political violence and the emergence of the dispute over abyei, sudan, 1950–1983

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This article was downloaded by: [The University of British Columbia] On: 29 October 2014, At: 21:17 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Eastern African Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjea20 Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983 Luka B. Deng Kuol abc a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, USA b College of Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba, Buluk, Juba, South Sudan c Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Gronland, Oslo, Norway Published online: 26 Aug 2014. To cite this article: Luka B. Deng Kuol (2014) Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8:4, 573-589, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.950077 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.950077 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

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Page 1: Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983

This article was downloaded by: [The University of British Columbia]On: 29 October 2014, At: 21:17Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Eastern African StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjea20

Political violence and the emergenceof the dispute over Abyei, Sudan,1950–1983Luka B. Deng Kuolabc

a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School,Cambridge, MA, USAb College of Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba,Buluk, Juba, South Sudanc Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Gronland, Oslo, NorwayPublished online: 26 Aug 2014.

To cite this article: Luka B. Deng Kuol (2014) Political violence and the emergence of thedispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8:4, 573-589, DOI:10.1080/17531055.2014.950077

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.950077

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

Page 2: Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 3: Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950–1983

Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan,1950–1983

Luka B. Deng Kuola,b,c*

aCarr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, USA; bCollegeof Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba, Buluk, Juba, South Sudan; cPeace ResearchInstitute Oslo (PRIO), Gronland, Oslo, Norway

(Received 14 April 2014; accepted 28 July 2014)

The question of the future status of Abyei remains a deeply contested issue betweenSudan and the independent South Sudan. The connection between the politicalviolence in Abyei and eruption of the two civil wars in Sudan is sparsely documented,but this history reveals the character of the Abyei problem. This article provides ananalysis of the role of political violence in the emergence of the dispute around thestatus of Abyei. It charts the evolution of the problem chronologically, first situatingthe history of the Ngok Dinka population of Abyei, and then mapping the history ofviolence through the independence period, the first civil war, the early 1970s and thefailure of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and finally the second civil war in the 1980s.Political violence in Abyei became central to the large-scale contestation between thesouth and the north in Sudan, the struggle of the Abyei people contributing towardsshaping a southern Sudanese identity and in defining the character of the independentstate of South Sudan.

Keywords: South Sudan; Abyei; Anya-Nya; civil war; political violence

Abyei was once described as the thread that holds the north and south of Sudan together,but it is now a disputed area in limbo between what has recently become two independentcountries.1 The unresolved status of Abyei and the recurrent violence have theirbackground in decades of violence.2 To the Ngok Dinka – who are permanently settledin the area – and to the Misseriya, the neighbouring people to the north, this is foremost aconflict over ownership of land and access to seasonal grazing. However, long-lastinghostilities have deepened the enmity and generated new grievances. Violence in Abyeiwas an integral part of the two civil wars which preceded South Sudan’s secession. Notonly is Abyei strategically and symbolically important to leaders in Khartoum and Juba,but the Ngok and the Misseriya can mobilize formidable fighting forces and theycontinue to be core constituencies to the ruling parties in South Sudan, the SudanPeople’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and Sudan, the National Congress Party,respectively. The significance of the Abyei area is reflected in the fact that one of thesix protocols of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between theGovernment of Sudan and SPLM deals solely with this conflict. This adds another layerof complexity to the local conflict and makes it more intractable.

*Email: [email protected]

Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2014Vol. 8, No. 4, 573–589, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.950077

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

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The area of Abyei currently settled by the Ngok Dinka has an estimated population ofaround 300,000 people. The delimitation of the area of the Ngok was the result of a long-lasting arbitration process that is binding on the Governments of Sudan and SouthSudan.3 This process started with the report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission in2005 and moved on to the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2009.Moreover, according to a decision incorporated within the CPA, a referendum over thefuture of Abyei was to be conducted simultaneously with that of South Sudan in January2011. The Government of Sudan refused to honour this part of the peace accord andrejected the African Union’s subsequent proposal for the Abyei referendum to beconducted in October 2013.4 Frustrated by the stalled process, Abyei leaders andintellectuals organized a unilateral referendum on the future status of Abyei during 27–29October 2013. The referendum was carried out without any officially recognizedassistance. The Ngok Dinka participated in the referendum, while the Misseriya nomadsdid not as the AU Proposal restricted the eligibility in Abyei Referendum to the NgokDinka and other permanent residents. Sixty-three thousand four hundred and thirty-threevoted in the referendum: 99.99% in favour being annexed to South Sudan, with only 12people voting in favour of belonging to Sudan.5 This gave an indication of where thepreference of the Ngok Dinka lay, but the referendum was foremost a symbolic gestureaimed at pressuring the two governments and the international community to resolve theimpasse. But the process remains stalled: the African Union declared that the referendumwas illegal and a threat to the peace; the Governments of Sudan and South Sudandeclared beforehand that the outcome would carry no weight.6

It was the tension and frequency of violence in Abyei since 2005 which prompted theNgok Dinka leaders to try to force the issue of the referendum. Despite the continuouspresence of United Nations peacekeeping forces at Abyei, the Sudan Armed Forces twicetemporarily occupied the area after large-scale fighting, first in May 2008 and then againin May 2011.7 Moreover, clashes between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriyia militias havecaused widespread insecurity and devastation as well as displacement of the Ngok Dinkafrom their home areas. This violence is partly related to the Misseriya’s demand for accessto grazing land in Abyei, but is also rooted in the larger contestation between Sudan andSouth Sudan, where people from the Misseriya were organized into local militias underthe Popular Defence Force umbrella and many from the Ngok Dinka were recruited intothe SPLA.8 In May 2013, the Paramount Chief of the Ngok Dinka, Kuol Deng Kuol –who wanted Abyei to be part of South Sudan – was assassinated by Misseryia militias.President Salva Kiir accused the Government of Sudan of being implicated in this murder,and it was cited as one of the reasons why the Abyei referendum of October 2013 wasconducted.9 The people of Abyei and their leaders argue that the continuation of violencedictates that the issue of Abyei’s status needs to be resolved sooner rather than later – notonly to give the people of Abyei the protection it needs but also to defuse an issue whichcan escalate into a new war between Sudan and South Sudan.

To resolve the Abyei predicament a better understanding of its historical backgroundis required. Why has the issue of Abyei come to gain such a prominent place in thepolitical relations between Sudan and South Sudan? The purpose of this article is to tracethe origin of the current contestation over the status of Abyei, and to assess the impact ofpolitical violence in Abyei on the history of conflict between the Government of Sudanand the people of the south. This article begins with a section giving background on theNgok Dinka and their arrival to Abyei, followed by a discussion of how the dispute overAbyei emerged and took shape. Subsequent sections deal with the place of Abyei in theprocess of Sudan’s independence in the 1950s; political violence in Abyei during the first

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civil war (1963–1972); the resolution and (lack of) implementation of the Abyei issue inthe 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement; and finally the eruption of political violence inthe early 1980s in Abyei. Through this investigation, this article demonstrates that theAbyei issue gained political significance not only because of repressive violence from thegovernment and its allies but also through the people of Abyei’s shared experience ofpolitical struggle against oppression.

The Ngok Dinka and their arrival in Abyei

The Dinka of Abyei are generally known as the western Ngok, forming part of a largerethnic, linguistic and agro-pastoralist group, the Padang, which, in turn, is one of themain groups of the Dinka people. Oral history relates that the Ngok, together with othergroups of the Padang, are descendants of people who ‘began to push westwards’ from theWhite Nile some 300 years ago, forced to migrate by an increasing population andpressure from Nuer advances.10 Santandrea relates how the first three chiefs of the Ngok,Jok, Bulabek and Dongbek, lived and died east of the White Nile between Malakal andLake No, and that the first chief to cross the river was Kuoldit, who led his peoplewestward under pressure from the Nuer and in search of grazing for their increasingnumber of cattle.11 Both Paramount Chief Kwoldit and his son, Monydhang, ‘died andwere buried’ in the region of ‘Demboloia’, northeast of Abyei town on the Ngol River.Santandrea further recounts that Monydhang’s son, Alor, invaded the territory of the Begior Girma, and reached as far as today’s Abyei town.12 Chief Alor’s son, Biong, settledsouth of Abyei, on the River Kiir, in a place called Wunchuei, where he died and wasburied. Sabah concurs that, by the early nineteenth century, Chief Biong had settled inpresent-day Ngok land.13

By 1810, the nine subsections of Ngok Dinka occupied the Abyei area in two distinctgroups: the original settlers (Abyor, Achweng, Anyel, Diil, Mannyuar and Mareng) andthe latecomers (Alei, Achak and Bongo).14 It is argued that among the original settlers,the subsection of Abyor led by the Pajok lineage arrived first to the area and took the bestplaces including Abyei town in the highlands, while Mannyuar, led by Dhiendior lineage,arrived later and occupied the next best areas.15 The location of what is today’s Abyeitown became the home of the Paramount Chief and the hub of Ngok political andcommercial affairs. Since settling in Abyei, the Ngok have shown a remarkable resistanceagainst assimilation into the Arabic and Muslim cultural hemisphere of the northernSudan.16

The Ngok Dinka of Abyei departed from the characteristic stateless Nilotes leadershipand adopted a ‘centralised’ political structure similar to that of Shilluk.17 According toBeswick, the Ngok Dinka by the twentieth century had developed a centralized politicalstructure ruled by a Paramount Chief with powers of imposing taxation, exercisingsupreme judicial authority and military leadership.18 She explains this unique trait withreference to a combination of an internal struggle for leadership, external pressure fromthe north, particularly from the Misseriyia, and the distinct ecological environment of theAbyei area. The ecology of Abyei is characterized by harsh climate, with a hot-dry seasonalternating with a rainy season during which large areas are flooded. Agricultural land isconcentrated in one area circumscribed by sandy ridges and this hinders seasonalmigration, which, according to Beswick, further facilitated a centralized politicalstructure.19

The Ngok have coexisted with a number of neighbouring groups, including thenomadic Misseriya Arabs, the Malual Dinka, the Awan Dinka, the Twic Dinka and the

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Ruweng Dinka, each of which groups make seasonal use of the Abyei area. TheMisseryia Arabs have proven to be the most problematic of these neighbours, and havecontributed towards recurrent political violence in the area, engaging in what amounts toa power struggle with the Ngok Dinka.

Most scholars recognized that the Muslim Baggara Arabs started moving along thesavannah belt from the Kingdom of Wadai in French Equatoria Africa (Chad), passingthrough Darfur and Kordofan in the eighteenth century. This migration was characterizedby bitter fighting among the Baggara, which resulted in their division into four distinctgroups: the Misseriyia Humr (red), Misseriyia Zurug (black), Hwazama and Rizaygat.20

The Misseriyia Humur had arrived and settled in Muglad (Deinga) in south-westKordofan by the late eighteenth century, and they became the immediate neighbours tothe north of the Ngok Dinka at Abyei.21 Initial relations between the Ngok Dinka andMisseriyia were peaceful, and it is even argued that some sections of Ngok Dinka assistedthe Misseriyia in conquering their current areas of settlement in Muglad from theindigenous Shatt peoples.22

The origin of conflict at Abyei

The arrival of the Turco-Egyptian regime to Sudan in 1821 changed the local balance ofpower in favour of Misseriyia, and this led the Ngok to adopt new defensive strategiesagainst their northern neighbours.23 During the period of the Turkiyya (1821–1881), theTurco-Egyptian authorities and private traders undertook slave raids on a considerablescale into what is today South Sudan.24 The Misseriyia also raided the Dinka and otherpeoples of Bahr el-Ghazal for slaves and cattle, becoming part of al-Zubayr Pasha’s slavetrading empire in Bahr el-Ghazal.25 As a consequence of ubiquitous slaves trading andincreased ownership of slaves in Kordofan, the Turco-Egyptian regime in 1851 allowedMisseriyia to pay their taxes in slaves.26

Under the leadership of Chief Arob Biong, the Ngok resisted these slave raids andfought the Arab traders. Chief Arob Biong adopted various defensive strategies such asusing age-sets as a ‘standing-army’ and electing ‘war chiefs’ for each village. In addition,Chief Arob Biong used diplomacy: he initiated relations with the chiefs of Rizaygat andMisseriyia and he succeeded in forging an alliance with the Misseriyia Chief, Ali Massar.Allegedly, Chief Arob and another Misseriyia Chief, Azuza, ritually mixed blood tosymbolize their special and brotherly relation.27

As the Turco-Egyptian regime became increasingly oppressive in the final quarter ofthe nineteenth century, the Misseriyia were among the first groups to convert to theMadhdi’s cause. In a bid to protect their people against slave raids at this time, the chiefof Ngok Dinka and other Dinka chiefs in Bahr el-Ghazal accepted the offer of truce bythe leaders of the Mahdist uprising and forged a temporary alliance with the Misseriyia toget rid of the Turco-Egyptian regime.28 This caused the collapse of the formal Egyptianadministration in Bahr el-Ghazal.29 But with fall of Turco-Egyptian regime in 1881 andthe advent of the Mahdiyya, relations between Misseriyia and the Ngok Dinka rapidlydeteriorated. To protect his people from slave raids and to win the confidence of the newregime, Chief Arob Biong with other sub-chiefs (including Alor Ajing of Mannyuar andDhiel Yak of Achak) went to the north to give their allegiance to the Madhdi and tocomplain about Arabs slave raids and robbery of his people.30 After their return and inorder to show their special relations with the Mahdi, Chief Arob Biong named one of hissons Mahdi, Alor Ajing named one of his sons Sobah (Arab names referring to east) and

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Dhiel Yak named one of his daughters Hawa (Arab name for Eve), a traditional Dinkapractice of naming children after specific events.31

Although the period of Mahdiyya was characterized by two decades of conflict andaccompanying chaos, some scholars have argued that it was a relatively peaceful periodfor the Ngok.32 But there is evidence to suggest that the Ngok suffered and experiencedslave raiding during this period.33 The rise and fall of the Mahdist regime had the indirecteffect of enhancing the centralized political structure as well strengthening the Ngokposition in their relations with their Misseriyia neighbours.34 The split among theMisseriyia over support of the Madhi resulted in non-Mahdist Misseriyia being thrownout of Dar Misseriyia (home of Misseriyia). These expelled Misseriyia were accom-modated by Chief Arob Biong of the Ngok Dinka until the Anglo-Egyptian invasion in1898.35 After the defeat of the Mahdiyya, the Misseriyia were then reunited and returnedback to Dar Misseriyia.

At this point, Ali Jula, a former marasala (messenger) of the Khalifa, was recognizedas nazir (head sheikh) by the new Anglo-Egyptian regime.36 Despite the good relationsbetween the Ngok Dinka and the anti-Mahdist Misseriyia at the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the returning of the Mahdist Misseryian to the Dar Misseriyiaand their assumption of leadership generated greater inter-tribal violence. Ali Jula, thenew Sheikh of Misseriyia, encouraged and was responsible for conducting further slaveraids against the Ngok and Twic Dinka.37 But it should be noted that this raiding wasmutual, and that the Ngok enslaved Arabs captured during retaliatory strikes.38

During the Anglo-Egyptian regime, the Ngok Dinka consolidated their centralizedpolitical structure and enhanced the economic position of Abyei as a cross-borderbetween the African south and the Arab north.39 A new breed of Ngok leadershipemerged. Kuol Arob, who became Paramount Chief after the death of his father ArobBiong in 1905, defended the Ngok Dinka from the continued raids by Misseriyia. AsDinka were generally perceived as opposing the new regime, the British administrationinitially tolerated the continued Arab Baggara raids into Dinka areas, including Abyei. Inthe light of such challenges, Mareng, a subsection of Ngok Dinka, found it necessary todefend themselves from such raids by allowing free passage to Misseriyia with their cattleand slaves through their territory after raiding in the south.40

Following a series of complaints from Ngok and Twic Dinka, the Anglo-Egyptianregime decided to place the victims and perpetrators of the slave raids under a singleadministration that would be better able to prevent and respond to such incidents.41 Thus,Chief Arob Biong and his people were placed under the administration of Kordofanprovince in March 1905.42 After the Dinka rebellion of 1922, the British administrationchanged its policy and tried to win the confidence of the Dinka people. Chief Kuol Arobsubsequently pledged his allegiance to the Anglo-Egyptian regime and he wasrecognized, not only as the chief of the Ngok but also of other neighbouring Dinkasections, including Ruweng and Twic.43 Improved relations between the Britishadministration and the Ngok contributed to the gradual consolidation of the Ngok’scentralized political structure. Moreover, the colonial government now ended its previoustacit acceptance of Arab raids against the Ngok, reprimanding Ali Jula, the chief ofMisseriyia.44

This centralized political structure of the Ngok Dinka raised concerns among someBritish administrators in the south that this was a sign of Arabization. Although having nosubstantive foundation, this perception surely contributed to the imposition of the ‘closeddistricts’ policy of 1922, the demarcation in 1924 of a new boundary lying 25–40 milessouth of the Bahr al-Arab/Kiir in Dinka land, and development of the ‘Southern Policy’

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in 1930. The purpose of these impositions was to divide the Arab Islamic north from theAfrican south, including the Ngok Dinka, and so insulating them from northern SudaneseIslamic and Arab influence.45 This policy did much to give rise to a separate southernSudanese identity among Ngok Dinka and played a large part in the emergence ofAbyei’s particular problems.

Abyei and the independence of Sudan

Already by the end of the 1920s, the status of the Ngok Dinka had become a concern forthe colonial administration. Over the next decade, the British administration attempted tomove the Ngok south, to place them under the administration of Bahr el-Ghazal andabandon the home areas north of Kiir (Bahr al-Arab) River.46 This would have formallyseparated the Ngok Dinka from the Misseriyia. The other Dinka chiefs urged Kuol Arobto accept this relocation, but Chief Kuol Arob refused.47 The chief explained to themprivately that if the Ngok were to join the Bahr el-Ghazal, he feared that the Arabs, whomhe described as ‘thieves’, would try to seize their territory.48 Beswick suggests that ChiefKuol Arob might have opted to remain in Kordofan also because he wanted toconsolidate his political power and to preserve his position as Paramount Chief of theNgok Dinka.49

However, after the decision to remain in Kordofan, Chief Kuol Arob becamepolitically isolated, and his leadership was further weakened when Twic Dinka andRuweng Dinka were placed under the administration of the south. Chief Kuol Arob thenfailed to secure his son Deng Abot as his successor. Deng Abot was unwilling to ally withthe Misseriyia.50 Instead, one of his other sons, Deng Majok, staged a political coup in1942, and the British administration – supported by the Misseriyia Chief Babo Nimir –elected him as the Paramount Chief of the Ngok. Once imposed, Deng Majok emerged asshrewd and powerful leader. It is during his period that the Ngok were introduced to acash economy, a modern market system and Western education. Deng Majok evenencouraged his own children and those of other sub-chiefs of Ngok Dinka to go toschool.51 By marrying some 200 wives, he consolidated his leadership among the Ngok.Chief Deng Majok also maintained close relations with the Misseriyia, the two groupsoccupying a position of apparent political parity.52 Under his leadership, relations withMisseriyia and British administration improved considerably and the Ngok enjoyed acertain degree of political and economic stability.

The 1930s and 1940s witnessed the rapid growth of the Sudanese nationalistmovement and the first steps towards Sudan’s independence. During self-governmentnegotiations in the early 1950s, the unique status of the Ngok Dinka was recognized. In1951, the colonial administration again offered the Ngok the opportunity to move to Bahrel-Ghazal.53 At this time, the British were concerned that the interests of the Ngok wouldnot be fairly represented within the government structures in northern Sudan. A meetingheld in Abyei, on 7 March 1951, resolved that ‘the best future for the Ngok Dinka lay inBahr el-Ghazal Province’. But according to the official British report on the meeting, theleaders disagreed about the future of their area.54 Some of the Ngok leaders, notablyDeng Majok, were against shifting to the administration of Bahr el-Ghazal since theybelieved that Kordofan – as a province in the northern Sudan – would be betteradministered and better funded than that of Bahr el-Ghazal.55 The detailed account of themeeting reveals that despite the fact that most of these sub-chiefs were appointees ofChief Deng Majok, almost all of them voted in favour of transfer of the Ngok to the Bahrel-Ghazal. The only exceptions were Chief Deng Majok himself and the chiefs of the two

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subsections of Abyor and Diil.56 When Chief Deng Majok realized he was in a minority,he played for time, arguing for more consultation and further study. The colonialadministration gave him time after the meeting in 1951 to visit Wau, Aweil and Gogrialbefore taking their final decision about the status of Abyei.57

Following the March 1951 meeting, Chief Deng Majok energetically conducted aseries of consultations with all chiefs and elders of the nine subsections of the Ngok, chiefsof the Bahr el-Ghazal province, as well as shaykhs and elders of the Misseriya.58 Theseconsultations, however, continued to produce mixed results. Most chiefs of subsections ofthe Ngok rejected the proposal to move, and only the four chiefs of the Abyor, Anyel, Diiland Mannyuar accepted it.59 It is apparent that the position of Chief Deng Majok andothers not to join the south was based, among other factors, on the fact that they did notwant to move there without their lands north of Kiir River. Consequently, Chief DengMajok, like his father, rejected the transfer proposal: ‘should we abandon this land with allits blessings’, he is reported to have said, ‘our descendants will one day blame us’.60

In addition to these administrative concerns, Chief Deng Majok had personal reasonsfor remaining in Kordofan: in the Bahr el-Ghazal, as one Dinka chief among many, hebelieved his status would be lowered. Moreover, his younger brother and rival, DengAbot, was a strong supporter of the transfer proposal. Because of this, some observerssuspected that Chief Deng Majok feared that if the transfer took place, Deng Abot wouldreplace him as Paramount Chief. Some educated Ngok supported Deng Majok because,with growing resistance against colonial rule among elites in Sudan, they feared that thetransfer proposal was part of a British plan to divide Sudan along racial lines.61 Still, amajority of Ngok leaders, chiefs, sub-chiefs and the elites favoured a return to the southand opposed the decision of Chief Deng Majok not to accept the transfer proposal. Theyfeared the fate of the Ngok under the new administration led by Arab and Muslimrulers.62

Nevertheless, the Ngok, under the influence of their Chief Deng Majok, decided in1951 to join the Misseriya District Council instead of the Dinka Gogrial Council in theBahr el-Ghazal, with one reservation:

During the year the Ngok Dinka decided to amalgamate with Misseria district council andnot with the Dinka Gogrial Council in Bahr el Ghazal, when it should come into being. Theyhave reserved the right to withdraw from Misseria Council after five (5) years.63

In 1954, as the colonial administration was about to end, other groups among the Ngok atAbyei, representing a younger political constituency, sent representatives to Fulla inKordofan. They wanted to discuss the exercise of the right to withdraw from theMisseriya Council and to be amalgamated with the Dinka Gogrial Council in the Bahr el-Ghazal, but they were arrested and accused of advocating separatism.64 Dr John Garangrecounted this history when he addressed the people of Abyei in 2004, recognizing thatthe struggle of the people of Abyei had begun in 1954, several months before the Toritmutiny in 1955, which is often cited as the beginning of the first civil war in Sudan.65

Abyei and the first civil war

In December 1955, Sudan’s last British Governor General, Sir Alexander Knox Helm,departed, and on 1 January 1956, Sudan became independent. But even before that thesouthern Sudanese, including the Ngok, were subjected to discriminatory governmentpolicies.66 Well-established religious, cultural and educational norms were eroded during

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the years of Sudanization (1954–1955) prior to independence. Then, from January 1956,according to Alier, a number of further steps were taken to Islamize and Arabize culturallife in the entire country, angering southerners everywhere, including those in the Abyeiarea.67

In Abyei, primary schools that were run as part of the education system of Bahr el-Ghazal changed in this period to follow the Northern education system. All teachers weretransferred to Bahr el-Ghazal and were replaced by teachers from the North. The newnorthern teachers insisted on replacing pupils’ Ngok Dinka names with Arabic names.According to Johnson, pro-south chiefs sent their sons to the Bahr el-Ghazal forschooling, while those who were against the transfer of Abyei to the south, such as ChiefDeng Majok, took their children to Kordofan; even those studying in the south, such asFrancis Deng and Zacharia Bol, were taken out of Rumbek Secondary School and sent toKordofan.68

Civil servants and teachers working in Abyei, such as Lino Wuor Abyei and LouisNyok Kwol Arop, were all transferred to the Bahr el-Ghazal. These developments breddissatisfaction in the south, and soon gave rise to the mutiny of the Torit garrison inEquatoria province in 1955. The Commission of Inquiry’s Report revealed that among thecauses of the 1955 disturbances were injustices perpetrated against the south.69 SomeNgok of Abyei, such as Dau Deng Kueth, took part Torit Mutiny in 1955. Shortly afterTorit, in 1957, the youth and students of Abyei organized themselves into a politicalmovement.70 This was headed by Bona Bulabek Kwol and, Angelo Ajing Jipuur.They, and others, became the first generation of Abyei to join the southern politicalmovement.71

The centralized political structure of the Ngok Dinka was weakened with thedeparture in 1956 of the British administration that had supported the leadership of ChiefDeng Majok. In the absence of British administration, clan rivalries quickly emergedwithin and among different subsections of the Ngok. The subsection of Mannywar(Dhiendior), whose population was greater than the ruling subsection of Abyor (Pajok),forged an alliance within the northern government to change the balance of power and toend the old system of tribal rule.72

With the end of the colonial administration, the conflict between the Misseriya andthe Ngok intensified. A number of raids by the Misseriya took place, these beingcondoned by the new Government of Sudan. Hostilities between the Ngok and Misseriyareached a climax in 1965, when the Ngok attacked the Misseriya during their dry seasonmigration southward. This was in retaliation for a brutal insult to a fellow Dinka in Awielwho was killed, and his arms amputated and used by Arab nomads to beat their drums.The cycle of violence continued later in 1965, when more than 200 southern Sudanese,including Ngok Dinka, were burnt alive in the presence of government officials and thenazir of the Misseriya in the towns of Muglad and Babanusa. These atrocities escalatedthe level of local conflict, merging into the larger north–south war.73

As his strategy had been to defend his people by forging good relations withMisseriyia and by refusing to move to the administration in the south, Chief Deng Majokfelt betrayed by the Misseriyia raids of these years. He now regretted his decision toremain in the North, becoming openly hostile towards his northern neighbours.74 Ratherthan winning the confidence of the Ngok people as the only non-Muslim and Dinka whowere under the administration in northern Sudan, the new government therefore insteadpushed the Ngok people away from Sudanese nationalism and towards the cause ofsouthern Sudan and separatism. The tension between the Ngok Dinka and theirMisseriyia neighbours was of course exacerbated by the intensifying north–south civil

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war, in which the Ngok Dinka eventually joined their kith and kin in the southernliberation struggle.75 Chief Deng Majok died in 1969, to be succeeded by his sonMonyyak Deng. This marked the end of any centralized political structure among theNgok Dinka.76

When the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and its military wing, the Anya-Nya, organized themselves for rebellion in 1963, the youth of Abyei followed suit in1964 under the Anya-Nya umbrella to wage an insurgency in the Abyei area.77 Thepolitical leadership of Abyei’s Anya-Nya unit included Arop Deng, Justin Deng Biongand John Maluil, and the military wing was under the command of Dodol Nyang andIreneo Biong Bol as political commissar.78 These local units posed a real threat to theauthorities in Abyei, managing to recruit a large number of youths who were sent to theAnya-Nya headquarters in Congo for further training.79

These activists from Abyei then played a prominent role in the evolution of the Anya-Nya rebellion. Dominic Kuol Arop was among the first policemen from Abyei whodefected from Raja, in March 1963, joined the Anya-Nya in Congo and subsequentlybecame a military trainer.80 He was one of three officers who accompanied CaptainBernardino Mau Juol, when SANU sent him to launch military operations in the Bahr el-Ghazal. They attacked Wau in January 1964. This sent a clear signal of the rebellionthroughout southern Sudan, and marked the beginning of the serious military campaign inBahr el-Ghazal province.81 After the attack on Wau, Dominic Kuol became deputycommander of Division 5 of the Anya-Nya Army in Abyei and Gogrial. He went on tobecome commander of the same division during 1965–1967.82 Besides Dominic Kuol,two students at Rumbek Secondary School, Akonon Mathian and Ceasar Ayok Deng-Abot, joined the Anya-Nya in 1964, thus becoming the first educated youth from Abyeito join the southern rebellion.83 Akonon Mathiang, having excelled as a cadet, becameamong the first trainers of the Anya-Nya in Congo. He later joined the six-man commandcouncil of the military wing of the Bahr el-Ghazal Anya-Nya Movement formed in 1966.Akonon became a commander of Gogrial and Tonj, Lakes and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal,where he famously succeeded in cutting the rail link between north and south.84 CaeserAyok Deng-Abot was among the first three officers selected for training in France.85 Heand Akonon Mathiang were the most senior officers of the Anya-Nya from Abyei killedin action during the first civil war.

In 1970, the Government of Sudan killed, amongst others, Moyak Deng, chief of theNgok, who was accused of collaborating with the Anya-Nya. Out of a feeling of guilt, thechief’s brothers, Arop Deng and Justin Deng, surrendered to government authorities inAbyei.86 Despite this, the flow of new recruits from Abyei to the headquarters of Anya-Nya Liberation Army continued.87 It was during 1969 and 1970 that the different Anya-Nya groups of southern Sudan became more coordinated and increasingly under a centralpolitical leadership under the umbrella of South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).With the assassination of Ngok Paramount Chief, the national government expedited theprocess of dismantling the centralized political structure of the Ngok Dinka. Theimplementation of the People’s Local Government Act of 1971 then removed almost allinfluence of the Ngok within Kordofan.88

Abyei and the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972)

In May 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri seized power in Sudan through a coup d’état.Ironically, the coup opened the way for resolution of the conflict in Sudan by politicalrather than military means. On 9 June 1969, the new regime issued a ‘Declaration of

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Regional Autonomy for the southern Provinces’, outlining plans for regional self-governance. This paved the way for the SSLM to negotiate. Over the course of two weeksof talks between Nimeiri’s government and the SSLM, the Addis Ababa Agreement wasconcluded and signed on 27 February 1972. The issue of Abyei was discussed at lengthin Addis Ababa. The SSLM maintained that Abyei should be incorporated into thesouthern region.89 On the other hand, the Sudanese Government’s delegation wantedthe current status of Abyei and other border areas to be maintained, on the grounds thatthe SSLM was not entitled to speak on behalf of all the people of Abyei. The deadlockwas broken and a compromise was enshrined in the definition of the ‘Southern Provincesof Sudan’ as:

the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with theirboundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally andgeographically a part of Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum.90

In this context, the Addis Ababa Agreement thus made special provision for the people ofAbyei, and other border areas, with the right to choose through referendum whether toremain in the north or to join the south. However, the Addis Ababa Accord did notspecify which areas were ‘culturally and geographically’ part of the ‘Southern complex’nor did it provide a mechanism for identifying such areas. Nonetheless, the clear intentionwas to encompass Abyei and other border areas as affiliated to the ‘Southern Region’.

After the Addis Ababa Agreement, Arab nomads found themselves dealing withsouthern administrators, southern police and even southern soldiers. The effects of thiswere compounded by the abolition of native administration in the north in 1971, but itscontinuation in the southern region. In response to this new reality in the south, PresidentNimeiri announced the formation of the murahalin (mobile forces) which later becamethe popular defence force (al-difa’ al-shabi). These were paramilitary cattle guards whotravelled with Arab nomads during the dry season to prevent fighting between them andthe Dinka. The idea of murahalin was a response to the emergence of southern Sudaneselaw enforcement forces in areas accessed by Arab pastoralists. In December 1972,immediately after the Addis Ababa Agreement, Nimeiri visited Abyei. During this visit,the Ngok demanded the holding of a referendum in Abyei as outlined in the Agreement,the formation of local administration, and the right to have their own armed guards.Despite the fact that President Nimeiri was unhappy with the way he was received by theangry Ngok, he promised as a symbol of the unity of Sudan to declare a specialadministrative status for Abyei, directly under the presidency. But he ignored the demandfor a referendum and the request for armed guards.91

After his visit to Abyei, Nimeiri fulfilled his promise and issued a presidential ordergranting Abyei special status under direct supervision of the presidency. But this, in fact,proved to indicate a backtracking on the Addis Ababa commitment to hold a referendumon Abyei’s future status. Dr Francis Deng, the son of Chief Deng Majok and Minister ofState in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, helped to set up a US-fundeddevelopment project in Abyei. This was meant to provide the Ngok Dinka with ‘peacedividends’ comparable to those of the south, and to support Abyei’s special status as amicrocosm of Sudan. The Misseriya resented both the Ngok’s winning of the right toadminister their sub-district and the US-funded development project. In 1977, themurahalin began attacking the Ngok. Trucks travelling with Ngok passengers fromMuglad, the main Misseriya town, to Abyei were intercepted and looted, and people weremurdered. In 1977, Mark Majak Abiem, a Ph.D. student of the University of London,

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who was going to Abyei for fieldwork, was among some 80 Ngok killed in a singleincident.92 In 1980, Misseriya tribesmen and murahalin forces jointly staged a massiveattack on Ngok villages, burning houses, destroying crops, looting livestock, killing atrandom and forcing large numbers of people to flee.93

After the 1977 incidents, President Nimeiri sent first Vice President Al-Baqr Ahmedto Abyei. Upon his arrival, he promised that the referendum stipulated in the AddisAbaba Agreement would be held. But this declaration, combined with other issues, leadto the dismissal of the vice-president. His successor, Abdel Gassim Mohamed Ibrahim,met the same fate, again in part because of the position he took on Abyei. It seemed thatPresident Nimeiri was adamantly opposed to the holding of a referendum. He argued thateven if Article 3(iii) of the Addis Ababa Agreement was intended to include Abyei, theword ‘may’ in its language gave the government the liberty to conduct or not to conduct areferendum.

The people of Abyei nonetheless sent numerous petitions between 1973 and 1982requesting that the referendum be conducted.94 All these overtures were ignored. Noreferendum was ever conducted in Abyei. Instead, the Government of Sudan focused onestablishing self-rule. Justin Deng Aguer, a son of Abyei, was brought from Juba andappointed as assistant commissioner under the direct supervision of national minister oflocal government. Deng Aguer advocated reinstatement of the native administrationsystem and managed to recruit police and teachers mainly from among the Ngok.Teachers who had left Abyei area after ‘Sudanisation’, such as Lino Wuor, the formerheadmaster of Abyei Primary School, were brought back from the Bahr el-Ghazal, andex-Anya-Nya from Abyei were incorporated into the local police.

Abyei and the eruption of the second civil war

The issue of Abyei played a critical role not only in the deteriorating relations betweenthe south and north but also contributed significantly to the internal political dynamicsof the south. Dissatisfaction with Abel Alier, the first president of the Southern RegionalGovernment, over his handling of the Abyei issue led Ngok intellectuals in Juba to jointhe ‘wind of change’ movement in 1977. This targeted the Abel Alier faction andendorsed for the presidency the former Anya-Nya leader, Joseph Lagu, in the hope that hewould challenge President Nimeiri on the issue of Abyei. In the elections of 1978, DrZacharia Bol Deng, a son of Chief Deng Majok and past chairman of the AbyeiLiberation Front (ALF), won a seat in the southern Sudan Regional Assembly and wasthen appointed its Deputy Speaker.95 The assembly passed a resolution to annex Abyei tothe territory of southern region, but Joseph Lagu, the newly elected president, failed tosubmit the resolution to President Nimeiri.

In the midst of a power struggle in the south, President Lagu was subjected toimpeachment in 1980. In return, the Speaker of the Assembly, Clement Mboro, DeputySpeaker, Dr Zacharia, and Controller of the Assembly, Philip Akot, as well as someministers, were all dismissed. This political infighting gave Nimeiri a pretext in February1980 to dissolve the Regional Assembly, dismiss the government of Joseph Lagu, andform a High Technical Committee chaired by Abel Alier to supervise regional elections.In the elections in April 1980, the intellectuals of Abyei, headed by Dr Zacharia Bol, whohad again secured a seat in the Regional Assembly, supported Abel Alier for thepresidency of the regional government. They understandably felt betrayed by JosephLagu, who had failed to raise the issue of Abyei with the central government as hepromised when standing for the regional presidency in 1978. Abel Alier was

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overwhelmingly elected, and he formed a government that included Dr Zacharia Bol asminister of health, the first Ngok Dinka of Abyei to become a minister in the regionalgovernment.

The newly elected Regional Assembly, clearly influenced by Dr Zacharia Bol, againpassed a resolution to annex Abyei to the territory of the south and asked the newregional president to forward this resolution to the central government for implementa-tion. Abel Alier was firmer this time. But President Nimeiri again responded bydismissing the regional government and regional assembly in October 1981, appointingGissmallah Abdalla Rassas to oversee the process of dismantling the Addis AbabaAgreement altogether and ‘re-dividing’ the south into three ‘regions’.

Despite the fact that the Addis Ababa Agreement produced a decade of relative peace,its provisions were eventually largely abrogated by president Nimeiri on 5 June 1983.96

Among the factors that contributed to the failure of the agreement were a lack of fundingfrom the central government, the central government’s actions upon the discovery of oilin the south, the re-division of the southern region, and the failure of the government tohonour the provision that Abyei and other border areas were entitled to referenda.97 Theimposition of the Sharia law on all of Sudan, including the southern region, in September1983, angered the southerners further.

The ALF was founded in 1978 by Deng Alor, James Ajing, Arop Madut, EdwardLino and Col Deng Alak and under the chairmanship of Dr Zacharia Bol Deng.98 Its mainobjectives included building a united leadership for Abyei, working towards the holdingof a referendum, mobilizing funds and resources to buy guns for Abyei’s self-defence andinfluencing the leadership of the south to support the cause of Abyei.99 The formation ofthe ALF proceeded from a meeting of Abyei intellectuals in Juba with Abel Alier, thenpresident of the south, after the devastation of the Abyei area in 1977. At this meeting, hehad made it clear that (in his opinion) the issue of Abyei was insoluble and that, if theywere not careful, the people of Abyei would end up like the Palestinians; joiningKordofan was preferable to annihilation.100 According to Arop Madut, this was why theintellectuals formed the ALF and worked with the ‘wind of change’ movement to bringdown Abel Alier. The ALF set about acquiring arms for the people of Abyei and trainingthem to defend themselves from the Misseriya and murahalin.

In 1981, a group of Ngok Dinka intellectuals and chiefs, who were having an eveningsocial gathering in Abyei town, were attacked by government forces. Alor Arop, aprimary school teacher, was killed. A number of intellectuals, senior officials and theNgok Paramount Chief Kuol Deng, fled to the Bahr el-Ghazal. After this incident, theAbyei Anya-Nya II was organized by Miokol Deng, with support from the ALF. He led aforce out of Abyei to the Twic area and, together with the Malual Dinka, Anya-Nya IIbegan intensive local training. The forces of Abyei Anya-Nya II were involved in theattack on Ariath, a station along the railway linking north and south, in early 1983, in anincident that shocked Khartoum. Miokol was assisted in his work by many students,including Pieng Deng, an engineering student at the University of Khartoum, and byBagat Agwek, a soldier stationed in Juba who managed to smuggle guns into Abyei. Inearly 1983, Miokol and Bagat played a significant role in uniting various Anya-Nya IIgroups in the Bahr el-Ghazal. It has been estimated that Miokol Deng brought some10,000 fighters to the nascent SPLM/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) at itsheadquarters at Bilpam; many young people from Abyei died on the way. Dr JohnGarang, in his address to the people of Abyei in 2004, recognized the important roleplayed by Miokol Deng.101

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Besides the Anya-Nya II organized by Miokol in Abyei and the Bahr el-Ghazal,groups of students and intellectuals from the Abyei area went to Bilpam in early 1982.Kuol Anyel, the son of Anyel Kuol, who had been assassinated by government forces in1969 in Abyei town, was among the first group to go. The arrests of Abyei leaders inearly 1983 induced even more Abyei students and intellectuals to join the Anya-Nya II.After the Bor mutiny in May 1983, students from the University of Khartoum andUniversity of Juba, and some leading Abyei intellectuals in the south and Khartoum wentto Ethiopia and joined the SPLA. Among those Abyei intellectuals were Deng Alor, adiplomat in the national ministry of foreign affairs in Khartoum, Chol Deng, a seniorofficial in the southern regional government, and Mading Deng-Abot, a new graduate ofJuba University.

Following these developments in the Abyei area and formation of Abyei Anya-NyaII, the Government of Sudan arrested a number of Abyei intellectuals and senior Ngokofficials in the Southern Regional Government in early 1983.102 About 50 Abyeiintellectuals, chiefs and leaders, including Dr Zacharia, their leader, were rounded up, inMalakal, Wau, Juba, Khartoum and Abyei. A second wave of arrests of Ngok Dinkaintellectuals took place in 1984, which encouraged another wave of Abyei citizens to jointhe SPLA. According to Mawson, these and other developments ultimately led tosubstantial Ngok Dinka participation in the membership of the SPLA.103

Conclusion

The transfer of the Ngok Dinka and their lands to the administration of Kordofan in 1905marked the genesis of the official debates concerning Abyei’s status. As a political unit,Abyei has been shaped by power struggles among the Ngok Dinka, by their relations withMisseriyia, and by the larger dynamics of the conflict between Khartoum and southernSudan. The decision of the leaders of Ngok Dinka in the twentieth century to refuse re-transfer to the south indirectly helped to protect their area until the delimitation by thePermanent Court of Arbitration in 2009, which included their areas north of Kiir River.

As this article has demonstrated, the Abyei issue gained political significance not onlybecause of repressive violence from the government or agents acting on behalf of thegovernment, but also through the people of Abyei’s shared experience of struggle againstoppression. The relations between Ngok Dinka and Misseriyia provided opportunities aswell as challenges, which shaped the course of political violence in the Abyei area.Although the Misseriyia has perpetrated violence in Abyei area at the behest of variousregimes that have ruled Sudan, relationships between the two have been more complexthan this suggests: the leaders of the Ngok Dinka adopted defensive strategies as well asforging good relations with Misseriyia. Having good relations with Misseriyia helped theNgok Dinka to survive the turmoil of the Turkiyya slave raids, the Mahdiyya’s chaos, theAnglo-Egyptian’s early tolerance of slave raids and subsequent decades of misruled bythe post-independence northern elite regimes. The violent and acrimonious process ofchanging powers between different regimes in Sudan affected the relations of NgokDinka and their Misseriyia neighbours, often in favour of the Misseriyia. But the NgokDinka and their leaders managed also to maintain good relations with the succession ofregimes that governed Sudan, at least until the first civil war reached Abyei in the 1960s.

As the new Republic of South Sudan and Republic of Sudan have struggled tonormalize their relations, the history of the Abyei dispute suggests that peaceful relationsbetween the two countries may depend in part on a resolution of the Abyei issue. Theactive participation of the people of Abyei in the first civil war contributed towards

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shaping the definition of the territory of the south. The eruption of political violence inAbyei in the early 1980s contributed also to the initial outbreak of the second civil warthat resulted in the south’s achieving its ultimate political goal of independence, while thepeople of Abyei obtained clearer terms for the conduct of a referendum to decide its finalstatus.

Through international arbitration process the land of the people of Abyei has beensecured, but the final political status of Abyei is not yet resolved. The outcome of theAbyei referendum in October 2013 leaves South Sudan, Sudan, the African Union andthe international community with only two options: either to accept the outcome ofpeople’s referendum that overwhelmingly favoured inclusion of Abyei to the territory ofSouth Sudan or to conduct a new, but redundant, referendum on the basis of the AfricanUnion’s proposal. Until this can be resolved, Abyei will continue to be the scene of bitterdisputation.

AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this article was presented at the conference on ‘Struggles over Emerging Statesin Africa’, at the University of Durham, 9–11 May 2013. The author would like to thank DouglasH. Johnson, Øystein H. Rolandsen, the staff of the Rift Valley Institute, and Francis Deng, thepermanent representative of South Sudan to the United Nations, for their constructive comments onearlier drafts. The author acknowledges support from The Research Council of Norway, under theproject 214349/F10 ‘The Dynamics of State Failure and Violence’, administered by the PeaceResearch Institute, Oslo.

Notes1. Deng, The Man Called Deng.2. Johnson, “Why Abyei Matters”; Johnson, “New Sudan”; Deng, “Social capital”; and

Mawson, “Murahaleen raids.”3. Johnson, “New Sudan.”4. Sudan Tribune, “African Union Supports Abyei Referendum in 2013 but Gives Six Weeks for

a Deal,” October 25, 2012. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44335.5. BBC, “Abyei Residents Choose South Sudan,” October 31, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-24761524.6. Sudan Tribune, “African Union Says Abyei Unilateral Referendum ‘illegal,’” October 28,

2013. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48603; Sudan Tribune, “Sudan DismissesResults of Ngok Dinka Referendum in Abyei,” October 31, 2013. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48645.

7. Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Stop Abyei Abuses, Hold Forces Accountable,” May 26, 2011.http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/26/sudan-stop-abyei-abuses-hold-forces-accountable.

8. Mawson, “Murahaleen raids”; and Johnson, “Why Abyei Matters.”9. Sudan Tribune, “Kiir Accuses Sudan of Killing Abyei Chief to Sabotage Referendum,” May

9, 2013. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46516.10. Stubbs and Morrison, “Land and Agriculture,” 251–65; and Beswick, “The Ngok,” 147.11. Santandrea, The Luo.12. Ibid.13. Sabah, Tribal Structure.14. Henderson, “The Migration of Messiria,” 58.15. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 148.16. Ibid., 157; and Howell, “Notes on the Ngok Dinka,” 239–93.17. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 145.18. Ibid., 146.19. Ibid., 148.20. Ibid., 149.21. Henderson, “The Migration of the Messiria,” 55–63.22. Ibid., 55–63.

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23. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 151.24. Salih, “Ideology of the Dinka.”25. Johnson, “Why Abyei matters,” 3.26. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 151–52.27. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 46.28. Beswick, “The Ngok,”153.29. Ibid., 154.30. Interview with Ring Makuac, Juba, South Sudan, July 2014.31. Ibid.32. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 47.33. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”34. Ibid.35. Henderson, “The Migration of Messiria,” 69.36. Ibid., 69–70.37. Government of Sudan, Sudan Intelligence Report; and Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”38. Deng, Africans of Two Worlds, 138.39. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 155.40. Ibid., 156.41. Daly, Empire on the Nile.42. Government of Sudan, Sudan Intelligence Report.43. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 156.44. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 48.45. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 157; and Holt and Daly, “A History,” 96.46. Government of Sudan, Sudan Intelligence Report, 135, May 1929 (also cited in Beswick,

“The Ngok,” 157).47. Deng, The Man Called Deng.48. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”49. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 158.50. Ibid., 159.51. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 130.52. Ibid.53. National Records Office, Khartoum (hereafter NRO), WKD/66.E.5, P. Hogg, “Future of the

Ngok Dinka,” letter by District Commissioner of western Kordofan to Governor ofKordofan, 1951.

54. Government of Sudan, Report on the Administration.55. Deng, The Man Called Deng.56. Ibid.57. Ibid., 225.58. Ibid., 224–226.59. Ibid.60. Ibid., 227.61. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”62. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 223–8.63. Government of Sudan, Report on the Administration, 158.64. Interview with Justin Deng, March 2013, Kuajok, South Sudan. Deng was one of the youths

who took the letter to the colonial administration.65. John Garang, “Speech to the People of Abyei,” cited in “Editorial: How Dr Garang Wanted

Abyei to Be?,” Sudan Mirror, January 26, 2007.66. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads.67. Alier, Southern Sudan.68. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”69. Government of Sudan, Commission of Inquiry Report.70. Interview with Manu Kuol, March 2013, Wau, South Sudan.71. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”72. Deng, The Man Called Deng, 23–4, 43–5.73. Ibid., 238.74. Ibid.75. Deng, New Sudan.

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76. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 162.77. Interview with Justin Deng, March 2013, Kuajok, South Sudan; Rolandsen, “Making of the

Anya-Nya.”78. Interview with Dodol Nyang, April 2013, Abyei, South Sudan.79. Interview with Dominic Kuol, March 2013, Wau, South Sudan.80. Ibid.81. Alier. Southern Sudan, 40.82. Interview with Dominic Kuol, April 2013, Wau, South Sudan.83. Interview with Manau Kuol, April 2013, Wau, South Sudan.84. Arop Madut-Arop, Genesis of Political Consciousness.85. Interview with Dominic Kuol, April 2013, Wau, South Sudan.86. Interview with Justin Deng, April 2013, Kuajok, South Sudan.87. Johnson, “Abyei Brief Notes.”88. Beswick, “The Ngok,” 162.89. Alier, Southern Sudan, 117–8; Johnson, Root Causes, 44.90. “Draft organic law to organize regional self-government in the Southern Provinces of the

Sudan,” Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 3(iii). Emphasis added.91. Interview with Ring Arop, October 2013, Juba, South Sudan. Arop delivered speech on behalf

of the people of Abyei during President Nemieri’s visit there in 1972.92. Arop Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road, 63–6.93. Deng, War of Visions.94. Wakoson, “Politics of Southern Self-government.”95. Arop Madut-Arop, Genesis of Political Consciousness.96. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads.97. Alier, Southern Sudan.98. Arop Madut-Arop, Genesis of Political Consciousness.99. Interview with Zakharia Bol Deng, September 2013, Birmingham, UK.100. Interview with Arop Madut, October 2013, Oxford, UK.101. John Garang, “Speech to the People of Abyei,” cited in “Editorial: How Dr Garang Wanted

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