidati im dava mo`nost na organiziranite grupi nadvor od partiite da gi identifikuvaat i poddràt onie kandidati koi gi favoriziraat nivnite interesi, poradi {to pobednicite, iako voop{to ne bi moèle da ja dobijat nominacijata bez {iroka poddr{ka vnatre vo partijata, moàt sosema legitimno da smetaat deka toa e blagodarenie na nivnite napori i deka malku £ dolàt na partiskata organizacija.22 Za toa pridonesuva i samiot na~in na finansirawe na kampawite, osobeno pretsedatelskite koi se sekoga{ skapi, a metodite na pribirawe na sredstva ostanuvaat somnitelni. Imeno, iako fondovite se formiraat na razli~ni na~ini (vklu~itelno i partiski sredstva), kandidatite se upateni samite da pribiraat sredstva, poradi {to dominiraat donaciite od odredeni industriski i finansiski magnati i korporacii koi se najmnogu zainteresirani nivnata partija/kandidat da dojde na vlast.

22 Po aferata Votergejt (1974-1976) toga{niot pret se da tel Nikson, koj be{e optuèn za ilegalni aktiv nosti, si dade ostavka, no Republikancite ne bea mno gu ̀ estoko kazneti poradi nezavisnata priroda na pretsedatelskata kam-pawa. I samiot Nikson, kako i Ajzenhauer prethodno vo 1952, se distancira{e od sop stvenata partija.

So donesuvaweto na Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) od 1971 godina za prvpat e sozdadena sojuzna zakonska ramka koja go regulira finansiraweto na federalnite kampawi, gi utvrduva zakonskite limiti na kontribuciite vo izbornata kampawa od strana na po-edinci i organizacii,23 im nametnuva obvrska na partiite za zadolìtelno obelodenuvawe na nivnite tro{oci i ja vostanovuva Federalnata izborna komisija.24 I pokraj toa, vkupnite izborni tro{oci prodolìle da rastat i da go nadminuvaat zakonski utvrdeniot limit.25 Vo prilog na toa e i mo`nosta, predvidena so pravilata od 1999 godina, kandidatot da ne gi prifati federalnite fondovi, pri {to, vo takov slu~aj, toj se osloboduva od obvrskata za pridrùvawe kon zakonskite ograni~uvawa i moè da potro{i kolku saka svoi pari.26 Javno-to finansirawe na pretsedatelskata kampawa na izvesen na~in go zajakna trendot na nejzino personalizirawe za{to fondovite odat po pravilo kaj kandidatot a ne kaj partijata koja i ne ja vodi pretsedatelskata kampawa, tuku samo go poddrùva. Zatoa mnogumina smetaat deka edna od reformite na izborniot sistem treba da opfati sosema nov na~in na finansirawe na kampawite od javni sredstva koi bi

23 Najprvo so amandmanot od 1974 godina, za da tie limi-ti bidat zgolemeni so Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act od mart 2002.

24 FEC e zamislena kako nezavisna agencija sostavena od {est ~lena (po tri od sekoja partija), koja treba da go sprovede zakonot i da go administrira javnoto finan-sirawe na pretsedatelskite kampawi, koe za po~na so izborite od 1976 godina.

25 Istovremeno se legalizira sponzoriraweto na kam-pawite od strana na t.n. Politi~ki akcioni komiteti (PACs), organizirani od korporacii, sindikati, tr gov ski asocijacii i razni vidovi interesni grupi, ~ij {to broj na sojuzno nivo porasnal naglo od okolu 600 vo 1974 go-dina na preku 3350 vo 1982.

26 Bu{ vo dva navrati, vo 2000 i 2004 i Keri vo 2004 godi-na se otkaàa od javnite fondovi nameneti za primar-nite izbori, taka {to samo Bu{ vo 2004 potro{i pove}e od 150 milioni dolari.


Velimir Delovski

se davale na partiite, a ne direktno na individualnite kandidati.

Osven toa, dvostepenata postapka koja gi karakterizira pretsedatelski-te izbori e ~estopati kritikuvana, osobeno vo delot na izjasnuvaweto na izborniot (elektorski) kolex koj ne sekoga{ gi odrazuva realnata slika i raspoloènieto na glasa~koto te lo i moè duri da ja dovede vo pra{awe legitimnosta na izbraniot pretsedatel.27 Isto taka, izborniot sistem na SAD ne e voop{to imun na malverzacii, neregularnosti i improvizacii, za {to govori i kon fuzijata koja se sozdade okolu prebrojuvaweto na glasovite vo Flo-rida na pretsedatelskite izbori vo 2004.

Vo sekoj slu~aj, izborniot uspeh na partiite vo edno ogromno i {a -re noliko op{testvo kakvo {to e amerikanskoto, neminovno zavisi od nivnoto povrzuvawe so razli~nite interesni grupi koi gi izrazuvaat specifi~nite barawa na odredeni segmenti od elektoratot organizirani zaradi ostvaruvawe vlijanie vrz javnata politika, pa se postavuva pra{aweto, dali tie ja ostvaruvaat ulogata na komunikaciski link pome|u poedincite i politi~kite lideri. Apstinencijata kaj pogolemiot del

27 Usvoen kako kompromisno re{enie pome|u onie koi go favorizirale izborot na pretsedatel od strana na za-konodavnite tela na dràvite i onie koi bile za nep-osreden izbor od gra|anite, ovoj mehanizam dozvoluva kandidatot koj osvoil najgolem broj glasovi od gra|anite sepak da gi izgubi izborite (pri izborot na Kenedi, Nik-son – prviot pat, Klinton – dvata pati i Xorx V. Bu{ – prviot pat).

izbira~i sekako ne e rezultat na niv-nata apati~nost sprema poli ti ka ta, tuku na apati~nosta na amerikanskata politika kon niv, za{to dvete glavni i prakti~no edinstveni partii, koi gi dràt pod kontrola osnovnite izvori na mo} i me|u koi re~isi i da ne postojat bitni razliki, se smetaat za instrumenti na dve frakcii na belite mo}nici i korporacii koi kako takvi ne pruàat pogodna ramka za izbor na soodvetni alternativi za golem broj gra|ani. Moèbi rekordnata izleznost na tradicionalnite apstinenti kako i pobedata na Obama na poslednite pretsedatelski izbori }e ozna~at nekakva promena na amerikanskata partiska scena?! Nejzinata relativna stabilnost se ostvaruva po cena na ograni~uvawe na programskiot i ideolo{kiot izbor taka {to, gledano od op{testven aspekt, amerikanskiot dvopartiski sistem nema dovolno sila nitu volja da gi pretstavuva niìte marginalizirani sloevi. Raste~kata uloga na interesnite grupi vo poslednive nekolku de-cenii, zaedno so naglasenata per-sonalizacija na pretsedatelskite kampawi, pridonesuva za sevkupna erozija na partiskoto vlijanie vo politi~kiot sistem na zemjata. I pokraj redefiniranite funkcii na partiite, pove}e od neophodni se natamo{ni promeni so cel tie uspe{no da se soo~at so predizvicite na novata Amerika i drasti~no izmenetiot svet.



The article analyzes the historical development of the two-party system in the United States, the main differences between major political parties in their ideological orientations, the national party organization as well as the key functions that the American parties perform.

Minor parties have not enjoyed much electoral success in America, although they have contributed ideas to the both Democratic and Republican platforms because of the electoral model and the political socialization process, which results in most Americans’ identifying with either the Democratic or the Republican party. There has been a change in the pattern of party identifi cation in the direction of increase of the number of independents, but the structure of the electorate has remained stable. Regardless of the reforms that were made in both parties during the 1970s, they are still highly decentralized in comparison with the parties in other countries. A major factor in their decentralization is the reliance on primary elections while nominating candidates to run for public offi ce.

When it comes to presidential elections, although candidates cannot win the nomination unless they have broad support within the party, the winners can legitimately claim that they have won the nomination through their own efforts and that they owe little to the party organizations. In general, campaigning has evolved from a party-centered to a candidate-centered process and the candidates must raise most of the money for the campaigns themselves. In order to win an elective offi ce in any society as large and diverse as is that of the United States, parties depend heavily on unions with political interests groups as tighter coalitions of people organized for the purpose of expressing specifi c demands and infl uencing public policy.

All in all, the American two-party system is unable to represent the marginalized segments of the society. Therefore, there is a need for changes that would ensure the ability of the United States to cope with the problems of the contemporary world.

Abstract


Cultural pluralism: The key component of the contemporary international relations

Ljuben Tevdovski

In the process of the constantly in-creasing global interaction and com-munication, the conserved values of lo-cal, national or other cultures are often perceived as destructive for the glob-al interaction or reasons behind glob-al mistrust, misunderstandings, clashes and confl icts. Many have tried to avoid them, some suggested that people for-get them and others liked the idea of re-placing them with the artifi cial cosmo-politan theory.

Nevertheless, conventions and val-ues, beliefs and ideas of nations, com-munities and people have proven to be stronger than any temporary interac-tion, new challenges or developments. All these processes actively infl uence, transform and merge cultures, but they cannot reject or forget them.

Instead, the colorful background of cultures that has shaped societies, insti-tutions, states, policies and mindsets, is the personal and collective identity that all nations, communities and people car-ry with them in any form of interaction. Embedded in the laws and morality up-on which people live, culture shapes the communication and becomes its very pattern. It is through their learned manners and morality that people listen, judge, and converse. This cultural matrix is the essence of ‘who people are’, their fi rst tool for self-representation, and the unique message and energy that they are passing to the others.

Furthermore, all cultures are products of long-lasting internal dialogue and mu-tual compromises inside particular com-munities and groups. The national cul-tures today, more than ever before, are the product of cultural pluralism and con-stant internal social debate. As such, they are more rooted in dialogue than in con-fl ict. Thus its very nature bears the char-acteristics of previous and actual social interactions and compromi ses, and there-fore has capacities to embrace and pro-mote the international dialogue as well. It represents a creative and democrat-ic force and capacity that should not be avoided, but rather shared. It is a plural-istic energy, with which we can communi-cate, inspire each other and create new, shared values and identities.

One of the most successful cases of culture and cultural pluralism as a tool for managing international relations can be traced in the policies of a small coun-try in the center of the culturally color-ful and deeply troubled Balkan region – Macedonia.

The culture, with all its aspects from the heritage to the culture of the modern life, has been in the very center of the Macedonian foreign policy strategies. Even more, the specifi c cultural plurali-ty, multiculturalism and the tolerant and peaceful traditions of Macedonian citi-zens played a central role in the coun-try’s quest for authentic voice in region-al and global relations.

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Ljuben Tevdovski

Culture in Macedonian foreign re-lations

On this occasion, I will not go back more extensively to the culture and for-eign relations of the Macedonian repub-lic in the socialist period. Yet, it is impor-tant to emphasize some developments from that period that have strongly pro-moted the involvement of culture and cultural strategies in the Macedonian foreign relations.

For instance, we should have in mind that in the former Yugoslav fed-eration the foreign relations represent-ed one of the main domains of the Fed-eral policies.1 Therefore, the republics, including Macedonia, had to fi nd alter-native ways for international coopera-tion. Thus, after the Second World War, and especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the Macedonian republic developed fi rm cultural policies, with a great focus on the international exchange. These poli-cies, implemented through relatively in-dependent agents, such as diverse in-ternational festivals and events, once again strengthened the links among Macedonian artists and intellectuals and their colleagues from many countries in the world,2 established new internation-al ties with different societies, and pro-moted once again the strong links with the huge Macedonian diaspora across all continents.3

Thus, the artists and intellectuals who were sent on cultural exchanges by the Republic, and worked and per-

1 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted on 21 February 1974, National Archive of Macedo-nia. Also available at: www.wikipedia.org

2 Council for the Research on South-Eastern Europe of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Macedonian Cul-ture, Skopje, 2000.

3 Gregory Michaelidis, Salvation Abroad: Macedonian Migration to North America and the Making of Modern Macedonia, 1870-1970, PhD Dissertation, Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, 2005.

formed around the world, became an al-ternative diplomatic network and the fi rst state-fi nanced cultural ambassadors of Macedonia. At the same time, the inter-national cultural exchange became a le-gitimate substitution, or a quasi-foreign policy of the nation.

Additionally, the massive presence of foreign artists and intellectuals at the international events in almost all Mace-donian cities enriched and additionally pluralized the multicultural and demo-cratic character and supported the dem-ocratic changes in the Macedonian so-ciety.

Culture and freedom

“The former Macedonian Ambassa-dor to France, Jordan Plevneš, was de-clared Knight of Art and Culture of the French Republic. On behalf of the Pres-ident, he was awarded with this title in Ohrid by Bernard Valero, the French Ambassador to Macedonia, who said that Mr. Plevneš was one of the great-est personalities in the fi eld of culture, not only in Macedonia, but also inter-nationally.

‘This decoration honors not only one of the greatest individuals in Macedo-nian culture, but also the deep, intensive and rich ties between the two countries’, stressed Ambassador Valero.4”

Macedonian Information Agency After the fi rst free and democratic

elections in 1990 and the Declaration of Independence in 1991, Macedonia has entered into a new phase in its devel-opment. The newly independent coun-try that chose freedom and self-gover-

4 News of the Macedonian Information Agency, see also at the cultural portal: www.culture.in.mk, 3 July 2008, Skopje.



nance, had to urge all its resources in facing independently the new and some-times unknown challenges.

As in many post-communist societ-ies and countries in transition, the intel-lectuals and artists were the ones who embraced fi rst the quest for a free, plu-ralistic and democratic society and the responsibility to build and develop its in-stitutions and its future. These promi-nent intellectuals, artists and thinkers were also the ones who faced one of the most challenging fi elds after the procla-mation of the independence of the coun-try, the international relations.

Thus, in an informal conversation with the author of this text, His Excellen-cy Mr. Ljubiša Georgievski,5 recollects: “We went with Academician Popovs-ki6 to the Czech embassy in Belgrade. We intended to explicate our case (the Macedonian independence) and start fi rst relations. My strategy was to ex-plain to them that I have directed sev-eral plays by Havel, I knew him well. Of course, this was almost unneeded, as our host in the embassy has been trans-lating the poetry of Ante,7 and was truly enchanted by his lyrics” (paraphrase of an informal recollection).

Partly as a result of the undeveloped diplomatic system in the fi rst years of in-dependence and the limited number of professional diplomats, and partly as a token of their appreciation in the soci-ety for the capacities in the fi eld of cul-ture, many artists and intellectuals were

5 Ljubiša Georgievski is a famous Macedonian fi lm and theater director, writer and intellectual, anti-communist and presiden-tial candidate in the early 1990s, later Ambassador and Pres-ident of the National Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.

6 Ante Popovski was a highly respected Macedonian poet, writer and intellectual, one of the most translated poets from Mace-donia, member of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sci-ences, a politically active and a prominent fi gure in the nation-al movement in the years before the independence; later, also an ambassador.

7 Ibid.

appointed as ambassadors and envoys, becoming part of the offi cial diplomat-ic system of the country and represent-ing it in important centers of internation-al relations.

While these individuals were nei-ther the most experienced nor the most educated ones in the skills of tradition-al diplomacy, their main role and suc-cess was as cultural and public diplo-mats. Being prominent professionals in their own fi elds, they already had close ties with their colleagues in the other countries and established many more in the coming years. The main role of the Macedonian ambassadors in the fi rst years of the independence was to re-introduce one ancient and important branch of the European culture, now transformed and with a new face of a modern nation, both to the elites and the general public in the different states.

Nonetheless, the contemporary chal-lenges of the foreign relations of Mace-donia, over the years, reached far more complex dimensions. Emerging from the deeply troubled and bloody dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, this republic in the center of the Balkans with a pop-ulation of two million challenged the re-gional geo-strategic reality with its in-dependence8 and had to confront se-rious security, political and economic threats.

The creative and positive foreign pol-icy strategies of Macedonia, based on its strongest asset, the rich, famous and ancient culture of the Macedonian peo-ple, was not always a satisfactory an-swer for the policies of direct confron-tation and coercive diplomacy endorsed by some of its resourceful neighbors.

8 Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, PhD., UNPREDEP in Mace-donia: Achievements and limits of preventive diplomacy, On-line Journal of Peace and Confl ict Resolution, March 1999.


Ljuben Tevdovski

The refore, the country had to reach far beyond the cultural traditions and his-torical ideals and accomplishments of the Macedonians.

In these circumstances, the Mace-donian strategists reached for the most universal component of the Macedonian culture and traditions. They transformed the unique traditions of cultural plurali-ty and tolerance of this country into its strategy, image and pattern in manag-ing foreign relations. This strategy man-aged to unite the power of its internal cultural richness, and gained strategi-cally from the traditions, ideas and en-ergy of the small cultural, ethnic and re-ligious groups living side by side with Macedonians for centuries. This cul-tural richness and the plurality of inde-pendent cultural players has made the Macedonian message strong, unifi ed, vivid and universal, and thus much more appealing to the ‘hearts and minds’9 of many countries and citizens around the world.

The Macedonian cultural pluralism

Macedonia is a “democratic country with an authentic model of multicultural living, a historical crossroads of diverse cultures and civilizations, but also a fi eld for their continuous dialogue”.10

Igor Ilievski, former State Secretary,

Macedonian MFA

9 Joseph S. Nye Jr..,”Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Ameri-can Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008.

10 Statement by Mr. Igor Ilievski, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, from the analytic article “Public diplomacy for membership in EU,” BBC Macedonian.com, October 2006.

The cultural pluralism of Macedonia is unique and vivid. It has naturally uni-fi ed the traditions of a ‘peaceful nation’, tolerance and cultural diversity and de-centralized, independent and strong cul-tural institutions.

This and such pluralistic cultur-al identity became the most efficient tool for achieving the overall aim of the Macedonian foreign policy in the years after the independence. This tool has creatively and pragmatically answered the need of the country to articulate an original voice and image of the nation, different from the negative perceptions connected with the neighborhood and the Balkan region in general.

Thus, these particular characteristics of tolerance and its efforts toward cultur-al understanding among the Balkan na-tions have indisputably helped Macedo-nia in acquiring the prestigious title of an “Oasis of Peace” in the Balkans.

Yet, Macedonia did not gain this title and a strong positive brand by accident. The original characteristic of the Mace-donian society, based on the principles of ‘culture of peace’11 and dialogue12 and deeply rooted in the peaceful13 and hu-manist ideas of the Macedonian people, and especially intellectuals and think-ers, throughout history were not quite enough.

What was needed, in addition, was a clear political will and a strong vision for the future. Therefore, the Macedo-nian society and the government in-vested enormus energy in strengthen-

11 United Nations, Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. Resolution adopted by the General Assem-bly, October 1999.

12 Hansjoerg Eiff, former NATO Ambassador to Macedonia, “On NATO and Macedonia: a Mission in Skopje 1999-2000,” CROSSROADS, The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, October 2007.

13 Sam Vaknin, “The Plight of the Kosovar”, article published in Middle East Times, September 1998.



ing these original traditions and the col-lective memory of culture of tolerance and coexistence. The ideas of peaceful coexistence of the Balkan nations pro-claimed in the Macedonian ‘manifes-tos’14 from the end of the 19th and be-ginning of the 20th centuries15 and the humanistic messages of the literature, and especially the poetry from the pe-riod between the two world wars16were taken and promoted as important ‘intan-gible cultural heritage’17 of the Macedo-nian people and a basic ‘value,’ attitude pattern, a model for behavior in inter-nal and external relations and ‘way of living’18 of the modern Macedonian na-tion.

Additionally, the institutions have in vested a serious amount of energy, hu man and financial resources, tak-ing many proactive policies and mea-sures in the fi eld of cultural cooperation. Thus, concerning the ‘culture of peace’, for more than a decade Macedonia was the locus of regional and international efforts for peace, involving international conferences and seminars of peace, tol-erance and human rights, but also host-ing peace negotiations,19 refugees20 and

14 “Let us fuse our souls and hearts and save ourselves, so that we and our children and our children’s children might live in peace, work calmly and make progress!....” Manifesto of the Kruševo Republic, Kruševo 1903, quoted by Erwan Fouere, EU Special Representative and Head of the European Com-mission Delegation to the Republic of Macedonia, in “Meeting the expectations and fulfi lling the obligations: Macedonia and the EU enlargement strategy,” The Macedonian Foreign Poli-cy Journal CROSSROADS, April 2007.

15 Council for Research on South-Eastern Europe of the Mace-donian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Macedonian Culture, Skopje, 2000.

16 Ibid.17 United Nations Educational Scientifi c and Cultural Organiza-

tion, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultur-al Heritage, Paris, 17 October 2003.

18 United Nations, Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. Resolution adopted by the General Assem-bly, October 1999.

19 BBC News: Yugoslavs return to Kosovo talks, World News: Europe, June 8, 1999.

20 Hansjoerg Eiff, former NATO Ambassador to Macedonia, “On NATO and Macedonia: A mission in Skopje 1999-2000,” The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal CROSSROADS, Oc-tober 2007.

democratic leaders.21 The UN Special Representative to Macedonia, Mr. Hen-ryk J. Sokalski summarized this dynam-ics in the country in his memories in sim-ple words: ‘Hardly a day would go by without important foreign visitors arriv-ing in Skopje’.22

In this context, in Ohrid, the city pro-tected by UNESCO, both for its cultural and natural heritage23 many internation-al conferences were established, among which the prominent Ohrid Academy of Humanism and the World Conference on Dialogue among Religions and Civ-ilizations.24

The further development of the Ma-cedonian society and its institutions has used the cultural plurality and the rich-ness of the cultures of Macedonian citi-zens for developing a system of an open and vivid society that promotes and in-tegrates different cultures.

Due to its remarkable accomplish-ment and standards in the fi eld of cul-tural, educational and political rights of ethnic minorities, Macedonia was right-fully called “the only functional multieth-nic democracy in the Balkan region.’ Un-der this image and guided by these prin-ciples, the country has managed to build a strong and modern society and com-bat the understanding of the multiethnic and multicultural realities in the Balkan region as sources of confl ict and crises.

21 Eran Fraenkel and John Marks, European Centre for Common Ground in Brussels – Washington, “Making peace in Macedo-nia”, Yes! Magazine, Spring 2000.

22 Henryk J. Sokalski, “Macedonia and the UN: from a case study in preventive diplomacy to an active contributor to glob-al peace and security,” The Macedonian Foreign Policy Jour-nal CROSSROADS, Skopje, December 2006; for additional explanation, see Fn. 30.

23 UNESCO Periodic Reporting, Ohrid Region with its Cultural and Historical Aspect and its Natural Environment, State of Con-servation of World Heritage Properties in Europe, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/, 2006.

24 Report and Declaration of the World Conference on Dialogue Among Religions and Civilizations: „The contribution of reli-gion and culture to peace, mutual respect and cohabitation“, Ohrid, 28 October, 2007.


Ljuben Tevdovski

Instead, the respect for cultural plurali-ty, the coexistence of cultures, ethnici-ties and religions has become the trade-mark and strong foundation of the Mace-donian society.

Additionally, these developments we-re consistently followed by all govern-mental and cultural institutions and orga-nizations in the county. The Ma ce donian National Television, the public service, broadcast in seven languages around the world, the Ministry of Culture fi nances independent literature and theater institu-tions for the Albanian and Turkish minori-ty and other events supporting the culture of all minorities and the Ministry of Edu-cation and Science supports the educa-tion of minorities in their mother tongue.25 Additionally, Macedonia has continuous-ly hosted international symposiums, se-minars and meetings on the culture of its minorities, such as the International Seminar on Albanian Studies26 and the International Festival of Vlach Music.27 Thus, the country presents itself in front of the international public in all its cultur-al richness and diversity.

Finally, the independent and direct-ly engaged actors in the fi eld of culture represent the strongest pillar of the dem-ocratic character and cultural pluralism of Macedonia and the Macedonian so-ciety. Numerous great festivals, carni-vals or unique citizens’ initiatives, non-governmental organizations or informal groups, these authentic representatives of the culture and values of the Macedo-nian citizens constantly and freely com-

25 Carlos Pais, Minorities in Democracy, Published by Konrad Adenauer Foundation and European Centre for Minority Is-sues, 2003.

26 International Seminar on Albanian Studies, Tetovo State Uni-versity, Address of Nikola Gruevsk, President of the Go-vernment of the Republic of Macedonia, Tetovo, Septem-ber, 2007.

27 Report, Annual program for providing national interests in the fi eld of culture in 2007, Ministry of Culture, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2008.

municate the culture, values and spirit of Macedonia to the people and organiza-tions around the world.

While almost every Macedonian town organizes at least one international cul-tural event, some of the more prominent are the Ohrid Summer Festival, the Stru-ga Poetry Evenings, the international po-etry festival, The Manaki Brothers Inter-national Festival of Film Camera in Bi-tola, the Skopje Jazz Festival, and the Blues and Soul Festival in Skopje, the May Opera Evenings, or the Galičnik Wedding.28 Some of these festivals are quite prominent internationally and all of them bring together many international-ly recognized writers, painters, artists, performers and thinkers in Macedonia, and send many of their Macedonian col-leagues abroad.

In addition, the numerous interna-tional art festivals and colonies, carni-vals, major ethnic and traditional events and other events with international par-ticipation organized in the smaller towns of Macedonia established important cul-tural ties that are wining the ‘hearts and minds’ of thousands of artists, intellectu-als, journalists, youngsters and tourists from different countries. Additionally, they support the vivid cultural life of the Mace-donian towns, connecting Macedonian citizens with the values and ideas of dif-ferent societies and cultures.

In conclusion, it is fair to claim that, al-though it looks challenging to coordinate such a decentralized and diverse model of cultural policies, cultural pluralism pro-vides, as the case of Macedonia clear-ly demonstrates, an important and irre-placeable frame and strong arguments in managing international relations.

28 Document, National culture program for 2004-2008, Minis-try of Culture, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2008.



Rezime

Vo procesite na postojano raste~ki globalni interakcii i komunikacii, so~uvanite vrednosti na lokalnite, nacionalnite i drugite kulturi mnogu pati se tretiraat kako pre~ka vo globalnata sorabotka ili pri~ini poradi koi za razvivaat nedoverba, nedorazbirawa, sudiri i konflikti na globalno nivo. Tokmu poradi toa, mnogumina se obiduvaa da gi zaobikolat kulturite, nekoi predlagaa lu|eto ednostavno da gi zaboravat, a pak drugi ja poddrùvaa idejata tie da se zamenat so ve{ta~kata teorija na kosmopolitizmot.

Sepak, konvenciite i vrednostite, veruvawata i ideite na narodite, zaednicite i lu|eto voop{to, dokaàa deka se posilni od site povremeni vlijanija, novi predizvici ili aktuelni slu~uvawa. Site ovie procesi aktivno vlijaat, gi oblikuvaat ili zbliùvaat kulturite, no tie ne moàt nitu da gi otfrlat, nitu pak da gi frlat vo zaborav.

Naprotiv, koloritnoto milje od kulturi, koe oblikuva{e op{testva, institucii, dràvi i misle~ki sistemi, e onaa pluralisti~ka energija so koja moème da komunicirame, me|usebno da se inspirirame i preku koja spodeluvame vrednosti i identiteti vo me|unarodnite odnosi.

Eden od najsvetlite primeri za kulturata i kulturniot pluralizam kako alatka na dobrite me|unarodni odnosi e posvedo~en tokmu vo edna mala zemja vo centarot na kulturno-bogatiot i kulturno-zavojuvan Balkan – Makedonija.


Why thinking too much really hurts: Schmitt and Figgis on the consciousness/sovereignty nexus

Te

or

ija

Adrian Grama

Introduction According to Jacob Taubes, the

“development from heteronomian the-ism to the autonomian atheism of the 19th and 20th centuries contains the inner history of theological-political thought in the modern age”.1 In this paper, I argue that we can make sense of Taubes’ insight by ferreting out a fascinating and yet little known dialogue carried among these lines, the one opposing two outstanding political philosophers of the last century, John Neville Figgis (1866-1919) and Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). It is my contention that, in the light of this historical reconstruction, we may better understand a whole gamut of an-tithetic conceptual personae that inhabit the core of modernity, thereby framing our political vocabularies: monism vs. pluralism, heteronomy vs. autonomy, hierarchy vs. equality, absolutism vs. relativism, immanence vs. transcen-dence, analogy vs. dialectic etc. The classical differend that brought the two into contact can be approximately ren-dered in the form of the classical Hob-besian question: given the sociological realities of modern policies, whom/what

1 Jacob Taubes, “Theological and Political Theory”, Social Re-search, vol. 22, no. 1, 1955, p. 63. Arresting as it is, Taubes’s diagnosis is but an echo of Carl Schmitt who explicitly spelled out the opposition between his (by now famous) treble shib-boleth “exception, decision, dictatorship” and the overall con-viction of the late 19th century that: “le juste va de soi si l’on ne trouble pas l’immanence de la vie.” Théologie politique. Quatre chapitres sur la théorie de la souveraineté, translated by Jean-Louis Schlegel, Gallimard, 1988, p. 75. (my emphasis).

to obey? To put it in other, more familiar terms: where does authority stand with respect to moral consciousness? To whom or to what does the modern em-pirical citizen owes loyalty/allegiance? J. N. Figgis and Carl Schmitt, each in his own way, but taking as their starting point the state/church relation and a deep involvement with Thomas Hobbes, have tried to provide a proper answer to this perennial dilemma. In the next segment, I shall try to briefl y outline the background against which both thinkers placed their political theories. In order to do that, it is of utmost importance to grasp the impact on the 19th century of Kant’s struggle against consciousness’s dependence on revealed dogmas. If, by the end of that century, concepts like “popular sovereignty”, “democracy” and even “capitalism” had acquired any meaning at all, it was precisely because a vast realm of immanence, populated by the post-Kantian troubled selves, slowly came into being2.

Fire in the minds of men…

What is the source of law? Arguably, a hint to a possible answer is provided by those intellectual histories of the 19th

2 The post-Kantian bourgeois man is necessarily a “meaning-making subject (minimally always “making up his/her mind” in experiencing and so likewise responsible for what he/she claims to know), a self-conscious subject, in this active, self-determining relation to itself in all experience as well as in all action.”, Robert Pippin, The Persistence of Subjectivity. On the Kantian Aftermath, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 2005, p. 2.


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century’s seditious ambitions, most of them written at the height of the “cultural cold war” in order to dredge up the “thin red line” stretching from various past thinkers to 20th century totalitarianisms. Irrespective of their authors’ intentions and ambitions, such studies should not be taken as just another run-of-the-mill, conservatively perverse set of narra-tives on the fatuity of men in search of emancipation; rather, at a more serious level, we should understand them as pieces of historical writing (stories) on man carrying - for the fi rst time in his-tory, the burden of independent thought. Therefore, what all those romantic revo-lutionaries were in point of fact doing was far from anything resembling the mental schemata of the political hor-rors to come, quite the opposite; they were thinking with their own heads and in so doing, they were experiencing the onus of Kantian autonomy. This is why all genealogies of modernity, after mapping its entire span, inevitably end up telling us “how the modern age, after the fashion of the preceding ages, springs into life with a law for all laws: consciousness - the condition both of laws called theoretical or scientifi c as well as for practical and positive laws.”3 To vulgarly sum it up, by the fi n de siècle nothing was more commonsensical than to posit the subject’s consciousness (its very own will) as the source of anything pertaining to authority (law included).

The route to man’s moral autonomy was set up by the Protestant theology of inwardness, a theology that counted among the heritors of a whole variety of mystical speculations on the origin

3 Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, translated by Reg-inald Lilly, Indiana U.P., Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2003, p. 355. Henceforward BH. I heavily rely on Schürmann’s master-ful reconstruction of Kant’s moral philosophy.

of the divine into man’s soul4. It was Martin Luther, in the midst of his revolt, who pointed to the locus noster subse-quently inhabited by the moderns when, addressing his contemporaries, he ut-tered: “Our place, where we ought to live with God, is consciousness.” Centuries after, Hegel fathomed the true nature of Luther’s achievement when he wrote: “Protestantism is a religion that builds its temples and altars in the human heart.”5 On the level of social history, links between Lutheranism and Idealism are more than obvious. Lutheranism, by removing priestly mediations, opened up the way for a direct relation between believer and God, consequently breed-ing a community of astute and indepen-dent Bible-readers. In the 18th century, Pietism (Kant’s parents’ religion) already succeeded in promoting a homogenous culture of religious inwardness, plac-ing the act of self-examination at its core.6 Be that as it may, reading Kant with Luther should make us aware of yet another key element of modernity, namely the inviolability of conscience. Taking up God’s imperative “Judge for yourself in matters of conscience!” Calvinism managed to promote con-scientious self-judgment as the core of humanity’s moral existence. In this light, consciousness simultaneously blended in the basic natural right and the basic

4 Here we should also stress the decisive step made toward modernity by Luther’s perfect contemporary, Nicolaus Coper-nicus who single-handedly wiped out the Ptolemaic cosmolo-gy. For a concise view on the matter, see Jacob Taubes, “Di-alectic and Analogy”, The Journal of Religion, vol. 34, no. 2, 1954, pp. 111-119. The Copernician turn (and its consequenc-es) has received due attention in the works of Thomas Kuhn and Hans Blumenberg.

5 Quoted in Mark Lilla, “Hegel and the political theology of Re-construction”, The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 54, no. 2, 2001, p. 887.

6 Jerrold Seigel, “The Idea of the self. thought and experience in Western Europe” since the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge U.P., 2005, pp. 299-304.



law of nature7. In the aftermath of the Edict of Nantes (1685), the Huguenots drew on this strain of thought to defend the idea of an inalienable right argu-ing for resistance against the French king’s repressive policies. Neverthe-less, Kant’s reworking of the Protestant legacy into an all the embracing moral philosophy, claiming subject’s reason to be the “sternest of judges”, is radically at odds with Luther’s ruminations on consciousness. For the latter, man in possession of authentic reason receives his nomos (his complex of laws) form elsewhere since consciousness remains essentially heteronomos, depending on God and nothing else. As Schürmann boldly put it: “Heteronomy, the origin of salvation in Luther, becomes the root of all evil in Kant; inversely, autonomy, the tendency which is radically evil for Luther, in Kant turns into the supreme good of the person.”8 With respect to Kant’s views on religion and politics, it is worth recalling that what bothered the mind of the German philosopher was the age-old problem of “divided loyalties.” Just as for his predecessors, for Kant the political predicament of faith was that it created an unquenchable tension between the two Cities. It fell to Hegel once again to shrewdly notice how the Protestant man was similar to a bat, belonging, that is, neither to earth nor sky. Kantian moral revolution generated a new type of man: in full possession of his autonomy hence responsible, compelled to make decisions and pass judgments thus anxious, questioning everything and for that reason bound

7 Knud Hakkonssen, “Protestant natural law. A general interpre-tat ion”, in Natalie Brender, Larry Krasnoff (eds.) New Essays on the History of Autonomy. A Collection Honoring J. B. Sch-neewind, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 2004, pp. 102-104.

8 BH, p. 356. After Kant, the German “das Gewissen” (moral con-sciousness) renders exclusively as “the voice of an inner judge, keeper of the knowledge concerning good and evil”.

to live, as Kant knew well, in something akin to a daily Calvary.

Throughout the 19th century, this categorical imperative gradually under-mined each and every concept related to or derived from heteronomy. What was expelled, without gratuitous violence, from the post-Kantian moral and politi-cal landscape, to wit, what came to be perceived as utter nonsense, was the very idea of transcendence. However, some debunkers of it were far from supporting equality since, for a thinker like Nietzsche, immanence went natu-rally hand in hand with the most brutal, “aristocratic” form of hierarchy. The great Catholic theologian, Henri de Lubac, writing during the Second World War, asked how it was possible that the most gifted philosophers of the 19th century so fi ercely revolted against transcendence, taking the very existence of God as a token of man’s slavery. For him, tran-scendence had a noble and egalitarian Christian history behind. It fi rst made its appearance in Late Antiquity, when it completely shattered the metaphysi-cal support of the ancient world, freeing man from the “ontological slavery” the Greeks so much favored. Thus, every man, irrespective of his origin, through a direct link with his Creator could hence-forward regard Fate, the old gods, the stars and Greek pagan mythology at large as mere superstitions. The sheer joyfulness one fi nds in the writings of the early Christians, de Lubac rightly believed, was nothing but a celebration of this initial revolutionary breakthrough. It would take the “humanist atheists” of the 19th century to denounce any morality based on transcendence that took up the form of equality before God. What this “equality from outside” really meant to them, was no more than the


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priests’ resentment directed against the natural hierarchy of life or, in Nietzsche’s own terms, against the “innocence of becoming.”9

In spite of all this, immanence brings to the fore equality as the ultimate value. Deleuze was among the very few to have perceived what monumental a shift immanence implies for human life – it literally couches it in a neutral form, placing it beyond good and evil “puisque seul le sujet qui l’incarnait au milieu des choses la rendait bonne ou mauvaise.”10 At the beginning of the 20th century, bringing the Law down from the mountain (again), the theory of the di-vine right to govern or the “caste society” of the Middle Ages were but laughable ingredients of a bedtime fairytale. By this time, concepts like heteronomy, transcendence or hierarchy had already lost all their meaning. This is precisely what makes most contemporary de-bates on the origins of capitalism and the “the rise of the West” so interest-ing. Instead of taking seriously the two standard answers to the old question de Braudel (why has capitalism succeeded in Europe and not in other regions of the Globe?) - the Neo-Spenglerian version (Asian values) and its vulgar Webe-rian counterpart (l’esprit orthodoxe), we should remember Marx’s remark according to whom the only limit to capital is capitalism itself. To put it differ-ently, capitalism only functions on what Deleuze called plages d’immanence by initially instituting and then devouring/dissolving its own barriers (the produc-tive forces) - in this manner revolution-

9 Jacob Taubes, Die politische Theologie des Paulus, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 1993, p. 171.

10 Gilles Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous. Textes et entretiens, 1975-1995, édition préparée par David Lapoujade, Les Édi-tions de Minuit, Paris, 2003, p. 361.

izing the means of production11. In the same vein, free of any exterior point of reference, the meaning of sovereignty suffered a total redefi nition: from an eminently “distinctive” quality of a levi-tating monarch, it turned into a unifi ed “identical” bloc comprising, at the very same time, the will and its bearers, the lawgiver and those supposed to obey, to wit - the sovereign people. Staging the battle…

After the demise of those concepts above discussed, we are left with an-other potpourri of metaphors that help us describe the possible relation between the modern autonomous conscious-ness and the sources of normativity: monism and pluralism, absolutism and relativism and so on12. Establishing an unambiguous connection between consciousness and the norms it is sup-posed to follow means answering the central conundrum of modern societies: how to preserve the independence of the subject with respect to an exterior authority while providing a common “inter-subjective” ground in order to invest norms with suffi cient authority as to command sought-after behaviors. In Hobbesian terms, this means asking “whom/what to obey?” and it is precisely to this question that Figgis and Schmitt have tried to respond.

11 Once more Deleuze proves himself to be the most perceptive observer of how capitalism unfolds: “Seul l’Occident étend et propage ses foyers d’immanence. Le champ social ne renvoie plus, comme dans les empires, à une limite extérieure qui le borne en haut, mais à des limites intérieures immanentes qui ne cessent de se déplacer, en agrandissant le système, et qui se reconstituent en se déplaçant.”, Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guat-tari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, Les Éditions de Minuit, Pa-ris, 2005, p. 93.

12 Hans Kelsen, “Absolutism and relativism in philosophy and pol-itics”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 42, no. 5, 1948, pp. 906-914. Kelsen also considers pluralism and mo-nism as two radically opposed views on sovereignty.



To put a hook in the nose of the Leviathan…

At the core of Figgis’s theory of the pluralist state lays the liberty of con-science. Gathered in a single volume as Churches in the Modern State, Figgis’s lectures delivered on the eve World War I offer his most coherent exploration of the state/church relation within a plural-ist framework. Figgis’s concern, both as a clergyman and as a scholar, was how to secure reasonable liberty for the Anglican Church “as a self-developing body living a supernatural life” within the boundaries of a legal system that only recognized, in the light of a theory of sovereignty allegedly inherited from Thomas Hobbes, the existence of corpo-rations as persona fi cta13. It was already F. W. Maitland, the great defender of a corporate life within the modern English state and Figgis’s source of inspiration, who targeted Hobbes as the primary opponent of pluralism. Both thinkers were well aware of these words coming from the author of Leviathan: “Another infi rmity of a Common-wealth is … the great number of Corporations, which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.”14 There-fore, enemies of pluralism - John Austin in the 19th century or Neo-Hegelians like Bosanquet at the beginning of the 20th, were all but mirroring Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. If the Church decided to gain legal personality under this dogma, that is, if the state was to grant the exis-tence of the Church as nomen juris, Fig-

13 John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, Longmans, Green and Co., London, second edition, 1914, p. 61. Hence-forward CMS.

14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R Tuck, Cambridge, Cam-bridge U.P., 1996, p. 230. For Maitland anti-hobbesian allu-sions, see his preface to Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1922, p. xxxiii.

gis insisted, “it will surely be subjected to all sorts of restrictions.”15 The liberty of the Church of England and consequent-ly the liberty of conscience would be achieved only if that particular doctrine of government would be dropped. But, what exactly is this sovereign against which “no conscience and corporate life” can be pleaded?16 To Figgis, its theologico-political genealogy is roughly this: “The Great Leviathan of Hobbes, the plenitudo potestatis of the canonists, the arcane imperii, the sovereignty of Austin, are all names of the same thing – the unlimited and illimitable power of the lawgiver in the state, deduced from the notion of unity.”17 Furthermore, after the peace of Augsburg, Figgis noticed, Hobbes’s notion of a compact, unitary and omnipotent sovereign reached its peak, embodying the cujus regio ejus religio principle. It was only this context that permitted the king to claim that his people’s consciences belonged exclu-sively to him.

What explains the success the concessionist theory of associations has acquired? How come that, even at the end of the 19th century, the state could still invoke an intimate relation to each individual citizen? A single, isolated conscience pitted against the mighty state could immediately turn into an enslaved conscience. For Fig-gis, this state of affairs was wholly intolerable since not only did tyranny become an always present danger, but the theory of sovereignty inherited from Early-Modern absolutism was utterly

15 CMS, p. 66. 16 According to Schmitt, Figgis was right to observe that Levia-

than was “the Deity of Calvinism, with power unchecked by law, justice or conscience.” Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines Politischen Symbols, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1938, p. 99. Henceforward STH.

17 CMS, p. 79.


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irrelevant to modern societies. Faced with a complex, heterogeneous civil society, the state could only take the form of an association of associations. Thus, the cardinal principle of associa-tionalism takes into account the irreduc-ible diversity of modern life, that “vast complex of gathered unions, in which alone we fi nd individuals, families, clubs, trade-unions, colleges, churches and so forth.”18 Absolute and unitary sover-eignty is perilous because it continually undermines the efforts of building some intermediary bodies between the state and its citizens. According to Figgis’s nostalgic view of the Middle Ages, something went tragically wrong in the 17th century, when the good old life, su-perbly documented by Otto von Gierke, with its serene tolerance, local laws and customs, corporate liberty, craft and merchant guilds backed by baronial honors, conceiving of the state as a communitas communitatum “made it seem that a system of universal liberties and balanced powers would result, that at last the lion of the throne would line down with the lamb of spiritual freedom in a semi-federalist polity.”19 However, this did not happen. Frightened by the dangers of anarchy and civil war under feudalism, the people got blinded by the ever-greater danger of autocracy itself. This is how the Hobbesian solution emerged. To sum it up, Figgis attacked what he perceived as a neo-absolutist theory of sovereignty on two points: 1. its blindness toward the sociologically multifaceted modern civil society and 2. the ability of all those groups outside the state to radically alter man’s personality thereby demanding the most in terms of loyalty and commitment from him/

18 CMS, p. 71. 19 CMS, p. 80.

her. Starting from these raw facts Figgis articulated his own conception of the state based on a very strict defi nition of liberty. From a historical point of view, if we follow Figgis, freedom seems to be the by-product of a religiously fragmen-tated polity. “Political liberty - he wrote, is the fruit of ecclesiastical animosities.”20 Pluralism is the only political form the state can assume if what is after is safeguarding the existence of a politi-cized civil society - thereby securing the liberty of conscience. When unhindered and associated consciences collide with the sovereign will, when a member of a Church refuses to obey the state, the civil war looms large. But this is a small price to pay given that, “in the last resort the individual’s allegiance to his own consciousness is final.”21 Ultimately, Figgis is forced to choose between two rival threats - that of tyranny and that of civil war. Nevertheless, anyone valuing liberty shall consider the possibility of civil war as the lesser of the two evils.

Todeskeim, or the impossibility of gewissenfreiheit…

In a reveling fragment from his booklet on Hobbes, Schmitt places Fig-gis among those apologists of an “un-kontrollieren und unsichtbaren Mächten der Gesellschaft”, a truly heterogeneous power which supported the rise of a political system dominated by parties and having its roots in the autonomy of Churches and that of the trade-unions22. In the presence of this fl ourishing social pluralism, what Schmitt feared the most, namely the hidden powers (Gewalten) exercised “from below” developed freely.

20 CMS, p. 101. 21 CMS, p. 154. 22 STH, p. 117.



From now on, he grimly concluded, “die alten Gegner, die indirekten Gewalten von Kirche und Interessenorganisation-en, sind in diesem Jahrhundert in mod-erner Gestalt als politische Parteien, Gewerkschaften, soziale Verbönde, mit einem Wort als Mächte der Gesellschaft wiedererscheinen.”23 Society fi nally won the battle against the Leviathan and it will gradually tear it apart. What went wrong?

For Carl Schmitt, the history of the decline of Leviathan parallels the history of the development of the liberty of con-science. This story can be traced back to Hobbes’s vital distinction between faith and confession, between fides and confessio. What to some historians (the likes of Pierre Manent) may look like the very basis on which liberalism was grounded, to Schmitt is essentially the “Todeskeim”, the “seeds of death” planted by Hobbes at the roots of the absolutist state that would eventually lead to its demise24. The posterity of Hobbes granting the free enjoyment of one’s conscience under privacy is, ac-cording to Schmitt’s overtly anti-Semitic narrative, but the successive unfolding chronicle of mainly Jews, free-masons, illuminati, romantics and revolutionaries making fun of the Leviathan, turning the Hobbesian crack into an open fi ssure. Thus, Schmitt writes “[…] Sobald es freilich zum äußeren Bekenntnis des Glaubens kommt, hört das private Urteil auf und entscheidet der Souverän über

23 STH, p. 115. 24 “Schmitt konstatiert [...] eine paradoxale Situation: die Notwen-

digkeit eines moralischen Innenraums für die Entstehung des souveränen, säkularen Staates legt zugleich den Todeskeim in ihn hinein.” Jan-Friederich Missfelder, “Die Gegenkraft und ihre Geschichte. Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck und der Bürgerkrieg”, Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 58, no. 4, 2006, p. 323. The great conservative historian and Schmitt’s post-war Heidelberg favorite pupil, Reinhart Ko-selleck, would further investigate this paradox in his renowned study Kritik und Krise.

Wahr und Unwahr.”25 In other words, as soon as the sovereign is being judged for what he does by the private, neces-sarily reckless, consciences he is sup-posed to protect, as soon as the private individual in possession of subjective freedom feels the need to weight “the Good and the Evil” actions of the state, the road to civil war is opened again. Only uncontested sovereignty can min-ister the fear of violent death. Too much thinking on the part of the citizens, value judgments clothed as public opinion fl y-ing across the public authority by virtue of a tolerated “moral dualism” signals to Schmitt the arrival of the Behemoth, a state of generalized disorder, chaos, violence, lawlessness and anarchy.

Conclusion…

Schmitt’s quarrel with Figgis now becomes clear. The ethical conse-quences he is able enough to draw from the pluralist theory of the state is that l’homme singulier fi nds himself tied up in an intricate civil society, freely developing a complex cluster of loyalties, owing fi delity to everyone and hence relativizing his allegiance to the state. Furthermore, pluralism is not about “inner autonomy” rather, it is essentially a polemical doctrine, says Schmitt, with the goal of rearranging the social bonds26. For this reason it goes

25 STH, p. 56 and few pages later: “Die Unterscheidung von In-nen und Außen wurde fürden sterblichen Gott die Krankheit zum Tode.” STH, p. 99. It is fair to mention that Schmitt’s eso-teric reading of Hobbes (supposedly a late critique of the Nazi regime) has not received much scholarly credit, for a detailed “why” see Luc Foisneau, Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu, P.U.F., Paris, 2000, pp. 282-283.

26 Reviewing Harold Laski’s Studies in the Problem of Sovereign-ty, the venerable George H. Sabine wrote in the name of all British pluralists: “in their view, the state is at most primus in-ter pares, a special corporation but nothing else […] its sover-eignty is limited by the undoubted fact that man’s conscience will not permit him to sacrifi ce all other loyalties to that which they owe to the state.”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 1918, p. 86.


Adrian Grama

Rezime

together with relativism. When the in-evitable confl ict between the individual’s many allegiances takes place, when he has to decide to whom he owes more fi delity, he must – given the full liberty of conscience he commands, decide on his own. Whereas for Figgis this intel-lectual torment is the natural condition citizens experience as members of the civil society and the state, for Schmitt’s monistic stance it is a logical impossibil-ity. Of course, he ironically notes, some “mobile and skillful” citizens would be quite pleased to practice this “equili-brated sort of freedom, the way one jumps from one ice fl oe to the next”27 but for the vast majority it will be nothing if

27 Carl Schmitt, “Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat”, Kant-Stu-dien, vol. 35, nr. 1, 1930, p. 33. Henceforward SPS.

not a hellish nightmare. The sheer idea that the individual, isolated with his own consciousness, can make choices is not only absurd but empirically false. When the state looses its monopoly over the criterion which allows it to “intensify” the community by deciding between friend and foe, that is – when the citizen, once asked to obey, takes a minute to think it over, such situation means “sovereignty of the social groups and not freedom and autonomy for the single individual.”28 The organization, be it church, trade-union or political party will always decide instead of its members and when this is the case, we are thrown back into the state of nature.

28 SPS, p. 34.

Vo ovoj trud toa {to go tvrdam e deka politi~kiot pluralizam ima smisla samo ako ja razbereme metafizi~kata pozadina vrz koja toj funkcionira. So taa cel, jas se obidov da skiciram kratka genealogija na toa {to zna~i da se bide moderen, a potoa otvoram dijalog pome|u eden od osnova~ite na pluralisti~kata teorija na dr`avata i eden od negovite naj`estoki kriti~ari.


Problemot na vrednuvaweto vo makedonskiot politi~ki pluralizamili za Problemot na politi~kiot pluralizam i negovoto aksiolo{ko vrednuvawe

Dejan Donev

Te

or

ija

Ako ima ne{to {to pluralizmot so svoeto etablirawe po promenite na sistemot so sebe go nosi, toa e doveduvaweto pod pra{awe na pret-hodnite vaè~ki-normirani vred-nosti i ponuda na novi vrednosti, {to samo po sebe ja dokaùva vrednosta na pluralisti~koto op{testvo kako mo`nost. No, mnogu pova`no od ova e faktot deka pluralizmot kako vred-nost sama po sebe e dokraj iskoristena samo toga{ koga istiot }e bide sfaten i razbran kako laboratorija od koja so tekot na vremeto treba da bide izgraden vrednosen sistem koj sam po sebe }e sozdade situacija da ne se postavuva pove}e pra{aweto: dali toj nosi ili ne nosi vrednosti, tuku dali onie koi go praktikuvaat, kolku i kako eti~ki odgovorno gi koristat i reali-ziraat mo`nostite koi toj gi dava?

* * *Denes i ovde, koga pluraliz-

mot ili poto~no idejata za nego e realnost, ona {to zagriùva ne e samo neposvetenosta na iskoristu-vaweto na negovite vrednosti za ponatamo{en odr`liv i traen razvoj vo sekoj pogled, tuku toa {to negovoto etablirawe vsu{nost vo zemjite na

tranzicija so specifi~no istorisko nasledstvo, kakov {to e slu~ajot na Makedonija, sozdava pove}e prostor za otvorawe pra{awa otkolku za nivno zatvorawe.

Na primer, edno od klu~nite pra-{awa {to vo momentov se nametnuva e: "dali paralelno so promenata na proizvodnite odnosi i sopstvenosta vrz kapitalot i sredstvata za proiz-vodstvo, voedno se re{ava i proble-mot vo smisla na toa dali onie koi vo momentot vladeat i go odreduvaat le-gislativnoto razre{uvawe na takvite odnosi, vodej}i smetka za potrebata od demokratsko razre{uvawe na plu-ralizmot na interesite, istovremeno gradat i vrednosni sistemi i me-hanizmi koi nema da sluàt samo za kontrola na protokot na sredstvata. No, u{te pova`no od toa e dali istite vodat smetka i za razrabotka na takov dano~en sistem koj onie koi vo momen-tot se sopstvenici na sredstvata za umnoùvawe na kapitalot }e gi ob-vrze da prezemat del od socijalnata odgovornost da go reinvestiraaat op-lodeniot kapital vo ponatamo{niot razvoj na op{testvoto od ~ii resursi go vle~at plodot i vrz baza na {to ostvaruvaat razlika!?#.


Dejan Donev

Voveduvaweto na pra{aweto za eti~kata vtemelenost i odgovor-nost na ekonomskoto odnesuvawe i pra{awata {to se otvoraat so na-~inot na ostvaruvaweto na dohodot i oploduvaweto na kapitalot, se vsu{nost samo startnata osnova za otvoraweto na zapra{anosta: “dali politi~kiot pluralizam vo Make-donija e rezultat na realnata potreba na gra|anite da preku politi~kite partii najdat na~in da gi izrazat svoite razliki vo organizirana for-ma i da dojdat do ona {to vo su{tina e i cel na sekoe novo demokratsko op{testvo – demokratsko gra|ansko op{testvo so izgradeni mehanizmi na kontrola na onie koi ja koristat kako na~in da dojdat do izvr{na-vladeja~ka-zakonodavna funkcija?#.

Kako i da e, ova naveduva na kon-statacijata, koga }e se razgleda i izanalizira makedonskata politi~ka pluralisti~ka scena – na koja evi-dentno dominiraat samo nekolku opcii, a izborite pokaùvaat deka s¢ u{te gra|anstvoto odi pove}e na izbor na li~nost otkolku na programa – deka pluralizmot sam po sebe e vrednost, no problemot e vo toa {to do pluralizmot e dojdeno bez da se napravi proverka na ona {to od pret-hodnite vrednosni sistemi moè da se inkorporira vo novite vrednosni sistemi i od toa da se (do)izgradi realen vrednosen sistem.

Vtoriot problem, mnogu eviden-ten ovde, e deka otsustvoto ili gra-deweto na reperen vrednosen sistem ovozmoùva situacija vo koja vred nost (i ekonomska i politi~ka) stanuva ona {to }e uspeete da go prodadete kako ideja deka toa e edinstveniot na~in da vlezete vo nekakva si zaednica, a pritoa sopstvenoto zakonodavstvo da

go prisposobuvate na baraweto na onie na koi sakate da im se pridruìte, ne vodej}i smetka za faktorot deka bez soodveten eti~ki mehanizam, bez soodvetno prisposobuvawe i repro-gramirawe na programskite nasoki na obrazovanieto, ne moète realno, na dolg rok, da gi koristite prido-bivkite od pluralizmot na interesi i idei, a da pritoa ne pribegnete kon odredeni metodi koi se neprimerni za sistemi za koi se zalagate, a vo ime na koj ste smenile sistem.

Ova zna~i deka pluralisti~kata scena vo Makedonija pove}e nali-kuva na audicija vo teatar otkolku na mesto kade {to sekoj od onie {to ja dobile ulogata, navistina ja znae celta i funkcijata na ulogata vo ramkite na kompletnata pretstava {to treba da se odigra, za da se dojde do realen vrednosen sistem na avto-regulacija preku prirodna selekcija na odr`livost ili neodr`livost na ponudenoto na izbor na dolgi pateki.

Zna~i, so samata ponuda na novi vrednosti se otvora i poleto na sudi-rot na interesite na eksponentite na politi~kiot pluralizam i se otvora pra{aweto na vrednosniot sistem {to se obiduvaat da ni go ponudat. Vakvata zapra{anost sama po sebe e kvalitet na pluralizmot, no problemot e vo toa {to istiot toj pluralizam voedno, zaradi negovata nedoizgradenost na vrednosniot sistem, a u{te pove-}e zaradi otsustvoto na soodvetna politi~ko-demokratska kultura i tradicija, go otvora pra{aweto na eti~kata odgovornost i sposobnost na izbor na vrednosti koi }e se vgradat vo koncepcijata za ponatamo{niot op{testven razvoj.



Za da bide pojasno za {to stanuva zbor, ovde treba da se spomene i u{te eden faktor za razgleduvanite prob-lemi. Komparativno gledano, vo t.n. razvieni demokratii, nezavisno od promenata na vladeja~kata garnitura, postoi zabeleìtelen kontinuitet na odredeni stabilni vrednosti i eti~ki normi na odnesuvawe koi, nezavisno od bojata na partijata koja }e pobedi na izbori, ostanuvaat ne-someni orientiri i na politi~arite. No, istite tie imaat u{te edna funk-cija i kvalitet kako vrednost: na gra|anstvoto mu davaat mo`nost spo-reduvaj}i go odnesuvaweto na izbra-nite so takvite normi voedno da go gradat i svojot sopstven eti~ki stav kon ne{tata, no i sebesi da se gradat kako kontrolori na realiziraniot dogovor za demokratsko upravuvawe. Toa zna~i deka istite se osposobuvaat da go prepoznavaat stepenot na re-alizacijata na principite koi gi od-brale kako opcija za ponatamo{niot razvoj na op{testvoto, no voedno i na kriteriumot kaj sebe da izborite gi sfa}aat ne kako prostor na koj }e se natprevaruvaat odreden broj li~nos-ti i retoriki, tuku kako mo`nost za korekcija na prethodnoto propu{teno i inkorporirawe na novi opcii i prak-tiki koi retrospektivno i proektivno pokaùvaat deka samo so me|usebno kodejstvo moàt odredeno op{testvo na odreden stepen na ekonomski raz voj da go pridviàt i ponatamu ili barem da go odrùvaat dovolno vitalno nezavisno od me|unarodnite ekonomski stresovi koi ne retko se ~uvstvuvaat vo odredeni sredini.

Ovaa zabele{ka osobeno se odne-suva na makedonskata ekonomska scena, kolku poradi nejzinata nepri-lagodenost na tendenciite vo svetot,

tolku na potrebite na sopstveniot pazar, a najmnogu na faktot {to onie koi vo momentot upravuvaat s¢ u{te ja nemaat doizgradeno svojata organiza-ciska i organizaciona kultura, a u{te pomalku imaat dovolno istorisko iskustvo na samo-upravuvawe so kapi-talot i sposobnost del od svojata isto-riska glad da ja pot~inat na potrebata na odrùvaweto na resursite.

Zna~i, soglasno prethodnoto, ne se do veduvaat pod pra{awe vrednosti te i mo`nostite na politi~kiot plurali-zam, tuku se postavuva pra{aweto kolku onie koi gi koristat nego vi-te mo`nosti se vo sostojba-zreli da izgradat soodveten regulatoren vrednosen sistem preku koj }e se vrednuvaat (preventivno) odredeni pojavi ili dvièwa i dali takvoto vrednuvawe i prezemawe na sood-vetno dejstvie, dokolku odredena pojava ili dvièwe ne e se vo so-glasnost so momentalnite tendencii i potrebi na op{testvoto, }e pre-dizvika sozdavawe mehanizmi koi nema da naveduvaat na vra}awe na prethodnite metodi na sistemite za koi groto od elektoratot se izjasnilo deka se neprifatlivi.

Ova ottamu {to, konkretno vo Makedonija, najgolemiot del od onie koi ja sozdavaat op{testvenata os-nova na ekonomskoto opstojuvawe i u~estvuvaat vo reguliraweto na odnosite i podelbata na op {tes-tvenite ulogi, obrazovno pripa|aat na eden sistem, dejstvuvaat vo drug sistem bez odredeni normi i pravila vrz eti~ka osnova, a se obiduvaat da sozdadat preduslovi za gradewe na sistem vo koj demokratijata kako takva ne e sama po sebe cel, tuku me-hanizam koj }e gi servisira potrebite na gra|anite.


Dejan Donev

Prethodnovo dava ovde za pravo da se zeme predvid i konstatacijata za praktikata na nekriti~koto preze-mawe na vrednosti od drugi modeli na praktikuvawe na demokratijata i ekonomijata i nivno (ne)kriti~ko implementirawe-impostirawe kaj nas. Imeno, re{avaj}i se za eden tip na demokratija, za àl, se slu~i situacija da, opredeluvaj}i se za neoliberalniot kapitalisti~ki mo del, voedno ne se razrabotija i demokratskite mehanizmi primerni za nego i negova kontrola. So drugi zborovi, se slu~i situacija vo koja, od edna strana, Ustavot, me|u drugo-to, garantira deka po deklaracija dràvata vo koja toj e donesen e i socijalna dràva,1 a od druga strana, seta legislativa koja ja regulira ovaa sfera od op{testvenoto ìveewe e nosena i se nosi spored dnevno-politi~kite potrebi na onie koi vo momentot vo Sobranieto go posedu-vaat mnozinstvoto. Toa zna~i deka na istite moè da im se zabeleì deka zakonskite re{enija ne gi nosat spored praviloto da se ima vizija i koncepcija za ona {to i kako i do koj stepen treba dràvata da se odnesuva kako socijalna, no u{te pove}e za toa {to i kolku donesuvaweto na takvite zakonski re{enija vo dadeniot moment }e im ovozmoì na onie koi raspola-gaat so kapitalot da go investiraat i izvezuvaat taka kako {to sakaat, a pritoa da ne snosat odgovornost deka na toj na~in od dràvata so neracio-nalnoto koristewe na resursite gi potkopuvaat i ekonomskite osnovi za mo`no reinvestirawe.

1 ^len 1 od Osnovnite odredbi na Ustavot na Republi-ka Makedonija, http://www.sobranie.mk/mk/default.asp? vidi=ustav.

Pa taka, se dojde vo situacija vo koja imate buxetska dràva, t.e. dràva koja se odrùva na buxetska osnova, namesto na realnoto proiz-vodstvo.2 Problemot ne e tolku vo toa {to buxetot e poln ili se polni, tuku problemot e vo mehanizmite preku koi istiot se polni! Za da go razre{i ovoj, ne samo politi~ko-ekonomski, tuku pred s¢ socijalno-ekonomski i eti~ki problem, t.n. „novokomponi-ran pluralizam# (poto~no negovite eksponenti vo praktika),3 za koj vo momentov, za àl, moè da se kon-statitra deka nema jasna politi~ka, eknomska ili kakva bilo druga vizija, del od tie sredstva od buxetot gi vra}a preku javnata potro{uva~ka. Eti~kata zapra{anost okolu javnata potro{uva~ka se javuva toga{ koga, sogleduvaj}i ja realizacijata na programite na koi se tro{at del od buxetskite sredstva, pove}e nalikuva na „Potemkinovi sela# otkolku na sozdavawe uslovi od koi, podigaj}i go javniot i sekoj drug standa rd, }e se sozdavaat ekonomsko-obrazovni-eti~ki i legislativni preduslovi za takov tip na ekonomija i proizvod-stvo, koi, potpiraj}i se najmnogu na lokalniot potencijal, }e go baraat svoeto mesto vo ramkite na global-nata ekonomija.

* * *

2 Pri ova se misli deka buxetot pove}e se koristi kako sredstvo za odrùvawe na potro{uva~kata, cirkula-cijata na parite i pazarot, otkolku kako izvor na inves-ticija za sozdavawe na uslovi za samoreprodukcija.

3 koi naj~esto se povikuvaat na globalnite dvièwa ka ko izgovor, a pomalku na praktikata na razvienite ekonomii od tipot na Germanija, Francija i nivnite mehanizmi vo takvi situacii, kade nezavisno od poli-ti~kata orientacija na partijata na vlast, socijalnata odgovornost i potrebata od zadrùvawe na ekonomski-ot identitet i razvoj i negovata odr`livost, ne se za-borava za smetka na potrebata dominantnite sopstveni-ci na kapitalot da ne se otkaàt od podr{kata na istite tie partii.



Seto prethodno sekako deka ne gi opfa}a site problemi i aspekti na ona {to pluralizmot go nudi kako pole za proverka i voveduvawe na vrednosti i gradewe na reperni sis-temi od toa.

No, nezavisno od toa, ostanuva faktot deka problemot na pluraliz-mot ne e vo toa deka ne nosi vred-nosti ili deka tie parcijalno ne se prisutni sega i ovde, tuku prob-lemot e vo toa {to duri i takvite vrednosti gubat na zna~ewe zaradi

otsustvo na svest deka pluralizmot ne e scena za politi~ki igri, tuku scena na koja ponudenite vrednosti preku proverkata niz praktikata }e stanat: eti~ki i sekakov drug regu-lator na ponatamo{niot razvoj. Onoj moment koga vaka }e bide sfatena negovata uloga toga{ }e mo`e da se zboruva za pluralizmot kako pojdoven vrednosen sistem. Dotoga{ toj e samo mo`nost za vrednuvawe na iskoris-teni mo`nosti!

If there is something that pluralism carries with it in its setting within the system changes, it is the process of questioning the previously valid values and offering new ones.

Together with the new values, there is a process of opening the fi eld of confl ict of interests among the exponents of political pluralism, as well as the question of the system of values that they are trying to offer us. More precisely, political pluralism opens the question of ethical responsibility and the ability to choose values which will be incorporated in the conception of the further development of the society.

Hence, the main question is whether political pluralism, a value by itself, has the potential to build an adequate ethical value system through which a certain political phenomenon will be (preventively) evaluated and whether this kind of evaluation and taking of certain action, if a particular political phenomenon is not in accordance with the momentary tendency in the society, means reviving the previous methods of systems which the majority of the people unhesitatingly declared unacceptable.

In this context, we can also address the question of taking over values from other models of democratic practice and economy and their critical or uncritical implementation in/imposing on our environment.

This is the fundamental subject of interest and consideration of the thesis proposed in this text.

Abstract


Dejan Donev

Literatura

Pinto, Jeffrey K. (ed.). Project Leadership: From Theory to Practice. Pennsyl-vania: Project Management Institute, 1998.

Burns, James M. Leadership. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979.

Ciulla, Joanne B. & Terry L. Price & Susan E. Murphy (eds.). The Quest for Moral Leaders: Essays on Leadership Ethics (New Horizons in Leadership Studies Series). Edward Elgar Pub, 2006.

Rost, Joseph C. Leadership for the Twenty-fi rst Century. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

Sims, Ronald R. Ethics and Organizational Decision Making: A Call for Renewal. Westport, CT.: Quorum Books, 1994.

Ustav na Republika Makedonija, http://www.sobranie.mk/mk/default.asp?vidi=ustav.

Pa`anin, Ante. Etika i politika. Zagreb: Hrvatsko fi lozofsko dru{tvo, 2001.

Wisser, Richard. Odgovornost u mijeni vremena. Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1988.

Facione, A. Peter, Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig. Ethics and Society. Second edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1991.


Another chance for party pluralism:The logical positivist challenge to Duverger’s law

Sergiu Gherghina

Introduction1

Natural sciences scholars have re-peatedly attacked social scientists for their quasi-scientifi c conclusions, the non-existence of universal laws, and the weakness of the scientific tools. Among the philosophical current of the 20th century, logical positivism assumed a position closer to what natural science meant, imposing a specific rigour in theory formation and validation. Logical positivism considers that the “claims to knowledge of the world can be justifi ed only by experience,” not being entitled to assert the existence of anything beyond all possible experience (Hollis 1994, 42). Knowledge is grounded in particular observations and can extend to general beliefs only in so far as ex-perience can confi rm them (Hollis 1994, 43). Starting with these basic claims, this article analyzes Duverger’s law of political parties using the framework provided by one of the most infl uential schools of philosophy in the 20th century. Therefore, logical positivism is used as a methodological tool for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of what was shown to be the most infl uential theory in explaining party pluralism.

1 A complete version of this article was published with a different title in 2007 in Vasile Boari, Sergiu Gherghina, Natalia Vlas and Cosmin Marian (eds.), Studii politice, vol 2 (Political Studies, vol. 2), Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press. The author is gra-teful to Paul Nieuwenburg for comprehensive thoughts, com-ment, and suggestions on the draft versions of the article.

Duverger’s theory continues to infl u-ence political science research. It fastly became a milestone for investigation in party pluralism and, often, researchers did not even claim the validity of this law or its character. By taking the law for granted, many aspects are ignored, some of which are revealed by ap-plying the logical positivist framework to this theory. The goal of this article is two-folded. Firstly, it tests the status of Duverger’s theory from the logical positivist perspective, identifying the elements that fi t the logical positivist perspective and the shortcomings of the theory. Secondly, it reformulates the law, by adding the necessary aspects by means of which the theory can reach the logical positivist requirements. Two research questions are asked: can the theory proposed by Duverger be consi-dered a theory from the logical positivist point of view and can the elimination of theory’s shortcomings improve the status of the theory?

The fi rst section analyzes the stan-dard theoretical requirements of logical positivism and emphasizes its four main criteria. The second section applies the logical positivist model to Duverger’s theory and identifi es the shortcomings of the theory from this point of view. The last section reformulates Duverger’s theory so that its explanatory potential increases and the sources of criticisms in the literature can be diminished.

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Conceptual clarifi cation: Law vs. theory

There are three main reasons why Duverger’s “law of political parties” can be considered a theory, not a law. Firstly, Duverger developed a whole theory from which only the concept of explanandum was taken and was called “law”. He himself did not name it a law, although he hoped to make it closer to a sociological law. I focus on the entire theory, as shown below, and not only on the explanandum. Secondly, it is a theory because it consists of all the parts of a theory, has the features of a theory (explanatory potential) and includes universal laws within its formulation. Thirdly, as shown in the article, the theory he develops does not have uni-versal properties that characterize a law. All these aspects are detailed below and for brevity, I use the term “Duverger’s law”, but I refer to his theory.

Logical positivism and standards for theories

Logical positivism developed its own standards and requirements for scientifi c theories, and considers them axiomatic systems that obtain empiri-cal interpretation through appropriate statements (rules of correspondence) that establish a correlation between real aspects and the abstract concepts of the theory. A scientifi c theory deals with general properties expressed by uni-versal statements. References to spe-cifi c space-time regions or to individual things are not allowed. The distinction between a fundamental theory, universal without restrictions, and a derived theory with references to individual objects, is highly important.

The fi rst criterion imposed by logi-cal positivism for theory is the easiest to account and verify: the criterion of parsimony – a theory has to be concise and use clear concepts. There are four more interlinked components to be ana-lyzed when establishing the positivist standards for a theory. Firstly, the prin-ciple of verifi ability according to which a statement is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifi able. Secondly, based on a distinction logical positivists make between observational and theoretical terms, the statements of a theory are divided in analytic (a priori and their truth is based on the rules of the language) and synthetic (depend on experience, and their truth can be acknowledged only by means of experience) (Hollis 1994). Thirdly, there is the distinction between the deductive or inductive na-ture of scientifi c theories, where logical positivism emphasizes logical validity, provides models for both, but cannot solve the problem of the latter. Finally, there are two features of theories that are equally important: the explanatory and predictive potential.

The criterion of verifi ability

Logical positivism claims that state-ments are meaningful only as long as they are verifi able and formal. The statements can be verifi ed only in two ways: empirical statements which are verifi ed by experiment and evidence and analytic truth statements which are true or false by defi nition. The verifi abi-lity criterion of meaning implies that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifi able. Wittgenstein’s infl uence is decisive for the formulation of the verifi abilty criterion. In Tractatus, Wittgenstein asserts that we understand



a proposition when we know what hap-pens if it is true, and compare it with Schlick’s assertion that “the defi nition of circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly equivalent to the defi -nition of its meaning” (Schlick 2002, 18). A statement proves to be meaningful if it is found to be true after being tested through an appropriate method.

In Language, Truth and Logic, A.J. Ayer sets out the distinction between the “strong” and the “weak” sense of verifi cation. „A proposition is said to be verifi able, in the strong sense of the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established by experience” (Ayer 1971, 18), while in the “weak” sense a proposition is verifi able ... if it is possible for experience to render it probable” (Ayer 1971, 18). Ayer (1971, 19) further argues that “no proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypoth-esis,” thus a subject only of weak veri-fi cation. This statement was criticized by other logical positivists, who argued that strong verifi cation is the basis of scientifi c theory.

Synthetic and analytic statements

The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is a consequence of the verifi ability principle and it can be linked with the observational-theoretical distinction, briefl y summarized below. According to the verifi ability principle, an alleged synthetic a priori state-ment does not have a meaning; thus, there are only two kinds of assertions: synthetic a posteriori and analytic a priori. Accordingly, there are only two sources of knowledge: logical reasoning and empirical experience. The former is analytic a priori, while the latter is

synthetic a posteriori; hence synthetic a priori does not exist. The rejection of the synthetic a priori constitutes a central element within their empiricism (Friedman 1999, 6).

Hume makes a sharp distinction between “matters of fact” and “relati-ons of ideas.” The former implies that all true statements about the world are true “contingently,” being contingent on matters of fact and not necessarily true in any sense. On the other hand, statements that are necessarily true are not about the world but about relations of ideas, depending for their truth on logical relations and the meaning of ideas (Hollis 1994, 51). Building on this differentiation, logical positivists made a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, terms introduced by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. For analytic statements, their truth or falsity depends solely on the meaning of their terms, while with synthetic sta-tements, their truth or falsity depends on matters of fact (Hollis 1994, 52). With respect to the role of analytic sentences in a scientifi c theory only two possibili-ties are allowed: an analytic statement is a logical-mathematical theorem (thus it has no empirical signifi cance) or it is a convention that defi nes the meaning of theoretical terms.

The distinction between observa-tional and theoretical terms emphasizes the difference between directly observed and measured terms (observational) and terms that can be inferred from direct observations as we are not able to measure and observe them directly (theoretical). Carnap (1966) begins from distinguishing between empirical laws, which use observational language, and theoretical laws, which use theoretical terms. The former are consequences of


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the latter. Empirical laws can be tested independently of theoretical laws, but not vice versa. Theoretical laws interpret empirical laws, while empirical laws interpret only empirical facts.

Logical positivism emphasizes reali-ty as a convention of language and, as a result, synthetic aspects being truths by convention. The same applies to all truths of logics, mathematics and formal systems: they result from rules that de-pend solely on human decision (Hollis 1994, 52). However, these connections have to be clearly established in order to understand the argument. The question that arises is how can material objects or concepts like “causality” be related with experience. The Positivists provided a direct and straight answer - by tests. The cognitive signifi cance (meaning) of any sentence is the condition of its empirical confi rmation or infi rmation. Claims about the empirical world are analyzed into the (confi rming or infi rming) experiences out of which they must somehow have been logically constructed.

Deduction and induction

The dichotomy between deductive and inductive mechanisms in theory was translated by Hempel into two different models where the emphasis is on the probability of result. The differences between deduction and induction were narrowed to the scope of the analysis. This “solution” was meant to solve the issue of induction which, in Ayer’s (1971, 34) conceptualization, implies “the problem of fi nding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future.” Before briefl y analyzing the models created by Hempel to illustrate the differences

and similarities between induction and deduction, it is necessary to spend some time with the conceptual issues developed by positivists.

Hempel and Oppenheim divided the explanation into two major components: the explanandum and the explanans. The former means “the sentence describing the phenomenon to be de-scribed (not that phenomenon itself)” whereas the latter is understood as “the class of those sentences which are ad-duced to account for the phenomenon” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 137). The explanans falls into two different subclasses: one that contains sentences that state specifi c antecedent condi-tions and one set of sentences which represents general laws (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 137). An explanation takes the form of a deductively valid argument where the explanandum, oc-cupies the position of the conclusion and the premises consist of laws and statements of conditions which in con-junction with the laws, deductively entail the explanandum.

The constituents of the explanation have to satisfy conditions of adequacy that can be divided into logical and empirical conditions. There are three logical conditions of adequacy. Firstly, the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans. Thus, the former must be logically deducible form the information contained in the latter. Secondly, the explanans must contain general laws to be required for the derivation of the explanandum. Thirdly, the explanans must have em-pirical content in order to be tested. Furthermore, there is only one empiri-cal condition of adequacy and it implies that the explanans is true (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 137).



Hempel proposes two models: the deductive-nomological and the proba-bilistic explanations. The former asserts that the explanation of a fact consists of a logical relationship between state-ments: the explanandum being deduced from “principles which have the charac-ter of general laws” (Hempel 2002, 47). The explanatory laws have the character of empirical generalizations connecting the observable aspects of the phenom-ena under scrutiny (Hempel 2002, 47). The laws and theoretical principles are of strictly universal form, asserting that in “all cases in which specifi ed condi-tions are realized an occurrence of such and such kind will result” (Hempel 2002, 49). Even though the premises are well known, they have to be stated. The explanans has to be empirically testable and its statements must be true. The explanandum is a logically necessary consequence of the explana-tory premises, whereas the premises in the explanans “state a suffi cient (and sometimes, though not invariably, a necessary) condition for the truth of the explanandum” (Nagel 1974, 21).

The probabilistic statistical form models are “assertions to the effect that if certain specifi ed conditions are realized, then an occurrence of such and such a kind will come about with such and such a statistical probability” (Hempel 2002, 49). This probability is characterized as the strength of the inductive support which the explanans confers upon the explanandum or as the induction probability which the lat-ter possesses relatively to the former (Hempel 2002, 50). Trying to solve the problem of induction, logical positivists took necessity out and thus, the conclu-sion is not a logical consequence of the two premises. The inductive explanation

requires a covering law, the explanan-dum being explained by means of sci-entifi c laws. In this model the laws are not deterministic, statistical laws being admitted.

Both deductive and inductive ex-planations are nomological and require universal laws. The relevant fact is the logical relation between the explanans and explanandum, in deductive expla-nation the latter being a logical conse-quence of the former.

Explanation and prediction

The explanatory and predictive force of a theory refl ects its importance and potential. The features and the logical structure of an explanation were extensively discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the current section emphasizes only the similarities and differences between explanation and prediction. According to Hempel and Op-penheim, the explanation and prediction have to fulfi ll exactly the same adequacy requirements and have identical logical structure: an explanation can be used to forecast and a forecast is a valid explanation. The difference between the two is “of a pragmatic character” and resides in the occurrence moment of the described phenomenon: if it oc-curred before the laws and statements of antecedent conditions to be given we deal with an explanation, while if those components of the explanans are given and the phenomenon is derived priori to its occurrence, we have a prediction (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 138).

An explanation and a prediction have to be complete. If in some explanatory cases the explanans can be incomplete due to parts that are assumed to be ob-vious, logical positivists emphasize the


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need of a complete explanans in order to lead to the explanandum. When re-ferring to explanation, logical positivists regard it as a causal explanation with an event that is caused by a combina-tion of antecedent circumstances in the presence of universal laws (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 139).

Duverger’s theory in the logical positivist framework of analysis

Does the theory proposed by Du-verger meet the requirements imposed by logical positivists? We shall proceed step by step and check the consistency of the two approaches.

The verifi ability and types of statements

Duverger’s law fulfi lls the verifi ability criterion of meaning according to which a statement is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifi able. The Duverger law statements are synthetic and they can be verifi ed only by experiment and evidence. The premises regarding the mechanic and psychological factors are both verifi able and are based on logical reasoning and refl ection of the reality. The psychological factor is a combina-tion of logical reasoning (assessing the strategic vote and the electoral behavior of the individual) and empiric evidence (the case of he parties in Great Britain where strategic voting manifested). The theory is based on empiric evidence of electoral systems until the 1960s and it is tested by experiment in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States (Duverger 1963, 218-226).

The law satisfi es both the criterion of verifi ability and the nature of state-ments to be included. It has analytic

a priori and synthetic a posteriori, not including Kantian type synthetic a priori statements, rejected by logical positiv-ists. However, based on the verifi ability criterion, obvious limits of the theory can be identifi ed, the most severe being its incapacity to explain those cases where the electoral system corresponds to the theory and there are more than two par-ties (32 countries).

The probabilistic causality

Duverger’s law fulfi lls one basic cri-terion in logical positivists’ conception of a theory: it is parsimonious and the con-cepts it uses are clear. However, there is a large amount of ambiguity in his statement of the relationship between the electoral system and the number of parties. It is not clear if plurality voting is a necessary condition, a suffi cient condition of the two-party system, both or neither of them. Duverger’s claim that the relation is a sociological law asks for necessity or a necessary and suffi cient condition whereas the use of “favors” suggests a probabilistic and not a de-terministic relation (Riker 1982, 754). The form of probabilistic explanation fi ts Duverger’s law the best for two different reasons. The fi rst is the linguistic one and it has already been mentioned. The formulations from 1954 (“favors”) and the one from 1986 (“tends to”) are ap-propriate to the probability system, not to the deductive–nomological one. The ambiguity increases when putting face to face the linguistic formulations and the claims of his law. Although Duverger uses “favors” in his theory to establish the relationship between the electoral and party systems, he was oriented to-wards the deductive-nomological model as he considered his theory universal,



the exceptions being very rare and they “can generally be explained as the result of special conditions” (Duverger 1963, 217). Therefore, he did not see his theory in probabilistic terms, but uni-versal, able to explain all but few cases characterized by special conditions.

Secondly, the empirical tests of Du-verger’s law for necessity, suffi ciency and causality do not hold today and they probably did not hold even when the theory was created. Before provid-ing the empirical tests, there are a few conceptual clarifi cations to be made with respect to the necessity and suffi ciency debate. Necessity implies that a cause must be present for the outcome in ques-tion to occur; the cause must precede the effect (Ragin 2000, 92). Suffi ciency means that the cause in question always produces the outcome in question, a cause produces the outcome in itself (Ragin 2000, 93). Or, in other words, X is a necessary condition for Y if Y does not occur in the absence of X (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000, 846).

Therefore, there are three situations for Duverger’s law: suffi cient, but not necessary (if there is a plurality system then there is a two-party system), neces-sary, but not suffi cient (only if majority rule then a two-party system) and both necessarily and suffi cient (if and only if majority rule then a two-party system). The data refl ecting party systems and electoral systems in the world refl ect no solid grounds for any of these three instances. Out of 17 countries having a two-party system, 13 have both “First Past the Post” (plurality rule) electoral system and two-party system, while 4 have only the latter. Out of 45 states having majority rule, only 13 have both majority-rule and two-party system,

while 32 have only the former (IDEA 2006).

As a result, Duverger’s law can be considered only as a probabilistic theory, with the explanatory and prediction po-tential and limitations that are assigned to this type of theories. The electoral system does not deductively imply the two-party system, and the existence of the former does not lead to the certain existence of the latter. However, it is possible to have had in the past a higher probability of having a two-party system when we have the plurality rule, especially since only 14 out of the 49 countries exemplified earlier existed when Duverger stated his law.

The structure of the theory and the deductive-inductive dilemma

Although Duverger did not formulate his theory exactly like a deductive nomo-logical one, he constructed it in deduc-tive-nomological terms. This is shown by the deduction he makes to reach the conclusion and by the descriptions and examples he provides. The theory meets the logical positivist requirements with respect to logical validity and the structure of scientific explanations. Thus, there is an explanandum (the two-party system) and an explanans (the electoral system and the processes it implies – the mechanical and psycho-logical effect.)

Following the deductive-nomological model, the conclusion results with ne-cessity for premises. The fi rst premise is the mechanical one and consists of the under-representation of the third party, the weakest in the poll (Duverger 1963, 226). The second premise is represented by the psychological factor


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and implies that the voters do not want to waste their votes on loser parties and thus they orientate themselves to-wards the large parties (Duverger 1963, 226-227). The combination of these premises, identifi ed as a third premise in the form provided below, leads to the conclusion according to which the bi-partism is a result of the simple-majority single-ballot system. The general form of the theory is:

The simple-majority single-ballot • system leads to the under-represen-tation of the weakest party.The simple-majority single-ballot • system leads to strategic voting. Both under-representation and • strategic voting are mechanisms to promote a two-party system.The simple-majority single-ballot • system leads to a two-party sys-tem.

The only step Duverger never made is to put his theory in this logically deduc-tive format; otherwise, he explicitly men-tions all these elements in his descrip-tions and analyses. Three out of the four elements of the deductive-nomological model are met here. Firstly, there is the form of a deductively valid argument where all the premises are stated. Sec-ondly, the explanans contains at least one general law (under-representation and strategic voting promote a two-party system). Third, the explanans is em-pirically testable and all the above cited studies and developments, including Duverger’s empirical work, account in this respect. The problematic element in his reasoning is that all the statements contained by the explanans must be true and the truth has to result after an empirical verifi cation. When empirically

verifi ed, the two general statements of the explanans are not true at this mo-ment or when Duverger created the theory. There are instances when voters do not act strategically and third parties are not under-represented even in a simple-majority single-ballot system. The examples today are represented by those 32 countries that have this elec-toral system and more than two parties (IDEA 2006).

Explanation and prediction

Duver ger provides two explana-tions regarding the effect of the elec-toral system on the number of parties. The fi rst one is mechanical and refers to the under-representation of parties, and the second is psychological and refers to the strategic voters. Rae’s study (1971, 89-92) came to confi rm the validity of the mechanical explana-tion, his results showing that plurality rules gave, compared to representation rules, a greater advantage to large par-ties over small ones. Using Rae’s data, Sprague reached the conclusion that in proportional systems the small par-ties get a fair or positively biased fair of seats if they get one-eighth or more of the votes, whereas in plurality systems they get a fair share only if they get over one third of the vote (Riker 1982, 762). With respect to the psychological factor, Downs (1957, 48) elaborated on Duverger’s theory and reached the conclusion that voters are sophisticated, taking into account the anticipated votes of the others and tries to reach the best realizable outcome for himself. Thus, in the election of single executives, so-phisticated voting “always works against third parties” (Riker 1982, 762).



The predictive force of Duverger’s theory is given by two indicators. Firstly, it contains the main aspects that are taken into account when choosing or reforming an electoral system (the me-chanical and the psychological effect.) Basing their choice on the theoretical grounds provided by Duverger, the de-signers can make the choice that best fi ts their society. Secondly, the electoral system is perceived today as the main source of shaping party-systems and, often, this is taken for granted without further inquiry.

Reformulating Duverger’s law

The limits of Duverger’s law explana-tory force, the problems which occurred in terms of induction and deduction and the insuffi ciencies regarding the universality of the law, as opposed to the identifi ed probability, lead to a reformulation of the law in accordance with the principles of logical positivism. The appropriate reformulation of the law increases its explanatory and predictive force. Riker (1982, 761) revised the theory to incorporate Canada and India, by adding the boundary conditions of the existence of a third party that acts continuously at a local level and of one party that is always a Condorcet winner (a party that can beat any other in a pairwise contest). More boundary condi-tions, in order to incorporate states that do not fi t the model, do not represent a valid solution, especially when today there are so many cases that are left out by Duverger’s theory. It is allowed to introduce as many new elements as necessary, but where is the limit? As in statistics, too many variables introduced spoil the model and the initial indicator loses its value.

However, by adding boundary condi-tions, irrespective of their content, the theory becomes more probabilistic and the general statements can become true. However, this does not always solve the problem of the deductive-nomological model. The non-universality of the law, especially today, made me believe that another form proposed by the logical positivists might be suitable for Duvergerian theory. Thus, the model of probabilistic explanation overcomes all the shortcomings previously stated. Without affecting its level of generality and with no further variables involved, the theory can be easily stated in proba-bilistic terms. Thus, the proposed form of the law is the following:

The probability for a simple-majority • single-ballot system to lead to a two-party system increases with the strategic behavior of the voters and the occurrence of third party under-representation.

This solves the issue of the unex-pressed boundary conditions where voters acted strategically and parties got under-represented in various sys-tems and manages to partially solve the problem of induction and probability. The explanatory and predictive force of the theory is increased by this relativization and probabilistic expression due to the switch of the level of analysis on me-chanical and psychological factors. Thus, if those statements are proved to be true, present in the political system under ob-servation, then the probability to have a two-party system is extremely high.

Conclusions

This analysis shows that the theory proposed by Duverger corresponds to


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most of the standards set by logical posi-tivists. Thus, it meets the requirements regarding the verifi ability criterion, it has the structure of a scientifi c explanation, it involves analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori statements by distinguishing between observational and theoretical terms and it possesses an explanatory and predictive force.

However, from the logical positivist perspective, there are a few shortcom-ings that the theory presents and their overcoming can signifi cantly improve the theory. There are three main weak-nesses in Duverger’s theory. Firstly, the explanatory force decreased sig-nifi cantly across decades, reaching a point where it can explain less than one third of the empirical cases. Sec-ondly, although stated as probabilistic at language level, the theory is highly deterministic and generates problems in terms of induction and deduction. The model proposed by Duverger suffers at the explanans level. Thirdly, in addition to the previous two points, the problems arise at the level of the theory’s univer-sality, a probability being closer to what we have at empirical level nowadays and to what was identifi ed theoretically as being problematic at the time. Thus, a certain electoral system does not neces-sarily lead o a two-party system, and the effects depend on various factors.

The revealed qualities and short-comings may help future research in improving the law, especially since it has been done in a constructive man-ner. This claim is more powerful as the identifi ed weaknesses are not only normative, but based on the empirical reality, combining the logical positivist rigour with the empirical realities in the sub-fi elds of electoral systems and political parties. The claim of this article gets stronger if we take a look at how Duverger himself refi nes and amends his theory after two decades, stating that “the plurality rule tends to produce a two-party system” (Duverger 1986, 70). The probability introduced in the new formulation of the law is necessary, but not suffi cient to eliminate the highlighted issues. The main problems reside in the reasoning of this law, in the truth of the general statements from the explanans and on the non-specifi cation of bound-ary conditions. The new formulation of the law does not indicate if any of these were modifi ed, it indicates only a modifi cation of the terms, not enough to catch the exact meaning of the theory as shown in Section 3. The novelty of the probabilistic version of Duverger’s theory proposed in this article consists of not introducing additional elements in the law, but on closely linking the explanandum and the explanans.

Rezime

Prirodonau~nicite postojano gi napa|aat onie od op{testvenite nauki za nivnite kvazinau~ni zaklu~oci, nepostoeweto na univer-zalni zakoni, kako i slabosta na nau~nite sredstva. Vo filozofskite tekovi na 20 vek, logi~kiot pozitivizam zazede pozicija poblisku do ona {to prirodnite nauki go tvrdat, so toa {to se vovede specifi~na krutost vo formiraweto na teoriite i nivno validirawe. Teorijata na Duverger prodolùva da vlijae vrz istraùvawata vo oblasta na politi~kite nauki. Istata nabrgu stana merilo za istraùvawata vo oblasta na partiskiot pluralizam, dodeka ~estopati istraùvawata



References:Ayer, A.J., 1971, Language, Truth and Logic, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Balashov, Yuri and Alex Rosenberg, 2002, Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge.Black, Jerome H., 1978, “The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Cana-dian Federal Elections”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 22, no. 3. Blais, Andre and R.K. Carty, 1991, ”The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measu-ring Duverger’s Elusive Factor”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 21, No. 1. Braumoeller, Brau F and Gary Goertz, 2000, “The Methodology of Necessary Condi-tions”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 44, no. 4.Carnap, Rudolf, 1966, Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, New York: Basic Books.Chibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman, 1998, ”Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States”, American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2.Cox, Gary W., 1997, Making Votes Count, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Downs, Anthony, 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Bros. Duverger, Maurice, 1963. Political Parties: Their Organization and Acticity in the Modern State, New York: Wiley, Science Ed. Duverger, Maurice, 1986, ”Duverger’s Law Forty Years Later” in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), 1986, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon. Elster, Jon, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, 1997, Institutional Design in post-Commu-nist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Friedman, Michael, 1999, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaines, Brian, 1999, “Duverger’s Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 32, no. 3.

voop{to ne ja zemaat predvid validnosta na ovoj zakon ili negoviot karakter. So toa {to ovoj zakon se zema zdravo za gotovo mnogu aspekti se ignoriraat, dodeka pak samo nekoi se otkrivaat niz perspektivata koja ja razviva logi~kiot pozitivist vrz baza na ovaa teorija. Ovaa statija ima za cel da go testira statusot na Teorijata na Duverger od perspektiva na logi~kiot pozitivist i da gi identifikuva elementite koi se vklopuvaat so perspektivata na logi~kiot pozitivist, kako i nedostatocite na teorijata.

Dodeka od edna strana Teorijata na Duverger soodejstvuva so pove- }eto od standardite postaveni od strana na logi~kite pozitivisti, sepak, istata poka`uva tri glavni slabosti: potencijalot za objasnu-vawe se namaluva vo zna~itelna mera niz deceniite, iako e sveden na verojatnost na jazi~no nivo, teorijata e visoko determinira~ka i ra|a problemi vo smisla na indukcija i dedukcija, a se javuvaat problemi i na nivo na univerzalnosta na teorijata – verojatnost koja e pobliska do ona {to go imame na empirisko nivo vo momentov, i do ona {to be{e teo-retski identifikuvano kako problemati~no so tekot na vremeto. Kako zaklu~ok, odreden glasa~ki sistem ne zna~i deka vodi kon dvopartiski sistem, rezultatot zavisi od razni faktori.


Sergiu Gherghina

Gotowski, William E., and John P. Georges, 1993, “Optimal Sophisticated Voting Stra-tegies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates”, Public Choice, vol. 77, no. 2.Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (eds.), 1986, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon. Hempel, Carl G. and Paul Oppenheim, 1948, ”Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 15, no. 2.Hempel, Carl, 2002, ”Two Models of Scientifi c Explanation”, in Yuri Balashov and Alex Ro-senberg, 2002, Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge.Hollis, Martin, 1994, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), www.idea.int, last accessed October 28, 2006. Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully (eds.), 1995, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Mainwaring, Scott, 1998, „Rethinking Party Systems Theory in the Third Wave of De-mocratization: The Importance of Party System Institutionalization.“ Working Paper #260. Notre Dame, Indiana: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.Mair, Peter, 1997, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.Mair, Peter, Wolfgang Muller and Fritz Plasser (eds.), 2004, Political Parties and Electoral Change, London: Sage Publications.McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1972. “A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” in J. F. Herndon and J. L. Bernd (eds.), 1972, Mathematical Applications in Political Science, vol. 6. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.Nagel, Ernest, 1974, The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientifi c Ex-planation, 4th edition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Ordeshook, Peter and Olga Shvetsova, 1994, “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 1. Rae, Douglas W., 1971, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 2nd edition, New Haven: Yale University Press.Ragin, Charles, 2000, Fuzzy-Set Social Science, Chicago; University of Chicago Press. Reed, Steven R., 2001, ”Duverger’s Law is Working in Italy”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 3. Riker, William H., “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 76, no.4. Riker, William, 1986, ”Duverger’s Law Revisited” in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), 1986, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon.Sartori, Giovanni, 1986, “The Infl uence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?” in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), 1986, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon.Sartori, Giovanni, 2005, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Col-chester: ECPR Press.Schlick, Moritz, 2002, „The Future of Philosophy”, in Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, 2002, Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, London: Routled-ge.Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shuggart, 1989, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, New Haven: Yale University Press. Wildawsky, Aaron, 1959, ”A Methodological Critique of Duverger’s Political Parties”, Journal of Politics, vol. 21, no. 2.


Edna od glavnite pri~ini i celi na promenata na prethodniot sistem, koj po~nuvaj}i samiot od sebe od vnatre da se izjaduva i samiot si pridonese za propa|awe, a onie koi se re{ija toa da go storat, poa|aj}i od pretpostavkata deka menuvaj}i go prethodniot sistem, koj mnogumina go na rekuvaat „vreme na ednoumie#, ne pravea razlika me|u idejata na sis-temot i lu|eto koi go sproveduvaa i realiziraa, be{e da se sozdade sistem vo koj pluralizmot na ideite }e najde prostor preku organizirana politi~ka scena vo oblik na partii, nezavisno od nivnata opredelba ili boja, da mu ovozmoì na gra|aninot da najde na~in da zeme u~estvo vo odlu~uvaweto za ona {to i kako }e se raboti, {to i kako }e se pro-iz ve duva, {to i kako }e se edu cira, {to i koja treba da bide krajnata cel na op{testvoto vo koe saka da ìvee i kakvo toa da bide.

Ovaa potreba i èlba za vakov vid op{testvo i vakvo sou~estvo i soodgovornost na gra|aninot, ̀ elba sama po sebe plauzibilna, svojata realizacija ja doìvea na na~in koj, za àl, poradi agonijata koja se vika tranzicija koja ovde trae pove}e od 18 godini, se pretvori vsu{nost vo izvor na frustracija, otu|uvawe na ~ovekot i od sebesi i od svetot, so {to vo su{tina vo golema merka se doveduvaat do pra{awe samata

vrednost i opravdanost na plura-lizmot.

Imeno, se nametnuva pra{aweto: dali pluralizmot, koj sam po sebe e nesporna vrednost, vo situacija kade nekriti~ki i po sekoja cena se ru{at i vrednosti i mehanizmi koi i vo prethodniot sistem davale pozitiven rezultat, ne se pretvori vsu{nost vo igra-koketerija so su{tinskite vrednosti na plura-lizmot – prostor kade plasiraj}i odredeni idei, namesto vo pros-tor-sredstvo vo koe, koristej}i gi demokratskite mehanizmi, sekoj od u~esnicite ne samo da go izgradi sopstveniot identitet i kako ~ovek i kako ~len na op{testvoto, tuku i identitetot na site gra|ani i dràvata, kako na~in za sozdavawe vrednosen sistem spored koj }e se vrednuva i sebesi, no voedno toa }e bide i na~in spored koj i drugite }e se vrednuvaat sega i ovde, za ovde.

Zna~i, pluralizacijata na poli-ti~kata scena voedno ne samo {to otvora prostor za voveduvawe no vi orientacii, tuku voedno i otvo ra prostor, blagodarenie na informati~kata globalizacija na svetot, za poinakvo gledawe i vrednuvawe na na~inot na ìvo-tot-potro{uva~kata-na~inite na proizveduvaweto na egzistencijata i menuvaweto na mentalniot sklop na odredena sredina shodno nasto-

Te

or

ija

Aleksandar Dimitriev

Novite „vrednosti# od politi~kiot pluralizam kako izvor na frustracii



juvawata da se fati ~ekor so t.n. globalizacija po odreden model.

No, ova otvora i niza pra{awa na koi dosega{nata praktika ne dava odgovor, tuku samo gi prodlabo~uva doveduvaj}i ja situacijata do ap-surdnost, t.e. do kontinuitet na frustracii od ona {to se saka i od ona {to se moè ili na gra|anite im se dava kako prostor za seberea-lizacija i sebeaktualizacija.1

Poto~no, ona {to toj go otvora kako zapra{anost e: dali so vovedu-vaweto na istiot voedno dràvata i site nejzini institucii, a osobeno vo sodejstvo so obrazovnite, gradi i sistem-mehanizmi za eti~ko vrednu-vawe na posledicite od plura li-zacijata na politi~kata scena, t.e. sistem na eti~ki, socijalni, moral-ni... vrednosti. Za àl, odgovorot e NE! No {to e u{te postra{no – se dojde vo situacija na nametnuvawe na „vrednosti# bez pred toa istite da bidat prakti~no provereni ili validizirani od realniot eti~ki vrednosen sistem ili prethodno da se sogleda faktot deka toa se isto taka „vrednosti# koi i onie sistemi od koi se prezemeni odamna gi imaat nadìveano ili se trudat so sopstvenoto zakonodavstvo da gi eliminiraat mo`nite negativni posledici od istite.

Vakvite posledici od plural-izacijata kaj nas, osven {to imaat negativen efekt vrz op{testveniot razvoj, tie imaat, pred i nad s¢, pos-ledica i po eden od osnovnite seg-

1 [to sekako e i posledica kolku na nepodgotvenoto vl-etuvawe vo tranzicijata, tolku i na pomodnoto „za bo-ravawe# na teoriskite postavki na odreden broj te-oreti~ari, filosofi, misliteli i teoreti~ari na ekonomijata, vrz ~ii soznanija i t.n. razviena zapadna de mokratija i ekonomija vo golema merka ja gradat svo-jata politi~ko-teoriska i ekonomska misla i koncepci-ja za ponatamo{en odr`liv i traen razvoj.

menti na op{testvoto-semejstvoto,2 kade se ogledaat posledicite od pluralizacijata kolku na ekonom-skoto odnesuvawe tolku i na poli-ti~koto dejstvuvawe i prakticirawe na vlasta na eti~ki nesoodveten na~in.

Toa, pak, voedno go otvora i pra-{aweto na funkcionalnosta ili disfunkcionalnosta na gra|aninot, a osobeno na onie koi po sklop na biolo{kite okolnosti se educirani vo eden sistem, a treba da se realizi-raat vo drug politi~ki sistem. Ova, pak, kaj istite doveduva do frus-tracii vo odnos na vrednostite koi gi ima interiorizirano i vrednos-tite spored koi se odreduva nivniot socijalen, politi~ki i op{testven status, suverenitet i identitet, i kako li~nost, no i kako gra|anin na funkcija.

Imeno, prethodnata konstatacija sama po sebe ne e sporna. Me|utoa, ona {to e sporno e pra{aweto: „dali so nekriti~koto doveduvawe pod pra{awe na prethodnoto, onie koi gi doveduvaat vo pra{awe takvite vrednosti, voedno nametnuvaj}i nov vrednosen sistem, toa go pravat proveruvaj}i go preku realen vred-nosen sistem za koj ne se postavuva pra{aweto dali e eti~ki vtemelen i izgraden?#.

Poednostaveno: se raboti za toa dali, urivaj}i gi prethodnite sistemi, a so samoto toa i vrednos-tite koi toj gi nudel, a za koi so sigurnost moè da se tvrdi deka

2 Ovde se misli na nametnuvawe na „in“-vrednosti od nad-vor {to ovde rezultira so sostojba na postojano gener-irawe na socijalni frustracii i potencijalni sudiri poradi nemo`nosta (finansiska ili druga) da se ̀ ivee spored ona {to nekade tamu e stil i nivo na ìveewe. Ova, pak, vo praktikata na mikro nivo, po radi rasloju-vaweto na op{testvoto, doveduva do ras pa|awe na seme-jstvoto kako osnovna }elija na op{testvoto.



{to se odnesuva na planot na t.n. „gra|anska sloboda# ili „u~estvoto na edinkata vo op{testvoto# ima sporni elementi, sepak i vo takviot sistem nemalo odredeni eti~ki i moralni vrednosti koi moèle da se inkorporiraat i vo naredniot ponuden politi~ki sistem.

Problemot ne e, na krajot na krai{tata, samo vo toa, tuku i vo toa {to golem broj od vaka gene-riranite problemi onie {to se na vlast se obiduvaat da gi re{at so nosewe na zakonska regulativa „po merka#. No, ona {to zagriùva e otsustvoto na politi~kata svest i soznanieto deka samo legislativno ne moàt da se razre{at naslede-nite istoriski nedousoglasenosti, izvori na sudiri, {to prirodni, {to nametnati od nagloto voveduvawe na „slobodata na informacii#, koi pove}e nalikuvaat na selekcija na vestite i manipulacijata so niv,3 a u{te pomalku so kontrolata na/vrz zakonodavstvoto koe se podre-duva na potrebata da se izbegnuvaat sudirite, a ne da se gradi ramka i osnova za prevenirawe na mo`nosta od kulturolo{ko frustrirawe na identitetot.

Pokonkretno, ova pak doveduva do situacija da samo se premestuva teì{teto na mo`niot izvor na novi frustracii, a od toa i sudiri koi

3 Se razgledaat li informaciite {to gi nudat infor-mativnite glasila }e zabeleìte deka dominiraat ne-ga tivnite vesti, {to moè da bide rezultat na real-nata sostojba i eventualno na realnoto infor mirawe. No, ona {to mnogu pove}e zagriùva e faktot {to i vo vestite od stranstvo dominira hororot, {to samo po sebe ne ~udi imaj}i ja predvid seop{tata globalna situ-acija. No, ona {to zagriùva e faktot {to se lek cijata na takvite vesti kako da e naso~ena kon ute {uvawe na ovde{nite gra|ani deka ne im e samo nim lo{o, so {to ne samo {to se podgreva malogra|anskiot mentalitet – sekade e isto, ni tie ne se podobri, tuku so toa povtor-no vo praktika se voveduva metodologijata na zaslepu-vawe i unificirawe na na~inot na mis leweto primerni za eden drug sistem.

vo edna situacija }e se narekuvaat vaka a vo druga onaka, a na krajot toa pokaùva deka onie koi gi igraat ulogite na pluralisti~kata scena samo „{miraat# i svojot „de-mokratski trud# go naso~uvaat kon pomestuvawe na su{tinskite pro-blemi pod kilimot, namesto istata scena i vrednostite {to so sebe gi nosi pluralizacijata da im sluì kako agora za razmena na dijalog do me|usebno razbirawe od koe }e po~ne da se vle~at zaedni~kite imeniteli na realno univerzalniot eti~ki sistem, nezavisno od nacionalnoto, kulturnoto ili kakvo bilo drugo po-teklo na onie koi igraat na scenata i go izigruvaat elektoratot.

Toa samo pokaùva deka plu-ralizmot prestana da bide pole za razmena na idei i regulator na odnosite na politi~kata scena, a s¢ pove}e se pretvora vo izbor na garnituri koi }e realiziraat vakov ili onakov ekonomski koncept, ili }e poddràt vakva ili onakva naso~enost vo ekonomskiot razvoj, za koj evidentno e deka ne postoi nitu nacionalen koncept, a u{te pomalu nacionalen konsenzus.

Soo~eni so vakvata situacija, namesto demokratizacijata na eko-nomskite odnosi, prednostite na slobodnata konkurencija i pazarot da gi vtemeluvaat vrz etikata na bioodr`livosta i biotrajnosta, vodej}i smetka za bioresursite i bionasledstvoto, vo nedostatok na realen eti~ki ekonomski vrednosen pazaren sistem i soodvetna biopo-litika i zakonodavna regulativa, „pluralisti~kite glumci# kosti-mirani „vo interes na narodot#, vle~at ekonomsko-politi~ki potezi koi deluvaat kako Potemkinovi



sela,4 so {to se zatskriva real-noto osiroma{uvawe na gra|anite, i duhovno i ekonomski. Ova, pak, na kraj vo periodite na izbori, rezultira so toa {to glasa~koto telo namesto da (iz)bira opcija na odr`liv i traen razvoj bira opcii koi neposredno vo naredniot period moàt da mu izgledaat kako re{enie na problemite od sekojdnevieto koe emotivno go prazni (i od frustra-ciite so koi sekojdnevno se soo~uva poradi nemo`nosta da gi zadovoli ponekoga{ i najosnovnite potrebi, ne samo ekonomski, tuku i kulturni, demokratski...).

Ova, pak, ja stava pod pra{awe edna od glavnite vrednosti na plu-ralizmot: mo`nosta da se izgradi nov demokratski gra|anski identi-tet i op{testveno ureduvawe vrz baza na realni vrednosti nasproti frustraciite od somnevaweto vo rezultatite od nametnatiot model na globalizacija na lokalnata eko-nomija, {to s¢ zaedno rezultira i so frustracija vo odnos na nasle-denite vrednosti, no i na predod-redenosta na odredeni prostori da sluàt kako raskrsnica – ekspe-rimentalen prostor za istorisko raskusuruvawe.

* * *Vakvata sostojba pokaùva u{te

ne{to. Namesto voveduvaweto na pluralizmot na ovie prostori da bide iskoristeno ne samo kako mo`nost za „per~ewe# na izbori, ni se slu~i ne{to sosema drugo. Imeno,

4 vo stilot na: „Za sekoj u~enik kompjuter#, a pritoa ne se re{eni nitu najelementarnite uslovi za izveduva-we na obrazovanieto, iako se trgnuva so parolata de ka „Znaeweto e mo}, znaeweto e sila!# koja, za ̀ al, so najno-vite zakonodavni reformi na obrazovanieto od osnov-no do visoko, s¢ pove}e nalikuva na toa deka „Znaewe-to e sila, dràvata e mo}!#.

namesto pluralizmot na teorii i praktiki na demokratska realiza-cija na razre{uvawe na problemite proizlezeni od prethodniot sistem od koj tolku rado se otkaàvme, vsu{nost, vo Makedonija ni se slu~i situacija na uvoz na praktiki parcijalno razbrani i u{te pone-soodvetno praktikuvani. Delumno opravduvawe za vakvata sostojba leì i vo toa {to sekoj plurali-zam, pa taka i makedonskiot, treba da gi izìvee detskite bolesti na pluralizacijata na misleweto i razbiraweto na svetot.

Opasnosta pri ova e vo toa {to po 18 godini gradewe demokratska politi~ka pluralisti~ka scena, na nea se slu~uva ona {to najmalku tre-ba da se slu~i. Namesto izleguvawe od periodot na adolescencijata na obmislata na ponudenoto, nie s¢ u{te sme vo situacija na sekojdnevna manifestacija na petar-panovskiot sindrom. Vakvata situacija, za ̀ al, kolku {to e rezultat na odredeni negativni praktiki5 prezemeni od sistemot koj be{e zamenet, tolku e rezultat i na potrebata da pred svetot se izgleda deka sme vo ~ekor, zaboravaj}i pri toa da izgradime vrednosen eti~ki kriti~ki sistem i teorija, koi, ako ni{to drugo, barem }e ovozmoàt pojdovna analiti~ka osnova, pa makar i post festum za ona do {to n¢ dovedoa odredeni pre-zemeni modeli na odnesuvawe bez da se poznava nivnoto koreni{te, a u{te pomalku ekonomskite pre-duslovi za takviot model na od-nesuvawe, da se sozdadat i da se izgradat soodvetni mehanizmi za

5 Poradi dnevno-politi~kite i populisti~kite poli ti-ki na vladeja~kite garnituri i otsustvoto na nivnata eti~ka odgovornost i svest za posledicite od toa.



preraspredelba na op{testveniot proizvod.

Poednostavno kaàno, ona {to nedostasuva na pluralisti~kata scena vo Makedonija e paralelen razvoj na teoriskata misla za po-li ti~kiot razvoj, isto kolku i te o riskiot analiti~ki odnos kon ekonomskite tekovi, za da ne se bide vo situacija, koga se diskutira za nekoj problem ili pi{uva za nego ili organiziraat simpoziumi za nego, tie pove}e da nalikuvaat na nabrojuvawe na sostojbi i elementi, koi samo }e ja potvrdat neophod-nosta od teoriskiot pristap spored teorijata na haosot, otkolku {to da-vaat konkreten odgovor po princip na kriti~ko razlagawe i faktorska analiza na odnosite i pri~inite za nivnoto takvo sozrevawe do stepen kade {to, namesto pluralizmot da bide prostor, vreme vo koe Negovoto Viso~estvo Gra|aninot, koj spored definicijata bi trebalo da bide cel na postoeweto na dràvata, }e gi razre{uva svoite frustaciii, istiot e samo niven generator.6

* * *Nekoga{ se sonuvalo za plura-

lizam kako pole za demokratska seberealizacija i sebeekspresija. Isto tolku pluralizmot, vo vis-tinskata smisla na zborot, zna~i i prezemawe odgovornost, i indivi-dualna i kolektivna, a so samoto toa i po~ituvawe na principot na supsidijarnost i socijalna odgo-vornost, isto kolku i vra}awe

6 Konstatacijata deka pluralizmot koj sam po sebe e vred-nost zatoa {to e pole vo koe praktikata ja prove ru va odr`livosta na ponudenite vrednosti do stepen ka de {to od niv }e se gradi vrednosen sistem, se pre tvori sega i ovde vo generator na frustracii, svoeto opravdu-vawe go nao|a tokmu vo na~inot na koj se praktikuva-ko-risti pluralizmot vo Makedonija.

kon realno univerzalen eti~ki vrednosen sistem vo koj edinkata-gra|aninot }e bide krajnata cel na postoeweto na dràvata vo preod-niot period do fazata koga taa }e premine vo sostojba na serviser na dogovorenoto me|u gra|anite koi na sekoi naredni izbori }e gi biraat ili nema kandida tite spored niv-nata uspe{nost vo realizacijata na vakvoto sfa }a we na vrednosta na demokratskiot pluralizam.7

Deka pluralizmot treba da bide taka sfaten, nema somnevawe! Ova zatoa {to samo taka sfateniot plu-ralizam i vrednostite koi so sebe gi nosi kako mo`nost }e ja ispolni svojata cel – da bide pole od koe vo razmena na mislewa-dijalog }e se dojde do soznanieto koj komu vo pluralizmot treba da mu sluì: izbi ra~koto telo na partiite ili partiite da evoluiraat do stepen ka-de {to }e bidat vo sostojba borej}i se za mnozinstvo vo Sobranieto da so sekoj nareden zakon {to }e go done-sat gi pro{iruvaat i zacvrstuvaat temelite za sozdavawe takov vid op{testveno-ekonomski i socijalni odnosi koi so svojata odr` livost i trajna otvorenost za re{avawe na tekovnite problemi, voedno na gra|aninot }e mu go vratat ne samo dostoinstvoto kako osnova na dràvata i celta na nejzinoto po stoewe, tuku }e mu ovozmoàt osloboduvaj}i se od konfliktot pome|u ona {to go posakuva i ona {to e mo`no, svesen deka onie koi

7 Dali i koga voop{to }e se dojde do toa, da posakuva-noto stane realnost, u{te pove}e zavisi i od sposob-nos ta na onie koi gi sproveduvaat promenite za da vos postavat takvo ureduvawe i takov na~in na koris tewe na kapitalot i negovoto oploduvawe koi nema da otvoraat pra{awa okolu opravdanosta na vospostavu vaweto na pluralisti~kiot sistem, tuku }e gi zatvora at pra{awata koi proizleguvaat od negov-oto vospostavuvawe.



gi bira se gri`at za razre{uvawe na takvite problemi, realno da go dade i svojot li~en pridones vklu~uvaj-

AbstractThe introduction of political pluralism is a value by itself. The basic question

that this introduction opens is whether with the importation of political pluralism, the state and all of its institutions, especially the educational ones, have built a system and the mechanisms for the ethical evaluation and valorization of the consequences of pluralism on the political scene, in other words, do they introduce a system of ethical, social, moral ... values?

The pluralization of the political scene, at the same time, does not only open the space for introducing new orientations, but also, thanks to the informational globalization of the world, the space for different perceptions and valorization of the way of life; the focus is on the consumption and the forms of production for basic existence which change the mental structure of the whole society in the attempt to remain in touch with the so-called globalization according to a certain model.

These consequences of pluralization, besides having an effect on the development of the society, also infl uence one of the basic segments of the society – the family, where the effects of such an infl uence can be felt in a rather negative way, as well as in the economic currents, political activity and practicing of authority.

This also opens the questions of the functionality or disfunctionality of the citizens, especially of those who, due to certain circumstances, were educated in one system, and have to adapt to another political system. This leads to frustrations caused by the previous isolation and the circumstances in which they are now judged on the basis of their socio-political background, their status in the society and identity. These are the main issues addressed in this text.

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Laing, R.D. Podeljeno je politika do`ivljaja. Beograd: Nolit, 1977.

Konstantinovi}, Radomir. Filosofija palanke. Beograd: Nolit, 1981.

Habermas, Jirgen. Saznanje i interes. Beograd: Nolit, 1975.Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge & Human Interest. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.Difren, Mikel. Umjetnost i politika. Sarajevo: Svijetlost, 1982.

Bloch, Ernst. Prirodno pravo i ljudsko dostojanstvo, Beograd: Komunist, 1977.Adorno, Theodor et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper, 1950.Adorno, Theodor. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum, 1973.Horkheimer, Max. Critique of Instrumental Reason. New York: Continuum, 1974.Fromm, Erich. Human Nature and Social Theory. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969.Foucault, Michel and Alan Sheriden. Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge, 2002.

}i se vo pluralizmot kako eti~ki kontrolor-korektor.


„[efot na dràvata i nadvore{nata politika# od Aleksandar Spasenovski

Me|u pozna~ajnite nau~ni ostva-ruvawa od oblasta na politi~kite nauki se izdvojuva i istraùvaweto na Aleksandar Spasenovski, pos-veteno na ulogata na {efot na dràvata vo nadvore{nata poli-tika. Vo okolnosti koga politi~kiot sistem na Republika Makedonija s¢ pove}e stanuva cel na razli~ni tolkuvawa, ovoj nau~en trud nudi seopfatna analiza na sostojbite vo pove}e dràvi, {to sekako pri-donesuva za pocelosno razbirawe na ovaa problematika.

Deloto „[efot na dràvata i nadvore{nata politika# e sostave-no od voved, dva dela vo koi se sodràni {est glavi, i zaklu~ni sogleduvawa. Vo vovedniot del av-torot pravi osvrt na opravdanosta i potrebata za istraùvawe vo ovaa oblast, kako i podelbata na dràvite spored nivniot politi~ki sistem. Ovaa podelba se primenuva i vo ostanatite delovi na knigata. Isto taka, voveduvaj}i go ~itatelot, se nudi i kratok osvrt na funkcijata na {efot na dràvata i na negovata uloga vo nadvore{nata politika voop{to, sporeduvaj}i ja i so ulogata na pretsedatelot vo makedonskiot politi~ki sistem.

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Vasko Naumovski

Aleksandar Spasenovski, "[efot na dràvata i nadvore{nata politika# , Evropa 92, Skopje, 2008

Prvata glava od knigata e pos-vetena na sistemot na vlasta, a po sebno na izvr{nata vlast. Ovde avtorot navleguva podlaboko vo mestoto i ulogata na {efot na dr-àvata, negovite prava i dol ̀ nosti, so naglasuvawe na nad vo re{nata politika.

Vo vtoriot del avtorot ja ana-lizira politikata kako op{testven


Vasko Naumovski

fenomen, pritoa otkrivaj}i gi as-pektite na nadvore{nata politika. Poimot „me|unarodna politika# se definira preku analiza na ~etiri stojali{ta prifateni vo nau~nata javnost – totalitaristi~koto, eta-tisti~koto, pluralisti~koto i republikanskoto. Vo natamo{noto istraùvawe se posvetuva vni-manie na pove}e teoriski pravci – realizmot, institucionaliz-mot, radikalizmot, teorijata na odlu~uvaweto, hegemonisti~kata teorija na stabilnosta, konstruk-tivizmot i dekonstruktivizmot. Isto taka, ovde se obraboteni i subjektite na me|unarodnite odnosi, kako i diplomatskata aktivnost i nejzinite osnovni principi.

Prviot del od trudot zavr{uva vo tretata glava, kade {to avtorot gi prou~uva dràvite vo koi se najvidlivi razli~nite politi~ki sistemi: SAD, Francija, Obedine-toto Kralstvo i [vajcarija. Vo site ovie primeri detalno se analizira polo`bata na {efot na dràvata, a posebno negovite dol`nosti vo vodeweto na nadvore{nata poli-tika. Zaklu~uvaj}i ja sekoja celina, avtorot ja analizira i uspe{nosta na nadvore{nata politika na site ovie dràvi.

Vtorot del od knigata zapo~nuva so ~etvrtata glava, kade {to Spase-novski navleguva vo ustavnite od red-bi posveteni na {efot na dràvata vo Republika Makedonija. Zapo~nuvaj}i so analiza na makedonskiot politi~-ki sistem i negovite principi, ovaa glava dava jasna slika za modelot na politi~ki sistem prifaten vo Republika Makedonija, a posebno izborot, statusot i ovlastuvawata na pretsedatelot na dràvata.

Organite za vodewe na nadvo-re{nata politika se tema na pet-tata glava, pri {to se obrabotuvaat principite na Ustavot na Republika Makedonija, Zakonot za nadvore{ni raboti, kako i drugi akti. Avtorot gi analizira organite vo Republika Makedonija nadle`ni za sprovedu-vawe na nadvore{nata politika, vklu~itelno i sobranieto, vladata, ministerstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti, itn.

Vo poslednata glava se prou~uva-at principite na nadvore{nata politika na Republika Makedonija, nejzinite celi i mo`nosti. Od poseb-no zna~ewe vo ovaa glava e analiza-ta na pove}e govori na dosega{nite pretsedateli na Republi ka Make-donija, so {to se dobiva jasna slika za na~inot na realizacija na ovlastuvawata na pretsedatelite vo nadvore{nata politika. Vo ovaa glava se istraùva i razvojot na odnosite na Makedonija so sosed-nite dràvi, kako i so vode~kite svetski sili i so Evropskata Unija. Na toj na~in, se dobiva slika za pri-stapot primenet vo odnosite so site ovie subjekti, a posebno ulogata na pretsedatelot vo toj kontekst.

Zaklu~nite sogleduvawa na av torot gi sublimiraat rezulta-tite od istraùvaweto, pri {to jasno se definiraat pove}e poimi i sostojbi povrzani so {efot na dràvata, diplomatijata, drà-vnite i nedràvnite akteri, i politi~kiot sistem voop{to. Poseb-no vnimanie se posvetuva na orga-nizacijata na dràvnata vlast vo Republika Makedonija, vlijanieto na razli~nite granki na vlasta vo me|unarodnite odnosi, kako i na kratkoro~nite, srednoro~nite i


„[efot na dràvata i nadvore{nata politika# od Aleksandar Spasenovski

dolgoro~nite celi na nadvore{nata politika na Republika Makedonija. I vo ovaa prilika, su{tinskite re-zultati se odnesuvaat na mestoto, ulogata i uspehot na institucijata Pretsedatel na Republika Make-donija vo nadvore{nata politika.

Spasenovski vo ova delo gi do-bliùva nau~nite sogleduvawa za pretsedatelot na dràvata do po{irokata publika, adaptiraj}i gi svojot stil i jazikot. Vidlivo e ne-govoto iskustvo vo istraùva~kite dejnosti povrzani so temite koi gi razrabotuva vo ovoj svoj trud, vo nau~niot i nevladiniot sektor. Od nesomnena korist pri is tra-ùvaweto e i negovoto iskustvo kako pratenik vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija, koe mu dava retka mo`nost za sublimacija na teoretskite i prakti~nite aspekti

na podelbata na vlasta, a posebno na nadvore{nata politika.

„[efot na dràvata i nadvo-re{nata politika# nedvosmisleno pretstavuva korisna literatura za studentite i istraùva~ite od oblasta na pravoto, politi~kite nauki i me|unarodnite odnosi, no i za site ostanati ~itateli koi ima-at potreba podlaboko da navlezat vo principite na gorenavedenite koncepti. Tehni~kata obrabotka e na vrvno, svetsko nivo, so {to ovaa kniga moè da pretstavuva primer za site idni dela od ovoj tip. Kako del od akademskata zaednica vo Republika Makedonija, moàm samo da go prepora~am ovoj nau~en trud na site kolegi od zemjata, no i od regionot, za {to bi bilo potrebno vo bliska idnina da se pristapi kon negov prevod na pove}e jazici.

Abstract

The research of Mr. Aleksandar Spasenovski is among the rare successful accomplishments in the area of the political systems, related to the role of the head of the state in the foreign policy. Having in mind the current circumstances where the Macedonian political system is interpreted differently, this scholarly approach contributes to a better knowledge in this area.

In the book, the author analyzes the most important principles related to the functioning of the political system and especially the position and the role of the head of the state. The duties of this institution, as well as of the others in the area of foreign affairs are given special attention. Also, many important empirical data about the practical realization of these duties are given, as a unique approach in the history of the Macedonian political science.

This book is an extremely useful resource for students and researchers in the area of political science and international relations, but also for other interested readers who would like gain insight into this scholarly fi eld.


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VII. SPROVEDUVAWE NA IZBORITE

1. Sredstva za sproveduvawe na izborite

^len 88(1) Sredstvata za sproveduvawe na izborite se obezbeduvaat od Buxetot na Republika Makedonija i so niv raspolaga Dràvnata izborna komisija.(2) Od sredstvata nameneti za izborite dve tretini sluàt za pokrivawe na tro{ocite povrzani so izbornite dejstvija na organite za sproveduvawe na izborite.(3) Edna tretina od sredstvata za sproveduvawe na izborite sluì za pokrivawe na del od tro{ocite {to gi napravile organizatorite na izbornata kampawata ~ii kandidati se izbrani.(4) Za sproveduvawe na lokalnite izbori sredstva se obezbeduvaat od buxetot na op{tinata i gradot Skopje i so niv raspolaga op{tinskata izborna komisija, odnosno Izbornata komisija na gradot Skopje, a sredstva za izborniot materijal se obezbeduvaat od Buxetot na Republika Make do nija i so niv raspolaga Dràvnata izborna komisija.

2. Izboren materijal

^len 89Izborniot materijal za sproveduvawe na izborite se sostoi od:– kutii za glasawe i paravani,– obrasci na zapisnici i dnevnik za rabota na izbira~kiot odbor,– blok so glasa~ki liv~iwa spored izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok,– listi na kandidati,– potpi{an izvod od Izbira~kiot spisok,– sredstva za obeleùvawe i proverka na licata koi glasale (UV lamba, sprej i grafitno perni~e),– pe~ati,– upatstvo za glasawe i– drug materijal potreben za glasawe.

^len 90(1) Upatstvoto za glasawe se istaknuva na vidno mesto na glasa~kiot paravan i na drugi vidni mesta na glasa~kite mesta vo soglasnost so Upatstvoto izdadeno od Dràvnata izborna komisija. Upatstvoto e pe~ateno na makedonski jazik i negovoto kirilsko pismo i na jazicite i pismata na zaednicite navedeni vo Preambulata na Ustavot na Republika Makedonija.(2) Listite na kandidati }e bidat istaknati vo prostorijata za gla sawe.

Izboren zakonik na Republika Makedonija – Sproveduvawe na izbori / Закон за изменување и дополнување на изборниот законик


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3. Predavawe na izborniot materijal

^len 91(1) Dràvnata izborna komisija izborniot materijal go predava na op{tinskite izborni komisii najdocna vo rok od 72 ~asa pred denot opredelen za odrùvawe na izborite.(2) Za predavaweto na izborniot materijal se sostavuva zapisnik vo koj treba posebno da se navede vkupniot broj na glasa~ki liv~iwa so seriskite broevi i potrebniot broj listi na kandidati {to se istaknuvaat vo prostoriite za glasawe.

^len 92(1) Op{tinskata izborna komisija e dol`na eden den pred denot opredelen za odrùvawe na izborite da go predade izborniot materijal na izbira~kite odbori.(2) Za predavaweto na izborniot materijal od op{tinskata izborna komisija na izbira~kite odbori se sostavuva zapisnik vo koj treba da se navede vkupniot broj na glasa~ki liv~iwa so seriskite broevi i drug materijal potreben za glasawe.(3) Zapisnikot go potpi{uvaat pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na izbira~kiot od bor i ~lenot na op{tinskata izborna komisija koj go predava materijalot.(4) Ako prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listi imaat zabele{ki za predavaweto na izborniot materijal, tie imaat pravo da im se ovozmoì da bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot i tie da bidat osnova vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo.(5) Ako na prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listi ne im bidat evidentirani zabele{kite od stavot (4) na ovoj ~len vo zapisnikot, imaat pravo zabele{kite da gi dostavat do op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa po potpi{uvaweto na zapisnikot.(6) Pri predavawe na izborniot materijal pravo na prisustvo imaat i ovlastenite nabquduva~i.

4. Glasa~ko liv~e

^len 93(1) Glasa~koto liv~e se pe~ati na makedonski jazik i negovoto kirilsko pismo.(2) Imeto na podnositelot na listata, imeto i prezimeto na kandidatot, odnosno nositelot na listata se pi{uvaat na makedonski jazik i negovoto kiril sko pismo.(3) Za pripadnicite na zaednicite, imeto na podnositelot na listata i imeto i prezimeto na kandidatot, odnosno nositelot na listata se pi{uvaat na makedonski jazik i negovoto kirilsko pismo i na jazikot i pismoto na zaednicata na koja tie pripa|aat.(4) Vo op{tinite vo koi najmalku 20% od gra|anite zboruvaat slu`ben jazik razli~en od makedonskiot jazik, glasa~kite liv~iwa za izbori se pe~atat pokraj na makedonski jazik i negovoto kirilsko pismo i na slu`beniot jazik i pismo {to go upotrebuvaat gra|anite vo taa op{tina.

^len 94(1) Na glasa~koto liv~e ako ima kandidati, odnosno nositeli na lista so isto ime i prezime, toga{ se naveduva i po~etnata bukva na nivnoto sredno ime.(2) Na glasa~koto liv~e kandidatite, odnosno podnositelite na listite se navedeni po onoj redosled koj e utvrden vo edinstvenata lista na kandidati.



(3) Glasa~koto liv~e sodrì del za glasawe i del koj ostanuva na ko~anot.

Za pretsedatel na Republikata

^len 95(1) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e za glasawe za izbor na pretsedatel na Republikata sodrì:– naziv na glasa~koto liv~e, op{tina i broj na glasa~koto mesto,– reden broj, ime i simbol (ako go ima) na podnositelot na listata i– ime i prezime na kandidatite vrz osnova na podatocite od mati~nata evidencija.(2) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e {to ostanuva na ko~anot na blokot go sodrì seriskiot broj na glasa~koto liv~e, op{tinata i brojot na glasa~koto mesto.(3) Vo nazivot na glasa~koto liv~e e sodràno znameto na Republika Makedonija.

Za pratenici

^len 96(1) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e za glasawe za izbor na pratenici sodrì:– naziv na glasa~koto liv~e, brojot na izbornata edinica, op{tinata i brojot na glasa~koto mesto,– reden broj, ime i simbol (ako go ima) na podnositelot na listata i– ime i prezime na nositelot na listata vrz osnova na podatocite od mati~nata evidencija.(2) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e koj ostanuva na ko~anot na blokot sodrì seriski broj na glasa~koto liv~e, brojot na izbornata edinica, op{tinata i brojot na glasa~koto mesto.(3) Vo nazivot na glasa~koto liv~e se sodràni brojot na izbornata edinica i znameto na Republika Makedonija.

Za ~lenovi na sovet

^len 97(1) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e za glasawe za izbor na ~lenovi na sovet sodrì:– naziv na glasa~koto liv~e, brojot na glasa~koto mesto i op{tinata,– reden broj, ime i simbol (ako go ima) na podnositelot na listata i– ime i prezime na nositelot na listata vrz osnova na podatocite od mati~nata evidencija.(2) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e koj ostanuva na ko~anot na blokot gi sodrì seriskiot broj na glasa~koto liv~e, op{tinata i brojot na glasa~koto mesto.(3) Vo nazivot na glasa~koto liv~e za izbor na ~lenovi na sovetot se sodrì imeto na op{tinata, odnosno gradot Skopje za koi se vr{i izborot.

Za gradona~alnik

^len 98(1) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e za glasawe za izbor na gradona~alnik sodrì:– naziv na glasa~koto liv~e, broj na glasa~koto mesto i op{tina,– ime i simbol (ako go ima) na podnositelot na listata i– reden broj, ime i prezime na kandidatite vrz osnova na podatocite od mati~nata evidencija.


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(2) Delot od glasa~koto liv~e koj ostanuva na ko~anot na blokot sodrì seriski broj na glasa~koto liv~e, op{tinata i brojot na glasa~koto mesto.(3) Vo nazivot na glasa~koto liv~e za izbor na gradona~alnik se sodrì imeto na op{tinata, odnosno gradot Skopje za koi se vr{i izborot.

5. Glasa~ko mesto

^len 99(1) Za sekoe izbira~ko mesto se opredeluva mestoto (prostorija vo objektot) na koe se vr{i glasaweto (vo natamo{niot tekst: glasa~ko mesto).(2) Vo prostorijata vo mestoto opredeleno za glasawe se istaknuvaat listite na kandidati.

^len 100(1) Pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na izbira~kiot odbor najdocna eden ~as pred po~etokot na glasaweto se sobiraat vo prostorijata za glasawe i utvrduvaat:– dali prostorijata e vo istata sostojba kako {to ja ostavile na denot pred izborite,– dali izborniot materijal e vo ista sostojba kako {to bil na denot pred izborite i– dali glasa~kata kutija e prazna.(2) Izbira~kiot odbor sostavuva zapisnik za utvrdenata sostojba, koj go potpi{uvaat pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na odborot.(3) Zabele{kite na pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na izbira~kiot odbor se konstatiraat vo zapisnikot.(4) Ako ovlastenite prisutni pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite imaat zabele{ki, pretsedatelot e dolèn da im ovozmoì da bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot i tie da bidat osnova vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo.(5) Ako zabele{kite na ovlastenite prisutni pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite od stavot (4) na ovoj ~len ne im bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot, imaat pravo zabele{kite da gi dostavat do op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa po potpi{uvaweto na zapisnikot.(6) Pravo na prisustvo pri utvrduvaweto na sostojbata pred po~etokot na glasaweto imaat i ovlastenite nabquduva~i.

6. Vremetraewe na glasaweto

^len 101(1) Glasaweto zapo~nuva vo 7,00 ~asot i trae neprekinato do 19,00 ~asot.(2) Vo 19,00 ~asot glasa~koto mesto se zatvora, a na izbira~ite koi se zateknale vo objektot kade {to se glasa im se ovozmoùva da glasaat.(3) Izbira~kiot odbor moè da go zatvori glasa~koto mesto i pred istekot na rokot od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len, po prethodna soglasnost od nadle`nata op{tinska izborna komisija, ako glasale site izbira~i zapi{ani vo izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok.

7. Obezbeduvawe na glasa~koto mesto

^len 102(1) Policijata go obezbeduva glasa~koto mesto neprekinato po~nuvaj}i od 6,00 ~asot do 19,00 ~asot.



(2) Po zatvoraweto na glasa~koto mesto, za vreme na sumiraweto na rezultatite policijata go obezbeduva objektot i prostorijata vo koja e smesteno glasa~koto mesto i izbira~kiot odbor i gi otstranuva site neovlasteni lica od objektot.(3) Policijata go obezbeduva izbira~kiot odbor do predavawe na zapisnikot i izborniot materijal na op{tinskata izborna komisija, ako e toa pobarano od strana na izbira~kiot odbor.

8. Nadle`nost na izbira~kiot odbor za vreme na glasaweto

^len 103(1) Izbira~kiot odbor se griì za odrùvawe na redot i mirot na glasa~koto mesto.(2) Izbira~kiot odbor moè da go otstrani sekoe lice koe go naru{uva redot i mirot na glasa~koto mesto.(3) Objektot vo koj e smesteno glasa~koto mesto i priodot do nego za vreme na sproveduvawe na glasaweto go obezbeduva policija.(4) Izbira~kiot odbor moè da pobara pomo{ od policijata za vospostavuvawe red na glasa~koto mesto.(5) Nikoj ne smee da dojde na glasa~koto mesto vooruèn, osven policijata vo slu~ajot predviden vo stavovite (3) i (4) na ovoj ~len.(6) Vo objektot i prostorijata kade {to se izveduva glasaweto i vo nejzina blizina, izbira~kiot odbor vo sorabotka so policijata e dolèn da gi otstrani propagandnite materijali.(7) Policijata po barawe na pretsedatelot ili zamenikot na pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor e dol`na da gi otstrani neovlasteno prisutnite lica vo objektot i prostorijata za glasawe, kako i neovlasteno prisutnite lica od objektot kade {to se izveduva glasaweto vo radius od 100 metra.

^len 104(1) Izbira~kiot odbor moè da go prekine glasaweto, ako na glasa~koto mesto se naru{i redot s¢ dodeka toj ne se vospostavi.(2) Glasaweto moè da se prekine i vo slu~aj na vremenski nepogodi ili drugi vonredni okolnosti.(3) Izbira~kiot odbor }e go prekine glasaweto ako priodot do glasa~koto mesto ne go obezbeduva policija, a za toa imalo potreba ili ako taa e povikana i ne se odzvala na povikot.(4) Pretsedatelot ili zamenikot na pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor moè da ja povika policijata vo prostorijata kade {to se glasa dokolku ima potreba od toa.(5) Ako glasaweto e prekinato podolgo od 1 ~as, glasaweto }e prodolì za onolku vreme kolku {to trael prekinot, no ne podolgo od 3 ~asa.(6) Ako prekinot trael podolgo od 3 ~asa, glasaweto }e se povtori.(7) Pri~inite za prekinot na glasaweto i vremeto za koe glasaweto se prekinalo se vnesuvaat vo zapisnikot.

9. Prava i obvrski na podnositelite na listi i ovlastenite nabquduva~i za vreme na glasaweto

^len 105(1) Pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite, dokolku imaat zabele{ki na rabotata na izbira~kiot odbor za vreme na glasaweto, moàt da ukaàt na nepravilnostite, so cel tie da bidat otstraneti.


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(2) Pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor e dolèn na prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite, ako imaat zabele{ki, da im se ovozmoì da bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot i tie da bidat osnova vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo.(3) Ako zabele{kite od stavot (2) na ovoj ~len na pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listi ne se evidentirani vo zapisnikot, tie imaat pravo da gi dostavat do op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa po potpi{uvaweto na zapisnikot.(4) Ovlastenite doma{ni nabquduva~i, dokolku imaat zabele{ki na rabotata na izbira~kiot odbor imaat pravo da gi evidentiraat vo dnevnikot na izbira~koto mesto.

^len 106Pretsedatelot, ~lenovite na op{tinskite izborni komisii i izbira~kite odbori i nivnite zamenici, kako i pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listi i nabquduva~ite za vreme na glasaweto i na mestoto na glasaweto ne smeat da nosat oznaki ili simboli na politi~ka partija, koalicija ili kandidat.

10. Glasawe

^len 107(1) Glasaweto se vr{i li~no na glasa~kite mesta vo Republika Makedonija.(2) Glasawe za drugo lice e zabraneto, osven vo slu~aite predvideni vo ~lenot 111 od ovoj zakonik.

Utvrduvawe na identitetot na glasa~ot

^len 108(1) Izbira~ite pristapuvaat da glasaat eden po eden.(2) Koga izbira~ot pristapuva da glasa izbira~kiot odbor proveruva dali izbira~ot e na soodvetnoto glasa~ko mesto i so ultravioletova lamba proveruva dali ima nebri{liv beleg na noktot i palecot na desnata raka.(3) Koga izbira~ot pristapuva da glasa izbira~kiot odbor go proveruva negoviot li~en identitet.(4) Li~niot identitet izbira~ot go dokaùva so li~na karta ili patna isprava.(5) Izbira~kiot odbor, po utvrduvaweto na identitetot na izbira~ot, go zaokruùva negoviot reden broj vo izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok i izbira~ot go stava svojot potpis, a ako e nepismen stava otpe~atok od desniot pokazalec. Ako izbira~ot nema desen pokazalec, toj }e stavi otpe~atok od negoviot lev pokazalec, a dokolku nema ni lev pokazalec, ne se stava otpe~atok.(6) Po identifikacijata, izbira~ot dobiva glasa~ko liv~e i mu se obeleùva so sprej palecot na desnata raka, odnosno palecot na levata raka, dokolku nema palec na desnata, pritoa vnimavaj}i so sprejot da se opfati i noktot na palecot. Ako izbira~ot nema palec na dvete race nema da se vr{i obeleùvawe.

11. Na~in na glasawe

^len 109(1) Glasaweto se vr{i so edno glasa~ko liv~e za sekoj vid na izbori utvrdeni so ovoj zakonik.(2) Glasa~koto liv~e se otkinuva od ko~anot na blokot po numeri~ki redosled, mu se stava pe~at na prednata strana i potoa mu se dava na izbira~ot.



(3) Na izbira~ot mu se objasnuva na~inot na glasaweto i mu se ovozmoùva da glasa.

^len 110Izbira~ot glasaweto go vr{i na toj na~in {to go zaokruùva redniot broj pred podnositelot na listata, odnosno redniot broj pred kandidatot za koj{to se opredelil da glasa i na glasa~koto liv~e preklopeno pred da go stavi vo kutijata za glasawe, izbira~kiot odbor na zadnata strana mu stava pe~at.

Glasawe na nemo}no ili bolno lice

^len 111(1) Izbira~ot koj ne e vo mo`nost da glasa na glasa~koto mesto (nemo}no ili bolno lice spored upatstvoto na Dràvnata izborna komisija), a saka da glasa, za toa }e ja izvesti op{tinskata izborna komisija najdocna tri dena pred denot opredelen za glasawe.(2) Izvestuvaweto od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len moè da se dade i preku polno-mo{nik.(3) Izbira~kiot odbor na liceto od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len }e mu ovozmoì da glasa vo negoviot dom eden den pred odrùvaweto na izborite na na~in so koj se obezbeduva tajnosta na glasaweto.(4) Izbira~kiot odbor za glasaweto od stavot (3) na ovoj ~len obezbeduva posebna kutija za glasawe koja se nosi prazna vo domot kade {to se nao|a izbira~ot.(5) Glasaweto od stavot (3) na ovoj ~len izbira~kiot odbor go vnesuva vo zapisnikot.(6) Za denot i ~asot na glasaweto od stavot (3) na ovoj ~len pretsedatelot na op{tinskata izborna komisija pismeno gi izvestuva pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite.

Glasawe na izbira~ koj ne moè da glasa sam

^len 112(1) Izbira~ot koj ima fizi~ki nedostatok ili e nepismen i poradi toa ne moè da glasa na na~in utvrden so ovoj zakonik, ima pravo so sebe da dovede lice koe }e mu pomogne pri glasaweto.(2) Ako izbira~ot od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len ne dovede so sebe lice koe }e mu pomogne pri glasaweto, toga{ izbira~kiot odbor }e opredeli drugo lice od redot na izbira~ite.(3) Liceto koe }e mu pomaga na drugo lice pri glasaweto ne smee da bide od redot na ~lenovite na izbira~kiot odbor, pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite ili nabquduva~ite.(4) Edno isto lice moè da pomogne pri glasaweto najmnogu na dvajca izbira~i od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len.(5) Izbira~kiot odbor na liceto od stavovite (1) i (2) na ovoj ~len }e mu ukaè deka so negovata pomo{ ne treba da vlijae vrz odlukata na izbira~ot.(6) Glasaweto od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len izbira~kiot odbor go vnesuva vo zapisnikot.


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Glasawe na izbira~i koi se na otsluùvawe na voeniot rok, voena ve`ba, na izdrùvawe kazna zatvor ili vo pritvor

^len 113(1) Izbira~ite koi na denot na glasaweto ne se vo mestoto na svoeto ìveali{te poradi otsluùvawe na voeniot rok ili se na voena ve`ba, glasaat vo voenata edinica, organizacijata, ustanovata ili edinicata.(2) Izbira~ite koi na denot na glasaweto se nao|aat na izdrùvawe kazna zatvor ili se vo pritvor, glasaat vo kazneno-popravnite domovi.(3) Op{tinskata izborna komisija e dol`na vedna{ po dobivaweto na spisocite na izbira~ite od stavovite (1) i (2) na ovoj ~len da gi dostavi na voenite edinici, organizaciite, ustanovite, edinicata, kako i do kazneno-popravnite domovi kade {to izbira~ite se na otsluùvawe na voeniot rok ili se na voena ve`ba, odnosno na izdrùvawe kazna zatvor ili se vo pritvor.(4) Za izbira~ite od stavovite (1) i (2) na ovoj ~len izborite gi sproveduva izbira~kiot odbor od najbliskoto izbira~ko mesto ili poseben izbira~ki odbor soglasno so ovoj zakonik i upatstvoto na Dràvnata izborna komisija, eden den pred denot opredelen za glasawe, a za glasaweto se izvestuvaat i pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite zaradi nivno prisustvo na glasaweto.(5) Za glasaweto od stavot (4) na ovoj ~len izbira~kiot odbor sostavuva posebni zapisnici.(6) Zapisnicite i izborniot materijal po zavr{uvaweto na glasaweto se dostavuvaat do soodvetnite op{tinski izborni komisii.

12. Sumirawe i utvrduvawe na rezultatite od glasaweto na glasa~kite mesta

^len 114Rezultatite od glasaweto na glasa~koto mesto od strana na izbira~kiot odbor se sumiraat i utvrduvaat na na~in {to:– se prebrojuvaat neupotrebenite glasa~ki liv~iwa i po prebrojuvaweto, prvo se kine desniot dolen agol, a potoa se stavaat vo poseben plik koj se zatvora, zape~atuva i vrz nego se zapi{uva brojot na izbira~koto mesto i vkupniot broj na neupotrebenite liv~iwa,– se otvora glasa~kata kutija i se pristapuva kon prebrojuvawe na glasovite,– se utvrduva vkupniot broj na izbira~i koi glasale i stavile potpis, ili samo otpe~atok od zapi{anite vo izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok,– so ̀ drepka se opredeluva eden ~len koj }e gi vadi i otvora glasa~kite liv~iwa edno po edno od glasa~kata kutija i }e mu gi predava na pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor,– glasa~koto liv~e se pokaùva na site ~lenovi na izbira~kiot odbor, na prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite i na nabquduva~ite,– izbira~kiot odbor utvrduva dali glasa~koto liv~e e vaè~ko ili ne i za koja lista na kandidati, odnosno za kandidat e glasano i– se registrira dadeniot glas, a glasa~koto liv~e se stava na soodvetno mesto i se pristapuva kon vadewe novo liv~e od glasa~kata kutija.

Vaè~ko glasa~ko liv~e

^len 115(1) Glasa~koto liv~e e vaè~ko ako e vo soglasnost so ~lenot 110 od ovoj zakonik.



(2) Za vaè~ko glasa~ko liv~e se smeta i ona glasa~ko liv~e od koe na siguren i nedvosmislen na~in moè da se utvrdi za koja lista na kandidat, odnosno lista na kandidati izbira~ot glasal.(3) Glasa~koto liv~e e nevaè~ko ako ne e popolneto ili ima zaokruèno pove-}e listi na kandidati ili kandidat.

Zapisnik za glasawe

^len 116(1) Izbira~kiot odbor vo zapisnikot za glasawe gi vnesuva slednive podatoci: redniot broj na izbira~koto mesto; brojot na re{enieto za formirawe na izbira~kiot odbor; vremeto na zapo~nuvaweto i zavr{uvaweto na glasaweto; vkupniot broj na izbira~i vo izbira~koto mesto spored izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok; vkupniot broj na izbira~i koi glasale; vkupniot broj na glasa~ki liv~iwa staveni vo glasa~kata utija; vkupniot broj na glasa~ki liv~iwa {to ne se upotrebeni i vkupniot broj na nevaè~ki glasa~ki liv~iwa i vkupniot broj glasovi koi gi dobila sekoja lista na kandidati oddelno.(2) Zapisnikot sodrì poseben tabelaren del za sumiraweto i utvrduvaweto na rezultatite od izbira~koto mesto.(3) Vo zapisnikot se vnesuvaat i eventualnite zabele{ki dadeni od ~lenovite na izbira~kiot odbor.

^len 117(1) Zapisnikot go potpi{uvaat pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na izbira~kiot odbor.(2) Zapisnikot e vaè~ki ako e potpi{an od mnozinstvoto ~lenovi na izbira~kiot odbor ~ii potpisi se deponirani.(3) Pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor treba da gi navede pri~inite za nepotpi{uvawe na zapisnikot od ~len na odborot.(4) Ako zapisnikot ne e potpi{an od mnozinstvoto ~lenovi na izbira~kiot odbor, zapisnikot go sostavuva i potpi{uva op{tinskata izborna komisija, vrz osnova na celokupniot izboren materijal.(5) Pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor e dolèn na prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite ako imaat zabele{ki, da im se ovozmoì da bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot i tie da bidat osnova vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo.(6) Ako zabele{kite na pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite od stavot (5) na ovoj ~len ne se evidentirani vo zapisnikot, tie imaat pravo da gi dostavat do op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa od sostavuvaweto na zapisnikot i tie zabele{ki moàt da bidat osnova za prigovor.(7) Ovlastenite doma{ni nabquduva~i, dokolku imaat zabele{ki, imaat pravo da gi evidentiraat vo dnevnikot na izbira~koto mesto.

Predavawe na izborniot materijal na op{tinskata izborna komisija

^len 118(1) Zapisnicite i drugiot izboren materijal, izbira~kiot odbor gi dostavuva do op{tinskata izborna komisija, vo rok od 5 ~asa po zavr{uvaweto na glasaweto.(2) Primerok od zapisnicite napraveni kako kopija pod indigo dobiva sekoj pretstavnik na podnositelot na listata, a ovlastenite doma{ni nabquduva~i primerok od tabelarniot del od zapisnikot. Originalniot primerok, koj prethodno e so pe~at od Dràvnata izborna komisija, se dostavuva do op{tinskata izborna komisija.


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(3) Izbira~kiot odbor vedna{ po zavr{uvaweto na dejstvijata od stavovite (1) i (2) na ovoj ~len gi objavuva i istaknuva sumiranite rezultati od izvr{enoto glasawe na glasa~koto mesto.(4) Izborniot materijal do op{tinskata izborna komisija go dostavuva pretsedatelot na izbira~kiot odbor vo pridru`ba na zainteresirani ~lenovi na izbira~kiot odbor, ili pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite i pretstavnici od policijata, ako za toa ima potreba.(5) Za predavaweto na materijalot od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len se sostavuva poseben zapisnik.

13. Sumirawe i utvrduvawe na rezultatite od glasaweto za izbor na pretsedatel na Republikata

^len 119Op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa od priemot na celokupniot izboren materijal od izbira~kite odbori gi sumira rezultatite od glasaweto za listata na kandidati od izbira~kite mesta za koja e nadle`na i gi predava na Dràvnata izborna komisija.

Prv krug

^len 120Za pretsedatel na Republikata e izbran kandidatot koj dobil mnozinstvo glasovi od vkupniot broj izbira~i zapi{ani vo Izbira~kiot spisok.

Vtor krug

^len 121(1) Ako vo prviot krug nitu eden kandidat za pretsedatel na Republikata ne go dobil potrebnoto mnozinstvo glasovi, vo vtoriot krug se glasa za dvajca kandidati koi vo prviot krug dobile najmnogu glasovi.(2) Vtoriot krug na glasawe se odrùva vo rok od 14 dena od zavr{uvaweto na prviot krug na glasaweto.(3) Na povtornoto glasawe za pretsedatel na Republikata e izbran kandidatot koj dobil mnozinstvo glasovi od izbira~ite koi glasale, dokolku glasale pove-}e od polovinata izbira~i.

Povtoruvawe na glasaweto

^len 122(1) Dokolku i vo vtoriot krug na glasawe nitu eden od kandidatite ne go dobil potrebnoto mnozinstvo glasovi, se povtoruva celata izborna postapka.(2) Ako za pretsedatel na Republikata e predloèn eden kandidat, a vo prviot krug na glasawe ne go dobil potrebnoto mnozinstvo glasovi, se povtoruva celata izborna postapka.

Izjava

^len 123(1) Pred prezemaweto na dol`nosta, najdocna vo rok od deset dena od denot na objavuvaweto na kone~nite rezultati, no ne porano od denot na prestanok na mandatot na prethodniot pretsedatel, pretsedatelot na Republikata dava i potpi{uva sve~ena izjava pred Sobranieto, koja glasi:



„Izjavuvam deka funkcijata pretsedatel na Republika Makedonija }e ja vr{am sovesno i odgovorno, }e go po~ituvam Ustavot i zakonite i }e go {titam suverenitetot, teritorijalniot integritet i nezavisnosta na Republika Makedonija.#(2) Izjavata od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len pretsedatelot na Republika Makedonija, izbran vrz osnova na izbori za pretsedatel poradi prestanok na mandatot, ja dava vo rok od tri dena od denot na objavuvaweto na kone~nite rezultati.

14. Sumirawe i utvrduvawe na rezultatite od glasaweto za izbor na pratenici

^len 124Op{tinskata izborna komisija vo rok od 5 ~asa od priemot na celokupniot izboren materijal od izbira~kite odbori za koi taa e nadle`na gi sumira rezultatite od glasaweto za listite na kandidati od izbira~kite mesta na soodvetnata izborna edinica.

Zapisnik za glasaweto

^len 125(1) Za svojata rabota op{tinskata izborna komisija sostavuva zapisnik.(2) Vo zapisnikot za glasaweto se vnesuvaat podatoci za sumiranite glasovi od glasaweto, i toa: redniot broj na izbira~kite mesta vo izbornata edinica za koja e nadle`na, vkupniot broj na izbira~i za tie izbira~ki mesta zapi{ani vo izvodite od Izbira~kiot spisok, vkupniot broj na izbira~i {to glasale, vkupniot broj na nevaè~ki glasa~ki liv~iwa i vkupniot broj na glasovi {to gi dobila sekoja lista na kandidati na nivo na izborna edinica od izbira~kite mesta za koi taa op{tinska izborna komisija e nadle`na.

^len 126(1) Zapisnikot od ~lenot 125 na ovoj zakonik go potpi{uvaat pretsedatelot i ~lenovite na op{tinskata izborna komisija.(2) Zapisnikot e vaè~ki ako e potpi{an od mnozinstvoto ~lenovi na op{tinskata izborna komisija.(3) Pretsedatelot na op{tinskata izborna komisija treba da gi navede pri~inite za nepotpi{uvawe na zapisnikot od ~len na komisijata.(4) Ako prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite imaat zabele{ki, pretsedatelot na op{tinskata izborna komisija e dolèn na prisutnite pretstavnici na podnositelite na listite, ako imaat zabele{ki, da im se ovozmoì da bidat evidentirani vo zapisnikot i tie da bidat osnova vo postapkata za za{tita na izbira~koto pravo.(5) Primerok od zapisnikot dobiva i sekoj pretstavnik na podnositelot na listata, a doma{nite nabquduva~i primerok od tabelarniot del od zapisnikot.

15. Utvrduvawe na rezultatite i raspredelba na mandatite za izbor na pratenici

^len 127(1) Dràvnata izborna komisija gi sumira i gi utvrduva vkupnite rezultati od glasaweto vo izbornite edinici.(2) Dràvnata izborna komisija rezultatite od glasaweto gi utvrduva vrz osnova na zapisnicite so sumiranite rezultati od nadle`nata op{tinska izborna komisija i celokupniot izboren materijal.


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(3) Dràvnata izborna komisija rezultatite gi utvrduva oddelno za sekoja izborna edinica, spored brojot na vkupnite glasovi {to gi dobile listite na kandidati oddelno vrz osnova na sumiranite rezultati od op{tinskata izborna komisija za izbira~kite mesta vo izbornata edinica za koja e nadle`na.(4) Utvrduvaweto na rezultatite od izborite se vr{i so primena na D'Hondt-ovata formula.(5) Po utvrduvaweto na vkupniot broj dadeni glasovi za toj broj na kandidati vo izbornata edinica (takanare~ena izbira~ka masa), sekoja lista oddelno se deli so nizot deliteli 1, 2, 3, 4 itn. s¢ dodeka ne se raspredelat spored opredeleniot princip site prateni~ki mesta vo izbornata edinica.(6) Koli~nicite od deleweto od stavot (5) na ovoj ~len se redat po golemina pri {to se relevantni onolku najgolemi koli~nici kolku {to se izbiraat pratenici vo izbornata edinica.(7) Listata na kandidati dobiva tolkav broj na prateni~ki mesta kolku {to ima najgolemi koli~nici od brojot na koli~nicite od stavot (6) na ovoj ~len.(8) Ako vo dodeluvaweto na poslednoto prateni~ko mesto se javat dva identi~ni koli~nika, mandatot se dodeluva so `drepka.(9) Pri raspredelbata na prateni~kite mesta za izbrani se smetaat onolku kandidati kolku {to mesta dobila listata.(10) Od listata na kandidati se izbrani kandidatite navedeni vo listata spored utvrdeniot redosled.

^len 128(1) Dràvnata izborna komisija za utvrduvaweto na rezultatite od glasaweto vo izbornata edinica sostavuva zapisnik oddelno za sekoja izborna edinica.(2) Vo zapisnikot se vnesuvaat podatoci za rezultatite od glasaweto, i toa:– vkupniot broj na izbira~ki mesta,– vkupniot broj na izbira~i zapi{ani vo izvodite od izbira~kiot spisok za izbornata edinica,– vkupniot broj na izbira~i {to glasale,– vkupniot broj na nevaè~ki liv~iwa,– vkupniot broj glasovi {to gi dobila sekoja lista na kandidati oddelno,– brojot na dobieni prateni~ki mesta od listata na kandidati i– imeto i prezimeto na izbranite kandidati.

^len 129Izborite se smetaat za zavr{eni po kone~nosta na rezultatite za izbor na site 120 pratenici.

16. Sumirawe, utvrduvawe na rezultatite od glasaweto za izbor na ~lenovi na sovet i raspredelba na mandatite

^len 130(1) Op{tinskata izborna komisija gi presmetuva vkupnite rezultati od glasaweto vo op{tinata.(2) Op{tinskata izborna komisija rezultatite od glasaweto gi presmetuva vrz osnova na zapisnicite so sumiranite rezultati od izbira~kite odbori i celokupniot izboren materijal.(3) Op{tinskata izborna komisija rezultatite gi utvrduva spored brojot na glasovite {to gi dobile listite na kandidati za ~lenovi na sovetot oddelno vrz osnova na sumiranite rezultati od izbira~kite odbori.



(4) Izbornata komisija na gradot Skopje rezultatite od glasaweto za ~lenovi na Sovetot gi utvrduva spored brojot na glasovite {to gi dobile listite na kandidati za ~lenovi na Sovetot oddelno, vrz osnova na sumiranite rezultati dobieni od op{tinskite izborni komisii na podra~jeto na gradot Skopje.(5) Utvrduvaweto na rezultatite od izborite se vr{i so primena na D'Hondt-ovata formula.(6) Po utvrduvaweto na vkupniot broj dadeni glasovi za sekoja lista na kandidati (takanare~ena izbira~ka masa), sekoja lista oddelno se deli so nizot deliteli 1, 2, 3, 4 itn. s¢ do brojot na ~lenovite na sovetot koi se izbiraat vo op{tinata i gradot Skopje.(7) Koli~nicite od deleweto od stavot (6) na ovoj ~len se redat po golemina pri {to relevantni se onolku najgolemi koli~nici kolku {to se izbiraat ~lenovi na sovetot.(8) Listata na kandidati za ~lenovi na sovetot dobiva tolkav broj na sovetni~ki mesta kolku {to ima najgolemi koli~nici od brojot na koli~nicite od stavot (6) na ovoj ~len.(9) Ako vo dodeluvaweto na poslednoto sovetni~ko mesto se javat dva identi~ni koli~nika, mandatot se dodeluva so `drepka.(10) Pri raspredelbata na sovetni~kite mesta za izbrani se smetaat onolku kandidati kolku {to mesta dobila listata.(11) Od listata na kandidati za ~lenovi na sovetot se izbrani kandidatite navedeni vo listata spored utvrdeniot redosled.

^len 131(1) Op{tinskata izborna komisija za utvrduvaweto na rezultatite od glasaweto sostavuva zapisnik.(2) Vo zapisnikot se vnesuvaat podatoci za rezultatite od glasaweto, i toa:– vkupniot broj na izbira~ki mesta vo op{tinata i gradot Skopje,– vkupniot broj na izbira~i zapi{ani vo izvodite od Izbira~kiot spisok za op{tinata i gradot Skopje,– vkupniot broj na izbira~i koi glasale,– brojot na neva`e~ki liv~iwa,– vkupniot broj glasovi {to gi dobila sekoja lista na kandidati oddelno,– brojot na dobieni sovetni~ki mesta od listata na kandidati i– imeto i prezimeto na izbranite kandidati.(3) Primerok od zapisnikot dobiva i sekoj pretstavnik na podnositelot na listata, a doma{nite nabquduva~i primerok od tabelarniot del od zapisnikot.

17. Utvrduvawe na rezultatite za izbor na gradona~alnik

Prv krug

^len 132(1) Vo prviot krug od glasaweto za gradona~alnik e izbran onoj kandidat koj dobil mnozinstvo glasovi od izbira~ite koi glasale, dokolku na izborite izlegle edna tretina od vkupniot broj na izbira~i zapi{ani vo izvodot od Izbira~kiot spisok za soodvetnata op{tina.(2) Izbornata komisija na gradot Skopje rezultatite od glasaweto za gradona~alnik gi utvrduva spored brojot na glasovite {to gi dobile listite na kandidati za gradona~alnik oddelno, vrz osnova na sumiranite rezultati dobieni od op{tinskite izborni komisii na podra~jeto na gradot Skopje.


Dokument

(3) Ako za gradona~alnik e predloèn eden kandidat, a vo prviot krug na glasawe ne go dobil potrebnoto mnozinstvo glasovi od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len, se povtoruva celata izborna postapka.

Vtor krug

^len 133(1) Ako vo prviot krug nitu eden kandidat za gradona~alnik ne go dobil potrebnoto mnozinstvo glasovi, soglasno so ~lenot 132 stav (1) od ovoj zakonik, vo vtoriot krug se glasa za dvajcata kandidati koi vo prviot krug dobile najmnogu glasovi.(2) Vtoriot krug na glasawe se odrùva vo rok od 14 dena od denot na zavr{uvaweto na prviot krug na glasaweto.(3) Vo vtoriot krug na glasawe za gradona~alnik e izbran kandidatot koj dobil pogolem broj glasovi.

Imenuvawe na poverenik do novi izbori

^len 134(1) Ako i po vtoriot krug od koi bilo pri~ini ne se izvr{i izbor na gradona~alnik, izbornata komisija vo rok od 15 dena od zavr{uvaweto na izborite ja izvestuva Vladata.(2) Po dobivaweto na izvestuvaweto od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len, Vladata vo rok od 15 dena }e imenuva poverenik za vr{ewe na rabotite od nadle`nost na gradona~alnikot.(3) Vladata najdocna vo rok od 15 dena po denot na imenuvaweto na poverenik go izvestuva pretsedatelot na Sobranieto zaradi raspi{uvawe na izbori za gradona~alnik.

18. Objavuvawe na rezultatite od izborite

Dràvnata izborna komisija

^len 135(1) Dràvnata izborna komisija prvi~nite rezultati od izborite dobieni po elektronski pat gi objavuva sukcesivno, a rezultatite vrz osnova na podatocite od zapisnicite od op{tinskite izborni komisii vo rok od 12 ~asa po zavr{uvaweto na izborite.(2) Dràvnata izborna komisija kone~nite rezultati od izborite gi objavuva vo rok od 24 ~asa od denot na nivnata kone~nost.

Op{tinska izborna komisija

^len 136(1) Op{tinskata izbornata komisija prvi~nite rezultati od izborite za ~lenovi na sovet, odnosno gradona~alnik gi objavuva vo rok od 7 ~asa po zavr{uvaweto na izborite vrz osnova na podatocite od izbira~kite odbori i gi istaknuva na oglasna tabla vo op{tinata i gi soop{tuva na javnite glasila.(2) Izbornata komisija na gradot Skopje prvi~nite rezultati od izborite za ~lenovi na sovet, odnosno gradona~alnik gi objavuva vo rok od 10 ~asa po zavr{uvaweto na izborite vrz osnova na podatocite od op{tinskite izborni komisii za gradot Skopje i gi istaknuva na oglasna tabla vo gradot Skopje i gi soop{tuva na javnite glasila.



(3) Kone~nite rezultati od izborite za ~lenovi na sovet i gradona~alnik op{tinskite izborni komisii, odnosno Izbornata komisija na gradot Skopje gi objavuvaat najdocna vo rok od 24 ~asa od kone~noto zavr{uvawe na izborite.

19. Izbori za pretsedatel na Republikata poradi prestanok na mandatot

Raspi{uvawe na izbori

^len 137(1) Koga Ustavniot sud na Republika Makedonija }e donese akt so koj go utvrduva nastanuvaweto na uslovite za prestanok na funkcijata pretsedatel na Republika Makedonija soglasno so ~lenot 81 stav 8 od Ustavot na Republika Makedonija, vo rok od 24 ~asa go dostavuva do pretsedatelot na Sobranieto i go objavuva vo „Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija#.(2) Pretsedatelot na Sobranieto, vo rok od 48 ~asa od objavuvaweto na aktot od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len, donesuva akt za raspi{uvawe na izbori za izbor na pretsedatel na Republikata.

Postapka za sobirawe na potpisi

^len 138Sobiraweto na potpisite vo postapkata za kandidirawe za pretsedatel na Republikata i javniot uvid vo Izbira~kiot spisok se sproveduvaat pred Ministerstvoto za pravda i zapo~nuvaat pettiot den od denot na raspi{uvaweto na izborite za pretsedatel na Republikata poradi prestanok na mandatot i traat deset dena.

Podnesuvawe na lista na kandidat

^len 139(1) Listata na kandidati za pretsedatel na Republikata se dostavuva do Dràvnata izborna komisija, najdocna {esnaesettiot den od denot na raspi{uvaweto na izborite.(2) Kandidatot moè da se otkaè od kandidaturata, najdocna vo rok od 17 dena od denot na raspi{uvaweto na izborite.

Nadle`nost na Dràvnata izborna komisija

^len 140(1) Dràvnata izborna komisija vo rok od 24 ~asa po priemot na listite na kandidati za pretsedatel, utvrduva dali tie se podneseni vo rokot predviden so ~lenot 139 stav (1) od ovoj zakonik.(2) Ako Komisijata od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len po priemot na listata utvrdi deka se napraveni oddelni propusti, odnosno nepravilnosti, }e gi povika podnositelite na listite vedna{, no najdocna vo rok od 24 ~asa od dostavuvaweto na listata da gi otstranat konstatiranite propusti ili nepravilnosti.(3) Ako Komisijata od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len utvrdi deka listite se podneseni vo opredeleniot rok i se sostaveni vo soglasnost so ovoj zakonik, odnosno konstatiranite propusti i nepravilnosti podnositelite na listite gi otstranile vo rokot od stavot (2) na ovoj ~len, podnesenite listi }e gi potvrdi so re{enie vo rok od 24 ~asa od priemot na listite, odnosno otstranuvaweto na propustite ili nepravilnostite.


Dokument

^len 141(1) Ako Dràvnata izborna komisija utvrdi deka listite se podneseni nenavremeno, odnosno konstatiranite propusti i nepravilnosti podnositelite na listite ne gi otstranile vo rokot predviden vo ~lenot 140 stav (2) na ovoj zakonik, Komisijata podnesenata lista vo rok od 24 ~asa }e ja otfrli so re{enie.(2) Protiv re{enieto na Dràvnata izborna komisija moè da se podnese àlba do Vrhovniot sud na Republika Makedonija vo rok od 24 ~asa po priemot na re{enieto.(3) Vrhovniot sud na Republika Makedonija e dolèn da donese odluka po ̀ albata vo rok od 24 ~asa po priemot na àlbata.(4) @albata od stavot (2) na ovoj ~len se podnesuva preku Dràvnata izborna komisija, a dostavuvaweto na àlba po po{ta ne e dozvoleno.

Objavuvawe na listite

^len 142Dràvnata izborna komisija utvrdenite listi }e gi objavi vo „Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija# najdocna dvaeset i prviot den od denot na raspi{uvaweto na izborite.

Izborna kampawa

^len 143Izbornata kampawa zapo~nuva dvaeset i vtoriot den od denot na raspi{uvaweto na izborite i zavr{uva 24 ~asa pred denot na odrùvaweto na izborite.

Organizator na izbornata kampawa

^len 144Organizatorot na izbornata kampawa zadolìtelno otvora ̀ iro-smetka so naznaka „za izborna kampawa#, vrz osnova na izdadena potvrda od Dràvnata izborna komisija za podnesena lista na kandidat za pretsedatel na Republikata.

Mediumsko pretstavuvawe

^len 145(1) Predlogot na odlukata za pravilata za ramnopraven pristap vo mediumskoto pretstavuvawe za izbor na pretsedatel na Republikata poradi prestanok na mandatot, Sovetot za radiodifuzija ja dostavuva do Sobranieto najdocna 15 dena po raspi{uvaweto na izborite, a Sobranieto ja donesuva vo rok od dva dena od denot na priemot.(2) Odlukata od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len se objavuva vedna{, a najdocna vo rok od 24 ~asa vo „Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija#.

Objavuvawe na opisite na izbira~kite mesta

^len 146(1) Ministerstvoto za pravda kopie od re{enieto za opredeluvawe na brojot i opisot na sekoe izbira~ko mesto }e go dostavi do op{tinskata izborna komisija najdocna deset dena pred denot opredelen za izborite.(2) Op{tinskata izborna komisija najdocna pet dena pred denot opredelen za odrùvawe na izborite }e gi objavi na vidno mesto opisite na izbira~kite mesta koi se opredeleni za glasawe so nazna~uvawe od koe podra~je izbira~ite }e glasaat na opredeleno izbira~ko mesto.



ЗАКОН ЗА ИЗМЕНУВАЊЕ И ДОПОЛНУВАЊЕ НАИЗБОРНИОТ ЗАКОНИК

^len 52Vo ~lenot 91 po stavot (1) se dodavaat dva novi stava (2) i (3), koi glasat:„(2) Dràvnata izborna komisija izborniot materijal za glasawe vo DKP go predava na ovlasteno lice vo Ministerstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti najdocna deset dena pred denot na odrùvawe na izborite.(3) Ministerstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti izborniot materijal na DKP go dosta-vuva vedna{ po priemot.#Stavot (2) stanuva stav (4).

^len 53Vo ~lenot 95 stav (1) alineja 1 zapirkata se bri{e i se dodavaat zborovite: „za glasaweto vo Republika Makedonija#.Po alinejata 1 se dodava nova alineja 2, koja glasi:„- naziv na glasa~koto liv~e, sedi{teto na DKP za glasawe vo stranstvo,#.Alineite 2 i 3 stanuvaat alinei 3 i 4.Vo stavot (2) po zborot „op{tinata# se dodavaat zborovite: „odnosno sedi{teto na DKP#.

^len 54Vo ~lenot 101 stav (1) to~kata na krajot na re~enicata se bri{e, se stava za-pirka i se dodavaat zborovite: „a vo DKP se po~ituva vremenskata razlika vo zemjata, odnosno od 7,00 do 19,00 ~asot soglasno so smetaweto na vremeto vo soodvetnata zemja#.

^len 55Vo ~lenot 104 stavot (6) se bri{e. Stavot (7) stanuva stav (6).

^len 56Vo ~lenot 105 po stavot (4) se dodava nov stav (5), koj glasi: „(5) Pretstavnicite na podnositelite na listite i ovlastenite doma{ni nabquduva~i moàt od neposredna blizina da go sledat utvrduvaweto na identitetot na izbira~ot koj pristapuva na glasawe. #

^len 57Vo ~lenot 106 po zborot „odbori# se stava zapirka i se dodavaat zborovite: „odnosno izbira~kite odbori za glasawe vo DKP#.

^len 58Vo ~lenot 107 stav (1) to~kata na krajot od re~enicata se bri{e i se dodavaat zborovite: „i vo DKP#.

^len 59Vo ~lenot 110 zborovite: „na glasa~koto liv~e preklopeno pred da go stavi vo kutijata za glasawe, izbira~kiot odbor na zadnata strana mu stava pe~at# se zamenuvaat so zborovite: „glasa~koto liv~e preklopeno go stava vo kutijata za glasawe#.

^len 60Po ~lenot 113 se dodava nov ~len 113-a, koj glasi:


Dokument

„^len 113-a(1) Izbira~ite koi na denot na glasaweto se na privremena rabota ili prestoj vo stranstvo glasaat vo DKP eden den pred denot na odrùvaweto na izborite vo Republika Makedonija.(2) Dràvnata izborna komisija e dol`na vedna{ po dobivaweto na izborniot materijal da go dostavi na DKP preku Ministerstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti.(3) Za izbira~ite od stavot (1) na ovoj ~len izborite gi sproveduvaat izbira~kite odbori za glasawe vo DKP.(4) Izbira~kite odbori za glasawe vo DKP sostavuvaat zapisnici.(5) Glasa~kite liv~iwa se stavaat vo posebni koverti na koi e nazna~eno sedi{-teto na DKP i izbornata edinica i se zape~atuvaat.(6) Zapisnicite, zape~atenite koverti i drugiot izboren materijal po zavr{uvaweto na glasaweto izbira~kite odbori preku Ministerstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti gi dostavuvaat do Dràvnata izborna komisija.(7) Dràvnata izborna komisija vr{i sumirawe i utvrduvawe na rezultatite od glasaweto vo stranstvo.#

^len 61Vo ~lenot 121 stavot (3) se bri{e.

^len 62^lenot 129 se bri{e.

^len 63Vo ~lenot 138 zborovite: „Ministerstvoto za pravda# se zamenuvaat so zboro-vite: „Dràvnata izborna komisija#.

^len 64Vo ~lenot 141 stav (2) zborot „àlba# se zamenuva so zborot „tu`ba#, a zboro-vite: „Vrhovniot sud na Republika Makedonija# se zamenuvaat so zborovite: „Upravniot sud#.Vo stavot (3) zborovite: „Vrhovniot sud na Republika Makedonija# se zamenu-vaat so zborovite: „Upravniot sud#, a zborot „àlbata# se zamenuva so zborot „tu`bata#.Vo stavot (4) zborot „àlbata# se zamenuva so zborot „tu`bata#.

^len 65Vo ~lenot 146 stav (1) zborovite: „Ministerstvoto za pravda# se zamenuvaat so zborovite: „Dràvnata izborna komisija#.


Za avtorite

Za

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Anri Bone e direktor na Fonda-cijata „Konrad Adenauer# vo Skopje, Re pub lika Makedonija. Po profe sija e politikolog. Prethodno rabo tel vo Fondacijata „Konrad Aden auer# vo Kiev i Moskva. Rabotel i kako ekspert za bezbednosni pra{a wa vo Germanskata ambasada vo Kiev i kako OBSE nabquduva~ za vreme na „Por-tokalovata revolu cija# vo Ukraina.

Sergiu Gergina e doktorant pri Katedrata za politi~ki nauki na Univerzitetot vo Lajden vo Holandi-ja. So zvawe magister po politi~ki nauki se zdobil na Srednoevrop-skiot univerzitet vo Budimpe{ta, a so stepen magister po filozo-fija na Univerzitetot vo Lajden. Negovo potesno pole na interes se politi~kite partii, instituciona-lizmot i demokratizacijata.

Adrian Grama (roden 1984) e magister po Politi~ki studii od Univerzitetot vo Bukure{t, pi{uva dnevni politi~ki komentari za golem broj levo-orienti-rani vesnici i raboti na romanskoto izdanie na La Mésentente Politique et philosophie na @ak Ransier.

Velimir Delovski, diplomiran pravnik. Momentno e anga`iran ka ko demonstrator na Pravniot fakultet „Justinijan Prvi# – Skopje. Porane{en stipendist na Fondaci-jata „Konrad Adenauer# i praktikant vo Sobranieto na Republika Make-donija.

Henri Bohnet is Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Skopje, Re-public of Macedonia. He is a political scientist who has previously worked in the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Kiev and Moscow. Mr. Bohnet has also worked as a security expert in the Ger-man Embassy in Kiev and as an OSCE monitor during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Sergiu Gherghina is a Ph.D. re-searcher at the Department of Politi-cal Science, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. He holds an MA degree in Political Science from the Central European University Budapest and an M.Phil. degree awarded by the Univer-sity of Leiden. His areas of interest are political parties, institutionalism and democratization.

Adrian Grama (b. 1984) holds a B.A. degree in Political Science from the University of Bucharest, writes daily po-litical comments for a major left-oriented newspaper and works on a Romanian edition of Jacques Rancière’s La Mésen-tente Politique et philosophie.

Velimir Delovski has graduated from the Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius Univeristy of Skopje and currently teaches at this faculty as a teaching assistant. He was a former scholarship holder of the Konrad Aden auer Foun dation and internee in the Parliament of the R. of Mace donia.


Za avtorite

Aleksandar Dimitriev, roden 1955, PhD, nezavisen konsultant i analiti~ar za razvoj, prognostika i mre`no planirawe. Magistriral na Fakultetot za politi~ki nauki vo Belgrad na tema „Realizacija na celi i pri~ini za kriza na sistemi#, a doktoriral na „Bajtov insti-tut# vo Qubqana na tema „Mre`no planirawe, analitika, prognostika i proekcija na kriza na sistemi#. Bil urednik na prviot nezavisen ekonomski nedelen vesnik „Biznis#, urednik i ko-urednik na nekolku zbornici za teorija na kritikata i literaturata, urednik na prviot obrazoven ciklus TV leksikon na MRTV, kako i promotor na Pettiot krug vo makedonskata literatura.

Dejan Donev, roden 1976, PhD, docent doktor po „Liderstvo i etika# i „Kulturolo{ki studii vo biznisot# na Euro College vo Kumanovo – Fakultet za biznis administracija. Magistriral vo juli 2005 godina so temata „Eti~-kiot mehanizam na dejstvuvawe na nevladinite organizacii#, a dok-to riral 2008 godina na Filozof-skiot fakultet vo Skopje so tema pod naslov „Eti~kite vrednosti vo menaxerstvoto#. Dosega objavuval brojni tekstovi so nau~na sodrìna vo spi sanijata: „Filosofija#, „Razgledi#, „Kulturen ìvot#, „Gra|anski svet#, „Fi lozofska istraìvawa#, kako i spisanieto „Habitus#, a u~estvuval i na brojni nau~ni internacionalni i doma{ni simpoziumi.

Aleksandar Dimitriev (b. 1955), Ph.D. In-dependent consultant, development, prog-nostics and network planning analyst. He received his MA degree from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade; his thesis title was “Goal achievement and causes for system crisis”, while his doctoral thesis was “Network planning, analytics, prog-nostics and projection of system crises”, with which he obtained his Ph.D. degree from the Bajt Institute in Ljubljana. He was the editor of Biznis, the fi rst independent economic weekly magazine, editor and co-editor of several collections of texts on critical theory and literature, editor of the ‘TV Lexicon’, the fi rst educational series on the Macedonian Radio and Television, as well as the promoter of the Fifth Cycle in the Macedonian literature.

Dejan Donev (b. 1976), Ph.D., Assistant Professor. He has taught the courses Leadership and Ethics and Cultural Studies in Business at the Faculty of Business Administration of the Euro College in Kumanovo. He received his MA degree with his thesis “The ethical mechanism in the activities of non-governmental organizations” in 2005 and his doctoral degree with the thesis entitled “Ethical values in manage-ment” from the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje in 2008. He has published a number of articles in scholarly journals, such as Filosofi ja, Razgledi, Kulturen život, Gragjanski svet and Filozofska istraživanja and Habitus. He has also participated in several domestic and international scholarly gatherings.


Za avtorite

Vladimir \or~ev e roden 1978 godina vo Skopje. ^len e na VMRO-DPMNE i pratenik vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija. Apsolvent e na Pravniot fakultet vo Skopje. Pretsedatel na Komisijata za od-brana i bezbednost vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija.

Zoran Zaev e roden e na 8. X 1974 vo Strumica. Diplomiral na Ekonom-skiot fakultet vo Skopje vo 1997 godina i momentalno e zapi{an na postdiplomskite studii od oblasta na monetarna ekonomija i finansii na istiot fakultet. Na partiskiot Kongres odr`an vo septemvri 2008 godina izbran e za vr{itel na dol-`nosta pretsedatel na Socijalde mo-kratskiot sojuz na Makedonija (SDSM). Od 2003 do 2005 godina bil pratenik vo Parlamentot na Re publika Make-donija kako ~len na SDSM. Vo 2005 godina e izbran za gradona~alnik na op{tina Strumica.

Ermira Mehmeti e magister po Komparativna politika na London School of Economics i pratenik vo Sobranieto na Republika Makedoni-ja od redovite na Demokratskata unija za integracija.

Vasko Naumovski, roden 1980 go di-na, diplomiral, magistriral i dok-toriral pravo na Pravniot fakultet „Justinijan Prvi# na skopskiot Uni-verzitet „Sv. Kiril i Metodij#, a magistriral i evropski studii na Rajnskiot univerzitet Fridrih Vil-helms vo Bon, Germanija. Docent po me|unarodno pravo i pravo na EU na Wujork univerzitetot Skopje.

Vladimir Gjorčev (b. 1978 in Skopje). Member of VMRO-DPMNE and MP in the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia. He is a fi nal-year student (all course requirements completed) at the Faculty of Law in Skopje. He is also president of the Parliament Defense and Security Committee.

Zoran Zaev, Acting president of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. (SDSM). He was born on 8 October 1974 in Strumica. In 1997 he graduated from the Faculty of Economics in Skopje and is currently attending postgradu-ate studies in Monetary Economy and Finances at this faculty. At the party con-gress held in September 2008 he was elected acting president of SDSM. In the period from 2003 – 2005 he was mem-ber of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia as a representative from the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. In 2005 he was elected mayor of the municipality of Strumica. Ermira Mehmeti holds an MA degree in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics and is MP in the Parliament of the Republic of Macedo-nia, representing the Democratic Union for Integration.

Vasko Naumovski (b.1980) graduated from the Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law in Skopje, from which he also received his MA and PhD degrees. He also holds an MA degree in European Studies from the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Germany. He is Assistant Professor of Law and European Law at the New York Univer-sity Skopje.


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Tito Petkovski e roden na 23.01.1945 go dina vo Psa~a, Kriva Palanka, Republika Makedonija, kade zavr{il gimnazija. Zavr{il praven fakultet vo Skopje. Bil potpretsedatel na makedonskoto Sobranie vo prviot parlamentaren sostav, pratenik vo trite prethodni parlamentarni sostavi, a od 1996 do 1998 e pretseda-tel na Sobranieto na RM. Vo 1999 godina bil pretsedatelski kandidat na Socijaldemokratskiot sojuz na Makedonija. Kon krajot na 2005 godina istapil od Socijaldemokratskiot sojuz na Makedonija. Na osnova~koto sobranie odràno na 17.12.2005 godina be{e formirana Nova so-cijaldemokratska partija – NSDP na koja Petkovski be{e izbran za nejzin prv Pretsedatel.

Liljana Popovska e pretsedatel na politi~kata partija DOM – De-mokratska obnova na Makedonija i pratenik vo Sobranieto na Republi-ka Makedonija. Bila potpretsedatel na Sobranieto, zamenik minister za razvoj, sovetnik vo Sovetot na Skopje. Aktiven poddrùva~ na civilniot sektor kako vaèn seg-ment na demokratskiot razvoj, borec za pravata na ènite, licata so hendikep i socijalno marginali-ziranite. Koordinator e na Make-donskoto ènsko lobi i inicijator za parlamentarnoto lobi za licata so posebni potrebi.

Liljana Popovska, President of the Party for the Democratic Renewal of Macedonia (DOM) and MP in the Parlia-ment of the Republic of Macedonia. She was Vice President of the Parliament, Deputy Minister of Development and councillor in the Skopje City Council. She actively supports the civil sector as an important segment of democratic development and upholds the rights of women and the disabled, as well as the marginalized groups. She is also the coordinator of the Macedonian Women’s Lobby and the initiator for the establish-ing a parliamentary lobby group for the persons with special needs.

Tito Petkovski (b. 1945) fi nished his secondary school in Kriva Palanka and graduated from the Faculty of Law in Skopje. He was Vice President of the fi rst Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, MP in the three previous parliaments, and from 1996 to 1998, President of the Parliament of the Re-public of Macedonia. In 1999 he was the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. By the end of 2005 he left the ranks of the Social Democratic Union of Macedo-nia. The New Social Democratic Party (NSDP) was formed at the constitutive assembly held on 17 December 2005, when Tito Petkovski was elected its fi rst president.


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Imer Selmani e pretsedatel na partijata Nova demokratija i e ~len na Parlamentot na Republika Makedonija. Od 2000 do 2006 toj bil gradona~alnik na op{tinata Saraj. Toj e porane{en minister za zdravstvo kako i potpretseda-tel na ZELS. Isto taka e ~len na Dràvniot sovet za bezbednost.

Quben Tevdovski raboti vo Min-isterstvoto za nadvore{ni raboti, vo sektorot za nacionalni pri-oriteti i e ~len na ureduva~kiot odbor na politi~kiot magazin za nadvore{nata politika na Repub-lika Makedonija Crossroads. Toj e i eden od osnova~ite na Institutot za me|unarodni kulturni odnosi i na Makedonskiot mladinski evro-atlantski forum.

Zagorka Tnokovska – zavr{en pra-ven fakultet, poloèn pravosuden ispit. Vrabotena vo Ministerstvoto za pravda na raboti i zada~i. Ra-ko vo di tel na sektorot za dràvna upra va, izboren sistem i upravni nad le`nosti.

Nata{a Hroneska e rodena 1983 go-dina. Diplomirala Politi~ki nauki na Pravniot fakultet vo Skopje. Magisterski studii za Jugoisto~na Evropa zavr{ila na atinskiot Nacionalen univerzitet. Momen-talno raboti kako analiti~ar vo ekspertska institucija.

Imer Selmani is president of the New Democracy Party and MP in the Parlia-ment of the Republic of Macedonia. From 2000 to 2006 he was mayor of the municipality of Saraj. He is former Minister of Health and Vice President of ZELS (Association of Local Government Units) and member of the State Security Council.

Ljuben Tevdovski, M.A., works for the Macedonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the Sector for National Priorities, and is also member of the editorial board of the Macedonian foreign policy magazine Crossroads. Mr. Tevdovski is a found-ing member of the International Cultural Relations Institute and the Macedonian Youth Euro-Atlantic Forum.

Zagorka Tnokovska holds a BA de-gree from the Faculty of Law and the LPC Certifi cate (Legal Practice Course Certifi cate).She works at the Ministry of Justice as head of the State Administra-tion, Electoral System and Administra-tive Jurisdiction Department

Nataša Hroneska (b. 1983) graduated from the Department of Political Sci-ences at the Faculty of Law in Skopje. She holds an MA degree in Southeast European Studies from the National Uni-versity in Athens. She currently works as a researcher in anlytics.


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