pli spinoza desire and power

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Contents

Spinoza: Power and Desire

The three kinds of knowledge.GILLES DELEUZE 1

Spinoza: Superior Epiri!ist"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ )1

Spinoza* or* The +ower of Desire,%-ILLE DU-#ULI //

%lain (adiou as a 'eader of Spinoza+IE''E0'%$2#IS -#'E%U 34

Spinoza5s ultiple 6 Deleuze5s ultipli!it7.ST+&%$ LE,LE',8 39



Varia

Sutra!tion: "ewish and ,hristianSL%;#" <I<E= >9

The E?tent of Gi@ing: Sending in Derrida and &eidegger %$D'EA -IT,&ELL 9B

-oses -endelssohn and the Geran 'e!eption of 'oger (os!o@i!h5sTheoria

G'EG A&ITL#,= 1C3

#n 'h7th* 'esonan!e and DistortionZ%E' %'%,%G= 1)

=ant5s produ!ti@e ontolog7(ET& L#'D 133

Reviews

The -eor7 of Thought,L%I'E ,#LE('##= 193

;irtuall7 $ewA%&ID% =&%$D=E' 19B

The Logi! of SensationD%''E$ %-('#SE 1B1



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 10)C

The three kinds of knowledge.

GILLS DL!"

Toda7* I would like this to e our last eeting. This will e our lasteeting on Spinoza* unless 7ou ha@e an7 Huestions. In an7 !ase it5sne!essar7 that* toda7* if there is an7thing that !on!erns 7ou* 7ou inter@eneas u!h as possile.

%nd so* I would like to do two things toda7: firstl7 that we finish withthe Spinozist !on!eption of indi@idualit7* e!ause we ha@e spent Huite longenough on this !on!ept* ut also that we draw fro it the !onseHuen!es!on!erning a point* a forula* a !elerated Spinozisti! forula: Aee?perien!e ... we e?perient.1 Ae feel and we e?perien!e. This forula

does not sa7: we think. These two @er7 loaded words: to feel ande?perien!e that we are eternal. Ahat is this faous Spinozist eternit7#=. %nd se!ondl7 and finall7* it is ne!essar7 to draw soe !onseHuen!esfro what ought to ha@e een the ipli!it thee of all these eetingsJ thatis to sa7: what is the relationship etween an ontolog7 and an ethi!s on!eone sa7s that this relation is of intrinsi! interest for philosoph7. The fa!t isthat this relation was onl7 de@eloped and founded 7 Spinoza. So u!h so*that were soeod7 to !oe to us and sa7 that their proKe!t was a kind of ethi!s whi!h had a !orrelation with an ontolog7* that is* a theor7 of (eing*

one would ha@e to stop and sa7: fine* in this wa7* in this kind of inHuir7*one !an sa7 an7 new things* ut it is a Spinozist inHuir7. It is an inHuir7signed Spinoza.

ou re!all* and I reind 7ou of this not at all to return to these points* ut to see what we5@e got. ou re!all the three diensions of indi@idualit7 irst diension: I ha@e an infinit7 of e?tensi@e partsJ well

1 Expérimenter eans oth to e?perien!e and e?perient. It is worth earing in indthat this doule eaning also applied to Spinoza5s Latin experientia M whi!h is wh7he was ale to write in the Political Treatise N).1 experientia sive praxis

e?perien!e6e?perient or pra!ti!e Otrans.P.



GILLES DELEUZE )

ore* if 7ou reeer ore pre!isel7. I ha@e an infinit7 of wholes*

!oposed of an infinit7 of parts whi!h are e?tensi@e or e?ternal to oneanother. I a !oposed to infinit7.

Se!ond diension: these infinite wholes of e?tensi@e parts e?ternal toone another elong to e* ut the7 elong to e under !hara!teristi!relations. 'elations of o@eent and of rest whi!h the last tie I tried tosa7 were nature.

Third diension: these !hara!teristi! relations do nothing ut e?press adegree of power that !onstitutes 7 essen!e* 7 essen!e of 7selfJ that isto sa7* a singular essen!e.

Therefore the three diensions are the e?tensi@e parts e?ternal to oneanother that elong to e* the relations under whi!h these parts elong e*and the essen!e as degree* gradus or modus* the uniHue essen!e thate?presses itself in these relations. $ow* Spinoza ne@er does sa7 this*

e!ause he has no need to sa7 it* ut we are for!ed to note a !uriousharon7* etween what and what (etween these three diensions of indi@idualit7 and what he !alls* now and again* the three kinds of knowledge. If 7ou re!all the three kinds of knowledge* 7ou williediatel7 see the stri!t parallelis etween the three diensions of

indi@idualit7 as su!h and the three kinds of knowledge. (ut that there issu!h a parallelis etween the two ust for!e us to !ertain !on!lusions.ou see* this is not soething that Spinoza needs to sa7. I insist on this

e!ause I would also want 7ou to draw fro this rules for the reading of all philosophers.

&e will not sa7: noti!e. It is not up to hi to e?plain. #n!e ore* Iinsist on this at length: one !annot do two things at on!e. #ne !annot aton!e sa7 soething and e?plain what it is that one sa7s. It is e!ause of this* that things are @er7 diffi!ult. #=. It is not Spinoza that has to e?plain

what Spinoza saidJ Spinoza has to do etter than this: he has to sa7soething. To e?plain what Spinoza has said is not ad* ut in the end itdoes not go @er7 far. This is wh7 the histor7 of philosoph7 ust ee?treel7 odest. Spinoza will not sa7 to us: noti!e* 7ou see that 7 threekinds of knowledge and that the three diensions of the indi@idual*!orrespond to one another. It is not up to hi to sa7 this. (ut for us* in our odest task* it is good to point this out. So* in what sense do the7!orrespond



4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ou re!all that the first kind of knowledge is the totalit7 of inadeHuate

ideas. That is to sa7* the totalit7 of passi@e affe!tions and of passion0affe!ts that result fro inadeHuate ideas. This is the totalit7 of signs*inadeHuate !onfused ideas* and the passions* the affe!ts* that result frothese affe!tions. This is what we learnt last tie. $ow* fro the oentwe e?ist* under what !onditions or* what is it that akes it the !ase that weare not onl7 destined to inadeHuate ideas and to passions ut e@en perhaps*!ondened to ha@e only inadeHuate ideas and passi@e affe!ts* or passions.Ahat is it that !reates our sad situation

Understand that this should e o@ious so I don5t want to stress this in

too u!h detail. I would Kust want 7ou to feel* sense* that we are ade upof e?tensi@e parts. In as u!h as we ha@e e?tensi@e parts* this !ondensus to inadeHuate ideas. Ah7 e!ause of what the s7ste of e?tensi@e

parts is. #n!e ore* the7 are e?ternal to one another* the7 go to infinit7* oth at on!e. The siplest odies* that are the ultiate parts* 7ou re!all*the siplest odies do not ha@e an7 interiorit7. The7 are alwa7sdeterined fro the outside. Ahat does this ean (7 sho!ks. (7 ipa!tsfro another part. In what wa7 do the7 en!ounter sho!ks In the siplestwa7* to know that the7 ne@er !ease !hanging relations* sin!e it is alwa7s

within a relationship that the parts elong to e or do not elong to e.+arts of 7 od7 lea@e 7 od7 and enter into another relationship. Therelation of arseni!* this relation does not iport well* the relation of theosHuito when it ites e* the relation ... I do not stop integrating partsinto 7 relations. Ahen I eat* for e?aple* when I eat there are e?tensi@e

parts that I appropriate for 7self. Ahat does this ean* to appropriate parts for oneself To appropriate parts for oneself is to sa7: the7 lea@e the pre!eding relations that the7 ade up to take a new relation* this newrelation eing one of 7 relation to 7self: 7 eating eat I !reate 7own flesh. Ahat horrorQ (ut in the end* it is ne!essar7 to li@e* life does notstop eing like that: sho!ks* appropriations of parts* transforations of relations* !opositions to the infinite* et!. This s7ste of parts e?ternal toone another that do not stop rea!ting* at the sae tie that the infinitetotalities in whi!h the7 enter do not stop @ar7ing* is pre!isel7 the regie of inadeHuate ideas* of !onfused per!eptions* of passi@e affe!ts* of the

passionate affe!ts that result. In other words* it is e!ause I a !oposedof a !olle!tion of an infinit7 of infinite wholes of e?tensi@e parts e?ternalto one another* that I do not stop ha@ing per!eptions of e?ternal things*

per!eptions of 7self* per!eptions of 7self in 7 relations with e?ternal



GILLES DELEUZE /

things* per!eptions of the e?ternal things in relation to 7self. It is all this

that akes up the world of signs. Ahen I sa7: Rha5 this is good* that is ad*what are these signs of good and ad These inadeHuate signs sipl7ean: I en!ounter e?ternall7 parts whi!h are compatible with 7 own

parts under their relation Rad5: I en!ounter e?ternall7 parts whi!h do notagree with e.

See* therefore* that the whole doain of the infinite wholes of partse?ternal to one another !orresponds e?a!tl7 to the first kind of knowledge.This is e!ause I a !oposed of an infinit7 of e?trinsi! parts of whi!h Iha@e inadeHuate per!eptions. So that the first kind of knowledge

!orresponds to this first diension of indi@idualit7. $ow one sees* pre!isel7* that the prole of the kinds of knowledge

was rilliantl7 laun!hed 7 the Spinozist proleati!. Aith this definitionone ight elie@e that we are !ondened to inadeHuate knowledge*knowledge of the first kind. ,onseHuentl7* how are we to e?plain the!han!e that we ha@e to es!ape fro this !onfused world* fro thisinadeHuate world* fro this first kind of knowledge

Spinoza5s response is: 7es* there is a se!ond kind of knowledge.

(ut how does Spinoza define the se!ond kind of knowledge In the Ethics* this is @er7 strikingJ the se!ond kind of knowledge is knowledge of relations* of their !oposition and of their de!oposition. #ne !an not!oe up with a etter phrase than: the se!ond kind of knowledge!orresponds to the se!ond diension of indi@idualit7. Sin!e* in fa!t* thee?ternal parts are not onl7 e?ternal in relation to one another* ut areradi!all7 e?ternal* asolutel7 e?ternal* how is it then that we !an sa7 thate?ternal parts are part of e

This eans onl7 one thing for Spinoza* nael7 that these parts aredeterined* alwa7s fro the outside* to enter into su!h or su!h relation*into this or that relation that !hara!terizes e. %nd oreo@er* what is theeaning of Rto die5 To die eans onl7 one thingJ it is that the parts that

elonged to e under this or that relation are deterined fro the outsideto enter into another relation that does not !hara!terize e* ut that!hara!terizes soething else.

The first kind of knowledge is therefore the knowledge of the effe!ts of en!ounters* or effe!ts of a!tion and of intera!tion 7 e?ternal parts on oneanother. #ne !annot define it etter. This is @er7 !lear. The effe!ts aredefined 7 either the effe!ts !aused 7 the sho!k or 7 the en!ounters of



3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

e?ternal parts with one another. This in turn defines the first kind of

knowledge. In fa!t 7 natural per!eption is an effe!t of the sho!ks and!ollisions etween the e?ternal parts that !opose e and the e?ternal parts that !opose other odies. (ut the se!ond kind of knowledge* this isan altogether different kind of knowledge. This is knowledge of therelations that !opose e and relations that !opose other things. ousee* this is no longer the effe!ts of en!ounters etween parts* this isknowledge of relations* nael7 the anner in whi!h 7 !hara!teristi!relations are !oposed with those of other things* and the anner in whi!h7 !hara!teristi! relations and other relations de!opose thesel@es.

$ow this is adeHuate knowledge* and in fa!t this knowledge !an onl7 eadeHuate. It is opposed to a knowledge that is !ontent to rea!t* sin!e this isa knowledge that raises itself to the !oprehension of !auses. In effe!t*an7 relation whatsoe@er Orapport quelconqueP is a reason. %n7 relationwhatsoe@er is the reason 7 whi!h an infinit7 of e?tensi@e parts elongs toone su!h od7 rather than to soe other.

In this oent of the se!ond kind of knowledge* I sipl7 insist on this:that the wa7 I ha@e tried to put it does not ipl7 that this is at all anastra!t for of knowledge. If 7ou ake this astra!t then all of

Spinozis !ollapses. This is e@identl7 the fault of the !oentaries* the7sa7 alwa7s: haQ well 7es* its atheati!s. &aQ well* no* its notatheati!s. It has nothing to do with atheati!s* e?!ept thatatheati!s is a spe!ial !ase. It is in fa!t possile to define atheati!sas a theor7 of relations. There then* agreed* atheati!s is a part of these!ond kind of knowledge. It is a theor7 of relations and proportions. SeeEu!lid. #=* it is a theor7 of relations and proportions* and at this @er7oent atheati!s fors part of the se!ond kind of knowledge. (ut tothink that the se!ond kind of knowledge ust e a atheati!al t7pe of knowledge* this an aoinale pie!e of stupidit7 ObêtiseP e!ause* at that@er7 oent* all of Spinozis e!oes astra!t. #ne does not li@e one5slife 7 atheati!s. It is not ne!essar7 to e?aggerateJ it is a Huestion of the

proles of life. I5ll take this as an e?aple* e!ause it appears to einfinitel7 ore Spinozist than geoetr7 or atheati!s* or e@en theEu!lidean theor7 of proportions* I5ll take as e?aple of soething that onewould want to sa7 is adeHuate knowledge of the se!ond kind* soething atthe le@el of learning how to swi: &a* I know how to swiQ O je saisnager P $ood7 !an den7 that to know how to swi is a !onHuest of e?isten!e. It is fundaental* 7ou understand. I !onHuer an eleentJ



GILLES DELEUZE >

endogenousl7 one will not !onHuer an eleent. I know how to swi* I

know how to fl7. oridale. Ahat does this eanThis is all siple: not to know how to swi is to e at the er!7 of an

en!ounter with a wa@e.) So* 7ou ha@e the infinite od7 of water ole!ulesthat !opose the wa@e. I sa7: this is a wa@e e!ause* these siplest odiesthat I !all ole!ules* are not in fa!t the siplest* and it will e ne!essar7to go still further than the water ole!ules. The water ole!ules alread7

elong to a od7* the water od7* the od7 of the o!ean* et!. ... or the od7 of the pond* the od7 of soe pond. So what is the knowledge of thefirst kind It is this: to go* I laun!h 7self* I go there* I a in the first kind

of knowledge. I laun!h 7self. I splash aout as one sa7s. Ah7 does onewant to sa7 Rsplash aout5 Splashing aout is @er7 siple. Splashingaout* the phrase a!!uratel7 indi!ates* one sees !learl7* that this is all aatter of e?trinsi! relations. Soeties the wa@e slaps e and soetiesit !arries eJ these are the effe!ts of a sho!k* nael7: I do not knowan7thing of the relation that is !oposed or that de!oposes itself. Ire!ei@e the effe!ts of e?trinsi! parts. The parts that elong e to e areshaken. The7 re!ei@e the effe!t of a sho!k fro the parts that elong to thewa@e. So soeties I laugh and soeties I sni@el* as a result of what the

wa@e does to e* akes e laugh or kno!ks e senseless. I5 affe!ted passionatel7: &a u* the wa@e fought eQ #=. &a u* the wa@efought e. M a s!rea that we will not stop ha@ing so long as we reainin the first kind of knowledge sin!e one will not stop sa7ing: &a the talehas hurt eJ this is e?a!tl7 the sae as sa7ing: the other hurt eJ not at all

e!ause the tale is inaniate* Spinoza is so u!h sarter than all that wewere ale to sa7 afterwards. It is not at all e!ause the tale is inaniate*that we are dri@en to sa7: the tale has hurt e. It is as stupid to sa7:+ierre has hurt e as it is to sa7 the ro!k Ola pierreP has hurt e* or thewa@e has hurt e. It is all at the sae le@el* it is all the first kind of knowledge. #=. ou follow e

#n the !ontrar7: I know how to swiJ that does not for!e e to sa7that I ha@e a atheati!al* ph7si!al* or s!ientifi! knowledge of theo@eent of the wa@e. It is Kust to sa7 that I ha@e a knowhow* anastonishing know how. it is to sa7 that I ha@e a kind of sense of therh7th. Ahat !an one sa7 aout this rh7th I know how to !opose 7

) It is possil7 worth noting here that there is a siple and terrile pla7 of wordshere: la vague* the wa@e is !onne!ted to the Latin vaga i.e. @ague knowledge* the

first kind of knowledge* the iagination Otrans.P.



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!hara!teristi! relations dire!tl7 with the relations of the wa@e. $othing else

happens etween the wa@e and e. This is to sa7 that no ore happens etween the e?tensi@e parts* the wet parts of the wa@e and the parts of 7 od7* than takes pla!e etween the relations. The relations that !oposethe wa@e* the relations that !opose 7 od7* and 7 fitness* or !apa!it7*when I know how to swi: to present 7 od7 under relations that are!oposed dire!tl7 with the relation of the wa@e. I di@e at the rightoent. I resurfa!e at the right oent. I a@oid the wa@e that approa!hes*or* on the !ontrar7 I use it* et!. ... %ll this is the art of the !oposition of relations. I look for e?aples that are not atheati!al e!ause* on!eore* atheati!s is onl7 a part of this. It would e ne!essar7 to sa7 thatatheati!s is the foral theor7 of the se!ond kind of knowledge. It is notthat the se!ond kind of knowledge is atheati!al. It is the sae thing atthe le@el of lo@e. Aa@es or lo@es* it is all the sae. In a lo@e of the firstkind* well* 7ou are !onstantl7 in this s7ste of en!ounters etweene?trinsi! parts. In what one !alls a grand amour, La dame aux camélias*what is it that is eautiful OlaughsP* there 7ou ha@e a relation of !oposition. $o* 7 e?aple is @er7 ad e!ause la dame aux camélias*this is the first kind of knowledge* ut in the se!ond kind of knowledge7ou ha@e a t7pe of !oposition of relations with one another. ou are no

longer in the regie of inadeHuate ideasJ nael7: the effe!t of a part onone of 7 own* the effe!t of an e?ternal part or the effe!t of an eternal

od7 on ine. There 7ou attain a doain deeper than the one that is the!oposition of the !hara!teristi! relations of a od7 with the !hara!teristi!relations of another od7. %nd this t7pe of fle?iilit7 or of rh7th whi!ho!!urs when 7ou present 7our od7* and fro that tie 7our soul also* 7ou

present 7our soul or 7our od7* under the relation that is !oposeddire!tl7 with the relation of the other. ou trul7 feel that this is a strangehappiness. &ere* in this* is the se!ond kind of knowledge.

Ah7 is there a third kind of knowledge There is a third kind of knowledge e!ause Spinoza sa7s relations are not essen!es. The third kindof knowledge* or intuiti@e knowledge* is that whi!h surpasses relations andtheir !opositions and their de!opositions. This is knowledge of essen!es* whi!h goes further than relations sin!e it attains the essen!e thate?presses itself in relations* the essen!e on whi!h the relations depend. Ineffe!t if relations are ine* if relations !hara!terize e* this is e!ausethe7 e?press 7 essen!e. %nd 7 essen!e is what It is a degree of power.=nowledge of the third kind is knowledge that this degree of power gets



GILLES DELEUZE 9

fro itself and gets fro other degrees of power. This tie it is a

knowledge of singular essen!es. #=. The se!ond kind* and* e@en ore so*the third kind of knowledge* are perfe!tl7 adeHuate. ou see that there is a!orresponden!e etween the kinds of knowledge and diensions of indi@idualit7. This eans what* finall7 This !oin!iden!e eans that thekinds of knowledge are ore than kinds of knowledge* the7 are wa7s of e?isten!e. The7 are wa7s of li@ing.

(ut wh7 is it that the7 are wa7s of li@ing This e!oes diffi!ult e!ause* ultiatel7* all indi@iduals are !oposed of the three diensionssiultaneousl7. It is there that one will find the final prole. ou* e* it

is not iportant who* an7 indi@idual has all three diensionssiultaneousl7. Ahat !an one !on!lude fro this E@er7 indi@idual has allthree diensions siultaneousl7* agreed. &ere e?a!tl7 is the prole:e@er7 indi@idual has all three diensions siultaneousl7* and ne@erthelessthere are indi@iduals that will ne@er lea@e the first kind of knowledge. The7will not !oe to a!hie@e the se!ond or the third Oend of the tape...P aknowledge of their singular essen!e or other singular essen!es. &ow do wee?plain this This is not at all autoati!. E@er7 indi@idual has the threediensions ut note* this does not ipl7 that it has all three kinds of

knowledgeJ one !an easil7 reain in the first kind. &ow !an we e?plainthis last point Let us ta!kle the Huestion differentl7: when is it that thereare !onfli!ts or e?aple: one !an hate oneself. It happens that one hatesoneself. &ate* this kind of !onfli!tual ode of e?isting* fro one indi@idualto another indi@idual* is what &ow to e?plain hate ,onsider ane?eplar7 te?t of Spinozas* (ook I; of The Ethics* the first a?io of (ook I;* it will other us a lot* the appearan!e of this a?io* and thereSpinoza does not e?plain it u!h.

%?io: There is in $ature no indi@idual thing that is not

surpassed in strength and power 7 soe other thing.There is no ultiate power e!ause the ultiate power is the totalit7 of $ature. % thing eing gi@en* it is defined 7 a degree of powerJ and thereis alwa7s a degree of superior power and in fa!t one has seen that there isan infinit7 of degrees of power. Infinit7 is alwa7s a!ti@e for Spinoza* isalwa7s a!tual* a degree of power greater than the greatest degree of power than I !an !on!ei@e. Till now* it would not e worth othering aout thisa?io ut it !ontinues:

Ahatsoe@er thing there is* there is another ore powerful 7

whi!h the said thing !an e destro7ed.



B Pli 1/ F)CC4

This stateent ust ake us pauseQ Ah7 e!ause the se!ond senten!e

rings an une?pe!ted pre!ision. The first senten!e sa7s: on!e a thing has een gi@en* it is defined 7 its power* ut on!e a degree of power has eengi@en* i.e. a thing in its essen!e* the degree of power is the essen!e of thething. %greed* that5s fine. #ne understands. Se!ond senten!e* it adds*note: 7 soething ore powerful the first thing !an alwa7s e destro7ed.This is @er7 earrassing. Ah7 Suddenl7 one sa7s to oneself: I don5tunderstood an7thing. Ahat5s going on It sees to sa7 that an essen!e !an

e destro7ed 7 a ore powerful essen!e. Then at this @er7 oent thereis no longer an7 third kind of knowledge. There is e@en less an7 se!ondkind of knowledge* e!ause destru!tion is what This is e@identl7 theeffe!t of an essen!e on another essen!e. If an essen!e !an e destro7ed 7a ore powerful essen!e* 7 an essen!e of a superior degree* this is!atastrophi!* the whole of Spinozis !ollapses. #ne is rought a!k to theeffe!ts* one is rought a!k to the first kind of knowledge* it is no longer

possile to ha@e knowledge of the essen!es. &ow is it that there !an e anadeHuate knowledge of essen!es* if essen!es !an e in a destru!ti@erelation with one another

ortunatel7* e@er7one has understood. %nd furtherore* it will e

ne!essar7 to wait a long tie for an answer* ut this is noral* this is wh77ou need patien!e to read. Aell finall7* in (ook ;* there is proposition 4and proposition 4 gi@es us* after its proposition* and after thedeonstration of the proposition* it gi@es us a separate stateent* as!holiu* and the s!holiu sa7s this: the a?io of (ook I;* whi!h I ha@e

Kust read* !on!erns singular things in so far as one !onsiders the inrelation to a definite tie and a !ertain pla!e* of whi!h I think no one !an

e in dout. &ere it is ne!essar7 to laugh* e!ause* e@en so: of whi!h Ithink no one !an e in dout* is soething that we5@e had to wait a longtie for and it !ould ha@e een said in (ook I;* whi!h would ha@e sa@edus a lot of troule. (ut that5s Spinoza5s prole. Ah7 does he sa7 it solate &e sa7s it when he needs to sa7 it. Ahat !an one sa7 of this

pre!ision

Spinoza sa7s to us: note* the a?io of destru!tion* the a?io of !onfli!t: an essen!e !an oppose itself to another to the point of destro7ingit. #ne understands this onl7 when one !onsiders things in relation to a!ertain tie and a !ertain pla!e. &e does not sa7 an7thing ore aout this.Ahat does this ean: to !onsider things in relation to a !ertain tie and a!ertain pla!e Ahat one wants to sa7* is: !onsider the in their e?isten!e.



GILLES DELEUZE 1C

Ah7 should one want to sa7: !onsider the in their e?isten!e To !onsider

the as the7 e?ist* as the7 are passed into e?isten!e* as the7 pass intoe?isten!e* and this eans what Ae5@e seen it: to pass into e?isten!e* iswhat #ne passes into e?isten!e* an essen!e !oes into e?isten!e when aninfinit7 of e?tensi@e parts finds itself e?ternall7 deterined to elong under su!h a relation. I ha@e an essen!e* 7self* +ierre or +aul. I ha@e anessen!e. I sa7 that I pass into e?isten!e when an infinit7 of e?tensi@e partsis e?ternall7 deterined Fthat is to sa7 7 the sho!ks whi!h reound froother e?ternal parts to enter into a relation whi!h !hara!terizes e. Thusat first I did not e?ist* insofar as I did not ha@e these e?tensi@e parts.

To e orn is this. I a orn when an infinit7 of e?tensi@e parts aree?ternall7 deterined* 7 an en!ounter with other parts* to enter into arelation that is ine* that !hara!terizes e. %t that @er7 oent* I ha@e arelation with a !ertain tie and with a !ertain pla!e. Ahat is it thathappens at this tie and pla!e* the tie and pla!e of 7 irth. This here*here and now* is what This is the régime of e?tensi@e parts.4 Thee?tensi@e parts* the wholes of e?tensi@e parts* the7 alwa7s ha@e a tie anda pla!e. (etter* the7 will endure what the7 will endure. The e?tensi@e partsare e?ternall7 deterined to enter into a relation that !hara!terizes e* ut

for how long Until the7 are deterined to enter into another relation. %tthat @er7 oent* the7 pass into another od7. The7 do not elong to ean7 oreJ it endures a !ertain tie. Aell. Ahat does this ean &ow hasthis !larified things

In fa!t I !an talk aout !onfli!t etween two indi@iduals onl7 in asu!h as these indi@iduals are !onsidered as e?isting here and now. This is@er7 iportant for the foration of !onfli!tual relations. It is onl7 in asu!h as indi@iduals are !onsidered as e?isting here and now that the7 !anintera!t. This is not a Huestion of good or e@il. It is a Huestion of logi!al

possiilit7. I !an onl7 ha@e !onfli!tual relations with another indi@iduala!!ording to what %!!ording to the e?tensi@e parts that !opose us* that elong to us. The pla!e* the en@ironent of the !onfli!t* is that of e?tensi@e parts. In what does the !onfli!t etween the indi@iduals !onsistIn the !onfli!ts etween indi@iduals it is alwa7s a atter of knowing the

4 It is worth keeping the original ren!h at this point* for as the translators of Lantioedipe point out* The word régime has a nuer of different eanings in ren!h*in!luding: regien or for of go@ernentJ a set of laws* rules or regulationsJ fate of flow* as a !urrentJ rate or speed of operation* as of a otor or engine. Sin!e theauthors use the word in se@eral senses* the ren!h word régime has een retained

throughout the English te?t !nti"#edipus p. 41 Otrans.P.



11 Pli 1/ F)CC4

final relation that these infinite wholes of e?tensi@e parts will enter.

Iagine this sad situation: I fight with a dog o@er a kind of pVtW. #=.&orrile spe!ta!le. &ow !an we des!rie this spe!ta!le It is a atter of what ou ha@e three ters: the food* the dog and e. Then I ite the dogto seize OlaughsP his foodJ the dog hits e with his paw. Ahat happensou ha@e an infinite whole of e?tensi@e parts under the relation eat.ou ha@e an infinite whole of e?tensi@e parts under the relation dog.ou ha@e an infinite whole of e?tensi@e parts under the relation e. %ndall that whirlwind* and all that struggle. $ael7: e* I want to !onHuer thee?tensi@e parts of the eat to assiilate the for 7selfJ that is to sa7* toipose 7 relation on the. The dog* it wants the sae. I ite the dog. Iwant to dri@e it off. The dog* it ites e* et!. et!. There isn5t an7thing else.This is the doain of !onfli!t. The !onfli!t is the respe!ti@e effort of ea!he?isting od7 to appropriate for itself the e?tensi@e parts. Ahat doesRappropriate for itself the e?tensi@e part5 ean It eans to effe!ti@el7ake the relation that !orresponds to ea!h indi@idual. In this sense I !analwa7s sa7: I a destro7ed 7 soething stronger than e. %nd in fa!t* aslong as I e?ist* this is the risk of e?isten!e. #=. %nd the risk of e?isten!eonl7 ends with what one !alls death. Ahat is death This is the fa!t thatSpinoza will !all ne!essar7* in the sense of ine@itale* that the e?tensi@e

parts that elonged to e under 7 !hara!teristi! relation will stop elonging to e and pass into another relation that !hara!terizes other odies. It is ine@itale 7 @irtue of the @er7 law of e?isten!e. %n essen!ewill alwa7s eet an essen!e stronger than it under !onditions of e?isten!ethat eans that* fro that tie* the stronger essen!e destro7s. Destro7swhat literall7 destro7s the elonging of the e?tensi@e parts to the firstessen!e.

Good* agreed. (ut I5ll initiall7 sa7* e@en if it eans I5ll ha@e to !orre!t7self shortl7* and it will e ne!essar7 to !orre!t 7self* I sa7: supposethat I a dead. So* I a dead. or Spinoza M this will take on an astra!tair* ut tr7: it is up to 7ou to ake the effort. I will sa7 shortl7 wh7 thisdoes not appear astra!t for e* ut ake the effort. I a dead* whatdoes this ean #n!e again if 7ou a!!ept these preises* that this is not atall an astra!t theor7* it is reall7 a !on!rete prole. If this is all that deathis* it eans that there are no longer an7 e?tensi@e parts* there are no longer an7 e?trinsi! wholes that elong to e. I a dispossessed. %greed* I adispossessed. I do not ha@e an7 ore parts. This eans: 7 !hara!teristi!relations stop eing effe!tuated. This is what death eans* ut nothing



GILLES DELEUZE 1)

ore than that. So* what is it that is ended 7 death Ahat ha@e not ended*

a!!ording to Spinoza* are 7 relations. The7 ha@e !eased to eeffe!tuated* true* ut there is an eternal truth of these relations. The7 arenot effe!tuated* agreed* ut we5@e seen that for Spinoza* relations arelargel7 independent of their ters. To effe!tuate a relation eans thatsoe ters arri@e that effe!tuate the relation. The relation is effe!tuated 7its ters. Then there are no longer an7 ters that the7 effe!tuate. Therelation has an eternal truth as a relation* a truth independent of its ters.It is no longer effe!tuated* ut it reains a!tual as a relation. It does not

pass to a @irtual state. There is an a!tualit7 of the non0effe!tuated relation.%nd* e@en ore* there is an a!tualit7 of the essen!e that e?presses itself inthe relation* sin!e the essen!e is not at all an e?tensi@e part* it is anintensi@e partQ It is a degree of power. This degree of power does not!orrespond to an7thing an7 ore. This degree as we saw the last tie* thisdegree of intensit7 does not !orrespond to an7thing an7 ore in e?tension.There are no longer an7 e?tensi@e parts that !orrespond to the intensi@e

part. %greed. (ut the realit7 of the intensi@e part* as an intensi@e part* thatsur@i@es.

In other words there is a doule eternit7* !opletel7 !orrelati@e. There

is a doule eternit7: the eternit7 of the relation or relations that!hara!terize e* and the eternit7 of the essen!e* the singular essen!e that!onstitutes e* and that !annot e affe!ted 7 death. %nd e@en ore* onthis le@el as it is des!ried in (ook ;* in the te?t that I ha@e Kust read* onthis le@el* !onfli!t !annot e?ist. Ah7 (e!ause all the relations are!oposed to infinit7 following the laws of relations. There are alwa7srelations that are !oposed. %nd on the other hand all the essen!es agreewith all the essen!es* e@er7 essen!e agrees with all the others* as a puredegree of intensit7.

In other words* for Spinoza* to sa7 that a degree of power or a degreeof intensit7 destro7s another degree of intensit7* this is a propositionde@oid of sense. The phenoena of destru!tion do not e?ist on this le@eland the7 ha@e for a rule that the7 relate a!k to the régime of the e?tensi@e

parts that pro@isionall7 elong to e.

,onseHuentl7* what does it ean to sa7: I feel* I e?perien!e that I aeternal This is not: I know it. Ahat I would want 7ou to understand isthe differen!e etween the last proposition and this one: I know and Iaintain that I a iortal. #ne !ould sa7 that this is a theologi!al

suggestion. I know and I aintain that I a iortal. %nd: I feel and I



14 Pli 1/ F)CC4

e?perien!e that I a eternal. In fa!t Spinoza hiself reKe!ts* in (ook ;* all

!on!eptions of iortalit7. &e sa7s to us: no no* it is not the !ase thate@er7one is iortalJ it is a atter of sa7ing that e@er7one is eternal* andthis is not at all the sae thing. Ah7 is this different &ow does Spinoza

present this what is this e?pressi@it7 I elie@e that it is ne!essar7 tounderstand the word in the strongest possile sense. This is not sipl7: Iake the e?perien!e* or I ha@e the e?perien!e. it is rather to !reate thee?perien!e in an a!ti@e anner.

I ha@e the e?perien!e that I a eternal. Ahat is it that this e?presses Itis @er7 !urious. If 7ou look for it in literature* it is u!h later* in the

English literature of the nineteenth !entur7* that 7ou will find a kind of Spinozis of this t7pe: eternit7* an e?perien!e of eternit7. %nd it is alsostrangel7 tied to the idea of intensit7* as if I !ould not ha@e the e?perien!eof eternit7 other than under an intensi@e for. This is a freHuent theewith authors who do not* e?a!tl7* appear to e to e so far reo@ed froSpinoza. E@en if the7 do not know it* in authors su!h as Lauren!e* in ainor ook su!h as Powys* there is a t7pe of e?perien!e of eternit7 under the for of the intensi@e.

&ere* I5ll tr7 to return to eing ore !on!rete. Ahen 7ou e?ist* 7ou

e?ist as 7ourself in opposition to e@er7thing else. E@er7thing opposes itself to e@er7thing else* and Spinoza does not at all sa7 it would e ne!essar7 toes!ape this. &e knows that this is asolutel7 ne!essar7. That this is adiension* a diension of e?isten!e. %greed* ut he sa7s: here* take twoe?tree !ases. Let us take the indi@idual RX5* the indi@idual +ierre. Letus !onsider +ierre* as hiself. &e spent the aKorit7 of his life M 7ou seehere how this e!oes @er7 nuan!ed and @er7 !on!rete M one !an sa7 of +ierre that he spent his life* ainl7* in the first kind of knowledge. This isthe !ase for ost people* sin!e a!!ording to Spinoza* it is ne!essar7 to

ha@e e@en a little philosoph7 to get out of the first kind of knowledge.Take the !ase of soeone that li@es ostl7 in the first kind of knowledge.Ah7 do I spe!if7 ostl7 it is ne!essar7 to e optiisti!* e@en if it doesnot alwa7s happen. This person* in an7 !ase* he will ha@e properl7understood a sall part of his life* a tie* not a long tie* a da7* ane@ening* an e@ening while returning to his hoe. &e will ha@e understooda sall part. &e will ha@e had the ipression of understanding a little of soething. -a7e he reall7 will ha@e understood a little of soething andthen* all his life he tries to forget that he had understood soething sostriking. Suddenl7 he sa7s to hiself: ut wait* there5s soething not Huite



GILLES DELEUZE 1/

right here. %ll* e@en the worst of the poor wret!hes* ha@e this e?perien!e.

E@en the worst of orons has passed !lose to soething where he hassaid: !ouldn5t I ha@e* !ouldn5t I ha@e passed all 7 life in de!eption Thenone lea@es to a sall e?tent the first kind of knowledge. I.e.* in Spinoza5sters* 7ou will ha@e understood e@en on a tin7 point* 7ou will ha@e had anintuition of soething of essen!e* or the intuition of an essen!e* or the!oprehension of a relationship. #ne !an e @er7 generous: there are @er7few people who are totall7 idioti!. There alwa7s is soething that the7understand. Ae all ha@e our skills. or e?aple soe ha@e an astonishingsense of soe anial. That does not pre@ent the fro eing ean* or whate@er* ut the7 ha@e soething: #r !onsider wood!raft: This t7pe* thisfool* this fool and this iser* at least when he talks aout trees there issoething* one feels that there is soething. #ne spends one5s tie toha@e these e?perien!es. The ipression that* if 7ou want* it is o@er* thate@en the worse !lown* there is a point where he has to stop eing a !lown.%t last there is soething. $ood7 is !ondened to the first kind of knowledge* there is alwa7s a sall hope. $ow this is @er7 iportant.There is a glier with soeone. It was less hateful when I did not

elie@e itQ It5s suffi!ient to find the skill. Then* ut of !ourse* soetiesone has e@en ore weaknesses to find* agreed* and then one falls again

fast. (ut I 7self do not know: the worst poli!ean* the worst I !ouldthink of* there surel7 has to e soe sall skill. Surel7.

Spinoza does hold out the !all to the ar7 of the lessed to sa@ee@er7one. $o* he wants to sa7 to us soething else. &e wants to sa7 to us*LookQ This is @er7 !opli!ated e!ause finall7* 7our e?isten!e is a atter of proportions. Ahat does this eans* a atter of proportions %greed*7ou ha@e the e?tensi@e parts that !opose 7ou* and so 7ou e?ist. It is notat all Huestion of reKe!ting that. Ahat would it e* to renoun!e thee?tensi@e parts that !opose e* that is* to renoun!e all the !oinationsof e?isten!e* so as to withdraw oneself fro all li@ed oppositions. Iwithdraw 7self fro li@ed oppositions. I onl7 eat grass. I li@e in a !a@e*et!. This is asi!all7 what we !all as!eti!is. Spinoza is not interested inthat at all. To hi it is a duious solution. ;er7* @er7 duious. &e thinksthat the as!eti! is deepl7 ali!ious* and that the as!eti! pursues anipla!ale hate* an ine?piale hate against the world* against nature*et!. ... Therefore this not at all what Spinoza would re!oend. &e sa7sto us: wat!h outJ in 7our e?isten!e it is a atter of a relati@e proportion*

etween what and what



13 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ou grant e that I now ha@e 7 three diensions of the indi@idual:

the e?tensi@e parts* se!ondl7 the relations* thirdl7 the essen!e or theintensi@e part that !onstitutes e. I !an e?press the in following for.The e?tensi@e parts that elong to e are the sae as the inadeHuate ideasthat I ha@e. The7 are ne!essaril7 inadeHuate. The7 are* therefore* theinadeHuate ideas that I ha@e and the passions that result fro theseinadeHuate ideas. The relations that !hara!terize e* when I arri@e atknowledge of the* these are the !oon notions* or adeHuate ideas. Theessen!e as pure intensi@e part* as a pure degree of power that !onstitutese* this again is an adeHuate idea. Spinoza sa7s to us: in 7our e?isten!e*7ou !an ha@e a @ague idea of the proportion that there is etweeninadeHuate ideas and passions* sin!e the two are linked* the inadeHuateideas and affe!ts0passions that fill 7our e?isten!e* on the one hand* and onthe other hand the adeHuate ideas and the a!ti@e affe!ts to whi!h 7ou!oe.

ou re!all* the inadeHuate ideas M I will finish Hui!kl7 and then ask if 7ou understood M inadeHuate ideas and passions* these relate a!k to thefirst diension of e?isten!e: to ha@e e?tensi@e parts. The two other aspe!ts* knowledge of relations and knowledge of degrees of power as

intensi@e parts* these refer a!k to the two other aspe!ts: the !hara!teristi!relations and the essen!e as intensi@e part. Suppose that in 7 e?isten!e Iha@e* !oparati@el7 Fplease note* it is not Huestion of renoun!ing e?tensi@e

parts: this would e to kill oneself* and we know what Spinoza thoughtaout sui!ide ... Iagine that during 7 e?isten!e I a!hie@ed a relati@eaount FSpinoza sa7s we !annot a!hie@e total a!ti@it7 sin!e 7ou are!oposed of e?tensi@e parts and 7ou are suKe!t to the law of e?tensi@e

partsJ ut suppose that 7ou ha@e su!!eeded in a!hie@ing ostl7 adeHuateideas and a!ti@e affe!ts. This is the first e?aple. %nd in the se!onde?aple* iagine: 7ou a!hie@ed a!ti@e affe!ts @er7 rarel7* and not for @er7long. #=. +ut 7ourself at the oent of 7our death. This is all @er7!on!rete. Ahen 7ou die* in the first e?aple and in the se!ond e?aple*what will happen Ahen 7ou die this eans that all the different kinds of e?tensi@e parts that ake 7ou up disappearJ this eans that the7 go off into other odies i.e. the7 effe!tuate other relations than 7ours. Ahen 7oudie in the se!ond e?aple* 7ou had in the aKorit7 of 7our e?isten!e*inadeHuate ideas and passi@e affe!ts. This eans that what dies is*!oparati@el7* the greater part of 7ourself. This is proportionall7 the larger

part of 7ourself. It is the other wa7 around in the first e?aple. This is



GILLES DELEUZE 1>

!urious* this inter@ention of a t7pe of relati@e proportion. This is what is

iportant in (ook ;. If 7ou iss this in (ook ; Fdespite Spinoza einge?pli!it aout it* I elie@e that 7ou !annot understand the o@eent of (ook ;. The other e?aple: suppose that during 7our e?isten!e 7ouattained* on the !ontrar7* a !oparati@el7 large nuer of adeHuate ideasand of a!ti@e affe!ts* at that @er7 oent the part of 7ou that dies is!oparati@el7 uniportant* insignifi!ant.

So this is @er7 odd. It see to e that Spinoza returns to the idea of e?isten!e as a test. (ut this is not at all a oral testJ this ore a test of a

ph7si!o0!hei!al t7pe. I feel that I a eternal* 7es. Ahat does this

stateent ean I now ha@e this e?perien!e* under what !onditionThis is not at all a Huestion of the soul sur@i@ing the od7* or the

Huestion of iortalit7 whi!h would e: in what sense and in what fordoes the soul sur@i@e the od7. This is how it was asked 7 philosoph7and theolog7* Fignoring the huge differen!es* fro +lato to Des!artes.ro +lato to Des!artes* this Huestion is asked. This is reall7 the Huestionof the iortalit7 of the soul* and the iortalit7 of the soul ne!essaril7

passes* fro this point in tie* 7 wa7 of the prole of a efore and of an after. Ah7 Ahat deterines the efore and the after* fro the

standpoint of the iortalit7 of the soul* nael7 the oent of the unionof the soul and od7 nael7 that* efore the soul* is efore in!arnation* efore the soul unites itself to a od7. The after of iortalit7* the after of the soul* this is after death* this is to sa7 after what ... hen!e the dis!ofortof all the authors who ha@e talked aout the iortalit7 of the soul. Ahatis their dis!ofort It is that the iortalit7 of the soul !annot eapprehended or !an e !on!ei@ed onl7 under the teporal for of a eforeand of an after. %nd this is alread7 the whole thee of the Phaedrus thatintrodu!es +lato5s ideas aout the iortalit7 of the soul. +lato5s

Phaedrus dialogue laun!hes a huge do!trine of the iortalit7 of the soul pre!isel7 under the for of the efore and the after: efore the union andafter the union. Ahen Spinoza opposes his eternit7 to iortalit7* onesees pre!isel7 what he wants to sa7. ro the standpoint of iortalit7* if 7ou like* I !an know that the soul is iortal. (ut in what doesiortalit7 !onsist It !onsists in eing ale to sa7 that* for e?aple* Iknow FI know M ut then 7 wa7 of what kind of knowledge M ut this is aside issue that 7 soul does not die with 7 od7. E@en if I adit the+latoni! idea that there is this knowledge* I do not know what kind of forit has. Ah7 e!ause iortalit7 trul7 sees to e?!lude the efore and the



1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

after* so it is alread7 an eternit7* ore pre!isel7 it !annot e known

O savoir P or known OconnaisP that under the spe!ies of the efore and after.%nd Des!artes again will ask: under what for That the soul is iortal*I !an sa7 I a sure of this* a!!ording to Des!artes. (ut as to whi!h for* Iknow nothing. I !an at ost assert that there is a efore and that there is anafter. That the soul was not orn with the od7 and that it does not diewith the od7. I !an assert that. I !annot assert the what or the how. Itwould ne!essaril7 ha@e to e an intelle!tual intuition* as the7 sa7* ut wedon5t ha@e intelle!tual intuition.

This is not how Spinoza puts the prole* e!ause for hi the prole

does not in@ol@e a efore and an after. It is a prole of the sae tie. Iwant to sa7 that at the sae tie I a ortal that I e?perien!e6e?perientthat I a eternal. %nd to e?perien!e6e?perient that I a eternal does notean that there is a efore* that there has een a efore and that there will

e an afterJ it eans that starting now I e?perien!e6e?perient soethingthat !annot e under the for of tie. %nd what is this* that !annot eunder the for of tie To know that there are two asolutel7 opposedeanings of the word partJ first: there are the parts that I ha@e: these arethe e?tensi@e parts* e?ternal to one another* and I ha@e the in the ode

of tie. In effe!t* I onl7 ha@e the pro@isionall7. I ha@e the in duration. Iha@e the in the ode of tie: whi!h is the parts that are e?ternal to oneanother* the e?tensi@e parts that I ha@e. #=. (ut when I sa7: intensi@e

parts* I want to sa7 soething !opletel7 different. The two senses of theword part differ in nature* e!ause when I sa7 intensi@e parts Y essen!e*this is no longer a part or parts that I ha@e* this is a part that I a. I a adegree of power. I a an intensi@e part. I a an intensi@e part and other essen!es are also intensi@e parts. +art of what +art of the power of God*sa7s Spinoza. E?perien!e6e?perient that I a eternal: this is toe?perien!e6e?perient that parts* in the intensi@e sense* !oe?ist anddiffer in nature fro parts in the sense of e?ternal and e?tensi@e. Ie?perien!e6e?perient here and now that I a eternal. This eans that Ia an intensi@e part or a degree of power irredu!ile to the e?tensi@e partsthat I ha@e* that I possess. So that when the e?tensi@e parts are taken froe Y death* that does not effe!t the intensi@e part Fwhat I a fro alleternit7. I e?perien!e6e?perient that I a eternal. (ut onl7 on one!ondition* on the !ondition that I rose to ideas and to affe!ts that gi@e tothis intensi@e part an a!tualit7. It is in this sense that Ie?perien!e6e?perient that I a eternal. Therefore this is an



GILLES DELEUZE 19

e?perientation that signifies an eternit7 or a !oe?isten!e* and not an

iortalit7 of su!!ession. Starting now* in 7 e?isten!e* I !ane?perien!e6e?perient the irredu!iilit7 of the intensi@e part that I a froall eternit7* that I a eternall7* to the e?tensi@e parts that I possess under the for of duration. (ut* if I did not ake a!tual 7 essen!e* or e@en 7relations* if I reained onl7 within the law of e?tensi@e parts that eetthesel@es fro the outside* at that @er7 oent I ha@e not e@en the ideaof e?perien!ing that I a eternal. %t that @er7 oent* when I die* 7es* Ilose the greater part of 7self. The opposite would happen if I ade 7intensi@e part proportionall7 larger. Ahat does this ean ,learl7 this isnot straightforward. This rings into pla7* in a t7pe of proportional!al!ulation* the e?tensi@e parts that I ha@e and the intensi@e parts that Ia. This is diffi!ult sin!e there is no !oonalit7 in nature etween thetwo senses of the word part. So* how !an it e said that one or the other is ore or less large* !oparati@el7* than the other Spinoza tells us: whenI die* soeties what perishes* nael7 the e?tensi@e parts that are nolonger a part of e* that whi!h perishes of e* is in !ertain !ases thegreater part* and in other !ases it is an insignifi!ant part* rather sall. Itwould e ne!essar7 therefore that the intensi@e part and the e?tensi@e partsha@e a !oon !riterion in whi!h to enter into this rule of proportion*

nael7 fro the two e?tree !ases where soeties the e?tensi@e partsthat disappear* !onstitute the larger part of 7self. Soeties* theopposite* where the7 !onstitute onl7 a sall part of 7self e!ause theintensi@e part has taken the larger part of 7self. #=* we !annot gofurther. It is perhaps up to us* in e?isten!e* to estalish this t7pe of

proportional !al!ulation* or of the li@ed sense of proportion. It would ene!essar7 to sa7 what is iportant in a life* what is it that is iportant.

The !riterion of iportan!e. To what ha@e 7ou gi@en iportan!e%nswer: 7ou ha@e gi@en iportan!e to Rthe iportant5. It would ene!essar7 to do soething* alost* of iportan!e. This is iportantJ that isnot iportant. It would e alost ne!essar7 to ake it a !riterion of e?isten!eQ +eople* what do the7 Kudge iportant in their life That whi!h isiportant is it what is said on the radio Is it ne!essar7 to e a stap0!olle!tor to li@e a health7 life +erhaps all thatQ Ahat is a happ7 life* in thesense where soeone dies while sa7ing to hiself: after all I ha@e largel7done what I wanted. I !ae !lose to doing what I wanted* or what I wouldha@e wished for* 7es this is good. Ahat is this !urious lessing that one!an gi@e oneself and that is the opposite of a self0!ontentent Ahat is it



1B Pli 1/ F)CC4

that one eans 7 this !ategor7* the iportant es agreed* that is

earrassing* ut it is not iportant. Ahat is this !al!ulation Is it notthis !ategor7 of the rearkale or of the iportant that allows us tosee the proportions etween the two irredu!ile senses of the word part%nswer: what depends on* or what results fro* the intensi@e part of 7self* and what returns* on the !ontrar7* to the e?tensi@e parts that Iha@e.

%nd then* o@iousl7 there is alwa7s the prole of preature deaths ...The singular essen!e* it !oes into e?isten!e* good* ut I a a !rushed

a7 OLaughP. Up to whi!h point the Spinozist rule holds* nael7 that the

tie that I endure ultiatel7 has no iportan!e. Spinoza sa7s this @er7firl7* and he has the right to sa7 it sin!e he did not die @er7 old ut hewas not a !rushed a7. &e had the tie to write The Ethics$ So*nonetheless* what aout the aies that die Spinoza5s rule* ut after allwhen I die this eans onl7 one thing* nael7: I no longer ha@e e?tensi@e

parts. Ae are earrassed 7 !ases of preature deaths* e!ause of preature deaths* one alwa7s !an sa7: he has his eternal essen!e* ut thiseternal essen!e* on!e ore* in this wa7 that one reads Spinoza* is notsipl7 an essen!e like a atheati!al figure. It is an essen!e that e?ists

onl7 insofar as it has passed into e?isten!eJ i.e. soething that hasa!tualized its degree* or it has a!tualized 7 itself its own degreeJ i.e. theintensi@e part that it was. It goes without sa7ing that when I die

preaturel7 I ha@e not at all a!tualized the intensi@e part that I was. Inother words I e?pressed nothing.

I ha@e in no wa7 e!oe the intensit7 that I a.

%ll this is what happens when one dies at a !ertain age* ut all thosethat die efore There I elie@e in fa!t that it is ne!essar7 rather... If oneiagines that a !orrespondent !ould ha@e asked this of Spinoza* what

would Spinoza ha@e replied I elie@e that he would not ha@e at allflattered this ali!ious Huestioner. &e would ha@e said soething like:unfortunatel7 7es* this is all part of the irredu!ile e?teriorit7 of nature*that akes up the group of people who ha@e een* who will e poisoned*et!. That the whole prole of the e?tensi@e part of ourself was su!h thatin !ertain !ases it !ould indeed ake ... I ean that* in Spinozisti! ters* itis ne!essar7 alost to sa7: soeone who dies preaturel7* 7es* this is a!ase where death iposes itself in su!h a anner that* it is iposed inthese !onditions su!h that* at this oent it !on!erns the greater part of

the indi@idual we are !onsidering.



GILLES DELEUZE )C

(ut what one !alls a happ7 life is to do all that one !an* and Spinoza

insists on this in order pre!isel7 to tr7 to a@ert preature deathsJ i.e. to pre@ent preature deaths. Ahat does this ean In no wa7 tr7ing to stopdeath* ut so that death* when it !oes* finall7 onl7 !on!erns the sallest

part of 7self. &ere I elie@e* su!h as he saw it* he e?perien!ed and feltthings.

Translated by %on &ubin



Pli 1/ F)CC4* )10/4

Spinoza: S#perior $piri%ist

&'()T*)( R!+I(

This paper was pro@oked 7 two things. irst 7 a fas!inating !oent inDeleuze5s Expressionism in Philosophy Fwhi!h he repeats in Practical

Philosophy where he writes that the !oon notions ust e understoodas ore iologi!al than atheati!al. Se!ond 7 a worr7 that despite their

est efforts and intentions* re!ent attepts to swit!h and de@elop the fo!usof in@estigation in Spinoza to his a!!ount of the iagination ha@e* 7downpla7ing or ignoring the role of reason* lost soethng !ru!ial for our ailit7 to distinguish etween ser@itude and freedo.

Co$$on (otions

Ah7 are Spinoza5s !oon notions interesting or rele@ant to!onteporar7 politi!al theor7 There ha@e een a nuer of e?!ellentworks that treat of the fundaental iportan!e of the iagination as far as

politi!al organisation is !on!erned. I a thinking in parti!ular of (aliar5s'pino(a and Politics Fand a nuer of his essa7s* Llo7d and Gatens5)ollective *maginings and of !ourse $egri5s The 'avage !nomaly. The

ne!essit7 of engaging with the interse!tion of Spinoza5s theor7 of iagination and politi!s would e suffi!ientl7 Kustified for no other reasonthan that ost people* ost of the tie* in their intera!tions* fun!tion at thele@el of the first kind of knowledge. (aliar is parti!ularl7 instru!ti@e onhow the iagination in Spinoza5s Ethics fun!tions as a kind of priar7Rso!ial glue5 for want of a etter phrase M all iagination is ne!essaril7!olle!ti@e in as u!h as it is the result of an intera!tion etween oth 7our own and soe other od7 Fhen!e Llo7d and Gatens5 title. %ll of this issuffi!ient to Kustif7 this work. &owe@er* none of this work Fand Llo7d and

Gatens are ore guilt7 of this than others should lind us to the status of



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ ))

the iagination in Spinoza. The iagination is ne!essaril7 inadequate. So

long as we reain within the first kind of knowledge and Deleuze isasolutel7 right when he writes: The different kinds of knowledge arealso different wa7s of li@ing* different odes of e?isting ODeleuze 1BB)

p.)9BP* so long will our wa7 of li@ing e inadeHuate too. In pre!isel7 whatsense should we !onsider it inadeHuate The first kind of knowledgelea@es us at the er!7 of !han!e en!ounters M as a wa7 of life* it is theun!ontrolled nature of our en!ounters that lea@es us alwa7s pre7 tosadness or weakness. Deleuze has a wonderful des!ription of life as thefirst kind of knowledge when he des!ries swiing* a !ru!ial e?aplethat will e e?ained further:

So what is the knowledge of the first kind It is this: to go* Ilaun!h 7self* I go there* I a in the first kind of knowledge. Ilaun!h 7self. I splash aout as one sa7s. Ah7 does one want tosa7 Rsplash aout5 Splashing aout is @er7 siple. Splashingaout* the phrase a!!uratel7 indi!ates* one sees !learl7* that thisis all a atter of e?trinsi! relations. Soeties the wa@e slapse and soeties it !arries eJ these are the effe!ts of a sho!k*nael7: I do not know an7thing of the relation that is !oposed

or that de!oposes itself. I re!ei@e the effe!ts of e?trinsi! parts.The parts that elong e to e are shaken. The7 re!ei@e theeffe!t of a sho!k fro the parts that elong to the wa@e. Sosoeties I laugh and soeties I sni@el* as a result of what thewa@e does to e* akes e laugh or kno!ks e senseless. I5affe!ted passionatel7: &a u* the wa@e fought eQ #=. &au* the wa@e fought e. M a s!rea that we will not stopha@ing so long as we reain in the first kind of knowledge

ODeleuze 1B91* this @oue* p. >P

Iagination is the doain of servitude.

,reedo$ is virt#e or perfe%tion-

The diffi!ult7 with a !on!ept su!h as freedo is the Fperhaps artifi!ialseparailit7 of two Huestions: what is it %nd how does one a!hie@e it

1 OSpinoza 1B31* N).P



)4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

That these are artifi!iall7 or astra!tl7 separale M and that this is a ad

thing M is a worr7 that is linked to a roader !on!ern aout the status of !oon notions generall7. This is* for the oent* regrettal7 opaHue utit will e ade !learer when I !oe to address the !opetinginterpretations of what the !oon notions are in Spinoza. That these twoHuestions are not properl7 e@en astra!tl7 separale for Spinoza is!aptured 7 his insisten!e on the eHui@alen!e of @irtue or perfe!tion.Though this parti!ular eHui@alen!e is stated in the Political Treatise* itsdeonstration is also to e found in the prefa!e to (ook I; of the Ethics:7 perfe!tion in general I shall understand realit7* as I ha@e said that isthe essen!e of an7 thing whatsoe@er and then Definition 9: (7 virtue and

power I ean the sae thingJ that is F+r.*III* @irtue* in so far as it isrelated to an* is an5s @er7 essen!e. So we get the eHui@alen!es:essen!e or perfe!tion* F@irtue or power or essen!e therefore perfe!tion or @irtue. #f !ourse* Ran5s @er7 essen!e5 is nothing ut desire M that is* hisconatus. So we !an !on!lude that Reing free5 is alwa7s an a!ti@it7 M if notne!essaril7 a Rstri@ing5.) reedo is pre!isel7 a e!oing.

Despite the diffi!ult7 of separating the proles of what freedo isfro how we a!hie@e it* su!h a separation is ne!essar7 if onl7 for the

initial pedagogi!al ipetus. (ut I ha@e still not e?plained wh7* if we areinterested in freedo* we should also e interested in the !oon notions.This ight e thought to e Huite straightforward* ut in fa!t is an7thing

ut.

The initial !ru!ial proposition is I;+)4:

In so far as a an is deterined to soe a!tion fro the fa!tthat he has inadeHuate ideas* he !annot e said* withoutHualifi!ation* to e a!ting fro @irtue Oi.e. he is not freePJ he !an

e said to do so onl7 in so far as he is deterined fro the fa!tthat he understands.

%s a stateent of Spinoza5s position* this is @er7 !lear. If 7ou understandsoething* it is e!ause 7ou ha@e fored a !oon notion* or adeHuateidea. It is onl7 on the asis of adeHuate ideas that we !an e said to e

) I ha@e dealt elsewhere with the proles of translating !onatur and wh7 it is not ateleologi!al notion. The est translation* to 7 ind* would e work or effort M understood in stri!tl7 energeti!ist ters. This is* unfortunatel7* not soething Iha@e the spa!e here to defend and so I ha@e retained the ore traditional

translation.



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ )/

a!ti@e F7 III+1 M and it is onl7 when we are a!ti@e that we are free. This

is* so far* Kust a !larifi!ation of I;+)4. The real prole !oes in the proof:

In so far as a an is deterined to a!tion fro the fa!t that hehas inadeHuate ideas* to that e?tent F+r.1*III he is passi@eJ thatis FDefs 1. and )*III* he does soething that !annot e

per!ei@ed solely in ters of his own essen!e* that is FDef.9*I;*soething that does not follow fro his own @irtue. (ut in so far as he is deterined to an a!tion fro the fa!t that he

understands* to that e?tent he is a!ti@e F+r.1*IIIJ that isFDef.)*III he does soething that is perceived solely in termso+ his own essence* that is FDef.B*I;* whi!h follows adeHuatel7fro his own @irtue.

Oephases addedP

The !ru!ial diffi!ult7 for an7one who ight wish to a!!ept this proof as@alid is the !lai that to the e?tent that one is passi@e* an a!tion !annot e

per!ei@ed in ters of one5s own essen!e i.e. it is not a free a!t. Ah7 is

there a prole with this !lai There is a prole e!ause it appearsdire!tl7 to !ontradi!t part of the proof of III+B: The essen!e of the indis constituted 7 adequate and inadequate ideas Fas we showed in III+4*and so FIII+ it endea@ours to persist in its own eing in so far as it has

oth these kinds of ideas Oephases addedP. The !ontradi!tion isgenerated 7 the !lai of III+B that the essen!e of the ind is !onstituted

7 adeHuate and inadeHuate ideas and the !lai of I;+)4 thatinadeHuate ideas !annot e per!ei@ed solel7 in ters of its own essen!ee@en though inadeHuate ideas partiall7 !onstitute one5s essen!e. III+B+r

!lais that the essen!e of the ind is !onstituted 7 both adeHuate andinadeHuate ideas whereas I;+)4+r !lais that it is onl7 adeHuate ideasthat !onstitute the essen!e of the ind.

These two Huotations need a lot of unpa!king to dispel the apparent!ontradi!tion. The !ru!ial word* I will argue* that dispels the apparent!ontradi!tion is: Rsolel75.

This will e ade a lot !learer 7 a return to the swiing e?apleused 7 Deleuze. It is perfe!tl7 possile to stay a+loat Fi.e. sta7ing afloat issoething we !an do without eing ale to swim M so long as the sea is



)3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

kind* or if we wearing soething like ar0ands* or are holding on to a

pie!e of wood. %s Deleuze puts it: we are !arried 7 the water. So long asthis reains the !ase* we !annot understand our ailit7 to sta7 afloat solelyin ters of our own ailit7 to swi. (ut if we !an swi then there isnothing else that needs to e added or understood in order to e?plain our sta7ing afloat. #@iousl7 in order to swi* 7ou need water Fand air* andgra@it7 et!.* ut eing ale to swi is su++icient to e?plain soeod7ssta7ing afloat* whereas soeod7 who !annot swi needs soething elseto e?plain their sta7ing afloat: e.g. ar0ands or lu!k.

To Kustif7 this parti!ular e?planation* let us !onsider the proof to III+1:

In e@er7 huan ind* soe of its ideas are adeHuate* others arefragentar7 and !onfused. $ow ideas that are adeHuate insoeone5s ind are adeHuate in God in so far as he !onstitutesthe essen!e of that indJ and furtherore those ideas that areinadeHuate in the ind are also adeHuate in God* not in so far ashe !ontains in hiself the essen!e of that ind only* ut in so far as he !ontains the inds of other things as well.

Oephasis addedP

This proof relies on the idea that fro the perspe!ti@e of sustan!e* thereare no su!h things as inadeHuate ideas. Sustan!e !annot suffer* as there isnothing e?ternal to it. %s it !annot suffer* all odifi!ations of sustan!eare a!ti@e M that is the7 are adeHuate ideas F!onsidered under the attriuteof thought or a!tions F!onsidered under the attriute of e?tension.+assions* or inadeHuate ideas* are therefore ne!essaril7 perspectival Fseealso II+4+r: there are no ideas !onfused or inadeHuate* e?!ept in respe!tto a parti!ular ind and III+4S!h: Ae therefore see that passi@e states

are related to the ind onl7 in so far as the ind has soething in@ol@ingnegation: that is O siveP* in so far as the ind is !onsidered a part of $ature*whi!h !annot e !learl7 and distin!tl7 per!ei@ed through itself independentl7 of other parts$ It is onl7 odes that !an suffer* or ha@einadeHuate ideas* ut all ideas are adeHuate in God. It is e!auseinadeHuate ideas alwa7s in@ol@e oth our own essen!e and the essen!e of another ode* that the7 !annot e understood solel7 in ters of our ownessen!e. It needs stressing again that this is not a s7etri!al relation. If the reason we !an sta7 afloat is e!ause we !an swi* this does not ean



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ )>

that we ha@e suddenl7 e!oe !ut off fro nature M adeHuate ideas* or

eing a!ti@e* in no wa7 suddenl7 !onstitute an or an7thing else as aniperiu in iperio F(ook III prefa!e. %t the @er7 least* as I saidearlier* to sta7 afloat 7ou need water and gra@it7 M ut if the reason that7ou sta7 afloat is e!ause 7ou !an swi* e!ause 7ou are swiing* thenthis is suffi!ient and this is no ore than repeating Def1*III: (7 anadeHuate !ause* I ean a !ause through whi!h its effe!t !an e !learl7 anddistin!tl7 per!ei@ed. If the reason that 7ou are sta7ing afloat is e!ause7ou are wearing ar0ands then 7ou are onl7 the Rpartial !ause5 of 7our sta7ing afloat FDef)*III. #f !ourse 7 Spinoza5s own theor7 if soething!oines with our own power* then it is legitiate to !onsider theasselage as one indi@idual. This of !ourse would ean that the huan0wearing0ar0ands asselage would indeed e sta7ing afloat through itsown essen!eJ it would e the adeHuate !ause of its sta7ing afloat.

hat are %o$$on notions/

There is with @er7 few e?!eptions a broad !onsensus aout Kust what a

!oon notion is. I stress the road* e!ause there is soe disagreeentaout the pre!ise details. In an interesting paper S!hoen dis!usses anuer of different interpretations of !oon notions. %s he puts it:Spinoza hiself is so terse* if not ta!iturn* with regard to this topi! thatan7 interpretation of his thought ust look for !orroorati@e support

e7ond ere !onsisten!7 with the te?t OS!hoen 1B p.34P.4 Despite thisla!k of te?tual e@iden!e all !oentators agree on the iportan!e of !oon notions. Ahether it is Deleuze writing that the entire Ethics iswritten fro the standpoint of the !oon notions ODeleuze 1B99 p. 3P

or ,urle7 writing that the !on!ept of the !oon notions O...P is of !onsiderale signifi!an!e in the ature theor7 of the Ethics O,urle7 1B4 p./BP. There is no disagreeent aout the iportan!e of the !oonnotions.

4 This is an e?!ellent paper M not onl7 for the thoroughness of its anal7sis of what Iha@e een !alling the R!onsensus @iew5 of !oon notions ut also for itso!!asional insights into Spinoza5s ontolog7. Its onl7 flaw is its ain thesis: the

elief that soehow* Spinoza was tr7ing to pro@ide an a!!ount for how logi! Rlo!ksonto5 the world* turning the Ethics into a Fadittedl7 at least on Shoen5s a!!ount*

su!!essful proto0 Tractatus Logico"philosophicusJ a o@e as old as it is wrong.



) Pli 1/ F)CC4

&ow does this road !onsensus suggest we should understand !oon

notions The7 are ideas of properties !oon to all oKe!ts that wee?perien!e O,urle7 1B4 p.3/* ephasis addedP./ #r ore full7:

!oon notions are the foundations* or starting0points* of our genuine reasoning Frationcinii nostri +undamenta and of s!ientifi! knowledge F +undamenta rationis. The oKe!ts of su!hideas* their ideata* are those properties whi!h an7 ode of e?tension or an7 od7* or an7 part of one* ne!essaril7 possesseserel7 in @irtue of eing a ode of E?tension.

O&apshire 1B3C p. B3 ephasis on Rproperties5 addedP

If !oon notions are notions of properties* that is: that their !ontents are properties* what is their for %s there is a !onsensus aout the !ontent of !oon notions* it is unsurprising to find that there is also !onsensusaout their for: !oon notions are propositionalJ as one ight e?pe!tgi@en that the7 are supposed to e the dedu!ti@e ase of our s!ien!e.,oon notions* on this @iew* are fors of declarative nowledge Fasopposed to pro!edural knowledge: knowing that * rather than knowing

how. Ahat is the te?tual e@iden!e in the Ethics, the onl7 pla!e where!oon notions are dis!ussed* for this kind of @iew There are two ainarguents that !an e put forward to support the idea that !oon notionsare ideas of properties. The first* rests on how to translate II+4B: Id Huod!orpori huano et Huiusda !orporius e?ternis* a Huius !orpushuanu affi!i solet* !oune est* et proprium Oephasis addedP.listad translates this as: That whi!h is !oon to and a propert7 of thehuan od7* and !ertain e?ternal odies 7 whi!h the huan od7 is usedto e affe!ted.3 This akes it !lear that what !oon notions are notions

of are properties. -ore odern translations* spe!ifi!all7 ,urle7 andShirle7 do not translate et propriu as a propert7 ut as proper toi.e. that whi!h is !oon and proper to. This does not gi@e as u!h!reden!e to the @iew that what Spinoza is referring to are properties*though this does not stop ,urle7 fro !laiing that the7 are.

The first ad@antage of understanding !oon notions as knowledge of properties is that it does not deand an7 spe!ial interpretati@e effort on

/ See also Olistad 1B>B p. 1C9P

3 See also the Elwes translation for a siilar rendering.



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ )9

our part to see how and wh7* It is in the nature of reason to per!ei@e

things under a for of eternit7 FII+//,or and of !auses as ne!essar7. Inas u!h as we think that scienti+ic laws are supposed to hold [email protected]. the7 are not teporall7 ound and ne!essaril7* then the7 look to egood !andidates for eing !oon notions. The se!ond ad@antage of understanding the !oon notions as knowledge of properties* that is* astrue uni@ersals Fas opposed to the false uni@ersals* or trans!endentals thatSpinoza disisses and denoun!es in II+/CS!h* is that it allows us to fitSpinoza into a !oon lineage of philosophers who ha@e linked a growthin knowledge to a growth in freedo. This lineage goes a!k to the Stoi!sand +lato and is the doinant assuption underl7ing the Enlightenent. If &apshire is right in !laiing that !oon notions are the foundations of our s!ientifi! pra!ti!es* then Spinoza5s theor7 would pla!e hi firl7 inthe tradition %dorno and &orkheier des!rie in the -ialectic o+

Enlightenment . This would ake Spinoza5s !lai that !oon notionsare the prereHuisite for our freedo thoroughl7 !oprehensile. &owe@er*in interpreting Spinoza5s !on!eption of reason as a for of spe!ifi!all7instrumental rationality M the Huestion as to whether Spinoza was right to!lai that !oon notions just are the ne!essar7 and suffi!ient !onditionfor our freedo looks a lot ore proleati!.

This a7 all e going a it too fast. The Rinstruental rationalit75 tag!an all too Hui!kl7 e applied to an7 philosophers5 !on!eptions of reasonFand in an7 !ases is a wa7 of disissal that reHuires as u!h thought asthe !harge of ressentiment J it needs a lot and 7et rarel7 gets it and in fa!tlooks e@en ore appli!ale to an understanding of !oon notions thatreads the as pro!edural rather than de!larati@e knowledge Fas I intend todo. The prole with this reading of Spinoza is that it turns an into aniperiu in iperio Fkingdo within a kingdo M or if not an thenthe udding Enlightenent philosophe$ %n7 arguent that rea!hes a !laiso e?pli!itl7 reKe!ted 7 Spinoza ust e treated with suspi!ion.

The final prole that I want to outline with the de!larati@e knowledgeinterpretation of the !oon notions is that it renders parti!ularl77sterious Spinoza5s !lai in II+49: Those things that are !oon to allthings and are eHuall7 in the part as in the whole !an e !on!ei@ed onl7adeHuatel7. ,oentators* su!h as ,urle7 or &aphsire* who read this

proposition as referring to asi! s!ientifi! understanding are left wonderinghow: Spinoza ight ha@e re!on!iled this @iew with the fa!t that peopledid* for an7 !enturies* ha@e inadeHuate ideas aout otionO,urle7 1B4



)B Pli 1/ F)CC4

p.3/P M and indeed still do. E@en worse is the !orollar7 to this proposition:

&en!e it follows that there are !ertain ideas or notions !oon to allen. To whi!h the onl7 response is in!redulit7 M e?a!tl7 what propositionis supposed to e affired 7 all people e@er7where and presual7 at allties sin!e the irth of language

Ahat I5@e here een !alling the standard @iew of !oon notionswhere7 their !ontents are properties and their for is propositional* runsinto se@eral proles. Ahat are we to ake of Spinoza5s repeatedinsisten!e throughout (ooks III and I; of the Ethics of the !lai that wedo ha@e adeHuate ideas* not an7 adittedl7* ut soe* if adeHuate ideas

are supposed to e the +oundation for our F!urrent* or se@enteenth!entur7 s!ientifi! pra!ti!e. &ow are we to understand Spinoza5s !laithat we do ha@e !oon notions* that soe !oon notions are had 7all people* if the7 are supposed to e s!ientifi! notions

S#perior $piri%ist

In the title to this paper* I proposed that Spinoza should e read as a

Rsuperior epiri!ist5. $ow this is not eant to e 7et another inter@ention*or an attept at a ressure!tion* of the epiri!ist6rationalist deate.> ThisRdeate5 was definiti@el7 uried 7 a paper 7 ,urle7 O,urle7 1B4P*whi!h starts off 7 pointing out that the rationalist6epiri!ist distin!tionwas nonsense to egin with and then shows how fundaental the notion of e?perien!e and e?perient are to Spinoza5s work M he !ould ha@e alsoadded praxis as in experientia sive praxis OSpinoza 1B31* N1.4P.Superior epiri!ist is a ter that was originall7 !oined 7 S!helling*reused 7 (ergson and then resurre!ted 7 Deleuze. I do not for the

oent wish to suggest that I !an gi@e either a full or a definiti@ee?planation of what this phrase is supposed to denote in Deleuze5s ownwork. In fa!t I a gi@ing it a thoroughl7 partial reading in as u!h as I adeterinedl7 ignoring Deleuze5s !oents aout how a new do!trine of the fa!ulties is a !entral !oponent of a superior epiri!is. 'e@ised or not* properl7 trans!endental or not* I a not going to tr7 to for!e fa!ultiesonto Spinoza.

> &owe@er* see Deleuze 1BB)a for a wa7 of re!asting the epiri!ist 6 rationalist

distin!tion that does not start fro the prole of knowledge.



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ 4C

So what a I taking to e the defining feature of a superior epiri!is

%t the end of the iage of thought !hapter of -i++erence and &epetition*Deleuze argues that the eedded assuptions of the dogati! iage of thought finall7 !ollapse into Kust one: the pri@ileging of knowledge o@er learning. That is: the dogati! iage of thought !lais to e?haust what weean 7 thinking 7 redu!ing it to knowing M or redu!es thought toknowledge. This is all part of Deleuze5s general !ritiHue of representationas eing inadeHuate to a!!ount for what thinking is. I think it is o@iousthat what I ha@e !alled the Rstandard interpretation5 of the !oon notionsis a !lear instantiation of the dogati! iage of thoughtJ whether or not thestandard interpretation is !orre!t* those who ha@e proposed it !an eshown to hold to the ipli!it presuppositions of the dogati! iage of thought. Deleuze !lais that all the eight postulates eed within oneanother su!h that the7 !ould all e deri@ed fro the eighth and final

presupposition that learning is dependent upon knowledge. In order to Kustif7 7 !lai that the standard interretation adheres to the iage of thought I would ha@e to show that the7 held the last presupposition* andthe rest would follow. Deleuze5s !lai that all the postulates !an ederi@ed fro the final one a7 e thought to e Huestionale. &owe@er*with the standard interpretation5s !lai that the se!ond kind of knowledge

is de!larati@e and foundational for s!ien!e* we !an see the outlines of theeighth* whi!h is the final presupposition: the postulate of the end* or result* the postulate of knowledge Fthe suordination of learning toknowledge and the si?th: the postulate of logi!al fun!tion* or the

proposition Fdesignation is taken to e the lo!us of truth ODeleuze 1BB/ p. 1>P.

The proles that the standard interpretation has !an e seen to ha@e een !learl7 anti!ipated in Deleuze5s own !ritiHue of the dogati! iageof thought. Deleuze announ!es Fin his two ooks on Spinoza that thefundaental ethi!o0politi!al prole is the prole of how we achieve!oon notions. In aking this pronoun!eent he is sa7ing no ore thanthis: that the prole of learning is !entral to the Ethics* that Spinoza isnot a philosopher whose work is susuale within the dogati! iage of thought. If we are to take seriousl7 Deleuze5s !lai that the !oonnotions are ore iologi!al than atheati!al* we need to ha@e anunderstanding of the radi!all7 different fro the standard one.

I !ould put it this wa7: to know how to swi is to ha@e a !oonnotion of the relations that are fored 7 7 od7 and a od7 of water.



41 Pli 1/ F)CC4

This is* I elie@e* still too astra!t and stati! M swiing* the a!ti@it7 of

sta7ing afloat is a !oon notion M a !oon notion that is !ontinuall7fored and refored anew with e@er7 stroke and reathJ alwa7s liale tothe realis of the sole a?io of ook I; of the Ethics: There is in $atureno indi@idual thing that is not surpassed in strength and power 7 soeother thing. Ahatsoe@er thing there is* there is another ore powerful 7whi!h the said thing !an e destro7ed. $o atter how well we !an swithere is alwa7s an une?pe!ted rip0tide or unusual wa@e that !ande!opose the !oon notion that we were otherwise ale to for. I5not going to sa7 an7 ore aout how we for !oon notions Kust 7et* asI want to !onsider a set of oKe!tions that -a!here7 raises in O-a!here71BB>P.

The n%o#nter with Spinoza

The o@erall thrust of -a!here75s paper is !on!erned to opposeDeleuze5s reading of Spinoza5s philosoph7 as a philosoph7 of e?pression.%lthough it is not 7 intention to defend Deleuze5s reading of Spinoza as

an e?pressionist philosopher* there is an additional interesting point of disagreeent whi!h !an e inferred 7 a reark -a!here7 akes at theend of his paper: we ight ore !on@in!ingl7 present hi OSpinozaP as atheorist of alienation* than ake hi a philosopher of e?pressionO-a!here7 1BB> p.13>P. The iport of this !oent 7 -a!here7 is Ithink that there is u!h ore to the disagreeent etween Deleuze and-a!here7 than a !lash within the histor7 of philosoph7. %s I ha@e een

pointing out* and will hopefull7 !ontinue to ake !learer* the Huestion of Spinoza5s !oon notions is tied to the Huestion of Spinoza5s theor7 of

freedo and of politi!s. #ne !an see in this !oent 7 -a!here7 a u!hlarger !lash with Deleuze o@er the wa7 in whi!h politi!s* freedo and of !ourse* -ar?is should e thought. %s signifi!ant as this !lash is* this isnot the pla!e to deal with it.

-a!here7 oKe!ts to the interpretation of Spinoza as a philosopher of e?pression. &e liits his oKe!tions to two spe!ifi! points of interpretation.The first point is Deleuze5s reading of Spinoza as iporting a S!otistnotion of Hualit7 to define the attriutesJ I will not deal with this oKe!tionas it is not rele@ant to 7 !on!erns here. The se!ond oKe!tion* whi!h is

the one that does pose a rele@ant prole for e* is to Deleuze5s a!!ount



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ 4)

of the foration of !oon notions. -a!here75s oKe!tions are threefold

ut all re@ol@e around the status of RKo7ful passions5. irstl7 he dete!ts Rtheoutline of a diale!ti!5 in the need for the e?isten!e of Ko7ful passions andDeleuze5s des!ription of the o@eent fro Ko7ful passions to !oonnotions. Se!ondl7 he reKe!ts the @er7 e?isten!e of Ko7ful passions. Thirdl7*

Kust to ake sure* he argues that e@en if the7 did e?ist then the7 would etoo unstale to do the work that Deleuze* or I need the to do. %lthoughthe se!ond oKe!tion is the ost iportant and the ost interesting* I shalldeal with the in the order that -a!here7 raises the. &owe@er* efore I!an respond to -a!here75s oKe!tions* I need to sa7 a little aoutDeleuze5s fraework so that it is !lear what -a!here7 is oKe!ting to. Indes!riing this fraework* I should not e taken to e full7 endorsing it. Iha@e 7 own prole with Deleuze5s a!!ount M one that* !uriousl7*-a!here7 sees to noti!e ut finds no prole with.

The opposition of a!tions and passions should not !on!eal theother opposition that !onstitutes the se!ond prin!iple of Spinozis: that of Ko7ful passi@e affe!tions and sad passi@eaffe!tions. #ne in!reases our power* the other diinishes it. Ae!oe !loser to our power of a!tion insofar as we are affe!ted 7

Ko7. The ethi!al Huestion falls then* in Spinoza* into two parts: .ow can we come to produce active a++ections/0ut first of all: .ow can we come to experience a maximum o+ joy+ul passions/

ODeleuze 1BB) p. )/>P

O"o7ful passionsP still do not gi@e us possession of our power of a!tion* we ha@e no adeHuate idea of oKe!ts that agree in naturewith usJ Ko7ful passions are thesel@es orn of inadeHuate ideas*

whi!h onl7 indi!ate a od75s affe!t on us. Ae ust then* by theaid o+ joy+ul passions* for the idea of what is !oon to soee?ternal od7 and our own. or this idea alone* this !oonnotion* is adeHuate. This is the se!ond stage of reasonJ then* andthen onl7* do we understand and a!t* and we are reasonale: thisnot through the a!!uulation of Ko7ful passions as passions* ut

7 a genuine Rleap*5 whi!h puts us in possession of an adeHuateidea 7 the aid of su!h an a!!uulation.

ODeleuze 1BB) p. )94P



44 Pli 1/ F)CC4

The o#tline of a diale%ti%/

%s -a!here7 notes* Ko7ful passions o!!up7 an interediate position etween sad passions and adeHuate ideas. Though the7 are not thesel@esadeHuate and we !annot therefore e said to e a!ti@e* nonetheless the7in!rease our power of a!ti@it7. The7 !ould* perhaps* e said to o!!up7 aRediating5 position etween sad passions and a!ti@it7 and it is this @er7ediating position that -a!here7 fo!uses on in order to !lai that he hasfound the Routline of a diale!ti!5. Gi@en that all passions liit our a!ti@it7*the7 in@ol@e a Rsort of negati@it75. #ne ight* as -a!here7 suggests* e

tepted to !all the transforation of the negati@it7 of sad passions* 7 thestill negati@e for of Ko7ful passion* a negation of the negation* or a ruseof reason that akes use of an e@il* passion* to ad@an!e soething good*ethi!al lieration O-a!here7 1BB> p. 134P. -a!here7 hiself has no tiefor this kind of diale!ti!al agi!: no conjuring with the situation will e@er turn soething ad or harful into soething useful O-a!here7 1BB> p.13/P. If the transforation of passions into adeHuate ideas in Deleuze5sa!!ount does indeed rel7 upon a hidden diale!ti!* then we would eentitled to feel soe suspi!ion towards the a!!ount that he offersJ not least

as su!h an a!!ount would underine the !lai that Spinoza5s philosoph7is inno!ent of the laour of the negati@e. Ah7 though would we a!!eptsu!h a des!ription

There is a hidden assuption that dri@es -a!here75s a!!ount. Thisassuption is* I think* false M and with its reKe!tion* we !an also reKe!t theidea that onl7 the magic of the diale!ti! !ould answer how the o@e fro

Ko7ful passions to adeHuate ideas o!!urs. -a!here7 is eing tooessentialist aout what akes a passion a passion. I ha@e alread7 arguedthat passions in@ol@e a ne!essar7 perspe!ti@alis M that as sustan!e

!annot suffer* so all passion is* as should e o@ious* odal. Though we!annot R!onKure with the situation5* the Huestion of what the situation is* iswhat is at stake here. If we !onsider swiing on!e ore M one reasonwh7 we a7 e afloat is that we are wearing ar ands. $ow this eansthat we ha@e not 7et entered into our power of swiing. Ae !anunderstand this 7 re@ersing the order of the deonstration to I;+)4: tothe e?tent that soeone does soething that !annot e per!ei@ed solel7 inters of their own essen!e* then the7 are passi@eJ that is* their a!tions aredeterined 7 inadeHuate ideas. Ahat is in Huestion is pre!isel7 the

indi@iduation of essen!es M the7 do not R!ar@e nature at its Koints5 M if we



43 Pli 1/ F)CC4

% !ru!ial distin!tion that -a!here7 oilises here is etween passionate

Ko7 and Ko7ful passion. I sa7 it is !ru!ial as it is not iediatel7 e@ident in-a!here75s paper and so ths os!urit7 lea@es the reader soewhat affled 7 -a!here75s arguent that despite Spinoza introdu!ing the notion of a passionate Ko7 F(7 Ko7* therefore* I shall understand in what follows that passion 7 whi!h the ind passes to a greater perfe!tion Spinoza doesnot allow for the e?isten!e of Ko7ful passions. The distin!tion* though thin*is tenale. +assionate Ko7s refer onl7 to the feeling that we e?perien!ewhen soe !han!e !oposition in!reases our power of a!ti@it7 M that is*we o@e to a greater state of perfe!tion. "o7ful passion* though* refers to aode that !auses this transition. The Huestion that -a!here7 poses !an e

put this wa7: although it is !learl7 the !ase that Spinoza does postulate passionate Ko7s* !an we !lai that what !auses the are thesel@es Ko7ful*i.e. that there are Ko7ful passions. It is his reKe!tion of this last !lai thatneeds e?aining.

&is general !lai Fgeneral in the sense that it akes no spe!ifi!referen!e to the Ethics* outlined in the Huotation ao@e I will e?aine in aoent. &owe@er* he also goes on to e?aine the notion of +luctuatioanimi* or R@a!illation of ind5 whi!h* as his third and final oKe!tion* he

!lais pro@ides a definiti@e refutation of Deleuze5s !lai that there are Ko7ful passions. I will also e?aine -a!here75s arguent with respe!t tothe propositions of the Ethics that he refers to. irstl7* though* the generalarguent.

I ephasised two phrases in the ao@e Huotation: Rpassionate entrop75and Rsad destin75. %s rhetori!al as these phrases ight sound* the7 are!ru!ial* as it is onl7 7 their literal interpretation that -a!here7 is ale tooffer a principled oKe!tion to the e?isten!e of Ko7ful passions. Ah7 this isso* I will e?plain shortl7* ut first the daage that would e done to

Spinoza5s s7ste if -a!here7 were right needs to e ade !lear. Thedistin!tion that I wish to draw is what differentiates his se!ond oKe!tionfro his third. The third oKe!tion* whi!h is a u!h weaker Fthough still!rippling de +acto oKe!tion is that as it happens Ko7ful passions are toounstale to do the work Fwhate@er that a7 e that I or Deleuze needthe to do. The se!ond oKe!tion whi!h I a presentl7 e?aining is that

,opare to Shirle75s translation: So in what follows I shall understand 7 pleasureRthe passi@e transition of the ind to a state of greater perfe!tion*5 Per laetitiamitaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem, qua mens ad maiorem per+ectionem

transit III+11S!h



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ 4>

all passions are necessarily sad M hen!e there !an e no Ko7ful ones. In

order to Kustif7 this !lai* -a!here7 is for!ed to introdu!e a teleologi!al prin!iple into Spinoza5s s7ste. $othing else will gi@e hi a principled oKe!tion. If he does not introdu!e a teleologi!al prin!iple then he !annotestalish that what we take to e a t7pi!al unstale degeneration of a

passionate en!ounter into soething daaging* soething sad was anecessary e@ent. That -a!here7 of all people should ake this o@e isastonishing. +erhaps he did not realise that onl7 an appeal to teleolog7would gi@e his !lai the prin!iple it needed. Gi@en the generalit7 of his!lai F7 whi!h I ean there is no referen!e to an7 parti!ular passage inthe Ethics* I assue that we are sipl7 supposed to re!ognise it assoething that we elie@e aout the Ethics. $othing* I hope* !ould efurther fro the !ase. Ae are left in this situation: the onl7 wa7 -a!here7!an offer a prin!ipled oKe!tion to the e?isten!e of Ko7ful passions is 7iporting a teleologi!al prin!iple into the EthicsJ Spinoza is faous for explicitly reKe!ting all fors of teleolog7* or teleologi!al e?planation M andgi@en the failure in this paper to pro@ide an arguent for the e?isten!e of teleolog7 in the Ethics* !oined with his otherwise e?pli!it reKe!tion of this @iew* we !an reKe!t -a!here75s oKe!tion to the e?isten!e of Ko7ful

passions.

,l#%t#atio )ni$i

This rings e finall7 to -a!here75s last oKe!tion: that passions FKo7fulor otherwise are sipl7 too unstale to Rprepare the wa75 for our gainingadeHuate ideas.

#f !ourse there is ore to -a!here75s worr7 aout Deleuze5s proKe!t

of showing how Ko7ful passions !an e a Kuping off point for theforation of !oon notions. E@en if we reKe!t -a!here75s ipli!it !laithat there is a teleologi!al ne!essit7 dri@ing the passions towardsdissolution* passions a7 still see like fortuitous en!ounters* rando andunstale. This of !ourse* is not Kust a prole for Deleuze* or 7self as wetr7 to e?plain how it is that* gi@en Spinoza5s s7ste* !oon notions !an

e foredJ if this is a !orre!t des!ription of the passions* then it is a aKor prole for an7 reading of Spinoza that seeks to e?plain the foration of the !oon notions. (ut wh7 should we a!!ept this des!ription of the

Deleuze5s own des!ription of the iagination as a wa7 of life M the wa@e



4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

hitting us and soeties !arr7ing us and soeties swaping us M a7

see to suggest that rando and unstale is a good des!ription of the passionsJ ut then* we are not fish. To put this another wa7* a potentiall7!rippling oKe!tion to the kind of a!!ount I a tr7ing to offer here of theforation of !oon notions is that passions* qua passions are toounstale to a!t as enaling !onstraints for the foration of !oonnotions. Ah7 though should we a!!ept this des!ription of the passions M are the7 reall7 so unstale or rando

The @er7 ter rando should alert us to the likelihood of this eing aserious isreading of what Spinoza eans 7 a passion. +assions are

contingent * ut this is a purel7 episteologi!al Fthough ne!essar7definition: Spinoza the etaph7si!al deterinist. InadeHuate and!onfused ideas follow 7 the sae ne!essit7 as adeHuate* or !lear anddistin!t ideas FII+4>. There is then* no reason to elie@e that passions arerando. %re the7* howe@er* still too unstale to do the work of preparingthe wa7 for our a!hie@ing !oon notions

-a!here7 thinks that there is in Spinoza5s idea of the +luctuatio animi adeonstration of the instailit7 of the passions M that the7 ne!essaril7flu!tuate etween Ko7 and sadness. Ahat is +luctuatio animi

If we iagine that a thing whi!h is wont to affe!t us with aneotion of pain* has soething siilar to another thing whi!h iswont to affe!t us with an eHuall7 great eotion of pleasure* weshall hate it and lo@e it at the sae tie OIII+1P

-a!here7 !lais that the notion of +luctuatio animi is ne!essaril7 e?!ludedfro Deleuze5s thought. irstl7 e!ause it !opletel7 Fa!!ording to-a!here7* at least undoes Deleuze5s a!!ount of the foration of !oonnotions and se!ondl7 e!ause all Deleuze5s philosophi!al thinking is

ased on reKe!ting the thee of ai@alen!e and the asso!iated diale!ti!alin@ersion that he sees as depending on negati@it7 O-a!here7 1BB> p.13>P. Ah7 does the notion of +luctuatio animi undo Deleuze5s a!!ount



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ 49

The wa7 Spinoza uses the thee of +luctuatio animi shows how

the s7etr7 estalished etween Ko7 and sadness 7 the fa!tthat the7 are produ!ed 7 !on@erse o@eents is erel7apparent: there is in sadness nothing e@en potentiall7 positi@ethat ight allow one to see it as a liiting of conatus* to whi!h itreains altogether foreign.

O-a!here7 1BB> pp. 133013>P

This is wh7 -a!here7 sees Spinoza ore as a philosopher of alienationthan e?pression M for -a!here7 passions are alien to our power of a!ti@it7*for Deleuze the7 involve, though to the lowest degree possile* that power.So is -a!here7 right The onl7 response using his own fine phrase* is thatif we look !arefull7 at what Spinoza sa7s* this sees @er7 doutful. #nthis parti!ularl7 diffi!ult Huestion* I would !lai rather luntl7 that-a!here7 is wrong and that I ha@e in fa!t alread7 dealt with this Huestion.To reind 7ou: The essen!e of the ind is constituted 7 adeHuate andinadeHuate ideas OIII+B+rP that is 7 !oon notions and passions* andan5s essen!e is his !onatus. %s a !onseHuen!e we a7 also reKe!t-a!here75s !lai aout one of the links etween Spinoza and -ar?* that

of alienation. There is no alienation: Spinoza the anti0huanist.If we return on!e ore to the swiing e?aple* then we !an also see

that Deleuze has no prole with the notion of @a!illation M in fa!t he ise?pli!it in a wa7 that -a!here7 seeed to think he ne@er !ould e aoutthe doain of iaginationJ the differen!e is with the wa@es soeties!arr7ing e and soeties swaping e. There is no teleolog7 here.

nd for (ow

This paper will tail off towards a !lose* rather than rea!h a !on!lusion* 7outlining soe of the proles that I ha@e with the @iew that !oonnotions are a pro!edural rather than de!larati@e for of knowledge as wellas a!knowledging the work that still has to e done. or soe of these

proles* I think resour!es e?ist that are ale to o@er!oe the produ!ti@el7J for others M I ha@e as 7et no idea. %lthough ainl7e?egeti!al* this last part will !lose on a final politi!al prole. This @iewof the !oon notions where7 the7 are a!ti@ities or skills M e the7



4B Pli 1/ F)CC4

swiing* walking or riding a i!7!le without stailisers gets round most

of the proles that the standard @iew has. Learning to walk is soethingthat all ale0odied huans do M 7 @irtue of what the7 ha@e in !oonand the relations that the7 for etween the strength and elasti!it7 of theleg us!les and the !onstant pull of gra@it7. Likewise* there is no prolewhen Spinoza writes that if we ha@e an adeHuate idea* we know that wedo. If 7ou5re swiing* then 7ou5re swiing. There is no roo for dout and to think that there e@en !ould e* would e se!retl7 to return toa @iew of the !oon notions as de!larati@e knowledge. E?plaining how!oon notions are known under a for of eternit7 is one prole that Ido not as 7et ha@e an answer for.

There still reains the prole of how we !oe to for !oonnotions. In a few pages of Expressionism Fpp. )9C0)94 whi!h !ontinue tofrustrate* despite their failiarit7* Deleuze starts off 7 writing that:There is* though* a danger of !oon notions appearing to inter@eneira!ulousl7 unless we e?plain how we !oe to for the. .ow do theycome to brea the concatenation o+ inadequate ideas to which we had

seemed condemned ODeleuze 1BB) p. )9C ephasis in the originalP M if we do not e?plain how we !oe to for !oon notions the whole of Spinozis reains 7sterious. ,an we do an7thing when we read this utnod in agreeent and e?pe!tation Three pages later he answers thisHuestion of how we for !oon notions: we do not do it 7 ana!!uulation of Ko7ful passions as passions* ut 7 a genuine Rleap*5whi!h puts us in possession of an adeHuate idea* 7 the aid of su!h ana!!uulation ODeleuze 1BB) p.)94 ephasis addedP. % leap ... well asfar as attepts go to de7stif7 transitions in a rigorousl7 deterinisti!thinker* this ust !ount as a spe!ta!ularl7 disal failure. Indeed* if the!on!lusion to a superior epiri!is when !onfronted with e?plaininglearning is to utter* Rleap5 Fthough wh7 not oun!e* or hop* or dan!e

then we ight ha@e douts aout its superiorit7. There are* fortunatel7*resour!es that !an offer u!h ore in the wa7 of an e?planation. #ne

pla!e we !ould look to for ore of an e?planation of the e!haniss of learning would e in the work of +aul and +atri!ia ,hur!hland.

It a7 see to e a it of a leap suddenl7 to tr7 to iport the,hur!hlands into a paper that had pre@iousl7 fo!used on differinginterpretations of Spinoza5s !oon notions. Ah7 would we turn to the,hur!hlands5 work Ahat possile !onne!tion !ould there e To relie@ethose who are parti!ularl7 alared 7 this suggestion* there is not the



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ /C

spa!e here to engage here with their work in the detail it would need to

gi@e an adeHuate a!!ount of the o@e fro iagination to !oonnotions. The7 are entioned here ore as a sign Fin a trul7 Spinozisti!sense that there are resour!es to answer this Huestion. It is a!tuall7 notthat hard to link Spinoza and the ,hur!hlands. To take Kust two instan!es:Spinoza5s notion of desire is resolutel7 non0intentional* his notion of elief as I ha@e een arguing is also est understood non0propositionall7. olk

ps7!holog7 has no pla!e in the Ethics: Spinoza the eliinati@e0aterialistFsee also O,ook 1B9>P for a siilar linking though with @er7 different!on!lusions and ais. The ,hur!hlands don5t Kust reKe!t folk ps7!holog7

e!ause the7 think it is a false theor7. It is also a moribund theor7. It la!ksthe !on!eptual resour!es to e?plain a nuer of phenoena that are!learl7 !ru!ial: Oolk ps7!holog7P fails utterl7 to e?plain a !onsiderale@ariet7 of !entral ps7!hologi!al phenoena: ental illness* sleep*!reati@it7* eor7* intelligen!e differen!es* and the many +orms o+ learning O,hur!hland 1BB9* 9P. It is the ,hur!hlands5 !lai that anunderstanding of learning Fof whi!h there are an7 kinds is one of* if notthe* !ru!ial eleent issing fro folk ps7!holog7. It is this one !ru!ial!lai aout the iportan!e of learning that links the ,hur!hlands toDeleuze. Unlikel7 ed0fellows as Deleuze and the ,hur!hlands a7 e* I

think their work may Fand I stress this Ra75 as it is an epiri!al Huestionas to whether the7 are right or not e ale to offer a fresh insight into thee!haniss where7 we learn M or at least offer soething etter thanRleap5.

To gi@e an e?aple of how their approa!h is useful* I5 a!tuall7 goingto Huote soe people !opletel7 different M Kust e!ause on this parti!ular suKe!t I !ouldn5t find an7thing as Huotale. % aKor prole that has

een left unresol@ed is the status of Ko7ful passion M surel7* e@en if wea!!ept the arguents against -a!here7 that I ha@e ade and parti!ularl7 if we are not happ7 with the idea of oun!ing fro Ko7ful passions into!oon notions* then there is ore work to e done here. So what ore!an I sa7 aout the M to use a @er7 different terinolog7* I think Ko7ful

passions !an est e understood as enabling constraints:

The language of energeti!s and !onstraints is a @er7 general onefor dis!ussing d7nai!s* ut it is unfortunatel7 !oon to!onsider !onstraints as onl7 pla!ing restri!tions. &owe@er* and!ru!iall7* !onstraints are oth disaling Osad passionsP Fsoe



/1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

d7nai!al states are there7 rendered d7nai!all7 ina!!essile

and enaling OKo7ful passionsP Fsoe d7nai!al states arethere7 rendered d7nai!all7 a!!essile. The huan skeleton*e.g.* pla!es !onstraints on shape and size plasti!it7 ut alsoenales all the o@eent that underlies our powerful

eha@ioural adaptailitiesJ the graar of language sharpl7!onstrains word !hara!ter and order* ut it akes powerful!ouni!ation a!!essile. %n enaling !onstraint is a restri!tionon a s7ste whi!h opens up new !apa!ities for the s7ste.(e!ause of its !onstru!ti@e !hara!ter for us* !ulture is perhapsour ost profound enaling !onstraint. (ut of !ourse theenaling is alwa7s on alan!e* it !annot e purel7 enaling* asorganised despotis deonstrates Fand ask the painter or dan!er aout the liits of linguisti! e?pressi@eness.

%n Integrating S!affold athttp:66www.new!astle.edu.au6!entre6!asrg6puli!ations6(aspapB

A.pdf

#rganised s7stes !hara!teristi!all7 fa!e gloal !onstraints* and

these !onstraints a7 fun!tion oth in an inhiitor7 fashion* 7ruling out !ertain otherwise a@ailale !ople?ions of the s7ste*and in a fun!tionall7 aplif7ing fashion 7 aking a@ailale!ertain !apa!ities whi!h the s7ste would e otherwise unaleto a!hie@e. Ae refer to the latter as enaling !onstraints. or e?aple* the !ell erane is a gloal enaling !onstraint withrespe!t to intra0!ellular io!hei!al organisation e!ause it

pro@ides a Huasi0isolated en@ironent within whi!h !riti!al paraeters su!h as ioni! !on!entrations* enz7e a!ti@it7 et!.*

a7 e aintained and organised so as to perfor useful work and without whi!h the7 would !ollapse.

#rganisation* E@olution and ,ognition athttp:66s!istud.uk!.edu6psaB96papers6!hristensen.pdf

I realise that as it stands this is erel7 suggesti@e* ut I think that it a7well e a wa7 of !on!retising the notion of Ko7ful passion in a wa7 thatakes -a!here75s worries superfluous. inall7* on this reading of the

!oon notions as knowing0how rather than knowing0that* reason* rather



"#$%T&%$ 'U(I$ /)

than eing astra!ti@e or fa!ultati@e* e!oes thoroughl7 eodied and

eedded. Unfortunatel7 it would take a paper twi!e as long as this one togo into the full raifi!ations for tr7ing to tie Deleuze and the ,hur!hlandstogether to arti!ulate a !lear understanding of the o@e fro iaginationto reason.

In a shorter @ersion of this paper gi@en at the So!iet7 for European+hilosoph7 !onferen!e )CC)* I ended with what I !alled* for want of a

etter phrase a Rou!auldian politi!al worr75. Aith his ephasis on the produ!ti@e nature of power* as -a!here7 has pointed out Fin an attept touse Spinoza to !larif7 soe aspe!ts of ou!ault5s work ou!ault !an e

read Kust as u!h as a Spinozist as $ietzs!hean Fthough -a!here7 akesno attept to !lai that ou!ault was failiar with Spinoza5s work* ane?aination of ou!ault5s -its et ecrits indi!ates su!h a failiarit7*despite the fa!t that he still pri@ileged $ietzs!he o@er Spinoza. % aKor task of -iscipline and Punish is to show how in some respectsdis!iplinar7 apparatuses in!rease Rwhat a od7 !ould do5 M e@en thoughthe odies that were produ!ed 7 dis!iplinar7 apparatuses were Rdo!ile5. Itis not at all !lear to e* gi@en the understanding of !oon notionsoutlined in this paper* how dis!iplines su!h as rifle drill do not !ount as

foring a !oon notion.If the do!ile od7 does not !ount as a freer od7 Fand I hope that we!an agree that it does not* then the notion of adeHuate and inadeHuateideas !annot e thought to ark out the doains of freedo and ser@itudeas straightforwardl7 as one ight ha@e hoped.

That was where the pre@ious @ersion of this paper got stu!k. $ow*howe@er* I realise that this whole worr7 rested on a !ru!ial* and oreiportantl7 liberal assuption. In his ook 0odies, 1asses, Power -ontag argues that for Spinoza the indi@idual is not a eaningful* or

interesting politi!al entit7 Fand a7 e downright de!epti@e as the power of an indi@idual* !opared to the state* is negligile. I think it is possileto ake a stronger !lai than that. I said that we !ould not distinguish rifledrill fro other !oon notions that we a7 well ha@e wanted to sa7in!rease our freedo M but why would we assume that a politi!al judgment o+ this ind could be made in any event at the level o+ the individual #nl7* of !ourse* if we were lierals would we think that . There is nodis!riination etween rifle drill and freedo e!ause politi!s does notreside at the le@el of the indi@idualJ to Huote -ontag to finish this paper:

sal@ation will e !olle!ti@e or it will not e O-ontag 1BBB* p. 9)P.



/4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

(aliar* . F1BB9 'pino(a and Politics FLondon: ;erso

,hur!hland* +aul -. [ ,hur!hland* +atri!ia S. F1BB9 #n the )ontraryF-assa!husetts: -IT +ress,ook* ".T. F1B9> RSelf0=nowledge as Self0+reser@ation5* 'pino(a and the 'ciences ed. -arKorie Greene* Dera $ails* FLan!aster: D. 'eidel+ulishing ,opan7,urle7 1B4: RE?perien!e in Spinozas Theor7 of =nowledge5* 'pino(a !)ollection o+ )ritical Essays ed. -arKorie Grene* F$otre Dae* Indiana:Uni@ersit7 of $otre Dae +ressDeleuze* G. F1B91 Les trois genres de !onnaissan!ehttp:66www.wedeleuze.!o6htl6TXT61C491.htlDeleuze* G. F1B99 'pino(a2 Practical Philosophy FSan ran!is!o: ,it7Light (ooksDeleuze* G. F1BB)a Expressionism in Philosophy2 'pino(a F$ew ork:Zone (ooks-a!here7* +. 1BB>: RThe En!ounter with Spinoza5* -eleu(e2 ! )ritical

&eader ed. +aul +atton* F#?ford: (la!kwell-ontag* A. F1BBB (odies* -asses* +ower FLondon: ;erso

$egri* %. F1BB1 'avage !nomaly, The F-inneapolis: Uni@ersit7 of -innesota +ress

S!hoen* Edward L. F1B RThe 'ole of ,oon $otions in SpinozasEthi!s5* in 'outhern %ournal o+ Philosophy 13Spinoza* (. F)CC1 Theological"Political Treatise FIndianapolis: &a!kett*trans. S. Shirle7Spinoza* (. F)CC) )omplete 3ors, trans. S. Shirle7* ed. -i!hael L.-organ FIndianapolis: &a!kett



Pli 1/ F)CC4* //03)

Spinoza1 or1 The Power of Desire-

C)2ILL D!2'!LI3

-. The power of conatus

-.-. The appetite

Spinoza5s etaph7si!s originates fro a renewed Huestioning !on!erningthe nature of sustan!e* su!h as it was firstl7 defined 7 %ristotle andsuseHuentl7 resued 7 Des!artes. If one distinguishes sustan!e Fthatwhi!h persists eneath all !hanges fro its attriutes Fi.e. a!!idents or se!ondar7 properties* a Huestion then arises regarding the status of sustan!e independentl7 fro its attriutes. or instan!e: what is a od7without for* !olour* weight* et!. Des!artes sol@ed this prole 7deri@ing one ain attriute that !hara!terises the essen!e of ea!hsustan!e. In the !ase of the od7* this attriute !orresponds to e?tensionJin that of the ind* the attriute has to e identified with thought. $odout we !annot think sustan!e independentl7 fro its ain attriuteJhowe@er* reason deands we preser@e this distin!tion.

The prin!iples of Spinoza5s etaph7si!s ai to eliinate this!ontradi!tion 7 pro!eeding in the ost rigorous anner starting fro theontologi!al di@ision etween sustan!e and a!!ident. If sustan!e isdefined as !ause of itself in relation to all a!!idents whi!h are onl7 throughit* then there ust e onl7 one infinite sustan!e whose essen!e in!ludese?isten!e: God. This sole sustan!e is !onstituted 7 an infinit7 of attriutes of whi!h we !an know onl7 two: e?tension and thought. Ea!h

1 This essa7 was originall7 pulished in Le désir F%rand ,olin6&E' diteur* +aris1BBB. Ae thank the author and the pulisher for allowing us to print it here in

translation. 4 Trans.



/3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

attriute* in so far as it is the e?pression of sustan!e* is itself infinite and

!onstitutes one of its wa7s of eing. %fter ha@ing adopted the %ristotelianidea a!!ording to whi!h essen!e is energ7* Spinoza affirs that theessen!e of God is power. The latter transits its energ7 to all that is.

The perse@eran!e of ea!h thing in its eing* the stri@ing of all e?isting eings to e in a!!ordan!e with their own essen!e* !oin!ide withdeterinate e?pressions of the infinite power of God. This for!e* thisstri@ing* is naed 7 Spinoza conatus. It sustains the appetite for life of allthat is and oosts a fundaental desire. Ae !ould identif7 su!h a stri@ingwith a priordial dri@e whi!h is not deterined 7 an7 suKe!t nor ai to

attain an7 spe!ifi! oKe!t. This also !onstitutes the asis of Spinoza5sethi!s* as it is !learl7 stated in the following forula: The stri@ing to preser@e oneself is the first and onl7 foundation of @irtue FI;* ))*!orollar7.) The notion of appetite refers a!k to %ristotle5s hormé or orexis passing through the appetitus of the Stoi!s. &owe@er* the passagefro the doain of ontolog7 to that of ethi!s entails a radi!al o@erturning:there is no longer an7 a priori deterination of the Good* no oKe!t isgood in itself. The !riterion of an a!tion is alwa7s suKe!ti@e* and in the

pla!e of a oralit7 intended as a sear!h for rules in life* we find an ethi!s

founded upon a @ital power* an energeti!s. This o@erturning is suarised 7 the resuption of a !elerated forula 7 %ristotle:

The apparent good is the oKe!t of appetite* and the real goodis the priar7 oKe!t of rational wish. (ut desire is !onseHuenton opinion rather than opinion on desire F 1etaphysics* (ook L*.

To whi!h Spinoza replies in the Ethics 7 stating e?a!tl7 the opposite:It is !lear that we neither stri@e for* nor will* neither want* nor desire an7thing e!ause we Kudge it to e goodJ on the !ontrar7*

we Kudge soething to e good e!ause we stri@e for it* will it*want it* and desire it FIII* B* s!holiu.

urther on FI;* 1B* Spinoza spe!ifies that e@er7one desires that whi!hs6he Kudges to e good for hi6her* a!!ording to the laws of his6her ownnature. This is to sa7 that su!h a Kudgeent is not a pure a!t of reason* or the effe!t of a natural in!lination towards the Good M as it is in So!rati!oralit7. #n the !ontrar7* it is the e?pression of a state of affe!tion Oétat

) %ll Spinoza5s Huotations are taken fro ! 'pino(a &eader 4 The Ethi!s and #ther 3ors* edited and translated 7 E. ,urle7* +rin!eton Uni@ersit7 +ress* +rin!eton $"

1BB/. 4 Trans.



,%-ILLE DU-#ULI />

a++ecti+ P whi!h translates and utters a tenden!7 into priar7 Kudgeents of

e?isten!e. Its onl7 ontologi!al and ethi!al !riterion is the enhan!eent or diinishing of the sensation of powerJ the Ko7 and sadness whi!ha!!opan7 the flu!tuations of power are the priar7 !riteria of all @alue

Kudgeents.

-.4. The p#re positivit0 of desire

The appetite M qua e?pression of the power of God in ea!h eing M is

infinite. %s a !onseHuen!e* it does not a!tuall7 ha@e a suKe!t or an oKe!t*a eginning or an end. Things e?press this infinit7 in a definite anddeterinate ode* in as u!h as ea!h of the is the earer of a quantumof power. $e@ertheless* ea!h of the li@es this quantum as if it wereinfinite. This is wh7 desire has to e intended as pure positi@it7. %t thisstage* two other !onseHuen!es are deri@ed: firstl7* desire does not followfro a la!kJ on the !ontrar7* it follows fro an infinite superaundan!e of

power that sear!hes for and !reates the ne!essar7 !onditions for its owngrowth. In the se!ond pla!e* the @ital for!e does not entail an7 internal

liitation or negati@it7. E@er7 single thing opposes itself to all that !ansuppress its e?isten!e* and ao@e all* no thing has an7thing in itself whi!h!an destro7 it. In spite of all the iportan!e that Spinoza5s influen!e hadon odern thought* on &egel and on ps7!hoanal7sis in parti!ular* it isne@ertheless e@ident that an irredu!ile differen!e opposes the. Thelaour of the negati@e and the death dri@e are in!on!ei@ale in Spinoza5suni@erse. %ll liitations of power M as well as death itself M !an onl7 e!aused 7 e?ternal for!es. or instan!e* e@en when roa!hing the Huestionof sui!ide* Spinoza does not interpret it in oral ters M as the entire

philosophi!al tradition did efore hi M ut alwa7s in ters of power andenergeti!s. #ne does not !oit sui!ide* one is sui!ided:Those who kill thesel@es are weak0inded and !opletel7!onHuered 7 e?ternal !auses !ontrar7 to their nature FI;* 19*deonstration.

Ahilst fro liidos to reudian liido* passing through the S!hopenaueriannotion of Aill* a diaoli! !hara!ter of desire is affired* Spinozarepresents on the !ontrar7 an histori! rupture: the appetite !orresponds to a

positi@e and infinite e?pression of the di@ine power in ea!h thing. It a7

o!!ur that it errs M espe!iall7 in the !ase of an. In order to understand



/ Pli 1/ F)CC4

these istakes* it is ne!essar7 to spe!if7 the nature of desire. If on the one

hand the latter is in its essen!e stri!tl7 identifiale with the appetite* on theother* it !an also e said to e one of its parti!ular anifestations.

4. Desire is the essen%e of $an

4.-. The affe%ts

In the Ethics FIII* B* Spinoza affirs that appetite is the essen!e of anand states that etween appetite OappetitusP and desire OcupiditasP there isno differen!e* e?!ept that desire is generall7 related to en insofar as the7are !ons!ious of their appetite. Ahat are en a!tuall7 !ons!ious of This!ons!iousness !annot e referred to appetite itself. The fa!t that an is or is not !ons!ious of his own appetite does not alter an7thing in the latter:indeed* appetite presents all the ain features of an un!ons!ious will.'ather* the spe!ifi!it7 of desire !onsists in sear!hing for stiuli in

parti!ular e?ternal representations whi!h a7 deterine and orientate the

stri@ing. In other words* desire is defined 7 the differen!e etween theappetite and its representation or* ore pre!isel7* etween the appetite andthe representation of the affe!ts whi!h a!t upon the od7.

Desire OcupiditasP is an5s @er7 essen!e* insofar as it is!on!ei@ed to e deterined* fro an7 gi@en affe!tion of it* to dosoething FIII* definitions of the affe!ts I.

irst point: desire presupposes the representation of a !ause whi!hdeterines all a!ti@it7 FI;* >1. This is how the wandering and erring of desire start: instead of turning towards the internal eanation of conatus*

the ind sear!hes outside for oKe!ts whi!h supposedl7 !ause desire.Instead of wanting that whi!h we Kudge to e desirale in a!!ordan!e withour own essen!e* we ake the istake of sear!hing for the origin of desireand the reasons of what is desirale in e?terior things. La!an5s definitionof objet petit a* intended as a phantasati! oKe!t0!ause of desire whi!h isnot the a!tual oKe!t of desire* finds here its philosophi!al origin. The saegoes for the essential distin!tion that ps7!hoanal7sis draws etween theaffe!t and its representation* as well as for the idea a!!ording to whi!h wedo not e@er ha@e a dire!t a!!ess to the affe!t M let alone the dri@e M utonl7 to their representati@e FTriebrepr5sentant * or* to use reud5s



,%-ILLE DU-#ULI /9

terinolog7* to the representati@e0representation

F6orstellungsrepr5sentant .Se!ond point: this affe!tion* or se!ondar7 !ause* is an effe!t produ!ed

7 e?ternal odies on our od7. Therefore* it does not !oin!ide with theaffe!t itself* ut with its representation* or with its idea* sin!e* gi@en thedistin!tion etween odes* there is no iediate relationship etween the

od7 and the ind. The latter onl7 per!ei@es e?terior odies through theideas of the affe!tions of its own od7 FII* )>* and ao@e all:

The huan ind does not know the huan od7 itself* nor does it know that it e?ists* e?!ept through ideas of affe!tions 7

whi!h the od7 is affe!ted FII* 1B.The !onne!tion etween the two odes and etween the order of their respe!ti@e !auses is realised in God. In hi alone odes are !o0present.%s a !onseHuen!e* it is in hi that an learns to know the !onne!tion

etween ideas and the affe!tions of the od7.

4.4. The passions

The affe!tions whi!h a!t upon desire are therefore passions: in other words* the7 !orrespond to the ental interpretation of the a!tions suffered

7 the od7. The asi! !riterion at work here is alwa7s the sae: theenhan!eent or diinishing of power* of whi!h Ko7 and sadness aresoehow signals. (7 !onsidering onl7 the e?ternal !auses* we !onfineoursel@es to a passi@e situationJ eanwhile we are also e?posed to the

power of iagination. The latter is a fa!ult7 of the ind that producesideas aout e?ternal odies on the asis of the affe!tions whi!h one5s own

od7 suffers. Therefore* it is an inadeHuate representation ut one whi!ha!!oplishes a ne!essar7 fun!tion. It pro@ides an answer to the fa!t thatan is alwa7s situated in $ature and is there7 alwa7s affe!ted 7e?ternal odies. During this perpetual !ollision* iagination spontaneousl7attepts to satisf7 the appetite* that is* to produ!e Ko7 through thesensation of an enhan!eent of power.

The ind as far as it !an* stri@es to iagine those things thatin!rease or aid the od75s power of a!ting FIII* 1).

Gi@en that representations do not !orrespond to things in an adeHuate

anner* we find oursel@es in@ol@ed in false KudgeentsJ 7 oe7ing to the



/B Pli 1/ F)CC4

for!e of things whi!h we wrongl7 suppose to doinate* we end up

a!hie@ing the opposite of what is desirale* thus finding oursel@es in astate of ipoten!e. Therefore* a passion is nothing ut an inadeHuatee?pression of desire whi!h relies on a fantas7* an iaginar7 oKe!t* andnot on an a!tual thing.

The two essential feelings of lo@e and hate deri@e fro the twofundaental passions of Ko7 and sadness M whose passi@e and there7iperfe!t !hara!ter is due to the fa!t that the7 are alwa7s suKe!ted toflu!tuationsJ an entire !oinator7 of affe!ti@e life* together with thefortuitousness of !ontradi!tor7 desires* follows in turn fro lo@e and hate.

&owe@er* we are not fore@er !ondened to inadeHuate representations inwhi!h the soul is passi@e and doinated 7 the iagination. Gi@en the asi! distin!tion etween representation and affe!t* it is possile for us todraw adeHuate ideas fro things without e?perien!ing the passions whi!ha!!opan7 the. eelings !ease to ha@e a passi@e !hara!ter as soon as wefor !lear and distin!t ideas aout theJ there is no affe!tion of the od7of whi!h we !annot for !lear and distin!t ideas F;* 4 and /. %t this

point* we e!oe a!ti@e and are ale to re@erse the logi!s of odes 7gi@ing a!k to the ind its own power o@er the od7. In su!h a wa7* we

enter a rational desire.

5. The intelle%t#al love of God

5.-. Rational desire

There are an7 !onne!tions etween the Stoi!s5 oralit7 and Spinoza5s

ethi!s. Undoutedl7* if we !onsider ataraxia to e the ai of Stoi!is*then the latter is irre!on!ilale with Spinozis. #n the other hand* if itsai is to e identified with !mor +ati M i.e. to desiring that whi!h o!!urs*to a @oluntar7 adheren!e of an to his destin7 M then Stoi!is is @er7

pro?iate to what Spinoza defines as ipassiilit7* that is* an a!ti@eadhesion to the ne!essit7 of $ature whi!h rings aout a feeling of a!tual

Ko7 and fulfilent.

Indeed* rational desire is a desire and not its negation or suission tothe intelle!t. &owe@er* it finds a guide in reason and in so doing it

e!oes autonoous and a!ti@eJ it !eases to e deterined 7 e?ternal



,%-ILLE DU-#ULI 3C

affe!ts and sear!hes all stiuli for a!ting within itself* that is* fro its own

essen!e. Sin!e the !orre!t ethi!al !riterion is alwa7s pro@ided 7 thedegree of power* one should not define those who !annot a!hie@e thefreedo of autono7 as guilt7 ut as ipotent* as in!apale of asteringthe affe!ts deterined 7 e?ternal !auses. This wisdo is not a for of intelle!tualis. It is not a atter of suitting passions to reason anderadi!ating the power of iagination as it is in the !ase of !lassi!aloralit7. #n the !ontrar7* onl7 passions !an a!t upon other passions. Inother words* one ust assign to the a?is of reason the for!e of

persuasion whi!h is proper to passions thesel@es. In this wa7* Spinozaresues the Stoi!al pra!ti!e a!!ording to whi!h oral rules* i.e.theoremata* ust e editated upon so that the7 !an e!oe as!ustoar7 for the od7 as the7 are for the ind. %t this stage* theiagination pla!es itself at the ser@i!e of this intelle!tual for!e of

persuasion thus !ontriuting to re@erse passi@it7 into a!ti@it7. "o7 is theethi!al passion par excellence and an a!tual !riterion for oral a!tion:

% desire whi!h arises fro Ko7 is stronger* other things eHual*than one whi!h arises fro sadness FI;* 19.

The ai of ethi!s is indeed to grant desire its power and positi@it7.

Therefore* Spinoza5s oralit7 is essentiall7 positi@e: it is founded upons7path7 and generosit7* it orients e?isten!e in a!!ordan!e with thatwhi!h is ost desirale and does not depend on that whi!h would e

etter to fear* run awa7 fro or prohiit. Spinoza inaugurates the odern!ritiHue of negati@e and interdi!tor7 oralit7 whi!h nourishes resententand feeds ad !ons!ien!e. ,ontrar7 to ,hristianit7 and other religiousoralities Fagainst whi!h he had to defend hiself throughout his ownlife* he !ondens pit7* huilit7 and reorse as negati@e feelings whi!h!ause sadness.

5.4. The co-naissance5 of $an and God

In the !ase of rational desire* Ko7 does not undergo an7 enhan!eent or diinution dependent upon the fortuitousness of affe!ts: on the !ontrar7* itfollows fro an5s adKusting to his essen!e and fro the latter5s adKusting

4 )o"naissance is an untranslatale pun on the ren!h ters connaissance

Fknowledge and naissance Firth. M Trans.



31 Pli 1/ F)CC4

to the essen!e of $ature. Su!h is the lissfulness whi!h a!!opanies the

ultiate realisation of desire that Spinoza !alls it intelle!tual lo@e of God: on!e again* this lo@e should not e read in intelle!tualisti! ters.E@en if it relies on knowledge it is not a ere a!t of reason. It is a thirdkind of knowledge: e7ond the first le@el M that of !onfused ideas M andwith the ediation of a se!ond le@el M that of adeHuate ideas M this lastkind of knowledge is nothing less than the knowledge of God hiself. It is

oth the knowledge of God5s nature* that is of its odes M ind and od7 M as per!ei@ed fro the standpoint of their eternal essen!e* and theknowledge of $ature as God alone !an intuit it. This a!t of intelle!tion of

$ature that produ!es a Ko7 whose sole !ause is God is itself an a!t of lo@e.%nd 7et* God is erged in an eternal enKo7ent of hiself and !annot lo@ein return. The lo@e of God is thus said to e intelle!tual in order to showhow it lea@es an7 deand of re!ipro!it7 M whi!h !reates the pathos of lo@e

M out of !onsideration. The infinite and eternal idea whi!h God has of hiself is nothing ut intelle!tual lo@e of hiself. To put it with Spinoza:God lo@es hiself with an infinite intelle!tual lo@e F;* 43. ro this* itfollows that the ind5s lo@e for God parti!ipates in the lo@e with whi!hGod lo@es hiself:

Insofar as God lo@es hiself* he lo@es en* and !onseHuentl7

God5s lo@e of en and the ind5s intelle!tual lo@e of God areone and the sae F;* 4>* !orollar7.

In su!h a wa7 Spinoza returns to the !on!lusions of the +lotinian 7sti!s*e@en though it sustitutes the infinite trans!enden!e of God with hiseternal ianen!e. This is wh7 one !ould talk of a co"naissance of an*world and God within the refle?i@it7 of the ind. The refle!tion of thewise an who knows $ature in an adeHuate anner and desires itsne!essit7 !orresponds to an a!t of san!tifi!ation of the world whi!h

pro@ides the ind with a feeling of eternit7 and di@inises all that is.

&ere the laws of oral ps7!holog7 finall7 find their true ethi!aleaning. (7 initiall7 instituting the essential positi@it7 of desire* Spinozaestalishes that oralit7 does not !onsist in running awa7 fro the e@il or in fearing deathJ this attitude of the ind !ould e@entuall7 onl7 lead tosadness and negati@e feelings. #n the !ontrar7* oralit7 dire!tl7 ais atthat whi!h gi@es ore power and refuses to !onsider the essen!e of an asa eing0for0deathJ up to &eidegger* the latter has indeed often eentaken as the greatest ethi!al reHuireent:



,%-ILLE DU-#ULI 3)

% free an thinks of nothing less than of death* and his wisdo

is a editation on life* not on death FI;* >.Spinoza5s oral ps7!holog7 finds its @eritale diension in the fifth ook of the Ethics: its task is to gi@e a!k to an the eaning of his eternit7through the intelle!tual lo@e of God and a parti!ipation in his Ko7. Su!h aneternit7 should not e lo!ated in an7 (e7ond ut !onsists instead in an5sreal eing* whi!h effe!ti@el7 parti!ipates in the eternal e?isten!e of God.The idea of a co"naissance of the world @ia the refle?i@it7 of the ind willreerge in &egel5s thought. (ut the one thinker who drew all!onseHuen!es fro this affirati@e philosoph7 of desire is !ertainl7

$ietzs!he.

Translated by Loren(o )hiesa



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 3403

)lain +adio# as a Reader of Spinoza-

PIRR6,R)(7'IS 2'R)!

The !onstant presen!e and iportan!e of the figure of Spinoza in the work of %lain (adiou needs to e a!knowledged M despite the !riti!iss that(adiou often le@ies against hi. This was testified as re!entl7 as the

prologue of (adiou5s !brége de 1étapolitique F1BB9: in this te?t theRphilosopher as resistant5 is linked to the shadow of ,a@aill\s* whoFfollowing in the wake of ,anguilhe5s assessent fought in the'esistan!e e!ause of logi! and Spinozis.) In the rearks that follow*we will sipl7 indi!ate soe of the salient points in (adiou5s traKe!tor7 asa reader of Spinoza.

Let us egin at the eginning* if not at the origin: in the idst of the1B>Cs* Louis %lthusser pulished 7or 1arx and then* in !ollaoration*

&eading )apital$ (oth the !olle!tion of arti!les and the edition of the work undertaken in %lthusser5s seinar aied at a renewal of the understandingof -ar?is: without a dout* the7 attained this goal in a anner that wentfar e7ond their e?pe!tations. These three @olues4 enKo7ed an ienseinfluen!e* and were read far e7ond the restri!ted !ir!le of philosophers*finding thesel@es at the !entre of a whole host of polei!s on theRepisteologi!al reak5* alienation* Rtheoreti!al pra!ti!e5* and so on. In

-a7 1B>* %lain (adiou pulished in )ritique an arti!le entitled RLe Fre!oen!eent du atWrialise diale!tiHue5 RThe F'e,oen!eent of

1 O%rti!le originall7 pulished in !lain 0adiou$ Penser le multiple* ed. 7 ,harles'aond F+aris: L5&arattan* )CC)* pp. 4B104B>. Ae would like to thank theauthor and ,harles 'aond for perission to pulish this translation.P

) I ust here refer the reader to the rearkale arti!le 7 -ogens Laerke* RThe;oi!e and the $ae: Spinoza in the (adioudian ,ritiHue of Deleuze5* Pli2 The3arwic %ournal o+ Philosophy 9 F1BBB* pp. 9>0BB* as well as to the work in

progress of ran]oise (araras.4 OThe original unaridged ren!h edition of Lire le )apital was pulished in two

@olues 7 ditions -aspero* in the series Théorie* run 7 %lthusser hiself.P



+IE''E0'%$2#IS -#'E%U 3/

Diale!ti!al -aterialis5/ whi!h* following the !usto of this Kournal* is

less a re@iew in the stri!t sense than an original stud7 M in whi!h (adioutakes sto!k of the !onteporar7 situation of -ar?is* interprets%lthusser5s own interpretation Fit is not sipl7 a Huestion of situating%lthusser* ut also of registering* with respe!t to !ertain Huestions* the

points of opa!it7* and finall7 attepts to go further in the last pages* inorder to resol@e those diffi!ulties whose solutions %lthusser has 7et tofind* and whi!h perhaps he has not e@en !learl7 forulated.

The undertaking represented 7 7or 1arx is defined in ters of what itgets rid of: the Rdaaged goods5 that tr7 to pass for -ar?is and whi!h

!an e redu!ed to three !ategories: Rfundaental -ar?is5 FGaraud7 andthose Rtheories5 of alienation fas!inated with the oung -ar?*Rtotalitarian -ar?is5 Fthe partisans of Rdiaat5* and Ranalogi!al-ar?is5 FLuka!s and Goldann. %lthusser is !redited with a rigorous

preo!!upation to look for -ar?is there where it is effe!ti@el7 found M in)apital M and with dis!o@ering -ar? under the register of a rigorousepisteolog7* whose forulation here owes ore to Spinoza and =antthan (a!helard. Ah7 in fa!t should one e@oke Rthe rule that !onsigns tothe iaginar7 e@er7 assuption of a totalit753 %nd further on re!all Rthat

a!!ess to the totalit7 is foridden to us* whi!h is what the first =antian,ritiHue rigorousl7 estalished O^P5> (esides* the two !on!epts that suup the &egelian enterprise Fwhi!h at the tie was !onsidered as the!ontinent to e aandoned in order to la7 the foundations of histori!alaterialis are totalit7 and negati@it7J and against this totalit7* it is=antian !ritiHue whi!h alread7 la7s !lai to @alidit7: Rin an7 respe!ts*the trans!endental diale!ti! is the se!ret go@ernent ehind the%lthusserian polei!5J Rthe theor7 of the produ!tion of knowledgesOconnaissancesP is a sort of pra!ti!al s!heatis. The philosoph7 of the!on!ept* sket!hed out 7 %lthusser as it had een 7 ,a@aill\s efore hi*

ears a strong reselan!e to the e?hiition of the stru!tured field of knowledge O savoir P as a ulti0trans!endental suKe!t0less field5.9 The

/ )ritique )/C F-a7 1B>* pp. /490/>. OThis arti!le is dis!ussed at length in (runo(osteels* R%lain (adiou5s Theor7 of the SuKe!t: +art I. The 'e!oen!eent of Diale!ti!al -aterialis5* Pli2 The 3arwic %ournal o+ Philosophy 1) F)CC1* pp.)CC0))B.P

3 Iid.* p. //3.> Iid.* p. />>. Iid.* pp. />>0/>.

9 Iid.* p. />>.



33 Pli 1/ F)CC4

!ritiHue of negati@it7 is instead de!iphered in Spinozist ters: the reKe!tion

of finalit7 is opposed to e?pressi@e !ausalit7J the theor7 of the oKe!t0ideais opposed to spiritual interiorit7J the irredu!iilit7 of illusion is opposed tothe freedo of the for0itself. It is indeed the first two or three first parts of the Ethics that !an a!t as ulwarks against the prin!ipal danger posed 7negati@it7* whi!h is alwa7s read7 to reinsert itself surreptitiousl7 into-ar?ist dis!ourse so as to per@ert its rigour.

or what !on!erns the thorn7 prole of knowing in a gi@en epo!h Finea!h so!ial foration whi!h is the deterining instan!e or pra!ti!e* isresol@ed 7 distinguishing M in a wa7 that follows -ar?5s te?ts to the letter

M etween doination and deterination: in ea!h so!ial foration* there isa doinant pra!ti!e* whose definition depends on the spe!ifi!it7 of theforation Fhere we re!ognise the !lassi!al referen!e of %ntiHuit7 to the

politi!al* of feudalis to the religious* and of !apitalis to the e!onoi!J ut the @er7 distriution of these pla!es is guaranteed 7 a single pra!ti!e M whi!h is deterining e@en if it is not doinant: this is what is !lassi!all7referred to as the e!ono75s role of Rdeterination in the last instan!e5.The interest of this distin!tion o@iousl7 lies in the fa!t that it safeguards

oth the spe!ifi!it7 of histori!al epo!hs and the !entral theses of -ar?is.

$e@ertheless* what is !hara!teristi! here is the language in whi!h thistheor7 of deterination is e?pressed: Rsu!h a pra!ti!e* like Spinoza5s $ature* will e oth stru!tured and stru!turing5.B

It sipl7 reains to indi!ate where the ain Rgaps5 in %lthusser5sundertaking are situated. (adiou lo!ates the in the fa!t that %lthusser5swork is still rooted in that whi!h it wants to reak with*1C as well as in theerel7 epiri!al a!!eptation of a pluralit7 of instan!es whi!h areultiatel7 not theoreti!all7 defined. This gi@es us the following proles:

M the status of diale!ti!al aterialis: Diale!ti!al -aterialis Rdiffers

fro an asolute knowledge a lot less than %lthusser is willing to!on!ede511J

M the asen!e of a response to the Huestion Rare the stru!tures wheredeterination is e?er!ised defined upon sets5

B Iid.* p. /3>.1C R$e@ertheless* %lthusser5s interpretati@e work finds itself in a situation of !aesura.

In an7 respe!ts* it is still go@erned 7 theoreti!al resentent* whi!h soeties linds it to e@er7thing within it that testifies the presen!e of the philosophi!al* or e@en ideologi!al* tradition5 Fiid.* p. />3.

11 Iid.* pp. />C0/>1.



+IE''E0'%$2#IS -#'E%U 3>

This is wh7* esides e!onoi! pra!ti!e and its presen!e as an instan!e

within the whole Rthere is a @er7 enigati! distortion6unifi!ation* whosefirst Rodel5 was doutless pro@ided 7 the ,artesian0Spinozist relation etween God and the adeHuate idea of God. (ut here* like in Spinoza* the prole reains that of the dedu!tion of the odes* that is* of Rwhat5 isstru!tured 7 the stru!ture* of that upon whi!h the stru!ture is defined5.1)

Ahen!e the ne!essit7 of a foral dis!ipline like the theor7 of histori!alsets M all the ore urgent inasu!h as R7 all sights* %lthusser elie@es he!an do without it5* sin!e he wishes to Rrealise at on!e O^P a dire!tdeterination of the !on!ept of stru!ture that need not rel7 on an7underl7ing sets5.14 It is against this pre0theoreti!al na_@etW that (adiousket!hes out* within a atheati!al register* what a !oplete !onstru!tionof the !on!ept of deterination !ould e. I will not follow the detail of hisreasoning hereJ what interests e is sipl7 the stateent of the

philosophi!al !ondition reHuired in order to !onfer rigour to the entiretheor7: reading =ant in Spinoza. RLet us not e istaken: =ant andSpinoza !an e entioned here to the pre!ise degree that we suppresswhat !ould superfi!iall7 ring the together: suppressed* (ook ; of the

Ethics* in whi!h the intelle!tual lo@e of God restores a for of an5s parti!ipation Oco"appartenanceP in the ultiate foundationJ suppressed* the

se!ond ,ritiHue* in whi!h freedo !uts a path toward thetransphenoenal5.1/

Spinoza5s erit would thus lie in the !ritiHue of negati@it7J his sin inthe re0opening of totalit7. I think this is the last tie that (adiou will speak of Spinoza in su!h dire!tl7 politi!al ters. (ut he will speak of hi again*as if to deepen and re@erse this estiate.

#n the side of totalit7* one !an see his !ritiHue of Spinozis as!endfro Ethics ; to Ethics I* as if little 7 little the entire s7ste were

arked 7 this aspiration toward totalit7 whi!h in 1B> onl7 !hara!terisedits !on!lusion. In!identall7* I think that* generall7 speaking* all readings of Spinoza that isolate Ethics ; are dooed either to isunderstand the logi!of the s7ste or* if the7 are rigorous* sooner or later to retra!e their stepsand find in the first ooks the ante!edents and !onne!tions that produ!ethe last one.

1) Iid.* p. />1.14 Iid.* p. />4.

1/ Iid.* p. />.



3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

In 1B9)* in Théorie du sujet OTheory o+ the 'ubject P* the Spinozist or

%lthusserian Rpro!ess without a suKe!t5 O proc8s sans sujet P is denoun!edas the Repitoe of the #ne5. It is now in the nae of diale!ti!s* whi!hstruggled to find its definition in the 1B> arti!le* that Spinozist ontolog7 is!ondened. Sipl7 put* in Spinoza hiself there is Rthe spe!tre of thetwo5J and it is Deleuze who is Kudged to represent the Spinozis of theultiple.13

In L9tre et lévénement O 0eing and Event P* and then in the 1BB4!onferen!e RL5#ntologie ipli!ite de Spinoza5 ORSpinoza5s Ipli!it#ntolog75P*1> we !an see this possiilit7 of the Two in Spinoza grow in

signifi!an!e M the od76soul relation finding itself grounded at a deeper le@el* in the diffi!ulties asso!iated with the infinite odes* and thenespe!iall7 in the infinite ode that is the di@ine understanding* or* to speak like (adiou* the intelle!t of God. In the 1BB4 !onferen!e* we witness the

pla!e for a suKe!t eing hollowed out* 7 the triple relation of !ausalit76!oupling6in!lusion that !ir!us!ries the irredu!ile !hara!ter of the infinite intelle!t within the s7ste: that Thought does not resele theother attriutes* that the di@ine intelle!t does not resele the other infiniteodes* and that the in!lusion of finite intelle!ts within the infinite intelle!t

does not resele an7 other relation defined 7 Spinozist ontolog7 M ea!hand e@er7 tie an e?oritant trait signals a point of tension within thes7ste.

Ae are therefore Kustified in thinking that the figures of totalit7 andsuKe!ti@it7 ha@e een in@erted 7 (adiou: whereas thirt7 7ears ago thedanger of totalit7 pointed to the e?tree edge of a proleati! !on!ernedwith the !ritiHue of negati@it7 !on!ei@ed as suKe!ti@it7* we now see theSuKe!t rise up in the ipasses of a proleati! !entred on the #ne M or

perhaps* haunting it like a spe!tre.

Translated by !lberto Toscano13 RDiale!ti!s states that there is the Two Oil y a du -euxP. It proposes to infer fro it

the #ne as a di@ision in o@eent. -etaph7si!s posits the #ne* and gets endlessl7entangled tr7ing to draw the Two out of it O^P. The ontolog7 of the ultiple is aetaph7si!s O^P. In Spinoza* who is a great philosopher* there passes the spe!treof the Two: the attriutes* thought and e?tension5J ut this appearan!e is R!an!elled5

7 the deterination of sustan!e as !onstituted 7 an infinit7 of attriutes M inother words* Rthis Two is a disailit7 of the ultiple5* sin!e it is onl7 the liitationof the huan understanding that redu!es its knowledge to that of two attriutes.See Théorie du sujet F+aris: Seuil* 1B9)* pp. /C0/1.

1> 'pino(a, Puissance et ontologie F+aris: =iW* 1BB/.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 390>

Spinoza8s $#ltiple 9 Dele#ze8s $#ltipli%it0.

ST3P*)( LCLRC

The Spinozist ultiple and the Deleuzian ultipli!it7* despite their et7ologi!al pro?iit7* are* without dout* inter!hangeale or assiilaleonl7 with great diffi!ult7. The7 oth originate in different uni@erses of thought* fro distin!t powers of refle!tion* e@en though* as is known*Deleuze was a great reader of Spinoza. $e@ertheless* the thought thatthere is no link etween these two thinkers* or orders of thought* should ea@oided. 8uite the !ontrar7. (ut if their thought is united* genealogi!all7* itis on different points than those of the multiple and of multiplicity. AhatenKoins these two figures is* unHuestional7* that whi!h sets the ultiple

and ultipli!it7 at pla7. The anal7sis of these two !on!epts will notne!essaril7 un@eil a presence of Spinoza5s philosoph7 in the work of Gilles Deleuze* nor a Deleuzian presentient at the heart of Spinozistdis!ourse. 'ather* a thought will e!oe apparent in the spa!e etween* inthe wa@e or in the fold of these two affirations: the ultiple andultipli!it7. ar fro a Spinozist0Deleuzian identity whi!h would* atties* e delineated* it would e etter to understand here the foration of a !on!ept* or a group of !on!epts as situation* as the irruption of an a0suKe!ti@e thought* a thought whi!h no longer elongs to an7one. Is this

not the fate of true !reations (7 dint of eing !on!ei@ed 7 thea!!uulation and !onKun!tion of fors* of thoughts* and of atter*!reation* like a astard !hild* sees itself with so an7 fathers that it

elongs to e@er7od7: indefiniteness of origin as singular Hualit7* e7ondan7 !hronolog7 or an7 failialis.



3B Pli 1/ F)CC4

The li;eration of the $#ltiple

The Deleuzian ultipli!it7 is hardl7 an ensele of unities on whi!h other unities !ould e added without !hanging its nature. The Deleuzianultipli!it7 a@oids nueri!al asselage* trans!ended 7 a #ne whi!hwould ipose on it oth its origin and its oti@ation. Deleuze5sultipli!it7 is u!h ore a ultipli!it7 in itsel+ . It does not find itsoriginalit7 outside itself* e@en if it finds all its d7nai!s fro outside* frothe eleent whi!h would !oe to e added.1 Ahat Deleuze gi@es toultipli!it7 is an autono7. This autono7 should e understood as the

singularisation of a ultiple* and not as its identifi!ation* or itssuKe!ti@ation. It takes* hen!eforth* the nae of ultipli!it7. Thisautono7 thus estowed on what e!oes a multiplicity is nothing other than the possiilit7 to cut an7 effe!t of trans!enden!e on this ensele.The singularisation of ultipli!it7 reaks the power of the #ne on theultiple. That ultiple has often appeared depri@ed of a proper oti@ation* disin!arnated 7 a doinant* trans!endent #ne* alwa7s ina!tualit7. This e!ause that multiple is onl7 !onstituted 7 nueri!alunities as the alwa7s sensile effe!tuation of an ipenetrale #ne0!reator.)

In this s7ste* for it is a Huestion of s7ste* unit7 !an e repeated* againand again* without !hanging the nature of the ultiple or that of the #ne. If the shepherd trans!ends the flo!k* the flo!k is nothing without theshepherd. Ea!h anial is one of the flo!k5s eleents* without a singularit7whi!h would in!arnate it spe!ifi!all7. &en!eforth* the eing Fétance of theunit7 is outside itself* lodged in the foring #ne* or in the shepherd.4 The#ne does not !ease to trans!end it* without its deterination eingaffe!ted.

The Deleuzian operation* so inus!ule in its gesture* ne@ertheless

!reates an iense disruption. If the #ne thus stops affe!ting the unit7*the unit7 will naturall7 find its oti@ation in itself. Aithout the shepherdthe flo!k e!oes a pa!k* where ea!h of its eleents e?ists 7 a differen!ewhi!h is singular to it. In this wa7 the pa!k realises a !ertain degree of differentiation intrinsi! to ea!h anial. The pa!k is thus !hara!terised 7 a

power of differentiation raised to the power of x. Effe!ti@el7* differen!e is produ!ti@e of power* insofar as it is itself power without eing trul7

1 Deleuze [ Guattari* 1ille Plateaux* +aris* -inuit* 1B9C* p.1>.) Iid.* p.14.

4 Deleuze* -i++érence : &épétition, +aris* +U* 1B>9* p./>.



ST+&%$ LE,LE',8 >C

a!tualised. If differen!e !ae to e a!tualised* it is differen!e in general

whi!h would !oe to fade awa7. It would e a little like aninstitutionalised differen!e* a little like a di++erence"state apparatus. The power of differen!e is what a!!redits it first a differentiation with itself*that is to sa7 a perpetual !reation of intensities and affe!ts. If there is a

power* that is a power to affe!t and to e affe!ted* awa7 fro alla!tualisation as ere!tion of Hualities./

(eing is a power to affe!t and to e affe!ted. It is intrinsi!all7!on!ei@ed 7 a prin!iple of differentiation* allowing it a differen!e withitself* as well as a differen!e with another. This power to affe!t* douled

with a power of differentiation in!arnates it in a non0deterinationianent to its nature. &ow to deterine that whi!h does not stop!hanging (eing !hanges* and ne@er stops !hanging* a!!ording to two!riteria* o@eents Flongitude and intensit7 Flatitude.3 (eing does not!ease to o@e and to affe!t* to allow itself to e affe!ted. The intrinsi!differen!e* or spe!ifi! differen!e aniating it allows it a no@el o@eentwhere e@en its for is indefatigal7 put into Huestion again and again.Ahat is the for of (eing whi!h !annot gesti!ulate an7ore (eing !anonl7 e !on!ei@ed 7 its longitudes and latitudes* eternal o@eents of

intensities whi!h !an no longer e intensified. &e!!eities. (eing is anhe!!eit7* indi@iduation without for* or with a thousand fors* untiel7and ipregnale.>

*e%%eit0 as %ondition of $#ltipli%it0

E@er7 eleent of the sensile is he!!eit7. Ae see* in this !on!ept* theinter!hange* or the union* of an ontolog7 and an episteolog7 at work.

(eing and nature* -eus sive natura. In the end* eing is not that differentto the things that surround it. %ll for a pa!k* or a multiplicity* a ultiplesingularised 7 that whi!h akes it. The pa!k* like e@er7 ensele* is!oposed of eleents whi!h do not stop o@ing* redefining thesel@es

perpetuall7 a!!ording to new o@eents. +re!arious latitudes andlongitudes that gi@e eing a for whi!h is new e@er7 tie. The Deleuzian

/ Deleuze [ Guattari* ;uest"ce que la philosophie/* +aris* -inuit* p.13/.3 Deleuze [ +arnet* -ialogues* +aris* laarion* 1BB>* p.11).> Deleuze [ Guattari* op.!it.* 1B9C* p.419. &e!!eit7 is a !on!ept of "ohn Duns

S!otus whi!h Deleuze* as we shall see* takes up without keeping its original sense.



>1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ultipli!it7 !annot ut o@e* it rests within a s7steati! indeterination

where it finds its oti@ation* as well as its foundation: the plane of ianen!e.

Deleuzian ultipli!it7 is indeed deterined the ost 7 thisindeterination at work. Indeterination is the oti@ation of alldifferen!e. There !an e no !on!eptual deterination that lea@es its oKe!tdeterined. #ne !annot !hange 7 reaining the sae* 7 lea@ingdifferen!e solel7 on the le@el of the a!!ident. Understanding differen!e onthe le@el of the a!!ident* and thus of the sensile* eans that eing wouldreain faithful to itself in a differen!e trans!ended 7 it. %!!epting the

slight Huotidian !hange without eing !hanged 7 it would show rather well this t7pe of a!!idental differen!e. (eing deterined 7 a doinateddifferen!e. #n the !ontrar7* a pure differen!e transfors with it oth all

eings and all of the sensile. &eterogeneous essen!e as pure ontolog7.

It is during his anal7sis of differen!e a!!ording to %ristotle thatDeleuze shows est this prin!ipal differen!e at work as ontologi!al!ondition.9 It is known that* for %ristotle* all effort on the part of atter tends towards the for. The o@eent of atter* so well dri@en 7 theo@eent of o@eent* or otor* onl7 works towards the realisation of

for.B

or is the @er7 a!!oplishent of the o@eent of atter. These!reated fors are like a residue of eternal fors* and thus the wa7 to rea!hthe* or at least to iagine the. (ut* oKe!ts Deleuze* in this produ!tionof fors there ust e a pro!ess of differentiation at work* otherwise allfors would e identi!al. In order for atter* in the ianen!e of itso@eent* to produce differen!e* differen!e !annot e a!!idental* utust indeed e pla!ed on the le@el of essen!es.1C There ust e*ne!essaril7* a !ontrariet7 in the genus itself and not sipl7 in its sensileeffe!tuation. or a thing to e einentl7 different* different in itsel+ * it is

ne!essar7 that the pro!ess of differentiation aniating it e pla!ed on thele@el of eing Fétance* and not onl7 on its realisation. Differen!e itself isat the origin of eing Fétance. The essen!e of a thing is ne!essaril7!oposed of heterogeneous @e!tors whose asselage authorises sensilerealisation. The essen!e of -er!ur7* for e?aple* is !oposed of withfeet and with wings. Aith feet and with wings* as opposed

Deleuze* *mmanence2 une vie* +aris* -inuit 1BB3* pp.403.9 Deleuze* op.!it.* 1B>9* pp./30/B.B %ristotle* Physics* II* 1B4.

1C Deleuze* op.!it.* 1B>9* p./>.



ST+&%$ LE,LE',8 >)

Hualities* are heterogeneousl7 united to for -er!ur7. -er!ur7 !annot

e?ist without these two Hualities of its figure. It founds then* if 7ou like* a pro!ess of differentiation at the heart itself of the essen!e of -er!ur7.

Thus* differen!e is essential for the !oposition of essen!es* andauthorises the realisation of the sensile. The oKe!t e?presses* 7 itsessen!es* its atter* and in its for* a differen!e whi!h is intrinsi! to itFspe!ifi! differen!e. Differen!e is then an e?pression of for. (ut thisdifferen!e at work !annot e an e?pression of for* and 7 reason of essen!e* other than on the !ondition that the essen!e of the thing reainswithin a li@ing indeterination.11 Ahat !hanges* and has !hange as its @ital

pro!ess* a7 onl7 gi@e rise to an indeterinate for* itself alwa7s!hanging.

$o dout unfortunatel7* this !on!ept of spe!ifi! differen!e is onl7@irtuall7 at work in %ristotle5s philosoph7. This is for two reasons. To

egin with* differen!e !annot e thought without a pure o@eent asd7nai!s of !hange and of spe!ifi! differen!e. or this* a real o@eent isneeded as a substrate. This sustrate ust e an essentiall7 differento@eent* that is to sa7 ianent* or etter* pure ianen!e* to whi!hthe eleents are related. #n the !ontrar7* the %ristotelian o@eent refers

the o@eent ianent to things to a supree o@eent* or prieo@er. Ioile* ungenerated o@eent* it is the intelligile o@eentdire!ting the infinit7 of sensile o@eents. %t this stage* differen!e !anno longer produ!e itself. It is trans!ended 7 this o@er with strangeHualities.1) This intelligile o@eent * pre!isel7 7 its un!oonHualities* relegates spe!ifi! differen!e to the @ariet7 and the eHui@o!it7 of the sensile. -oreo@er* the prin!iple of !ategories pre@ents this spe!ifi!differen!e fro e?pressing itself and fro eing at the origin of e?pressionof oth for and atter. If the essen!e of an eleent reains

indeterinate* it will find its effe!tuation in an alwa7s no@el e?pression. If all things are lended in a prodigious !haos* the7 !an onl7 e distinguishedas for or as thing 7 a singular e?pression in!arnating the. #nl7 thee?pression of a thing would offer it an indi@iduation. If now a pro!ess of !ategorisation a!ts upon this !haos* aiing to !lassif7 and iteise things*differen!e would no longer e a Huestion of internal e?pression ut of the!ategor7 itself. (7 the !ategor7* the thing finds its differen!e pre!isel7 in

11 Iid.* p.3C.

1) %ristotle* Physics* ;III* )>a.



>4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

the !ategor7 to whi!h it elongs* and no longer 7 that spe!ifi! differen!e

whi!h* e@en till now* was e?pressed in it.14

It is Duns S!otus* distant dis!iple of %ristotle* who will trul7 reathe

spe!ifi! differen!e into the heart of his aster5s thought. "udging* like agood student* that o@ed atter e?hausts itself in for* Duns S!otus willsee in it an asolute indi@iduation whi!h will finall7 resele spe!ifi!differen!e. If e@er7 thing possesses a for* and e@er7 thing is different* asa !onseHuen!e e@er7 for is indi@iduated so that it e!oesdistinguishale.1/ %nd* as we know* the sensile for is a residue of intelligile fors* that is to sa7 it reains the priar7 eans of knowledge

of the intelligile. Thus* through the sensile for we !an* as it were*swi a!k upstrea. The indi@iduated for holds a pro!ess of indi@iduation as objective +inality and thus allows us to understand essen!eitself as this pro!ess. Ahat is iportant here* therefore* is to see a pro!ess*as !on!ept* at work* and not* a little landl7* to follow an analog7 thatwould allow us to !opare the sensile with the intelligile for. or assoon as there is pro!ess at work* the pro!ess of indi@iduation* it aountsto the sae as seeing a !on!ept* that of differen!e* effe!tuated.

This !on!ept is that of he!!eit7 in Duns S!otus5s sense: a singular

indi@iduation as spe!ifi! differen!e e?pressed in essen!es. Thisindi@iduation* rendering things dissiilar* is entirel7 the e?pression of essen!e. Essen!e* if it is one* will not !ease to e?press itself differentl7 inall the oKe!ts of its !reation. %nd if these e?pressions are different aongthesel@es* the7 are all eHual with regard to the essen!e* allowing it adifferential in!arnation in the sensile. The totalit7 of these e?pressions intheir relation with essen!e is naed 7 Duns S!otus uni@o!it7.13

14 Deleuze* op.!it.* 1B>9* p.3C.1/ Duns S!otus* Principle o+ *ndividuation* Huestion /.13 Deleuze* op.!it.* p.3. See also: StWfan Le!ler!H* .éccéité et univocité$ La

présence de %ean -uns 'cot dans loeuvre de <illes -eleu(e Fpaper gi@en at the,oll\ge International de philosophie* Les Editions Sils -aria* forth!oing )CC4. Itust e added that it was %lain (adiou who first threw light on the uni@o!it7inherent in the work of Deleuze* as !an espe!iall7 e seen in -i++erence and

&epetition* and Expressionism in Philosophy2 'pino(a. See %lain (adiou* -eleu(e2

The )lamor o+ 0eing



ST+&%$ LE,LE',8 >/

The $#ltiple and sing#larities in Spinoza

or Spinoza* e@er7 unit7 is distin!t. It !an no longer for a set* or agroup on whi!h it would depend. Unit7 is not organised a!!ording to anumericity where it would lose oth its eaning and its intrinsi! @alue. or Spinozist unit7* it is ore of a Huestion of organisations Fagencements.#rganisation with the other* thus organisation for the !onstru!tion of nature* organisation also with God* without whi!h nothing is done.

E@er7 unit7 is distin!t* e!ause it is spe!ified. It is spe!ified insofar as

it in!arnates a spe!ifi! essen!e. Essen!e is the !ause of unit7. Unit7* in itsturn is the e?pression of essen!e. Therein lies a eautiful organisationFagencement . Aithout a !ause there is no unit7* without e?pression thereis no essen!e.1> Ae !an see estalished here a relation of a new t7pe* onewhi!h !annot !orrespond to the usual trans!enden!e etween the thing andits essen!e.1 Ianen!e is put in pla!e. &ere it is no longer a Huestion of go@erning the thing and of installing* eginning with it* a !reati@ehierar!h7. Aith Spinoza* the world is !onstru!ted at the sae tie* in aunilateral relation etween the different parties* like the essen!es*sustan!es* odes* and attriutes.19 There is a !oon relation installedwherein ea!h realises the !oon. This realisation of the !oon !annot*whate@er one thinks* e realised on the sae* on reselan!e* on analog7.8uite the !ontrar7* there is a !on!ept of differen!e at work* whi!h allowsea!h of the values present to e what it is* perhaps*1B ut also to e!oewhat it e!oes. This differen!e intrinsi! to essen!es !reates* as thee?pression of these essen!es* the singular thing .

%ll eleents ha@e things in !oon* and at the sae tie also @er7dissiilar things. The singular thing is not solel7 !onstituted 7differen!es* e@en if onl7 a singularit7 a7 gi@e irth to the singular. -an7things are !ur@ed like an egg* ut e@er7thing is not an egg. There ust

1> Spinoza* Ethics* II* XL;.1 Spinoza* the infinite e!oing0philosopher. &e showed* drew up* and thought the

Rest5 plane of ianen!e 0 that is* the purest* the one that does not hand itself o@er to the trans!endent or restore an7 trans!endent* the one whi!h inspires the fewestillusions* ad feelings* and erroneous per!eptions. Deleuze [ Guattari* 3hat is

Philosophy/* trans. &ugh Tolinson and Graha (ur!hell* $ew ork* ,oluiaUni@ersit7 +ress* 1BB/* p. >C.

19 Deleuze* 'pino(a et le probl8me de lexpression* +aris* -inuit* 1B>9* pp.B011.

1B Spinoza* op.!it.* II* XXXI.



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ne!essaril7 e a differen!e at work e@en within the essen!es in order for

the @ariet7 of the world to e estalished into a multiple world. TheSpinozist ultiple therefore is estalished on that whi!h things ha@e in!oon* simultaneously with that in whi!h the7 differ. %ll things in theworld are like silings through this prin!iple of essen!es as !auses. Two or se@eral things a7 for a ultiple* and not a ultipli!it7* e!ause the7 aresiilar. %nd this reselan!e is indeed the sae differen!e whi!h isshared in !oon. Things are singularl7 the sae for the7 are essentiall7different. Ahat the7 ha@e in !oon is a differential prin!iple inspiringthe* u!h rather than a reselan!e 7 analog7. $e@ertheless* if a thingis singular* that is e!ause it is not totall7 different. There is a !opositionof the heterogeneous aniating it.)C The sae and the different are united.(ut what things ha@e priaril7 in !oon is that the7 are e?er!ised 7 a!on!ept of differen!e. The sae as analog7 is onl7 sensile* eHui@o!al* for a first kind of knowledge. The sae and the different in the oKe!t is a)haosmosis* as Wli? Guattari would sa7* uniting the sae and the di@erse*order and !haos* o@eent and rest.)1

Understanding this* that is to sa7* eing infiltrated within the relations etween things* within the link that !oprehends oth the thing and the

unit7* is* a!!ording to Spinoza* the se!ond* and then the third kinds of knowledge. These kinds of knowledge allow the realisation of anadeHuate* that is a true and authenti! idea.)) True* then* is not the sae* utthe sae united with differen!e. The adeHuate idea is the onl7 one whi!h!an grasp essen!es and e united with the. It is e!ause we are different*and e!ause this differen!e realises us as e?pressions of an essen!e* thatwe elong to God and to $ature. God is hiself $ature* as Spinoza has sowell said. The ultiple is indeed all these e?pressions oth of essen!esand* !onseHuentl7* of God* to whi!h e@er7 eing is united 7 its @er7differen!e.

This differen!e that all essen!es ha@e in !oon and that all eleentsof the real ipel !onstitutes the Spinozist Plane o+ *mmanence. Differen!eis no longer that whi!h is immanent to the eleent or the thing. Differen!e*

)C Iid.* II* ;II.)1 Singular things are defined in ters of o@eent and rest. (ut this o@eent or

rest is not otained 7 the oKe!t itself ut fro another* fro a !onditionedsingular thing. FSpinoza* op.!it.* II* III. There is undoutedl7 a !onne!tion to eade with the &era!litean Rta panta rhei5* as %ristotle des!ries it in 1etaphysics*% )03.

)) Spinoza* op.!it.* II* I;.



ST+&%$ LE,LE',8 >>

pushed to su!h a power* !an no longer e the figure of the predi!ate* the

attriute. This power is too strong* too fero!ious* at the @er7 heart of the!reati@e pro!ess. Sin!e ianen!e is pure power* as !ondition of the real*that whi!h is !reated* engendered* is related to it. It is no longer a Huestionof different things* ut of a differen!e whose e?pression things realise.Differen!e is an ianen!e as !ondition of the real. %t this stage* the @iewof differen!e as a state, or as a real prin!iple of realit7* ust e [email protected] would onl7 ha@e the ad@antage of understanding differen!e ashoogeneous* as showing solidarit7 with itself. That differen!e is onl7 stillan attriute adhering to the thing for the !onstru!tion of an identit7. #n the!ontrar7* if differen!e has indeed this ultiate power assigned to it* it doesnot stop eing different to itself. If we sa7* for e?aple* that !olour arksthe differen!e etween things* then a lue sea* a pink sk7 are differentiated

7 their nuan!e M ut this is still a differential attriute. (ut if this lue* or this pink* is ne@er apparent in the sae wa7* here turHuoise* there na@7

lue* then the sk7 and the sea will undergo a !onstant differentiation withthesel@es* 7 a differen!e as !ondition of their e?isten!e. This differen!e!annot ut !hange* and !hange the eleents that it in!arnates with it. Thesea* or the sk7* is related to this unstale lue in a !onstant* untiel7differen!e at work. The ianent e!oes ianen!e* plane of

ianen!e* in a tuult of o@eents* @ariations* and intensities.)4

S#perposing the planes

The essential for us toda7 is not to understand Deleuze5s thought!orrelati@el7 with* in parallel to* Spinoza5s. Ahat is iportant is rather toknow what these two thoughts organise together* and for us* under the

order of the ultiple and of ultipli!it7.%s we know* the plane o+ immanence is a Deleuzian !on!ept. +erhapsthe ost iportant !on!ept in Deleuze5s philosoph7* it ne@ertheless findsits oti@ation* as well as its effe!tuation* in Spinoza5s light. In this respe!twe !ould well !all Deleuze a 'pino(ist * although his thought* and the!on!epts issued fro it* !annot e redu!ed to this. Spinoza re@eals to

)4 or one e!oes Spinozist without knowing it* arri@ing in the iddle* trul7Spinoza5s pla!e in philosoph7: the !onstru!tion of a plane of ianen!e ade of speeds and slownesses* and affe!ts. Deleuze* 'pino(a et nous* in 1aga(ine

Littéraire no$ 4C* $o@eer 1BB9* p.3C.



> Pli 1/ F)CC4

Deleuze the !on!ept of the plane o+ immanence whi!h he will eplo7 in

his reading of Spinoza ut also* Huite pre!iousl7* for the organisation of hisown philosoph7. This* einentl7 episteologi!al* plan !oes to edouled* or superposed* 7 a high ontologi!al degree whi!h !onstitutes itsine@itale !ounterpart: uni@o!it7.)/ Ae !annot understand this Deleuzian

plane of ianen!e in its inherent ultipli!it7 without this uni@o!it7 at itsheart* uniting* on the sae plane* eing and $ature. Ianen!e anduni@o!it7 are inseparale* without the risk of trun!ating a Kustunderstanding of Deleuzian thought.

Ae !an well see the degree to whi!h ianen!e and uni@o!it7 are

siultaneousl7 !onstru!ted* how the7 parti!ipate in the sae oti@ation*and siilar deterinations. (eing is !oposed of distin!t* differentiale?pressions whi!h* though different etween the* are no less eHual in therelation to eing whi!h the7 !opose Funi@o!it7. %t the sae tie*differen!e is e?pressed as !ondition of the thing* a!!ording to speeds*o@eents* and affe!ts. Speeds* o@eents* and affe!ts are thee?pression of differen!e in the thing* and in differen!e itself. Thisdifferen!e at work realises what all things ha@e in !oon. (ut thisdifferen!e is far fro eing a differen!e lo!ated in the sensile* as

a!!ident* a differen!e as e?er!ised attriute of the thing. (e!ause thisdifferen!e is at the origin of things* it is !on!eptual* trans!endental. It a!tson things and does not a!!opan7 the. %n intrinsi! differen!e therefore*like that whi!h all things ha@e in !oon* a7 e understood as plane o+ immanence.

Ianen!e and uni@o!it7 indeed parti!ipate in the sae pro!ess of differentiation* in eing and in things. (eing and things share thisdifferen!e as world order* as the #ne0all of the uni@erse.)3 %ttept at aninstallation of a true cosmology. -ultipli!it7* affe!ts* o@eents*

intensities. +ure ianen!e to whi!h e@er7thing is related* e?pression of eing as differen!es: ultipli!it7 !an thus* finall7* e?press itself.

Translated by .ector =ollias

)/ % plane !an ne@er e understood on its own* Kust as a !on!ept* on its own* withoutlinks to other !on!epts* reains an astra!tion.

)3 This #ne0all is pure ianen!e at work. % true ultipli!it7: a #ne whose @er7 eing is differen!e and ultipli!it7. or the opposition of the Deleuzian #ne0all tothe +latoni! and neo0+latoni! #ne* see: Deleuze [ Guattari* ;uest"ce que la

philosophie/ -inuit* 1BB1* pp./>0/.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* >9099

S#;tra%tion: &ewish and Christian

SL)V'& <I<=

Ahen we are dealing with an eroti!0religious te?t like The 'ong o+ 'ongs*!oentators hurr7 to warn us that its e?tree and e?pli!it eroti! iager7is to e read allegori!all7* as a etaphor: sa7* when* in the poe* the lo@er kisses the woan5s lips* this Rreall7 eans5 that &e iparts on the "ewsthe Ten ,oandents. In short* what appears as the des!ription of aRpurel7 huan5 se?ual en!ounter* s7oli!all7 renders the spiritual!ounion of God and the "ewish people. &owe@er* the ost perspi!uous(ile s!holars thesel@es are the first to ephasize the liits of su!h aetaphori!al reading whi!h disisses the des!ried sensual !ontent as

Ronl7 a siile5: it is pre!isel7 su!h a Rs7oli!5 reading whi!h is Rpurel7huan5* i.e.* whi!h persists in the e?ternal opposition of the s7ol and itseaning* !lusil7 atta!hing a Rdeeper eaning5 to the e?plosi@e se?ual!ontent. The literal reading Fsa7* of The 'ong o+ 'ongs as alost

pornographi! eroti!is and the allegori!al reading are the two sides of thesae operation: what the7 share is the !oon presupposition that Rreal5se?ualit7 is Rpurel7 huan5* with no di@ine diension dis!ernile in it. F#f !ourse* the Huestion arises here: if se?ualit7 is Kust a etaphor* wh7 do weneed this proleati! detour in the first pla!e Ah7 do we not dire!tl7

render the true spiritual !ontent (e!ause* due to the liitations of our sensual finite nature* this !ontent is not dire!tl7 a!!essile to us. Ahat*howe@er* if The 'ong o+ 'ongs is not to e read as an allegor7* ut* u!hore literall7* as the des!ription of a purel7 sensual eroti! pla7 Ahat if the Rdeeper5 spiritual diension is alread7 operati@e in the passionatese?ual intera!tion itself The true task is thus not to redu!e se?ualit7 to aere allegor7* ut to unearth the inherent Rspiritual5 diension whi!hfore@er separates huan se?ualit7 fro anial !oupling. Is it* howe@er*

possile to a!!oplish this step fro allegor7 to full identit7 in "udais



>B Pli 1/ F)CC4

Is this not what ,hristianit7 is aout* with its assertion of the dire!t

identit7 of God and an1

There is a further prole with The 'ong o+ 'ongs. The standarddefen!e of Rps7!hoanal7ti! "udais5 against ,hristianit7 in@ol@es two!lais: first* it is onl7 in "udais that we en!ounter the an?iet7 of thetrauati! 'eal of the Law* of the a7ss of the #ther5s desire FRAhat do7ou want5J ,hristianit7 !o@ers up this a7ss with lo@e* i.e.* the iaginar7re!on!iliation of God and huanit7 in whi!h the an?iet70pro@okingen!ounter with the 'eal is itigated M now we know what the #ther wantsfro us M God lo@es us* ,hrist5s sa!rifi!e is the ultiate proof of it...

Se!ond !lai: do te?ts like The 'ong o+ 'ongs not deonstrate that* far fro eing Fonl7 a religion of an?iet7* "udais is also and ao@e all thereligion of lo@e* an e@en ore intense lo@e than ,hristianit7 Is the!o@enant etween God and the "ewish people not a supree a!t of lo@e&owe@er* as we ha@e Kust indi!ated* this "ewish lo@e reainsRetaphori!5J as su!h* it is itself the iaginar7 re!on!iliation of God andhuanit7 in whi!h the an?iet70pro@oking en!ounter with the 'eal isitigated. #r* to put it in a dire!t and rutal wa7* is The 'ong o+ 'ongs notideolog7 at its purest* insofar as we !on!ei@e of ideolog7 as the iaginar7

itigating of a trauati! 'eal* as Rthe 'eal of the di@ine en!ounter with ahuan fa!e5

&ow* then* do we pass fro here to ,hristianit7 proper The ke7 to,hrist is pro@ided 7 the figure of "o* whose suffering prefigures that of ,hrist. Ahat akes the 0oo o+ %ob so pro@o!ati@e is not sipl7 the

presen!e of ultiple perspe!ti@es without a !lear resolution of their tensionFthe fa!t that "o5s suffering in@ol@es a different perspe!ti@e than that of religious relian!e on GodJ "o5s perple?it7 resides in the fa!t that hee?perien!es God as an ipenetrale Thing* un!ertain as to what &e wants

fro hi with the ordeals to whi!h he is suitted Fthe La!anian R)hevuoi/5* and* !onseHuentl7* that he M "o M is unale to as!ertain how hefits into the o@erall di@ine order* unale to re!ognize his pla!e in the di@ineorder.

The alost unearale ipa!t of the 0oo o+ %ob resides not so u!hin its narrati@e frae Fthe De@il appears in it as a !on@ersational partner of

1 Is ,atholi! !elia!7 Fthe prohiition of priest5s and nun5s arriage not ultiatel7anti0,hristian* a reainder of pagan attitude Does it not rel7 on the pagan notionthat those who sa!rifi!e terrestrial se?ual pleasures there7 gain a!!ess to the di@ine

jouissance



SL%;#" <I<E= C

God* and the two engage in a rather !ruel e?perient in order to test "o5s

faith* ut in its final out!oe. ar fro pro@iding soe kind of satisfa!tor7 a!!ount of "o5s undeser@ed suffering* God5s appearan!e atthe end ultiatel7 aounts to pure oasting* a horror show with eleentsof far!i!al spe!ta!le M a pure arguent of authorit7 grounded in

reathtaking displa7 of power: Rou see all that I !an do ,an 7ou do thisAho are 7ou then to !oplain5. So what we get is neither the good Godletting "o know that his suffering is Kust an ordeal destined to test hisfaith* nor a dark God e7ond Law* the God of pure !apri!e* ut rather aGod who a!ts as soeone !aught in the oent of ipoten!e* weaknessat least* and tries to es!ape his predi!aent 7 ept7 oasting. Ahat weget at the end is a kind of !heap &oll7wood horror show with lots of spe!ial effe!ts M no wonder that an7 !oentators tend to disiss "o5sstor7 as a reainder of the pre@ious pagan 7tholog7 whi!h should ha@e

een e?!luded fro the (ile.

%gainst this teptation* one should lo!ate the true greatness of "owith pre!ision: !ontrar7 to the usual notion of "o* he is not a patientsufferer* enduring his ordeal with the fir faith in God M on the !ontrar7*he !oplains all the tie* reKe!ting his fate Flike #edipus at ,olonus* who

is also usuall7 isper!ei@ed as a patient @i!ti resigned to his fate. Ahenthe three theologian0friends @isit hi* their line of arguentation is thestandard ideologi!al sophistr7 Fif 7ou suffer* it is 7 definition that 7oumust have done soething wrong* sin!e God is Kust. &owe@er* their arguentation is not liited to the !lai that "o ust e soehow guilt7:what is at stake at a ore radi!al le@el is the eaningFlessness of "o5ssuffering. Like #edipus at ,olonus* "o insists on the utter meaninglessness of his suffering M as the title of %ob ) sa7s: R"o-aintains &is Integrit75.) %s su!h* the 0oo o+ %ob pro@ides what is

perhaps the first e?eplar7 !ase of the !ritiHue of ideolog7 in the huanhistor7* la7ing are the asi! dis!ursi@e strategies of legitiising suffering:"o5s properl7 ethi!al dignit7 resides in the wa7 he persistentl7 reKe!ts thenotion that his suffering !an ha@e an7 eaning* either punishent for his

past sins or the trial of his faith* against the three theologians who oardhi with possile eanings M and* surprisingl7* God takes his side at the

) %!!ording to "ung* in the !ons!ious suffering of ,hrist* God atones for thesuffering of "o: Rfor* Kust as an ust suffer fro God* so God ust suffer froan. #therwise there !an e no re!on!iliation etween the two5 F,.G. "ung*

!nswer to %ob F+rin!eton: (ollingen 1B39* p. 4B. The fraework is here still that

of e?!hange: one suffering for the other^



1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

end* !laiing that e@er7 word that "o spoke was true* while e@er7 word

of the three theologians was false.%nd it is with regard to this assertion of the eaninglessness of "o5s

suffering that one should insist on the parallel etween "o and ,hrist* on"o5s suffering announ!ing the Aa7 of the ,ross: ,hrist5s suffering is alsoeaningless* not an a!t of eaningful e?!hange. The differen!e* of !ourse*is that* in the !ase of ,hrist* the gap that separates the suffering desperatean F"o fro God is transposed into God hiself* as &is own radi!alsplitting or* rather* self0aandonent. Ahat this eans is that one shouldrisk a u!h ore radi!al reading of ,hrist5s Rather* wh7 did 7ou forsake

e5 than the usual one: sin!e we are dealing here not with the gap etween an and God* ut with the split in God hiself* the solution!annot e for God to Freappear in all his aKest7* re@ealing to ,hrist thedeeper eaning of his suffering Fthat he was the Inno!ent sa!rifi!ed toredee huanit7. ,hrist5s Rather* wh7 did 7ou forsake e5 is not the!oplaint to the omnipotent !apri!ious God0ather whose wa7s areinde!ipherale to us* ortal huans* ut the !oplaint whi!h hints at theimpotent God: it is rather like the !hild who* after elie@ing in his father5s

powerfulness* dis!o@ers with horror that his father !annot help hi. FTo

e@oke an e?aple fro re!ent histor7: at the oent of ,hrist5s!ru!ifi?ion* God0the0ather is in a position soewhat siilar to that of the(osnian father* ade to witness the gang rape of his own daughter* and toendure the ultiate traua of her !opassionate0reproa!hing gaze:Rather* wh7 did 7ou forsake e5^. In short* with this Rather* wh7 did7ou forsake e5* it is God0the0ather who effe!ti@el7 dies* re@ealing hisutter ipoten!e* and thereupon rises fro the dead in the guise of the &ol7Ghost.

Ah7 did "o keep his silen!e after the oastful appearan!e of God Is

this ridi!ulous oasting Fthe popous atter7 of RAere 7ou there when^5rhetori!al Huestions: RAho is this whose ignorant words 6 Sear 7 designwith darkness 6 Aere 7ou there when I planned the earth* 6 Tell e* if 7ouare so wise5F %ob 49:)03 not the @er7 ode of appearan!e of itsopposite* to whi!h one !an answer 7 sipl7 sa7ing: R#= * if 7ou !an doall this* why did you let me su++er in such a meaningless way5. Do God5sthundering words not render all the ore palpale his silen!e* the asen!eof an answer Ahat* then* if this was what "o per!ei@ed and what kepthi silent: he reained silent neither e!ause he was !rushed 7 God5so@erwheling presen!e* nor e!ause he wanted there7 to signal his



SL%;#" <I<E= )

!ontinuous resistan!e* i.e. the fa!t that God a@oided answering "o5s

Huestion* ut e!ause* in a gesture of silent solidarit7* he per!ei@ed thedi@ine ipoten!e. God is neither Kust nor unKust* ut sipl7 ipotent.Ahat "o suddenl7 understood is that it was not him, but <od himsel+ whowas e++ectively on trial in %obs calamities* and he failed the testiseral7. E@en ore pointedl7* one is tepted to risk a radi!alana!hronisti! reading: "o foresaw God5s own future suffering M RToda7it5s e* toorrow it will e 7our own son* and there will e no one tointer@ene for him. Ahat 7ou see in e now is the pre0figuration of 7our own passionQ5.4

Sin!e the fun!tion of the os!ene superego suppleent of the Fdi@ineLaw is to ask this ipoten!e of the ig #ther* and sin!e ,hristianit7reveals this ipoten!e* it is* Huite !onseHuentl7* the first Fand onl7religion to radi!all7 lea@e ehind the split etween the offi!ial6puli! te?tand its os!ene initiator7 suppleent: in it* there is no hidden untold stor7.In this pre!ise sense* ,hristianit7 is the religion of 'e@elation: e@er7thingis re@ealed in it* no os!ene superego suppleent a!!opanies its puli!essage. In old Greek and 'oan religions* the puli! te?t was alwa7ssuppleented 7 se!ret initiator7 rituals and orgiesJ all attepts to treat

,hristianit7 in the sae wa7 Fto un!o@er ,hrist5s Rse!ret tea!hing5soehow en!oded in the $ew Testaent or found in apo!r7phal Gospelsaount to its hereti! re0ins!ription into the pagan Gnosti! tradition.

%propos ,hristianit7 as Rre@ealed religion5* one should thus ask theine@itale stupid Huestion: what is effe!ti@el7 re@ealed in it That is to sa7*is it not that all religions re@eal soe 7ster7* through the prophets who!arr7 the di@ine essage to huans FE@en those who insist on theipenetrailit7 of the dieu obscur ipl7 that there is soe se!ret whi!h

4 %s for the R"ewish e?!eption5* one is thus tepted to risk a radi!al rereading of

reud* who attriuted to "ews the disa@owal of the priordial !rie Fthe parri!ideof -oses: what if e@en alternati@e reudian readings whi!h propose the h7pothesisof a displa!ed !rie Feffe!ti@el7* it was -oses hiself who was guilt7 of theRparri!ide5 7 killing the pharaoh are wrong Ahat if -oses5 true !rie was notthe urder* ut the humiliation of the pharaoh* the puli! displa7 of his ipoten!eIs this not worse than a dire!t killing: after the killing* the father returns as the idealagen!7 of the Law* while the huiliated father Kust sur@i@es as a ridi!ulous ipotente?!reent Ahat if this huiliation of the father was the pre!ondition for estalishing "udais as the first great religion whi!h* originall7 and for ost of itse?isten!e* was not a state religion* ut the religion of a group without a stateidentit7 %nd* furtherore* what if this is what renders the idea of the State of

Israel proleati!



SL%;#" <I<E= /

Rrepressed5 status of the E@ent is what gi@es "udais its unpre!edented

@italit7.Does* howe@er* this ean that the split etween the Roffi!ial5 te?ts of

the Law with their astra!t legal ase?ual !hara!ter FTorah M the #ldTestaentJ -ishna M the forulation of the LawsJ and Talud M the!oentar7 of the Laws* all of the supposed to e part of the di@ine'e@elation on the -ount Sinai* and =aalah Fthis set of the deepl7se?ualised os!ure insights to e kept se!ret M re!all the notorious

passages aout the @aginal Kui!es reprodu!es within "udais the tension etween the pure s7oli! Law and its superego suppleent* the se!ret

initiator7 knowledge % !ru!ial line of separation is to e drawn here etween the "ewish fidelit7 to the disa@owed ghosts and the paganos!ene initiator7 wisdo a!!opan7ing the puli! ritual: the disa@owed"ewish spe!tral narrati@e does not tell the os!ene stor7 of God5sipenetrale onipoten!e* ut its e?a!t opposite: the stor7 of &isimpotence !o@ered 7 the standard pagan os!ene suppleents. The se!retto whi!h the "ews reain faithful is the horror of the di@ine ipoten!e M and it is this se!ret whi!h is Rre@ealed5 in ,hristianit7. This is the reasonwh7 ,hristianit7 !an onl7 o!!ur after "udais: it re@eals the horror first

!onfronted 7 the "ews. It is thus onl7 through taking into a!!ount this lineof separation etween paganis and "udais that one !an properl7 graspthe ,hristian reakthrough itself.

Ahat this eans is that* in for!ing us to fa!e the a7ss of the #ther5sdesire Fin the guise of the ipenetrale God* in refusing to !o@er up thisa7ss with a deterinate fantasati! s!enario Farti!ulated in the os!eneinitiator7 7th* "udais !onfronts us for the first tie with the parado? of huan freedo. There is no freedo outside the trauati! en!ounter withthe opa!it7 of the #ther5s desire: freedo does not ean that I sipl7 get

rid of the #ther5s desire M I a as it were thrown into 7 freedo when I!onfront this opa!it7 as su!h* depri@ed of the fantasati! !o@er whi!h tellse what the #ther wants fro e. In this diffi!ult predi!aent* full of an?iet7* when I know that the #ther wants soething fro e* withoutknowing what this desire is* I a thrown a!k into 7self* !opelled toassue the risk of freel7 deterining the !oordinates of 7 desire.

%!!ording to 'osenzweig* the differen!e etween "ews and ,hristian elie@ers is not that the latter e?perien!e no an?iet7* ut that the fo!us of an?iet7 is displa!ed: ,hristians e?perien!e an?iet7 in the intia!7 of their

!onta!t with God Flike %raha* while for "ews* an?iet7 arises at the



3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

le@el of their eing a !olle!ti@e entit7 without a proper land* threatened in

its e?isten!e.3

%nd* perhaps* one should estalish here a link with the weak point of &eidegger5s 'ein und >eit Fthe Rillegitiate5 passage froindi@idual eing0towards0death and assuing one5s !ontingent fate to thehistori!it7 of a !olle!ti@e: it is only in the !ase of the "ewish people thatsu!h a passage fro indi@idual to !olle!ti@e le@el would ha@e eenRlegitiate5.

In what* then* does the ,hristian !ounit7 differ fro the "ewishone +aul !on!ei@es of the ,hristian !ounit7 as the new in!arnation of the !hosen people: it is ,hristians who are the true R!hildren of %raha5.

Ahat was* in its first in!arnation* a distin!t ethni! group* is now a!ounit7 of free elie@ers whi!h suspends all ethni! di@isions For* rather*!uts a line of separation within ea!h ethni! group M the !hosen people arethose who ha@e faith in ,hrist. Ae ha@e thus a kind of ?transubstantiation o+ the chosen people: God kept his proise of redeption to the "ewish people* ut* in the pro!ess itself* he !hanged theidentit7 of the !hosen people. The theoreti!al Fand politi!al interest of thisnotion of !ounit7 is that it pro@ides the first e?aple of a !olle!ti@ewhi!h is not fored and held together through the e!hanis des!ried 7

reud in his Totem and Taboo and 1oses and 1onotheism Fthe sharedguilt of the parri!ide M are not further @ersions of this sae !olle!ti@e there@olutionar7 part7 and the ps7!hoanal7ti! so!iet7 R&ol7 Ghost5designates a new !olle!ti@e held together not 7 a -aster0Signifier* ut 7the fidelit7 to a ,ause* 7 the effort to draw a new line of separation whi!hruns Re7ond Good and E@il5* i.e.* whi!h runs a!ross and suspends thedistin!tions of the e?isting so!ial od7. The ke7 diension of +aul5sgesture is thus his reak with an7 for of !ounitarianis: his uni@erseis no longer that of the ultitude of groups whi!h want to Rfind their @oi!e5and assert their parti!ular identit7* their Rwa7 of life5* ut that of a fighting!olle!ti@e grounded in the referen!e to an un!onditional uni@ersalis.

&ow* then* does the ,hristian sutra!tion relate to the "ewish oneThat is to sa7* is a kind of sutra!tion not ins!ried into the @er7 "ewishidentit7 Is this not wh7 the $azis wanted to kill the all: e!ause* aongall the nations* "ews are Rthe part that is no part5* not sipl7 a nationaong nations* ut a reainder* that whi!h has no proper pla!e in theRorder of nations5 %nd* of !ourse* therein resides the stru!tural prole

3 See ranz 'osenzweig* The 'tar o+ &edemption F$otre Dae: Uni@ersit7 of $otre

Dae +ress* 1B93.



SL%;#" <I<E= >

of the State of Israel: !an one for out of this reainder a State like

others It was alread7 'osenzweig who ade this point:(ut "udais* and it alone in all the world* aintains itself 7

sutra!tion* 7 !ontra!tion* 7 the foration of e@er new renants. O^P In"udais* an is alwa7s soehow a sur@i@or* an inner soething* whosee?terior was seized 7 the !urrent of the world and !arried off while hehiself* what is left of hi* reains standing on the shore. Soethingwithin hi is waiting.>

"ews are thus a reainder in a doule sense: not onl7 a reainder withregard to the set of Rnoral5 nations* ut also* on top of this* a reainder

with regard to themselves* a reainder in and o+ themselves M the rest*that whi!h reains and persists after all the perse!utions and annihilations.These two diensions are stri!tl7 !orrelated: if "ews were to e onl7 areainder in the first Fe?ternal sense* the7 would for Kust another self0identi!al ethni! group. So when "ews are !on!ei@ed of as a reainder* weshould e @er7 pre!ise in defining that with regard to what the7 are areainder: of !ourse* of thesel@es* but also o+ humanity as such* insofar as it was aandoned 7 God. It is as su!h* as Rout of pla!e5* that "ews arethe pla!e0holders of uni@ersal huanit7 as su!h. %nd it is onl7 against this

a!kground that the +aulinian Rtransustantiation5 of the ,hosen +eopleFno longer onl7 "ews M a parti!ular ethni! group M ut an7one* irrespe!ti@eof his6her origins* who re!ognizes hiself6herself in ,hrist !an e

properl7 understood: +aul* as it were* Kust swit!hes a!k to theuni@ersalit7* i.e.* for hi* ,hristians are the reainder of huanit7. Inother words* we are all, humanity entire, considered as redeemed, as arest M ut of what

&ere* one should return to the &egelian point that e@er7 uni@ersalAhole is di@ided into its +art Fparti!ular spe!ies and its 'est. The +art

Fparti!ular as opposed to uni@ersal is the os!ene eleent of e?isten!e M sa7* at the le@el of the law* the os!ene unwritten suppleent that sustainsthe a!tual e?isten!e of the uni@ersal Law* the Law as an operati@e power.

> ranz 'osenzweig* The 'tar o+ &edemption* pp. /C/0/C3. #f !ourse* I owe thisHuote to Eri! Santner* who de@eloped in detail this notion of "ewish identit7 in hisoutstanding Psychotheology o+ Everyday Li+e. Interestingl7* this notion of eing areainder is also part of the traditional Slo@ene national identit7J the trauati! !utin the Slo@ene histor7 is the !ounter0'eforation offensi@e in the late 1>th !entur7*as the result of whi!h one third of the Slo@enes were killed* one third eigrated intoGeran7 in order to reain +rotestants* and the reainder* the s!u who

!oproised their fidelit7* are the e?isting Slo@enes^



Pli 1/ F)CC4

'e!all the tension etween uni@ersal and parti!ular in the use of the ter

Rspe!ial5: when one sa7s RAe ha@e spe!ial fundsQ5* it eans illegal or atleast se!ret funds* not Kust a spe!ial se!tion of the puli! fundsJ when ase?ual partner sa7s RDo 7ou want soething spe!ial5* it eans a non0standard Rper@ert5 pra!ti!eJ when a poli!ean or Kournalist refers toRspe!ial easures in interrogation5* it eans torture or other siilar illegal

pressures. F%nd were not* in the $azi !on!entration !aps* the units whi!hwere kept apart and used for the ost horrif7ing Ko of killing and!reating thousands and disposing of the odies* !alled'onderommando* spe!ial units. In ,ua* the diffi!ult period after thedisintegration of the Eastern European ,ounist regies is also referredto as the Rspe!ial period5.

%long the sae lines* one should !elerate the genius of Aalter (enKain whi!h shines through in the @er7 title of his earl7 essa7 R#nLanguage in General and &uan Language in +arti!ular5. The point here isnot that huan language is a spe!ies of soe uni@ersal language Ras su!h5whi!h !oprises also other spe!ies Flanguage of gods and angels aniallanguage the language of soe other intelligent eings out there in spa!e!oputer language the language of the D$%: there is no a!tuall70

e?isting language other than huan language M ut* in order to!oprehend this Rparti!ular5 language* one must introdu!e a inialdifferen!e* !on!ei@ing it with regard to the gap whi!h separates it frolanguage Ras su!h5 Fthe pure stru!ture of language depri@ed of the insigniaof huan finitude* of eroti! passions and ortalit7* of the struggles for doination and the os!enit7 of power. The parti!ular language is thusthe Rreall70e?isting language5* language as the series of a!tuall7 utteredstateents* in !ontrast to the foral linguisti! stru!ture. This (enKainianlesson is the lesson issed 7 &aeras: what &aeras does is pre!isel7what one should not do M he posits the ideal Rlanguage in general5 Fthe

pragati! uni@ersals directly as the nor of the a!tuall70e?istinglanguage. So* along the lines of (enKain5s title* one should des!rie the

asi! !onstellation of the so!ial law as that of the RLaw in general and itsos!ene superego underside in parti!ular5^ The R+art5 as su!h is thus theRsinful5* unredeeed and unredeeale aspe!t of the Uni@ersal M to put itin a!tual politi!al ters* e@er7 politi!s that grounds itself in the referen!eto soe sustantial Fethni!* religious* se?ual* life0st7le^ parti!ularit7 is

7 definition rea!tionar7. ,onseHuentl7* the di@ision introdu!ed andsustained 7 the ean!ipator7 FR!lass5 struggle is not the one etween



SL%;#" <I<E= 9

two parti!ular !lasses of the Ahole* ut the one etween the Ahole0in0its0

parts and its 'eainder whi!h* within the +arti!ulars* stands for theUni@ersal* for the Ahole Ras su!h5* opposed to its parts.

#r* to put it in 7et another wa7* one should ear in ind here the twoaspe!ts of the notion of renant: R'est5 as what reains after sutra!tionof all parti!ular !ontent Feleents* spe!ifi! parts of the Ahole* and Rrest5as the ultiate result of the sudi@ision of the Ahole into its partsJ when*in the final a!t of sudi@ision* we no longer get two parti!ular parts or eleents* two Soethings* ut a Soething Fthe 'est and a $othing. Inthis pre!ise sense* one should sa7 that* fro the perspe!ti@e of

'edeption Fof the RLast "udgeent5* the unredeeed part is irre@o!al7lost* thrown into nothingness M all that reains is pre!isel7 the 'eainder itself. This* perhaps* is how one should read the otto of the proletarianre@olution RAe were nothing* we want to e!oe %ll5 M fro the

perspe!ti@e of 'edeption: that whi!h* within the estalished order*!ounts as nothing* the reainder of this order* its part of no part* will

e!oe %ll

The stru!tural hoolog7 etween the old "ewish or +aulinian-essiani! tie and the logi! of the re@olutionar7 pro!ess is !ru!ial here:

RThe future is no future without this anti!ipation and the inner !opulsionfor it* without this Rwish to ring aout the -essiah efore his tie5 andthe teptation to R!oer!e the kingdo of God into eing5J without these* itis onl7 a past distended endlessl7 and proKe!ted forward5. Do these wordsnot fit perfe!tl7 'osa Lu?eurg5s des!ription of the ne!essar7 illusionthat pertains to a re@olutionar7 a!t %s she ephasizes against there@isionists* if one waits for the Rright oent5 to start a re@olution* thisoent will ne@er arri@e M one has to take the risk and pre!ipitate oneself into the re@olutionar7 attepts* sin!e it is onl7 through a series of

Rpreature5 attepts Fand their failure that the FsuKe!ti@e !onditions for the Rright5 oent are !reated.

%gaen aintains that +aul onl7 e!ae readale in the )Cth !entur7*through Aalter (enKain5s R-essiani! -ar?is5: the !lue to +aul5s Rendof tie5 is pro@ided 7 the re@olutionar7 state of eergen!7. This state of eergen!7 is to e stri!tl7 opposed to toda75s lieral0totalitarianeergen!7 of the Rwar on terror5: when a state institution pro!lais thestate of eergen!7* it does so 7 definition as part of a desperate strateg7to avoid the true eergen!7 and to return to the Rnoral !ourse of things5.

'osenzweig* p. )).



B Pli 1/ F)CC4

'e!all a feature of all rea!tionar7 pro!laations of the Rstate of

eergen!75: the7 were all dire!ted against popular unrest For R!onfusion5and presented as a de!ision to restore noral!7. In %rgentina* in (razil* inGree!e* in ,hile* in Turke7* the ilitar7 pro!laied the state of eergen!7in order to !ur the R!haos5 of o@erall politi!ization: RThis adness uststop* people should return to their e@er7da7 Kos* the work ust go onQ5.

In soe sense* one !an effe!ti@el7 argue that* toda7* we areapproa!hing a kind of Rend0tie5: the self0propelling e?plosi@e spiral of gloal !apitalis does see to point towards a oent of Fso!ial*e!ologi!al* and e@en suKe!ti@e !ollapse in whi!h total d7nais and

franti! a!ti@it7 will !oin!ide with a deeper ioilit7. &istor7 will eaolished in the eternal present of ultiple narrationsJ nature will eaolished in its iogeneti! disposailit7J the @er7 peranent transgressionof the nor will assert itself as the un!onditional nor^ &owe@er* theHuestion RAhen does ordinar7 tie get !aught in the essiani! twist5 is aisleading one: one !annot dedu!e the eergen!e of essiani! tiethrough an RoKe!ti@e5 anal7sis of histori! pro!ess. R-essiani! tie5ultiatel7 stands for the intrusion of suKe!ti@it7 irredu!ile to theRoKe!ti@e5 histori!al pro!ess* whi!h eans that at any point * things !an

take a essiani! turn* tie !an turn Rdense5.The tie of the E@ent is not another tie e7ond and ao@e theRnoral5 histori!al tie* ut a kind of inner loop within this tie. 'e!allone of the standard plots of the tie tra@el narrati@es: the hero tra@els intothe past in order to inter@ene into it and thus !hange the presentJafterwards* he dis!o@ers that the eergen!e of the present he wanted to!hange was triggered pre!isel7 through his inter@ention M his tie tra@elwas alread7 in!luded in the run of things. Ahat we ha@e here* in thisradi!al !losure* is thus not sipl7 !oplete deterinis* ut a kind of

asolute deterinis whi!h in!ludes in ad@an!e our free a!t. Ahen weoser@e the pro!ess fro a distan!ed @antage point* it appears to unfold ina straight lineJ howe@er* what we lose fro our sight are the suKe!ti@einner loops that sustain this RoKe!ti@e5 straight line. Ahi!h is wh7 theHuestion RIn what !ir!ustan!es does the !ondensed tie of the E@enteerge5 is a false one: it in@ol@es the re0ins!ription of the E@ent a!k intothe positi@e histori!al pro!ess. That is to sa7* one !annot estalish the tieof the e?plosion of the E@ent through a !lose RoKe!ti@e5 histori!al anal7sisFin the st7le of: Rwhen oKe!ti@e !ontradi!tions rea!h su!h a le@el* thingswill e?plode5: there is no E@ent outside the engaged suKe!ti@e de!ision



SL%;#" <I<E= 9C

that !reates it M if one waits for the tie to e!oe ripe for the E@ent* the

E@ent will ne@er o!!ur. 'e!all the #!toer 'e@olution: the oent whenits authenti! re@olutionar7 urgen!7 was e?hausted was pre!isel7 theoent when* in theoreti!al dis!ussion* the topi! of different stages of so!ialis* of the transition fro the lower to a higher stage* took o@er M atthis point* re@olutionar7 tie proper was re0ins!ried into linear andRoKe!ti@e5 histori!al tie* with its phases and transitions etween phases.In !ontrast to it* authenti! re@olution alwa7s o!!urs in an asolute +resent*in the un!onditional urgen!7 of a $ow.

It is in this pre!ise sense that* in an authenti! re@olution* predestination

o@erlaps with radi!al responsiilit7: the true hard work awaits us on theorning after* on!e the enthusiasti! re@olutionar7 e?plosion is o@er and weare !onfronted with the task of translating this e?plosion into a new #rder of Things* of drawing the !onseHuen!es fro it* of reaining faithful to it.In other words* the trul7 diffi!ult work is not that of the silent preparation*of !reating the !onditions for the E@ent of the re@olutionar7 e?plosionJ theearnest work egins a+ter the E@ent* when we as!ertain that Rit isa!!oplished5^9

The shift fro "udais to ,hristianit7 with regard to the E@ent is est

en!apsulated with regard to the status of the -essiah: in !ontrast to "ewish-essiani! e?pe!tation* the asi! ,hristian stan!e is that the expected 1essiah has already arrived * i.e. that we are alread7 redeeed: the tieof ner@ous e?pe!tations* of pre!ipitousl7 o@er!oing oneself towards thee?pe!ted %rri@al* is o@er* we live in the a+termath o+ the Event, everything

4 the 0ig Thing 4 already happened .B +arado?i!all7* of !ourse* the resultof this E@ent is not ata@is FRIt alread7 happened* we are redeeed* so letus Kust rest and wait^5* ut* on the !ontrar7* an e?tree urgen!7 to a!t: ithappened* so now we have to bear the almost unbearable burden o+ living

9 %nd it is perhaps at this le@el that we should also approa!h the oldHuestion* whi!h latel7 sees to regain its a!tualit7* of the line of separation etween anial and an: at the le@el of positi@e eing* there isno differen!e* an is Kust an anial with spe!ifi! properties and ailitiesJ itis onl7 fro the engaged position of eing !aught in the pro!ess of suKe!ti@ation that the differen!e e!oes palpale.B +erhaps the ost su!!in!t answer to ,hristianit7* to the ,hristian notion that the

-essiah is alread7 here* was pro@ided 7 =afka5s !lai that the -essiah definitel7will arri@e* ut too late* when huanit7 will alread7 e tired of waiting for hi and

his arri@al will no longer atter* there7 lea@ing people indifferent.



91 Pli 1/ F)CC4

up to it, o+ drawing the consequences o+ the !ct@ R-an proposes* God

disposes5 M an is in!essantl7 a!ti@e* inter@ening* ut it is the di@ine a!twhi!h de!ides upon the out!oe. Aith ,hristianit7* it is the o@erse M notRGod proposes* an disposes5* ut its in@ersion: RGod OfirstP disposes*Oand thenP an proposes5. It is waiting for the arri@al of the -essiah whi!h!onstrains us to the passi@e stan!e of* pre!isel7* waiting* while the arri@alfun!tions as a signal that triggers a!ti@it7.

Ahat this eans is that the usual logi! of the R!unning of reason5 Fwea!t* inter@ene* 7et we !annot e@er e sure of the true eaning and ultiateout!oe of our a!ts* sin!e it is the de!entred ig #ther* the sustantial

s7oli! #rder* that de!ides is also strangel7 turned around M to put it inLa!anian ters* it is huanit7* not God* whi!h is here the ig #ther. It isGod hiself who ade a +as!alian wager: 7 d7ing on the !ross* he adea risk7 gesture with no guaranteed final out!oe* i.e.* he pro@ided us M huanit7 M with the ept7 S1* -aster0Signifier* and it is to huanit7 tosuppleent it with the !hain of S). ar fro pro@iding the !on!lusi@e doton the Ri5* the di@ine a!t stands instead for the openness of a $ew(eginning* and it is to huanit7 to li@e up to it* to de!ide its eaning* toake soething of it. It is like a +redestination that !ondens us to franti!

a!ti@it7: the E@ent is a pure and empty sign* and we ha@e to work togenerate its eaning. RThe -essiah is here5 points towards the terrileris o+ revelation: what R'e@elation5 eans is that God took upon hiself the risk of putting e@er7thing at stake* of full7 Re?istentiall7 engaginghiself5 7 wa7 of* as it were* stepping into his own pi!ture* e!oing

part of !reation* e?posing hiself to the utter !ontingen!7 of e?isten!e.#ne is alost tepted to refer here to the &egelian0-ar?ian opposition of foral and a!tual susuption: through the E@ent Fof ,hrist* we are

+ormally redeeed* susued under 'edeption* and we ha@e to engage

in the diffi!ult work of a!tualising it. The true #penness is not that of unde!idailit7* ut that of li@ing in the afterath of the E@ent* of drawingout the !onseHuen!es M of what +re!isel7 of the new spa!e opened up 7the E@ent.

Ahat this eans* in theologi!al ters* is that it is not us* en* who !anrel7 on the help of God M on the !ontrar7* we must help <od . It was &ans"onas who de@eloped this notion* referring to the diaries of Ett7 &illesu*a 7oung "ewish woan who in 1B/) @oluntaril7 reported to a!on!entration !ap in order to e of help there and share the fate of her

people: R#nl7 this one thing e!oes ore and ore !lear to e: that 7ou



SL%;#" <I<E= 9)

!annot help us* ut that we ust help 7ou* and in so doing we ultiatel7

help oursel@es. O^P I deand no a!!ount fro 7ouJ 7ou will later !all usto a!!ount5.1C "onas links this stan!e to the radi!al idea that God isipotent M the onl7 wa7* a!!ording to hi* to e?plain how God !ould ha@eallowed things like %us!hwitz to happen. The @er7 notion of !reationiplies God5s self0!ontra!tion: God has to withdraw into hiself*!onstrain his onipresen!e* in order to first !reate the $othing out of whi!h he then !reates the uni@erse. (7 !reating the uni@erse* he sets it free*lets it go on its own* renoun!ing the power of inter@ening into it: this self0liitation is eHui@alent to a proper a!t of !reation. In the fa!e of horrorslike %us!hwitz* God is thus the tragi! ipotent oser@er M the onl7 wa7for hi to inter@ene in histor7 was pre!isel7 to Rfall into it5* to appear in itin the guise of his Son.

Su!h a fall 7 eans of whi!h God loses his distan!e and e!oesengaged* steps into the huan series* is dis!ernile in a !lassi! Koke frothe Geran Deo!rati! 'epuli! in whi!h 'i!hard $i?on* Leonid(rezhne@ and Eri!h &one!ker !onfront God* asking hi aout the futureof their !ountries. To $i?on* he answers: RIn )CCC* the US% will e,ounistQ5* $i?on turns around and starts to !r7. To (rezhne@* he sa7s:

RIn )CCC* the So@iet Union will e under ,hinese !ontrol5. %fter (rezhne@also turns around and starts to !r7* &one!ker finall7 asks: R%nd how will it e in 7 elo@ed GD'5. God turns around and starts to !r7^ %nd hereis the ultiate @ersion: three 'ussians who share the sae !ell in theLu7anka prison were all !ondened for politi!al offen!es. %s the7 aregetting a!Huainted* the first sa7s: RI was !ondened to 3 7ears for opposing +opo@5. The se!ond sa7s: R%h* ut then the part7 line !hanged*and I was !ondened to 1C 7ears for supporting +opo@5. inall7* the thirdone sa7s: RI was !ondened for life* and I am +opo@5. F%nd is it ne!essar7to add that there effe!ti@el7 was a (ulgarian high =ointern fun!tionar7naed +opo@* a !lose !ollaorator of Georgi Diitro@ hiself* whodisappeared in the purges of the late 1B4Cs. ,an this not e ele@ated intoa odel for understanding ,hrist5s suffering RI was thrown to the lions inthe arena for elie@ing in ,hristQ5J RI was urned at a stake for ridi!uling,hristQ5J RI died on a !ross* and I am ,hristQ5^ +erhaps* this oent of stepping into the line* this final re@ersal 7 eans of whi!h the foundingE?!eption FGod as it were falls into his own !reation* is inserted into the

1C 8uoted fro &ans "onas* 1ortality and 1orality FE@anston: $orthwestern

Uni@ersit7 +ress 1BB>* p. 1B).



94 Pli 1/ F)CC4

series of ordinar7 !reatures* is what is uniHue to ,hristianit7* the 7ster7

of in!arnation* of God M not onl7 appearing as a an* ut M e!oing aan.

This !opels us to deta!h radi!all7 the ,hristian Rlo@e th7 neighour5fro the Le@inasian topi! of the #ther as the ipenetrale neighour.Insofar as the ultiate #ther is God hiself* one should risk the !lai thatit is the epochal achievement o+ )hristianity to reduce its #therness to'ameness: God hiself is -an* Rone of us5. If* as &egel ephasizes* whatdies on the ,ross is the God of the e7ond itself* the radi!al #ther* thenthe identifi!ation with ,hrist FRlife in ,hrist5 eans pre!isel7 the

suspension of #therness. Ahat eerges in its stead is the &ol7 Ghost*whi!h is not #ther* ut the !ounit7 For* rather* collective of elie@ers:the Rneighour5 is a eer of our !olle!ti@e. The ultiate horizon of ,hristianit7 is thus not respe!t for the neighour* for the a7ss of itsipenetrale #thernessJ it is possile to go e7ond M not* of !ourse* todire!tl7 penetrate the #ther* to rea!h the #ther the wa7 it is Rin itself5* utto e!oe aware that there is no 7ster7* no hidden true !ontent* ehindthe ask Fde!ei@ing surfa!e of the #ther. The ultiate idolatr7 is not theidolizing of the ask* of the iage* itself* ut the elief that there is soehidden positi@e !ontent e7ond the ask.

%nd no aount of Rde!onstru!tion5 !an help us here: the ultiate forof idolatr7 is the de!onstru!ti@e purif7ing of this #ther* so that all thatreains of the #ther is its pla!e* the pure for of #therness as the-essiani! +roise. It is here that we en!ounter the liit of de!onstru!tion:as it e!ae !lear to Derrida hiself in the last two de!ades* the oreradi!al a de!onstru!tion is* the ore it has to rel7 on its inherent non0de!onstru!tile !ondition of de!onstru!tion: the -essiani! proise of "usti!e. This proise is the true Derridean oKe!t of belie+ * and Derrida5s

ultiate ethi!al a?io is that this elief is irredu!ile* Runde!onstru!tile5.Derrida !an thus indulge here in all kinds of parado?es* !laiing* aongother things* that it is onl7 the atheists who trul7 pra7 M pre!isel7 7refusing to address God as a positi@e entit7* the7 silentl7 address the pure-essiani! #therness^ It is here that one should ephasize the gap thatseparates Derrida fro the &egelian tradition:

It would e too eas7 to show that* easured 7 the failure to estalishlieral deo!ra!7* the gap etween fa!t and ideal essen!e does not showup onl7 in O^ P so0!alled priiti@e fors of go@ernent* theo!ra!7 and

ilitar7 di!tatorship O^P. (ut this failure and this gap also !hara!terize* a



SL%;#" <I<E= 9/

priori and 7 definition* all deo!ra!ies* in!luding the oldest and ost

stale of so0!alled Aestern deo!ra!ies. %t stake here is the @er7 !on!eptof deo!ra!7 as !on!ept of a proise that !an onl7 arise in su!h adiastema Ffailure* inadeHuation* disKun!tion* disadKustent* eing Rout of

Koint5. That is wh7 we alwa7s propose to speak of a deo!ra!7 to come*not of a +uture deo!ra!7 in the future present* not e@en of a regulatingidea* in the =antian sense* or of a utopia M at least to the e?tent that their ina!!essiilit7 would still retain the teporal for of a +uture present * of afuture odalit7 of the living present .11

&ere we get the differen!e etween &egel and Derrida at its purest:

Derrida a!!epts &egel5s fundaental lesson that one !annot assert theinno!ent ideal against its distorted realization. This holds not onl7 for deo!ra!7* ut also for religion M the gap that separates the ideal !on!eptfro its a!tualisation alread7 inheres in the !on!ept itself: in the sae wa7that Derrida !lais that RGod alread7 !ontradi!ts hiself5* that an7

positi@e !on!eptual deterination of the di@ine as a pure essiani! proise alread7 etra7s it* one should also sa7 that Rdeo!ra!7 alread7!ontradi!ts itself5. It is also against this a!kground that Derrida elaoratesthe utual ipli!ation of religion and radi!al e@il1): radi!al e@il Fpoliti!all7

speaking: Rtotalitarianis5 eerges when religious faith or reason For deo!ra!7 itself is posited in the ode of future present. &owe@er*against &egel* Derrida insists on the irredu!ile e?!ess in the ideal !on!eptwhi!h !annot e redu!ed to the diale!ti! etween ideal and itsa!tualisation: the essiani! stru!ture of Rto !oe5* the e?!ess of an a7ssthat !an ne@er e Rpositi@ised5 in its a!tual deterinate !ontent. &egel5sown position is here ore intri!ate than it a7 at first appear: his point isnot that* through gradual diale!ti!al progress* one !an aster the gap

etween !on!ept and its a!tualisation and a!hie@e the !on!ept5s full self0transparen!7 FR%solute =nowledge5. To put it in spe!ulati@e ters* his

point is to assert a Rpure5 !ontradi!tion whi!h is no longer the!ontradi!tion etween unde!onstru!tile pure #therness and its faileda!tualisations6deterinations* ut rather the thoroughl7 ianentR!ontradi!tion5 that pre!edes an7 #therness. %!tualisations and6or !on!eptual deterinations are not Rtra!es of an unde!onstru!tile di@ine#therness5* ut just traces arking their own in0etween. #r* to put it in

11 "a!Hues Derrida* 'pecters o+ 1arx FLondon: 'outledge 1BB/* pp. >/0>3.1) See "a!Hues Derrida* Raith and =nowledge5* in &eligion* ed. 7 "a!Hues Derrida

and Gianni ;attio FStanford: Stanford Uni@ersit7 +ress* 1BB9.



93 Pli 1/ F)CC4

7et another wa7* in a kind of in@erted phenoenologi!al epoche* Derrida

redu!es #therness to the Rto0!oe5 of a pure potentialit7* thoroughl7 de0ontologising it* ra!keting its positi@e !ontent* so that all that reains isthe spe!tre of a proiseJ ut what if the ne?t step is to drop this inialspe!tre of #therness itself* so that all that reains is the rupture* the gap assu!h whi!h pre@ents entities fro rea!hing their self0identit7 'e!all theold reproa!h of the ren!h ,ounist philosophers to Sartre5se?istentialis: Sartre threw awa7 the entire !ontent of the ourgeoissuKe!t* aintaining onl7 its pure for* and the ne?t step was to throwawa7 this for itself M is it not that* mutatis mutandis* Derrida threw awa7all positi@e ontologi!al !ontent of essianis* retaining nothing ut the

pure for of the essiani! proise* and the ne?t step is to throw awa7 thisfor itself %nd* again* is this not also the passage fro "udais to,hristianit7 "udais redu!es the proise of %nother Life to a pure#therness* a essiani! proise that will ne@er e!oe full7 present anda!tualised Fthe -essiah is alwa7s Rto !oe5* while ,hristianit7* far fro!laiing full realization of the proise* a!!oplishes soething far oreun!ann7: the -essiah is here* he has arri@ed* the final E@ent alread7 took

pla!e* and yet the gap Athe gap that sustained the messianic promiseBremains$$$ #ne is alost tepted to propose here a return to the earlier

Derrida of di++erance: what if Fas* aong others* Ernesto La!lau hasalread7 proposed14 Derrida5s turn to the Rpost0se!ular5 essianis is not ane!essar7 out!oe of his initial Rde!onstru!tionist5 ipetus Ahat if theidea of infinite essiani! "usti!e whi!h operates in an indefinitesuspension* alwa7s to !oe* as the unde!onstru!tile horizon of de!onstru!tion alread7 ofus!ates the Rpure5 di++erance* the pure gapwhi!h Rdiffers5 an entit7 fro itself Is it not possile to think this pure in0

etween prior to an7 notion of essiani! Kusti!e Derrida a!ts as if the!hoi!e is etween positi@e onto0ethi!s* the gesture of trans!ending the

e?isting towards another higher positi@e #rder* on the one hand* and the pure proise of spe!tral #therness* on the other M howe@er* what if wedrop this referen!e to #therness altogether Ahat then reains is either Spinoza M the pure positi@it7 of (eing M or La!an M the inial torsion of dri@e* the inial Rept75 Fself0differen!e whi!h is operati@e when athing starts to fun!tion as a sustitute +or itsel+ :

Ahat is sustituted !an also appear itself* in a 1:1 s!ale* in therole of the sustitute M there onl7 ust e soe feature ensuring

14 See Ernesto La!lau* EmancipationAsB FLondon: ;erso* 1BB3.



SL%;#" <I<E= 9>

that it is not taken to e itself. Su!h a feature is pro@ided for 7

the threshold whi!h separates the pla!e of what is sustitutingfro what is eing sustituted M or s7olizes their deta!hent.E@er7thing that appears in front of the threshold then is assuedto e the ersatz* as e@er7thing that lies ehind it is taken to ewhat is eing sustituted.

There are s!ores of e?aples of su!h !on!ealents that areotained not 7 iniaturization ut onl7 7 eans of !le@er lo!alization. %s reud oser@ed* the @er7 a!ts that are foridden

7 religion are pra!ti!ed in the nae of religion. In su!h !ases M

as* for instan!e* urder in the nae of religion M religion also!an do entirel7 without iniaturization. Those adaantl7ilitant ad@o!ates of huan life* for e?aple* who opposeaortion* will not stop short of a!tuall7 urdering !lini!

personnel. 'adi!al right0wing opponents of ale hoose?ualit7in the US% a!t in a siilar wa7. The7 organize so0!alled Rga7

ashings5 in the !ourse of whi!h the7 eat up and finall7 rapega7s. The ultiate hoi!idal or hoose?ual gratifi!ation of dri@es !an therefore also e attained* if it onl7 fulfils the

!ondition of e@oking the selan!e of a !ounter0easure. Ahatsees to e Ropposition5 then has the effe!t that the ? to efended off !an appear itself and e taken for a non0?.1/

Ahat we en!ounter here 7et again is the &egelian Roppositionaldeterination5: in the figure of the ga70asher raping a ga7 an* the ga7an en!ounters hiself in his oppositional deterination* i.e.* tautolog7Fself0identit7 appears as the highest !ontradi!tion. This threshold !an alsofun!tion as the foreign gaze itself: sa7* when a disen!hanted AesternsuKe!t per!ei@es Tiet as a solution to his !risis* Tiet alread7 loses its

iediate self0identit7 and turns into a sign of itself* its own Roppositionaldeterination5. In !ontrast with ga70ashing rape* where the hoose?ualdesire is satisfied in the guise of its opposite* here* in the !ase of a AesternTiet worshipper* the utter rejection of Tiet* the etra7al of what theTietan !i@ilization is a!!oplished in the guise of its opposite* of theadiration for Tiet. % further e?aple is pro@ided 7 the e?tree !ase of interpassi@it7* when I tape a o@ie instead of sipl7 wat!hing it on T;*

1/ 'oert +faller* RThe +otential of Thresholds to #stru!t and to a!ilitate. #n the#peration of Displa!eent in #sessional $eurosis and +er@ersion5 Funpulished

paper* )CC).



SL%;#" <I<E= 99

separates drea fro realit7: when* in the iddle of the night* one has a

drea aout a hea@7 stone or anial seating on one5s !hest and !ausing pain* this drea* of !ourse* rea!ts to the fa!t that one has a real !hest pain M it in@ents a narrati@e to a!!ount for the pain. &owe@er* the tri!k is not Kust to in@ent a narrati@e* ut a ore radi!al one: it !an happen that* whileha@ing a !hest pain* one has a drea of having a chest pain M eing awarethat one is dreaing* the @er7 fa!t of transposing the pain into the dreahas a !aling effe!t FRIt is not a real pain* it is Kust a dreaQ5.

%nd this parado? rings us to the relationship etween an and ,hrist:the tautolog7 Ran is an5 is to e read as a &egelian infinite Kudgeent*

as the en!ounter of Ran5 with its oppositional deterination* with its!ounterpart on the other side of the -oeius strip. In the sae wa7 that*alread7 in our e@er7da7 understanding* Rlaw is law5 eans its opposite* the!oin!iden!e of law with aritrar7 @iolen!e FRAhat !an 7ou do* e@en if it isunKust and aritrar7* law is law* 7ou ha@e to oe7 itQ5* R-an is an5signals the non0!oin!iden!e of an with an* the properl7 inhumane?!ess that disturs its self0identit7 M and what is ultiatel7 ,hrist ut thenae of this e?!ess inherent in an* an5s e?tiate kernel* the onstroussurplus whi!h* following the unfortunate +ontius +ilate* one of the few

ethi!al heroes of the (ile Fthe other eing "udas* of !ourse* !an onl7 edesignated as ecce homo



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 9B01C/

The >tent of Giving: Sending in Derrida and

*eidegger

)(DR 2ITC*LL

California State !niversit01 Stanisla#s

There is a pro?iit7 etween Derrida and &eidegger that !an ede!epti@e. It flu!tuates. %t ties it !ontra!ts to a point where the two seeso near as to tou!h* and at other ties it e?pands so far that the two seeworlds apart. $owhere is this ore e@ident than in regards to the @er7issue of distan!e and pro?iit7. Derrida and &eidegger ea!h think agi@enness or gift of the world whi!h !onfronts the traditional* etaph7si!alnotion of presen!e. aousl7* &eidegger has anal7zed the Geran idioCes gibtD Fliterall7 it gi@es* !olloHuiall7* there is in this regard. If wedo not sipl7 take presen!e for granted* ut indeed think it as gi@en* thenwe are led to !onsider the distan!e that this gi@ing tra@erses. These!onsiderations of distan!e* pro?iit7* and gi@ing`of sending* in short` are e?pli!itl7 treated in Derrida5s 1B9C te?t The Post )ard2 7rom'ocrates to 7reud and 0eyond$1 %nd it is pre!isel7 here* where their

interests would appear to !oin!ide* that Derrida takes a great distan!e fro&eidegger. In &eidegger5s attept to distan!e hiself fro a etaph7si!al@iew of presen!e* Derrida sees a reiteration of presen!e and a failure todepart fro etaph7si!s. If it is allowale to isolate three oents in thislogi! of the gift and of gi@ing`an origin that gi@es* a gift that is gi@en* anda re!eption of the gift gi@en`then &eidegger5s thought of sending would

1 "a!Hues Derrida* La carte postale2 de 'ocrate 7reud et au"del F+aris:laarion* 1B9C6English translation: The Post )ard2 7rom 'ocrates to 7reud and 0eyond * trans. %lan (ass F,hi!ago: Uni@ersit7 of ,hi!ago +ress* 1B9J

hereafter )P with ren!h6English pagination.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL BC

reain etaph7si!al at e@er7 one. &eidegger holds to the thought of a pure

origin Foriginar7 presen!e* he thinks the gift as su!h Fgift as presen!e*and he is assured of its arri@al Fdestination in presen!e. &ow !lose theseoKe!tions !oe to striking their ark* how far &eidegger a7 e ale tododge or a@oid these !harges* I will address in what follows. irst* I will

present Derrida5s !ritiHue of sending in &eidegger as it appears in The Post )ard and the asso!iated seinar <iven Time* illustrating ea!h of thethree oents enuerated ao@e.) Then* rather than address ea!h of thesein turn* I will arti!ulate &eidegger5s !on!eption of essen!e F3esen andessen!ing F3esung * to show how a thought of essen!e applies to ea!h of the three oents of Derrida5s !on!ern. In so doing* I will rel7 hea@il7upon &eidegger5s )ontributions to Philosophy A+rom EnowningB$4

a. The Charges )i$ed

-. P#rit0 of 'rigin

&eidegger appears relati@el7 earl7 in the !orresponden!e that opens The Post )ard . %t issue is his @ision of histor7 F<eschichte as a sendingF'chicung . In Time and 0eing F1B>) for e?aple* what is sent Fdas<eschicte are the @arious epo!hs of eing that go towards histor7./

Ahat is histori!al in this histor7 is the wa7 that eing ea!h tie o!!ursF geschieht through these @arious epo!hs FGreek* -edie@al* -odern* or howe@er one ight nae the. These epo!hs of eing Fwhi!h Derrida@iews in ters of CenvoisDB !ulinate in the epo!h of te!hnolog7 and it ishere for &eidegger* so Derrida* that the te!hnolog7 of the post and

) "a!Hues Derrida* -onner le temps2 F$ La +ausse monnaie F+aris: ditions GalilWe*1BB16English translation: <iven Time2 F$ )ounter+eit 1oney* trans. +egg7 =auf F,hi!ago: The Uni@ersit7 of ,hi!ago +ress* 1BB)J hereafter <T with ren!h6English

pagination.4 -artin &eidegger* <esamtausgabe* @ol. >3: 0eitr5ge (ur Philosophie Avom

EreignisB, ed. riedri!h0Ailhel @on &errann Frankfurt a -ain: ;ittorio=losterann* 1B9B6English translation: )ontributions to Philosophy A+rom

EnowningB, trans. +ar@is Ead and =enneth -al7 F(looington: IndianaUni@ersit7 +ress* 1BBBJ hereafter <!>3 with Geran6English pagination.

/ -artin &eidegger* >ur 'ache des -enens FTingen: -a? $iee7er ;erlag*1B>B6English translation: #n Time and 0eing,trans. "oan Staaugh F$ew ork:

&arper [ 'ow* +ulishers* 1B).



B1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

tele!ouni!ation would find its hoe. (ut Derrida resists this

postponeent of te!hnolog7* for hi the post is operati@e fro the outset.The point is not onl7 that te!hnologi!al positing and positionostinatel7 refuse to e sho@ed aside fro the origin* nor is it onl7 thatthere is there7 a !on!oitant ad@ent of etaph7si!s with the supposedl7

pure origin* though these are ea!h iportant effe!ts of postalit7. 'ather*and alongside these !on!erns* the issue is to deonstrate the negligen!e of the onti! in these atters. E@en when we are !on!erned with theipossiilit7 of an origin de@oid of te!hnologi!al positing* we a7 stillfind oursel@es !onstruing that te!hnologi!al ne!essit7 in the ost generalof ters* with the ost purified of !on!epts. There is here then not ate!hnologi!al positing in general* ut a parti!ular foration of this in thea!tual* national post offi!es. It would e a istake to !all this aninstantiation of te!hnologi!al positing* as well* sin!e the general idea of te!hnolog7 does not reain an7where outside of these deterinations.Derrida5s insisten!e on approa!hing these issues of sending through theseeingl7 aritrar7 or* at the least* whisi!al dis!ussion of post !ards and

postal s7stes* is itself a resistan!e to the purified !on!eptualit7 of te!hnolog7 and etaph7si!s. E@en if we adit a !o0presen!e of thete!hnologi!al at the origin* there is nothing here to Keopardize the purit7 of

that origin* if te!hnolog7 is thought in stri!tl7 !on!eptual or pure ters.The post offi!e and the histor7 of the ail s7ste is a parti!ularl7 ess7wa7 of entering into this !ople? of issues. The ipli!it target of theserefle!tions is &eidegger* a &eidegger who would resist an7 onti!!ontaination of the purel7 ontologi!al origin.

(ut this postalit7 is itself prone to generalization* one !an e@en speak here of a postal prin!iple. %n7tie there is gi@ing there is the post* andwith it etaph7si!s. Derrida iagines &eidegger5s response to this* hedoutless would see in the postal deterination a preature F ipositionof tekhnb and therefore of etaph7si!s.3 Derrida5s first !harge against&eidegger is that he would think sending apart fro the te!hnologi!al andetaph7si!al* that he would aintain a purit7 of essen!e in the Greek origin. Su!h a !harge is not to e taken lightl7:

This is serious e!ause it upsets perhaps &eidegger5s stillRderi@ati@e5 s!hea Fperhaps* upsets 7 gi@ing one to think thatte!hnolog7* the position* let us sa7 e@en etaph7si!s do noto@ertake* do not !oe to deterine and to dissiulate an

3 P) 46>3.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL B)

Ren@oi5 of (eing Fwhi!h would not 7et e postal* ut would

elong to the Rfirst5 en@oi`whi!h o@iousl7 is ne@er Rfirst5 inan7 order whatsoe@er . If the post Fte!hnolog7* position*etaph7si!s is announ!ed at the first envoi* then there isno longer % etaph7si!s* et!.>

%!!ordingl7* &eidegger5s origin would e un!ontainated 7etaph7si!s* there would e a perfe!t sending un!ontainated 7te!hnolog7.

4. The Gift as S#%h

In the seinar <iven Time* gi@en around the tie of The Post )ards!oposition and pro!laiing itself indisso!iale fro the latter * Derridareads &eidegger as a thinker of the gift in the !opan7 of -auss and(en@eniste. &ere the postal !ritiHue !ontinues and &eidegger is presentedas !ertain of the gift as such.9 The issue is an e!onoi! one* for on!e thegift has een re!ognized as su!h* as soon as it is gi@en as su!h* thenthe gift is ipli!ated in a !7!le of pa7a!k* det* repa7ent* and @alue.

E@er7thing gift0like aout it is lost. This annihilates the gift for Derrida*ro the oent the gift would appear as gift* as su!h* as what it is* inits phenoenon* its sense and its essen!e* it would e engaged in as7oli!* sa!rifi!ial* or e!onoi! stru!ture that would annul the gift in theritual !ir!le of the det.B Aithin su!h a s7ste of instant e@aluation* thegift is ipossile`indeed* it is the ipossileJ Derrida5s own aporeti!itali!s: $ot ipossile ut the ipossile` CGon pas impossible maisl5impossible$D1C

Instead of a!knowledging this ipossiilit7 of the gift* &eidegger

seizes upon the gift and renders it !ertain. (elie@ing that he has the gift athis disposal* he !an !onfidentl7 write of the gift as su!h. Ahat &eidegger5s

> P) 46>30>>. <T 14/ n.161C/ n. )1.9 This point a7 e siilar to Derrida5s !riti!iss of La!an inThe Post )ard where

Derrida ephasizes La!an5s refusal to think the letter Fwhat is sent as di@isile and partitioned Flike the two sides of a post !ard. % thought of the gift as su!h would e a thought that !ould wholl7 identif7 the gift* and this !ould onl7 e possilegi@en the gift5s indisso!iailit7 and dependale* supportale* integrit7.

B <T 496)4.

1C <T 1B6.



B4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

@arious forulations of the gift ultiatel7 attest to for Derrida is the

desire to a!!ede to the proper whi!h is alread7 surreptitiousl7 ordered 7 &eidegger a!!ording to the diension of [email protected] %nd re!ipro!all7.11

Gi@ing is not an ipossiilit7 for &eidegger* ut a ne!essit7* and onesuordinated to propriet7. To know the gift as su!h is to know it in its

proper pla!e* to ha@e it !opletel7 at one5s disposal* present anda!!ounted for. To !on!ei@e the gift as su!h is at on!e to etra7 it andreturn it to etaph7si!s.

5. Destination

Derrida5s final !harge against &eidegger !on!erns a !ertaint7 of arri@aland destination. If there is a pure origin and a gift as su!h* there ust e*!orrespondingl7* a final destination that is rea!hed and attained in thegi@ing of the gift. &eidegger5s thinking of the gift would therefore also

e a thinking of destination and !oplete re!eption. Derrida ipli!itl7speaks of &eidegger in a sall diatrie against #?ford a!adei!s and

+lato s!holars per@ersel7 interested in the authenti!it7 of +lato5s epistles:the7 ha@e a properl7 atheati!al`and therefore tea!hale`!ertaint7of what an authenti! destination is Fand none of our old en es!apes this*not e@en the one fro reiurg* I fear* e@en if in this respe!t he reainsthe ost prudent one* the7 know what apo!r7pha and astards areQ1)

,ertaint7 of destination pro@ides the assuran!e for whate@er !lais areade aout te?tual or filial lineage. Su!h a !ertaint7 entails the !opletere!eption of what has een transitted. In this re!eption there is again noreainder and nothing that reains outstanding. The gift as su!h* sent

fro the pure origin* is here !opletel7 re!ei@ed. There is nothing la!kingor issing in this* nothing lost in the translation fro origin to destination.Ahen what is sent arri@es* one a7 e !ertain of its ha@ing een sent and!ertain of its integrit7 a!ross the Kourne7 Fthat it has arri@ed inta!t andwhole* in one pie!e. #nl7 upon re!eipt of this assuran!e !an one

pronoun!e upon the authenti! and the inauthenti!* the real and the!ounterfeit.

11 <T 4>6)1.

1) P) B469/.



B3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

!oon aong eers of a kind or t7pe. 'ather* it ser@es to nae the

wa7 of eing of the singular eing* what &eidegger ters its essen!ing.13

This essen!ing* for its part* as the essen!ing of the respe!ti@e singularit7is an essen!ing whi!h o!!urs ea!h tie. It is not onl7 that the traditionalgeneralit7 of essen!e is here !ountered 7 a singularit7* ut the tie of thisnotion also* its stead7 persisten!e* is here !ountered 7 the pun!tuated or s7n!opated teporalit7 of the ea!h tie. Ea!h tie the eing issingularized and differentiated fro the others* it is singular through andthrough`so u!h so that this essen!ing leads to what &eidegger !alls thetruth of e0ing.

Truth is here thought in ters of a !learing* one that is opened through* 7* and as essen!ing: the o!!urren!e of the truth of eing O'eynP* this isessen!ing.1> The opening of this !learing o!!urs through an essen!ing of the singular eing e!ause in this essen!ing there is siultaneousl7!on!ealent. In not showing itself* the eing opens the !learingJ thiswithdrawing of the eing is its essen!ing* and this !learing is the truth of

eing* the !learing for self0!on!ealing Odie Lichtung +Hr das'ichverbergenP.1 If eings were to wholl7 present thesel@es* the!learing !ould not e opened* there would e no spa!e for a !learing. This

is not a !ase of o@er!rowding* sin!e su!h a thought is rooted in thinkingspa!e as a !ontainer. &ere there is sipl7 no spa!e for spa!e. Essen!ingF3esung would thus a!t as the o!!urren!e of a !learing for self0!on!ealent. Ahat it eans for a thing to ha@e an essen!e or to eessentiall7 is for it to o!!ur in su!h a wa7 that there is siultaneousl7 aself0!on!ealent. Essen!ing would e a wa7 of not showing oneself.Essen!ing would e the o!!urren!e of a thing where7 it announ!es itsself0!on!ealent. The essen!e of a thing is nothing general* it is nothing atall* it is instead a withholding. This is the first point to e ade regardingessen!e* it is essen!ing* a self0!on!ealing or a withholding.19

13 Aith this* &eidegger has not aandoned the thought of !oonalit7 that isendei! to essen!e. or &eidegger there !an e no !oonalit7 or !ounit7 of indi@iduals when these are !onsidered to e identi!al in essen!e. Singularit7 of essen!e* as &eidegger @iews it* first distinguishes ea!h fro the other and thus firstallows for what !ould e tered a !ounit7 of essen!es. The distin!tion is onethat a7 e found in the thought of "ean0Lu! $an!7* etween a hoogeneous!oon eing and a singular eing in !oon.

1> <!>3: )996)C)0)C4J t.1 <!>3: 4/>6)/)J t.19 This is !onfired 7 a glan!e ahead to 1B315s (uilding Dwelling Thinking where

essen!e is spoken of as a sort of hiding pla!e or spa!e of !on!ealent for the thing*



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL B>

%nd to return to gi@ing* the se!ond point to e ade is that this

withholding withdrawal is nothing negati@e* ut soething gi@en. It is notthe result of a la!k or asen!e. &eidegger speaks of a gi@ing self0withdrawing O schenenden 'ichent(iehenP to !apture this sense of essen!ing* identif7ing this as the essen!e of self0!on!ealing.1B

,on!ealent is withdrawal* ut this withdrawal ust gi@e itself to @iewand appear in the !learing. In a sense* the !learing and the withdrawal areone and the sae* the withdrawal gi@es the !learing. Essen!ing as aaking0known of !on!ealing !annot o!!ur an7where other than in a!learing. %nd this !learing is uilt of eings Fthings. (eings thesel@esare the site of essen!ing* are thesel@es that ark of withdrawal. &ow!ould essen!e e thought distin!t fro eings Essen!ing is the singular gi@ing of eings and is inseparale fro the. Gi@ing is the irror0iageof withdrawal.

%nd lest we oKe!t that this essen!e in withdrawal is itself a strateg7 for prote!ting the purit7 of this essen!e* and of safeguarding e0ing fro eings* &eidegger is Huite !lear on the !oin!iden!e of e0ing and eings:

Aanting to separate be"ing fro soe snat!hed up eing isipossile* espe!iall7 sin!e an7 eing whatsoe@er* if it is onl7

e?perien!ed as true* is alwa7s alread7 the other to itself`notlike some other as the opposite that elongs to it. 'ather* theother eans that whi!h as sheltering the truth of eing lets a

eing e a eing.)C

(eings are alread7 Fthe truth of e0ing* and not as an opposite that wouldstill elong to the sae* not as a ne!essar7 attendant in the oppositionaland diale!ti!al logi! of positing Fnot as the sames other. (e0ing and

eings !annot e separated e!ause the7 elong together* the7 are heldtogether in withdrawal. (e0ing elongs to it Othe parti!ular eingP and

onl7 to it.)1

ar fro safeguarding essen!e* this withdrawal of e0inghands the parti!ular eing o@er to a!hination and te!hnologi!al

we allow soething into its essen!e when we properl7 !on!eal soething a!k into its essen!eJ essen!ing o!!urs onl7 then when the7 thesel@es* as things* areallowed to e in their essen!e F-artin &eidegger* 6ortr5ge und !u+s5t(e* th ed.FStuttgart: $eske* 1BB/* p. 1/46English translation in: -artin &eidegger* Poetry,

Language, Thought * ed. and trans. %lert &ofstadter F$ew ork: &arper [ 'ow*+ulishers* 1B1* p. 1/BJ t.

1B <!>3: )/B61>J t.)C <!>3: )>/619>J t.

)1 <!>3: 11369CJ t.



B Pli 1/ F)CC4

!ir!ulation* where essen!e is ost endangered. %s a !onseHuen!e of this

withdrawal of e0ing* a withdrawal whi!h is itself the essen!ing of e0ing*the eing then appears so* it appears as oKe!t and soething present0at0hand* as if e0ing did not essen!e.)) or soething to appear as if e0ingdid not essen!e Fas if ephasizing the ipossiilit7 of su!h a situationis to appear as if it were an oKe!t full7 present. The world of presen!e` etaph7si!s* in short`is what is gi@en. Ahat is gi@en is the aandonentof e0ing.

,onsidering essen!e in this wa7* as nothing general ut as a singular o!!urren!e of self0!on!ealent* as the gi@ing of a withdrawal* and as the

deli@er7 of the eing to a!hinational danger* a response !an e @olle7edto ea!h of the !harges ao@e.

-. The 'ther +eginning ?vs. P#rit0 of 'rigin@

This self0!on!ealing pla7 of essen!ing is not without !onseHuen!es for anunderstanding of eginning and origin. To inHuire into the purit7 of originfor &eidegger reHuires an understanding of his !on!eption of eginning.

The first thing to note is that the eginning is alwa7s douled. &eidegger distinguishes a eginning of etaph7si!s* what he !alls the first

eginning* and an other eginning Fandere !n+ang that would eludeetaph7si!s. The aiguit7 of other is ke7 here. Earlier* in the first&clderlin !ourse F1B4/01B43 as well as in the first S!helling !ourseF1B4>* &eidegger had spoken of a new eginning.)4 Su!h talk isaandoned 7 the tie of the )ontributions F1B4>01B49 as it reainswithin the frae of etaph7si!s. or su!h a new eginning* what is pastust e o@er and done with* !opletel7 left ehind* in a word* o@er!oe.

$ot !oin!identall7* $ietzs!he speaks of a new eginning FCein GeubeginnenD in des!riing the final transforation of the lion into !hildin his Thus 'poe >arathustra.)/

)) <!>3: 11369C091J t.)4 See -artin &eidegger* <esamtausgabe* @ol. 4B: .Ilderlins .ymnen

C<ermanienD und C-er &hein,D )nd ed.* ed. Susanne Ziegler Frankfurt a -ain:;ittorio =losterann* 1B9B* p. 11B Fhereafter <! 4B and -artin &eidegger*<esamtausgabe* @ol. /): 'chelling2 6om 3esen der menschlichen 7reiheit AFJKB,ed. Ingrid S!hler Frankfurt a -ain: ;ittorio =losterann* 1B9B* p. 3.

)/ See riedri!h $ietzs!he* !lso 'prach >arathustra, C6on der drei

6erwandlungen,D in riedri!h $ietzs!he* =ristische 'tudienausgabe* @ol. /* ed.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL B9

This idea of a !oplete deta!hent* of a separation without reainder

or tra!e* surreptitiousl7 in!ludes a thought of pure presen!e and asen!e.The new eginning would e !opletel7 present and wholl7 untou!hed 7 the !opletel7 asent old eginning* whi!h would likewise ha@e!opletel7 !oe to its end. The other eginning does not o@er!oewhat went efore. #ther does not indi!ate a se!ond eginningsoewhere after the first* and eginning does not entail an asen!e of relation with what went efore. &eidegger5s other eginning does not!oe after the etaph7si!al first eginning has !oe to its end* despiteDerrida5s ipli!ations to the !ontrar7. Instead* the other eginning liesright upon the first eginning. The two do not follow ea!h other seriall7:Leaping into the other eginning is returning to the first eginning* and@i!e @ersa.)3 %t the risk of too s!heati! a presentation* one ight sa7that the other eginning is the essen!e of the first eginning* it is nowhereother than at the first eginning* ut ne@ertheless reains !on!ealed there.

or this reason* there is alwa7s another eginning* whi!h is not to sa7that there is need to go a!k and start again. The first eginning is alread7another eginning pre!isel7 Hua eginning. % eginning for &eidegger isne@er o@er and done with* is not restri!ted to what egins. This would e

what &eidegger ters a start F 0eginn* in the first &clderlin !ourse.

)>

'ather* a eginning onl7 egins 7 holding soething of itself in reser@e.% eginning is gi@en and hen!e the !on!ealent. (e!ause this!on!ealent is essential to the eginning* there !an ne@er e a !oplete

eginning* though ea!h eginning is wholl7 egun. The eginning does note?haust itself in what it starts up* ut reains also !on!ealed in this

eginning. In a pie!e that ser@es as the suation of the first three $ietzs!he !ourses Fdating fro 1B4B* prior to the de!ision to lead a fourth!ourse into $ietzs!he* &eidegger e?presses this ne@er0!opleted aspe!tof eginning in a graati!al anner: The eginning is onl7 in

eginning* C!n+ang ist nur im !n+angen$D) % eginning !annot esustantialized insofar as this would entail a !opleted and wholl7 present

Giorgio ,olli and -azzino -ontinari F-ni!h6(erlin: Deuts!her Tas!hen;erlag6Aalter de Gru7ter* 1B99* p. 41.

)3 <!>3: 193614C.)> <!4B: 4.) -artin &eidegger* Giet(sche* @ol. ) F+fullingen: ;erlag Gnther $eske* 1B>1* p.

)B6English translation: -artin &eidegger* Giet(sche* @ol. 4* ed. Da@id arrell =rell*trans. "oan Staaugh* et. al. FSan ran!is!o: &arper [ 'ow* +ulishers* In!.*

1B9* pp. 19)0194.



BB Pli 1/ F)CC4

oKe!t of our noination. 'ather* the eginning is alwa7s a @eral

o!!urren!e* insofar as this entails a ne!essar7 in!opletion to the a!t*insofar as we reain pre!isel7 in the eginning and do not lea@e it assoething that has een or has egun.

In other words* eginning egins with refusal. (ut this is no sipleostina!7 to egin* rather it is again a gi@en refusal nati@e to eginning. Inthis sense* the eginning akes all essen!ing in!eptual: Cre+usal is the

+oremost and utmost giving o+ be"ing OS!henkung des Se7nsP* even itsinceptual essencing Oanfngli!he AesungP itsel+$D)9 The withdrawal andrefusal of the other eginning lets the first eginning egin* and &eidegger

is !lear that this first eginning* the eginning of etaph7si!s* is likewisethe eginning of technê and positing.)B ,onseHuentl7* there is no preatureiposition of technê or etaph7si!s for &eidegger* e!ause thete!hnologi!al and etaph7si!al !on!eption of eing is alread7 the

eginning of eing.

4. The ssential ?vs. the A)s S#%hB@

Gi@en what was said ao@e !on!erning the refusal of essen!e* it is o@iousthat this alread7 short0!ir!uits the !oplete and total seizure of the thingas su!h. I !annot ha@e the essen!e of a thing sin!e this is pre!isel7 aatter of !on!ealent`it is not there for e to ha@e. #f !ourse* this is notto sa7 that I !annot e in a relation to this essen!e. #n the !ontrar7* 7relation to this essen!e is one of sheltering* there is a refusal to !hallenge itout into presen!e. (ut this does not ean`and this is Fperhaps !ontraDerrida`that essen!es would a@oid the !ir!ulation of e!ono7. This is ake7 point for understanding essen!e in &eidegger.

#n the one hand* we are fa!ed with a thinking of withdrawal andrefusal* where the thing does not show itself* and does not show itself essentiall7. #n the other hand* we are not to iagine that the essen!e of the thing is a se!ret preser@e where it !an e?ist untou!hed 7 the!hallenges of the te!hnologi!al world around it. If the latter were the !ase*and in Derrida5s @iew it is pre!isel7 the situation with &eidegger* thiswould e an elaorate effort to ensure the purit7 of essen!e and to defendit fro !ontaination with the etaph7si!al* the te!hnologi!al* and the

)9 <!>3: )/161CJ t.

)B <!>3: 19/61)B* 1>B611B.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL 1CC

onti!. (ut if essen!e lies in !on!ealent* it akes no sense to speak of a

purit7 of essen!e sin!e this !on!ealent ust itself announ!e itself and is!on!ealed 7 this @er7 announ!eent. There is no separation of essen!eand thing* &eidegger is Huite !lear on this in the )ontributions2Essen!ing does not lie Re7ond5 the eing and deta!hed fro it* rather a

eing stands in e0ing and* standing therein and lifted awa7* has its truth aswhat is true onl7 in be"ing$4C

'ather than think of essen!ing as the spiriting awa7 of the essen!e of the thing* we should think of it ore as an epla!eent of the thing intothe real of the etaph7si!al and te!hnologi!al. The withdrawal in

Huestion here gi@es the thing o@er to !ir!ulation and repla!eent. It gi@esit o@er ut ne@er !opletel7* for* if it did that then the thing would e!opletel7 !hallenged forth and a@ailale* it would e purel7 present. Insu!h a !ondition there !ould e no gift. So it would see that there is aline that &eidegger is unwilling to !ross* a thought that he !annot think.&eidegger will not allow for the !oplete e?position of the thing intote!hnologi!al a@ailailit7. (ut we !annot !on!lude fro this that he has

preser@ed an un!ontainated essen!e soewhere. Instead* we ust seein this gesture an effort to approa!h a situation of unending !hallenge and

es!alating danger. In other words* &eidegger5s !on!eption of essen!einsures that there will alwa7s e ore to !hallenge forth* alwa7s e oreto endanger. If the thing were !opletel7 turned inside0out and its essen!ee?posed without reainder* there would no longer e need for sheltering*there would no longer e a responsiilit7 to things or to the world.&eidegger will not allow for a !essation of the danger* ut onl7 for itsin!rease. Essen!e does not preser@e the thing* it endangers it* and does soessentiall7. Ae !annot annul our responsiilit7 for &eideggerJ this is hislesson. That we not e responsile to the giftJ this is the ipossile.

5. )rriving ?vs. Certaint0 of Destination@

The last point of !ritiHue against &eidegger* that he is !ertain of the arri@alof the gift* !an now e addressed. Sin!e the thing is not !oplete* ut hasits essence in concealment * the thing is not !opletel7 present. It is not allhere and it is essential to the thing that it not e all here. (ringing together the thought of gi@ing and essen!e as withdrawal* &eidegger !an speak of

4C <! >3: )96)C)J t.



1C1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

this !ondition inters of arri@al and arri@ing. Ahat is gi@en has not 7et

arri@ed. Ahat is gi@en is arri@ing. The arri@ing gi@en will ne@er arri@e. Itwill ne@er e here !opletel7* ne@er ha@e done with arri@ing. Aere it toarri@e in full* there would e no essen!e. Aere it to arri@e in full* therewould e !oplete se@eran!e fro the gi@er.

This logi! of arri@ing was addressed ao@e in ters of eginning.

There is no eginning that is o@er and done with* rather eginning liesonl7 in eginning* a pro!ess whi!h is not surpassed upon rea!hing the end.&eidegger5s ost sustained !onsideration of arri@ing* howe@er* isa!!oplished in ters of the Gods throughout his @arious readings of

&clderlin. The Gods ha@e flown* e?!lais the poet* and this flight isthere7 ade knownJ the asen!e of the Gods is announ!ed in it.41 Theflight of the Gods is no asen!e of the Gods* e!ause the Gods are not soasent as for that asen!e to go unrearked. &eidegger akes the sae

point in regards to the poet5s stateent at the !on!lusion of The Ister*where &clderlin writes* what that one does* the ri@er6 no one knowsFlines 10). (ut the poet ust know in order to sa7 this. In ea!h !ase*an asen!e is announ!ed and rendered an7thing ut asent.

The !onseHuen!es of this for a thinking of arri@ing !annot e

underestiated. If one is entitled here to speak of a flight of the gods* thenone is Kust as u!h entitled to speak of an arri@al of the tra!e* the tra!e of a flight that the poet has dete!ted and announ!ed. % departure that is aton!e an arri@al and an arri@al that arri@es in departure* these naes still putan end to the arri@ing and departing 7 sustantializing it. (ut if departurelea@es a tra!e* then it has not !opletel7 departed. %nd if what arri@es is atra!e of departure* then the arri@al is ne@er done with either. %rri@al is

postponed and deferred. Instead of departure and arri@al there is onl7departing and arri@ing.

Aith this we tou!h upon the darkest oent or Koint of &eidegger5s)ontributions to Philosophy A+rom EnowningB, that of the last god. &erelast does not refer to the final pla!e in a seHuen!e of gods FZeus^,hrist the Last God. The last in Huestion here* this ultia!7F Let(theit * is rather a ne@er0ending arri@ing. The last god will outlast allothers pre!isel7 e!ause it !an ne@er arri@e. Its arri@al would e its end.&eidegger sa7s as u!h in a stateent that re!olle!ts all the points that

41 CEnt+lohene <ItterMD, riedri!h &clderlin* C<ermanien F1* in riedri!h&clderlin* '5mtliche 3ere* @ol. )* ed. riedri!h (einer FStuttgart: A.

=ohlhaer ;erlag* 1B31* p. 1/B.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL 1C)

ha@e een ephasized ao@e: The last god is no end* ut rather the

beginning as it resonates unto and in0itself* and thus is the highest shape of refusal.4) The last god is so thoroughl7 a figure of arri@ing* that a few7ears later F1B4B01B/C* &eidegger will !all the last god the ost !oingof the !oing.44

ar fro a thought of !ertain arri@al and fi?ed destination* &eidegger5sthinking is inhaited 7 arri@ing and destining. To re!ognize this we neednot go an7 further than this rief ention of the last god* for the last god isthe nae that &eidegger gi@es to this @er7 prole of arri@ing. ro the

eginning* through the essential endangerent* and to the arri@ing*

&eidegger5s thinking is a thinking of in!opletion.

%. The Pla%e of P#;li%ation

In the response to Derrida5s !harges attepted ao@e* I ha@e intentionall7drawn fro &eidegger5s )ontributions to Philosophy A7rom EnowningB, ate?t una@ailale to Derrida at the tie of The Post )ard2 7rom 'ocrates to

7reud and 0eyond . &eidegger5s )ontributions* written during 1B4>01B49*

was onl7 first pulished in 1B9B* soe nine 7ears after Derrida5s te?t. or this reason it a7 see unfair or out of pla!e to !riti!ize Derrida5s readingfor ignoran!e of a te?t he !ould not possil7 ha@e known.4/ In The Post )ard * howe@er* Derrida undertakes an anal7sis of lega!7 where7 t7pi!al!hronolog7 is re@ersed* where the sons now gi@e thesel@es the father*where +lato sends hiself So!rates* et!. The situation is presented asfollows:

E?aple: if one orning So!rates had spoken for +lato* if to+lato his addressee he had addressed soe essage* it is also

that p. would ha@e had to e ale to re!ei@e* to await* to desire*in a word to ha@e !alled in a !ertain wa7 what S. will ha@e saidto hiJ and therefore what S.* taking di!tation* pretends to

4) <!>3: /1>6)B4J t.44 -artin &eidegger* <esamtausgabe* @ol. >B: -ie <eschichte des 'eyns* ed. +eter

Trawn7 Frankfurt a -ain: ;ittorio =losterann* 1BB9* p. )11.4/ It should e noted* howe@er* that Derrida does !ite the )ontributions to

Philosophy A+rom EnowningB in the 1BB1 puli!ation of the 1B01B9 seinar <iven Time FGT 44 n. 161B n. B. Derrida gi@es no indi!ation that the )ontributionswould alter his anal7sis in an7 wa7. #n the !ontrar7* the )ontributionsare !ited as

further support for it.



1C4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

in@ent`writes* right p. has sent hiself a post !ard^he has

sent it a!k to hiself fro hiself* or he has e@en Rsent5hiself S.43

&ere we see not so u!h the re@ersal of authorit7 in the speaker0writer relationship Fit is not the re!ipient who alone would now di!tate* as thesu@ersion of that relationship. The authoritati@e position is lost and whatis re@ealed there7 is the transitional spa!e etween the speaker andwriter* along with the ore or less su!!essful attepts to appropriate a

position within this spa!eJ positions whi!h a7 attept to reestalish aseat of authorit7 all o@er again. ,onsidering the relationship in ters of an

a!ti@e and a passi@e part7 is inadeHuate for siilar reasons. Thesupposedl7 passi@e part7 a!ti@el7 !alls for what is sent fro thesupposedl7 a!ti@e part7* who now passi@el7 re!ei@es the !all. This saelogi! of lega!7 a7 e applied to the interpretation of a te?t* to a te?t andits !oentar7.

"ust as we thought that So!rates !ae efore +lato* so did we think thatthe )ontributions to Philosophy F,+ !ae efore The Post )ard F+,.This eans that the line of des!ent or influen!e would run fro &eidegger to Derrida. So!rates di!tates to +lato* putting words into his outh. (ut for

Derrida this eans that +lato ust !all for what So!rates gi@es hi.+lato* in fa!t* gi@es this !all and oth parties are the donors here. In tersof our te?ts* +, would !all for ,+* The Post )ard would hear what itwants fro the )ontributions* whi!h the )ontributions would send to The

Post )ard Fits own post !ard. (ut this is onl7 if we follow the!opositional order of the te?ts* the puli!ation order tells a differentstor7. $ow instead of: ,+ then +,* we ha@e: +, then ,+. $ow it is The

Post )ard whi!h di!tates to the )ontributions Fits own !ontriution*the )ontributions whi!h are influen!ed 7 The Post )ard `now it is the

)ontributions whi!h !all for The Post )ardM This re@ersal of prioritiesin an alread7 re@ersed arrangeent Fre@ersed in regards to the!opositional order furnishes us with what would appear to e areinstateent of the !opositional hierar!h7 of influen!e* the arrangeentof traditional Fetaph7si!al !hronolog7. If we attend to the puli!ationhistor7* then the post !ard effe!t reinstates etaph7si!s it isindistinguishale fro it.

(7 ephasizing the puli!ation histor7 of these te?ts`and othDerrida and &eidegger ha@e !on!erned thesel@es with the role of the

43 P) 4364C.



%$D'EA -IT,&ELL 1C/

pulisher in their work`not onl7 is the idea of a dire!t line of des!ent

fro author to reader proleatized* ut so is an7 !on!eption of the post!ard effe!t as a siple re@ersal of !hronolog7. Instead* what we ha@e isthe opening of a spa!e of sending* a etween &eidegger would !all it*whi!h is the pro@enan!e of the pulisher. &ere again there is theen!roa!hent of the etaph7si!al and the te!hnologi!al upon a field thatwe ight otherwise think as pure. $ot onl7 is there no purit7 of origin* nogift as su!h* and no !oplete arri@al* ut e@en the inter@al opened up inthis thought of sending is itself ipure. &eidegger5s !on!ern with thepuli! !hara!ter of puli!ation would find its pla!e here.

(7 the logi! of sending* it is no foul to !riti!ize Derrida5s reading of &eidegger 7 appeal to a te?t pulished after his own. Ae oth @ie toestalish a !onne!tion with &eidegger5s thought in this and to ground itslegitia!7. There are no liits on the lineages and filiations we !an soaintain. Derrida5s work is not dependent upon &eidegger* ut it is notdependent without eing independent either. $ow e@er7 te?t is in a

possile relation to e@er7 other* writing it and eing read 7 it* !alling a!k one to the other. This field of infinite relations* this network of passages* is te?tualit7 itself. It is an opening and a non0identi!al presen!e

whi!h pre@ents the eHuation of a te?t with nuered pages etween two!o@ers. That an outside agen!7* the pulisher* through the @ariouste!hnologies of puli!ation* would pla7 a role in te?tualit7 is no oKe!tionto post!ardizationut is* rather* its attestation. There is no purit7 of lineage* one wa7 or the other. (ut this itself is nothing foreign to&eideggerian thinking.

+erhaps Derrida5s greatness is that he !alls this forth fro &eidegger.Indeed* as &eidegger hiself on!e stated* it is Huite sall to think that oneis independent. It is a sign of greatness to ear and sustain an influen!e. In

a 1B4>01B4 $ietzs!he !ourse Ffirst pulished in 1B>1* &eidegger writes:Dependen!e is not a !on!ept 7 whi!h we !an understandrelationships aong the greats. (ut the sall are alwa7sdependent on the greatJ the7 are sall pre!isel7 e!ause the7think the7 are independent. The great thinker is one who !anhear what is greatest in the work of other greats and who !antransfor it in an original anner.4>

4> -artin &eidegger* Giet(sche* @ol. 1 F+fullingen: ;erlag Gnther $eske* 1B>1* p./36English translation: -artin &eidegger* Giet(sche* @ol. 1* ed. and trans. Da@id

arrell =rell FSan ran!is!o: &arper [ 'ow* +ulishers* In!.* 1BB* p. 43.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 1C301)>

2oses 2endelssohn and the Ger$an Re%eption

of Roger +os%ovi%h8s Theoria

GRG *ITL'C=

I. +os%ovi%h8s Rep#tation in #rope

Aith the puli!ation of around one hundred s!ientifi! papers* thereputation of 'oger "oseph (os!o@i!h F111M191 spread rapidl7 a!rosseighteenth0!entur7 Europe. (os!o@i!h was renowned first in his adoptednation of Ital7. The %!adeia della S!ienze F(ologna ade hi aeer in 1/>* where he was entrusted 7 (enedi!t XI; with a series of high0profile s!ientifi! issions* and in his hoeland of Dalatia. &isreputation spread Hui!kl7 to ran!e* where his ideas re!ei@ed their ostenthusiasti! audien!e. &e was ele!ted !orresponding eer of theren!h %!adWie des S!ien!es in 1/9* and Louis X; ade hi a ren!h!itizen in 1/. %s a papal representati@e* (os!o@i!h Kourne7ed to +olandand e!ae a !elerit7 thereJ the e?iled king ade (os!o@i!h a eer of the %!ade7 of Stanislas 7 spe!ial ro7al re!oendation. %fter (os!o@i!h tra@eled through (ulgaria and Trans7l@ania* his reputation

lossoed throughout the Sla@i! world* in!luding 'ussia* where he wasade an honorar7 eer of the 'ussian %!ade7 of S!ien!e in 1>C.(os!o@i!h5s ideas also re!ei@ed a war wel!oe in England andS!otland. During his @isit to London and ,aridge* (os!o@i!h was gi@enhonorar7 eership in the 'o7al So!iet7 in 1>1. &is (ritish adirersin!luded "oseph +riestle7* "ohn 'oinson* Lord =el@in* -i!hael arada7*and others. ro England* (os!o@i!h5s fae spread to !olonial %eri!a.

1 or iographi!al sket!hes of (os!o@i!h* see E. &ill* 'oger (os!o@i!h: %

(iographi!al Essa7 in L.L. Ah7te* ed.* &oger %oseph 0oscovich '%, 7$&$'$ AFNFF4 FNJNB FLondon: George %llen [ Unwin* 1B>1* pp. 1M1C1J and (ranisla@+etronie@i!* Life of 'oger "oseph (os!o@i!h in 'oger "oseph (os!o@i!h* !Theory o+ Gatural Philosophy F,aridge* -ass.: -IT +ress* 1B>>* pp. @iiMi?.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 1C>

(enKain ranklin et (os!o@i!h in London* and ranklin5s house guest

in %eri!a* "oseph +riestle7* rought with hi an enthusias for theDalatian. Later* Lord =el@in re!alled (os!o@i!h fa@oral7 in his(altiore le!tures.

(os!o@i!h was a !ourt fa@orite in %ustria* as well. (os!o@i!h finishedthe Theoria Philosophiae Gaturalis while in %ustria* and its first editionwas pulished in ;ienna Fthough he was greatl7 disappointed in it* andanother was pulished four 7ears later in ;eni!e. %la Sodnik0Zupane!noted that (os!o@i!h inspired a widespread odernization of uni@ersit7!urri!ula in %ustria. ro %ustria* (os!o@i!h5s fae spread to Slo@enia*

&ungar7* and Turke7.Ae would e?pe!t* then* that Geran7* too* would ha@e re!ei@ed

(os!o@i!h5s ideas positi@el7. %fter all* (os!o@i!h soKourned in Geran7twi!e: on!e on his wa7 fro +oland to 'oe* and on!e tra@eling fro+aris to ,onstantinople. The ;ienna edition of the Theoria was oughtalost entirel7 7 indi@iduals or institutions in Geran7* and it wastranslated into Geran 7 19/.

(ut the Geran rea!tion to (os!o@i!h was as de!idedl7 negati@e as the%ustrian rea!tion was positi@e. The !urri!ulu !hange dis!ernile after

(os!o@i!h5s soKourn in %ustria was onl7 partl7 dis!ernile in Geran7.Sodnik0Zupane! has !atalogued works* with spe!ial referen!e to theLKulKana lirar7* that resulted fro (os!o@i!h5s soKourns in %ustria andGeran7.) %ll ut two were %ustrian puli!ations. In (reslau* %.Zepli!hal pulished Entwur+ der 0oscowischen Gaturlehre F1>B* and inArzurg* $. (urkhuser pulished Theoria corporis naturalis principiis

0oscovichi con+ormata F1C. Sodnik0Zupane! reported that(urkhuser5s work des!ried the atosphere in Arzurg as hostile to(os!o@i!h. In fa!t* (os!o@i!h was despised 7 !riti!s there. The7 sought

to dis!redit hi with gossipJ the7 @eheentl7 reprianded hiJ the7asserted that he had !orrupted philosoph7 or had stood true philosoph7 onits head. (urkhuser e?plained these rea!tions 7 sa7ing that the !riti!swere ignorant of (os!o@i!h5s a!tual works and that out of ere preKudi!eand se!ond0hand a!!ounts* arose os!ure* disordered* and false!hara!terizations of his ideas. (urkhuser also asserted that hateful

Kealous7 was a oti@ation.

) %. Sodnik0Zupane!* !ctes du 'ymposium *nternational &$%$ 0oOsovic FQF

F(eograd: 1B>)* pp. )940)9B.



1C Pli 1/ F)CC4

Sodnik0Zupane! wrote that (os!o@i!h5s Geran opponents were

representati@es of s!holasti!is with a fi?ed pedagogi!al agenda.4

The7feared that (os!o@i!h would !orrupt the 7outh with $ewton5s theories*and e@en ore so* with his own theories. The referen!e to s!holasti!is*and other rearks 7 Sodnik0Zupane!* suggests that the !riti!s werefollowers of ,hristian Aolff. (ut Leinizians were also disposed against(os!o@i!h. This was the situation in Arzurg* and it was t7pi!al of theGeran estiation of (os!o@i!h.

There sees to ha@e een no ni!he in Geran7 for (os!o@i!h. Therewas no honorar7 eership for hi in the Geran %!ade7. #f !ourse*

soe figures in the %!ade7* led 7 Leonhard Euler* defended $ewtonagainst the Leiniz0Aolffian philosoph7. Euler* howe@er* defended $ewton5s theor7 of asolute spa!e and tie* so (os!o@i!h* who era!edrelati@e spa!e and tie* would still ha@e een unattra!ti@e to hi./ The fa!tthat (os!o@i!h was anti0+russian politi!all7 during the Se@en ears Aar 3

!ertainl7 did not help his !ause in (erlin* ut politi!al s7pathies alone!annot e?plain the Geran antipath7 toward hiJ (os!o@i!h was a

popular figure a!ross se@eral lines of politi!al hostilit7.

Ah7* then* was the Geran re!eption of (os!o@i!h5s ideas so

negati@e* while the rest of Europe !elerated hi as one of its greatestli@ing thinkers In what follows* I will show how a widel7 read re@iew 7-oses -endelssohn F1)BM193 influen!ed Geran puli! opinion aout(os!o@i!h5s Theoria de!isi@el7 and how -endelssohn issed the ark.>

4 Sodnik0Zupane!* p. )9>./ Later* the Geran atoists G.T. e!hner and ".G. ;ogt adopted aspe!ts of

(os!o@i!h5s theor7J .A.". S!helling5s own d7nais a7 ha@e een influen!ed 7(os!o@i!hJ and ".G. &erder !oented positi@el7 on hi. Ianuel =ant re@isedhis own ph7si!s in rea!tion to (os!o@i!h5s ideas* ut onl7 ipli!itl7 and indire!tl7.

Aith these e?!eptions* the Geran intelligentsia paid (os!o@i!h no heed for a!entur7 or ore after his death. ".G. i!hte and riedri!h S!hlegel did not entionhi. %rthur S!hopenhauer* who railed against the notion of a!tion at a distan!e*would ha@e roundl7 reKe!ted (os!o@i!h ut apparentl7 did not e@en know of hi.Georg &egel* Ludwig euera!h* and =arl -ar? had no dis!ernile ipression of (os!o@i!h. riedri!h Lange entioned hi onl7 on!e* and then negati@el7* in his!ritiHue of aterialis.

3 E. &ill* lo!. !it.* p. /B.> I ha@e alread7 dis!ussed (os!o@i!h and $ietzs!he in 'oger "oseph (os!o@i!h*

(enedi!t de Spinoza and riedri!h $ietzs!he* in Giet(sche"'tudien F1BB>* pp.)CCM))CJ E?aining $ietzs!he5s Tie %tois Theor75 ragent fro 194*

in Giet(sche"'tudien F1BB* pp. 43CM4>CJ and In@estigations in Tie %tois



G'EG A&ITL#,= 1C9

II. +a%kgro#nd of 2endelssohn8s Review

% powerful* negati@e Geran response to (os!o@i!h !ae e@en efore theappearan!e of the Theoria5s standard ;eni!e edition of 1>4J onl7 onthsafter the first edition of 13B* -oses -endelssohn* seeking a !opleterefutation* atta!ked (os!o@i!h. -endelssohn re@iewed (os!o@i!h5sTheoria Philosophiae Gaturalis in a series of letters as part of his regular !ontriution to 0rie+e, die neueste Litteratur betre++end . This (erlinweekl7 was one of two !hief literar7 organs of the (erlinEnlightenent.9 Sin!e 1/C (erlin had een the !enter of Geran

Enlightenent thought. -endelssohn was one of 0rie+e5s founders andain editors and was a leading figure in the (erlin Enlightenent. InLewis Ahite (e!k5s estiation* -endelssohn was the epitoe of popular

philosoph7 at its est* the outstanding li@ing author of the spe!ulati@eetaph7si!s =ant targeted* and the ost readale of the earl7 Geran

philosophers.B The letters !on!erning (os!o@i!h are nuered /)* /3* 3/*and 3> Ffro "une to Septeer )C* 13B in se@en issues.1C This seriesgreatl7 influen!ed re!eption of the Theoria and its author aong Geransof the tie.

-endelssohn5s oti@es were threefold. irst* he sought to atta!k (os!o@i!h5s s7ste fro a Leiniz0Aolffian position* that is* as part of the larger $ewton0Leiniz ri@alr7. -endelssohn !onsidered (os!o@i!h to

e a logi!al* if e?tree* !onseHuen!e of $ewton. Se!ond* -endelssohn*though hiself an alien within Geran so!iet7 as a "ew* prooted the

udding Geran national !ulture* and (os!o@i!h was non0Geran. Thesetwo atters were inter!onne!tedJ when -endelssohn !oended our Geran philosoph7* he eant Leiniz and Aolff. -endelssohn opposed

and Eternal 'e!urren!e* in %ournal o+ Giet(sche 'tudies Fall )CCC* pp. 4/M3. Intwo future arti!les I dis!uss the treatent of (os!o@i!h at the hands of Ianuel=ant and the (ritish s!ientists.

or a iograph7 of -endelssohn* see &. Aalter* 1oses 1endelssohn2 'ein Lebenund seine 3ere F$ew ork: (lo!h* 1B4C.

9 L.A. (e!k* Early <erman Philosophy F,hippenha: Thoees +ress* 1B>B* p.4)/.

B Iid.* pp. 4)4* 44* 4)>.1C -. -endelssohn. <esammelte 'chri+ten. "uilusausgae. (and 3 +art I.

&e(ensionsartiel in 0rie+e, der neueste Literatur betre++end F13BM1>3.

roann ;erlag. StuttgartM(ad ,annstatt. 1BB1.



1CB Pli 1/ F)CC4

ren!h aterialis and he !onsidered (os!o@i!h to e one with the

ren!h.Third* -endelssohn5s attitude toward (os!o@i!h a7 e e?plained in

light of the !hallenges posed 7 Spinoza. -endelssohn !onsidered Spinozaa good and @irtuous an ut one whose philosoph7 led to atheis andfatalis. ! +ortiori* -endelssohn was disposed to !opletel7 reKe!t(os!o@i!h5s theor7* sin!e 0oscovichs theory went +ar beyond 'pino(ismin its radical consequences.

In fa!t* (os!o@i!h5s theor7 su@erted Spinozis in three !ru!ialrespe!ts* guaranteeing an e@en greater !on@ertiilit7 to atheis.

(os!o@i!h5s theor7 had as its first !onseHuen!e the reKe!tion of the @er7notion of sustan!e. or (os!o@i!h* there is no sustan!e. % ore polar opposition to Spinoza* whose first proposition is Sustan!e is prior to itsodifi!ations* !ould s!ar!el7 e iagined. The se!ond !onseHuen!e isthe reKe!tion of infinite for!eJ the total aount of for!e in the uni@erse isfinite. In (os!o@i!h5s natural philosoph7* there are no real infinitiesan7where in nature. The third !onseHuen!e of (os!o@i!h5s theor7 is thereKe!tion of infinite no@elt7. There is onl7 an endlessl7 re!urring set of

phenoena. #r as (os!o@i!h put it* his ideas do awa7 with the idea of

e@er7thing !ontinuous !oe?istingJ [ when this is done awa7 with theaKorit7 of the greatest diffi!ulties @anish. urther* nothing infinite isa!tuall7 found a!tuall7 e?istingJ the onl7 thing possile that reains is aseries of finite things produ!ed indefinitel7.11 This su@erted Spinoza5s

proposition X;I in (ook #ne of The Ethics: ro the ne!essit7 of thedi@ine nature there ust follow infinite things in infinite wa7s.

-endelssohn5s re@iew of (os!o@i!h5s Theoria did not pro@e!ontro@ersial. #n the !ontrar7* it was widel7 a!!epted as a de!isi@e andwel!oe refutation. -endelssohn defended the iortalit7 of the soul* the

e?isten!e of God the father* and the Leinizian optiis that the a!tualworld is the est of all possile worlds* essages that the Geran nationwanted to hear in the fa!e of (ritish s!ien!e and Spinozis. Ahile it wasne@er likel7 that (os!o@i!h5s s!ientifi! ideas would ha@e pro@en ore

popular in Geran7 than =ant5s own ph7si!al theor7 of d7nais or Leiniz5s onadolog7* it reains an unnoti!ed !hapter in Geranintelle!tual histor7 that -endelssohn5s re@iew failed to grasp (os!o@i!h5sreal position.

11 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1).



G'EG A&ITL#,= 11C

III. 2endelssohn8s Review: Pro;le$ of Co$penetration

(os!o@i!h5s theor7 of atter deri@ed fro this arguent:

1. Either two solid odies !an !ollide 7 iediate !onta!t* or the two odies !an !openetrate Fo!!up7 the sae spatial point at the saeinstant* or there e?ists a for!e in ea!h solid od7 that repels the other

od7 efore iediate !onta!t.

). Iediate !onta!t etween odies would @iolate the Law of ,ontinuit7* sin!e there would o!!ur a sudden !hange in @elo!it7.1)

4. Two odies !annot o!!up7 the sae spatial point at the saeoent.

Therefore* there e?ists a for!e in ea!h solid od7 that repels the other od7 efore iediate !onta!t. 14

ro this !on!lusion (os!o@i!h surised that the eleentar7 parti!les of atter ust e !enters of for!e* point parti!les* endowed with inertia*indi@isiilit7* ipenetrailit7* and a repulsi@e for!e !apale of e?tinguishing an7 @elo!it7 of another parti!le approa!hing the eforeipa!t. or!e* a!!ording to (os!o@i!h* alternates fro attra!ti@e torepulsi@e depending on the in@erse sHuared distan!e etween points. %tgreat distan!es* for!e is attra!ti@e* a!!ounting for gra@it7J at indefinitel7sall distan!es* for!e e!oes repulsi@e. (etween these distan!es* for!ealternates and a!!ounts for ph7si!al phenoena su!h as agnetis*ele!tri! !harge* !ohesion* and so on. ,enters of for!e are une?tended anddo not !onstitute a !ontinuu. 'ather the fields of for!e eanating frothese !enters !onstitute relational spa!e* whi!h is not a !ontinuu. ,entersof for!e ne@er a!hie@e dire!t !onta!tJ rather* the7 operate 7 action at adistance$

In his re@iew* -endelssohn atta!ked (os!o@i!h5s theor7 7 arguing*first* that Leiniz5s theor7 of atter was superior in that it sol@ed the

prole of !openetration 7 supposing that onads are elasti!* not solid* odies. F-endelssohn translated the Latin compenetratio into Geran as *neinander+allen. These underined* he elie@ed* an7 ne!essit7 of arepulsi@e for!e at indefinitel7 sall distan!es. Se!ond* -endelssohnargued that action at a distance was a nonsensi!al* !ounterintuiti@e notion.

1) '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* )/M)3.

14 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1C.



111 Pli 1/ F)CC4

Leiniz5s onadolog7* he happil7 !ountered* did not reHuire su!h a

strange assuption. Third* -endelssohn argued that (os!o@i!hintrodu!ed* or at least iplied* new notions of tie and otion.-endelssohn oKe!ted that (os!o@i!h !onsidered tie and spa!e as ereillusion. inall7* -endelssohn oKe!ted that (os!o@i!h5s theor7 of lightand atter defied !oon sense notions. Lesser* ore te!hni!aloKe!tions were ade to parti!ular e!hani!al e?planations of ph7si!al

phenoena* ut these all relied on the roader oKe!tions to the newtheor7 of atter. %dditionall7* theologi!al oKe!tions were laun!hedagainst (os!o@i!h.

Ea!h of -endelssohn5s oKe!tions* howe@er* were ased onisunderstandings of (os!o@i!h5s position or an o@erestiation of Leiniz5s relati@e ad@antages.

,on!erning elasti!it7 and !openetration* it is !ru!ial to realize that(os!o@i!h hiself responded to -endelssohn5s oKe!tion or siilar ones

posed 7 other Leinizians. 'e!all that -endelssohn5s re@iew appearedalost iediatel7 after the ;ienna edition of the Theoria. In thesuseHuent ;eni!e edition* (os!o@i!h responded to @arious !riti!s*in!luding that !harge 7 an unnaed Leinitian and soe of the

Leinitian !ir!le that elasti!it7 sol@ed the prole of !openetration andrendered the Theoria superfluous. &e wrote* -oreo@er* those who aditthat all the parti!les of solids* howe@er sall the7 a7 e* are soft or elasti!* 7et do not es!ape the diffi!ult7* ut transfer it to prie surfa!es* or

pointsJ [ here a sudden !hange would e ade [ the Law of ,[email protected]/

(esides* I was not the first to introdu!e the notion of siplenon0e?tended points into ph7si!s. The an!ients fro the tie of Zeno had an idea of the* [ the followers of Leiniz indeed

suppose that their onads are siple [ non0e?tended. I* sin!e Ido not adit the !ontinuit7 of the points thesel@es* ut supposethat an7 two points of atter are separated fro one another*a@oid a ight7 ro!k* upon whi!h oth of these others ha@e !oeto grief* whilst the7 uild up an e?tended !ontinuu froindi@isile [ non0e?tended things of this sort. (oth see to eto ha@e erred in doing so* e!ause the7 ha@e i?ed up with thesipli!it7 [ non0e?tension that the7 attriute to the eleentsthat iperfe!t idea of a sort of round gloule ha@ing two

1/ '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1C.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 11)

surfa!es distin!t fro one another* an idea the7 ha@e a!Huired

through the sensesJ although* if the7 were asked if the7 hadade this supposition* the7 would den7 that the7 had done so.13

urther*

Those arguents that soe of the Leinitian !ir!le put forwardare of no use for the purpose of !onne!ting indi@isiilit7 [ non0e?tension of the eleents with !ontinuous e?tension of theasses fored fro the. I dis!ussed the arguents in Huestionin a short note appended to %rt. 14 of the dissertation -e

1ateriR -ivisibilitR and Principiis )orporum^.Those, who say that monads cannot be compenetrated, because they are bynature impenetrable, by no means remove the di++iculty$ 7or, i+ they are both by nature impenetrable, : also at the same timehave to mae up a continuum, i$e$, have to be contiguous, thenat one : the same time they are compenetrated : they are not compenetratedS : this leads to an absurdity : proves theimpossibility o+ entities o+ this sort$ 7or, +rom the idea o+ non"extension o+ any sort, : o+ contiguity, it is proved by an

argument instituted against the >enonists many centuries agothat there is bound to be compenetrationS : this argument hasnever been satis+actorily answered$ 7rom the nature ascribed to them, this compenetration is excluded$ Thus there is acontradiction : an absurdity$1>

-endelssohn argued that Leiniz !ould es!ape the dilea that ensnaredZenonists along these lines* though it !annot e pro@ed that this wasintended aong the Leinizian !ir!le. ,learl7* (os!o@i!h responded thatonads !ould not e oth none?tended and !ontiguous without undergoing

!openetration* eaning that a !ontinuu !ould not e !onstru!ted out of su!h points. -endelssohn retorted that onads are not !ontiguous* i.e.* donot a!hie@e dire!t !onta!t. &e further interpreted (os!o@i!h to !onstru!t a!ontinuu out of his own none?tended for!e points. The deate thusresol@es into two Huestions of fa!t: Did Leiniz suggest that onadsa!hie@e dire!t !onta!t %nd did (os!o@i!h attept to !onstru!t a!ontinuu out of une?tended for!e points (oth these Huestions should eanswered in (os!o@i!h5s fa@or.

13 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 3B.

1> '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 3B. %ll ephases in original.



114 Pli 1/ F)CC4

irst* Leiniz allowed dire!t !onta!t for his none?tended

onads. Sin!e he did not era!e a!tion at a distan!e* a!ontinuu had to e !onstru!ted out of !ontiguous* none?tendedonads.

(ut 7 Theor7 differs in a arked degree fro that of Leiniz.or one thing* e!ause it does not adit the !ontinuouse?tension that arises fro the idea of !onse!uti@e non0e?tended

points tou!hing one another.1

Leiniz5s inferen!e was @ulnerale pre!isel7 here. -ar7 &esse oser@ed*The @ague and unsatisfa!tor7 nature of Leiniz5s arguents fro the

prin!iple of !ontinuit7 to a!tion 7 !onta!t is indi!ated 7 the use of thesae prin!iple 7 (os!o@i!h in rea!hing the opposite !on!lusion.19

(ertrand 'ussell oser@ed of Leiniz that&is elief in the plenu and the fluid ether should ha@e led hito the se!ond theor7 Oof an all0per@ading fluidP* and to thein@estigation of fluid otion. &is relational theor7 of spa!e* andhis whole do!trine of onads* should ha@e led hi* as it led(os!o@i!h* =ant* and Lotze* to the theor7 of une?tended !entersof for!e. The failure to !hoose etween these alternati@es ade

his d7nai!s a ass of !onfusions. The true LeinizianD7nai!s is not his own* ut that of (os!o@i!h.1B

In this !onne!tion 'ussell !ited the ao@e0anal7zed %rti!les 149 and 14Bof the Theoria. -endelssohn onl7 inherited the !onfusions.

Se!ond* it is entirel7 false that (os!o@i!h attepted to !onstru!tspatial !ontinuu fro une?tended points. This is the standardisinterpretation of his s7ste and one forwarded e@en toda7.(ut this entirel7 is!onstrued the entire (os!o@i!hian s7ste:relati@e tie and spa!e are !onstru!ted out of lines of for!e* notfor!e points. Ae aintain* on!e again* that it is a istake whenone !lais that* a!!ording to (os!o@i!h* real e?istent things*spatial points* or prior lo!ations* are !onne!ted 7 !ontinuous

1 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* 3B.19 -. &esse* 7orces and 7ields FAestport* ,onn.: Greenwood +ress* 1B>)* pp.

1>4M1>/.1B (. 'ussell* ! )ritical Exposition o+ the Philosophy o+ Leibni( FLondon: G. %llen

[ Unwin* 1B4* p. B1.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 11/

spa!e. . . . Did (os!o@i!h want to !onstru!t spa!e fro spatial

points %o@e all* not that.)C

IV. 2endelssohn8s Review: )%tion at a Distan%e

In general* (os!o@i!h !onsidered Leiniz5s as !lose to his own for!e point parti!les* with two iportant e?!eptions. irst* Leiniz5s onads e?plain ph7si!al phenoena 7 dire!t !onta!t with ea!h other rather than 7 a!tionat a distan!e. This left Leiniz with a serious prole of a!!ounting for

gra@it7. Se!ond* Leiniz* 7 reKe!ting a!tion at a distan!e* was for!ed to!onstru!t spatial !ontinuus fro !ontiguous* une?tended points. et-endelssohn !alled this do!trine an idol that has een anned froetaph7si!s with good effe!t.)1 &a@ing een onl7 partl7 lierated froidolatr7 hiself* and possessing his own idols of iagination* (os!o@i!h!onseHuentl7 laun!hed unfounded atta!ks against Leiniz* showing onl7his own fault7 knowledge of the Leiniz literature* -endelssohn argued.

%lost two !enturies later* 'ussell had the opposite e@aluation: This rings e to Leiniz5s grounds against a!tion at a distan!e. I !annot

dis!o@er* on this point* an7thing e7ond @ulgar preKudi!e. . . . The spatialand teporal !ontiguit7 of !ause and effe!t are apparentl7 pla!ed on ale@el. . . . Aith regard to tie* though a diffi!ult7 arises fro !ontinuit7*the a?i a7 e allowedJ ut with regard to spa!e* it is pre!luded* as aetaph7si!al a?io* 7 the denial of transeunt a!tion. Sin!e onads donot really a!t on ea!h other* e@en 7 ipa!t* ut onl7 represent the worldas a whole in per!eptions* there is no !oherent reason to !lai that* withinonads* the per!eption of things distant would e an7 less a !ause than

per!eption of things near7. The denial of a!tion at a distan!e ust*

therefore* e !lassed as a ere preKudi!e* and one* oreo@er* whi!h has aost perni!ious effe!t upon the relation of Leiniz5s D7nai!s to his-etaph7si!s.))

%gain* -endelssohn onl7 inherited Leiniz5s inailit7 to e?plaingra@it7 and the need to !onstru!t a !ontinuu fro onads* whi!h* while

)C S. 'istis!h* -er 'at( vom <runde und die <rHndung der puntuellen dynamischen !tomisti * in 6ierteljahrsschri+t +Hr wissenscha+tliche Philosophie und 'o(iologiens. 14* 49.1 F1B1/* p. 1CC.

)1 -endelssohn* <esammelte 'chri+ten (and 3 +art I* p. 94.

)) (. 'ussell* lo!. !it.* p. B4.



113 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ipenetrale and !ontiguous* do not affe!t ea!h other with priiti@e for!e.

It was left to (os!o@i!h* -a? "aer argued pace 'ussell* to take up the!hallenge.

Stri!tl7 speaking* in a!!ordan!e with his onadologi!al point of @iew* no transission of for!e was iplied* ut rather a utualrelease of inherent a!ti@it7. (ut in spite of this reKe!tion of thetransuent !hara!ter of for!e* Leiniz5s ipa!t theor7 !ould eworked out !onsistentl7 onl7 on the assuption of e?tended

parti!les. The last resort* therefore* of Leiniz5s d7nai!s wasultiatel7 &u7gen5s e!hanis of e?tended atos* a theor7 that

is in!opatile with the !entral ideas of Leiniz5s onadolog7.The onl7 wa7 out of this ipasse was to reKe!t the idea of e?tended parti!les altogether and to !on!ei@e for!es asasso!iated with atheati!al points as their !enters* a!on!eption that naturall7 presupposes a!tion at a distan!e as theonl7 ode of d7nai! intera!tion. It was 'oger "oseph(os!o@i!h who ad@an!ed the real Leinizian theor7 of d7nai!s* although ultiatel7 . . . (os!o@i!h5s !on!ept of for!eis relational rather than d7nai!.)4

V. 2endelssohn8s Review: Spa%e1 Ti$e1 and 2otion

-endelssohn !orre!tl7 noti!ed that (os!o@i!h had pioneered a new!on!eption of otion in spa!e and tie. In parti!ular* (os!o@i!hde@eloped a d7nai! theor7 of tie atois.

&e presues that duration is !ontinuous in its su!!essionJ ea!hand e@er7 oent eing . . . !onsidered the !oon order

etween the prior and suseHuent ones. Thus* there !an e notwo oents that are nearest to ea!h other* i.e.* etween whi!hno a!tual duration* no a!tual su!!ession* !ould e said to e?istJas little are there two points in the atheati!al line* two pointsin the surfa!e* or two points in the od7* whi!h dire!tl7 tou!hea!h other* and whi!h are nearest ea!h other. Tie is*

)4 -. "aer* )oncepts o+ 7orce F,aridge* -ass.: 1B3* p. 1C.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 11>

!onseHuentl7* ne@er dis!rete ut rather all points ust e

!ontinuousJ !onseHuentl7* the departure of alterations ustne@er e interrupted ut rather at all points ust e !ontinuous.(e!ause* if the alterations were interrupted an7where at all* a

Kup would ha@e to ha@e o!!urred. Sin!e where Kups o!!ur*duration of the prior state would e a!tuall7 dis!rete fro theduration of the suseHuent oent* and oth orders For the lastoent of the prior and the first oent of the suseHuent

period would e the nearest to ea!h other* whi!h is asurd. Toa@oid this asurdit7* one ust allow that alterations are Kust as!onstant as tie.)/

(os!o@i!h suggested that instants in tie are d7nai! parti!les rather thanstati! tie atos or lengths of duration. Tie instants are liits* or

oundaries* not parts of tie inter@als. &e ade tie relati@e* or at leastrelational* without an asolute tiefrae. -otion in tie is generated 7o@erlapping inter@als* not tie points. -endelssohn sought to refute(os!o@i!h5s theor7 of tie Fand there7 that of spa!e 7 arguing that(os!o@i!h eHui@o!ated etween real and iaginar7 tie. &e egan withthe oser@ation that (os!o@i!h5s theor7 reHuired real tie. (os!o@i!h

wrote* $ot onl7 those who adit asolute spa!e* whi!h is of its ownreal nature !ontinuous* eternal [ iense* ut also those who*following Leiniz [ Des!artes* !onsider spa!e itself to e therelati@e arrangeent whi!h e?ists aongst things that e?ist* o@er and ao@e these e?istent thingsJ it sees to e* I sa7* that allust adit soe ode of e?isten!e that is real [ not iaginar7Jthrough whi!h the7 are where the7 are* [ this ode e?ists whenthe7 are there* [ perishes when the7 !ease to e where the7

were.)3

)/ -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* pp. 3B0>C. See also -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 39: In!ontinuous alteration* then* a definite state F >ustand otains at ea!hoent of tie* whi!h is different fro oth the pre!eding and thesuseHuent oent. %nd as ea!h oent a7 e regarded as thetransition fro the pre!eding into the suseHuent oent* so -ister (os!o@i!h @iews the state that otains at ea!h oent erel7 as the!oon order etween the prior and the suseHuent agnitude.

)3 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1B.



11 Pli 1/ F)CC4

These two su!h odes are for the where and when of a point* as

-endelssohn e?pressed it. The author ga@e to e@er7 for!e0point these twoa!tuall7 e?isting odes* whi!h are real spa!e and tieJ the ere possiilit7 of these odes !onstitutes imaginary spa!e and tie.

Then he gi@es to ea!h and e@er7 point two series of su!ha!tuall7 e?isting odes F 1odis* and these* !onseHuentl7*!oprise real spa!e and real tie.)> . . . Ahen one thinks theere possiilit7 of these odes* then one has ept7 spa!e andept7 tie* if we a7 e?press it this wa7* or iaginar7 spa!eand iaginar7 tie.)

-endelssohn !orre!tl7 Huoted (os!o@i!h as sa7ing* These se@eral realodes are produ!ed [ perish* and are in 7 opinion Huite indi@isile* non0e?tended* io@ale [ un@ar7ing in their order.)9 Then -endelssohndeli@ered his refutation of the theor7.

In the tin7 inter@al etween points there e?ists a possile spa!e*in whi!h we !an iagine the possiilit7 of e@er ore points*whi!h could find their odes etween the original points. -ister (os!o@i!h would pro@e that this possile or iaginar7 spa!e e!ontinuous* infinite* eternal and ne!essar7* although real spa!e

does not otain all these properties. &e finall7 rings to ear ontie also e@er7thing he has said aout spa!e. I do not knowwhat to ake of this ere possiilit7* whi!h is also nonethelessaintained to e real. (etween points there is an inter@al* thisinter@al is real* ut it is nothing other than a possile spa!e. Do7ou see the error upon whi!h the father has ased his action at adistance &e had to !on!ede ept7 spa!e* then ade it ane!essit7 of his h7pothesis`and a @irtue of ne!essit7 at that.

$onetheless* he did not wish to !onsider this spa!e* like that of

the $ewtonians* as a real* e?tended* indi@isile and eternalthing. Therefore he ade a ere possiilit7 out of it* and indeeda possiilit7 that ust either e?ist or its points ha@e no inter@alsand ust* 7 his own h7pothesis* !openetrate. In order to keephis s7ste fro sinking* he thus allows this o@ious!ontradi!tion to stand.)B

)> -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 9>.) -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 9.)9 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1B.

)B -. -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 9.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 119

-endelssohn5s refutation does not work e!ause it !ontained

isunderstandings of (os!o@i!h5s theor7* although* in all fairness*(os!o@i!h5s ideas were in turn !ople? and os!ure. So let us la7 theout properl7.

(os!o@i!h distinguished etween real and iaginar7 tie. (7 the real *he eant ph7si!al points and inter@als. These points and inter@als !onsistof for!e. %nd for hi there is alwa7s a finite nuer of points andinter@als in the uni@erse. These points are indi@isile and endowed withrepulsi@e power and inertia. Inter@als arise fro relations etween points.or!e* not e?tended atter* fills up the uni@erse. The real eans su!h

points and inter@als as a!tuall7 found in nature. 'eal points are notinfinitel7 indi@isile* ut inter@als possess an infinite insertiilit7* or infinite !oponiilit7* of additional points. Ahen (os!o@i!h spoke of real

points and inter@als* he eant ph7si!al for!e points* not atheati!al points. (7 the imaginary* he eant points and inter@als as !on!ei@ed ingeoetri!* atheati!al reasoning. Iaginar7 spa!e and tie are fors of intuition* for hi. The7 are ept7 of an7 for!e. Ahereas there are not

perfe!t points* lines* or surfa!es in nature* geoetri! points* lines* andsurfa!es are perfe!t. %s su!h* iaginar7 points and inter@als are potentiall7

infinitel7 di@isile* and there is a potentiall7 infinite nuer of the.-atheati!al spa!e and tie* are !onstru!ted out of !ontinuous points* areinfinite in e?tension* and are !ontinuus. Iaginar7 points possess nofor!e of repulsion or inertia.

Aell efore =ant* (os!o@i!h distinguished spa!e and tie as the7 arein thesel@es and as we know the. Ae !annot know tie and spa!ein thesel@es* he asserted. Aere real relations to !hange* and 7et produ!ethe sae idea* we would noti!e no !hange. Tie and spa!e as we knowthe are e?perien!ed as !ontinuous* di@isile* and so on* 7et it is the !rude

threshold of the senses that a!!ounts for this ipression. 'ather thaneHui@o!ating and winding up in !ontradi!tion* (os!o@i!h was o@ingtoward his own @ersion of !riti!al philosoph7.4C -endelssohn reainedwithin a Leinizian* pre0!riti!al @iew of tie and spa!e. 'ussell5soser@ation that Leiniz5s !onfusions !ould e tra!ed a!k to aninsuffi!ient understanding of suKe!ti@e spa!e41 rings true for Leiniz5sfollower -endelssohn.

4C (os!o@i!h ga@e his !learest response to a !riti!is siilar to -endelssohn5s atTheoria %rti!le 4).

41 'ussell* lo!. !it.* p. BB.



11B Pli 1/ F)CC4

-endelssohn !riti!ized (os!o@i!h for !onsidering geoetr7 as

iaginar7. &ere -ister (os!o@i!h goes further than e@en the Leibni(ians.&e would @er7 gladl7 hold the opinion that the entirety o+ geometry restsmerely in the imagination.4) This is eas7 to deonstrateJ (os!o@i!h5sTheoria reads: &en!e the whole of geoetr7 is iaginar7J ut theh7potheti!al propositions that are dedu!ed fro it are true* if the!onditions assued 7 it e?ist* [ also the !onditional things dedu!ed frothe* in e@er7 !ase . . ..44 This eans onl7 that -endelssohn reainedwithin a realist notion of geoetr7* while (os!o@i!h looked e7ondEu!lidean geoetr7* soething =ant hiself did not do.

urther* -endelssohn isunderstood (os!o@i!h to !onsider tie as a!ontinuu. (os!o@i!h repeatedl7 said otion is the onl7 !ontinuu* and itis pre!isel7 otion that -endelssohn isunderstood. Theseisinterpretations in@alidated -endelssohn5s refutation. #ut of fairness to-endelssohn* though* these isunderstandings of (os!o@i!h are repeatede@en toda7.

VI. 2endelssohn8s Review: Testi$on0 of the Senses

(os!o@i!h5s entire theor7 deanded a radi!al departure fro thetestion7 of the senses. 'eferring to (os!o@i!hs Theoria* L.L. Ah7te!oented* I Koin $ietzs!he in holding it to e the greatest triuph o@er the senses that has 7et een a!hie@ed on earth.

Diaetri!all7 opposed to (os!o@i!h* -endelssohn took the testion7of the senses as foundational. -endelssohn was not an original thinker ut

preferred to proote a !oon sense* or popular* philosoph7 fro@arious sour!es. &e did not sipl7 defer to the @o? populiJ rather* his

popular philosoph7 defended philosoph7 and natural religion as the eansto huan happiness. %struse etaph7si!al issues were Kudged 7 their ethi!al* philanthropi!* or huanitarian ipli!ations.

#ne !onseHuen!e of -endelssohn5s !oon sense episteolog7 wasthat atter ust e !onsidered as e?tended and ipenetraleJ this is thewa7 it appears to huan sensation and understanding. &uan a!tion

4) -. -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 9).44 Theoria philosophiae naturalis$ N4>B first and se!ond editions: N4/ third

edition.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 1)C

reHuires that we think of aterial oKe!ts as e?tended* and thus of their

eleental parti!les. Throughout his re@iew* -endelssohn !hastised(os!o@i!h for !ontradi!ting the reHuireents of huan understanding anda!tion. Letter 33 egan 7 ephasizing that the (os!o@i!hian s7steopposed the senses in !onsidering e?tension* ipenetrailit7* along withan7 other properties of atter* as ere illusions* the real grounds of whi!h are points eanating for!e. E@en heat and !old* !olors* and othersare a!!ounted for 7 this h7pothesis. &is unseen* unfelt world of for!e

points defied the !oon sense of the (erlin re@iewer* espe!iall7 the!onstru!tion of e?tension out of une?tended points. That e?tension itself isan illusionJ su!h a elief would* of !ourse* underine the realist world@iew

ased on the fi@e senses. Solidit7 and ipenetrailit7 would e likewise anillusion* spa!e itself eing onl7 iaginar7. These triuphs o@er epiri!ale@iden!e were ought with the !urren!7 of action at a distance, in there@iewer5s e7es.

-endelssohn reKe!ted the entire (os!o@i!hian re@olution: not onl7 didaction at a distance pose an insolule !ontradi!tion for the "esuit froDalatia* ut* This is the general fate of his h7pothesesQ The7 seldodire!tl7 !onfront $ature in a pre!ise fashion* !onseHuentl7 one is led

astra7 fro tie to tie to do daage to the first and ost se!ure!on!epts in order not to relinHuish the h7potheses.4/ %nd so it sees thatthe de!isi@e oKe!tion to (os!o@i!h la7 in his opposition to the senses andwhat the7 tell us of $ature. The senses testif7 to solidit7 andipenetrailit7 of odies* dire!t !onta!t* e?tension* and aterial propertieslike heat* !olor* and so on. Ahereas for!e points operating in a!!ord withthe (os!o@i!h ,ur@e possess none of these Hualities. 'ather than followthe strange and idios7n!rati! Dalatian natural philosopher into asupersensile @iew of the world as for!e points strewn a!ross a @a!uu*-endelssohn prooted the Leinizian world@iew era!ed 7 a largesegent of the udding Geran national !ulture.

%nother !ase in point e?eplifies the !onfli!t etween author andre@iewer: the shape of Earth. 8uoting -e 7igure Telluris* -endelssohndeonstrated (os!o@i!h elie@ed that the shape of Earth is not deterined

7 the surfa!es of the atos !oposing it* and that the shape of Earth is!onstantl7 under sutle !hange. (os!o@i!h wrote*

This surfa!e of Earth* whi!h the o!eans* ri@ers* ountains and@alle7s order* is not onl7* at least in our @iew* irregular* ut

4/ -. -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 9.



1)1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

also dis!ontinuous* e!ause it alters with e@er7 sallest otion

of the fi?ed and fluid parts. $or has the Huestion e@er een thatof a Opre!iseP shape of Earth. #ther !ertain regular shapes ha@e een assued for it* whi!h ost !losel7 appro?iate itJ oneiagined that the ountain and hills were le@eled and @alle7swere filled in. %lso* this !on!ept of a shape of Earth alone isflu!tuating and indefinite* e!ause so an7 infinite regular !ur@es a7 e drawn through a parti!ular nuer of gi@en

points. Siilarl7* infinitel7 an7 !ur@ed surfa!es a7 e drawnaround the Earth* that the7 either tou!h ountains and hills at!ertain points or !ut a!ross the in su!h a wa7 that inner spa!esare filled in with atter !ontained outside the surfa!e* and allthese surfa!es a7 e regular. Therefore* there are infinitel7an7 surfa!es that eet the !riterion.43

To whi!h -endelssohn !oented* I !annot iagine how as astute aatheati!ian as (os!o@i!h undoutedl7 is* should ha@e forgotten that asallest Osurfa!eP ust e?ist* and that doutless these surfa!es are theHuestion when we seek to deterine the shape of Earth.4> The onl7

possile wa7 to atheati!all7 deterine the shape of Earth* he stated* is

to !onsider the surfa!es of the sallest parti!les of atter.&ere we see a draati! use of the iagination ased on a!ros!opi!oKe!ts for i!ros!opi! oKe!ts. %n ato was taken to e a sall parti!leof EarthJ an ato was ut a sallest !lup of Earth. +re!isel7 thisanalog7 is!onstrued an ato* a!!ording to (os!o@i!hJ atos arediensionless points of for!e* not at all sall la!k dots with easuralear!s or surfa!es. Ae sipl7 !annot use iagination in dedu!ing the

properties of sallest parti!les. -endelssohn !hose the !lup odel of anato and thus deterined the shape of Earth in his wa7. (os!o@i!h* of

!ourse* deterined Earth5s shape in another* e!ause he did not believe particles to have sur+aces at all . In fa!t* (os!o@i!h5s freHuent retort thatthe Leinizians iagine eleentar7 parti!les as dots with parts* rather thanas points without parts* is @erified here in -endelssohn5s !ase.

&ere I would ake three rearks against -endelssohn. irst* thearguent that the parts of a whole ust ha@e the sae !hara!teristi!s asthe whole itself is a glaring e?aple of the +allacy o+ division. Se!ond* his!hara!terization again presues that (os!o@i!h would a!!ount for

43 8uoted at -. -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* pp. 9CM91.

4> -. -endelssohn* lo!. !it.* p. 91.



1)4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

@i!iousl7 !ir!ular arguent* for -ister (os!o@i!h* all that follows fro

$ewton5s prin!iple is this: that the eHualit7 of a!tion and rea!tion alsoo!!urs in asses* that is* in a @ast nuer of points.

-endelssohn5s Letter 3/ FSepteer 14* 13B atta!ked (os!o@i!h5sideas aout the penetrailit7 of atterJ this issue has een !entral for u!hof the dis!ussion surrounding the Theoria* fro its appearan!e to !urrentties. -endelssohn as!ried to (os!o@i!h the elief that an oKe!t*tra@elling fast enough* would penetrate another od7 without atoi!!ollisions and !onseHuentl7 would lea@e no hole in the penetrated od7.This was allegedl7 how (os!o@i!h e?plained light5s penetration of odies.

The re@iewer then !opared this notion of penetrailit7 of atter to elief in ghosts passing through walls. &e granted that all philosophi!al s7stes!ontain ideas that ring irrational when taken fro !onte?t. -endelssohn*howe@er* argued that the world is too sall for (os!o@i!h5s theor7* and sohe went outside of it for soe of his e?planations.

-endelssohn5s oKe!tions to (os!o@i!h5s e!hani!s are espe!iall7weak. irst* -endelssohn dis!arded a full7 te!hni!al treatent of e!hani!s and aused (os!o@i!h for not doing the sae. et*-endelssohn hiself ga@e a des!ription of the (os!o@i!h ,ur@e to his

readersJ in!luding an illustration of it would surel7 ha@e helped ore thanhared readers. Se!ond* (os!o@i!h did not erel7 rein@ent $ewton5stheor7J his parti!les had repulsi@e* not attra!ti@e* for!es at indefinitel7sall distan!es. This differen!e had an7 ad@antageous raifi!ations for (os!o@i!h. Third* -endelssohn* like so an7 others* isunderstood(os!o@i!h on the nature of light. +riestle7 set the tone for re!eption of (os!o@i!h and his ideas in Great (ritain of the 1Cs 7 !oending hi

pre!isel7 on this point* and as a !ontrast to the (ritish re!eption* Letter 3/is espe!iall7 interesting. Though (os!o@i!h in 1>4 was wrong aout light*

he had a ore profound idea than -endelssohn ga@e hi !redit for. &eheld that due to the in!redile speed of light* the repulsi@e for!e of parti!les approa!hed 7 light would approa!h an infinite agnitude. Thiseant that light would a!hie@e a @irtual penetrailit7 of atter* thoughlight parti!les would still not a!hie@e dire!t !onta!t with other parti!les. If a ass* su!h as a !annonall* were to a!hie@e the speed of light* then it*too* would attain @irtual penetrailit7 of atter. (ut then again* su!h aass would also transfor into a @er7 tenuous efflu@iu* whi!h is how(os!o@i!h !hara!terized light./C Sin!e spirit is iaterial* ph7si!al points

/C '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1>>.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 1)/

of for!e would not e?ert a repulsi@e for!e of an7 agnitude against itJ thus*

spirit !an trul7 penetrate atter. In 7 opinion* (os!o@i!h5s greattheoreti!al weakness was not an issue of e!hani!s* ut rather that he hadto a!!ept a radi!al ,artesian dualis in order to retain an7 theologi!alnotion of spirit and God.

VIII. 2endelssohn8s Review: Theologi%al Iss#es

-endelssohn held that two notions the fatherhood of God and

iortalit7 of the soul`were !ru!ial for huan well eing. These werenotions he was unwilling to relinHuish at an7 !ost. The pre0estalishedharon7 of the uni@erse* Leiniz5s onadolog7* and the notion that thea!tual world is the est of all possile worlds were further ideas he!onsidered foundational. These Leinizian notions* he elie@ed* !oported

perfe!tl7 with his own tradition of "udais. or -endelssohn* the higheststandard of truth was health7 huan understanding* not dogatis.,oon sense pro@ed to e whate@er ga@e light and life to huanunderstanding. E@er7thing un!oon* e?traordinar7* disordered* or

os!ure was in!orre!t and a !orrupting influen!e. ,lear* enlighteningnotions ore in thesel@es the seal of truth. $ot onl7 the ontologi!al proof of God5s e?isten!e Hualified as truth ut also "ohn Lo!ke5s epiri!is.Spe!ulation had to eplo7 huan understanding as its !opass. %theis*he firl7 elie@ed* !ould onl7 lead to huan unhappiness and so ust efalse.

(os!o@i!h elie@ed in the e?isten!e of God and the iortalit7 of thesoul. &e was a de@out "esuit ut one who separated his s!ien!e fro!hur!h dogas and who followed s!ien!e e@en when it @iolated the.

Ahat the re@iewer -endelssohn saw* to his horror* was that* 7 tworelati@el7 inor !hanges to the Theoria* the author5s theor7 !ould dowithout the e?isten!e of God altogether as an e?planator7 h7pothesis. Inthe Theoria* God e?isted onl7 in an untenale dualis etween the worldof for!e and the (eing e?ternal to for!e. -endelssohn also saw that indswould suffer the sae fate. If !enters of for!e were also !enters of !onation and !ognition* then there would e no use for the notion of indas a sustan!e separate fro atter. (oth atter and ind Falong withGod would e super!eded as intelligile h7potheses* the world eing



1)3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

!on!ei@ale entirel7 as for!e0points strewn a!ross @oids a!ting in pairs in

an os!illating anner a!!ording to the in@erse of the distan!e sHuared.urther* (os!o@i!h5s notion of God did not !hoose the est of all

possile worlds* e!ause there is no su!h world. 'ather* God* as theInfinite Deterinator* !hose the world ased on a law of for!e that

pre@ented eternal re!urren!e. or* if point0parti!les !ould return to thee?a!t sae position in spa!e as o!!upied pre@iousl7* the world wouldoperate o@er enorous !7!les of tie a!!ording to eternal repetition of aself0sae uni@erse. (os!o@i!h did not elie@e in pre0estalished haron7Jthe world is a swirling flow of relations etween for!e0points.

-endelssohn5s !on!lusion on these issues is !orre!t aleit for thewrong reasons. (os!o@i!h5s theor7 did not perit an7 o!!ult e?planationsJthus the deterinations of God should not e peritted to e?plain how theuni@erse a@oids eternal re!urren!e of a self0operating s7ste of nature.F$or did his theor7 perit a!tual infinities in nature/1J thus his arguentthat a point !an ne@er return to a prior point due to the infinite!oponiilit7 of spa!e !annot e allowed. God ser@ed no @ital purposefro a s!ientifi! perspe!ti@e. In soe passages (os!o@i!h suggested that if for!e points were endowed with will and !ognition* there would e

possile soe third thing* neither ind nor atter./)

(os!o@i!h5sdualis was indeed untenale and a glaringl7 regressi@e aspe!t of hiss7ste: with it* we are left with a world of swirling for!es* neither indnor atter* re!urring eternall7. %lthough the !onteporar7 Geran puli!took his refutation as de!isi@e* -endelssohn5s popular philosoph7 did notstand the test of tie* lea@ing a ni!he for (os!o@i!h in Geran7* after all.

I. ,inal (ote

-endelssohn5s negati@e re@iew of the Theoria did not go un!hallenged.%n anon7ous author defended (os!o@i!h in !nmerungen Hber den

!us(ug, and die =riti eines berlinisches .errn &ecensenten das 0oscovischische 'ystem betre++end F'earks on the Suar7 and,ritiHue 7 a (erlin 'e@iewer of the (os!o@i!hian S7ste. It was

pulished 7 the 'o7al Iperial $ear0%ustrian ,ollege at reiurg as a

/1 '.". (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. 1).

/) '.L. (os!o@i!h* lo!. !it.* p. >/.



G'EG A&ITL#,= 1)>

aster5s degree thesis in philosoph7 in %ugust 1). This work is no

longer e?tant* with the e?!eption of its introdu!tor7 paragraph:% !ertain gentlean fro (erlin has @entured to suarize and!riti!ize (os!o@i!h5s work. I lea@e it to the puli! to de!ide howwell ea!h su!!eeds. &ere I suppl7 oth this Osuar7P and thatO!ritiHueP as the7 were inserted in 0rie+e, die neueste Litteratur betre++end$ I sipl7 add rearks thereto whi!h see to eappropriate to !larif7 os!ure attersJ to fill in* wherene!essar7* what has een left outJ to dis!uss in detail what has

een poorl7 understoodJ and to a!!use the !ritiHue* whi!h is so

often unfounded* of its fairness. In general it sees to e usefulto e!oe failiar with the s7ste in its original language* e!ause there a7 e douts raised 7 reading it in the Latin./4

The !ertain gentlean fro (erlin was -endelssohn* of !ourse.FThough the re@iew letters were surreptitiousl7 anon7ous* the one atissue was signed unaiguousl7 with the initial -. This paragraph tellsus that -endelssohn5s entire re@iew F)9 pages was reprinted in the thesisand that a detailed* !riti!al anal7sis of it was gi@en* in!luding referen!e tothe original Latin.// This re@elation is iportant e!ause the %nerkungen*

a !op7 of whi!h was possessed 7 the (asle Uni@ersit7 Lirar7* e!ae a!ru!ial resour!e for the 7oung professor riedri!h $ietzs!he a !entur7 later in 194. In fa!t* the Tie %tois ragent of 194 is $ietzs!he5snotes fro his reading of (os!o@i!h5s Theoria* the asters thesis* and* 7ipli!ation* -endelssohn5s re@iew. The os!urities* isunderstandings*and oissions !orre!ted 7 the anon7ous asters !andidate* olstered

$ietzs!he5s e@aluation of (os!o@i!h in 0eyond <ood and Evil * when hesought to rehailitate (os!o@i!h5s reputation in Geran7. The elatedattepted res!ue of a a@eri!k s!ientist 7 a a@eri!k philosopher did not

su!!eed in Geran7* though* e@en within $ietzs!he5s !losest !ir!les./3

/4 -. -endelssohn* <esammelte 'chri+ten ;ol. ))* pp. )BM4C.// The anon7ous re@iew was itself re@iewed four 7ears later 7 "ohann %ugust

Eerhard in 'ezension zu den %nerkungen^* in -ie !llgemeine deutsche 0ibliothe, %nhang zu 14M)/ (nde. %teilung I F1>* p. 3)>f.

/3 See G. Ahitlo!k* 'oger "oseph (os!o@i!h* (enedi!t de Spinoza and riedri!h

$ietzs!he* in Giet(sche"'tudien F1BB>* pp. )CCM))C.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 1)013/

'n Rh0th$1 Resonan%e and Distortion

"),R )R)C)G=

-an is a rope stret!hed etween the anial and the Superan M a rope o@er an a7ss...Ahat is great in an is that he is a ridgeand not a goal: what is lo@ale in an is that he is atransition...Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

The Ta!oa $arrows (ridge* whi!h spanned a length of oneile o@er the Ta!oa $arrows in (reerton* Aashington* wasni!knaed the Galloping Gertie e!ause of its !onstant ro!kingand twisting in the wind. These os!illations e!ae so great thaton $o@eer * 1B/C* a support !ale near the iddle of the

ridge snapped* !ausing the entire stru!ture to !rash into theri@er elow.

E.

That to think* to speak and to write aout rh7th reHuires and does notreHuire rh7th at the sae tie !an e otained fro a line of thought that

ais to preser@e its unthought* not as soething that !an e thought or written or spoken aout ut as that whi!h akes one aware of the asent presen!e of the unthought* as soething* or perhaps as the unheard.1

1 ,on!erning the Huestion of the unthought* parti!ularl7* in &eidegger* I wouldlike to a!knowledge 7 det to La!oue0Laarthes essa7s #literation and%po!r7phal $ietzs!he* FLa!oue0Laarthe* +.* The 'ubject o+ Philosophy*Uni@ersit7 of -innesota +ress* -inneapolis: 1BB4 and to his work in general.&owe@er* the wa7 I approa!h %gaens works in this essa7 should e seen asintending to foreground a new !on!ept of resonan!e 7 wa7 of in@entingstrategies to disappropriate the unheard* proKe!ted as that whi!h !an e

e?perien!ed in a relationship to ousia in %gaen.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 1)9

et how one approa!hes this ter also deterines the eaningFs

asso!iated with this ter. ,an we understand rh7th Is it possile tounderstand rh7th as such If it is possile* then how urtherore* wh7should we understand rh7th

,an we hear the rh7th

#ne possile wa7 of understanding rh7th !an e found in a traditionalappropriation of the word. 'h7th: di@ision of a supposed !ontinuu intointer@als* an attept at teporalisation et* that whi!h is known as a!ontinuu of tie is a !ontinuu onl7 when tie is !on!eptualised as asu!!ession of points M rh7th !an thus e !on!eptualised as a di@ision of a

!ontinuu of tie into inter@als onl7 when tie is ade of points 0 of what #f the e?perien!e of the one who e?perien!es it et* does rhythmha@e a suKe!t Does the subject ha@e a rh7th Is it possile to approa!hrh7th without appropriation Is it possile to forulate a !on!ept of rh7th without falling into the deterinations of an episteolog7 of suKe!t Is it possile to !onsider the heard and the unheard of rh7thwithout etra7ing the

-.

Getting into resonan!e with these preliinar7 Huestions* this essa7 finds its point of departure in two essa7s written 7 G. %gaen* entitled* +oiesisand +ra?is and The #riginal Stru!ture of the Aork of %rt.) The latter opens with the following senten!es:

E@er7thing is rh7th* the entire destin7 of an is one hea@enl7rh7th* Kust as e@er7 work of art is one rh7th* and e@er7thingswings fro the poetizing lips of the god. This stateent wasnot passed down to us 7 &clderlin5s own hand. It is fro a

period of his life 0 19C019/4 0 that we usuall7 define as the7ears of his insanit7. The words that !opose it weretrans!ried 7 a @isitor5s s7patheti! hand fro the in!oherentspee!h that he uttered in his roo in the house of the !arpenter Zier.4

) (oth in!luded in %gaen* G.* The 1an without )ontent * Stanford Uni@ersit7+ress* Stanford* ,alifornia:1BBB

4 %gaen* p. B/.



1)B Pli 1/ F)CC4

irst of all* one of 7 ais in this paper is to draw attention to a !ertain

reading of &clderlin5s Huite often !ited paragraph on rh7th with theintention of foregrounding in %gaen the pri@ilege !on!luded fro thisHuotation. That is* a !ertain pri@ilege that ight e taken here as!orresponding to an authenti! e?perien!e of rh7thJ or* perhaps* to an ear that hears the unheardJ or* perhaps* to a suKe!t M soething ore than asuKe!t that takes the step e7ond* that is indi!ated 7 a oent of

!u+hebung .

&owe@er* I elie@e that this pri@ilege !annot e ade !lear withoutfollowing %gaen5s route Fa route that not onl7 tra@erses possiilities ut

also produ!es truths towards a forulation of an original stru!ture of thework of art at the !ost of an e?!lusion and* at the sae tie* of anin!lusion of the unheard as that whi!h !an e e?perien!ed and that* Ithink* finds its point of departure in a negation* though it passes itself off as an affiration of the unthought. %s $ietzs!he showed us tie andagain* this is an affiration in whi!h is hidden a negation. #r* etter* this isa o@e of !u+hebung * in whi!h a negation is ele@ated to the le@el of affiration. Therefore* 7 ain !on!ern in this paper will e to read%gaen5s essa7 with the intention of affiring an affiration* that is*

keeping su!h oppositions as the thought and the unthought* the heard andthe unheard* the ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos as eredifferen!es 7 wa7 of arti!ulating a different approa!h to rh7th. -7se!ond !on!ern will e to distinguish the &eideggerian o@e in%gaen5s handling of &clderlin5s !lai and thus to throw light on theao@e entioned negation. Therefore 7 guiding Huestion will e: is therea possile wa7 of de@eloping a relationship etween ruqmoz (rhuthosand ariqmoz Farithos 7 keeping these ters as differential units andthus* in a doule o@e* rh7thising non0rh7th and non0rh7thisingrh7th

4.

In his essa7* +oiesis and +ra?is* tra!ing et7ologi!all7 the Foriginaleaning of poiesis* praxis and wor * %gaen la7s are the histori!ale@olution that these words went through in Aestern thought. %!!ording to%gaen the Fhistor7 0 for this is a stor7 of a fall 0 of these words is as

follows: poiesis in tie is !onKoined with praxis onl7 to e susued



Z%E' %'%,%G= 14C

under the general !on!ept of wor . ro 'oan ties onwards* wor

started to signif7 produ!tion with the sole ai of putting into action,whereas forerl7 these three represented different reals in their relationship to liit. Thus* ringing into presen!e whi!h was the ain!on!ern of art F poiesis in the eginning was repla!ed 7 an aestheti!

produ!tion of works F praxis and a !on!ern for prin!iples that !onstituteart as an aestheti! real.

or %gaen* it was in $ietzs!he that the ultiate unit7 of poiesis and praxis !ulinated into will to power. If the will that onl7 wills itself represented this e@olution* then a will that is willed 7 opening itself to an

appli!ation of eing to e!oing is what $ietzs!he introdu!ed intoetaph7si!al tradition. Therefore* $ietzs!hes thought was a thought of art./

If our intention is to approa!h these preliinar7 !on!lusions aout theissue of poiesis and praxis* we should e ale to lo!ate the atter in a

roader !onte?t: that is* in the Huestion of appli!ailit7 of the thought of eing to e!oing* in the Huestion of asso!iations the word will hasin $ietzs!he* and also in the u!h roader !onte?t of the Huestion of negation and affiration in $ietzs!he.

These three points e!oe espe!iall7 iportant when* for e?aple* one!onsiders %gaens other essa7* The #riginal Stru!ture of the Aork of %rt* where one oser@es that* in the forer essa7* the transforation of the whole of life into art and the artists will to power is u!h related tothe original stru!ture of the work of art whi!h %gaen dete!ts in theopposition of ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos. or if the

poiesis essa7 !an e seen as an attept to draw a pi!ture of the fall of poiesis into will to power* the se!ond essa7 tra!es the possiilit7 0 7 a!ertain reading of the Huotation fro &clderlin 0 of restoring poiesis to its

original status 7 eans of foregrounding the unheard as that whi!h !an eheard within the oppositional stru!ture of ruqmoz (rhuthos andariqmoz Farithos.

To start with* to e resonating with $ietzs!he proal7 aplifies those@irations of thought that* genealogi!all7 speaking* put forward thought asa differen!e of for!es* instead of the traditional wa7 of putting it intoopposition to praxis$ If the $ietzs!hean !riti!is of &egel M the !ritiHueof !u+hebung M should e pursued in the nae of a !ritiHue of &egelian

/ %gaen* p.93.



141 Pli 1/ F)CC4

transgression of liit* then one should first de!onstru!t the opposition of

the thought to the unthought* or the heard to the the unheard*whi!h is eodied in %gaen as the opposition etween poiesis and praxis or* etween ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos. Su!h ade!onstru!tion also pro@ides one with a reading of $ietzs!hean will not asan appli!ation of eing to e!oing ut as !oprising differentialunits* or rather* as less being of e!oing than eing of becoming .

Sin!e La!oue0Laarthe5s essa7s %po!r7phal $ietzs!he and#literation3* we ha@e learned too well the &eideggerean approa!h to

$ietzs!he that oliterated $ietzs!he 7 wa7 of an &egelian o@e

Fthough u!h !riti!ised and thought as surpassed 7 &eidegger hiself asa result of his step0a!k anoeu@re. I propose at this point that asiilar o@e !an e dete!ted in %gaen5s approa!h to $ietzs!he 7 wa7of his !riti!is of will that leads hi to a !on!eptualisation of ruqmoz

(rhuthos as an authenti! e?perien!e. Aithout dout* it does not eanthat %gaen oliterates $ietzs!he ut he* in a !ertain wa7* reads

$ietzs!he as if !ertain truths !an e otained fro hi 0 this is a suKe!t towhi!h I will return later as the ain thee of oth 7 essa7 and%gaens: resonan!e.

%s %gaen puts it:Ae are so a!!ustoed to this unified understanding of all ansdoing as praxis that we do not re!ognize that it !ould e* andin other eras has een* !on!ei@ed differentl7. The Greeks* towho we owe all the !ategories through whi!h we Kudgeoursel@es and realit7 around us* ade a !lear distin!tion

etween poiesis F poiein* to produ!e in the sense of ringinginto eing and praxis F prattein* to do in the sense of a!ting.%s we shall see* !entral to praxis was the idea of the will that

finds its iediate e?pression in an a!t* while* 7 !ontrast*!entral to poiesis was the e?perien!e of pro0du!tion into

presen!e* the fa!t that soething passed fro noneing to eing*fro !on!ealent into the light of the work. The essential!hara!ter of poiesis was not its aspe!t as a pra!ti!al and@oluntar7 pro!ess ut its eing a ode of truth understood asun@eiling* as aletheia.>

3 (oth in!luded inLa!oue0Laarthe* +.* The 'ubject o+ Philosophy* Uni@ersit7 of -innesota +ress* -inneapolis: 1BB4.

> %gaen* pp. >90>B.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 14)

In relation to these definitions of poiesis and praxis* the !ategor7 of

work was understood 7 the Greeks as that whi!h pertains to iologi!alne!essit7. %!!ording to %gaen* these distin!tions etween poiesis* praxis and wor ha@e een os!ured in tie as a result of a tenden!7 that prioritised @oluntar7 produ!tion of an effe!t ao@e all.

Ahen this pro!ess is !opleted in the odern era* e@er7 !han!eto distinguish etween poiesis and praxis* pro0du!tion anda!tion* is lost. -ans doing is deterined as an a!ti@it7

produ!ing a real effe!t* whose worth is appre!iated with respe!tto the will that is e?pressed in it* that is* with respe!t to its

!reati@it7 and freedo. F... In ters of the work of art* thiseans the ephasis shifts awa7 fro what the Greeks!onsidered the essen!e of the work 0 the fa!t that in it soething

passed fro noneing into eing* thus opening the spa!e of truthand uilding a world for ans dwelling on earth 0 and to theoperari of the artist* that is* to the !reati@e genius and the

parti!ular !hara!teristi!s of the artisti! pro!ess in whi!h it findse?pression.

The ost o@ious distin!tion etween poiesis and praxis* as !an e

oser@ed ao@e* is that for poiesis* there need not e soething a!tualisedthat !an e represented either in the for of a work or an art work. Inother words* that whi!h un@eils itself ight or ight not find eodientin an artwork* for what pre!isel7 distinguishes it fro praxis is the la!k of the will of the artist in poiesis and the will of the artist in praxis as@oluntar7 produ!tion of an effe!t* that is* the a!ti@e will of the artist torepresent this e?perien!e in an artwork. ,onseHuentl7* if* after thisde@elopent* one !an talk aout the parti!ular !hara!teristi!s of theartisti! pro!ess* then there is a ore !on@enient wa7 of defining it:

aestheti!s.or %gaen* all Aestern thought 0 asi!all7 etaph7si!al M !an eseen as a series of attepts to trans!end aestheti!s and to gi@e a newstatus to artisti! pro0du!tion Owhi!hP ha@e started fro the lurring of thedistin!tion etween poiesis and praxis* that is fro the interpretation of artas a ode of praxis and of the praxis as the e?pression of a will and a!reati@e for!e.9 $o@alis* $ietzs!he* %rtaud* and the Situationists*therefore* attepted in @ain to posit the essen!e of huan a!ti@it7 as will

%gaen* p.C.

9 %gaen* p.1.



144 Pli 1/ F)CC4

and @ital ipulseB e!ause what the7 stri@ed for was in fa!t a forgetting

of the original pro0du!ti@e status of the work of art as foundation of thespa!e of truth.1C

In the rest of the essa7 %gaen elaorates the distin!tions etween poiesis and praxis on the asis of liit and will. If poiesis has its liitoutside itself and is not deterined 7 an end or 7 an a!t of produ!tion*

praxis is what has its liit within itself and is* therefore* what isdeterined 7 an a!t of produ!tion in opposition to ringing into presen!e.urtherore* the final and the ost !ru!ial distin!tion etween the two liesin praxis relation to will: that an is !apale of praxis eans that an

wills his a!tion and* willing it* goes through it to its liit. Praxis is going through to the limit o+ the action, while moved by will J it is willeda!tion.11

$ow if we !ould su up all those distin!tions that went into thestru!turing of poiesis and praxis as oppositional ters* perhaps we !ouldfinish this essa7 at an7 oentJ 7et the fa!t that one !an ne@er produ!e asu total of su!h distin!tions is what raises soe Huestions aout thetruth of oth this essa7 and %gaen5s. Aithout dout* it is theine?haustiilit7 of su!h distin!tions that oth !onstru!ts and de!onstru!ts

su!h oppositions etween tersJ 7et there is alwa7s a point* where* 7eans of an appro?iation* a !on!rete opposition is produ!ed in phenoenolog7: poiesis or praxis %s long as thought pro!eeds with inar7 oppositions* it is ine@itale that one will e !aught 0 ost of thetie 7 an un!ons!ious a!t* or 7 sipl7 a@oiding it M !rossing the ridge.Then there arises a serious Huestion aout this ine?haustailit7: should one

prefer to !ross the ridge #r* should one prefer to preser@e an alread70there a7ss as an a7ss Is appro?iation una@oidale

Aithout produ!ing truths* ut rather* 7 looking at the origin of @alues

and @alues of origin* or* etter* pro!eeding genealogi!all7* !an one e?plainthis a7ss 7 wa7 of a !on!ept of resonan!e (7 resonan!e* I ean notthe general di!tionar7 of the ter 0 'esonan!e: sound produ!ed or in!reased in one od7 7 sound wa@es fro another^* ut resonan!e on

oth sides of a order that gi@es wa7 to a distorted rh7th on the @er7 lineF that sees to !onstitute the order.

B %gaen* p.).1C %gaen* p.1.

11 %gaen* p.3.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 14/

5.

The last se!tion of the poiesis essa7* %rt Is the &ighest Task and theTrul7 -etaph7si!al %!ti@it7 of -an1) is de@oted to a reading of

$ietzs!he that !rosses the lar7nthine ridge etween $ietzs!hes earl7and late works as &eideggers Zarathustra14 !rosses the ridge in order torea!h the truth. $ow will is transfored into will to power andeHuated with eternal re!urren!e* there7 ade to ear witness to the

$ietzs!hean proKe!t of transforing life into art* that is* transforing thewhole of life into an art work not 7 eans of the will of the artist ut 7

transforation of the will into a general will. These are the final senten!esof the essa7:

%rt is the eternal self0generation of the will to power. %s su!h* itdeta!hes itself oth fro the a!ti@it7 of the artist and fro thesensiilit7 of the spe!tator to posit itself as the fundaental traitof uni@ersal e!oing. % fragent fro the 7ears 199309>reads:The work of art where it appears without an artist* e.g.*as od7 as organis ^ To what e?tent the artist is onl7 a

preliinar7 stage. The world as a work of art that gi@es irth toitself M 1/

%gaen !oents no ore after this Huotation and it sees as if we areasked to !on!lude that this is the final stage of the fall of poiesis into thehegeon7 of the will* and sin!e then what has een ruling an is thisfallen state in whi!h he is !ondened to etaph7si!s. Aithout dout this

position eanates fro a spe!ial perspe!ti@e fro whi!h %gaen hasforerl7 looked at a faous $ietzs!hean aphoris in the 3ill to Power :

1) This is the last senten!e of the prefa!e that $ietzs!he wrote to his The 0irth o+ Tragedy in 191. The senten!e appears in =aufann5s translation as follows: Letsu!h serious readers learn soething fro the fa!t that I a !on@in!ed that artrepresents the highest task and the trul7 etaph7si!al a!ti@it7 of this life* in thesense of that an to who* as 7 sulie prede!essor on this path* I wish todedi!ate this essa7. $ietzs!he* .* The 0irth o+ Tragedy* 0asic 3ritings o+

Giet(sche* The -odern Lirar7* $ew ork: )CCC* pp. 4104).14 &eidegger* -.* Aho is $ietzs!he5s Zarathustra* &eview o+ 1etaphysics* @ol.

)C* no.4* issue no. B* -ar!h 1B>* pp. /11041.

1/ %gaen* p. B4.



143 Pli 1/ F)CC4

'e!apitulation: To ipose upon e!oing the !hara!ter of eing 0 that is

the supree will to power.13

This is supposedl7* as one !onsiders the generalisation of the will* what

!onstitutes* a!!ording to %gaen* the etaph7si!al twist of the will in $ietzs!he that* I elie@e* !an onl7 e aintained if one de!ides to read theHuotation literall7* that is* if one holds it as a eans for produ!ing truth.

I will return to this in following se!tions e!ause I think there is no wa7of produ!ing a !riti!is of how this point is appropriated 7 %gaen for restoring poiesis to its original status* without first showing the o@estaken 7 %gaen for foregrounding a relationship etween 1 the fallen

state of poiesisJ ) the Huotation fro &clderlinJ and 4 the opposition of ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos. #ne possile wa7 of su!h a!riti!is ight possil7 e undertaken 7 !laiing that all are works of negation: that is* 1 if $ietzs!hean will ends up in will to power it is

e!ause %gaen sees in $ietzs!he not an affiration of affiration utsipl7 an affiration of negationJ ) if %gaen !on!ludes that $ietzs!he*with a asi!all7 etaph7si!al twist* is the ultiate point in thede@elopent of the histor7 of the will* it is e!ause in the phrase eing of

e!oing he puts stress on being rather than on becoming J 4 if %gaen

raises the possiilit7 of hearing the unheard within an e!ono7 of opposition etween ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos hea!hie@es that onl7 7 wa7 of a negation of tie as ade of points 0 all of whi!h would ha@e to e pro@ed later.

F.

To 7 knowledge* it hardl7 o!!urred to an7one to take this Huotation 7

&clderlin 0 whi!h opens %gaens essa7 0 E@er7thing is rh7th* theentire destin7 of an is one hea@enl7 rh7th* Kust as e@er7 work of art isone rh7th* and e@er7thing swings fro the poetizing lips of the god 0 as

earing witness to the Huestion of the @isile. $ow perhaps this is a rather per@erse wa7 of approa!hing this Huotation 0 for there will e no ends inthis Huer7 and one is guaranteed to e!oe lost on the wa7 0 ut is not this

parallellis etween e@er7thing is rh7th and Kust as e@er7 work of art

13 $ietzs!he* .* The 3ill to Power * 'ando &ouse* $ew ork: 1B>* aphoris >1*

p. 44C.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 14>

is one rh7th drawn 7 &clderlin in order to throw light on e@er7thing

7 asking art in all its @isiilit7 to e present as witness to the in@isilerh7th in e@er7thing %sking this Huestion allows one to see F the potentialit7 of e@er7thing ha@ing a rh7th ut not 7 wa7 of identif7ingart with e@er7thing. That is* &clderlin offers us no dire!t passage frothe @isile or audile rh7th of the art work to the assertion thate@er7thing is rh7th. In other words* &clderlin does not guarantee thatone !an see or hear this ut one !an onl7 think of it as the inaudile* as thein@isile* that !an e thought onl7 as and not as such of the audile or @isile rh7th of the artwork. I elie@e this wa7 of thinking aout theradi!al otherness of e@er7thing that is !opared 7 &clderlin to theartwork in@ites us to rethink the relationship of the unthought to thought inthis Huotation F and also of &clderlin5s adness* or the Huestion of adness in general1>.

Should not one etter talk aout a pun!tured t7panu etween thetwo

.

I think there is no other wa7 of falling out of resonan!e with %gaensThe #riginal Stru!ture of the Aork of %rt For showing that if there is a

possiilit7 of getting into resonan!e with hi* it !an onl7 e a!hie@ed 7eans of aditting to a hierar!h7 etween a odel and a !op7 withoutfirst pointing to a deterination of liit with respe!t to the distin!tion

produ!ed 7 %gaen etween ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz

Farithos. FThe Huestion of resonan!e will alwa7s reain though* until weget to the point of ipossiilit7 of appropriating the unthought as the

thought.

1> See La!oue0Laarthe5s essa7 T7pograph7 whi!h is of in@aluale iportan!e for the issue of adness in philosoph7. In this essa7* and also in #literation*La!oue0Laarthe tra!es $ietzs!he5s adness and &eidegger5s treatent of itFLa!oue0Laarthe* +.* Typography* &ar@ard Uni@ersit7 +ress* London: 1B9B. #nthe other hand* looking at the Huestion of the @isile with regard to the Huestion of rh7th in &clderlin raises ore Huestions aout whether the issue at stake here isthe one related to iesis as iitation. et* I think this issue !annot e dis!ussed

within the liited spa!e of this essa7.



14 Pli 1/ F)CC4

%gaens o@e to sa@e poiesis fro the etaph7si!s of will* or*

asi!all7* fro etaph7si!s* or aestheti!s* goes 7 wa7 of showing thatrh7th is not a stru!ture in the sense that Stru!turalis appropriated it.%fter dis!ussing %ristotle5s !lai M whi!h the philosopher adopted fro%ntiphon M that rh7th is what gi@es stru!ture to eleental* inarti!ulatenature*1 %gaen !opares the ipli!ations of this theor7 withStru!turalis in general. If rh7th should e generall7 understood asstru!ture and if stru!ture is a whole that !ontains soething ore than thesiple su of its parts* then this soething is soething else*soething other than the eleents and that whi!h ust e?ist in soewa7.19 Ahat Stru!turalis did* in that sense was nothing different fro+7thagoreans who sought this eleent* this soething other* in ariqmoi

Farithoi* nuers. $uers for the !onstituted the original prin!iple of all things. Stru!tural anal7sis* then understands stru!ture not onl7 asruqmoz ut also as a nuer and eleental prin!iple.1B

or %ristotle* on the other hand* this soething else should esoething that is radi!all7 other that opens a ore essentialdiension:

%ristotle designates this diension as the aitia tou einai* the

!ause of eing* and the ousia* the prin!iple that gi@es originand aintains e@er7thing in presen!e: not a aterial eleent utor Fmorfh cai eidoz). Therefore* in the passage fro these!ond ook the Physics referred to earlier* %ristotle refuses thetheor7 e?pounded 7 %ntiphon and 7 all those who definenature as eleentar7 atter* to arrnqmioton* and insteadidentifies nature* that is* the original prin!iple of presen!e*

pre!isel7 with ruqmoz* stru!ture understood s7non7ousl7 withor)C.

$ow what happens in %ristotle is the aolition of the hierar!h7 etweeneleental* inarti!ulate nature and stru!ture as ruqmoz (rhuthos: thus*these !on!epts* su!h as stru!ture* rhuthos* and or are susued under a general !on!ept of ousia (ousia* presen!e. That is* for is alwa7salread7 there in nature e!ause of the original prin!iple* ousia (ousia* all

1 %gaen* p. B3.19 %gaen* p. B>.1B %gaen* p. B.

)C %gaen* p. B.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 149

of whi!h of !ourse gi@es wa7 to the Huestion of rh7th* whether it !an e

felt as su!h or as soething that !an e !al!ulated as in Stru!turalis.%gaens !riti!is* without dout* aKures Stru!turalis e!ause* as

we entioned ao@e* it understands stru!ture not onl7 as ariqmoz utalso as a nuer and eleental prin!iple)1* as soething ore than itseleents and thus it ais to trans!end aestheti!s 7 sear!hing for theoriginal prin!iple that is lo!ated outside its eleents* su!h asatheathi!al pre!ision Fariqmoz Farithos* Kust as in the !ase of the+7thagoreans.

If rh7th should e seen as soething else* that is* as soething

radi!all7 other* %gaen is Huite !areful not to offer a !on!ept of rh7ththat !an e felt as su!h. 'h7th* therefore* as &clderlin put it* is not astru!ture in the sense of ariqmoz Farithos* that is* soething !al!ulale*

ut* instead* is related to ousia (ousia* the prin!iple of presen!e thatopens and aintains the work of art in its original spa!e.)) Ahathappens here in %gaens !riti!is* 7 a sleight of hand* is the literaloliteration of what &clderlin* in his adness* Huite !arefull7 forulated*that is* the di@ision of e@er7thing and art. In other words* &clderlindoes not talk aout a possiilit7 of proKe!ting what is pe!uliar to art onto

e@er7thing* he onl7 akes a !oparison* without identif7ing one withthe other. In that sense* what the poet forulates as soething @isile*audile* or sipl7* as sensile for art is applied 7 %gaen* whoforerl7 defined his position as sa@ing poiesis fro aestheti!s* toe@er7thing. Aithout dout* one !annot tra!e here an7 intention that*on!e appropriated 7 e@er7thing* this rh7th !an e felt as su!h.

&owe@er* this o@e* first of all* does not sa@e %gaen froreappropriating the liit that was intentionall7 disappropriated earlier 0result of whi!h is that we are put fa!e to fa!e with a forerl7 denied

opposition: if we ha@e to think ruqmoz (rhuthos not in opposition toariqmoz Farithos* then what is at stake here is the reprodu!tion of another liit* sa7 etween e@er7thing and its outside. In other words*!an one preser@e ones distan!e fro reappropriation 7* first* e?tendingwhat onl7 applies* for &clderlin* to art* to e@er7thing and then !reatinganother liit etween e@er7thing* in whi!h art is in!luded* and anoutside* that is the original prin!iple* that is* presen!e* ousia (ousia Is

)1 %gaen* p. B.

)) %gaen* p. B9.



14B Pli 1/ F)CC4

this not to reappropriate the hierar!hi!al stru!ture aolished a se!ond ago*

that is* the one etween ousia (ousia and all the others* that is*e@er7thing

#n the other hand* there is the Huestion of whether this rh7th* that isnot onl7 pe!uliar to art* ut to e@er7thing* !an e felt as such. Does not%gaen here open up a possiilit7 for hearing the unheard in Huite a&eideggerian anner

Let us follow the steps !arefull7.

(ut what* then* is the essen!e of rh7th)4 asks %gaen.

H.

'e!apitulation: To ipose upon e!oing the !hara!ter of eing 0 that is the supree will to power.

This is supposedl7* as one !onsiders the generalisation of the will* what!onstitutes* a!!ording to %gaen* the etaph7si!al twist of the will in

$ietzs!he that* I elie@e* !an onl7 e aintained if one de!ides to read the

Huotation literall7* that is* if one holds it as a eans for produ!ing truth. $ow* $ietzs!hes position with regard to truth is o@ious as earl7 as

his The 0irth o+ Tragedy where he finds the eodient of this attititudein the person of So!rates. Gi@en this attitude* whi!h $ietzs!he defines asthe attitude of the So!rati! an* the tragi! @iew of life opposes it in thesense of a singularit7 For* rather* of appearan!es that knows no distin!tion

etween uni@ersal and parti!ular. If the produ!tion of truth is what !anonl7 e otained 7 eans of a knowledge whose @alidit7 is guaranteed 7a uni@ersal !on!ept of truth* the tragi! @iew of life pri@ileges a !ertain

a7ss that !annot e !rossed unless 7 wa7 of s!ientifi! appro?iation.Aithout dout* $ietzs!hes !riti!is of etaph7si!s* that !an e dis!erned*and 7et !annot e held as the ain thee of this earl7 work* elongs to alater period* sa7* to >arathustra* in the for of a proKe!t of lea@ingetaph7si!s ehind. %lread7 in the introdu!tion written to The 0irth o+ Tragedy in 191* he defends his position as follows: %rt is the highesttask and the trul7 etaph7si!al a!ti@it7 of an.

)4 %gaen* p. BB.



1/1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ear eguiling !ontrapuntal art 0 a fier!e hostilit7 to e@er7thing

that is happening toda7* an iron will Fnot far reo@ed froactive nihilismU whi!h sees to pro!lai* Id rather thatnothing were true than see 7ou triuph and 7our truth Listen*7ou high priest of art and pessiis* to one of 7our ownstateents* that eloHuent passage full of dragon killers ra@adoand rat!at!hers tri!ks so appealing to inno!ent earsJ listen to itand tell us* arent we dealing here with the !onfession of a trueroanti! of the 194Cs* disguised as a pessiist of the 193Cs,ant we hear ehind 7our !onfession the annun!iator7 soundsof the usual roanti! finale: rupture* !ollapse* return* and

prostration efore an old faith* efore the old God.... ,oe now*isnt 7our pessiisti! work itself a pie!e of anti &ellenis androanti! oonshine* fit to efog and into?i!ate* a kind of drug0 in fa!t* a pie!e of usi!* and Geran usi! to oot "ust listento this: Let us iagine a rising generation with undaunted e7es*with a heroi! dri@e towards the une?ploredJ let us iagine the

old step of these St. Georges* their re!kless pride as the7 turntheir a!ks on all the @aletudinarian do!trines of optiis*

preparing to dwell resolutel7 in the fullness of eing: would it

not e ne!essar7 for the tragi! indi@idual of su!h a !ulture*readied 7 his dis!ipline for e@er7 !ontingen!7* e@er7 terror* towant as his &elena a no@el art of etaph7si!al sola!e and toe?!lai as aust did:

!nd shall not F, by mightiest desire*

*n living shape that precious +orm acquire

Aould it not e ne!essar7 0 no* indeed* 7 roanti!fledglings* it would not e ne!essar7. (ut it is Huite possile that

things 0 that 7ou 7oursel@es 0 ight end that wa7:etaph7si!all7 sola!ed despite all 7our gruelling self dis!ipline and* as roanti!s usuall7 do* in the oso of the,hur!h.)>

Ahat is a!ti@e nihilis %nd* what is this ne!essit7 that $ietzs!he is!riti!al of here

)3 -7 ephasis

)> $ietzs!he* .* The 0irth o+ Tragedy* %n!hor (ooks* $ew ork: 1B3>* pp. 1401/.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 1/)

The a!ti@e nihilis that $ietzs!he is a!!using hiself of is the !ritiHue

that he dire!ted* in >arathustra* to The &igher -en* in who he tra!esa repla!eent of God with an. %s Deleuze puts it:

$ietzs!he5s idea is that the death of god is a grand e@ent*glaorous 7et insuffi!ient* for nihilis !ontinues* arel7!hanging its for. Earlier nihilis had eant depre!iation* thenegation of life in the nae of higher @alues. (ut now thenegation of these higher @alues is repla!ed 7 huan @alues F...

$othing has !hanged* for the sae rea!ti@e life* the saesla@er7 that had triuphed in the shadow of di@ine @alues now

triuphs through huan ones. F... That is wh7 $ietzs!he* in ook I; of Zarathustra* tra!es the great iser7 of those he !allsthe higher en. These en want to repla!e God: the7 !arr7huan @aluesJ the7 e@en elie@e the7 are redis!o@ering realit7*re!uperating the eaning of affiration.)

%t this Kun!ture* I would like to propose that we ha@e to e?!a@ate deeper into the Huestion of repla!eent and appli!ation* for it will throw light on1 how* as we will see soon* $ietzs!he !riti!izes hiself in the 199>introdu!tion* ) how the differen!es etween a!ti@e and rea!ti@e nihilis

are aintained in $ietzs!he and also 4 how the appli!ation* as such* the!hara!ter of eing on e!oing* is pro@ided in %gaen.

or one thing* it is o@ious that $ietzs!he realizes in the 199>introdu!tion that he !oitted su!h a repla!eent and therefore his

position in The 0irth o+ Tragedy with regard to God !arries the risk of enthroning su!h higher @alues in the spirit of 'oanti!is* in the for of rupture* !ollapse* return* and prostration efore an old faith* efore theold God.... or su!h a rising generation* what $ietzs!he de!lared asdestin7 was to dwell resolutel7 in the fullness of eing* the ne!essit7 of

whi!h was found nowhere ut in the Huotation fro Goethe. $ow* weha@e fullness of eing and its ne!essit7 on the one hand* and the!riti!is of this ne!essit7 on the other.

urtherore* in !hapter ;I of the 199> introdu!tion* we read $ietzs!he!oplaining aout another failure in ters of an appli!ation:

%nd 7et there reains the great Dion7sia! Huestion ark* inta!t*apart fro all those rash hopes* those wrong applications F7ephasis to !onteporar7 atters* whi!h tended to spoil 7

) Deleuze* G.* Pure *mmanence* Zone (ooks* $ew ork: )CC1* pp. 9C091.



1/4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

first ookJ reains e@en with regard to usi!. or the Huestion

here is Fand ust !ontinue to e* Ahat should a usi! look like whi!h is no longer roanti! in inspiration* like the Geran* ut Dion7sia! instead)9

Ahat $ietzs!he !riti!ises here as those wrong appli!ations was to appl7what passed for hi intiall7 as the prin!iples of tragi! art to Aagner5susi!. 'oanti!is* as he understands 7ears later* was rupture* !ollapse*return* and prostration efore an old faith* efore the old God.... This isa!tuall7 the god of nothingness that is repla!ed 7 the old god 7 an a!ti@enihilis and* the trul7 etaph7si!al a!ti@it7 of an that $ietzs!he

!laied in the 191 introdu!tion is now depre!iated as aestheti!etaph7si!s 0 a etaph7si!s whi!h would rather elie@e in nothingness*indeed in the de@il hiself* than in the here and now

Ahat is $ietzs!he proposing here as a kind of etaph7si!s that has a elief in the here and now % !ritiHue of appli!ation* not sipl7 of what passes for the old to the new* ut a !ritiHue of appli!ation as that whi!h!an e appli!ale %nd also* a !ritiHue of ne!essit7 If this is so* !an wedis!ern in this elief in the here and now an intention to !ast a light on

$ietzs!he5s !ritiHue of fullness of eing %nd does $ietzs!he ha@e a

nae for that It sees as if the nae Dion7sos* whi!h he eplo7ed inorder to oppose it to oralit7* etaph7si!s* the ,hristian God* andAestern art* does not suffi!e an7ore when $ietzs!he realises whatunderlines his position: a!ti@e nihilis* appli!ation of the old to the new*repla!eent. Ahat he does then upon this realisation M upon a new!ritiHue of fullness of eing that he depre!iates as unne!essar7 0 is to!onfess:

Thus it happened that in those da7s* with this prole ook* 7@ital instin!ts turned against ethi!s and founded a radi!al

!ounterdo!trine* slanted aestheti!all7* to oppose the ,hristianliel on life. (ut it still wanted a nae. (eing a philologist* thatis to sa7 a an of words* I !hristened it rather aritraril7 0 for who !an tell the real nae of the %nti!hrist 0 with the nae of aGreek god* Dion7sos.)B

In the first pla!e* in the late introdu!tion* $ietzs!he had realised that thatwhi!h re@eals itself as a Huestion of nae in fa!t is a Huestion of (eing* a

)9 The 0irth o+ Tragedy* p. 14.

)B The 0irth o+ Tragedy* p. 11.



1/3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

(efore one !an resonate with a proale answer to this Huestion 0 that

is* with $ietzs!hes answer 0 I think that these Huestions also pa@e the wa7for further Huestions aout $ietzs!he and the Huestion of st7le: after all*!an it e a philosophi!al issue to e true to $ietzs!he when one !onsidersthe pla!e of st7le in $ietzs!he It is a Huestion of reading $ietzs!he as!losel7 as possile to $ietzs!he* 7et to e !lose does not alwa7s endowone with eing true to $ietzs!he* for if appro?iation is what is thought to

e the ultiate result of eing !lose to* then $ietzs!he would e the lastof the philosophers who would e?!hange st7le with appro?iation. If the

philosopher in Huestion is $ietzs!he* then one is reHuired to forulate aeing !lose to hi* alwa7s with an e7e to the a7ss* due to his st7les* ina!!ordan!e with su!h !on!epts as e!oing* eternal re!urren!e* or will to power 0 !on!epts that fun!tion in $ietzs!he as for!es 7 whi!hall the negati@it7 of !on!epts like eing* essen!e* god isdisappropriated to e reappropriated 7 a!ti@e for!es. Ahat happens* for e?aple* in a pro!ess of e!oing

The iportan!e of doule affiration also e!oes @isile at su!h a Kun!ture: doule affiration in $ietzs!he is a o@e taken with theintention of produ!ing a !ritiHue of &egelian au+hebung . %s Deleuze put

it: The will to power* sa7s* $ietzs!he* !onsists not in !o@eting or e@en in taing ut in creating and giving . +ower* as a will to

power* is not that whi!h the will wants* ut that whi!h wants inthe will FDion7sos hiself. The will to power is the differentialeleent fro whi!h deri@e the for!es at work* as well as their respe!ti@e Hualit7 in a !ople? whole. Thus it is alwa7s gi@en asa oile* aerial* pluralist eleent. It is 7 the will to power thata for!e !oands* ut it is also 7 the will to power that a for!e

oe7s. To these two t7pes or Hualities of for!es there !orrespondtwo fa!es* two Hualia of the will to power* whi!h are ultiateand fluent* deeper than the for!es that deri@e fro the* for thewill to power akes it that a!ti@e for!es affir* and affir their differen!e: in the affiration is first* and negation is ne@er uta !onseHuen!e* a sort of surplus of pleasure. Ahat !hara!terisesrea!ti@e for!es* on the other hand* is their opposition to whatthe7 are not* their tenden!7 to liit the other: in the negation



Z%E' %'%,%G= 1/>

!oes firstJ through negation* the7 arri@e a selan!e of

affiration.41

Ahat does %gaen do in that sense irst* affiration: the opposition etween ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos is affired in order to ateporalise the ruqmoz (rhuthos* 7et at this @er7 oent thisaffiration M in whi!h the negati@e is preser@ed as negation M 7ields toanother negation and thus an opposition etween e@er7thing and itsoutside: thus the issue of ateporalising ruqmoz (rhuthos is a!hie@ed

7 introdu!ing another opposition of* another order etween* inside andoutside.

Ahereas what $ietzs!he would do in su!h a situation would e toaffir the opposition etween ruqmoz (rhutos and ariqmoz Farithosnot 7 wa7 of produ!ing another opposition ut 7 wa7 of offering anaffiration of ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos as differen!es.To do so* epowers one with appropriating the negati@e 7 a!ti@e for!es*and the latter reHuires a se!ond affiration. $egation loses its power andthe order etween a!ti@e and negati@e* affiration and negation* thusdoes not disappear* nor does it e!oe !on!rete ut pun!tured.

0 It is unne!essar7.

.

Is it tiel7 to talk aout resonan!e now #r is it etter to wait until things*fragents* get into a resonan!e M or la7 are the resonan!e etween thethought and the unthought* ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz

Farithos* the heard and the unheard

In other words* !an we talk aout a passage etween ruqmoz(rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos without pri@ileging an %gaeniane?perien!e of ruqmoz (rhuthos that enales one to hear the unheardAhat is the ai of an approa!h that sees in the phrase* E@er7thing isrh7th* the entire destin7 of an is one hea@enl7 rh7th* Kust as e@er7work of art is one rh7th* and e@er7thing swings fro the poetising lips of the god a possiilit7 of appl7ing what stands for art to e@er7thing

41 Deleuze* G.* Pure *mmanence* Zone (ooks* $ew ork: )CC1* pp. 40/.



1/ Pli 1/ F)CC4

J.

7or as long as tympanum will not have been destroyed @ that cannot beachieved by means o+ a simply discursive or theoretical gesture, +or aslong as these two types o+ mastery will not have been destroyed in their essential +amiliarity 4 which is also that o+ phallocentrism and logocentrism 4 and +or as long as even the philosophical concept o+ mastery will not have been destroyed, all the liberties one claims to taewith the philosophical order will remain activated a tergo bymisconstrued philosophical machines, according to denegration or

precipitation, ignorance or stupidity$ They very quicly, nown or unnown to their Cauthors,D will have been called bac to order . 4)

Ahat are the pre!onditions for resonan!e

The Ta!oa $arrows (ridge* whi!h spanned a length of oneile o@er the Ta!oa $arrows in (reerton* Aashington* wasni!knaed the Galloping Gertie e!ause of its !onstant ro!kingand twisting in the wind. These os!illations e!ae so great thaton $o@eer * 1B/C* a support !ale near the iddle of the

ridge snapped* !ausing the entire stru!ture to !rash into theri@er elow. Lu!kil7* the onl7 !asualt7 was a !o!ker spaniel* andthe failure has taught engineers sin!e then @aluale lessons.E?perts still argue o@er what !aused the failure in the first pla!e*

ut the7 do know what !ontriuted to the failure. The originaldesigners of the ridge should not e laed for the failure*sin!e their knowledge of all the for!es a!ting on the ridge wasin!oplete. The7 ore than likel7 progressed the field of engineering through their failure.

E@en toda7* no one is sure e?a!tl7 what !aused the Ta!oa $arrows (ridge to !ollapse. Se@eral theories e?ist e?plaining the prole* all in@ol@ing the effe!ts of aerod7nai! for!es on the ridge. Three of those theories were listed in the ederal Aork %gen!7s FA% report on the !ollapse: the wind lowingagainst the ridge had the sae freHuen!7 as the resonan!efreHuen!7 of the ridge* !ausing @irations to uild updisproportionate to the for!e of the windJ @orti!es generatedaround the ridge at!hed the resonan!e and !ause os!illations

4) 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ??ii.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 1/9

to graduall7 uild upJ rando flu!tuations in wind turulen!e

were enough to !ause the ridge to !ollapse. Ahate@er thereason* the for!es a!ting against the ridge on the orning of $o@eer se@enth were enough to !ause a !ale and to slip*whi!h put enough stress on the other parts of the ridge that itfailed.

Leon -oisseiff* the designer of the ridge* said* I !opletel7at a loss to e?plain the !ollapse* whi!h is true* !onsidering hedid not anti!ipate the need to !al!ulate for aerod7nai! for!eson the ridge design. E@en the A% reported after the !ollapse

that the ridge !onstru!tion was the ost suitale for its uses*e!onoi!s* and lo!ation. Therefore* the engineers !annot e pla!ed totall7 at faultJ their understanding was in!oplete. %fter the !ollapse of the ridge* engineers realised that there is a needto full7 understand all the for!es a!ting on their design. The7also learned in hindsight the dangers of e?!eeding a design

paradig. The Ta!oa $arrows (ridge was the ost fle?ile ridge of its tie* e?!eeding pre@ious ridges designs in tersof the ratios etween length* depth* and width. Ahether or not

the7 knew it at the tie* the designers were taking a risk 7tr7ing soething !opletel7 new. In this !ase* the7 failed* ut intheir failure* the7 proal7 !ontriuted ore to engineerings!ien!e than the7 would ha@e had the7 su!!eeded.

&art* Teren!e* for ,ES1)C: Engineering ,ouni!ations at%lfred Uni@ersit7

http:66a!la.alfred.edu6students6hartt6intro.htl.

% @irating sour!e whi!h will !reate @irations in another eleent: that is*

a relationship etween a odel and a !op7 is what deterines our understanding of resonan!e. Ahat kind of a resonan!e M if there is one M !an e said to e?ist etween $ietzs!he and &eidegger6%gaen #r* onwhat !onditions !an it e said that there is a resonan!e etween the #r*what kind of a resonan!e does $ietzs!he offer etween hiself and hisfuture readers

#n!e again: Is it possile to hear the unheard in what is heard (earingin ind this Huestion* I think* fa!ilitates one with eing !autious towardsrh7th M if what is supposed to e heard is ruqmoz (rhuthos in

opposition to ariqmoz Farithos. Sin!e we !an take it for granted that



1/B Pli 1/ F)CC4

this opposition is there in %gaen5s te?t* we !an spe!ulate a!!ording to

the preisses with whi!h %gaen puts forward this opposition. If resonan!e should e taken at its fa!e @alue* that is as entioned ao@e*then it !an e said that the wa7 %gaen proposes or pla7s with thisopposition is largel7 ased on this t7pe of resonan!e. irst: there is asour!e and it is 7 eans of this sour!e that the ariqmoz Farithos isade audile. Then* a series of Huestions follow: Ahat is this sour!e ,anthis sour!e e forulated as deterined with an opposition of teporaland ateporal. %s %gaen notes: we per!ei@e rh7th as soething thates!apes the in!essant flights of instants and appears alost as the presen!e

of an ateporal diension in tie.

44

%nd the in!essant flight of instantsis the real where we !an hear the rh7th Fi.e.* ariqmoz as such* that isas a pie!e of usi!^ In the ateporal diension* on the other hand* weare as though held* arrested efore soething* ut this eing arrested isalso a eing0outside* an e"stasis in a ore original diension.4/

$ow if one follows this route that pro!eeds 7 gi@ing wa7 todistin!tions su!h as* ruqmoz (rhuthos6 ariqmoz FarithosJteporal6ateporalJ inside6outside* the sour!e of rh7th !oes to theforeground rather as the origin of rh7th. %gaen does not tell u!h

aout this origin of rh7th e?!ept @ia referring to the et7olog7 of theword gift Fepoch) in %n!ient Greek. Gift Fepoch), in the sense that%gaen uses the word* as oth to hold a!k and to present Fepecw ) iseHuated with rh7th and to e or to e present. Then* theateporal* thought within the oppositional stru!ture of ruqmoz

(rhuthos6 ariqmoz Farithos and inside6outside* is what epowersan with an opening OtoP his authenti! teporal diension43. %fter thisseries of anoeu@res* the final point of whi!h is to la7 are the !entralit7of (eing or presen!e* the origin of rh7th !an e seen in the outside*

the !apa!it7 of e"stasis of an* that endows hi with an e?perien!e of what holds a!k and presents itself at the sae tie* that is* as what weknow fro &eidegger as aletheia.

Ahat ight e the ipli!ations of this theoreti!al fraework for our theor7 of resonan!e If ruqmoz (rhuthos* that is the ateporaldiension where an opens hiself to his authenti! diension with theintention of hearing the unheard in rh7th M for ariqmoz Farithos is the

44 %gaen* p. BB.4/ %gaen* p. BB.

43 %gaen* p. 1C1.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 13C

ordinar7* aritheti!* that is !al!ulale rh7th 0 then I think we !an talk

aout a hierar!hi!al or rather a etaph7si!al stru!ture etween ruqmoz(rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos. irst !oes ruqmoz (rhuthos andthe ordinar7* dail7 e?perien!e of ariqmoz Farithos is Kust a ad* ase!op7 of what is original. #r* in other words* ruqmoz (rhuthos* sin!e it!an e e?perien!ed onl7 7 lea@ing the inside for an outside* is what

presents itself onl7 in the outside* as the sour!e of ordinar7 rh7th that weare !apale of hearing. In order to ha@e the e?perien!e of the unheard M inorder to hear it M we ha@e to go outside.

The origin* then* as we ha@e ade !lear* !an e lo!ated in the outside M

as the sour!e of rh7th M whi!h* onl7 7 eans of getting into resonan!ewith* we !an hear* though as the ad !op7 of the original within the linear teporalit7 of ariqmoz Farithos. $ow I elie@e that the idea of resonan!e that is hinted here 7 %gaen !an e thought in its all no@elt7as an idea of resonan!e whi!h* 7 for!ing the hearer M or* shall we !all it*sipl7* the ear M to the outside* ais to set the ear free fro a forer hierar!h7 M the hierar!h7 of inside and outside. Ahat happens in theoutside %n e?perien!e of authenti! teporal diension* where the

poeti! status of an on earth finds its proper eaning. -an has on earth a

poeti! status* e!ause it is poiesis that founds for hi the original spa!e of his world.4>

Aithout going further than this* or let us sa7* without suitting whatis alread7 for!ed 7 %gaens reading Fof ruqmoz (rhuthos andariqmoz Farithos within the !onte?t of ousia on!e ore to a pun!ture

etween an inside and outside* to a pun!tured t7panu* nothing !an eotained at su!h a Kun!ture. That is* if there is a liit etween inside andoutside and* if %gaen for!es this liit to open an to an e?perien!e of authenti! teporal diension* then there should ha@e left no Huestion of

going further than this e!ause* then* there would ha@e left no liit to esurpassed* to e tran!ended* an7 ore. In other words* if this pun!ture!aused 7 %gaenian for!e on the t7panu opens a wa7 fro inside toan outside 7 wa7 of oliterating the liit* it puts the an in adiension Fateporal where he is supposed to hear what he did not hear

efore. et* does this position of an enale hi to get rid of the ear thathe forerl7 supposed to ha@e gotten rid of If we look at the stru!ture* thatis* what akes an ale to hear the unheard* it is nothing ore than the

4> %gaen* p. 1C1.



131 Pli 1/ F)CC4

sae hierar!h7 that has een aolished efore. In other words* the forer

hierar!h7 etween ruqmoz (rhuthos and ariqmoz Farithos is re0 paired in an5s new position: although the liit is aolished* or thet7panu pun!tured* it is now repla!ed 7 another liit etween eing*or presen!e on the one hand* and the an5s ear* his6her !apa!it7 of hearing this presen!e on the other. It is again the sour!e of rh7th* thatis presen!e* with whi!h an resonates* with a repaired ear* that akesthe authenti! e?perien!e of an what it is. %nd this o@e* surpassing itsliit Kust in order to !onstitute another liit* as we all know well* is ao@e of !u+hebung .

'epla!eent and appli!ation: do the7 not elong to the Huestion of re0 pairing 'epairing the pun!tured t7panu 7 wa7 of re0pairingoppositions

Ahat ight e the fun!tion of this pun!tured t7panu that is re0 paired as soon as an passes to the other side Ahat ight e the fun!tionof this pun!tured t7panu if it were left pun!tured irst: Aould anneed to pass to the other side Foutside if the pun!tured t7panu wereleft pun!tured Se!ond: Ahat would the preser@ation of a pun!turedt7panu as pun!tured ean for a theor7 of resonan!e

K.

+hilosoph7 has alwa7s insisted upon this: thinking its other. Itsother: that whi!h liits it* and fro whi!h it deri@es its essen!e*its definition* its produ!tion. To think its other: does this aountsolel7 to rele@er Faufheen that fro whi!h it deri@es* to headthe pro!ession of its ethod onl7 7 passing the liit #r

indeed does the liit* oliHuel7* 7 surprise* alwa7s reser@e oneore low for philosophi!al knowledge4

Ahat I would like to la7 are here is what is ipli!itl7 proposed andissed 7 %gaen5s !riti!is. or this purpose what I offer is a readingof Derrida5s essa7 T7pan with the intention of opening a dis!ussion onresonan!e M the t7pe of resonan!e that is proposed and issed 7%gaen.

4 1argins o+ Philosophy* pp. ?0?i.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 13)

ollowing the line of thought Huoted ao@e* Derrida elaorates the

&egelian o@e* !u+hebung as an insisten!e upon thinking its other: its proper other* the proper of its other. F^ In thinking it as such* inre!ognizing it he writes* one isses it. #ne reappropriates it for oneself*one disposes of it* one isses it* or rather one isses Fthe issing Fofit.49 urtherore* using t7panu as a etaphor for the liit etweeninside and outside* Derrida raises the following Huestions with a !on!ernfor the possiilit7 of a resonan!e etween inside and outside whi!h wouldgi@e wa7 to a @iration on a pun!tured t7panu: ,an one @iolentl7

penetrate philosoph75s field of listening without its iediatel7 M e@en pretending in ad@an!e* 7 hearing what is said of it* 7 de!oding thestateent M aking the penetration resonate within itself* appropriating theeission for itself* failiarl7 !ouni!ating it to itself etween the inner and iddle ear* following the path of a tue or inner opening* e it roundor o@al In other words* !an one pun!ture the t7panu of a philosopher and still e heard and understood 7 hi4B

Derrida does not sa7 it* ut what the philosopher would hear M when noinside6outside hierar!h7 left and the t7panu is pun!tured 0 would e ai?ture of @iration and distortion that !an e otained 7 wa7 of

underlining the issed opportunit7 7 %gaen. Ae ha@e alread7 saidthat what is ipli!itl7 proposed ut issed 7 %gaen* or etter* inDerrida5s ters* what %gaen isses the issing of in this atter isthe possiilit7 of preser@ing an alread7 pun!tured t7panu pun!tured:this is a situation when resonan!e is no ore understood in the hierar!i!alorder of an outside and inside* ut as what !oes to itself as a distortedFfailed rh7th produ!ed on the pun!tured t7panu as a result of odieson oth sides alread7 in resonan!e in thesel@es. That when thet7panu is pun!tured it will 7ield to distortion and hen!e it will put theunderstandailit7 M or* rather* the proper* the authenti!* the

presen!e* the (eing 0 at stake !an e furtherore Huestioned within theHuestion of the thought and the unthought or* etter* sin!e it would suit the!onte?t* the Huestion of the heard and the unheard in %gaen* and* notwithout &eideggerian re@ererations.

%s alread7 entioned* one of the reasons wh7 %gaen isses this point !an e found in the insisten!e of a o@e of !u+hebung whi!h insistson reappropriating the liit it has disappropriated. In Derrida5s ters* or

49 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ?i.

4B 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ?ii.



134 Pli 1/ F)CC4

this is how (eing is understood. It assures without let0up the relevant

o@eent of reappropriation./C

This is a!tuall7 where the spe!ifi!resistan!e of philosophi!al dis!ourse to de!onstru!tion takes pla!e: It isthe infinite aster7 that the agen!7 of (eing Fand of the proper sees toassure itJ this aster7 perits it to interiorise e@er7 liit as being and as

eing its own proper ./1 This o@e in %gaen is what transfors what is proposed as the unheard in rh7th as hearale as long as one opensoneself to the e?perien!e of authenti! teporalit7 that akes itself heardas presen!e* as (eing.

,an one pun!ture the t7panu so that the unheard reains as the

unheard without reappropriating the liit

-E.

This impression, as always, is made on some tympanum, whether resonating or still, on the double membrane that can be struc +romeither side. /)

$e@ertheless* the Huestion of the heard and the unheard should not ethought as a separate issue fro the fa!t that $ietzs!he prefigures as asour!e in %gaen5s essa7* +oiesis and +ra?is. It is so* e!ause* first of all* adittedl7* %gaens is a Huestion of getting into resonan!e/4 with

$ietzs!he* rather than eing true to hi. If one should approa!h whatresonan!e is* rather than understanding the Huestion of resonan!e* then that

$ietzs!he appears as a sour!e in %gaen5s te?t is not surprising. et* itis surprising at the sae tie* e!ause it does not onl7 present us withanother !ase of issing the issing of $ietzs!he* ut also* 7 wa7 of e?tending this issing to another one* with an introdu!tion of the @oi!e of

(eing into $ietzs!he M whi!h is presual7 there ut !annot e ade intosoething that resonates with (eing without not preser@ing the pun!turedt7panu as pun!tured.

/C 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ?@i./1 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ?i?./) 1argins o+ Philosophy* p. ??@./4 If we tune our inds to the resonan!e proper to this aphoris* if we hear in it the

@oi!e of of the one who tea!hes the eternal re!urren!e of the sae* it will open for us a region in whi!h art* will to power and eternal re!urren!e elong to one another

re!ipro!all7 in one !ir!le: %gaen* p.99.



Z%E' %'%,%G= 13/

$ietzs!he: the Huestion of st7le and the Huestion of resonan!e

Does $ietzs!he e@er e!oe what he is Ahere do we lo!ate theE!!e ,an we lo!ate the E!!e

&clderlin: e@er7thing is rh7th: !an it e heard

'e0pairing the pun!ture leads to aestheti!isation of life M fro this sideor that side 0 does it reall7 atter $e@ertheless* one !rosses the a7ss*despite $ietzs!he.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 133019/

=ant8s prod#%tive ontolog0

+T* L'RD

In this paper I will introdu!e an interpretation of =ant5s ontolog7 in tersof a !on!ept of produ!tion. The notion of an ontolog7* in the =antian!onte?t* reHuires soe !larifi!ation. =ant5s understanding of the wordontolog7 O#ntologieP would ha@e !oe largel7 fro ,hristian Aolff* who*in addition to eing the aKor odern philosophi!al influen!e in =ant5searl7 7ears* was apparentl7 responsile for popularizing ontolog7 as a

philosophi!al ter. #ntolog7* for Aolff* is the stud7 of logi!all7 possile eingJ that is* eing the predi!ates of whi!h are not !ontradi!tor7. The predi!ates of a possile eing !onstitute the essen!e and definition of that

eing* whi!h in turn !onstitute its !on!ept.1

#ntolog7* in this !ase* is thestud7 of eing insofar as it is definale and !on!eptualizale.

Aolff5s ontolog7 a7 e !hara!terized as an episteologi!al ontolog7*insofar as !on!eptual definition is a !ondition of possile eing. ,reation

7 God is the !ondition of a!tual eing* for eings otain erel7 as possile until soething is added to their possiilit7 to ake the e?istent.#ntolog7 does not seek after the di@ine ground of e?isten!eJ this is thetask of rational theolog7. 'ather* ontolog7 seeks !on!eptual knowledge of

eings: it inHuires into the essen!e of things* where essen!e is eHuated

with the thinkale !on!ept. Thus Aolff5s rationalist ontolog7 is !on!ernedwith the essen!e and knowailit7 of eings rather than with the ground of their e?isten!e. Essen!e entails !on!eptual definition and !on!eptualdefinition is the ground of our knowledge of essen!e: an7 oKe!t satisf7ingthe !ondition of !on!eptual definition is ontologi!all7 @alid. Thus Aolff5sontolog7 is an episteologi!al stud7 of essen!e* for whi!h an7thing that!an e logi!all7 thought has ontologi!al status. It is an essential rather thanan e?istential ontolog7* ut it is there7 also an episteologi!al ontolog7.

1 Lewis Ahite (e!k* Early <erman Philosophers F,aridge* -%: (elknap +ress*

1B>B* pp. )>40/.



(ET& L#'D 13>

=ant was e@identl7 dissatisfied with the Aolffian ontolog7J he felt that

with the odest Trans!endental %nal7ti! he had surpassed and repla!edthe proud nae of an #ntolog7 that presuptuousl7 !lais to suppl7* ins7steati! do!trinal for* s7ntheti! a priori knowledge of things ingeneral.) Indeed* the Trans!endental %nal7ti!* =ant5s s7ste of !on!eptsand prin!iples* repla!es rationalist ontolog7 with a radi!all7 newepisteolog7. et in his !on!eption of ontolog7 as episteolog7* and his!ategorization of the Huestions of the origin of e?isten!e and the eaningof eing under !osolog7 and theolog7 respe!ti@el7* =ant aintains theAolffian definition of ontolog7 and di@ision of philosophi!al topi!s. In

oth Aolff and =ant we see that ontolog7 is understood in episteologi!alters* and that this episteologi!al ontolog7 ` a sear!h for the groundsof knowledge ` is strongl7 distinguished fro e?istential ontolog7* asear!h for the grounds of e?isten!e. Geran rationalist ontolog7 had een!hara!terized 7 this di@ision* and indeed 7 the o!!lusion of thee?istential Huestion 7 episteologi!al !on!erns* sin!e the id0se@enteenth !entur7.4 It was 7 eans of this distin!tion* and 7 eans of a strong distin!tion etween possiilit7 and a!tualit7* that Aolff assertedhis differen!e fro the radi!al Spinozis of whi!h he was a!!used./

It a7 e true* as soe attest* that =ant straightforwardl7 a!!epted philosoph75s episteologi!al priorit7. The stru!ture of =ant5s first ,ritiHuedoes attest to a aintained distin!tion etween episteologi!al ande?istential Huestions. Indeed* soe parts of =ant5s te?t suggest thatHuestions !on!erning the grounds of e?isten!e are susued under theruri! of episteologi!al anal7sis of a priori !on!epts.3 &owe@er* I will

) Ianuel =ant* )ritique o+ Pure &eason* trans. $oran =ep Sith FLondon:-a!illan +ress* 1B)B* %)/ 6 (4C4. &ereafter are@iated to )P&* withreferen!es to the standard % and ( editions.

4 (e!k tra!es this ke7 distin!tion a!k to the Geran ,artesian "ohannes ,lauerg.Aith O,lauergP there egins a rationalisti! ontolog7 in whi!h the potentialit7 of eing thought defines eing. O...P % dire!tion is estalished in Geran philosoph7awa7 fro the !lassi!al ontologi!al realis of s!holasti!is* and its priar7 !on!ernwith eing* toward the priorit7 of the episteologi!al prole Fpp. 1930>."onathan Israel suggests that this distin!tion helped to propel Geran rationalisawa7 fro the dangerous ideas of Spinoza* although it did not prote!t !ertain

philosophers fro a!!usations of SpinozisJ see !hapters )>* )B* and 4/ of Israel5s &adical Enlightenment F#?ford: #?ford U+* )CC1.

/ or an e?!ellent a!!ount of Aolff5s perse!ution due to alleged Spinozis* seeIsrael* !h. )B.

3 See espe!iall7 )P& %9/30> 6 (940/.



13 Pli 1/ F)CC4

argue that =ant5s e?istential ontolog7 is far ore de@eloped than ost

!oentators ha@e suggested* and that it is in =ant5s theor7 of natural produ!tion that this ontolog7 eerges. urtherore* through natural produ!tion we will see that the episteologi!al and e?istential ontologiesare not in an7 sense distin!t: their oundaries are lurred* their oKe!tso@erlap* and their grounds are !oon. =ant5s o@erthrow of rationalistontolog7 goes far e7ond the %nal7ti!J it per@ades his philosoph7 of nature and his etaph7si!s as a whole.

I will look first at =ant5s 1>4 essa7 The #ne Possible 0asis +or a -emonstration o+ the Existence o+ <od in order to e?aine =ant5s earl7

thesis aout eing. The e?istential ontolog7 that =ant relies upon here iswhat I will !all a produ!ti@e ontolog7: a theor7 of the origin of e?isten!ethat is ased on a theor7 of natural or di@ine produ!tion. I will show thatfor the pre0!riti!al =ant the e?isten!e of an ontologi!al ground !annot ededu!ed fro a stri!tl7 episteologi!al ontolog7* and ust instead e

ased on a notion of produ!tion. I go on to e?aine &eidegger5sinterpretation of =ant5s thesis* whi!h as!ries to =ant a !on!eption of

eings as produ!ed peranent presen!e* and of being as an originalsuKe!t0oKe!t relation. or &eidegger* this episteologi!al understanding

of eing pla!es liits on e?istential ontolog7. (ut o@ing on to the)ritique o+ Pure &eason* I will suggest that the fo!us on natural produ!tion akes =antian ontolog7 rather ore !ople?. % produ!ti@eontolog7 will e seen to e?plain oth e?isten!e and knowledge* thus

lurring the distin!tion etween the e?istential and episteologi!alontologies.

-. The One Possible Basis: e>isten%e and divine %reation

The !entral !on!ern of =ant5s 1>4 essa7 The #ne Possible 0asis +or a -emonstration o+ the Existence o+ <od is ontolog7. This is true oth of ontolog7 in the Aolffian sense* the oKe!t of whi!h is the general

predi!ates whi!h !an e !on!eptuall7 thought* and of ontolog7 in the&eideggerian sense* whi!h ais to inHuire into the eaning of the eing of

eings. Indeed* the essa7 rings these two senses of ontolog7* theepisteologi!al and the e?istential* into !ollision: =ant !riti!izes the,artesian and Leinizian ontologi!al proofs for God5s e?isten!e pre!isel7

e!ause the7 attept to dedu!e God5s a!tualit7 fro a !on!ept* and this



(ET& L#'D 139

!riti!is is ased on an inHuir7 into the eaning of the ters being and

existence. % proper understanding of eing ` not as a real predi!ate for =ant ut as asolute positing ` will show up the flaws in traditionalontologi!al proofs* and ake wa7 for =ant5s new asis for adeonstration of God5s e?isten!e. That the e?isten!e of an ontologi!alground !annot e dedu!ed fro an epistei! stru!ture is =ant5s aKor

point against rationalist theolog7. =ant egins with an anal7sis of the!on!ept of e?isten!e* whi!h* while @er7 siple and well0understood* isne@ertheless diffi!ult to define pre!isel7.> This @er7 prole wille@entuall7 e the starting point for &eidegger5s proKe!t of fundaentalontolog7J for =ant* it leads to a renewed insisten!e on the e?istentialontolog7 of the ground of all e?isten!e* o@er against the episteologi!alontolog7 of !on!epts and prin!iples.

=ant egins his anal7sis of e?isten!e with the stateent: E?isten!eO -aseinP is not a predi!ate or deterination of an7 thing. This is to sa7that e?isten!e does not sa7 an7thing Hualitati@e aout a thing* and thus!annot e in!luded in the !on!ept of a thing. The !on!ept of a thing is!opletel7 deterinedJ whether that thing is possile or a!tual does notaffe!t the predi!ates pertaining to it. +redi!ates are deterinations of

!ontent* so all the predi!ates that pertain to a thing pertain to it eHuall7 in possiilit7 as in a!tualit7. The e?isten!e of a possile thing does not addan7 predi!ate* ut rather indi!ates that a thing whi!h was possile is nowa!tual* retaining the sae predi!ates it had as a erel7 possile thing. OIPt!annot e that if the7 Opossile thingsP e?isted the7 would !ontain oneore predi!ate* for in the possiilit7 of a thing a!!ording to its thoroughdeterination* asolutel7 no predi!ate !an e issing* sa7s =ant.9 Inorder to deonstrate that soething e?ists* one does not look in the!on!ept of the thing* ut rather in the origin of knowledge one has of thething Fe?perien!e or soe other Kustifi!ation.B

Epiri!al knowledge of the e?isten!e of soething is suffi!ient toestalish its a!tualit7. (ut the fa!t that there are a!tuall7 e?isting things*

> Ianuel =ant* -er Ein(ig 1Igliche 0eweisgrund (u einer -emonstration des -aseins <ottes V The #ne Possible 0asis +or a -emonstration o+ the Existence o+ <od * ilingual edition* trans. Gordon Treash FLin!oln: Uni@ersit7 of $eraska+ress* 1BB* %k. C01. &ereafter are@iated to #P0 with referen!es to theGeran F%kadeie pagination.

#P0 %k. ).9 #P0 %k. ).

B #P0 %k. )04.



13B Pli 1/ F)CC4

=ant !learl7 iplies* is due to God5s !reation. The !reator holds all

possiilit7 in his idea* and is uniHue in eing ale to ake the possilea!tual:

The eing who ga@e e?isten!e to the world* and to O"ulius,aesarP* would know all of O,aesar5sP predi!ates without asingle e?!eption and 7et regard hi as a erel7 possile thingwhi!h would not e?ist sa@e for his de!ree. O...P $ot a singledeterination would e wanting in the OrepresentationP that thesupree eing has of OthingsP* and 7et e?isten!e is not aongstthe sin!e he knows the as onl7 possile things.1C

This passage reinfor!es =ant5s point that e?isten!e is not aongst the predi!ates that deterine a thing* ut also suggests that e?isten!e iseHui@alent to createdness 7 God. E?isten!e is the o@ing of soethingfro possiilit7 to a!tualit7* fro God5s idea of it to his !reation of it 7de!ree. God does not need to add an7thing to possiilit7 to ake a thinga!tualJ he sipl7 posits the thing with all its predi!ates. Ahile thisdistinguishes =ant5s @iew fro Aolff5s* it also ties the pre0!riti!al =ant toa notion of di@ine !reation as the ne!essar7 !ondition of a!tualit7. Later inthe te?t* =ant asserts That things e?ist O...P is attriutale to the wise

!hoi!e of one who wills the.11

The assuption of di@ine !reation* howe@er* does not introdu!e a

,artesian !ir!le into =ant5s arguent* firstl7 e!ause he sets out not to pro@e God5s e?isten!e ut onl7 to estalish the grounds for su!h a proof* ut ore iportantl7 e!ause this assuption is not reHuired for hisarguent against traditional ontologi!al proofs. Ahereas Des!artesaintained that e?isten!e is in!luded in the !on!ept of God* the pre0!riti!al=ant !lais that God is in!luded in For iplied 7 the !on!ept of e?isten!e. =ant does indeed assue that e?isten!e eans !reatedness 7 a

di@ine author* ut that assuption is not necessary to his arguent:whether God is thought to e?ist or not* =ant5s definition of e?isten!e as anon0predi!ate iplies that God5s e?isten!e !annot e dedu!ed fro the!on!ept of God.

The assuption of di@ine !reation* howe@er* gi@es a doule eaning to=ant5s se!ond stateent* that e?isten!e is the asolute position of the

1C #P0 %k. ). Interpolations ine. I sustitute representation Odie 6orstellung Pfor Treash5s idea.

11 #P0 %k. 1C4.



(ET& L#'D 1>C

thing.1) %solute position ight ean huan logi!al positing* or it ight

ean God5s asolute !reation* pronoun!ing his onipotent +iat o@er a possile world.14 (oth senses are iplied* for =ant suggests that it isGod5s positing things into e?isten!e that allows huans to posit the ase?isting. +ositing* =ant sa7s* is identi!al with the !on!ept of eing O'einPin general.1/ Soething !an e posited in relation to a predi!ate Fa narwahlis rown* e.g.* in whi!h !ase eing is the !opula of Kudgent. (ut inaddition* should not onl7 this relation ut the thing in and for itself e@iewed as posited* then this eing is the sae as e?isten!e.13 E?isten!eO -aseinP is thus understood to e a spe!ifi! instan!e of eing O'einPJ whilethe forer indi!ates asolute positing* the latter !an also ean predi!ati@e

positing in general. This is wh7 the word is !an e used to indi!aterelations that non0entities or possile things ha@e to one another.1> In

pronoun!ing his +iat * God estalishes asolutel7 the e?isten!e of thingswhi!h were pre@iousl7 onl7 possile relations* ut does not there7 addan7 new deterinations to his idea of the things. It is ina!!urate* therefore*to sa7 % narwahl is an e?istent thing* for this suggests that e?isten!e is a

predi!ate in!luded in the !on!ept of a narwahl. Ae ought to sa7 the predi!ates that I think together as a narwahl elong to !ertain e?istent sea!reaturesJ in other words* we ought to think of the !on!ept of a narwahl*

with all its predi!ates* as asolutel7 posited.1 The narwahl is a!tual 7@irtue of God5s asolute positing* and thus positale as a!tual on thehuan s!ale* 7 huan oser@ers.

God* like the narwahl* !annot e predi!ated into e?isten!eJ e!ausee?isten!e is not a predi!ate* God !annot e said to e?ist sipl7 7 @irtue of the !on!ept of God in!luding e@er7 positi@e predi!ate. God5s e?isten!e!annot e pro@ed* =ant sa7s* on the asis of ere !on!epts. In =ant5s

asis for a deonstration* God can e posited asolutel7 7 @irtue of thene!essit7 that something e posited asolutel7: God5s ne!essar7 e?isten!eis the ne!essit7 of existence in general . =ant akes this !lai 7 showingthat possiilit7* and therefore !on!ei@ailit7* reHuire that there e someexistence. E@er7thing that is possile is also !on!ei@ale* for that whi!h isinternall7 possile ust e logi!all7 !oherent a!!ording to the prin!iple of

1) #P0 %k. 4.14 #P0 %k. /.1/ #P0 %k. 4.13 #P0 %k. 4.1> #P0 %k. /.

1 #P0 %k. 40/.



1>1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

!ontradi!tion* and what is logi!all7 !oherent is also !on!ei@ale. Ahat

allows for this internal possiilit7 is the a!tualit7 of something or other .The possiilit7 of things in general is aolished when no atter or nodatu for thought e?ists* Ofor thenP nothing !on!ei@ale is [email protected] If therewere no e?isten!e ` if nothing !ould e asolutel7 posited ` thennothing !ould e !on!ei@ed and nothing would e possile. There is no!ontradi!tion in the denial of all e?isten!e*

(ut that there e soe possiilit7 and 7et asolutel7 nothinga!tual !ontradi!ts itself. or if nothing e?ists* nothing!on!ei@ale is gi@en and one would !ontradi!t hiself in

ne@ertheless pretending soething to e possile. O...P To sa7nothing e?ists eans the sae thing as there is asolutel7nothing. It is o@iousl7 self0!ontradi!tor7 to add* despite this*that soething is possile.1B

+ossiilit7 in general* then* reHuires that there is not nothing : it reHuiresthe e?isten!e of something . %ll possiilit7 is gi@en in soething a!tual*and this gi@enness happens in two wa7s: either the possile is gi@en as adeterination in what is a!tual* or it is possile e!ause soething else isa!tual ` that is* as the !onseHuen!e of the e?isten!e of soething else.)C

%ll possiilit7 is gi@en as a deterination or !onseHuen!e of someactuality$ The !ondition for possiilit7 in general is an a!tual soething*in whi!h and through whi!h e@er7thing !on!ei@ale is gi@enJ O...P a!ertain a!tualit7 whose annulent itself would totall7 annul all internal

possiilit7.)1

This soething is not Kust another thing in the seHuen!e of effe!ti@e!ausesJ nor is it the logi!al !on!ept of a!tualit7 in general. The logi!al!on!ept of a!tualit7 !ould not itself generate the possile e?isten!e of things e!ause e?isten!e !annot e produ!ed fro ere !on!epts.

E?isten!e !an onl7 !oe aout through asolute positing 7 a eing thathas the power to transfer possiilit7 into a!tualit7. This eing is theultiate real ground of asolute possiilit7 O... pro@idingP the data and theaterial eleent in the !on!ei@ale.)) It e?ists ne!essaril7J it is unitar7*siple* iutale* and eternal* !ontaining the highest realit7*

19 #P0 %k. 9.1B #P0 %k. 9.)C #P0 %k. B.)1 #P0$ %k. 94.

)) #P0$ %k.B09C.



1>4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

#ne !ould* of !ourse* argue that the idea of !reation was ipli!it in

=ant5s anal7sis of e?isten!e all along* and that asolute positing is nothingother than di@ine !reation. The !onne!tion etween =ant5s inHuir7 into eing and his notion of produ!tion !ould thus e said to predeterine whathe takes to e the eaning of e?isten!e. This is pre!isel7 the line that&eidegger takes in his 0asic Problems o+ Phenomenology* where heargues that a !ertain produ!ti@e !oportent towards the world isipli!it in =ant5s philosoph7* as &eidegger takes it to e in the entiret7 of western etaph7si!al thought. &eidegger aintains that the idea of !reatedness ` that soething possile is !on@e7ed o@er to the a!tual*whether 7 adding predi!ates or 7 asolute positing ` is ased on theedie@al distin!tion etween essentia and existentia* whi!h =ant

preser@es as realit7 and a!tualit7.)3 The %ristotelian line is that thedistin!tion etween essen!e and e?isten!e is fundaental for produ!tion:onl7 if a possile !on!ept is distin!t fro a!tual e?isten!e !an the

produ!tion of eings o!!ur. Ahereas for Aolff this in@ol@es addinga!tualit7 to the !on!ept of the essen!e of the thing* for =ant* the thing issipl7 posited with all its predi!ates* and its !on!ept or essen!e reainsun!hanged. Aith oth philosophers a!tualit7 in@ol@es soe a!ti@it7 on the

part of God. &eidegger tra!es a!tualit7 a!k to agere* a!ting: that whi!h is

a!tual is possiilit7 whi!h has een a!tualized* ena!ted. %nd this spe!ifi!!hara!terization of all e?tant things as ena!ted* &eidegger sa7s*!oprehends eings in ters of a produ!ti@e !oportent towards the.This is the !harge that &eidegger la7s on =ant* asserting that =ant5s!onne!tion etween eing and produ!tion is entirel7 traditional.

I ha@e suggested alread7 that it is not the !ontent of =ant5s !on!eptionof di@ine !reation ut the ethod 7 whi!h he arri@es at it* that isrearkale in The #ne Possible 0asis. It is through an anal7sis of e?isten!e* and the ne!essit7 of e?isten!e to knowledge* that =ant5s

philosoph7 of produ!tion eerges. =ant e@identl7 aintains a distin!tion etween possiilit7 and a!tualit7* and thus etween essen!e and e?isten!eJhe also aintains a !on!eption of an a!ti@e God that posits eings into!reatedness. &eidegger5s !harge of produ!ti@e !oportent* as I willshow* is entirel7 !orre!t. (ut as we o@e into =ant5s !riti!al philosoph7*we !an use this notion of produ!ti@e !oportent against &eidegger5s

)3 -artin &eidegger* The 0asic Problems o+ Phenomenology, trans. %lert&ofstadter FIndianapolis: Indiana U+* 1B9) p. B4* BB. &ereafter are@iated to

0PP with page referen!es to the English translation.



(ET& L#'D 1>/

rather liited reading to show that e?isten!e* for =ant* is the produ!t of

natural and not di@ine a!ti@it7. urtherore* the relation etween essen!eand e?isten!e* etween the episteologi!al and e?istential ontologies* will pro@e to e far ore !ople? in =ant5s s7ste than &eidegger5s anal7sisallows for.

4. *eidegger8s prod#%tive %o$port$ent

+rodu!ti@e !oportent is* for &eidegger* an intentional attitude of a -a"

sein towards a thing: an attitude that interprets the thing and its eing inters of its fun!tion in a produ!ti@e s7ste. This !oportentunderstands that things ha@e een produ!ed* are produ!ile* or are not inneed of produ!tion. It is this produ!ti@e !oportent that &eidegger sa7shas guided the interpretation of the e?isten!e and essen!e of eings sin!eearl7 Greek philosoph7.)>

&eidegger argues that one of the earliest e?aples of su!h thinking isto e found in the relation etween morphe Ffor and eidos Flook* ideain Greek philosoph7. Ahile for odern philosoph7 the look or essen!e of

a thing is deterined 7 its for* for Greek ontolog7 it is the opposite: thefor of a thing* morphe* is deterined 7 its look* eidos. &eidegger suggests that this is e?plained 7 te!hni!al produ!tion* in whi!h the look

pre!edes the for: the produ!er egins with the idea* the anti!ipated look*of what is to e produ!ed through shaping and foring.) The eidos is theiage of iagination whi!h deterines what the thing alread7 was and is

efore all a!tualization.)9 (e!ause the eidos is prior to the a!tualizedthing* and e!ause it !ontains the total realit7 of what the thing alread7was* the eidos is the un!hanging truth of the thing: this eerges ost

!learl7 in +lato* where the idea represents the true realit7 of the parti!ular.&eidegger also argues that the eidos* whi!h !ontains all the Hualitati@edeterinations of a thing* !onstitutes the thing5s !opletedness* itsdeliitation as what it is* and thus its thing0deterinateness.)B #nl7

e!ause a spe!ifi! eidos go@erns produ!tion !an a thing e defined assoe spe!ifi! thing* and its whatness e as!ertained. This outlook on

)> 0PP p. 1C/03.) 0PP p. 1C>.)9 0PP p. 1C.

)B 0PP p. 1C9.



1>3 Pli 1/ F)CC4

eings !onsiders that things are understandale as spe!ifi! things e!ause

the7 ha@e een fored or produ!ed a!!ording to an eidos. %nd this eansthat eings are apprehended as ha@ing een produ!ed to stand !opletedon their own: the7 are produ!ed* pla!ed0efore F&eidegger pla7s on

.erstellen the apprehending person for use* released fro their relation tothe produ!er. The realit7* whatness* or essentia of a eing is thus dire!tl7related to its usailit7 and its standing independentl7 present* read7 for use.4C

&eidegger e?plains that the Greek word for that whi!h is* ousia*originall7 referred to propert7* and eings e!ae s7non7ous with at0

hand disposale possessions.41

#usia* that whi!h is* is the present athand* a@ailale for useJ e?isten!e* then* is interpreted as peranent presen!e. (eing* eing0a!tual* or e?isting* in the traditional sense* eans presen!e0at0hand.4) In his *ntroduction to 1etaphysics &eidegger addsthat the Greek sense of eing* as peranent presen!e* has the !hara!ter of standing in itself* anifesting itself for apprehension.44 &e thereforedes!ries the ode of a!!ess to the e?tant as 6or+inden* finding thee?istent thing present efore us. That whi!h e?ists is* for an!ient Greek

philosoph7* a!!essed through an intuiti@e finding present Odas

anschauende 6or+indenP whi!h is also known as aisthesis* a eholding per!eption.4/ &eidegger points out that su!h per!eption is onl7 aodifi!ation of produ!ti@e eha@iour* whi!h in@ol@es sight in the senseof the fore0sight of the anti!ipated look of the thing to e produ!edJ whilethe thing5s whatness is pres!ried 7 fore0sight* its thatness is estalishedthrough intuiti@e seeing. The a!tualit7 of the a!tual is only anifested in

pure intuition. urtherore* the a!tualit7 of the thing !an onl7 eestalished 7 referring a!k to its produ!tion* the fa!t that it has een

produ!ed a!!ording to an eidos and !opleted* set efore us for use.Ahen things are understood a!!ording to produ!ti@e !oportent* their a!tualit7 is onl7 !oprehensile in the !onte?t of their produ!tion and

per!eption ` things ha@e een produ!ed and set out to e found present 7 intuition. &eidegger5s point here is that the !on!epts of oth

4C 0PP p. 1C90B.41 0PP p. 1C90B. See also his *ntroduction to 1etaphysics* trans. 'alph -anhei

F$ew &a@en: ale U+* 1B3B* esp. p. >Cff and p. 1B/ff.4) 0PP p. 1CC.44 *ntroduction to 1etaphysics p. >40/.

4/ 0PP p. 1CB01C.



(ET& L#'D 1>>

essen!e6realit7 and e?isten!e6a!tualit7 refer a!k to produ!tion and are

grounded in huan produ!ti@e !oportent.This* for &eidegger* is the ground on whi!h the Aestern ontologi!al

tradition is ased: the produ!edness of eings is the presupposition for their !apa!it7 to e apprehended in per!eption* and it is with a produ!ti@e!oportent towards eings that we apprehend and understand theworld.43 % produ!ti@e e?istential ontolog7* then* is at the asis of episteolog7. E@en things whi!h are not understood to e produ!ed 7 a

produ!er ` things of nature ` are understood in ters of produ!ti@e!oportent* for these are understood to e the raw aterials whi!h are

alread7 present for produ!ing other things. +rodu!ti@e !oportent notonl7 understands indi@idual things as produ!ed* ut apprehends the worldin ters of a stru!ture of produ!ing.4> %nd this !oportent towards

eings deterines how their being is understood. It is due to produ!ti@e!oportent that oKe!ts are understood as independent: as produ!ed*

eings are finished and released fro their relation to a produ!er* standingindependentl7 on their own* a@ailale for use. This eans that things ha@ean e?isten!e* a eing0in0thesel@es* that is not dependent on huans: the

eing that is understood in produ!ti@e !oportent is e?a!tl7 the eing0in0

itself of the produ!t.

4

In eing apprehended in ters of produ!ti@e!oportent* things are alread7 understood to e in0thesel@es* to ha@e eing whi!h is not dependent on a huan produ!er. The eing0in0itself of athing is thus always already established in the apprehender5s !oportenttowards the thing. It is this parti!ular point that &eidegger uses toapproa!h the pla!e of produ!tion for =ant.

&eidegger aintains that there is an unde@iating !ontinuit7 of tradition fro an!ient and edie@al philosoph7 to =ant* insofar as eingis !onsistentl7 interpreted 7 wa7 of produ!tion.49 or the =ant of The

#ne Possible 0asis essa7* asolute positing is di@ine !reation* ande?isten!e is !reatedness: onl7 soething whi!h has een !reated 7 God!an then e posited 7 a huan suKe!t. &eidegger suggests that theedie@al sense of !reation that =ant inherits is related to* though notidenti!al with* the an!ient !on!ept of produ!tion. ro Greek to Latin

philosoph7* &eidegger !lais* there is a shift fro understanding the

43 0PP p. 11)04.4> 0PP p. 1130>.4 0PP p. 114.

49 0PP p. 11.



1> Pli 1/ F)CC4

world in ters of natural and huan produ!tion F phusis and techne to

understanding the world in ters of !reation 7 God: that which is isunderstood as ens creatum* while God is the uniHue ens increatum* the!reator of all eings whi!h is not itself in need of !reation.4B -edie@al andearl7 odern philosoph7 thus !ontinue to understand eings in ters of

produ!tion. The pre0!riti!al =ant is !learl7 thinking along these lines whenhe suggests a world di@inel7 !reated and des!ries God as eternal andiutale ne!essar7 e?isten!e: the !reator who does not hiself stand inneed of eing !reated.

&eidegger5s !lai is that eings* for =ant* are thought as produ!ed

peranent presen!e. Thus he adds that asolute positing for =ant eanspositing as letting soething stand of its own self./C Ahen a thing isasolutel7 posited* it is posited in and for itself* standing independentl7 of its !reator. The !reator gi@es the thing a eing in itself so that it a7stand on its own. %nd this essential le@el of eing is ina!!essile to thehuan oser@er. %lthough =ant does not forulate a phenoena0nouenadistin!tion in The #ne Possible 0asis* it is !lear that he does think of things as ha@ing an internal possiilit7 or sustan!e !reated 7 God andina!!essile to huan intuition. It is this internal possiilit7 that gi@es

things their thoroughgoing relations of unit7 and !oheren!e su!h thatthe7 e?hiit uni@ersal haron7 with one another./1 Ahile the huanoser@er !an spe!ulate aout the purpose of this haron7* she !annota!!ess its true workings. or &eidegger this liitation of knowledge withrespe!t to !reation is e?pli!ale in the !onte?t of produ!ti@e !oportent.&e interprets =ant to e sa7ing that huan intuition !annot a!!ess thetrue eing of things e!ause the forer has not !reated the latter./) Tosustantiate this !lai he draws upon two of =ant5s pre0!riti!al rearks:finite eings !annot of thesel@es know other things* e!ause the7 arenot their !reator* and no eing e?!ept the !reator alone !an !ogniti@el7grasp the sustan!e of another thing./4 "ust as knowledge of the eidos isrestri!ted to the produ!er for the Greeks* knowledge of the true eing or sustan!e or inner possiilit7 of things is liited to that eing who has!reated the things. &uan knowledge* eanwhile* is liited to thosethings whi!h huan intuition !an re" produ!e through the pro!ess of

4B 0PP p. 1190B./C 0PP p. 1109./1 See #P0 %k. B>ff./) 0PP p. 1/B.

/4 =ant* 'efle!tion no. B)B and Le!tures on -etaph7si!s* Htd. 0PP 1/B03C.



(ET& L#'D 1>9

representation.// Ahile God5s knowledge is e?istentiall7 and essentiall7

!reati@e* huan knowledge is episteologi!all7 reprodu!ti@e of that whi!his alread7 produ!ed. This iplies not onl7 an understanding of eing inters of produ!tion* ut also a !onne!tion etween the !onditions of knowledge and the !onditions of produ!tion. #nl7 what is e?istentiall7

produ!ed 7 God to e peranent presen!e !an e per!ei@ed* and onl7what is episteologi!all7 reprodu!ed , a!!ording to the appli!ation of the!ogniti@e fa!ulties to the per!ei@ed oKe!t* !an e nown. urtherore*&eidegger5s odel allows us to see how the e?istential andepisteologi!al ontologies e!oe separated in odern thought:e?istential !reation is God5s usiness* while episteologi!al reprodu!tionis huanit75s.

&owe@er* &ediegger5s anal7sis also shows that these two ontologies!annot e unrelated. or eings whi!h !an e episteologi!all7e?perien!ed ust first ha@e een e?istentiall7 !reated. &eidegger5sanal7sis of =ant* howe@er* allows hi onl7 a @er7 liited e?istentialontolog7: one in whi!h e?isten!e is understood as produ!edness0for0knowledge. %s produ!tion allows for !ognizailit7* !ognition iplies

produ!edness. The e?istential produ!tion of eings allows for their

episteologi!al reprodu!tion. E?istential produ!tion itself !annot eunderstood 7 the huan per!ei@er. &owe@er* the fa!t that eings areunderstood as produced is the asis of their episteologi!alrepresentation. &eidegger !oents on =ant5s two pre0!riti!al stateentsthus:

% genuine !ogniti@e grasp of a eing in its eing is a@ailaleonl7 to that eing5s !reator. The priar7 and dire!t referen!e tothe eing of a eing lies in the production of it. %nd this ipliesthat being o+ a being eans nothing ut producedness. O...P The

eing of things is understood as eing0produ!ed. In =ant this is present asi!all7 as a self0e@ident atter of !ourse* ut it doesnot re!ei@e e?pli!it e?pression./3

or &eidegger5s =ant* the eing of eings is understood as produ!ed peranent presen!e* and produ!edness eans knowailit7. +rodu!ednessis the ground of knowailit7 e!ause it is taken to e the ground of the

// See =ant5s )ritique o+ %udgment N>9* %k. 49/: we ha@e !oplete insight onl7into what we !an oursel@es ake and a!!oplish a!!ording to !on!eptsJ !f. )P&( ?iii: reason has insight onl7 into that whi!h it produ!es after a plan of its own.

/3 0PP p. 13C.



1>B Pli 1/ F)CC4

existence of eings* where true knowledge of the ground of e?isten!e is

ipossile. %n ontolog7 ased on this notion of produ!tion would e anepisteologi!al ontolog7 ` one whi!h* like Aolff5s* inHuires into the!onditions for the possiilit7 of the knowledge of eings. &owe@er* itwould e ased on an e?istential ontolog7 of produ!tion* a theor7 that

eings are generated and not erel7 conceptuali(ed . This is anepisteologi!al ontolog7 whi!h depends upon an e?istential ontolog7* andwhi!h therefore depends upon the e?isten!e of eings* not erel7 on thelogi!al relation of !on!epts.

I ha@e alread7 suggested that this is the kind of ontolog7 to whi!h =ant

o@es. Unfortunatel7* while &eidegger5s anal7sis gi@es us a =antianontolog7 ased on produ!tion* it does not go e7ond the des!ription of eings as produ!ed peranent presen!e. This is e!ause &eidegger elie@es that =ant does not o@e e7ond an ontolog7 of the e?tant./>

This is* in one sense* entirel7 true* ut &eidegger isses the radi!alis of =ant5s renewed fo!us on the e?tant* indi!ati@e of what soe!oentators see as his shift fro a rationalist to an epiri!ist stan!e. or while =ant5s definition of ontolog7 is siilar to Aolff5s* it differs in itsreferen!e to the e?isten!e of things. Aolff5s notion of ontolog7 had

nothing to do with a!tualit7: it was !on!erned with logi!all7 possile eing. =ant5s notion of ontolog7* like his notion of e?isten!e* reHuiresa!tualit7 as well as logi!al non0!ontradi!tionJ it reHuires a per!eptualrelation etween suKe!t and oKe!t. Ahile =ant !ontinues to defineontolog7 episteologi!all7* as the s!ien!e of the !onditions of

possiilit7 of knowledge* he adds that the !on!epts ust ear a relation tooKe!ts of the senses. =ant defines ontolog7 in his essa7 of 1B1* Ahat'eal +rogress has -etaph7si!s ade in Geran7 sin!e the Tie of Leiniz and Aolff:

#ntolog7 Fas a part of etaph7si!s is the s!ien!e that !oprisesa s7ste of all !on!epts and prin!iples of understanding* utonl7 insofar as these e?tend to oKe!ts gi@en 7 the senses and!an* therefore* e Kustified 7 e?perien!e. It does not deal withthe supersensile* the ultiate end of etaph7si!s* and thus

elongs to the latter onl7 as a propadeuti!. #ntolog7 is the por!hor entr7 wa7 of etaph7si!s proper and will e !alled

/> 0PP p. 1/9.



(ET& L#'D 1C

trans!endental philosoph7 e!ause it !ontains the !onditions and

first eleents of all our knowledge a priori$/

Aith this stateent =ant sa7s e?pli!itl7 that ontolog7 is !on!erned withthe !onditions of possiilit7 of sensile knowledge* and not with thesupersensile. Ahile that is to sa7 that ontolog7 is !on!erned withepisteologi!al grounds* and not with e?istential grounds or the eaningof eing* it is also to sa7 that ontolog7 is !on!erned with !on!epts and

prin!iples insofar as the7 relate to e?isting things. =ant5s is anepisteologi!al ontolog7* ut one that refuses to restri!t itself to thelogi!al e?aination of !on!epts: ontolog7 is a s7ste whi!h grounds

knowledge 7 !onne!ting !on!epts to e?isting things. The ao@e paragraph!ould* of !ourse* e an astra!t of the )ritique o+ Pure &eason* indi!atingthat =ant thought of that work as an ontolog7* as he hiself suggests in its!losing !hapters./9 I will now go on to look at eing and e?isten!e in thefirst ,ritiHue* to !onsider =ant5s departure fro di@ine !reation and thee?tent to whi!h he ne@ertheless aintains a produ!ti@e !oportent* as&eidegger suggests.

5. The Critique of Pure Reason: ;eing and nat#ral prod#%tion

The ao@e rearks suggest that =ant5s first ,ritiHue is an ontologi!alwork* where ontolog7 is understood to e an epistei! s7ste of !on!eptsand prin!iples of the understanding* insofar as the7 ake e?perientialknowledge possile a priori. I ha@e also suggested that the epistei!s7ste ust rest on an e?istential ontolog7 whi!h is !hara!terized 7 anotion of produ!tion. Ahile The #ne Possible 0asis presents an e?istentialontolog7 of di@ine !reation* we will see a different notion of produ!tion

taking hold in the first ,ritiHue* lurring the distin!tion etween e?istentialgrounds and episteologi!al grounds. %n e?istential ontolog7 ight e* as

/ Ianuel =ant* 3elches sind die wirlichen 7ortschritte, die die 1etaphysi seit Leibni(ens und 3ol+s >eiten in -eutschland gemacht hat/ V 3hat &eal Progresshas 1etaphysics 1ade in <ermany since the time o+ Leibni( and 3ol++/, ed.riedri!h Theodor 'ink F19C/* ilingual edition* trans. Ted &uphre7 F$ew ork:%aris (ooks* 1B94* p. 34 Ftranlsation slightl7 odified. or earlier definitions of ontolog7* see =ant5s Lectures on 1etaphysics$

/9 )P& %9/30> 6 (940/.



11 Pli 1/ F)CC4

%dorno suggests in his le!ture !ourse on =ant* sal@aged fro

episteolog7./B

The first half of the )ritique o+ Pure &eason FTrans!endental %estheti!and Trans!endental %nal7ti! is ontologi!al in pre!isel7 the sense =antdes!ries. The se!ond half* the Trans!endental Diale!ti!* !on!erns that towhi!h ontolog7 is propadeuti!* a!!ording to =ant: the supersensile* assoul* !osos* and God. &eidegger !opares the di@isions of the )ritiqueo+ Pure &eason to the di@isions of Aolffian etaph7si!s: the %estheti!and %nal7ti! are !hara!terized as metaphysica generalis Fontolog7* whilethe Diale!ti! with its three !hapters is !hara!terized as a !ritiHue of

metaphysica specialis Fps7!holog7* !osolog7* theolog7. =ant5s e?pli!itdis!ussion of eing o!!urs not in what is properl7 his ontolog7* ut rather in his !ritiHue of theolog7. =ant !riti!izes the ontologi!al proof for thee?isten!e of God in u!h the sae ters as he had in The #ne Possible

0asis essa7. %s in that essa7* he does this 7 wa7 of definitions of eingand e?isten!e. These ters do not ha@e e?a!tl7 the sae eanings as the7did in =ant5s pre0!riti!al work. In the )ritique o+ Pure &eason* -asein isused to nae the odal !ategor7 of e?isten!e: it is aong the pure!on!epts of the understanding* eHui@alent to the !on!ept of a!tualit7. 'ein*

7 !ontrast* is the !opula of predi!ati@e positing* a logi!al predi!ate rather than a real predi!ate. Thus =ant5s thesis aout eing:

?0eing is o@iousl7 not a real predi!ateJ that is* it is not a!on!ept of soething whi!h !ould e added to the !on!ept of athing. It is erel7 the positing of a thing* or of !ertaindeterinations* Oas e?istingP in [email protected]

=ant tells us that a real predi!ate is a predi!ate that deterines a thing*that is added to the !on!ept of the thing and enlarges it.31 %s in The #ne

Possible 0asis* =ant asserts that eing is not a predi!ate of this kind. The

addition of eing to a thing5s !on!ept does not enlarge the !on!ept of whatthe thing is. It does not affe!t the thing5s reality. It is useful at this point tonote =ant5s iportant distin!tion etween realit7 O &ealit5t P and a!tualit7O3irlicheit P. 'ealit7* for =ant as for (augarten and Aolff* does notdes!rie that whi!h is real in the sense of reall7 e?isting* ut rather

/B Theodor A. %dorno* =ants )ritique o+ Pure &eason, ed. 'olf Tiedeann* trans.'odne7 Li@ingstone FStanford: Stanford U+* )CC1* pp. 9309.

3C )P& %3B9 6 (>)>. I ha@e ra!keted =ep Sith5s words as e?isting* whi!h donot appear in the Geran te?t.

31 )P& %3B9 6 (>)>.



(ET& L#'D 1)

des!ries the deterinateness of a thing. ro the Latin res* =ant aligns

realitas with 'achheit * thingness or thing0deterinatenessJ in the tale of !ategories realit7 is listed under quality.3) The realit7 of a thing is itsquidditas* its what0!ontentJ thus a real predi!ate is an essential predi!atewhi!h deterines what the thing is.34 To sa7 that eing is not a real

predi!ate is to sa7 that eing !ontriutes nothing to the deterination of athing* !annot tell us an7thing aout what the thing is in its essen!e. %s inThe #ne Possible 0asis* =ant sa7s here that the Oa!tualP !ontains noore than the erel7 possile and uses the well known e?aple: %hundred Oa!tualP thalers do not !ontain the least !oin ore than a hundred

possile thalers.3/ The possile and the a!tual do not differ in their realit7: oth are deterined 7 the !on!ept of a hundred thalers. The7 differ*rather* in their a!tualit7: onl7 the a!tual one7 has e?isten!e* e?tantness*or as &eidegger will ha@e it* presen!e0to0hand.

(eing* whi!h is not a real predi!ate* has nothing to do with realit7.'ather* eing is oth a logi!al predi!ate and an e?istential predi!ate. In itslogi!al use it is the relation0word or !opula whi!h relates predi!ates totheir logi!al suKe!ts. In its e?istential use* we posit the suKe!t in itself with all its predi!ates* and indeed posit it as eing an object that stands in

relation to 7 concept .

33

This use of the word eing is roughl7eHui@alent to the eaning as!ried to the word e?isten!e in The #ne Possible 0asis. The thing is not Kust a possile anifold of predi!ates* utis actual and !an e known a posteriori.3> This is what =ant eans whenhe asserts that eing is the positing of a thing* or of !ertain deterinations*in thesel@es. (eing* as well as fun!tioning as a logi!al !opula* !an e anassertion of a!tualit7* des!riing a thing5s thatness rather than itswhatness. This definition of eing differs fro =ant5s definition of e?isten!e in The #ne Possible 0asis* howe@er* in that we are the ones whodo the positing* and things thesel@es are not generated 7 our positinga!ti@it7. The pre0!riti!al essa7 aintains that things !oe into e?isten!e 7@irtue of God5s asolute positing. The )ritique o+ Pure &eason* 7!ontrast* !lais that huan suKe!ts posit that a thing e?ists on the asis of e?perien!e. et this fails to a!!ount for the origin of e?isten!e* e?plaining

3) )P& (19)J %9C 6 (1C>.34 0PP pp. 4/049.3/ )P& %3BB 6 (>). I ha@e sustituted the word a!tual where =ep Sith

!onfusingl7 uses the word real F=ant uses 3irliche in oth !ases.33 )P& %3BB 6 (>).

3> )P& %>CC 6 (>)9.



(ET& L#'D 1/

The idea of this su0total is an ideal of pure reason* ne!essar7 for

understanding the deterinailit7 of things in general. =ant adds:If O...P reason eplo7s in the !oplete deterination of things atrans!endental sustrate that !ontains* as it were* the wholestore of aterial fro whi!h all possile predi!ates of thingsust e taken* this sustrate !annot e an7thing else than theidea of Oan %ll of realit7PJ an omnitudo realitatis.>)

The e?isten!e of things* as far as we !an e?perien!e and deterine the* presupposes the ideal of a Hualitati@e totalit7* a store of all possile!ontent for things. $othing is an oKe!t +or us* unless it presupposes the

su of all epiri!al realit7 as the !ondition of its possiilit7.>4 The possiilit7 of knowledge presupposes a ground of deterination. et thisground of deterination* the idea of the su0total of all possiilit7* istransfored 7 reason into an e?istential groundJ it is ade identi!al withthe !on!ept of an ens realissimum, the !on!ept of a total realit7 thingwhi!h !ontains within itself all possile deterinations of e?isting things.>/

'eason oKe!tifies and indi@iduates this !on!ept and !alls it the priordial eing O...P the highest eing O...P the eing of all eings Odas3esen aller 3esenP.>3 It is this last noination that =ant is parti!ularl7

!areful to Hualif7:These ters are not O...P to e taken as signif7ing the oKe!ti@erelation of an a!tual oKe!t to other things* ut of an idea toconcepts. Ae are left entirel7 without knowledge as to thee?isten!e of a eing of su!h outstanding pre0einen!e.>>

The eing of all eings is not an a!tual oKe!t and does not ne!essaril7e?istJ it is onl7 the idea of su!h a eing that reason presupposes. Thisbeing, the su0total of all possile deterinations* ust not e understoodas a thing . %ll possiilit7 presupposes not soe e?isting thing* ut rather

the idea of a su0total of all realit7. It is 7 eans of a trans!endentalsureption that reason o@es fro this idea to that of the ens

>) )P& %33 6 (>C4. =ep Sith oits what I ha@e pla!ed in ra!kets* whi!ho!!urs in the Geran te?t.

>4 )P& %39) 6 (>1C.>/ )P& %3>03 6 (>C/0>C3.>3 )P& %39 6 (>C>.

>> )P& %3B 6 (>C.



13 Pli 1/ F)CC4

realissimum* sustituting for Othe idea of a su0totalP the !on!ept of a

thing whi!h stands at the sour!e of the possiilit7 of all things.>

Ah7 does this trans!endental sureption take pla!e Ah7 does reason

insist on transferring the idea of a su0total onto the idea of an e?istentthing The answer does not sipl7 relate to the enduring notion of God asens realissimum* ut also refle!ts a fundaental un!ertaint7 in the fa!ult7of reason aout the origin and ground of e?isten!e. =ant indi!ates thisun!ertaint7 7 asking wh7 reason supposes the idea of total realit7 to e!ontained in an indi@idual eing. &e l7ri!all7 des!ries the wa@ering of reason on this Huestion:

Ah7 are we !onstrained to assue that soe one aonge?isting things is in itself ne!essar7* and 7et at the sae tie toshrink a!k fro the e?isten!e of su!h a eing O3esenP as froan a7ss O...P Ahile I a7 indeed e oliged to assuesoething ne!essar7 as a !ondition of the e?istent in general* I!annot think an7 parti!ular thing O -ing P as in itself ne!essar7. Inother words* I !an ne@er complete the regress to the !onditionsof e?isten!e sa@e 7 assuing a ne!essar7 eing* and 7et ane@er in a position to begin with su!h a eing.>9

Ahat we see here is not an aiguit7 aout the e?isten!e of God* utrather the wa@ering of reason etween the idea of a ne!essar7 ground for e?isten!e and the idea of a ne!essaril7 e?isting thing that grounds. =antasserts this distin!tion and warns against the redu!tion of the forer to thelatter. 'eason ust wa@er etween the two ideas lest it e linded 7 itsown illusion ` the illusion that the two are identi!al. The o@eent isenfor!ed 7 the two regulati@e prin!iples of ne!essit7 and !ontingen!7.The first !alls upon us to seek soething ne!essar7 as a !ondition of allthat is gi@en as e?istent* while the se!ond forids us to treat an7thing

epiri!al as this !ondition.>B

Thus reason is !onstrained to seek ane?istential ground ut pre@ented fro treating an7 epiri!al thing as thatground. The e?istential ground is not a thing in the world* 7et reason isirresistil7 drawn to this e?planation for the !ondition of e?isten!e. This!onfli!t draws attention to the prole that &eidegger !hara!terizes as theHuestion of the ontologi!al differen!e: nael7 that being itsel+ ustoriginate eings in soe wa7 ` and 7et while eing itself is not a being, it

> )P& %39)0394 6 (>1C0>11* itali!s ine.>9 )P& %>13 6 ( >/4.

>B )P& % >1> 6 ( >//.



(ET& L#'D 1>

!annot e understood without referen!e to eings. The Huestion as to

where eings get their being fro is answered here onl7 7 referen!e tothe regulati@e idea of a ne!essar7 eing* with all the !a@eats that entails.

'eason5s wa@ering etween the idea of a ne!essar7 ground for e?isten!e and the idea of a ne!essaril7 e?isting thing is irrored 7 a!onfli!t etween e!hanisti! and teleologi!al e?planations of nature. Thetwo sides of this !onfli!t are siilarl7 supported 7 the two regulati@e

prin!iples: while the prin!iple of ne!essit7 insists that we assue ane!essar7 first ground for all that elongs to e?isten!e* that of !ontingen!7 warns us not to regard an7 deterination whatsoe@er of

e?isting things as su!h an ultiate ground ... ut to keep the wa7 open for further deri@ation Oof !ausesP.C 'eason is in !onfli!t with itself o@er twoissues here: the Huestion of an e?istential ground* and the Huestion of ane?planator7 ground for a s7ste of nature. These two Huestions are thee?istential and episteologi!al @ersions of a roader Huestion whi!h!on!erns the origin of nature in general. #n the teleologi!al odel* weassue that nature has a ne!essar7 first !ause and that there is ane!essaril7 e?isting thing whi!h* 7 design* akes all e?isten!e possile.#n the e!hanisti! odel* we refuse to grant oKe!ti@e @alidit7 to a first

!ause and instead regard nature as a s7ste of effi!ient !auses* wherenothing epiri!al !an e regarded as the !ondition of all e?isten!e.Teleolog7 en!ourages us to understand e?isten!e to e gi@en 7 a being,nael7 GodJ e!hanis presents us onl7 with a s7ste of eings* thesour!e of the e?isten!e of whi!h !annot e dedu!ed fro an anal7sis of thes7ste itself.

The !onflation of these two !onfli!ts at %>1> 6 (>// suggests a nuer of iportant points. irst* as I ha@e suggested* the !onfli!t o@er whether nature is to e understood teleologi!all7 or e!hanisti!all7 is the

episteologi!al @ersion of the e?istential !onfli!t o@er whether e?isten!e isgrounded in a ne!essaril7 e?isting thing or not. The two positions will turnout not to e irre!on!ilale. (ut the iportant thing to note here is that thefundaental Huestion of natural s!ien!e is at the sae tie oth theHuestion of e?istential ontolog7 and the Huestion of episteologi!alontolog7. or the Huestion aout the origin of e?isten!e is the sae as theHuestion aout the produ!tion and generation of nature* and also theHuestion aout how we understand su!h produ!tion. =ant5s answer is thatateriall7* nature ust e thought to produ!e itself e!hani!all7* whilst

C )P& %>1> 6 (>//.



1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

forall7* it ust e understood to ha@e een !reated 7 God. Thus in our

s!ientifi! endea@ours we ust !ontinue to deri@e appearan!es fro other appearan!es as if there were an unending !ausal !hain* while at the saetie stri@ing toward the ultiate ground of that !hain* as if a ne!essar7

eing were presupposed.1 This results in =ant5s insisten!e on the idea of an intelligent e?istential ground whi!h regulates an otherwise e!hanisti!@iew of nature.) It is a foral reHuireent of reason* whi!h seeks unit7 inthe !onne!tion of e?perien!e* that a di@ine !reator e assued to e?ist* utthe !reator5s status is that of a erel7 regulati@e idea. In ters of what !ana!tuall7 e known to e?ist* it is nature itself that generates e?isten!e* and itis within nature that we ust seek the grounds of e?isten!e of those thingswe e?perien!e. The e?istential ground ust e sought within nature* su!hthat we pro!eed to in@estigate e?isten!e in ters of natural produ!tion* utthe ground of our !oherent understanding of e?isten!e is the regulati@eidea of a di@ine !reator. Thus we ust seek an e?istential ground solel7within nature* while upholding* for the sake of an episteolog7 of e?isten!e* the idea of a di@ine !reator.

It is episteologi!al ontolog7 itself whi!h arri@es at* and reHuires* theidea of a di@ine !reator as the origin of e?isten!e. %n e?istential ontolog7

should e deri@ale fro natural produ!tion alone* though without theregulati@e idea of God* we would not e ale to understand its7steati!all7. $atural produ!tion is the aterial !ondition of possiilit7of things in nature* whi!h ust e understood in ters of the !on!epts and

prin!iples of understandingJ this !on!eptualized nature* in turn* ust eunified 7 the ideas of reason* in!luding the idea of God as e?istentialground. The idea of God regulates the use of the understanding* and theunderstanding !onstitutes the e?perien!e of nature. et in addition to thetrans!endental hanging0together of e?perien!e* there is the aterialhanging0together of nature* whi!h is where the non0episteologi!ale?istential ontolog7 is to e found. It is true that we often interpret thisaterial !oheren!e of nature in teleologi!al ters. et natural produ!tion*howe@er it a!tuall7 o!!urs* ust e the material !ondition of possiilit7 of the appearan!es for whi!h the understanding pro@ides the +ormal !onditions of possiilit7. urtherore* we ust stri@e to e?plain nature5s!oheren!e in stri!tl7 natural Fnon0teleologi!al ters.4 E?planator7

1 )P& %>190B 6 (>/>0.) )P& %>C 6 (>B9 ff.

4 )P& %)04 6 (9CC01.



(ET& L#'D 19

grounds should ai to e adeHuate to e?istential grounds as the7 a!tuall7

are. This suggests that underl7ing the episteologi!al stru!ture of !on!epts* prin!iples* and ideas* is an e?istential ontolog7 of natural produ!tion ` that is* a notion of aterial nature as e!hanis* theongoing produ!tion of whi!h is the !ondition of possiilit7 of a world of e?isting things in general. This e?istential ontolog7 is at the asis of theepisteologi!al ontolog7* whereas a theor7 of di@ine !reation* as =antsa7s* !an onl7 e posited at the end of s!ientifi! inHuir7* after all naturale?planations ha@e een e?hausted./

If =ant is guilt7 of produ!ti@e !oportent* as &eidegger !lais* it is a

!oportent ased no longer on di@ine !reation* ut on natural produ!tion. This is the point that &eidegger isses: =ant5s liitedepisteologi!al ontolog7 reHuires an unliited* non0episteologi!ale?istential ontolog7 of natural produ!tion underpinning it. If produ!ednessis indeed the !ondition for the possiilit7 of per!ei@ing a thing* then natural

produ!tion is not onl7 the origin of the e?isten!e of things* ut also theground of all knowledge of nature. Indeed* it is the aterial ground of knowledge* Kust as the !ategories are the foral ground of knowledge.Through this initial look at produ!tion in the first ,ritiHue* we !an see that

e?istential grounds and episteologi!al grounds need not reain distin!t: produ!edness is the !ondition of possiilit7 of e?isten!e and of knowingaout that whi!h e?ists. %nd this episteologi!al s7ste* ased on ane?istential ontolog7 of produ!tion* then assues a di@ine !reator ase?planation for that whi!h !annot e e?plained naturall7. E?istential

produ!tion is now nature5s usiness* and episteologi!al reprodu!tion!ontinues to e huanit75s ` ut episteolog7 now rests on a theor7 of e?istential produ!tion whi!h episteolog7 itself ust produ!e* through

oth e?perien!e and s7ntheti! a priori prin!iples.

=ant5s episteologi!al ontolog7* as a s7ste of !on!epts and prin!iples* thus reHuires a produ!ti@e e?istential ontolog7* and thise?istential ontolog7 reHuires the episteologi!al stru!ture to regulate it.The two ust feed into one another if the huan ind is to know an7thingaout nature: the produ!ti@e e?istential ontolog7 ust e a@ailale to theepisteologi!al s7ste* stru!tured 7 it ut also ianent to it as itsgrounding !ondition.

/ )P& %>B40/ 6 ()10)J %)04 6 (9CC01.



1B Pli 1/ F)CC4

F. =ant and the $eaning of ;eing

&ow do the notion of eing and the !on!ept of e?isten!e fit into thisstru!ture I ha@e een talking aout an e?istential and produ!ti@e groundfor the e?isten!e of things* whi!h =ant puts in the !onte?t of dis!ussion of a ne!essar7 eing. et it will Hui!kl7 e seen that these !lais ha@e littleto do with =ant5s own notion of eing as he defines it in theTrans!endental Diale!ti!. (eing* for =ant* is not the origin of eingsJ nor is it a propert7 of the nor a !on!ept whi!h deterines the. urtherore*

eing is e@identl7 not a being . (eing is an episteologi!al sa7ing* an a!t

of Kudgent whi!h affirs the e?isten!e of a thing or the relation of a thingto a predi!ate. There is no reason to !onsider eing as inhering in thingsor originating theJ it is an affiration whi!h stes fro the suKe!t. It issignifi!ant that the word is has two different fun!tions: that of positinge?isten!e Fe?istential* and that of !onne!ting two !on!epts Flogi!al or episteologi!al. The is estalishes not onl7 the presen!e of a thing* utalso the nature or essen!e of that thing. In oth !ases* though* the is hasa stri!tl7 epistei! fun!tion* for e@en in its e?istential use* eing ser@es toassert the presen!e of a nowable thing to a mind J it does not indi!ate its

ere eing. (eing* in its e?istential use* affirs the relation the suKe!t ears to an oKe!t: that is* the fa!t that the oKe!t is a!tual* present to per!eption and !ognition.

Thus the ter eing is trans!endental in an iportant sense: itestalishes in Kudgent the a!tualit70relation a thing has to a per!ei@ingsuKe!t. (eing* for =ant* is the non0!on!eptual iteration of the relation

etween ind and world* the pro!laation 7 a ind that a world is present to it. Ahat !an e as!ried to a world* then* is not being ute?isten!e. %nd e?isten!e is as!ried to the world through appli!ation of

the !ategories. Thus it is that e?isten!e is one of the twel@e pure !on!eptsin =ant5s ontologi!al s7ste of !on!epts and prin!iples* while eing isneither a !on!ept nor a prin!iple. $e@ertheless* eing is aongst the!onditions of possiilit7 of knowledge as the positing of a knowale worldthrough the initial suKe!t0oKe!t relation. (eing is not a !on!ept e!ause it!onstitutes the @er7 asis of the =antian episteologi!al ontolog7* aking

possile the appli!ation of !ategories to a knowale oKe!t.



(ET& L#'D 19C

=ant5s notion of eing has een interpreted 7 +aul Da@ies as e?tra0

!ategorial* and siilarl7 7 Derrida as trans!ategorial.3

#n&eidegger5s late interpretation of this aterial* eing is odalit7 itself* oneof the four pre0!ategorial di@isions of Kudgents.> -odalit7* =ant tells us*is a pe!uliar fun!tion of Kudgent: it !ontriutes nothing to the !ontent of the Kudgent O...P* ut !on!erns onl7 the @alue of the !opula in relation tothought in general. Later =ant adds that the !ategories of odalit7 donot in the least enlarge the !on!ept to whi!h the7 are atta!hed as

predi!ates. The7 onl7 e?press the relation of the OoKe!t5sP !on!ept to thefa!ult7 of knowledge. The !ategories of odalit7 are possiilit7*e?isten!e* and ne!essit7. Aith regard to an oKe!t* !ategories of odalit7!ontriute no deterination of !ontent ut rather deterine what the!opula of the Kudgent ` the is ` eans for thought. There are threeodes of this relation: the oKe!t is related to thought either as possileFi.e. it agrees with the foral !onditions of e?perien!e* as a!tual Fi.e. it is

ound up with the aterial !onditions of e?perien!e* or as ne!essar7 Fi.e.it is deterined in a!!ordan!e with the uni@ersal !onditions of e?perien!e.9 These !ategories are akin to eing in that the7 are not real

predi!atesJ their eplo7ent deterines the pre!ise relation etweensuKe!t and oKe!t* either as possile* a!tual* or ne!essar7. These three

odalities are indeed odalities of eing* for the7 gi@e a pre!ise @alue tothe !opula. The is affirs the presen!e0to0ind of a thing* ut the odal!ategories ust deterine whether the thing in Huestion is possile* a!tual*or ne!essar7. The !ategor7 of e?isten!e deterines that the thing inHuestion has a!tualit7 for Kudgent.

I suggest that* with &eidegger* we align eing with odalit7* a o@ewhi!h assigns eing a grounding fun!tion in the tale of !ategories. %s the

3 +aul Da@ies has noted in =ant5s !riti!al philosoph7 a sense of eing that !annot e

!onflated with eing e?tant. See +aul Da@ies* =ant5s "oke F#r* #n ,ontinuing toUse the Aord RGod5* in The 1atter o+ )ritique* ed. %ndrea 'eherg and 'a!hel"ones F-an!hester: ,linaen* )CCC* pp. 11C01)9* here at p. 1). Derrida arguesthat eing* for =ant* trans!ends e@er7 !on!ept* and is the !ondition of all !on!eptsand !ategories. See "a!Hues Derrida* The Suppleent of ,opula: +hilosoph7

efore Linguisti!s* in 1argins o+ Philosophy* trans. %lan (ass FLondon: &ar@ester Aheatsheaf* 1B9)* pp. 130)C3* here at p. 1B3.

> -artin &eidegger* =ant5s Thesis aout (eing* trans. Ted E. =lein "r. andAillia E. +ohl* Pathmars, ed. Aillia -!$eill F,aridge: ,aridge U+*1BB9* pp.4404>4* here at p. 4/1.

)P& %/ 6 (BB01CCJ %)1B 6 ()>>.

9 )P& %)19 6 ()>30>.



191 Pli 1/ F)CC4

unspe!ified relation etween suKe!t and oKe!t* it allows for the

appli!ation of further !on!epts to the thing in Huestion. This eans that eing is an episteologi!all7 grounding a!ti@it7. The estalishent of therelation of intuitailit7 etween suKe!t and oKe!t is ne!essaril7 the firststep in an7 further inHuir7 into the oKe!t in Huestion* whether it is adee?pli!it or not: the narwahl ust e estalished to e an oKe!t for asuKe!t* and it ust e estalished to e a knowale oKe!t. This as!riptionof the is is the original relation etween suKe!t and oKe!t* whi!h

pre!edes the stages of intuition and !ategorization as =ant des!ries the.The estalishent* with the is* of the ind0world relation* would thus e

prior to all intuition and ake it possile. This would e an originaltrans!endental a!ti@it7 allowing for the !orresponden!e of intuition withthe world.

This is essentiall7 the position &eidegger takes in The 0asic Problemso+ Phenomenology. &eidegger argues ` u!h as he does in 0eing and Time ` that a pre0philosophi!al grasp of eing ust pre!ede theen!ounter with eings. Aith =ant* &eidegger sa7s* this is e?pressed as a

pre0!ogniti@e relation etween suKe!t and oKe!t* whi!h first estalishesthe field of intuitale oKe!ti@it7. &eidegger approa!hes this point through

per!eption. =ant akes !lear that per!eption is the eans 7 whi!ha!tualit7 is apprehended. Ahen dis!ussing eing as positing* he suggeststhat when a thing is thought to e?ist* all that is added to the !on!ept of theoKe!t is the per!eption of that thing.B Earlier* in his dis!ussion of a!tualit7in the +ostulates of Epiri!al Thought* =ant spe!ifies that the per!eptionwhi!h supplies the !ontent to the !on!ept is the sole ark of a!tualit7.9C

#n &eidegger5s interpretation* a!tualit7 for =ant has to do onl7 with theHuestion of whether a thing is gi@en in per!eption: onl7 per!eption !anestalish that a possile thing has a!tualit7* e?ists. This eans thate?istential assertion has the !hara!ter of per!eption: to posit a thing5se?isten!e is to sa7 that it !an e per!ei@ed. =ant thus sa7s in short:a!tualit7* e?isten!e* eHuals asolute position eHuals per!eption.

This is to sa7 that e?isten!e* asolute position* and per!eption are alldes!riptions of the intuiti@e or epistei! relation etween suKe!t andoKe!t. &eidegger spe!ifies that e?isten!e is not to e eHuated with the

per!ei@ed oKe!t* ut with its per!ei@edness* its relation to a positing

B )P& %>C1 6 (>)B.

9C )P& %))3 6 ()4.



(ET& L#'D 19)

suKe!t.91 This* of !ourse* does not ipl7 that the oKe!t e?ists onl7 7

@irtue of its eing per!ei@ed* as it would for (erkele7* ut rather that per!eption estalishes that the oKe!t e?ists for the positing suKe!t.&eidegger points out* howe@er* that per!ei@edness presupposes

per!ei@ailit7* and per!ei@ailit7 on its part alread7 reHuires the existenceof the per!ei@ale O...P eing.9) +er!ei@edness and positing !annot eeHuated with e?tantness* ut are wa7s of a!!essing this e?tantness.94

Indeed* this is o@ious fro =ant5s stateent that per!eption is the solemar of a!tualit7: per!eption is the onl7 wa7 we ha@e of knowing that athing is a!tual. This e?isten!e of the per!ei@ale thing would ha@e to

pre!ede its relation to the suKe!tJ the thing would ha@e to e?ist be+ore positing !ould take hold of it. This points to an e?tantness of the oKe!twhi!h pre!edes the !ogniti@e relation* ut also to a suKe!ti@e relation toe?tantness whi!h pre!edes per!eption. &eidegger argues that this isipli!it in =ant5s te?t: there is a pre0intuited e?tantness of things and a

pre0intuiti@e !oportent of huan suKe!ts to that e?tantness.9/

This eans* for &eidegger* that e?tantness ust soehow alread7 egrasped: e?tantness ust alread7 e dis!losed efore the e?tant !an [email protected] %nd this is the original relation etween suKe!t and oKe!t

whi!h &eidegger aligns with eing for =ant. It is at this point that&eidegger is ale to draw a parallel etween =ant5s notion of eing andthe e?istential stru!ture of Da0sein as des!ried in 0eing and Time. or &eidegger in this period* per!eption is an intentional !oportent of theDa0sein* dire!ted towards soething whose ode of eing is alwa7salread7 pre0!on!eptuall7 understood. % dis!losure of e?tantness elongs toDa0sein and is the !ondition of possiilit7 of the un!o@erailit7 of e?tant

91 0PP p. /9.

9) 0PP p. /B.94 0PP p. >. I ha@e used the ter e?tantness to refer to that state that things ight e in efore their relation to the suKe!t. This is distin!t fro e?isten!e* whi!hrefers to the state of things after the7 ha@e een intuited and deterined through the!ategories.

9/ Interestingl7* and apparentl7 without awareness of &eidegger5s arguent* Gerd(u!hdahl proposes a siilar reading of =ant: he argues for a pre0intuited eing inthe world of things whi!h we apprehend in a pre0intuiti@e wa7. See his =ant and the -ynamics o+ &eason F#?ford: (la!kwell* 1BB).

93 0PP p. 1.



194 Pli 1/ F)CC4

things.9> &eidegger e?tends this interpretation of the relation etween

per!eption and e?tantness to =ant:Aith respe!t to its possiilit7* perceivedness is grounded in theunderstanding o+ extantness$ O...P It is anifestl7 thisunderstanding of eing to whi!h =ant re!urs without seeing it!learl7 when he sa7s that e?isten!e* a!tualit7* is eHui@alent to

per!eption.9

Ahat &eidegger suggests is that the being of eings ust e dis!losed efore an7 parti!ular beings !an e un!o@eredJ efore a thing !an een!ountered* deterined* and posited along with all its predi!ates* its

eing ust in soe sense alread7 e understood. This takes pla!e as theoriginal suKe!t0oKe!t relation of the is* the episteologi!all7 groundingestalishent of eing. &eidegger akes !lear that this pre0!ogniti@erelation is not ena!ted prior to intuitionJ rather* it is ipli!it in the asi!!onstitution of Da0sein. In e?isting* the Da0sein also alread7 understandsthe ode of eing of the e?tant* to whi!h it !oports e?istingl7.99 Da0seinhas a asi! episteologi!al !oportent to things* whi!h estalishes thatthe7 are oKe!ts of possile knowledge. The !onditions of this estalishingo@e are that things are* and* as we saw pre@iousl7* that the7 are

produ!ed.I elie@e that &eidegger5s notion of the pre0!ogniti@e en!ounter whi!h

estalishes the presen!e and produ!edness of eings for thought gi@es usthe est wa7 of understanding how the initial stage of the apprehension of

eings o!!urs in =ant5s s7ste. (ut we need to ake !lear that this pre0!ogniti@e en!ounter does not a!!ess the eaning of eing or that whi!hgrounds e?isten!e in =ant5s s7ste. 'ather* eing is stri!tl7episteologi!all7 grounding: the pre0!ogniti@e en!ounter estalishes thegrounds of knowledge* not the grounds of e?isten!e. (eing is the asis of

=ant5s episteologi!al ontolog7* not his e?istential ontolog7. The groundof the e?isten!e of things* then* has nothing e?pli!itl7 to do with eing* ut

9> 0PP p. 1. See also &eidegger5s introdu!tion to 0eing and Time* trans. "oanStaaugh F%lan7: SU$ +ress* 1BB>.

9 0PP p. 10). It is un!lear to e wh7 &eidegger insists that =ant sa7s that e?isten!eis eHui@alent to per!eption. =ant nowhere asserts their eHui@alen!e* ut sa7s that

per!eption is the sole eans of veri+ying the e?isten!e of soething. Later in the passage to whi!h &eidegger refers F)P& %))30> 6 ()40/* it e!oes !lear that=ant is talking aout how we a!Huire knowledge of the e?isten!e of things* ie. onl7through per!eption.

99 0PP p. 1.



(ET& L#'D 19/

rather has to do with natural produ!tion. It is in =ant5s natural philosoph7

that we ust seek his e?istential ontolog7. et as we ha@e seen* thee?istential ontolog7 will e stru!tured 7 the episteologi!al ontolog7*while also foring the ground for its possiilit7.

In his !riti!al period* =ant5s e?istential ontolog7 is ased on natural produ!tion* while di@ine !reation takes on the status of an idea thatregulates our understanding of natural produ!tion. &is episteologi!alontolog7* eanwhile* is a s7ste of !on!epts and prin!iples with eing attheir asis. Ahile the grounds of e?isten!e and the grounds of knowledgewere stri!tl7 separated for =ant5s iediate philosophi!al prede!essors*

for =ant the7 are intertwined: natural produ!tion ust e theorized 7 theepisteologi!al s7ste* while knowledge ust ultiatel7 depend upon thesour!e of all e?isten!e. I hope to ha@e shown here that =ant5s ontolog7 isnot stri!tl7 episteologi!al* ut is also e?istential and produ!ti@e.&eidegger is right that =ant does not o@e e7ond an ontolog7 of thee?tant.9B (ut with this* =ant o@es de!isi@el7 e7ond an ontolog7 of theconcept * thus aking a signifi!ant ad@an!e in the philosoph7 of e?isten!e.&eidegger is also right that the !riti!al philosoph7 e?presses a produ!ti@e!oportent towards things. (ut rather than eing a !onstraint* as

&eidegger suggests it is* this notion !an e used to e?aine the iportan!eof natural produ!tion in =ant5s s7ste* and the underl7ing ne!essit7 of a!ertain kind of aterialis to trans!endental idealis. Indeed* what willeerge fro =ant5s philosoph7 of aterial nature is a ground of eingsthat !an in no wa7 e !hara!terized as produ!ed peranent presen!e* utust instead e deterined as ongoing produ!ti@e a!ti@it7.

9B 0PP p. 1/9.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 1930199

The Memory of Thought

Alexander Garcia Duttmann, The Memory of Thought (London:Continuum, 2002)

CL)IR C'L+R''=

In -i++erence and &epetition Gilles Deleuze de!lared that he was finall7Rdoing philosoph7*5 rather than pursuing the histor7 of philosoph7FDeleuze 1BB/* ?@. E@en so* in his histori!al studies of philosophersDeleuze had alread7 drawn a distin!tion etween a!ti@e and rea!ti@eapproa!hes to past philosophers. 'eading a figure fro the past is not

aout eginning with a well0fored Huestion and then assessing @ariousarguents to see who has !oe up with the est solution. Su!h anapproa!h erel7 doesti!ates the philosophi!al persona* returning the

pro@o!ati@e e@ents of philosoph7 to a single philosophi!al horizon. (7!ontrast* Deleuze asks how ea!h philosopher* 7 posing a prole*transfors the histor7 of philosoph7 FDeleuze 1BB1. Great philosoph7 isuntiel7 philosoph7J it does not add to or enri!h a philosophi!al histor7that we share and re!ognise. 'ather* a genuinel7 new prole disruptswhat we took oursel@es and philosoph7 to e* opening a new histor7.

In The 1emory o+ Thought, %le? Gar!ia Duttann distan!es his ownwork fro the histor7 of philosoph7 and does so in a doule anner.Duttann sees &eidegger and %dorno as in@oking naes M Gerania and%us!hwitz M that re!onfigure the histori!al !onte?t of philosoph7. (ut hiswork itself ena!ts the stru!ture of the nae* de!iding that &eidegger and%dorno present e@ents of philosoph7* and that their work is not Kust withinhistor7 ut also arks a de!ision that !onstitutes histor7. Indeed* therelation etween the nae and the !on!ept is* Duttann insists* not a

pe!uliarit7 we !an attriute to these two philosophers who are writing in ahistori!all7 signifi!ant oent* ut is a ne!essar7 stru!ture. Thought



,L%I'E ,#LE('##= 19>

egins with naing. %n e@ent* whi!h as 7et !annot e thought* astered or

!oprehended* presents itself to e thought. The nae la!ks sense and!onte?t. (ut naing is also an anti!ipation of sense in its @er7 failure toa!hie@e sense. The nae is the !ondition of sense ut is also that whi!hust e forgotten in the !onstitution of sense. The fa!t that* toda7* Rafter %us!witz5 has e!oe a slogan that e?tends e7ond %dorno s!holarship ise@iden!e of this stru!ture. ar fro !orre!ting the !oonisapprehension of what Rafter %us!hwitz5 means* or ust ean*Duttann asks wh7 this nae* in %dorno* !ould not 7et ha@e eeneaningful. The naing of this e@ent in %dorno was an attept to pursuethe liits of !oprehension* while !oprehending those @er7 liits.

In the sae anner* Duttann approa!hes %dorno and &eidegger witha resistan!e to in!lusion. &is work is* therefore* diaetri!all7 opposed tothose studies of %dorno that would lo!ate hi within* and defend hifro* the rigorous tradition of anal7ti! and !riti!al philosoph7. In !dorno2

-isenchantemnt and Ethics, ".- (ernstein presents %dorno as arearkal7 assiilale and @aluale philosopher* who pro@ides solutionsto su!h Huandaries as internalis @ersus e?ternalis* or dis!ourse ethi!sand =antianis. or (ernstein* %dorno5s thesis of disen!hantent allows

us to deal with our loss of a !onte?t for pra!ti!al reason F(ernstein )CC1.Duttann* 7 !ontrast* does not see %dorno as des!riing a loss of sense ut as produ!ing a nae that disrupts the sense of histor7. Duttann5s&eidegger is also a far !r7 fro &uert Dre7fus5s respe!tale and sensile

philosopher who !an help Rus5 sol@e the ind0od7 prole FDre7fus)CCC* or whose response to the holo!aust !an e read as a s7pto of Geran nationalis Foung 1BB. 'ather* 7 naing these philosophers*and 7 seeing their work as an e@ent that thought in its !urrent for !annot!oprehend* Duttann asks if their philosoph7 ight e est reada!!ording to what it deands and pro@okes* rather than what it sa7s.&eidegger5s naing of Gerainia dis!loses philosoph7 itself as anunde!idale e@ent etween nae and !on!ept* for the philosopher ustnae an e@ent in order to think and in order to a@oid the repetition of analread7 !onstituted histor7. (ut this naing shows &eidegger5s philosoph7itself to e a histori!al de!ision aout histor7* a de!ision that ust ha@e

een possile fro its own histor7* ut that is also e7ond &eidegger5sown histori!al !al!ulation. If we sipl7 sa7 that %dorno* like so an7others* saw %us!hwitz as a s7pto of the tri@ialit7 of reason* then wede!ide in ad@an!e the relation etween nae and !onte?t. If* howe@er* we



19 Pli 1/ F)CC4

ask aout the resistan!e of the nae to sense* and ask how ea!h nae

produ!es a philosophi!al !onte?t and histor7* how ea!h nae de!ides whatust e thought and what reains outside thought* then the philosopher isnot full7 redu!ed to a !on!ept* ut reains to e read.

(oth %dorno and &eidegger* for Duttann* present and think thestru!ture of the nae. (oth were aware of philosoph75s own re!ognitionof itself* and the liits of self0naing. (oth naed an e@ent in histor7 inorder oth to ark philosoph75s liit and to a@oid !on!eptualising thatliit fro an alread7 !onstituted philosoph7. (7 reading these

philosophers as naes rather than !on!epts* as e@ents within philosoph7

that pre!lude us fro lo!ating the isre!ognition of RGerania5 within&eidegger* or the proper approa!h to R%us!hwitz5 in %dorno* Duttanne?poses the risk of the nae. $othing de!ides the propriet7 of the nae.#nl7 when the nae falls into !on!eptualit7 !an we assess what the naewill ha@e done. #nl7 with the reading of the philosopher fro within thehistor7 the7 ake possile !an we assess the for!e of their prole.

&istor7 is ore than the ilieu of philosoph7 and philosoph7 is orethan the response to histor7. The histori!al nae* the e@ent that ea!h

philosopher re!ognises as the for!e that philosoph7 ust !onfront* is not a

de!ision within the histor7 of philosoph7. R%us!hwitz5 and RGerania5 ask us to do philosoph7 differentl7* ut the7 !an ha@e this for!e in relation to philosoph7 onl7 e!ause philosoph7 has soehow* efore itself* allowedthis e@ent to e naed.

The prole of the nae is* in Duttann5s work* itself a nae. Thest7le of The 1emory o+ Thought is !onditional rather than propositional. If it is the !ase that %us!hwitz and Gerania are naes* if the7 did not 7etha@e a eaning and a sense* then what is philosoph7 su!h that it !annae +hilosoph7 is no longer a logi! that ust deal with histor7* nor

itself a histor7 that !an refle!t on @arious wa7s of legitiating logi!.Duttann akes a positi@e !lai to what doing philosoph7 isJ ut this!lai is perfored* rather than stated. The 1emory o+ Thought approa!hesthe nae in &eidegger and %dorno to state the @er7 stru!ture of naing* asan e@ent of thought that resists thought ut that also de!ides the path of thinking. Duttann5s te?t itself is an a!t of naingJ it does less to defendthe relation etween &eidegger and %dorno than it deonstrates whatsu!h a relation ight enale us to think. If philosoph7 is naing* then its!onte?t is not pre0gi@enJ nor is su!h a !onte?t inno!ent or deterinale.

The naing of an e@ent is an a!t that does not 7et ha@e sense ut that



,L%I'E ,#LE('##= 199

orients sense. 'eading a philosopher !reates the prole and the !onte?t

that allows the philosopher to e thought* to then e!oe a !on!ept withina philosophi!al histor7.

(ernstein* ".-. )CC1. !dorno2 -isenchantment and Ethics$ ,aridge:,aridge Uni@ersit7 +ress$

Drefus* &uert. .eidegger, )oping, and )ognitive 'cience. -ark Arathall and "eff -alpas ed. ,aridge* -ass.: -IT +ress* )CCC.

oung* "ulian. .eidegger, Philosophy, Ga(ism. ,aridge: ,aridge

Uni@ersit7 +ress* 1BB



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 19B01BC

Virt#all0 (ew

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II , trans. Hug!omlinson, "ar#ara Ha##er$am, and %liot &oss Al#ert (London:Continuum, 2002)

)*ID) =*)(D=R

% st7le is anaging to staer in one5s own language. It isdiffi!ult* e!ause there has to e a need for su!h staering.

$ot eing a staerer in one5s spee!h* ut eing a staerer of language itself. (eing like a foreigner in one5s own language.

,onstru!ting a line of flight.1

The prole of no@elt7 Fof its eergen!e and* indeed* of its @er7 possiilit7 is well0trodden ground in the histor7 of philosoph7. 'epla!ingthe peranen!e of sustan!e with e!oing and flu? at the foundations of thought and knowledge* as is done in u!h !urrent Rde!onstru!ti@e5

philosoph7* !arries with it a Huestion: If no@elt7 is !ontinuall7 eing!reated* how !an we re!ognize it* if Rre!ognition5* 7 its @er7 nature*in@ol@es the re!oposition of pre0e?isting eleents %n e?aple* in thework of Gilles Deleuze* of how this relation etween old and new is

a!knowledged* if not ne!essaril7 resol@ed* is through the eplo7ent of Rinor5 languages. In@ention or R!reation5 o!!urs together with* and inspite of* the s7stes of thought* language* or politi!s that stru!ture our !on!eptual and so!ial worldsJ an old s7ste endures and 7et is alsosu@erted 7 the a!ti@it7 of the Rinor5 eleent added to it.

The prole !ries out for soe spe!ifi!it7.

% good pla!e to start* perhaps* is the new edition of the Deleuze6+arnet -ialogues. ,oonl7 re!oended as a !opa!t introdu!tor7 te?t to the

1 G. Deleuze* -ialogues ** * p/



A%&ID% =&%$D=E' 1BC

Deleuze oeu@re* this re@ised edition !ontains one Rnew5 essa7 entitled

RThe %!tual and the ;irtual5* translated 7 Eliot 'oss %lert. %lthough itis suggested 7 the translator that this additional pie!e was* in fa!t* erel7a draft for another paper* in itself* the essa7 does ha@e a nuer of @irtues.

1 It reiterates the relationship etween @irtual and a!tual* not as that etween pre0e?isting possile and finished produ!t* ut as one of utuale?!hange Fa !ir!uit in whi!h the iperanen!e of suKe!ti@it7 is e?posedat the ase of the Rpriordial5 a!t of per!eption.

) %lert5s generous end0notes ake wel!oe referen!es to the parti!ular works of &enri (ergson that ha@e dire!tl7 inspired Deleuze5s e?ainations

of the @irtual6a!tual relation Fworks su!h as 1ati8re et mémoire and LWnergie spirituelle that e?plore the intera!tions of eor7 and per!eption* of past and present.

-7 one Huile is that the in!lusion of this essa7 Fof arel7 fi@e pageshardl7 Kustifies the auda!ious addition of RII5 to the !olle!tion5s original

pulished title. or the sake of a!!ura!7 and re@it7* then* I would sa7 Kusttwo things. irstl7* -ialogues ** reains a useful perspe!ti@e on the!entral preo!!upations of soe of Deleuze5s works in whi!h the saesuKe!t atter is treated with soeties 7stif7ing !ople?it7 Fe.g.*

L!nti"#edipe and 1ille Plateaux. Se!ondl7* it should sipl7 e notedthat this !olle!tion is not* stri!tl7 speaking* Rnew5.



Pli 1/ F)CC4* 1B10)C4

The Logic of Sensation

Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. "' Gilles Deleuze (London e* +or: Continuum, 200-) !ranslated rom te /renc #'Daniel . 1mit. 20 33.

D)RR( )2+R'S

This translation of Deleuze5s elegant and sustained engageent with thespe!ifi!it7 of painting appears soe twent7 7ears after its initial

puli!ation in ran!e and is the last of Deleuze5s aKor philosophi!al

works to e translated into English. Ahen Deleuze originall7 pulishedthis work in 1B91 it !ae as a two0@olue set* with the first @olue!onsisting of the te?t and the se!ond of full0page reprodu!tions of the

paintings 7 (a!on !ited 7 Deleuze. Sin!e his arguents often unfoldthrough @er7 detailed anal7sis of spe!ifi! paintings 7 (a!on it isunfortunate that su!h a @olue of reprodu!tions does not a!!opan7 thislong0awaited translation. &owe@er* as Daniel Sith indi!ates in histranslator5s prefa!e* reprodu!tions of (a!on5s work are readil7 a@ailaleeither in print or on0line* and that of !ourse Deleuze5s te?t is est read

ha@ing su!h iages on hand.The te?t itself !onsists of se@enteen Rruri!s5* ea!h dealing with a ore!ople? aspe!t of (a!on5s paintings that Deleuze !lais R!ould ser@e asthe thee of a parti!ular seHuen!e in the histor7 of painting.5 Thus when!onsidered together these se@enteen ruri!s are intended to fun!tion as ana!!ount of a general Rlogi! of sensation5 asso!iated with a @er7 spe!ifi!task for painting. To grasp this logi! of sensation in painting* it isne!essar7 to inHuire into the nature of the painterl7 task whi!h fun!tions asthe operati@e presupposition of Deleuze5s Logic o+ 'ensation. Deleuze5s

a!!ount of this painterl7 task is e?pli!itl7 ediated through the spe!ifi!it7



D%''E$ %-('#SE 1B)

of (a!on5s own response as a painter* and is arti!ulated 7 Deleuze as that

route in painting that is !on!erned with elaorating Rhapti! spa!e5. &apti!spa!e* for Deleuze* is neither a anual spa!e opposed to a purel7 opti!alspa!e of @ision* nor is it a purel7 ta!tile spa!e !onne!ted to the opti!al. Itis rather a distin!t kind of spa!e that !opetes with opti!al spa!e. Thisroute would see to indi!ate that painting itself should not e understoodas the effort to erel7 perfe!t the representation or reprodu!tion of @isilefors. Su!h a notion of perfe!tion would erel7 ser@e to ipose linearit7upon the histori!al de@elopent of painting and restri!t what painting isa!tuall7 ale to a!hie@e. Thus for Deleuze in the Logic o+ 'ensationrepresentational perfe!tion is not !onsidered to e painting5s priar7 task.%s -erleau0+ont7 writes in RE7e and -ind5:

The idea of a uni@ersal painting* of a totalisation of painting* of afull7 and definiti@el7 a!hie@ed painting is an idea ereft of sense.or painters the world will alwa7s e 7et to e painted* e@en if itlasts illions of 7ears it will end without ha@ing een!onHuered in painting.1

Deleuze argues that painting is and alwa7s has een fundaentall7!on!erned with presenting the non0@isile for!es that a!t ehind or eneath

the @isile fors. Su!h a task has o@iousl7 e!oe ore and oree?pli!it for painters throughout the last !entur7 gi@en the eHui@alen!eestalished 7 !onteporar7 ph7si!s etween energ7 and atter. The!onstitution of e@er7 aterial oKe!t is now understood as a !ople?!on!entration of in@isile for!es. % phrase fro the painter +aul =leeresonates as a t7pe of otif in Deleuze5s ook M Rnot to render the @isile*

ut to render @isile5. Thus in painting it is ne@er a Huestion of reprodu!ingor representing !on!rete and @isile fors or e@en of in@enting astra!tfors. or painting it is alwa7s a Huestion of !apturing the in@isile for!es

of the 'eal* or what (a!on understands as !apturing the Rfa!t5. +aintersust attept to e?tra!t fro these in@isile for!es a Rlo! of sensation5 7!reating a !onstru!t or asselage in paint that ser@es as fraework for the !on@e7an!e of the sensation. The resulting artwork is thus a t7pe of sensational onuent to the in@isile for!es of the 'eal. In the Logic o+ 'ensation Deleuze argues that a R!ounit75 of artists for around a!oon prole* nael7 how to effe!ti@el7 harness these in@isile for!es

7 !reating a work of sensation !apale of eing adeHuate to the. %n

1 -. -erleau0+ont7* RE7e and -ind5* translated 7 ,. Daller7 in The Primacy o+

Perception F$orthwestern U.+.* 1B>/* p.19B



1B4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

iportant part of this artisti! task is this dis!o@er7 of a eans of

!on@e7an!e !apale of sustaining the @iolent iedia!7 of the sensationrather than erel7 fun!tioning to dull it. Ahilst different arts de@elop ande@ol@e their own solutions gi@en the nature of the aterial the7 ha@e towork with* Deleuze !onsiders (a!on5s painted igures Rto e one of theost ar@ellous responses in the histor7 of painting to the Huestion* &ow!an one ake in@isile for!es @isile5)

In de@eloping this a!!ount of the spe!ifi! painterl7 response in the Logic o+ 'ensation Deleuze often draws upon stateents ade 7 the painter hiself in !on@ersation with the art !riti! Da@id [email protected] Indeed*

one of the !ornerstones of Deleuze5s anal7sis is the !lai that we fail tolisten !losel7 enough to what painters thesel@es a!tuall7 sa7 regarding oth their own work and the nature of painting. ,onseHuentl7 in order to!onstru!t a philosophi!al understanding of (a!on5s work that is in soewa7 isoorphi! with the paintings thesel@es Deleuze e!oes oliged toalign hiself with (a!on5s understanding of his own work and the natureof painting that he e?presses through language. This alignent e!oes so!lose at ties that one !ould easil7 des!rie Deleuze5s ook as a t7pe of rigorous philosophi!al suppleent to (a!on5s inter@iews with S7l@ester.

Deleuze5s own fundaental understanding of (a!on5s paintings rests uponthe !ontention that the7 su!!eed in a!utel7 !on@e7ing a @er7 parti!ular t7pe of @iolen!e and that this is a @iolen!e o+ sensation rather than the@iolen!e of a spe!ifi! represented spe!ta!le. This is a @iew e?treel7 !loseto (a!on5s own @iew of his paintings. (a!on5s paintings thus attept to!on@e7 a t7pe of sensor7 @iolen!e asso!iated with the wa7 !olour odulation and line are utilised to !apture a sensation of the Rrutalit7 of fa!t5 or what (a!on sa7s Rused to e !alled truth5. &is attept to Rpaint thes!rea5 appears to Deleuze to e an e?eplar7 !ase in point. %!!ording to(a!on his ai was not to erel7 paint a reprodu!tion of the @isile horrorsof the world efore whi!h one s!reas ut rather to paint the intensi@efor!es that ight a!tuall7 produ!e a s!rea. &is ai is to Rrender @isilethe in@isile for!es5 that !on@ulse the od7 so as to produ!e an a!tuals!rea. The reprodu!tion of the a!tual @iolen!e of the horrif7ing spe!ta!leust e renoun!ed in the effort to !oune u!h ore deepl7 with* and

) G. Deleuze* 7rancis 0acon2 The Logic o+ 'ensation* p. 394 D. S7l@ester* The 0rutality o+ 7act2 *nterviews with 7rancis 0acon FQ"FN* 4rd

edn. FLondon: Thaes [ &udson* 1B9 Deleuze !ites this ook so often that it is perhaps ad@isale that one5s reading of Deleuze5s te?t e a!!opanied 7 a !op7 of

this te?t as well as 7 reprodu!tions of (a!on5s paintings.



D%''E$ %-('#SE 1B>

(7 reaking with the opti!al !ode of representational figuration* oth of

these e?trees of astra!tion reak with the per!ei@ed task of painting asthe iposition of Rfor5 upon atter. Thus Deleuze argues that the pureastra!tionists aied to lierate for through radi!alising opti!al !odes*whereas the astra!t e?pressionists aied to lierate atter throughunleashing an un!onstrained anual !haos. Ahat e!oes !lear is that

oth routes re!onfigure the painterl7 task awa7 fro the elaoration of theRatter0for5 relation go@erned 7 representational !odes and !oordinatesand toward a !on!entration upon elaorating pre@iousl7 une?ploredRaterial0for!e5 relations. +ainters upon either of these artisti! paths thusattept to elaorate a new eans for !apturing pure intensities of for!e*what +aul =lee !alled Rthe for!es of the !osos5. &owe@er* Deleuze !ites=lee5s !lai that in order to su!!essfull7 produ!e a !ople? sensation*Fi.e. in order to e ale not onl7 to harness the intense for!es of the !osos

ut also to render the suseHuent sensation R@isile5 in a sustainale wa7*the painter ust pro!eed with a soer and dis!iplined gesture thatsiplifies* sele!ts and !onstrains the aterial. =lee faousl7 !laied thatall an artist needed to open up an event of the 'eal was the sipli!it7 of a

pure and siple line* a pure infle?ion unfolding in and of itself. or =lee if one attepts to ultipl7 this siple line and elaorate an o@erl7 !ople?

spa!e tra@ersed 7 a !ople? interpla7 of ultiple lines* one risks openingup the spa!e to all e@ents and irruptions of the for!es of the !osos. Theo@ious danger here is that one risks produ!ing nothing ut a !haoti!s!rile that effa!es the genuinel7 lierating line* there7 effa!ing thesensation of the for!es of the 'eal. or Deleuze =lee5s rearks fun!tion to!larif7 a prole inherent within the painterl7 path pursued 7 their astra!t e?pressionists through the elaoration of pure anual !haos.

,learl7 (a!on !hooses a different painterl7 path* and for Deleuze thereason for this was pre!isel7 (a!on5s !on!ern with a@oiding theeffa!eent of the !larit7 of the sensation. Deleuze !lais that in (a!on5s

paintings an entirel7 different logi! of sensation e!oes apparent throughthe elaoration of a Rhapti!5 spa!e as his response to the iperati@e torender @isile the in@isile. Deleuze5s a!!ount of (a!on5s response eginswith the de@elopent of a philosophi!al understanding of the wa7 (a!on!ir!u@ents representational figuration. or Deleuze (a!on is a!utel7aware of the wa7 that the surfa!e of the !an@as is inhaited 7 pre0e?istingfigurati@e !oordinates* or what Deleuze !alls Rthe figurati@e and

proailisti! gi@ens5. (a!on5s approa!h to !ir!u@enting these gi@ens



1B Pli 1/ F)CC4

in@ol@es de@eloping an a!t of painting that eerges fro the aking of

rando arks Fwhi!h Deleuze ters Rline0traits5* a!ts of !leaning*sweeping* rushing or wiping areas of the !an@as in order to !lear awa7spe!ifi! zones of the !an@as Fwhi!h Deleuze ters R!olour0daus5 and thethrowing of paint at the !an@as. These rando a!ts are !learl7 asso!iatedwith the anual te!hniHues de@eloped 7 the astra!t e?pressionists ut in(a!on5s hands Deleuze argues that the7 e!oe soething fundaentall7different. The7 egin the pro!ess of delineating a Rhapti!5 spa!e. (a!onhiself !onsiders these anual arks erel7 preparator7* or erel7 aneleent of the suseHuent a!t of painting. %s (a!on hiself sa7s* RIsn5t itthat one wants a thing to e as fa!tual as possile and at the sae tie asdeepl7 suggesti@e or deepl7 unlo!king of areas of sensation other thansiple illustration of the oKe!t that 7ou set out to do Isn5t that what allart is aout5 In his !on@ersations with Da@id S7l@ester (a!on likensthese rando a!ts to what he !alls the Rgraph5 or Rdiagra5 that is a t7peof Rnon0illustrational for5 that works upon the le@el of sensation as

possiilit7 and suggestion Rand then slowl7 leaks a!k into the fa!t.59 This!on!ept of the Rdiagra5 e!oes the ke7 to Deleuze5s understanding of (a!on5s pre0figural preparation of the !an@as* i.e. (a!on5s wa7 of !ir!u@enting the figural gi@ens and thus his !ir!u@ention of the @isual

!ode of representational figuration. These anual arks are distinguished 7 eing ph7si!al a!ts rather than the @isual a!ts of painting* and thus setout the ground in !ontradi!tion to either a pre0planned representationalfiguration or the e?isting figural !oordinates inhaiting the !an@as. Deleuzeargues that one shouldn5t underestiate the degree to whi!h theseautoati! or rando anual arks ultiatel7 threaten to engulf an7suseHuent a!t of figuration the7 are supposedl7 preparing the wa7 for.Ahen the diagra engulfs the entire !an@as the painting e!oesanalogous to the totalised anual !haos paintings of astra!t

e?pressionis and the !larit7 and duration of the sensation is lost. (a!on is!on!erned to a@oid su!h a proliferation of the diagra and to transfigure itinto a produ!ti@e zone of figuration* a zone !apale of Rreeding5 fors.

or Deleuze what is parti!ularl7 signifi!ant aout the painterl7 diagrautilised within (a!on5s work is that it is priaril7 a eans for allowing theeergen!e of another t7pe of spa!e in painting M a Rhapti!5 spa!e. R&apti!5seeing designates a t7pe of @ision distin!t fro the opti!al where the

D. S7l@ester* iid.* p.3>

9 Iid.



D%''E$ %-('#SE )CC

7 the logi! of organised sensations* whi!h pro@ides the eans

of e?pression.14

,Wzanne e!ae in!reasingl7 !on@in!ed towards the end of his life thatthe ne!essar7 !apture of sensations of realit7 in painting Fthe Raking real5or Raking true5 of the intensit7 of sensation !ould onl7 !oe aoutthrough an e?ploration and elaoration of a radi!all7 internal Rlogi! of organisation5. It seeed ne!essar7 to ,Wzanne that he ha@e the entireintensit7 and life of nature within hiself as this logi! of sensation. &isRe?traordinar75 dis!o@er7 was that this logi! was purel7 a atter of theorganised sensations of colour * and that through the full de@elopent of an

organised s!hea of !olour the full intensit7 of sensation !an ereprodu!ed in painting. or ,Wzanne it is the essen!e of the painter to eale to speak in !olours and that those !olours ha@e an essential fluidit7*densit7 and organisation. In the late work of ,Wzanne Gowing shows how!olour is no longer fi?ed 7 the di!tates of @isual representation* ut

e!oes an organised flow or o@eent !apale of reprodu!ing the @er7rh7ths and te?tures of life M of sensation itself. ,olour itself e!oesgrasped 7 ,Wzanne as the aterial for!e of paint itself* a for!e !apale of

eing adeHuate to the intensit7 of nature. or ,Wzanne the task of the

painter is to grasp a !ertain internal Rlogi! of !olour5 and work with !olour as R!olouring sensation5. &e dis!o@ered for instan!e that when !olours are pla!ed in a !ertain order against one another there is an inherentsuggestion of a fundaental !hange in plane. &en!e* when a series of !olours* Falwa7s pla!ed in the order of the spe!tru and alwa7s pla!ed atregular inter@als along it* are elaorated 7 ,Wzanne the7 intrinsi!all7o@e towards a !ulinating point there7 !on@e7ing a sense of the!ontinuous !ur@ature of a real surfa!e. or Gowing in ,Wzanne5s hands!olour odulation e!ae de@eloped as a eans of aniatingrepresentations of life* of nature with an unparalleled intensit7 of sensation.

Deleuze understands ,Wzanne5s paintings as eerging fro twoopposing oents linked to this dis!o@er7 of !olour odulation as a logi!of organised sensation:

+erhaps this odulation of !olour is ,Wzanne5s prin!ipaloperation. (7 sustituting^a Ku?taposition of tints roughttogether in the order of the spe!tru* odulation will define adoule o@eent of e?pansion and !ontra!tion M an e?pansion

14 Iid.* p. 1B/



)C1 Pli 1/ F)CC4

in whi!h the planes* and espe!iall7 the horizontal and the

@erti!al planes* are !onne!ted an e@en erged in depthJ and atthe sae tie* a !ontra!tion through whi!h e@er7thing isrestored to the od7* to the ass* as a fun!tion of a point of ialan!e or a fall. It is through su!h a s7ste that geoetr7

e!oes sensile. %nd sensations e!oe !lear and durale:one has realised the sensation* sa7s ,Wzanne.1/

Deleuze ters these two oents the diastolic and systolic rh7ths of !olour and design. The diastolic oent !onsists of the @iolent eruption of !olour during whi!h there is nothing e?!ept !olours in all their

e?traordinar7 !larit7* fluidit7 and intensit7. The systolic oent in@ol@esthe !ondensation of this e?tree proliferation of !olouring sensation intodefinite fors Fwhi!h ,Wzanne had !alled Rstuorn geoetr75. or Deleuze these systolic and diastolic rh7ths of !olour and for are u!h!loser to the fundaental rh7ths of sensations of the 'eal thanrepresentations or iitations of realit7 that are go@erned 7 the!on@entions of opti!al per!eption. These rh7ths deliit what Deleuzewill !all Rhapti!5 spa!e. Through the use of these fundaental rh7ths,Wzanne is ale to infuse his late paintings with an intensit7 of sensation

!losel7 asso!iated with the in@isile for!es of the !osos* and enale hito render R@isile the folding for!e of ountains* the gerinati@e for!e of aseed* the theri! for!e of a lands!ape5.13 Thus ,Wzanne5s era!e of thediastolic oent of the eruption of !olouring sensation represents hishandling of the powerful diagraati! !haosger in painting and thestruggle that results in the e@entual iposition of a new for of stalegeoetr7 or pi!torial Rfa!t5 is the suseHuent systolic oent. Thus,Wzanne !an e re!ognised as re@olutionising a produ!ti@e utilisation of the !atastrophi! diagra in painting where7 a passage fro theRpossiilit7 of a fa!t5 to the Rfa!t5* or a o@eent fro the diagra to the

painting e!oes a!tualised.or Deleuze it is this tra@ersal fro the diagra to the painting whi!h

pla!es (a!on upon the sae traKe!tor7 in painting as ,Wzanne. ,Wzannewas a painter who understood that in order to render @isile the in@isilefor!es of the !osos one ust ne!essaril7 tra@erse and !onfine thediastoli! rh7th of the diagra. It is a strateg7 adopted 7 (a!on in hisown use of the diagra M the diagra !onsidered as a possiilit7 of Rfa!t5

1/ G. Deleuze* Iid.* pp. 1190B

13 Iid.* p. 3



D%''E$ %-('#SE )C)

rather than the Rfa!t5 itself. In following ,Wzanne5s e?aple* (a!on

deonstrates an understanding that not all of the figurati@e gi@ens ha@e todisappear* indeed figuration persists in his work insofar as a new t7pe of figuration is allowed to eerge fro the diagra that is !apale of !on@e7ing the @iolen!e* the rutalit7 and the intensit7 of Rfa!t5. ThereforeDeleuze posits (a!on5s paintings as !ontinuing ,Wzanne5s Rtepered useof the diagra5* a kind of Riddle0wa75 etween the suseHuent painterl7e?trees of pure astra!tion and astra!t e?pressionis* etween the purerestraint and un!onstraint of the diagra M and in doing do Deleuzeunderstands (a!on to e de@eloping the Rhapti!5 spa!e initiated 7,Wzanne.

Deleuze spends !onsiderale tie !onsidering the spe!ifi! utilisation of the diagra in (a!on5s work in the effort to delineate Rhapti!5 spa!e*anal7sing in detail (a!on5s handling of the !onfli!ts etween !haos andorder* !han!e and !ontrol. Deleuze argues that the iddle wa7 etweenthe purel7 opti!al and ta!ti!al initiated 7 ,Wzanne* in@ol@es utilising thediagra to !onstitute an analogical language in paint.

Ultiatel7 Deleuze argues this logi! of analog7 finds it higheste?pression in his treatent of !olours. The diagra* whi!h is the agent of

this analogi!al language* is itself utilised to rupture all the figurati@e gi@ens M ut through this a!tion Fi.e. when it e!oes operati@e* fun!tional and produ!ti@e the diagra defines the possiilit7 of Rfa!t5 7 lierating planes* odies and !olours for odulation. Lines and !olours e!oe aleto !onstitute the igure or the a!t* i.e. to produ!e Rnew5 reselan!esinside the @isual whole where the diagra operates and is realised as aspe!ifi! oent or area of the painting.

The law of the diagra for (a!on is this: egin with a figurati@e forFi.e. through the ine@itale figural gi@ens* produ!e the inter@ention of the

diagra to s!rale it* and then utilise the diagra to fa!ilitate theeergen!e of a for of a !opletel7 new t7pe* whi!h Deleuze ters theigure. (a!on5s logi! of sensation is thus understood as the produ!tion of a t7pe of reselan!e through a radi!all7 un0reseling eans. (eingitself a !atastrophe* the diagra ust not e peritted to erel7 !reate a!atastrophe. (eing a zone of s!raling* the diagra ust not e

peritted to s!rale the painting. The diagra ust e grasped as aninherentl7 fe!und zone* with what eerges fro it !oing oth graduall7and all at on!e. The pro!ess of painting e?eplified 7 (a!on5s route

in@ol@es a !ontinual inKe!tion of the anual diagra into the @isual whole*



)C4 Pli 1/ F)CC4

as a Rslow leak5. It is as if one were o@ing fro the hand to what

Deleuze !alls the Rhapti! e7e5* or fro the anual diagra to Rhapti!@ision5. This passage in (a!on5s work e@okes a siilar passage ade inthe late work of ,Wzanne and represents for Deleuze a trul7 great oentin the art of painting. The a!hie@eent of the Rhapti!5 represents the @er7

pinna!le of what he understands as (a!on5s logi! of sensation. Deleuze!on!ludes his anal7sis of (a!on 7 !iting Leiris1> on (a!on5s a!hie@eentof a hapti! @ision in the effort to !apture in paint the intensit7 of thesensation:

The words Leiris uses to des!rie (a!on M hand* tou!h* seizure*

!apture M e@oke this dire!t anual a!ti@it7 that tra!es theiilit f f t ill t th f t K t ill i

pli spinoza desire and power

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