philosophy paper - foucault & nietzsche
TRANSCRIPT
Marico Gabrielle B. Navarro
III- AB POS, 092581
PH101-QQ
CIRCULATING MORALITIES: A READING OF NIETZCHE AND FOUCAULT
THESIS:
"Foucault's later work (The Use of Pleasure) prioritizes
subjectivity and truth while the earlier work (Discipline and
Punish, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1) focus on power and
knowledge. More specifically, in the later work, Foucault aimed
"to study the games of truth, and the relation of self with self
and the forming of oneself as the subject" (UP, 6). In this
later work, Foucault analyzed how particular truths are
mobilized in the formation of the subject, such that one might
be required to recognize oneself as a subject through these
truths. For instance, Ancient Greeks recognized themselves as
individuals through their gender, class, age, wealth, marital
status, and so on. An important part of what it meant to be a
subject, then as today, was to recognize that one has a certain
truth to manifest in one's conduct. This focus on subjectivity
and truth tends to prioritize the agency of the individual in
that it highlights the action of the individual in constituting
himself/herself as a subject through manifesting certain truths.
Foucault's emphasis on the activity of the individual in
constituting themselves makes it possible for us to spot
openings for individual resistance, that is to say, activities
we might perform to subvert or resist the power relations we are
enmeshed in."
I. Introduction: From Nietzsche to Foucault, Foucault to
Nietzsche
Foucault may as well be famed among social scientists as a
pioneer of social constructivists. The notion of the formation
of a subject within institutionalized truths crystallizes the
foundation of this particular branch of thought; or at least
captures and encapsulates the very essence of it. Through a
review of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish alongside the History
of Sexuality Volume One, this paper highlights Foucault’s
assertions regarding the formation of the subject vis-à-vis
constructed truths. At the same time, it will dissect its
antithesis, or as Foucault observes – the surfacing of subjects’
defiance against such constructed truths. An analysis of
Nietzsche’s work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra would in turn, be
reference to strengthen this claim through a discussion on his
most famous concept of the “ϋbermensch”. Later, the idea on
institutionalized moralities will again be opened with a
different light, with less stress on institutional molding as
imposition but more of a necessary exercise of power for the
purposes of establishing people’s aesthetics of existence, or
better placed in a collective, the aesthetics of society. A
more genealogical and historically structured analysis by
Foucault in the second volume of the History of Sexuality would
serve reference to this.
Before dissecting the power dynamics within their
individual works, it is important to operationalize the
relationship between Foucault and Nietzsche by reviewing the
congruence and divergence between their philosophies. One must
note that Nietzsche had much influence on Foucault to the extent
that the latter gave praise and honored the previous by
attributing a new school of thought, postmodernism1, as a
substantial contribution in the field of political philosophy
and used similar themes as frameworks in his own writing. This
is evident first and foremost within comparisons laid out in the
Art of Ethics by Timothy O’ Leary where clear similarities or
better yet, transitions [developments from Foucault to
Nietzsche] are mapped out from the very beginning of the book.
Consequently, the disparity in period between Nietzsche’s time
and that of Foucault’s gave much appraisal to the former as to
the realization of his theory – that of the thinning,
disappearance even, of morality2.
Second in O’Leary’s line of comparison is that of the
‘aesthetics of existence’ if framed solely in Foucauldian terms.
Basically it talks of the idea of designing or ‘giving style’ to
one’s life3 – which is basically the heart of each parable within
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. What must be deducted (although I will
focus on this more extensively later) is the fact that while
there is much discussion that comes off as a critique on
institutionally fashioned moralities, particular dynamics of
stylized morals are imposed within Nietzsche’s parables as well.
As much as I regret having to introduce a critique as early as
in this section of the paper, it is simply more pragmatic for me
to question the way individualized moralities can be realized
1 Robinson, Dave. "Foucault and Nietzsche." In Nietzsche and
Postmodernism, 47. Cambridge, UK: Icon Books ;, 1999. 2 O’Leary, Timothy. "Introduction." In Foucault: The Art of Ethics (New
York: Continuum, 2002), 1.
3 O’Leary, 2-3.
with the way moral assertions were pegged down by Nietzsche
through Zarathustra. Perhaps, as Dave Robinson asserts in his
work Nietzsche and Postmodernism, Nietzsche is indeed carried
off in thought by arbitrary ideas and “personal idiosyncrasy”
such that no strict method is followed4. Add to that is his
translator, R.J. Hollingdale’s assessment of him as one who is
guilty of mixing both emotion and intellection in his writing5.
Hollingdale also inserts a critique, an assertion of fault –
that Nietzsche is guilty of ‘excess’ as characteristic of this
explosion of feelings found in his metaphors and style of
language. This notion of excess as a fault is where I disagree
with the translator. As much as there is indeed an over-
compensation with regard to the style of writing, this very fact
concretely illustrates several notions of his teaching – after
all, doesn’t ‘going beyond oneself’ entail extremes,
exaggeration, of excess? Moderation, unlike its glorification
within the philosophies of Aristotle in the Nichomachean ethics,
is to Nietzsche a form of mediocrity6. To me, Nietzsche’s
excess is simply an embodiment of his philosophy such that he
goes beyond the institutionalized notions of political
philosophy as pure intellection but go in so far as to dwell in
a poetic delivery of phenomenological literature.
With secularization and sexual liberation at its peak, the
lines that seem to plague the advent of post-modernity is the
4 Robinson, Dave. "Foucault and Nietzsche." In Nietzsche and
Postmodernism, 47-48. Cambridge, UK: Icon Books ;, 1999. 5 R.J. Hollingdale, introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra; by
Friedrich Nietzsche(England: Penguin Books, 1969), 11-35. 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale
(England: Penguin Books, 1969), 190
question – “how is one to live”? This particular question is
problematized by Foucault and Nietzsche in their discussion of
ethics; put quite simply, the deregulation of morality. They
argue that morality has either ceased to exist or is no longer
controlled by a set of laws7. By laws it is arguable that they
speak of the highly conservative, self-entitled piousness of the
Catholic Church. Consequently, people have begun to distinguish
their own values based on their own deliberations – which are
often, given the growing liberal society, is free of dignified
inducements.
Before we get lost within all these assertions on morality,
it is necessary that we define it by virtue of how it was used.
Let us question - What is morality? In his construction of the
idea of “genealogy” (in reference to Nietzsche’s genealogy of
morals8) to repudiate the conception of knowledge through a
linear account of history9, Foucault lacks a concrete definition
by which he terms the word “morality”. A literal reading of the
concept through his discussions in the History of Sexuality can
denote that this abstraction was used in reference to repressive
institutions – the Victorian era in general and the Church for
example10. Let us establish “morality” therefore as a
7O’Leary, Timothy. "Introduction." In Foucault: The Art of Ethics (New
York: Continuum, 2002), 1-3.
8Gutting, Gary. "Michel Foucault (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy)." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/ (accessed October 3,
2011).
9 Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy and History." In Language,
Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Interviews and Essays
(Ithaca: Cornell: University Press, 1977) 139-164.
10 Foucault, Michel. "The Repressive Hypothesis." In The History of
confinement of actions based on conservative dictation of
institutions (e.g. society as a whole, established decorum in
schools, teachings of the Church). This paper will therefore
re-examine “morality” as a socially constructed set of actions
performed by docile bodies shaped by social institutions
instigated by a multiplicity of power relations. This idea will
establish a contradiction by Foucault, arguing that morals are
indeed instituted by “inevitable trends” that are constructed by
a multiplicity of power11. This multiplicity of power creates
experiences of dissatisfaction particularly because its
heterogeneity lacks organization.
Just as Foucault argues that genealogy should explore
instances in absence or remain unrealized12, it is easy to impose
that the lack of response from dictated action constitutes to
the affirmation of the body of power that channel out
impositions. By virtue of rebellion against imposed rules, those
rules are reaffirmed. In the case of morality, by virtue of the
fact that we implore the lack of it or the degradation of it
rather, we also establish that morality is instituted and that
the rebellion happens in reference to it. To put it quite
simply, the fact that secularization is established and that
morality is misplaced due to the lack of religious restrictions,
suggest that this is done in reference to the fact that religion
is still a statist function that is instilled as the very
foundation of society.
Sexuality(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978-1986),17-29.
11Gutting, Gary. "Michel Foucault (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
12Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, 140.
While morality has been established in the bounds of
religious teachings with the Church as its institution, it may
be speculated that its existence in society is rooted even
deeper. Morality has existed and will exist even beyond
religion. The Church or religion in general is just one power
that dominates the instigation of morality. There are other
actors that constitute it. We can illustrate this idea with
Hobbes and Locke’s idea of self-preservation. The very
fundamentals of morality are egalitarian13 but its formation as a
whole is selfishly made in order to protect oneself from
another. Morality therefore is institutionalized by a
multiplicity of power from people who follow and normalize it.
Perhaps the most inquisitive angle in the discussion of
morality would be the fact that it is always associated to
sexuality. In fact, the degradation of “morality” is not so
much on the idea of people turning “bad” or becoming less
subservient to etiquette and general interactive behavior, but
more of the fact that sex is not as repressed as it used to be.
Nevertheless, Foucault’s assertion that sex is no doubt still
“censored” (a century after the Victorian era)14 still holds
true. This censorship however, just as he later concludes, is
the very reason why sex is multiplied and proliferated. It is
just interesting to see however, that contrary to the conditions
Foucault wrote the history of sexuality, within these bounds,
sexuality is slowly re-aligning itself to fit the “general and
13Foucault, Michel. "Prison." In Discipline and Punish: Complete and
Austere Institutions 232-233. 14Foucault, "We Other Victorians." In The History of Sexuality,3.
intensive work imperative”15 – in fact, perhaps in the advent of
capitalism, society is beginning to adjust to it.
While the previously mentioned definition of morality in
relation to sexual nuances is attune to the rest of this paper,
a gap superstitiously exists between Foucault and Nietzsche with
respect to the fact that Nietzsche’s morality is broader, more
generalized and not the least bit ‘sexualized’. As for
Foucault, his assessment of morality does not religiously follow
Nietzsche’s assertion of its death but argues that it goes
beyond the Church. In the History of Sexuality Volume Two, he
concludes that modes of power instituting morality existed even
before Christianity (and all other religions bound by laws of
moral values) emerged.16 In fact, Foucault views these power
dynamics as an inherent social cause for the better, such that
society itself id the architecture of its own “aesthetics of
existence”.17
II. Foucault: A Genealogy of Institutional Power Dynamics of
Morality
While Foucault’s earlier work, namely Discipline and Punish
and the History of Sexuality Volume 1, focus on discourses on
power and knowledge, there is also a vast discussion on
subjectivity and truth. His earlier work illustrates the effect
of austere institutions, rules and norms that in a way, navigate
the course of human action and interaction.
15Foucault, "We Other Victorians." In The History of Sexuality, 6.
16 Foucault, Michel. "Conclusion." In The Use of Pleasure(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978-1986),249-254.
17 Ibid
Discipline and Punish goes beyond the discussion of the
prison and dissects society as a whole. Within this work we
could find parallelisms establishing certain establishments like
the schools and hospitals as disciplinary institutions that
enforce certain rules, certain measures of conduct, and forms of
hierarchal organization that proliferate the creation of a
particular subject18. This subdued imposition of particular
characteristics is even more apparent in his discussion of the
military, or the training of soldiers to be exact. Foucault
introduces the idea of docile bodies which clearly maps out the
idea of the creation of a subject by means of an institutional
force that guides it toward particular behaviors.19
The notion of subjectivity and the idea of a person’s
dedication to the said institutional codes are put into question
upon analyzing the concept of panopticism20 which Foucault used
in describing an efficient prison system. In this arrangement,
the prisoners are well aware that they are being watched but are
not certain with regard to the course of time when they are put
under surveillance. The uncertainty forces them to assume a
permanent act wherein they behave accordingly at all times. The
problem with this arrangement, as opposed to other institutions
is the fact that the subject under surveillance is not fully
subjected in a certain behavior but is forced, out of fear
perhaps, to maintain a specific behavior. Of course, the same
18
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 19Foucault, Michel. "Docile Bodies." In Discipline and Punish: the
Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) 135-162. 20
Foucault, Michel. "Panopticism." In Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) 231-293.
analysis can be extended to some degree in lighter and more
subdued forms of disciplinary institutions. A simple example of
this is society. Everyone is put under the surveillance of
everyone else such that one is forced, in a way, to maintain a
public appearance safe from criticism of others. The beauty of
this system however is the adaptability one can perform within
it, such that it later follows the customs of the norm out of
one’s own initiative such that one no longer consciously thinks
of the possibility of criticism but performs it out of habit.
Let’s say for example, the notion of dressing up when one leaves
the house. If you think about it, a rational explanation as to
why a person might prefer to wear tight jeans over a comfortable
pair of sweats is because one fears scrutiny. But at the same
time, it’s easy to say, in a matter-of-fact tone: why wouldn’t
you prefer wearing jeans over sweats? An interactive imposition
as mundane as people’s clothing is then transformed into a
natural habit. Put quite simply, Foucault’s discussion
illustrates the power discourse in institutionalizing certain
codes and normalized conditions which, in the context of most
disciplinary systems, persist under the impunity of actors
subjected within it. His later works, namely the volumes on the
History of Sexuality extends this particular distinction of
power relations in so far as it is limited. Its limit lies in
the fact that despite a relatively effective institution of
power, there are still forces that form deviations.
The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 illustrates the
production of people’s notions of sexuality and moreover, it
puts forward an investigative look upon the intertwining of
morality within this realm of human interaction. What must be
further questioned however is the effectiveness of these
disciplinary devices (perhaps in the forms of norms or concrete
laws) in instituting a particular behavior. An example of this
is the evidence Foucault presents of an underground society of
sorts, which he termed as “The Other Victorians” – a
counterculture of sexual promiscuity that counteracts the
repressive nature of that era21. With all the bounds of the
norms and the impositions of church teachings, how can such a
culture develop? Or if society was treated as a human subject,
within a premised human individuality, is it safe to say that
the propensity for sexual acts are intrinsic and are simply not
repressed effectively? This genealogical investigation was
later extended by Foucault’s second volume, The Use of Pleasure,
which better examines the notion of subjectivity. He examines
precisely how people see themselves as subjects of sexuality,
and as subjects of desire. In this case, if such is placed as a
dogma, what place can morality have but an imposition? This is
precisely the philosophy that can be seen extended within
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra – the struggle for man to go
beyond himself. “Himself” being a creation of societal “truths”
such as status or physicality bound by social scrutiny or
habitual beliefs (or impositions that have turned into beliefs
through religion). What if the notion of the self is realized
to be outside of what society imposes? Would a person realize
21 Foucault, Michel. "We Other Victorians." In The History of
Sexuality(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978-1986),3-13.
it as their true self or would it become self-scrutiny as
impiety?
III. Nietzsche: Of Moral Conscience - Transcending to Self-
consciousness, Descending to Self-religion
In understanding the deployment of power relations freed
from institutionalized bounds, it is most helpful to look into
Nietzsche’s analysis on the death of a God22 and ‘godlessness’23
relative to the conception of the ϋbermensch or the superman.
Nietzsche’s mention of a ‘God’ is not necessarily a metaphysical
power but more of the symbol a divine being represents – an
overseer of all things who is feared by its worshippers. This
is the power the idea of a ‘God’ or any other celestial being
entails. To put in more empirical terms, Catholics for instance
fear the idea of judgment and hell – these being negative
incentives towards following dictated moralities. Similarly,
Hindus fear ‘karma’ and Daoists discipline themselves to achieve
the balance of ‘yin and yang’. In sum, my basic assessment is
that firstly, morality is instilled in people through the use of
fears. Second, these threats are no longer feared such that
notions of morality are rationalized and discerned by virtue of
either the influence of a growing secular institution of power
or judged through individual choices.
Now the discourse maintained by Nietzsche, at least at the
best of my understanding, is essentially maintaining a higher
22
Friedrich Nietzsche. “Prologue.” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans.
R.J. Hollingdale (England: Penguin Books, 1969), 41 23
Friedrich Nietzsche. “Of the Virtue that Makes Small.” in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (England: Penguin Books, 1969),
190
level of understanding within the genealogy of morality such
that one goes beyond institutionalized standards of morality.
Conversely, the ‘superman’ embodies one that emerges out of
secularism, one that in my perspective ultimately creates for
himself and internalizes within himself codes of morality. In
other words, while one frees himself from artificial codes of
morality, one proceeds to a form of secular thinking which to me
is more of a rebellion, or a questioning of institutionalized
values. Achieving the consciousness like that of a ‘superman’
however, goes beyond simply detaching itself through secularism.
In fact, one descends back to his primitive, naked self – one
that is created within a new form of enlightenment that not only
create his own standards of morality based on reason but an
internal philosophy of the self, out of one’s natural conscience
(if such exists).
While my assertions above are clearly the result of my own
interpretation, I ask that it be read with a heavier spirit of
inquiry and open-mindedness especially since the passages that
would follow are made specifically to prove it – with the use of
the text as a primary source of contemplation of course. The
emergence of a ‘superman’ must be realized within the context of
a transition that perpetuates as a form of growth rather than
mere change. Better phrased, as you may have already guessed,
I’m speaking of Nietzsche’s parable on the Three Metamorphoses.
A model of such a transition to the “superman” can be realized
by means of re-conceptualizing the idea of a camel, a lion and a
child in reference to a transition from religion, secularism and
‘going beyond oneself’ or attaining the consciousness of the
“superman”. The camel was described as having to carry a lump
in his back, or a burden, if you will. Similarly, for people
who have begun questioning the codes of morals they’re subjected
in, carry a form of lump characterized by a conflict between
rationality and what has been taught to be right, or what has
been taught to be a must. Or better characterized, it may be an
internal conflict between what is taught to be right and what
one perceives as right.
The lion embodies one who seeks to overpower an enemy. Put
in the same context as what was earlier described, one develops
a spirit of antagonism, a form of rebellion such that one simply
disavows all forms of religion and focus simply on the
rationalities of things. At this point in time, one is not able
or has yet to encounter the necessity to create one’s own
values, as the lion was described by Nietzsche24. But it is also
more than that, becoming the lion is a bridge towards a greater
understanding. Nietzsche describes the lion as one that is open
to ‘new creation’25, one that is perhaps more liberal in thought
and open to non-conventional forms of thinking.
The child embodies one who has truly gone beyond himself,
one who has recreated himself through the creation of new values
such that he only “wills his own will” and exists in “his own
world”26. Furthermore, a child in the ripest young age is free
of all influence, free of institutional subjection (at least
24
Nietzsche. “Of the Three Metamorphoses.” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
trans. R.J. Hollingdale, 54 25
Nietzsche. “Of the Three Metamorphoses.” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
trans. R.J. Hollingdale, 54 26
Ibid.
until they’re parents and other elders start shaping him) and
does what one feels like, moves the way he ought to move. A
child at a young age is, unlike what most perceive are able-
minded. Though bouts of rationality may be questioned with
regard to experience, they are more capable of absorbing
knowledge. Freeing oneself from all impositions of knowledge
and moralities frees one from unnecessary factualties and
enables him to ask bigger questions that cannot be easily
answered (like a child similarly does), questions that are
beyond the rationalities of most people, of the rest of the
world.
We must however go back to the context by which Nietzsche
argues and why the image of the “superman” was created.
Nietzsche, through Zarathustra asserts that a/the “God is dead”
and in all aspects it calls only for the idea that morality has
lost all essence to exist since a higher being of authority can
no longer suppress personal whims.27 This does not change the
fact however, that society has and always will, impose certain
standards of morality. Does Nietzsche therefore really assert
that morality is dead or is he simply appeasing towards the idea
that it has drastically changed or thinned down through the
ages? That point is probably more Foucauldian. As for
Nietzsche, he talks of the God of Christians in a sense that
laws that govern moralities no longer exist as objective laws.
Morality has been subjected to opinions, exceptions and
recapitulations within the Church. If they are not absolute, is
there really any bit of incentive or is there enough viable
reason for it to be followed? With men free of religious
27 Ibid 22
dictations, what becomes of him then? What would constitute him
as a man if he holds no virtues? Is going beyond oneself
precisely the opposite of a liberalization from religious
dictates and more of a self-internalized, self-imposed religion
such that one also regulates one’s values based on conscience or
deprives oneself of pleasures (so as to go beyond oneself)?
The lack of faith in a form of divinity urges one to create
boundaries for oneself. Embodying the superman requires a lot of
sacrifice such that one is placed at the mercy of social
scrutiny but moreover, at the watchful eyes of oneself – pushing
one to consistent bouts of internal conflicts, up until one
reconciles with all these self dictations and be elevated to a
realm where there is little to clamor for. It is the type of
enlightenment that puts one at peace with the self. The only
problem with Nietzsche’s image of this ϋbermensch however is his
lack of discernible characteristics. True, glimpses of the type
of virtue he entails is evident in Zarathusra’s parables but of
the man that embodies this path of spirit, what metaphysical
image does he embody such that people who have not reached this
intellectual and moral prowess can ever fully conceptualize him?
Going back to Foucault, one can proceed to argue that
transition within time means transition in moralities. We have
to remember that while moralities are dictations of society, in
essence it is also created by society. If moralities are simply
a reflection of society on itself, can one truly assert that he
is bound by it? Is a collective notion of people as a society a
violent power relation then? Indeed morality has lost its
essence in an objective sense, but it still remains to be a
necessary tool for induction. Moreover, it is a necessary
vehicle in life such that it more or less directs and takes one
to specific paths of fate. This brings us back to the
beginning, to the question that perhaps Foucault and Nietzche
have instilled in us all. How is one to live? One may discern
between two: the path of oneself or the path with others, a
beautiful, unchartered choice.