POLITICAL LAW

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL CONCEPTS

1. Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. [Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2 (1), Adm. Code of 1997]

2. Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty one (51) per cent of its capital stock. [Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2 (13), Adm. Code of 1997]

3. Agency is defined as any government authority other than a court or legislative body which affects private rights, either through rule-making or adjudication.

4. Agency refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit thereof. [Sec. 2 (4), Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987]

4. Examples of government agencies:a. The Land Transportation Office is an agency of the government because it is an office under the Department of Transportation and Communication.b. The Department of Public Works and Highways is an agency because it is a department.

7. Government-owned and controlled corporations may fall within the scope and meaning of the Government of the Philippines if they perform functions that are governmental in character acting as the entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines.

8. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. [Sec. 2 (10), Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987]

9. Examples of government instrumentalities:a. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is an instrumentality because it is vested with the special functions of being the central monetary authority, and enjoys operational autonomy through its charter.b. Philippine Ports Authority is an instrumentality because it is merely attached to the Department of Transportation and Communication. It is vested with the special function of regulating ports, and it is endowed with all corporate powers through its charter.c. The Land Bank of the Philippines is a government instrumentality because it is vested with the special function of financing agrarian reform. It is endowed with all corporate powers, and it enjoys autonomy through a charter.d. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA is not a government owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the government that is exempt from taxation.It is an instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. It exercises governmental powers of eminent domain, police power authority, and levying of fees and charges.Finally, the airport lands and buildings are property owned by the government that are devoted to public use and are properties of the public domain. (Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006)

10. A presidential government is one in which the state, the sovereign, makes the executive independent of the legislative, both in tenure and prerogative, and furnishes him with sufficient power to prevent the legislative from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the State as executive independence and prerogative. (Garner)

11. The principal identifying feature of a presidential form of government is embodied in the separation of powers doctrine. Each department of government exercises powers granted to it by the Constitution and may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done within the constitutional competence of the others. However, the Constitution also gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely restrain the others from improvident action, thereby maintaining a system of checks and balances among them, thus, preserving the will of the sovereign expressed in the Constitution. (UP Law Center)

12. A parliamentary government is one in which the state confers upon the legislature the complete control of the administration of laws. Under this system, the Cabinet or Ministry is immediately and legally responsible to the legislature or one branch thereof, usually the more popular chamber, and mediately or politically responsible to the electorate, while the titular or nominal executive the King or Chief of State occupies a position of irresponsibility. (Garner)

13. The essential characteristic of a parliamentary form of government is the fusion of the legislative and executive branches in parliament; the prime minister, who is the head of government, and the members of the cabinet, who are chosen from among the members of parliament and as such are accountable to the latter.Another feature is that the prime minister may be removed from office by a vote of loss of confidence by the parliament. There may be a head of state who may or may not be elected (UP Law Center) and who usually merely exercises ceremonial functions.

14. Advantages of a unicameral form of legislature:a. The Philippines is a simple and unitary state unlike the United States which is federal. There is no necessity for a bicameral system because there are no dual interests to be represented, i.e. the national or federal and local or state.b. It is simple in organization and deals quickly with the problems of legislation.c. It is more economical and would save a lot of because there is only one chamber.d. It is free from deadlocks between the Senate and the House, as well as recriminations which usually plague a two-chambered body.e. Responsibility is easily pinpointed there being only one deliberative body.

15. A unitary or centralized government is one in which the powers of government are vested in one supreme organ from which all local governing authorities derive their existence and powers.The Philippine government is an example of a unitary form of government.

16. The essence of a unitary form of government is the fact that a single organization has been created by the sovereign people (the people) through their constitution, to which is left the task of providing for the territorial distribution of governmental powers with which it is invested. (Aruego and Laguio)

17. A federal form of government is one in which the governmental powers are, by the common sovereign, distributed between a central government and the local governments, each being supreme within its own sphere. (Aruego and Laguio)

DELEGATION OF POWERS

1. The two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power are the Completion Test and the Sufficient Standard Test.

2. The Completeness Test which characterizes a valid delegation of legislative power means that the law being complete in itself must set forth the policy to be carried out by the delegate.

3. The Sufficient Standard Test which is a characteristic of a valid delegation of legislative power means that the limits to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions are determinate and determinable.

4. There is no undue delegation of legislative power when the VAT law provides that the President shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise to 12% the VAT rate. What was delegated was not the power to tax but only of the discretion as to the execution of the law. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita, etc., et al., G. R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing various cases]

5. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority.In the Abakada Guro case the President of the Philippines becomes merely the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will takes place. The President cannot set aside the findings of the President, who is now under the conditions acting as the legislatures alter ego or subordinate. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita, etc., et al., G. R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing various cases]

6. There is improper delegation of legislative authority if the law does not provide for the term of imprisonment leaving the same to the discretion of the court.Declared invalid was the proviso in Sec. 32 of R. A. No. 4670 (The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers) to the effect that certain violations shall be penalized by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (emphasis supplied)Leaving to the courts discretion the determination of the minimum and maximum term of imprisonment is granting a wide latitude to fix the imprisonment without any sufficient standard. This power is essentially legislative and may not be unduly delegated. (People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90)

SEPARATION OF POWERS

1. The Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all government employees, elective or appointive, except members of Congress and the Judiciary.

2. It is violative of separation of powers for Supreme Court to compel Congress to reinstate a member suspended for disorderly behavior. (Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863)

3. A member of the judiciary may not be investigated by the Ombudsman because it would violate the separation of powers by encroaching upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. (Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 454)

4. The doctrine of separation of powers is violated if the Ombudsman would investigate members of the Supreme Court for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust decision. (In Re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382)

5. A disadvantage of the separation of powers which is overcome by compromise between the contending parties. is that the Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government.It is the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of powers. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)

INHERENT POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

1. The three great inherent powers of government that may be exercised even without constitutional grant are police power, taxation and eminent domain.Although inherent the exercise must not contravene the constitution and may be exercise only if there is a law which provides for the details of the exercise.

2. Police power is based on the twin concepts of salus populi est suprema lex and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.

3. The two tests, requisites or limitations for valid exercise of police power are lawful subject and lawful means.

4. Lawful subject as a requisite for valid exercise of police power means that the interest of the public in general require an interference with private rights through the exercise of police power and not the interest of a particular subject.

5. Lawful means as a requisite for valid exercise of police power requires that the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.The means employed must not be unduly oppressive upon individuals. (City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing various cases)

6. Other limitations if the exercise of police power is merely delegated to local government units:a. The delegation is by express provision of law;b. It must be exercised within the territorial limits of the delegate;c. Exercise is not contrary to law.

7. Tests for the validity of an ordinance. It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:a. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;b. must not be unfair or oppressive;c. must not be partial or discriminatory;d. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;e. must be general and consistent with public policy; andf. must not be unreasonable. (City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G. R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161 and other cases)

8. Barangay Assembly or Liga ng mga Barangay both not being local government units cannot exercise legislative powers hence cannot exercise any policed power.

9. An ordinance prohibiting the establishment, within the Ermita-Malate Area of businesses such as sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beer houses, beer houses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels, inns. providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community and must therefore relocate outside of the Ermita-Malate area is not valid being an invalid exercise of police power because of the following reasons:a. It violates the equal protection because it prohibits motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments despite the fact that these establishments are all similarly situated.b. it prohibits the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. There is no valid classification because a noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.c. the standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution one of the ills the Ordinance aims to banish not a profession exclusive to women. This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.d. The requisites for the valid exercise of police power are not met because there is no reasonable relation between the purposes of the ordinance and the means employed for its accomplishment. The purpose of the ordinance is the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community but the means used the closing down and transfer of business or their conversion into allowed business will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community. It will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. (En banc, Tinga, J. City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)

10. There is no impairment of the obligations of contract where a zoning ordinance declared an area as commercial and a purchaser of a subdivision lot constructed a commercial building despite the restrictions in the deed of sale.There was a valid exercise of police power because a zoning ordinance was enacted reclassifying certain areas to protect the health and safety of the residents as a result of the construction of the main highway that made residential living in the subdivision hazardous and dangerous to the health and safety of residents.11. A law prohibiting certain types of advertisement (such for tobacco) is valid if it was adopted in the interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the people. (Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328)

12. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) in the exercise of police powers granted under its enabling act may prohibit a municipality from operating a dump site. (Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, et al., 231 SCRA 292)

13. The abatement of a nuisance is an exercise of police power, not of eminent domain, hence there is no need to pay just compensation.

14. Power of eminent domain is the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand. (Aruego and Laguio citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p. 1110)

15. Power of eminent domain distinguished from police power.a. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain the taking of property is for a public use WHILE in the exercise of police power, the taking is a mere incident to a valid regulation to promote public interest.b. In the exercise of eminent domain, property or right of property is taken from the owner and transferred to a public agency to be enjoyed by it as its own WHILE in the exercise of the police power the taking of property or a right therein is accomplished not by transfer of ownership but by destroying the property or impairing its value. (Aruego and Laguio)16. Constitutional limitations on the exercise of eminent domain.a. Due process clause and equal protection clause;b. Private property shall not be taken for public use without adequate compensation. (Lagcao v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004)

17. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain unless specifically granted. By virtue of Section 19 of the Local Government Code, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate. While housing is one of the most serious problems of the country, LGU do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. Their power is limited by Rep. Act No. 7279, the law that governs expropriation of lands for purposes of urban land reform. Lagcao v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004)

18. Rep. Act No. 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform. The following are its appropriate provisions:SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;b) Alienable lands of the public domain;c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites, which have not yet been acquired;e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; andf) Privately-owned lands.Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall five budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.SEC.10. Modes of Land Acquisition.- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: x x x

19. The acquisition of property for social housing is for public use which is not diminished by the fact that only a few and not everyone will benefit from the expropriation. (Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA 668)

20. Condemnation of small lots not intendment of power of eminent domain. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. (Lagcao v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004 citing Urban Estates, Inc. v. Montesa, 88 Phil. 348 [1951])21. Reconciliation between holding in Philippine Columbian Association and Lagcao. Philippine Columbian benefits to few does not result to invalidity of expropriation WHILE Lagcao refers to expropriation of small parcels as invalidating expropriation.

22. Local governments do not have inherent power of eminent domain unless specifically granted. By virtue of the Local Government Code, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate.While housing is one of the most serious problems of the country, LGU do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (Lagcao v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004)

23. A private commercial complex may not be expropriated so that the profits from its operation by the government would be used to finance housing projects for government employees. It is a taking for private purpose. (Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89)

24. A city ordinance which expropriates a parcel of land cannot fix the value of land, even if it is based on fair market value at the time of enactment ,because there may be supervening events which may change such value at the time of taking.

25. The legal rate of 6% should be used in computing interest on just compensation. CB Circular No. 416 which increased the legal interest to 12% is applicable only to loans and not to expropriation proceeds. (National Power Corporation v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542)

25. A judge cannot validly withhold the issuance of a writ of possession in expropriation while awaiting full payment. The government could immediately take possession of the property upon deposit of the provisional value with the National or Provincial Treasurer. (National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520)

26. The Department of Agrarian Reform cannot require a local government unit to secure an authority from it before converting an expropriated agricultural land to be converted into a housing project for the poor. To require such, would result to the DAR determining the public use to which the expropriated property shall be devoted which is the prerogative of the LGU. (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173)

27. Power of taxation can also be used to implement power of eminent domain. Tax measures are but enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions and clearly imposed for public purpose. In most recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647, April 16, 2005)

28. Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners. It is not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. For this reason a just compensation for income that is take away from establishments becomes necessary.It is in the tax credit (now tax deduction under current law) that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647, April 16, 2005)

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Refer to PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, infra for a discussion of the sovereign state immunity of foreign states.

1. State immunity from suit means that the state may not be sued without its consent. A corollary of such principle is that properties used by the State in the performance of its governmental functions cannot be subject to judicial execution.

2. The two kinds of sovereign immunity are absolute immunity and restrictive immunity.

3. Under absolute immunity all acts of state are protected by sovereign immunity.

4. Under restrictive immunity there is a distinction made between jure imperii the sovereign and government acts which is covered by the immunity compared with jure gestonis in which the States private, commercial and proprietary acts are not immune from suit. The Philippines adheres to restrictive sovereign immunity. (United States v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487, 490-491)

5. Consent of a state to be sued may be express or implied.

6. Consent is express when a law is passed providing conditions under which the state may be sued. (Com. Act No. 327 as amended by P.d. No. 1445)

7. Consent may also be implied from the following acts.a. A government waives its immunity if it sues thus a counterclaim may be interposed against it. (Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Pil.905)b. A government agency created for irrigation may not invoke State immunity from suit because it has a personality separate from the National Government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Furthermore, irrigation is a proprietary function. (Fontanilla v.Maliaman, 179 SCRA 685; 194SCRA 486)There was an unconditional waiver when the enabling statute was passed creating the agency hence the waiver may include an action based on a quasi-delict. (Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 456)c. A landowner whose property was taken by the government without prior expropriation or negotiated sale may sue the government because it is deemed to have waived its immunity. Otherwise, the guaranty that private property shall not be taken without compensation would be inutile. (Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464)

8. Waiver of the State of its immunity does not mean that it is admitting liability. (Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 180 SCRA 171) It means that the State in allowing itself to be sued is merely giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove its case but the State does not waive its lawful defenses.Consent to suit does not include consent to attachment of property for foreign sovereign. (Dexter v. Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43F2d 705)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1. The essential parts of a good written constitution.a. Constitution of liberty1) Fundamental civil and political rights2) Limitation on governmental powersb. Constitution of government1) Organization of government2) Enumeration of powers and rules relative to administrationc. Constitution of sovereignty1) Procedure for amendment

PREAMBLE

Art. I. NATIONAL TERRITORY

1. The national territory comprises of the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,a. consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains.b. Including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas.c. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Art. I, 1987 Constitution, arrangement and numbering supplied)

2. Archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of land and waters by defining an archipelago either as a group of islands surrounded by waters or a body of waters studded with islands.For this purpose, the doctrine requires that baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the outermost islands to encircle the islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the baselines regardless of breadth or dimensions are merely internal waters.

3. Territorial sea is the adjacent belt of sea with a breadth of twelve (12) nautical miles measured from the baselines of a state and over which the state has sovereignty. (Articles 2 and 3, Convention on the Law of the Sea)Ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Article 14,Convention on the Law of the Sea)

4. Internal waters are the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Article 1, 1987 Constitution)There is no right of innocent passage for foreign vessels in the case of internal waters.

5. Contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to twelve (12) nautical miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. (Article 33 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea)

6. Exclusive economic zone. A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a state over which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57, Convention on the Law of the Sea)

7. Rights of the coastal state in the exclusive economic zone:a. Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil,b. Sovereign rights with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone or EEZ such as production of energy from water, currents and winds;c. Jurisdictional right with respect to establishment and use of artificial islands;d. Jurisdictional right as to protection and preservation of the marine environment;e. Jurisdictional right over marine scientific research; andf. Other rights and duties provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention. (Article 56, Convention on the Law of the Sea)

7. Flag state means that a ship has the nationality of the flag it flies, but there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship. (Article 91, Convention of the Law of the Sea)

8. Flag of convenience. The flag of a country in which a merchant ship is registered solely in order to save on taxes and avoid the more stringent regulations imposed by other countries regarding such matters as safety, wages, environmental controls and working conditions. (Webster Randon)

Art. II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

PRINCIPLES

1. The doctrine of incorporation means that generally accepted principles of international law are incorporated as part of the law of the land without need of legislative enactment.

2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)

3. Armed Forces of the Philippines distinguished from the Philippine National Police.a. Functions. The function of the AFP is to protect the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory WHILE that of the PNP is to maintain peace and order, and to protect life and property.b. Confirmation. Appointment of AFP officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments WHILE such confirmation is required for PNP officers of the same level.c. The AFP is basically military in character and its personnel are not members of the civil service WHILE the PNP is civilian in character and its personnel are members of the civil service.d. No member of the AFP in the active service shall at any time be appointed or designated to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries WHILE such constitutional prohibition does not find application to PNP members.

4. Constitutional provisions that institutionalize the principle of civilian supremacy.a. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1st sentence)b. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st sentence)c. All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1)]d. The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for peoples rights in the performance of their duties. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1)]e. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (3), 2nd par.]

STATE POLICIES

1. The State policy on ecology. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people and their posterity to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Sec. 16, Art. II, 1987 Constitution)

2. The State policy on cultural minorities. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. (Sec.22, Art. II, 1987 Constitution)

Art. III BILL OF RIGHTS

1. Civil rights refers to the rights secured by the constitution of any state or country to all its inhabitants and not connected with the organization or administration of government. It defines the relations of individuals among themselves.They are rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G. R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)

2. Examples of civil rights are the rights against involuntary servitude, religious freedom, guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode, etc.

3. A contract may not impair the basic civil rights of marriage and procreation. These are part of the liberty protected under the due process clause. Waiver of basic human rights is void. Contractual property rights could not prevail over basic human rights.

4. Human rights are the basic natural rights which inherent man because of his humanity. The right to life, dignity and existence may be considered as human rights.

5. Political rights consist in the power to participate directly or indirectly, in the management of the government. It defines the relations between the individuals and the state.

6. Examples of political rights are the right of suffrage, right of assembly, right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

7. Distinctions between civil rights and political rights:a. Civil rights refers to all constitutionally guaranteed and protected not connected with the organization or administration of government WHILE political rights are those related to the establishment, management or support of the government;b. Civil rights defines the relations between individuals WHILE political rights defines the relations between individuals and the State;c. Civil rights extend protection to all inhabitants of a State WHILE political rights protect only citizens. (UP Law Center)

8. Distinctions between human rights on one hand, and civil and political rights on the other.a. The scope of human rights is broader than civil and political rights. Human rights also include social, economic, and cultural rights.b. Human rights are natural rights that are inherent in every person because they exist as humans. Every human being possess them everywhere, anywhere irrespective of national boundaries as a result of his being human WHILE some civil and political rights require that a statute should grant them. (UP Law Center)

DUE PROCESS

1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Sec. 1, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

2. Liberty as to come under constitutional protection is not mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. (City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil.660 (1919),as cited in Morfe v. Mutuc,130 Phil. 415,440; 22 SCRA 424, 440 (1968)]

3. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc .v. City Mayor of Manila, 20SCRA 849,860 (1967)] and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. [City of Manila, et al., supra citing In re Lutker, Okl. Cr. 274P. 2d 786, 789,790)Due process includes the right to decisional privacy, which refers to the ability to make ones own decisions and act on those decisions free from governmental or other unwanted interference. ]Grisworld v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 415 (1965)]This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called procedural due process and substantive due process. . ( City of Manila, et al., supra)

4. Purpose of guaranty of due process.a. To prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;b. to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice;c. to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; andd. to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing 16 C.J.S.,pp.1150-1151,numbering supplied)The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. [City of Manila, et al., supra, citing Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.136, 145 (1919)]

5. Procedural due process are the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed. 523(2002)]

6. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property.In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed.(2002), at pp. 523-524]

7. Rate increases which public utilities may charge shall be promulgated only by government regulatory bodies after proper notice and hearing. However, if the increase is merely provisional in character, it may be issued pending notice and hearing. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218) If the provisional rate increase is to be made permanent there is mandatory notice and hearing.8. Administrative due process does not require the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence before the same officer who will decide the case. (Adamson & Adamson v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237)

9. There is due process even if the complainant, the prosecutor and the hearing officers are all connected with one office and all subordinates of the deciding officer because the findings of the subordinates are not binding upon the head of office who is the deciding officer.What is important is that the respondent was allowed to present his side and the proof he has adduced supports the decision. (Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 470)

10. Through its October 22, 1991 Resolution, the Supreme Court prohibited live radio and TV coverage of court proceedings to protect the due process rights of the parties, prevent distraction of the participants, and to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

11. An Executive Order of a City Mayor may not prohibit artificial methods of birth control such as the use of condoms, pills, intrauterine devices, vasectomy and other methods of surgical sterilization, etc. in public hospitals but not in private clinics because it would violate due process and equal protection. The womens freedom of choice shall be curtailed and would discriminate against poor women who cannot afford to pay the fees charged by private clinics.

EQUAL PROTECTION

1. The criteria of equal protection and uniformity, are used interchangeably and is met:a. when the laws operate uniformly1) on all persons2) under similar circumstancesb. all persons are treated in the same manner1) the conditions not being different2) both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed3) favoritism and preference not allowed.

2. The commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under the color of its authority. (Duncan Association of Detailmen-PTGWO, et al., v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G. R. No. 1629934, September 17, 2004)

3. Requisites of valid classification.a. There must be substantial distinctions which must make for real differences.b. The classification must be germane to the issue.c. It must apply not only to existing conditions but future conditions as well.d. It must be applicable to all members of the same class. (People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56)

4. The equal protection clause does not take away from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police power laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. [Re: (a) Request of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957)]

5. The legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none. [Re: (a) Request of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 188]If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, equal protection should extend to every person under circumstances, which, if not identical, are analogous. (Ibid., citing Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., G. R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52)

6. Law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade violates the equal protection clause. The law discriminates only against Chinese citizens without any valid grounds shown for such classification. There must be a basis to discriminate other than on the basis of citizenship alone.

7. Tests used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the validity of a classification and compliance with the equal protection clause.a. The traditional (or rational basis) test.b. The strict scrutiny (or compelling interest) test.c. The intermediate level of scrutiny (or quasi-suspect class) test.

8. The traditional (or rational basis) test. The classification is valid if it is rationally related to a constitutionally permissible state interest.The complainant must prove that the classification is invidious, wholly arbitrary, or capricious, otherwise the classification is presumed to be valid. (Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420; United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166)

9. The strict scrutiny (or compelling interest) test. Government regulation that intentionally discriminates against a suspect class such as racial or ethnic minorities, is subject to strict scrutiny and considered to violate the equal protection clause unless found necessary to promote a compelling state interest.A classification is necessary when it is narrowly drawn so that no alternative, less burdensome means is available to accomplish the state interest.Thus, it was held that denial of free public education to the children of illegal aliens imposes an enormous and lasting burden based on a status over which the children have no control is violative of equal protection because there is no showing that such denial furthers a substantial state goal. (Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202)

10. The intermediate level of scrutiny (or quasi-suspect class) test. Classification based on gender or legitimacy are not suspect, but neither are they judged by the traditional or rational basis test.Intentional discriminations against members of a quasi-suspect class violate equal protection unless they are substantially related to important government objectives. (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190)Thus, a state law granting a property tax exemption to widows, but not widowers, has been held valid for it furthers the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss usually imposes a heavier burden. (Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351)

11. The standard used in the analysis of equal protection challenges in the Philippines in the main have followed the rational basis test coupled with a differential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. (Central Bank etc., v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, etc., G. R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004)

12. Tests to determine whether there is justification in taking. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis,523 U.S. 833, 840(1998)]For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. . [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., supra 5 citing Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed.(2002), at p. 524]

13. Two remedial alternatives courts face in sustaining the claim against a constitutionally underinclusive schemea. It may declare the statute a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit orb. it may extend to the coverage of the statute to include those aggrieved by the exclusion. [Re: (a) Request of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing Heckler v. Matthews, 465 US 728, 79 L Ed. 2e 646, 104 S Ct. 1387 (1984)]

14. The VAT law does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses when it reduced the input credits to only 70% of output VAT because input VAT is not property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause being merely a statutory privilege. Persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges.The state may change or take away rights, which were created by law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita, etc., et al., G. R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing United Paracale Mining Co. V. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 63786-87, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 108, 115)]

15. There is no such thing as political libel exempt from penalty. Unfounded and malicious statements made by one against another in the course of an election campaign, or by reason of differences in political views are not per se constitutionally protected. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004 citing Orfanel v. People 141 Phil. 519; 30 SCRA 819 (1969); U.S. v. Bustos, 13 Phil. 690, 701), or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them [Ibid., Ayer Productions v .Capulong, G.R. Nos. L-82830,L-82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861; U.S. v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918)], such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.

16. The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather it permits of reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another. It is sufficient that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004 citing various cases)

17. Under the privilege of neutral reportage in libel cases involving matters of public interest in public figures a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republishers subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January 17, 2005 citing 50 Am.Jur. 2d Libel and Slander Sec.313)

18. The doctrine of fair comment states that fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.It means that while in general every discreditable imputations publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed to be malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is made against a public person in his official capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.[Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January 17, 2005 citing Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1; 301 SCRA 1 (1999)]

19. For imputations against an official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, so long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. [Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January 17, 2005 citing Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1; 301 SCRA 1 (1999)]

20. Attacks against public figures not necessarily libellous unless there is actual malice which means that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless regard of whether it was false or not. [Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1; 301 SCRA 1 (1999)]

21. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection because economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration of the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and one who is not able to pay it. (Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395)CONTRARY STATEMENT: There is no violation of equal protection because punishment should not be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel the eradication of every disadvantage caused by poverty. (U.S. ex rel. Previtera v. Kross,382 U.S. 911)

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. Constitutional protection. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of what ever nature whatever and for any purpose shall be inviolable andno search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)Search and seizure without a judicial warrant becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (People v. Nuevas, et al., G. R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007)The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is a restraint upon the government and not upon private parties. (Waterous Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 280 SCRA 735)

2. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Sec. 4, Rule 126, ROC, arrangement and numbering supplied)

3. Authority to issue search warrant inherent in all courts. A search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. (Savage, etc. v. Taypin, et al., G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000)

4. Application for search warrant does not require certification of no forum shopping. The Rules of Court as amended requires the certification of no forum shopping only for initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of applications. The old Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification even from applications. The absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant. (Savage, etc. v. Taypin, et al., G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000)

5. Sufficiency of description of place to be searched. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. (People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001)

6. Lack of probable cause does not invalidate warrant if item was not seized. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of the drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized. The warrant is valid for the other items where probable cause exist. (People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001)

7. Police officers lawfully searching for firearms inadvertently found cocaine in plain view may lawfully seize the same. (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770)

8. A lawful search with is not invalidated by the failure of the searching officers to inform the owner of her right to be silent and to counsel.These rights may be invoked only if there is custodial investigation where a suspect has been identified and is under investigation. (People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111)

9. Articles described in the warrant may be lawfully seized even if found in a neighboring place, which is other than that shown in the warrant, because their possession is illegal. (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770)

10. Instances of valid warrantless searches and seizures. Alternatively, when there could be valid warrantless search and seizure.a. Search incident to a lawful arrest.b. When it involves prohibited articles in "plain view."c. Search of a moving vehicle,d. Consented warrantless search.e. Customs searches. (People v. Escano, et al., G.R. Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000)f. Searches without warrant of automobiles to prevent violations of smuggling or immigration laws. g. Terry search; andh. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. Nuevas, et al., G. R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007)

11. Search in incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (Sec. 13, Rule 126, ROC)

12. Warrantless search as an incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest.

13. As to subject, the warrantless search as an incident of a lawful arrest is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof off the commission of the offense.

14. With respect to time and place of the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.Stated otherwise, to be valid the search must be conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. (People v. Ting, etc., G.R. Nos. 130568-69, March 21, 2000) The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control.

15. Terry search. "Stop and frisk" is a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons."While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere suspicion or a hunch will not invalidate it. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997; People v. Escano, et al., G.R. Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000)

16. There is a difference between the concepts of "stop and frisk" search and of search incidental to a lawful arrest where a precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search.There could be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto nor a "hot pursuit" arrest preceding the search if there is a lack of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting office or an overt physical act on the part of the accused, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed, or was going to be committed. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)

17. The plain view doctrine. Objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

18. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:a. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.b. The object must be open to eye and hand;b. the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;c. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA `668, 710 - 711 cited in People v. Elamparo, G.R. No. 121572, March 31, 2000)

19. No need for further search. The plain view justifies the seizure of evidence without need of further search. (People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 1242, July 20, 2001; People v. Aspiras, G.R. No. 138382-84, February 12, 2002)

20. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, and the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126292, January 15, 2002)

21. Warrantless search of vehicles. The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can properly transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

22. Probable cause should exist for warrantless searches of vehicles. The mere mobility of vehicles does not give the police unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

23. The term probable cause for warrantless search of vehicles eludes exact definition but ita. signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; orb. the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

24. One form of search on vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an intensive search. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

25. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible is limited to the following instances:a. where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;b. simply looks into a vehicle;c. flashes a light therein without opening the cars doors;d. where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;e. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; andf. where the routine check is conducted at a fixed area. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

25. The physical intrusion of the body of the police officer into a vehicle would allow him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from the outside violates the constitution.

26. Consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches requires that to constitute a valid waiver, it must first appear that:a. The right exists;b. The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; andc. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (People v. Figueroa, et al., G.R. No. 124056, July 6, 2000)d. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

26. Characteristics of person giving consent to determine validity of consent. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:a. the age of the defendant;b. whether he was in a public or secluded location;c. whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;d. the education and intelligence of the defendant;e. the presence of coercive police procedures;f. the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;g. the nature of the police questioning;h. the environment in which the questioning took place; andi. the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

27. There was valid consented search where the accused accompanied police officers to his house in order to surrender his share of the ransom money. He even brought them to his room upstairs. The consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removed any badge of illegality, (People v. Deang, et al, G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000)

28. The act of the accused in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure, especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidating numerous and heavily armed. (People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 12442, July 20, 2001)

29. A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (People v. Cubcubin, Jr., G.R. No. 136267, July 20, 2001)

30. Scope of search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined to search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine. This is authorized under the Anti-Hijacking Law.Thus, a strip search is conducted by airport security inside the ladies room is not a search after a lawful arrest but in pursuance of law is valid. (People v. Canton, G. R. No. 148825,December 27, 2002)

31. Warrantless customs search. REASONS why there is no necessity for the Bureau of Customs to secure a judicial search warrant where the place to be searched is not a dwelling place:a. There should be no unnecessary hindrance on the governments drive to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon the Customs;b. To render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform (Jao, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., and companion case, 249 SCRA 35, 43); andc. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

32. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or constructive borders like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

33. A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, ROC)

34. Kinds of warrantless arrest:a. Arrest "in flagrante delito" under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113, ROC;b. Arrest in "hot pursuit" under Sec. 5 (b), and (c), Rule 113, ROC.

35. Requisites for valid in flagrante warrantless arrest.a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he1) has just committed,2) is actually committing, or3) is attempting to commit a crime; andb. Such overt act is done in the prescience or within the view of the arresting officer. (People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)

36. A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers and, if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, deserves judicial sanction.A warrant of arrest is not essential because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made incidental thereto are valid. (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 113255-56, July 19, 2001)

37. Where the police saw the gun tucked in the accuseds waist when he stood up, the gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Since the accused could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary. (People v. Go, G.R. Nos. 116001 & 123943, March 14, 2001)

38. Personal knowledge of facts in warrantless arrest must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.Thus, there is no personal knowledge of facts where the police officers merely relied on information given to them by others such as: a report of the killing, information from a witness who saw the killing, the physical description given of the last man who saw the victim fitting the person arrested and information where this man lived. (People v. Cubcubin, Jr. G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)The personal knowledge of facts or circumstances must convincingly be indicative or constitutive of probable cause. (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 cited in People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)

39. Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officer, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. (People v. Doria 301 SCRA 668 cited in People v. Molina, G.R. No 133917, February 19, 2001)

40. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that, reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. (People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)

41. There was no valid in flagrante delito or hot pursuit arrest where there is lack of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act on the part of the accused, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)

42. For warrantless arrest to be valid there must be compliance with the element of immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense and the time of the arrest. Warrantless arrests made within shorter periods like ten (10) days from commission considered as illegal. (People v. Salavaria, G.R. No. 104663, July 24, 1997)

43. Remedy for unlawful arrest.

a. Motion for the quashal of the warrant;b. Motion for reinvestigation.

44. Failure to challenge the validity of the arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby, is considered a waiver of the constitutional rights, particularly against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Cuison, et al., G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996)

45. Any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participation during the trial. (People v. Tumaneng, G.R. No. 117624, December 4, 1997)Failure to question the legality of the arrest before arraignment is deemed a waiver of such defense. (People v. Deang, et al., G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000

46. The filing of charges and the subsequent issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. (The minor Larranaga, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998)

47. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. (Sec. 26, Rule 114, ROC)

(1) PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

1. The inviolability of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence is applicable not only against the government but also acts of private individuals as well. (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699)

(2); (3) FRUIT OF THE POISONED TREE DOCTRINE

1. Any evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures under Section 2, Article III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec. 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution)

2. Admission of evidence procured without counsel not violative of due process in customs search and seizure proceedings because the protection does not extend to administrative proceedings but only to criminal proceedings. (Feeder International Line, PTS, Ltd., 197 SCRA 842)

3. The prohibition against warrantless searches applies to unwarranted intrusion by the government and does not operate as a restraint upon private individuals. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57)

(4) FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE

1. An association of mass media (print and ratio-TV broadcast) cannot be compelled by an advertiser to accept an advertisement which it believes to be offensive to women.The guarantee of the freedom of the press and speech is a limitation on state action and not on the action of private parties. [Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)]The mass media are private enterprises, and their refusal to accept any advertisement does not violate the freedom of the press and speech. ]Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democrat Control Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)]:2. Government nominees in a private corporation may not vote to block use of the corporate funds for advertising of a perceived offensive promotion because this is a threat to the freedom of speech of the advertiser which is constitutive of prior restraint.The government nominees being part of the State are bound by the freedom of speech protection which extends to commercial advertisements. [Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)] The mere fact that an advertisement is offensive cannot justify its suppression. (Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)]

3. People power may be defined as the power of the people to peaceably assemble in great numbers in order to effect a change in political leadership.It is an extra-constitutional act of the people to directly exercise the sovereignty that resides in them.

4. Constitutional provisions considered by some authorities as implementing people power: a. No law shall be passed abridging the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. (Art. III, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution)b. Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum. (Article VI, Sec. 32, Ibid.)c. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. (Art. XIII, Sec. 16, Ibid.)

5. B.P. Blg. 880 is valid but the use of calibrated preventive response (CPR) insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance is null and void.Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the conduct of the expression in the rally. The law neither recognizes nor allows the use of CPR. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

6. B.P.Blg.880, The Public Assembly Act, is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places and plazas.The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes otherwise they would not be peaceful and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances came from the wording of the constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

7. Requirement to hold permit to hold rally not prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly. What is regulated is the time, place, and manner of holding the public assembly. For prior restraint to apply what must be regulated should be the content of the speech itself. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

8. All public plazas are venues of rallies without need for permits if the local government unit does not declare, within thirty days from the decision, what public plazas may be used for rallies without need for permits. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

9. The application for a permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights event under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

10. Remedy to contest denial of application for permit. The denial may be contested in an appropriate court of law. The court must decide within twenty-four (24) hours from the date of the filing. Said decision may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.11. Absence of a permit when required results to arrest of leader but not participants. The holding of any public assembly by any leader or organizer without having first secured a permit where a permit is required results to arrest. However, those who are not the leaders are not to be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly [B.P. Blg. 880, Sec. 13 (a) and 14 (a)].

12. Rallyists to be stopped only if there is clear and present danger to public safety. The policy of maximum tolerance requires that rallyists should first be requested to disperse if they do not have any permits and only upon refusal may they be dispersed.

5. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

1. To expel the students who are children of a religious sect because they refuse to participate in the flag ceremony which includes saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, on account of their religious beliefs is tantamount to violation of their freedom of religion (Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent, etc., 251 SCRA 569), and the duty of the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and make such education accessible to all.Freedom of religion cannot be impaired except upon clear showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a right to prevent. The students refusal to participate in the flag ceremony does not pose a clear and present danger.

2. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (Art. III, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution, arrangement supplied).

3. State not to intrude in purely religious matters. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) must not intrude in purely religious matters by exclusively arrogating to itself the right to classify a product as halal even on the premise that the government has the power to protect and promote the Muslim Filipinos right to health.Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State in effect forced Muslims to accept the governments interpretation of the Qur-an and Sunnah on halal food. (Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., et al., v. Office of the Executive Secretary, etc., et al., G. R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)

4. The preferred status is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. (Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., et al., v. Office of the Executive Secretary, etc., et al., G. R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)

5. MTRCB may review but not ban the tapes on the ground that they attack other religions prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the reality already on the ground. (Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, et al., 259 SCRA 529)The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the state is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public morals, or public welfare.Clearly the use of offensive language may tend to influence the moral development of children who easily gain access to a medium such as television.

6. A fixed annual license fee on those engaged in the business of general enterprise including the sale of bibles by a religious sect is not valid and is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion.As a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, such a license fee, when applied to a religious sect is actually imposed as a condition for the free exercise of religion.A license fee restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.

6. LIBERTY OF ABODE

1. Residents in an area of imminent military operations may be forcibly evacuated without a necessity to secure a court order because the urgency of the need justifies a valid exercise of police power which takes precedence over the liberty of abode.

2. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1st sentence, 1987 Constitution)

7. RIGHT TO INFORMATION

8. RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS

9. JUST COMPENSATION

10. IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

1. Scope of the impairment clause. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its term, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. (Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702, 717),Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, et al., G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003]The non-impairment clause does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition on the impairment of obligations of contracts, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.

2. Illustration of non-impairment. Withdrawal of all tax exemption privileges under the Local Government Code did not impair the obligations imposed under the loan agreements executed by the NEA and the USAID, because the loan agreements did not provide any tax exemption in their wordings that the borrower shall pay the lender the principal amount of the loan and interest thereon, in full, without any deduction of the tax component thereof imposed under applicable Philippine law and any tax imposed shall be paid by the borrower with fund