philosophy of education || philosophy of education in twentieth century america

Philosophy of Education in Twentieth Century AmericaAuthor(s): Joe ParkSource: The High School Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, Philosophy of Education (Oct., 1966), pp. 1-7Published by: University of North Carolina PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40365989 .

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Philosophy of Education in Twentieth Century America

Joe Park Northwestern University

T)HILOSOPHY of education is what philosophers do when they 1 work with certain kinds of educational problems. Exactly what these problems are and how they should be studied, philosophers are not agreed. It is out of these disagreements that certain developments in American philosophy of education have emerged.

Early in this century Idealism was the dominant philosophy of education. Herman H. Home, the best known Idealist, was saying that all nature fills one space, all events one time, all existence one unity "whose body Nature is, and God the Soul." He saw the mind of man as the final step in the evolutionary process. To him God was the one complete and self-moving Being. Science was the thought of God in the world. Man was destined for immortality, where with God, he would continue his quest for the Platonic ideals of goodness, beauty and truth.1

In contrast to this metaphysically and religiously orientated philosophy, Dewey presented the ideas he saw implicit in a democratic society and began to apply these problems of the enter- prise of education. He carefully connected the growth of democracy with the development of the scientific method, the evolutionary doctrines of Darwin and the industrial changes of the time. He went to great lengths to indicate the modifications in instructional methods and in subject matter that were called for by these changes. He dared to discuss the aims of education, the nature of experience, and the place of the teacher in the learning situation. Final- ly he estimated the undesirable influences of certain theories of knowledge and value which he held "were formulated in earlier special conditions, but which still operate in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal."2 Whereas, during the second quarter of this century, Ideal- ism lost its fizz like an old bromide, a very different sort of thing happened to Dewey and his ideas. It appears that, unlike most prophets, he became honored in his own land. Some accepted him as

1. Herman H. Home's Idealism in Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910; Philosophy of Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927; and, The Democratic Philosophy of Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

2. John Dewey, Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.



2 The High School. Journal [October

a kind of educational deity and set about to convert others by preaching the Dewey gospel. From about 1918 to about 1950 Dew- ey's thoughts on education were very widely acclaimed although they may not have been understood very clearly. It appears that many of his disciples never read him carefully. As for Dewey himself, he rejected the notion that his philosophy should be taken as the gospel. In an organ of the Progressive Education Association he wrote:

"Unless we beg the question . . . assuming it is already known just what education is, just what are its aims, and what are its methods, there is nothing false nor extravagant in declar- ing that at the present time different sciences of education are not only possible but also much needed."3

One should not be misled by what has been said into believing that Dewey's ideas went unchallenged and unmodified. They were challenged by Idealists, essentialists and classical humanists among others, and they were modified by some who considered themselves Progressive Educators.

William C. Bagley was the chief spokeman for the essentialists. He was fond of pointing out that Progressive Education was a recent manifestation of a movement in education that for centuries had been in conflict with essentialism. The chief differences he ob- served between the two movements resided in the relative emphasis given to such considerations as "efforts vs. interest," "teacher-initiative vs. learner-initiative," "race experience vs. individual experience/' "subjects vs. activities" and "logical vs. psychological organization." In each instance Bagley placed his emphasis on the first of these alternatives and charged the Progressives with stress- ing to the point of ridiculousness the second item in each pair. In one of his addresses Bagley concluded thusly: "Essentialism pro- vides a strong theory of education; its competing school offers a weak theory. Essentialism is virile. Progressivism is not feminine by way of contrast-it is rather effeminate."4

The classical humanists, under the leadership of Robert Hutch- ins, also took out after Dewey and the Progressives. Hutchins charged that Dewey was an egalitarian. He criticized Dewey for looking upon the schools as an engine for social reform. Although Hutchins agreed that social reform was necessary, he did not see how the schools could bring it about before the people who con-

3. John Dewey, "Progressive Education the Science of Education." Progressive Ed- ucation, Vol. V., 1928, pp. 197-204.

4. William C. Bagley, "Just What is the Crux of the Conflict Between the Progres- sives and the Essentialists?" (A mimeographed statement prepared for a luncheon meet- ing of Phi Delta Kappa, Summer Session, University of Michigan, July 16, 1940.)



1966] Philosophy of Education 3

trolled the schools would consent to it. In short, Hutchins thought Dewey, and most especially the social reconstructionists, had a faulty notion of education and were blind to its limitations.

In spite of these criticisms of Dewey, Hutchins was very careful to declare that many of the doctrines of the Progressive Educators resulted from a misconception of what Dewey had said. For ex- ample, Hutchins wrote: "Since he is not a clear writer, his follow- ers may perhaps be excused for their failure to notice that when he talked about adjustment to the environment, he meant that the environment should first be improved."6

Regardless of the fact that Hutchin's remarks about Dewey's ideas on adjustment were not well taken, Hutchins was correct in his contention that Progressive Educators formed misconceptions about what Dewey said. This has been substantiated by recent re- search. One author has concluded that Progressive Education was a three-pronged movement made up of romantic progressives, perhaps more indebted to Rousseau than to Dewey, social reconstructionists bent upon using the schools as a vehicle for social reforms and those who comprehended and accepted what Dewey was saying.6 By 1938 Dewey found it necessary to indicate to the Progres- sives that education must proceed from ... "a level deeper and more inclusive than is represented by the practices and ideas of the contending parties."7

During the time these philosophical debates were under way, two philosophical movements were emerging in Europe that were destined to enter the mainstream of American educational thought. One was continental in origin. The other was British. These two movements, Existentialism and philosophical analysis, currently are quite influential in American philosophy of education. Judg- ing by the writings of philosophers, one might conclude that analysis has replaced Dewey's Experimentalism as the dominant and most viable philosophical stance in American education. Existen- tialism appears to be growing in influence.

Let us briefly examine these two movements, and in doing so, perhaps we can discover something of the nature of two recent developments in the philosophy of American education.

Existentialism is a name for a philosophical tendency rather than for a philosophy. It began to manifest itself in Western Eu-

5. Robert M. Hutchins, The Conflict in Education In a Democratic Society. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. P. 15.

6. John Brubacher, "The Challenge to Philosophize About Education," Modern Philosophies of Education, Fifty-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. Pp. 4-16.

7. John Dewey, Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955.



4 The High School Journal [October

rope after World War I, but it did not become influential in philosophical circles until after World War II. Existentialism is a shift in emphasis from an all-consuming concern for essence to an increased concern for existence. Essence is said to follow from existence, and what a man becomes constitutes his essence. Existential- ists deny that we human beings are held helplessly in the grasp of historical and natural forces. They insist on the importance of human freedom, personality, and will. They call our attention to the irrational and unconscious elements in human nature and re- mind us of the adverse effects our technical advances may have upon our freedom. Existentialists tend to be staunch supporters of education, for they believe it to be the foundation of human progress.

The two American educators who have written most extensive- ly on Existentialism and education are Van Cleve Morris, of Rut- gers University, and George Kneller, of the University of Califor- nia, Los Angeles. One cannot begin to summarize all these men have had to say about education. One can gain some insight into what they are thinking, however, if he will note with Morris that education may be defined as "awakened awareness in the learner- existential awareness of himself as a single subjectivity present in the world." The task of education, which falls chiefly on the secondary schools, is "to provide the occasions and circumstances for the awakening and intensification of awareness." Morris tries to show that there are three constituent awarenesses which make up what he calls the "psychological content of the self: These are (1) choos- ing agent, unable to avoid making choices throughout life, (2) free agent, "absolutely free" to set the goals of his life, and (3) responsible agent, personally accountable for his freely selected choices. The teacher's task is "to arrange the learning situations in such a way as to bring home the truth of these propositions to every individual."8

As was the case with Experimentalism, criticisms have arisen with respect to Existentialism. Two of the current criticisms, and perhaps the most telling ones, are that Existentialists erroneously attempt to infer ends and practices for education from metaphys- ical and epistemological principles; and, that they have not understood what academic philosophers writing on Existentialism are doing or saying, primarily because they have depended too much on secondary sources and the works of popularizers.

The second currently influential philosophical movement has 8. Van Oleve Morris, Existentialism in Education. New York: Harper & Bow,

Publishers, 1966.




directed a torrent of criticism at philosophers in education. Ana- lysts have pointed up the deficiencies in the preparation of philosophers. They have charged that certain educationalists have fostered social engineering, and have resorted to eclectic and synoptic efforts which have "spawned vagueness, ambiguity, pseudo-problems and pseudo-explanations, vacuous principles and impractical prescrip- tions/' Moreover, it is claimed that most educational philosophers have used philosophy to give an aura of respectability to their efforts. They are prone to teach classical theories which they understand only superficially and generally oversimplify into "schools" and "typical" positions. In contrast to these sorts of grandiose and misconceived efforts, the analyst sees his task as much less ambi- tious, as one of making clear "the diverse factors that are involved in complex issues of major theoretical impact." This he proposed to do by means of logical and linguistic analysis.9

Perhaps we can best understand what the analyst is doing if we consider some of the efforts of particular analysts. Israel SchefBer was the first American analyst to publish a book in education. In his book of readings, he focused attention on such conceptual problems in education as morals, the intellect, and scientific method. He tried to show how each of these concepts was best talked about.10 In a second book he declared that, because of the great explosion in knowledge, it has become more and more difficult for philosophers to encompass all available information into a significant world view. What in fact usually results from such an effort is a "superficial or badly inaccurate" world-picture that is "incapable of providing significant illumination." For that reason philosophers have rightfully turned their attention to the analysis of "the basic concepts, assumption arguments, and inferences characteristic of different domains." In this second book he confines his energies to definitions, slogans, and metaphors in education.11

Smith and Ennis published a collection of essays which focused upon "neglected meanings," "conceptual blunders," the removal of "pseudo-questions" and the "logical inconsistencies" in educational writings. The essays covered such topics as "Learning by Experience," "Needs and the Needs-Curriculum," "Explanation" and the "Logic of Slogans."12

9. Reginald D. Archambault, Philosophical Analysis and Education. New York: The Humanities Press, 1965.

10. Israel Scheffler, Modern Readings: Philosophy and Education. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 1958. . _ . _ _

11. 1 The Language of Education. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thom- as. 1960. _ ..

12. B. Othanel Smith and Robert Ennis, Language and Concepts %n Education. Chi- cago: Rand McNally & Company, 1961.



6 The High School Jouenal [October

More recently Archambault published a collection of essays by British analysts13 while Frankena has provided us with a most use- ful model for the analysis of normative philosophies of education.14

This brief discussion of the writings of a few analysts does not do full justice to the movement but it does provide some insights into the nature of their work. Nevertheless, the limits of space demand that attention now be directed to some criticisms of the movement. Among the more common complaints heard is that it is: (1) antiseptic in purpose and achievement, limiting its function to the clarification of language and thought, (2) a passing philosophical fad produced by an over-concern for academic respectability and prestige, and (3) not as original as some have supposed. (Was not Plato doing analysis when he inquired into the meaning of virtue?)

In this all too brief account of the development of philosophy of education in America since 1900, three major trends have been identified: (1) the decline of Idealism, (2) the rise of Experimen- talism, under the influence of Dewey, and (3) the emergence of two new philosophical movements that are making their way, in fact, analysis has made its way, to the center of the philosophical stage.

A number of other recent trends could be discussed at some length. Because of the limitations of space only four can be men- tioned: (1) a vast increase in the number of publications in the philosophy of education has occurred. Granted that many of these are textbooks, nevertheless, these publications are evidence of con- siderable ferment in the field. At least forty books and one journal have been added to the literature during the past ten years. (2) The offerings in philosophy of education appear to have been ex- tended and the quality of teaching may have improved. (3) There have been efforts to heal the schism that had grown up between the departments of philosophy and the schools of education by cross listing courses, by using the team teaching approach in certain courses in philosophy of education, and by the creation of joint graduate programs in the philosophy of education. Much of the credit for these results must go to the Philosophy of Education Society, the American Philosophical Association and the joint committee on philosophy of education appointed by these two or- ganizations. Finally, (4) the national, regional, and local meetings on philosophy of education have increased the exchange of ideas among philosophers of education. Through these meetings perhaps

13. Op. Cit. Philosophical Analysis and Education. 14. William K. Frankena, Philosophy of Education. New York: The Macmillan Com-

pany, 1965.




understandings have been broadened, the problems of education seen in some new light.

What the future holds for the philosophy of education is difficult to say. Crystal ball gazing is a risky and useless business, and it will be avoided in this treatment of the philosophy of American education.



philosophy of education || philosophy of education in twentieth century america

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