philosophy paper - final draft

8/7/2019 Philosophy Paper - Final Draft

1/8

Philosophy 101 Paper Final Version Tianyu Tao Apr.03.2011

The concept of identity is a complex one. Identity is defined to be the relation that

everything has to itself and nothing else. I think this definition makes sense if we interpret it this

way: identity is a reference which people use to distinguish different things. Things are different

because they have different properties. Therefore, identity is significantly related to properties of

objects. There are two ways of saying identity in terms of properties. The first one claims that

object x is identical to object y (i.e. have the same identity) if and only if they share all properties

(all of their properties are exactly the same). Another view holds that x is identical to y if and

only if they just share certain essential properties. Before continuing, I want to clarify that the

identity I am now talking about is numerical identity. It is not the case that I am talking about

two or more similar things like twins. There is only one thing. I want to discuss the question of

identity over time, that is, as time changes, what can we say about a certain objects identity (that

whether it is x or y over time).

It is now the time of deciding which view we should use to talk about identity. I think the

first view does not make sense in discussing the question of identity over time. It is obvious that

things always undergo changes through time. The difference is just that some changes are small

while others are big. If I suppose the first claim is valid, it will be impossible to say one object

can has an identity over time. Since even the smallest change will establish a difference in

identity. This is not the result I desire, and it is contrary to my intuition. Therefore, I prefer the

second view, claiming the necessary and sufficient condition for an object to hold an identity

over time is to maintain certain essential properties as time changes.

However, questions still remain. What should be considered as essential properties of

an object, especially when talking about personal identities (i.e. the object involved is a person)?


2/8

Again, there are two different views on this question about personal identity. The first one,

generally known as Dualism, claims there are two substances (properties) which constitute a

person. One is the body of the person, and the other is the mind, but the really essential part for a

person is the mind. Contrary to Dualism, the second view, known as Physicalism holds that the

only essential substance of a person is the persons body. Here I am willing to take a position

again. To me Physicalism is clearer and easier to explain, while Dualism is rather obscure (what

exactly is mind?). So I prefer the doctrine of Physicalism.

Now lets use these concepts to examine an interesting casethe story told by Daniel

Dennett in his philosophical essay Where am I. What happens in this story is that Dennetts

brain, called Yorick, was separated from the rest of his body, which is called Hamlet, but

connected via remote electronic devices. Everything works well until an accident happens,

resulting the connection between Hamlet and Yorick broken. Hamlet is then in a sense

disappeared in the context, while Yorick solely remains. One year later, Dennetts brain is

connected to a new body, called Fortinbras, but at the same time, a computer that synchronizes

with Yorick (exactly simulate the behavior of Yorick) called Hubert is constructed and is

connected to Fortinbras as well. There is a switch which can determine whether Yorick or Hubert

takes control of Fortinbras. Finally, the synchronization between the brain and the computer

breaks, and the two starts to deviate to have different ideas about which one should take control

of Fortinbras. The question I want to consider is: during the whole story, as the plot develops,

which object has the identity Dennett?

I will examine where Dennett is in each stage of iteration. Before I actually start, the

thesis I am going to defend is that Dennett is referred to the combination of Hamlet and Yorick.

At the very beginning, we have Dennett, the narrator of the story. What is the name


3/8

Dennett refers to? I think this has a clear answer, as my thesis states: it refers to both Hamlet

and Yorick. Based on Physicalism principle, the necessary and sufficient condition for an object

to possess the title of Dennett is to have a specific body, namely Yorick and Hamlet. I cannot

think any objections for this if one accepts Physicalism. It is by definition true that the body is

just the combination of Yorick and Hamlet. According to Physicalism, then, the distinct body

determines the distinct name, Dennett. However, someone may still argue that a brain (in this

case, Yorick), is the only essential part for a person to possess a specific identity (Dennett), the

rest of the body is irrelevant. This is a major objection to my thesis, almost every point I have

made can be argued against according to this thought, so I will make defend my view after I have

presented my major conclusions.

In the next stage, after an amazing surgery, Yorick and Hamlet are separated. Via distant

magnetic waves, Yorick can still taking control of Hamlet. I do not think the name Dennett

changes to refers to different things. I noticed that the only difference between this stage and the

previous stage is the relative distance between Yorick and Hamlet. Yorick and Hamlet together

are still connected and functioned exactly as before (although in a certain range, but this is due to

the distance between the brain and the rest of the body). I cannot say the body is changed. On the

assumption from the authors narrative, this surgery is perfect that it preserves everything and

adds nothing to Yorick and Hamlet. Except device that helps building the connection between

them. But if the body hasnt changed, how could I say that the person whose name is Dennett has

changed if I acknowledge Physicalism so firmly? After all, Dennett is just a name which refers to

the combination of Yorick and Hamlet, or that unique body. To this I think it is also no reason to

make an objection except the one I have just mentioned in the previous paragraph (the brain is

the only relevant property).


4/8

In the next iteration of the story, an accident happened, and Yorick lost its connection

with Hamlet. The situation is like a person that lost all of his/her sensory perceptions, while the

person is still conscious, since Yorick is still able to perform regularly. I think the major changes

that regards to what Dennett refers to happens here. The conclusion from my thesis is that the

name Dennett no longer serves as an effective reference, since the combination it refers to

(Yorick and Hamlet) is broken. It is meaningless to talk about Dennett unless we specify what

it refers to after the disconnection. I have said that based on Physicalism, the unique body which

constituted by the combination of Yorick and Hamlet is the only standard for us to recognize

what Dennett refers to. Here I want to make my first argument to address the fact that Yorick

and Hamlet cannot be treated separately; they are the two necessary parts to constitute the unique

body. In fact, when I talk about the body, Yorick and Hamlet should be considered as one thing.

Neither is Yorick more important than Hamlet nor is Hamlet more special than Yorick when the

concept of a body is considered as a whole. It is true to say Yorick is different than Hamlet, but

this only makes sense when regard them as different parts of the body. Therefore, according to

the story, we can consider the situation as Hamlet has disappeared and conclude that there is

not a combination between Yorick and Hamlet anymore. The body is no longer constituted by

the two parts. Then, by Physicalism, Yorick should not been given the title Dennett. The name

Dennett has no meaning unless we redefine it.

But someone may still argue that Yorick alone is enough to be entitled with the name

Dennett; since Yorick contains every pieces of information that is essential to Dennett. Even

if the person lost the rest of his body, as long as the brain exists, the person remains unchanged.

Others may want to say that Dennett refers only to the mind, whatever happens to Yorick and

Hamlet does not affect the reference of Dennett. To this latter objection, I cannot say anything


5/8

more since it is a dualism view which I oppose to strongly. To protect my thesis under the attack

of the first objection which I have mention in the early paragraph, there goes my second

argument: at the moment one just born (a baby is born); there has not been much information in

that ones brain. Can we say now that the brain is more essential than the body to constitute that

person? I think we cannot. The person has not developed, (not start experience things) so

simply changing the brain will make no difference for us to identify the person. But when can we

say that this person is really this person? Once the person starts to experiencing, there is no way

to stop him/her other than death. The person experiences things continuously; we cannot easily

draw a line which clearly distinguishes the different status of the person. If one accepts this, there

is no reason to prefer Yorick than Hamlet in the combination, or the reason for preference is

weakened at least. If at the beginning there is no preference, and the whole man continuously

develops, when does the brain gain its priority?

I believe the above argument is a good one (if it is not effective, it still sounds interesting),

now the story has reached an interesting point. In my view, after this disconnection, Dennett is

no longer in existence, but part of Dennett, Yorick, still exists. Since the author (the real

Dennett) of this story does not clearly made a claim about what Dennett should refer to. It is

meaningful to talk about which object is more related to the title Dennett. But this creates a

great chance for the supporters of the view that Yorick is essential enough to inherit the title

Dennett. They may want to borrow some ideas from Derek Parfit, a British philosopher who

have some interesting views on personal identity. We studied his thought in his essay Personal

Identity. He thinks that we should consider the problem of identity by the concept of

psychological connectedness. The notion can be briefly explained by saying two persons are

psychological connected if the psychological state of one of the two persons is largely caused by


6/8

the others psychological state. This is the major concept when considering the question of

identity over time. If a person at an instant t0 has identity A, then, at an instant t1 the identity A

refers to the person which has the most psychological connectedness. The concept of

psychological connectedness is based on Physicalism, I think, since it does not talk in terms of

mind and the psychological state of a person can be regarded as the persons brain activity,

which is physical. If one finds his theory plausible, it is meaningful to give Yorick the title

Dennett since the psychological connectedness between Yorick and Dennett is the highest.

But now my thesis is in a dangerous position again. Those who think Parfits idea are credible

can ask me why Yorick cannot has the title Dennett alone since it has the highest

psychological connectedness with Dennett.

I should make my last defend on my thesis here. Although it is true that Yorick always

has the most psychological connection with Dennett, it still cannot get the title Dennett alone

if Hamlet were connected to it. We could only refer Yorick as Dennett after Hamlets

disappearance. I think the combination of Yorick and Hamlet together has a higher psychological

connection with Dennett. It could be the case that some of the idea in Dennett are not only

created by Yorick, but originated from an action of Hamlet, if Hamlet were replaced by other

bodies, Yorick could process the information in a different way, thus in a sense deviated from

Dennett. The combination of Yorick and Hamlet is the most suitable candidate for Dennett.

I think this view also fits our intuitions; therefore I do not want to found other arguments to

against it anymore. After all this will be my last words about the objection which states Yorick

itself is sufficient for getting the title Dennett.


7/8


8/8

Works Cited

Dennett, D. (1978). Where Am I?Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology,

pp 310-323.

Parfit, D. (1971). Personal Identity. The Philosophical Review 80, pp.3-27.

philosophy paper - final draft

Documents