PO377 ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Week 18: Peace Processes and International Intervention

Question to take home from today’s and next week’s lecture

Are the prospects for sustainable peace lower after ethnic civil wars compared to other types of civil war?

What might this mean for our case studies?

Lecture Outline

I. Introduction: Data and definitions Data on civil war termination Definitions of peace More definitions

II. Theorising the prospects for peace after large-scale ethnic violence Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable? Why do peace processes fail?

Lecture Outline

III. Peace processes and conditions for sustainable peace Possible conflict outcomes Third-party intervention and mediation Levels (“Tracks”) of intervention and mediation The two-step approach to ethnic conflict resolution Step 1: Questions of “ripeness” Step 2: Essential criteria for a successful peace accord Step 2: The trade-off between efficacy and sustainability

IV. The role of international intervention Why should external actors care? Forms of international intervention International intervention as a “critical barrier” for peace International intervention as a problem Dilemmas of international intervention

V. Summary

Part I:

Introduction: Data and definitions

Data on civil war termination

Only 20-25% of civil wars that have ended, ended in negotiated settlements (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002 and 1997; Hartzell 1999; Sambanis 2000).

Removing the 5 year requirement produces about 42% (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001: 194).

No real difference in this respect between identity-based civil wars and non-identity wars (Licklider 1995; Walter 2002, 1997).

BUT only a third of identity-based civil wars ending in negotiated settlement ultimately remain peaceful (much lower than non-identity civil wars) (Licklider 1995).

Definitions of peace

Negative peace: absence of direct or personal violence (Galtung 1969; 1985); most often conceptualised as the absence of war (armed hostilities);

Positive peace: absence of structural violence (ibid.). According to Barnes (2009) positive peace has been achieved “where democratic governance is established, where human rights are protected, and where sustained progress can be made towards development” (ibid.:18).

More definitions

Peace processes are “persistent peace initiatives involving the main antagonists in a protracted conflict” (Darby and MacGinty 2002: 2). [Darby and MacGinty distinguish four phases in peace processes: pre-negotiation; the management of the process, including negotiations and violence; peace accords; and post-accord reconstruction.]

While peacemaking is concerned with bringing hostile parties to an agreement (Barnes 2009), “peacebuilding is more comprehensive, involving sustained and multidimensional efforts to address the structural causes of conflict … and to reconcile relationships affected by conflict” (ibid.: 14).

More definitions (2)

“Conflict settlement aims at establishing an institutional framework in which the conflicting interests of the different principal conflict parties … can be accommodated to such an extent that incentives for cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation” (Wolff 2006: 134-135).

“Conflict management is an attempt to contain or limit the effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict” (ibid.: 134).

[Both of the above are distinct from conflict resolution, conflict transformation and reconciliation – we will come back to this.]

Part II:

Theorising the prospects for peace after large-scale ethnic violence

Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable?

From the three broad approaches to studying ethnicity and ethnic conflict – primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism – primordialism is most pessimistic about the prospects of peace in divided societies:

“Wherever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of populations, there one may expect to find powerful assertions of national self-determination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in bitter and protracted ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability of such regions is better served in the short term by measures of containment, federation, mediation, or even partition, in the long run there can be little escape from the many conflagrations that the unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle” (Smith 1993: 40 cited in Lake and Rothchild 1998: 5).

Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable? (2)

Instrumentalists and constructivists, on the other hand, argue that ethnic violence is contingent upon elite behaviour (instrumentalism) or the wider social, political and economic circumstances (constructivism).

Hence, they are more optimistic about the prospects of peacebuilding endeavours if these manage to reconstruct ethnic identities.

Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable? (3)

Likewise, institutionalists believe that “suitable” political institutions – however defined – can help solve or at least manage violent ethnic conflict and prevent its recurrence (cp. weeks 14 to 17 of the module).

Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable? (4)

Neorealist explanations focus on conditions of anarchy and the security dilemma (cp. Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993), so their prescriptions for conflict resolution are either restoring state authority through victory on the battlefield, or partition.

Rationalist explanations focus on “the reasons actors have for being unable to resolve a disagreement short of conflict” (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005: 24), so their prescriptions for conflict resolution are largely focused on the external enforcement of peace settlements.

Why do peace processes fail?

According to these different approaches, the failure of peace processes could thus – in very simplistic terms – be explained by:

Primordialism: the inherently conflictual nature of ethnic identities;

instrumentalism and constructivism: the lack of elite commitment to peace and failure to reconstruct ethnic identities;

institutionalism: the establishment of “unsuitable” institutions;

realism: the pervasiveness of the ethnic security dilemma;

rationalism: the failure to overcome commitment problems.

Part III:

Peace processes and conditions for sustainable peace

Possible conflict outcomes

Parties to conflicts see their interests as diametrically opposed; possible outcomes are win-lose or compromise. In violent conflicts usually lose-lose.

Task of conflict resolution is to help parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum conflict to re-perceive it as non-zero-sum and then assist them to move towards positive-sum outcomes.

Prisoners’ Dilemma in Game Theory is representation of tendency of competing strategies to end in lose-lose outcomes, but also of potential for cooperation to end in win-win outcomes.

Third party intervention and mediation

Third party intervention and mediation is often needed to break a deadlock. Third party changes conflict structure and allows different pattern of communication.

Post-Cold War broadening in scope of third party interventions. Much wider view of timing of intervention. Bottom-up processes and roles of internal third parties and indigenous peacemakers now seen as more significant too.

Levels (“Tracks”) of intervention and mediation

Track I: governmental or inter-governmental representatives. Negotiation, peacekeeping, arbitration, “mediation with muscle”. (UN, international and regional organisations, governments, international financial institutions.)

Track II: unofficial mediators. Conciliation, problem-solving, mediation. (International NGOs, churches, academics, private business.)

Track III: building social cohesion and common ground. (Grassroots, indigenous resources and local actors.)

The two-step approach to ethnic conflict resolution

1. Establishing preconditions for effective intergroup dialogue and negotiations (through Track 1 or Track 2 procedures);

2. the negotiation of specific constitutional and other arrangements to reach a conflict settlement.

Each of these steps faces its own challenges.

(See Ross 2000)

Step 1: Questions of “ripeness”

Zartman: some political, social and economic moments are “ripe” for negotiation and dialogue and a move from violence to non-violence; others are not:

“Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab onto proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive” (Zartman 2002: 19).

This moment of ripeness is determined by the contending parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), involving both objective evidence and subjective perception.

Step 1: Questions of “ripeness” (2)

When a MHS is reached, parties to conflict realise status quo is a negative-sum situation; zero-sum outcomes are now considered impossible; positive-sum outcome must be attempted.

This also requires a perceived way out and strong leadership.

May be aided by presence of mutually enticing opportunities (MEO).

Step 1: Questions of “ripeness” (3)

Challenge to “ripeness” metaphor:

“Quick fixes to long-standing violent conflict are like growing a garden with no understanding of seeds, soils and sweat…. I believe in cultivation. Cultivation as a metaphor suggests that the core of the peacebuilding work – fostering and sustaining committed, authentic relationships across the lines of conflict over time – does not rise and fall with the temporal ups and downs of the conflict cycles. It answers the question – is it possible to pursue peace when things are bad – with a resounding ‘Yes!’ Just as it also suggests that when things are suddenly headed towards an agreement the work is hardly over. It has only begun” (Lederach 2002).

Step 2: Essential criteria for a successful peace accord

1) The protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith;

2) the key actors are included in the process;

3) the negotiations address the central issues in dispute;

4) force is not used to achieve objectives;

5) negotiators are committed to a sustained process.

(See Darby and MacGinty 2000)

Step 2: The trade-off between efficacy and sustainability

Fewer parties and issues involved in peace negotiations may be easier to manage and may make it easier to reach agreement (efficacy argument).

BUT more inclusive and more comprehensive peace processes are more likely to be sustainable (sustainability argument) (Barnes 2009).

See in this context also the dilemmas of public participation in peacemaking (ibid.).

Part IV:

The role of international intervention

Why should external actors care?

Because of: their own hegemonic ambitions; concerns for regional stability; sympathy for oppressed groups [or oppressors??]; sense of international responsibility; humanitarianism (Cooper and Berdal 1993 cited in

Rothchild and Lake 1998: 217).

“The paradox of the post-Cold War world, however, is that in the absence of the bipolar competition that drove them into the far reaches of the globe, the United States and other powers now lack the political will necessary to make a sustained commitment to the role of external guarantor.” (Rothchild and Lake 1998: 218).[This is probably even more the case now in our post-Afghanistan and Iraq world.]

Forms of international intervention

Non-coercive intervention;

Coercive intervention (Rothchild and Lake 1998);

Third party intervention can be formal or informal, need not be constant over time (Carment and Rowlands 2004).

International intervention as “critical barrier” for peace

External actors can help bring security and stability to war-torn countries by:

making conflict either extremely difficult or unnecessary (Carment and Rowlands 2004);

bringing representatives of contending groups together for peace negotiations (Barnes 2009);

enforcing peace settlements and providing necessary security assurances (Walter 1997);

encouraging opponents to design new institutional arrangements to manage conflict (Hartzell et al. 2002; Sisk 1996).

International intervention as a problem

External actors can be driven by belligerent motives (cp. Gurr 2000);

if external actors are biased or lack commitment to enforce conflict settlements, they can exacerbate rather than resolve conflict (Rothchild and Lake 1998);

where external actors aim to rush peace negotiations or avoid difficult issues, the conflict is likely to recur (Barnes 2009);

peace processes that neglect the conditions or interests of local communities increase dependence on external guarantees for peace (Darby and MacGinty 2002).

Dilemmas of international intervention (for the intervening party) Dilemmas faced by the intervening party:

1. The need to engage in confidence-building vs. efforts to punish particular groups;

2. the politicisation of international intervention;

3. information failures;

4. problems of regional or global organisations to agree on a course of action (Rothchild and Lake 1998).

Part V:

Summary

Summary

Whether or not we believe that violent ethnic conflict can be truly resolved – rather than merely managed or settled – depends to a large degree on the theoretical framework we adopt (cp. Kaufmann 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996).

These frameworks notwithstanding, sustainable peace is unlikely to be achieved if the structural causes of ethnic violence and the challenges specific to each step of the peace process are not addressed (hence, a positive conceptualisation of peace as well as flexibility and constant innovation in the peace process are crucial).

Summary

Many of the issues to do with getting violent actors to the stage of peace negotiation are debated within the literature (no consensus): timing, ‘ripeness’, hurting stalemates, inclusion versus exclusion, the utility (and forms) of external intervention.

Negotiations are extremely difficult and raise a host of issues regarding interpretation and implementation.

Summary

The usefulness of international intervention in ending ethno-national conflicts or mediating negotiations depends on a variety of contextual factors and is often limited, not least due to the lack of political will to intervene as external actor.

Peace processes, just like the emergence of violent ethnic conflict, need not – and do not – follow the same trajectories, so that it is crucial to bear country-specific differences in mind.

Summary

Case Studies:

Rwanda and Sri Lanka show problems that arise when political leaders do not have genuine commitment to peace process.

Rwanda shows how difficult peace is to establish where agreement is coerced rather than organic (hard to force an MHS). Bosnia and Kosovo also show this.

Summary

Case Studies:

Yugoslavia illustrates how the break-up of a multi-ethnic state is not necessarily a solution to ethno-political strife, even though it may bring about negative peace.

Sri Lanka shows how difficult it can be in a long-running internal conflict to get warring parties to move beyond zero-sum attitudes.

However, Northern Ireland shows us that as difficult as this is, it is possible – though it is only the first step in an even harder process of implementation/consolidation.