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Lesson 2

Religion and Philosophical Investigation of Mankind

2.1 Religion

The period of religious history begins with the invention of writing about 5,200 years ago

(3200 BCE) in the Near East. The prehistory of religion relates to a study of religious beliefs

that existed prior to the advent of written records. The earliest evidence of religious ideas dates

back several hundred thousand years to the Middle and Lower Paleolithic periods. Archeologists

refer to apparent intentional burials of early homo sapiens from as early as 300,000 years ago as

evidence of religious ideas and symbolic artifacts from Middle Stone Age sites in Africa. A

number of artifacts from the Upper Paleolithic (50,000-13,000) are generally interpreted by

scientists as representing religious ideas. Examples of Upper Paleolithic remains associated with

religious beliefs include the lion man, the Venus figurines, cave paintings from Chauvet Cave

and the elaborate ritual burial from Sungir. Later on this kind of expression of homo sapiens

become precise evidence for human belief and expression.

Many scholars had agreed that the main cause of belief come from two factors; emotional

or inside condition that is fear just like a baby who fears of his surrounding things because of his

lack of knowledge and reasons. And another is due to the evolution of human brain which grows

up and increase from time to time. This is external or physical condition. The quantity and

quality of brain will be multiple when he start to think again and again and use their own

organism especially hands to work out.

2.2 Development of religion

The religion have been naturally moderated from ancient till present. It was in intention or

maybe without intention of man. Religion has been changed and adjust to fit each community

and circumstances. It starts from simple form to be complex organization seen in nowadays.

There are 7 steps of religion development;

1)Paleolithic: Intentional burial, particularly with grave goods may be one of the earliest

detectable forms of religious practice. Societies may also have practiced the earliest form of

totemism or animal worship. Animal worship during the Upper Paleolithic was intertwined with

hunting rites.

2)Shamanism is a practice that involves a practitioner reaching altered states of

consciousness in order to encounter and interact with the spirit world. Generally, the shaman

traverses the axis mundi and enters the spirit world by effecting a transition of consciousness,

entering into an ecstatic trance, either autohypnotically or through the use of entheogens. The

methods employed are diverse, and are often used together.

3) Animism is the religious worldview that natural physical entities—including animals,

plants, and often even inanimate objects or phenomena—possess a spiritual essence. Animism

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encompasses the belief that there is no separation between the spiritual and physical (or

material) world, and souls or spirits exist, not only in humans, but also in some other animals,

plants, rocks, geographic features such as mountains or rivers, or other entities of the natural

environment, including thunder, wind, and shadows.

Animism consisted of two unformulated propositions; all parts of nature had a soul, and

these souls are capable of moving without requiring a physical form. This gives rise to fetishism,

the worship of visible objects as powerful, spiritual beings. The second proposition was that

souls are independent of their physical forms. It gives rise to 'spiritism', Many animistic cultures

observe some form of ancestor reverence. Whether they see the ancestors as living in another

world, or embodied in the natural features of this world, animists often believe that offerings and

prayers to and for the dead are an important facet of maintaining harmony with the world of the

spirits. This is sometimes called as “ancestor worship” as well.

4) Polytheism is the worship or belief in multiple deities usually assembled into a

pantheon of gods and goddesses, along with their own religions and rituals. Polytheism was the

typical form of religion during the Bronze Age and Iron Age, up to the Axial Age and the

gradual development of monotheism or pantheism, and atheism.

5) Henotheism is the belief and worship of a single god while accepting the existence or

possible existence of other deities that may also be worshipped. The Rigveda was the basis of

henotheism in the sense of a polytheistic tradition striving towards a formulation of The One

(ekam) Divinity aimed at by the worship of different cosmic principles. Hinduism later

developed the concept of Brahman implies a transcendent and immanent reality, variously

interpreted as personal, impersonal or transpersonal.

6) Monotheism is a belief in the existence of a single god. it is common for believers to

also think that this god created all of reality and is totally self-sufficient, without any

dependency upon any other being. This is what we find in the largest monotheistic religious

systems: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism. but they also deny the existence of the gods

of any other religious faiths. Only one supreme god however is relatively infrequent and occurs

more during a transition between polytheism and monotheism when the older gods need to be

explained away. Various theologians and philosophers through time have believed that

monotheism "evolved" from polytheism, arguing that polytheistic faiths were more primitive

and monotheistic faiths more advanced - culturally, ethically, and philosophically.

7) Rational religion

Rationality is based on reason or evidence. Faith is belief in inspiration, revelation, or

authority. In this stage of Religion evolution, men have questioned himself and others by the

reason. At this stage they depend on themselves rather other authorities such as unapproved

power of god and goddess.

2.3 Major religion of the world

Religion is an organized collection of beliefs, cultural systems, and world views that

relate humanity to the supernatural, and to spirituality. Many religions have narratives, symbols, and sacred histories that are intended to explain the meaning of life and/or to explain the origin

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of life or the Universe. From their beliefs about the cosmos and human nature, people derive

morality, ethics, religious laws or a preferred lifestyle. There are roughly 4,200 religions in the world. But there are five major religions which influence to people around the world.

2.3.1 Judaism

Judaism is the religion of the world's approximately 15 million Jews. It is one of the oldest religions and the first monotheistic religion to teach the belief in one God. Both

Christianity and Islam have similarities with Judaism. These religions accept the belief in one

God and the moral teachings of the Hebrew Bible, which includes the Torah or "תורה."

The basic laws and teachings of Judaism come from the Torah, the first five books of the Hebrew Bible and oral traditions. Some of these oral traditions were later written. The Mishnah

and the Talmud are books written based on these oral traditions. The Torah is the most

important holy book of Judaism. The Hebrew Bible is a collection of writings called the "Tanakh" ( ך”תנ ) in Hebrew. It is divided into three parts - Torah (תורה, Instruction), Nevi'im

.(Writings ,כתובים) and Ketuvim ,(Prophets ,נביאים)

The following is a basic, structured list of the central works of Jewish practice and thought.

The two most important groups of books in Judaism are the Bible and the Talmud. The beliefs

and rituals of Judaism come from these books. Later Jewish teachers and scholars wrote more

books, called commentaries, which explain and say more about the teachings of the Bible and

Talmud.

Bible

The Torah is the most important of all Jewish writings. The first five books of the Hebrew

Bible make up the Torah. The Torah contains the basic laws of Judaism and describes the

history of the Jews until the death of Moses. Jewish tradition says that God told Moses what to

write in the Torah, which is also called the Five Books of Moses. Jews divide the Bible into three

parts and call it the Tanakh. The three parts are the Torah, which is the first five books; the

Nevi'im, which are the books of the prophets; and the Ketuvim, meaning the Writings, which are

other books of history and moral teachings.

The Ten Commandments

1. You shall have no other Gods but me.

2. You shall not make for yourself any idol, nor bow down to it or worship it.

3. You shall not misuse the name of the Lord your God.

4. You shall remember and keep the Sabbath day holy.

5. Respect your father and mother.

6. You must not kill.

7. You must not commit adultery.

8. You must not steal.

9. You must not give false evidence against your neighbour.

10. You must not be envious of your neighbour's goods. You shall not be envious of his

house nor his wife, nor anything that belongs to your neighbour.

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Other important teachings of Judaism are;

1. The most important teaching of Judaism is that there is one God, who wants people to do

what is just and compassionate. Judaism teaches that a person serves God by studying the

holy writings and doing what they teach. These teachings include both ritual practices and

ethical laws. Judaism teaches that all people are created in the image of God and deserve

to be treated with dignity and respect.

2. The law of God is the most important than other law

3. Islael people was selected by God to bring man to God

4. Historical events are the witness of God’s mighty. Man should follow the order to enjoy

the realm of God

5. Messiah or the prophet is the son of God

6. After death all man will be judged by God, punishment will go to sinful one the rewards

will be granted to good one.

7. The judgment day is true and God will present in front of man for cleaning day

8. Divine messenger was sent by God to deliver the words of God

9. Following Jew tradition and culture as written in scripture strictly

10. Jew must live for purification by following the right

a. Right of life

b. Right of asset

c. Right of occupation

d. Right of dressing

e. Right of having own house

f. Right of resting and privation

2.3.2 Christianity

Christianity is a monotheistic religion centered on the life and teachings of Jesus as

presented in the New Testament. Its followers, known as Christians, believe that Jesus is the

only begotten Son of God and the Messiah (Christ) prophesied in the Hebrew Bible (the part of

scripture common to Christianity and Judaism). Christianity has played a prominent role in the

shaping of Western civilization at least since the 4th century. As of the early 21st century,

Christianity has between 1.5 billion and 2.1 billion adherents, representing about a quarter to a

third of the world's population.

To Christians, Jesus Christ is a teacher, the model of a virtuous life, the revealer of God,

as well as an incarnation of God. But most importantly Christ is the savior of humanity who

suffered, died, and was resurrected to bring about salvation from sin. Jesus ascended into heaven

during the Resurrection, and most denominations teach that Jesus will return to judge the living

and the dead, granting everlasting life to his followers. Christians call the message of Jesus

Christ the Gospel ("good news") and hence label the written accounts of his ministry as gospels.

Like Judaism and Islam, Christianity is classified as an Abrahamic Religion. Christianity began

as a Jewish sect in the eastern Mediterranean, quickly grew in size and influence over a few

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decades, and by the 4th century had become the dominant religion within the Roman Empire.

During the Middle Ages, most of the remainder of Europe was christianized, with Christians

also being a (sometimes large) religious minority in the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of

India. Following the Age of Discovery, through missionary work and colonization, Christianity

spread to the Americas and the rest of the world.

Christianity ( means "the anointed one" ) is a monotheistic, Abrahamic religion based on

the life and teachings of Jesus Christ as presented in the New Testament. Most Christians

believe that Jesus is the Son of God, fully divine and fully human, and the savior of humanity

prophesied in the Old Testament. Most Christians (Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Eastern

Rite and Protestants alike) accept the use of creeds, and subscribe to at least one of the creeds

mentioned above.

The central tenet of Christianity is the belief in Jesus as the Son of God and the Messiah

(Christ). Jesus' coming was the fulfillment of messianic prophecies of the Old Testament.

Through belief in and acceptance of the death and resurrection of Jesus, sinful humans can be

reconciled to God and thereby are offered salvation and the promise of eternal life. According to

the canonical gospels of Matthew and Luke, Jesus was conceived by the Holy Spirit and born

from the Virgin Mary. Little of Jesus' childhood is recorded in the canonical Gospels, however

infancy Gospels were popular in antiquity. In comparison, his adulthood, especially the week

before his death, is well documented in the Gospels contained within the New Testament. The

Biblical accounts of Jesus' ministry include: his baptism, miracles, preaching, teaching, and

deeds.

The New Testament consists of Four narratives of the life, teaching, death and

resurrection of Jesus, called "gospels" (or "good news" accounts);a narrative of the Apostles' ministries in the early church, called the "Acts of the Apostles", and probably written by the

same writer as the Gospel of Luke, which it continues; twenty-one letters, often called

"epistles" in the biblical context, written by various authors, and consisting of Christian doctrine, counsel, instruction, and conflict resolution; and an Apocalypse, the Book of

Revelation, which is a book of prophecy, containing some instructions to seven local

congregations of Asia Minor, but mostly containing prophetical symbology, about the end times.

Christians follow the New testament and the contents of new testament is similar the old

testament of Judaism but Jesus Christ had moderated the teaching by;

1) Preservative aspect

God is the only God. 2) moderated aspect

-Yahweh is father of mankind not only Jews

-The relation of God and man like father and son - Neighbor means mankind not just neighbor fellows

Don’t gaze at lady with bad thinking

3) Revolute aspect - Do not divorce your wife except she commit adultery

- Do not swear but say the truth

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- Do not retort your enemies by harming but kindness

- Do good for those who hate and harm you instead of harming enemies

2.3.3 Islam

Islam is a monotheistic and Abrahamic religion articulated by the Qur'an, a book

considered by its adherents to be the verbatim word of God (Arabic: هللا Allāh) and by the

teachings and normative example (called the Sunnah and composed of Hadith) of Muhammad,

considered by them to be the last prophet of God. An adherent of Islam is called a Muslim.

Muslims believe that God is one and incomparable and the purpose of existence is to love and

serve God. Most Muslims are of two denominations, Sunni (75–90%), or Shia (10–20%).

In Muslim tradition, the prophet Muhammad (c. 570 – June 8, 632) is viewed as the last

in a series of prophets. During the last 22 years of his life, beginning at age 40 in 610 CE,

according to the earliest surviving biographies, Muhammad reported revelations that he believed

to be from God conveyed to him through the archangel Gabriel (Jibril). The content of these

revelations, known as the Qur'an, was memorized and recorded by his companions.

During this time, Muhammad in Mecca preached to the people, imploring them to

abandon polytheism and to worship one God. Although some converted to Islam, Muhammad

and his followers were persecuted by the leading Meccan authorities. This resulted in the

Migration to Abyssinia of some Muslims (to the Aksumite Empire). Many early converts to

Islam, were the poor and former slaves like Bilal ibn Rabah al-Habashi. The Meccan elite felt

that Muhammad was establishing their social order by preaching about one God, racial equality

and in the process giving ideas to the poor and their slaves.

After 12 years of the persecution of Muslims by the Meccans and the Meccan boycott of

the Hashemites, Muhammads relatives, Muhammad and the Muslims performed the Hijra

("emigration") to the city of Medina (formerly known as Yathrib) in 622. There, with the

Medinan converts (Ansar) and the Meccan migrants (Muhajirun), Muhammad in Medina

established his political and religious authority. A state was established in accordance with

Islamic economic jurisprudence. The Constitution of Medina was formulated, instituting a

number of rights and responsibilities for the Muslim, Jewish, Christian and pagan communities

of Medina, bringing them within the fold of one community — the Ummah.

The Constitution established: the security of the community, religious freedoms, the role

of Medina as a sacred place (barring all violence and weapons), the security of women, stable

tribal relations within Medina, a tax system for supporting the community in time of conflict,

parameters for exogenous political alliances, a system for granting protection of individuals, and

a judicial system for resolving disputes where non-Muslims could also use their own laws. All

the tribes signed the agreement to defend Medina from all external threats and to live in

harmony amongst themselves. Within a few years, two battles were fought against the Meccan

forces: first, the Battle of Badr in 624, which was a Muslim victory, and then a year later, when

the Meccans returned to Medina, the Battle of Uhud, which ended inconclusively.

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The Arab tribes in the rest of Arabia then formed a confederation and during the Battle of

the Trench besieged Medina intent on finishing off Islam. In 628, the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah

was signed between Mecca and the Muslims and was broken by Mecca two years later. After the

signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah many more people converted to Islam. At the same time,

Meccan trade routes were cut off as Muhammad brought surrounding desert tribes under his

control.By 629 Muhammad was victorious in the nearly bloodless Conquest of Mecca, and by

the time of his death in 632 (at the age of 62) he united the tribes of Arabia into a single

religious polity.

The Five Pillars of Islam (arkān al-Islām أركان اإلسالم; alsoarkān al-dīn أركان الدين "pillars

of the religion") are five basic acts in Islam, considered mandatory by believers and are the foundation of Muslim life. They are summarized in the famous hadith of Gabriel.

They make up Muslim life, prayer, concern for the needy, self- purification and the pilgrimage. They are:

1. Shahadah: declaring there is no god except God, and Muhammad is God's Messenger

2. Salat: ritual prayer five times a day

3. Sawm: fasting and self-control during the blessed month of Ramadan

4. Zakat: giving 2.5% of one’s savings to the poor and needy. Here are five principles that

should be followed when giving the zakāt:

a) The giver must declare to God his intention to give the zakāt. b) The zakāt must be paid on the day that it is due.

c) After the offering, the payer must not exaggerate on spending his money more

than usual means. d) Payment must be in kind. This means if one is wealthy then he or she needs to

pay 2.5% of their income. If a person does not have much money, then they should

compensate for it in different ways, such as good deeds and good behavior toward

others. e) The zakāt must be distributed in the community from which it was taken.

5.Hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. If he/she is able to do.

Other belief for muslim

1. The Qu'ran asserts the existence of a single and absolute truth that transcends the world; a

unique, independent and indivisible being, who is independent of the entire creation. God,

according to Islam, is a universal God, rather than a local, tribal, or parochial one—God

is an absolute, who integrates all affirmative values and brooks no evil.

2. Muhammad therefore, being the last prophet, was vouchsafed a book which, in Muslim

belief, will remain in its true form till the Last Day.

3. Muslims believe the Quran to be the final revelation of God's word to man, and a

completion and confirmation of previous scriptures. 4. Believing in angels is one of the six Articles of Faith in Islam. Just as humans are made of

clay, and jinn are made of smokeless fire, angels are made of light. The names and roles

of some angels have been mentioned to us:

The angels of the Seven Heavens.

Hafaza, (The Guardian Angel):

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Kiraman Katibin (Honourable Recorders),[14] two of whom are charged to every human

being; one writes down good deeds and the another one writes down evil deeds. They are

both described as 'Raqeebun 'Ateed' in the Qur'an.

Mu'aqqibat (The Protectors) who keep people from death until its decreed time and who

bring down blessings.

Jundullah, those who help Muhammad in the battlefield

The angels who violently pull out the souls of the wicked,

Those who gently draw out the souls of the blessed,

Those angels who distribute (provisions, rain, and other blessings) by (God's) Command.

Those angels who drive the clouds.

Hamalat al-'Arsh, those who carry the 'Arsh (Throne of God), comparable to the

ChristianSeraph

Those that give the spirit to the foetus in the womb and are charged with four commands: to

write down his provision, his life-span, his actions, and whether he will be wretched or happy.

The Angel of the Mountains

Munkar and Nakir, who question the dead in their graves.

Darda'il (The Journeyers), who travel in the earth searching out assemblies where people

remember God's name.

The angels charged with each existent thing, maintaining order and warding off corruption.

Their number is known only to God.

There is the angel who is responsible for Jannah (Paradise). A weak hadeeth says his name is

Ridwan so as far as we know, there is no name for sure that we know of.

Maalik is the chief of the angels who govern Jahannam (Hell)

Zabaniah are 19 angels who torment sinful persons in hell

These angels take no pity on punishing them as they do what the Lord has commanded them precisely and perfectly.

5. Qadar (Arabic: قدر, transl.: qadar, English: fate; divine foreordainment/predestination) is

the concept of divinedestiny in Islam

6. The day of resurrection

2.3.4 Hinduism

Hinduism is the dominant religion of the Indian subcontinent, particularly of India and

Nepal. It includes Shaivism, Vaishnavism, Smartism among numerous other traditions. Among

other practices and philosophies, Hinduism includes a wide spectrum of laws and prescriptions

of "daily morality" based on karma, dharma, and societal norms. Hinduism is a categorisation of

distinct intellectual or philosophical points of view, rather than a rigid, common set of beliefs.

Major scriptures include the Vedas, Upanishads, Puranas, Mahabharata, Ramayana, Manusmriti,

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Bhagavad Gita and Agamas. Hindu belief is spanning monotheism, polytheism,

panentheism, pantheism, monism, and atheism among others; and its concept of God is

complex and depends upon each individual and the tradition and philosophy followed. It is

sometimes referred to as henotheistic (i.e., involving devotion to a single god while accepting

the existence of others), but any such term is an over generalization. The Rig Veda, the oldest

scripture and the mainstay of Hindu philosophy does not take a restrictive view on the

fundamental question of God and the creation of universe. It rather lets the individual seek and

discover answers in the quest of life. There is no founder of this religion but scholars agreed that

there were many rishi or sage who wrote the scripture and continued teaching and practice

according to the code of Hindu law or dharma.

Hindu society has been categorized into four classes, called varnas.They are,

the Brahmins: Vedic teachers and priests;

the Kshatriyas: warriors, nobles, and kings;

the Vaishyas: farmers, merchants, and businessmen; and

the Shudras: servants and laborers.

Traditionally the life of a Hindu is divided into four Āshramas (phases or stages; unrelated

meanings include monastery).

The first part of one's life, Brahmacharya, the stage as a student, is spent in celibate,

controlled, sober and pure contemplation under the guidance of a Guru, building up the mind for

spiritual knowledge.

Grihastha is the householder's stage, in which one marries and satisfies kāma and arthain

one's married and professional life respectively. The moral obligations of a Hindu householder

include supporting one's parents, children, guests and holy figures.

Vānaprastha, the retirement stage, is gradual detachment from the material world. This may

involve giving over duties to one's children, spending more time in religious practices and

embarking on holy pilgrimages.

Finally, in Sannyāsa, the stage of asceticism, one renounces all worldly attachments to

secludedly find the Divine through detachment from worldly life and peacefully shed the body

for Moksha

Mahabharata, Krishna defines dharma as upholding both this-worldly and other-worldly

affairs. The word Sanātana means 'eternal', 'perennial', or 'forever'; thus, 'Sanātana Dharma' signifies that it is the dharma that has neither beginning nor end.

Artha (livelihood, wealth); Artha is objective & virtuous pursuit of wealth for

livelihood, obligations and economic prosperity. It is inclusive of political life, diplomacy and material well-being. The doctrine of Artha is called Arthashastra, amongst the most famous of

which is Kautilya Arthashastra.

Kāma (sensual pleasure);Kāma means desire, wish, passion, longing, pleasure of the senses, the aesthetic enjoyment of life, affection, or love. However, this is only acceptable

within marriage.

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Dharma or righteousness. Householders must learn the scripture, examine the truth

written in text and following the basic code of spirituality by themeselve. Dharma means the way to be self-realisation. It covers all events and circumstanes which prove to be within one

reality God or Brahman.

Mokṣa (liberation, freedom from samsara);Moksha literally "release" (both from a root muc "to let loose, let go"), is the last goal of life. It is liberation from samsara and the

concomitant suffering involved in being subject to the cycle of repeated death and reincarnation.

2.3.5 Buddhism

Buddhism is a religion indigenous to the Indian subcontinent that encompasses a variety

of traditions, beliefs and practices largely based on teachings attributed to Siddhartha Gautama,

who is commonly known as the Buddha, meaning "the awakened one". The Buddha lived and

taught in the eastern part of the Indian subcontinent sometime between the 6th and 4th centuries

BCE.[1] He is recognized by Buddhists as an awakened or enlightened teacher who shared his

insights to help sentient beings end their suffering (dukkha) through the elimination of ignorance

(avidyā) by way of understanding and the seeing of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)

and the elimination of desire (taṇhā), and thus the attainment of the cessation of all suffering,

known as the sublime state of nirvāņa.

The evidence of the early texts suggests that Siddhārtha Gautama was born in a

community that was on the periphery, both geographically and culturally, of the northeastern Indian subcontinent in the 5th century BCE. It was either a small republic, in which case his

father was an elected chieftain, or an oligarchy, in which case his father was an oligarch.

According to the Theravada Tripitaka Gautama was born in Lumbini in modern-day Nepal,

around the year 563 BCE, and raised inKapilavastu. shortly after the birth of young prince Gautama, an astrologer named Asita visited the young prince's father—King Śuddhodana—and

prophesied that Siddhartha would either become a great king or renounce the material world to

become a holy man, depending on whether he saw what life was like outside the palace walls.Śuddhodana was determined to see his son become a king, so he prevented him from

leaving the palace grounds. But at age 29, despite his father's efforts, Gautama ventured beyond

the palace several times. In a series of encounters—known in Buddhist literature as thefour sights—he learned of the suffering of ordinary people, encountering an old man, a sick man, a

corpse and, finally, an ascetic holy man, apparently content and at peace with the world. These

experiences prompted Gautama to abandon royal life and take up a spiritual quest.

Gautama first went to study with famous religious teachers of the day, and mastered the meditative attainments they taught. But he found that they did not provide a permanent end to

suffering, so he continued his quest. He next attempted an extreme asceticism, which was a

religious pursuit common among the Shramanas, a religious culture distinct from the Vedic one. Gautama underwent prolonged fasting, breath-holding, and exposure to pain. He almost starved

himself to death in the process. He realized that he had taken this kind of practice to its limit,

and had not put an end to suffering. So in a pivotal moment he accepted milk and rice from a village girl and changed his approach. He devoted himself to anapanasati meditation, through

which he discovered what Buddhists call the Middle Way (Skt. madhyamā-pratipad: a path of

moderation between the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification.

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Gautama was determined to complete his spiritual quest. At the age of 35, he famously

sat in meditationunder a sacred fig tree — known as the Bodhi tree — in the town of Bodh Gaya, India, and vowed not to rise before achieving enlightenment. After many days, he finally

destroyed the fetters of his mind, therebyliberating himself from the cycle of suffering and

rebirth, and arose as a fully enlightened being (Skt.samyaksaṃbuddha). Soon thereafter, he attracted a band of followers and instituted a monastic order. Now, as the Buddha, he spent the

rest of his life teaching the path of awakening he had discovered, traveling throughout the

northeastern part of the Indian subcontinent, and died at the age of 80 (483 BCE) in Kushinagar,

India. The south branch of the original fig tree available only in Anuradhapura Sri Lanka is known as Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi.

His teachings on the Four Noble Truths are regarded as central to the teachings of

Buddhism, and are said to provide a conceptual framework for Buddhist thought. These four truths explain the nature of dukkha(suffering, anxiety, unsatisfactoriness), its causes, and how it

can be overcome. The four truths are:

1. The truth of dukkha (suffering, anxiety, unsatisfactoriness)

2. The truth of the origin of dukkha

3. The truth of the cessation of dukkha

4. The truth of the path leading to the cessation of dukkha

The five precepts are training rules in order to live a better life in which one is happy, without worries, and can meditate well:

1. To refrain from taking life (non-violence towards sentient life forms), or ahimsā;

2. To refrain from taking that which is not given (not committing theft)

3. To refrain from sensual (including sexual) misconduct;

4. To refrain from lying (speaking truth always);

5. To refrain from intoxicants which lead to loss of mindfulness (specifically, drugs and alcohol).

Philosophy

The word "philosophy" comes from the Ancient Greek (philosophia), which literally

means "love of wisdom". The introduction of the terms "philosopher" and "philosophy" has

been ascribed to the Greek thinker Pythagoras. Philosophy is the study of general and

fundamental problems, such as those connected with reality, existence, knowledge, values,

reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such

problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational argument. In

more casual speech, by extension, "philosophy" can refer to "the most basic beliefs, concepts,

and attitudes of an individual or group". Traditionally, there are five main branches of

philosophy which belong –

1)pure philosophy;

Metaphysics, which deals with the fundamental questions of reality.

Epistemology, which deals with our concept of knowledge, how we learn and what we

can know.

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Logic, which studies the rules of valid reasoning and argumentation

Ethics, or moral philosophy, which is concerned with human values and how individuals

should act.

Aesthetics or esthetics, which deals with the notion of beauty and the philosophy of art.

2) Applied philosophy for example:Philosophy of eductation ,Philosophy of

language,Philosophy of mind,Philosophy of religion,Philosophy of science,Political philosophy

Eastern philosophy (e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism) and early Western philosophy are similar in their interest in matters of basic significance to human existence. There

were, however, some important, interrelated, differences.

1). Early Western philosophy and science were influenced by the concept of 'God as King of the universe'. As King, God made laws that the natural world obeys (e.g. the 'law of gravity').

The role of philosophy and science was to discover the laws that govern the behavior of the

universe. In Eastern philosophy, however, the natural world does not follow laws, it simply 'is'.

Humans can look for regularities and pattern in the flow of nature, but any 'laws' thus detected are the product of human conception, a way of organizing our experiences, and are not the

underlying basis of the phenomena being observed.

2) Both the Western and the Eastern approach share a concept that a deeper understanding of reality is possible than is normally available in everyday experience. The

approaches differ significantly, however, in how to develop that understanding. The Western

approach to a deeper understanding involves the application of symbolic thought (i.e. words and mathematics). In other words, the nature of reality can be discovered by thinking about it the

right way. Science relies upon a specific thinking processes (logic) while faith relies upon

specific thoughts (dogma). In the Eastern approach, thinking moves us away from understanding reality. When we think we transfer our attention away from reality to the world of symbols, and

an irretrievable difference lies between the symbol and what it represents. In the Eastern

approach, the nature of reality is discovered by experiencing it directly, without thoughts. This is

accomplished through a variety of meditative processes. 3) In the Western approach, both religious and scientific, the verbal or mathematical

models of reality are evaluated along the criterion of Truth. A model is expected to accurately

express the true nature of reality. In the Eastern approach, however, verbal models concern more how to experience reality, and are much less concerned about how to think about reality. They

are evaluated on their effectiveness rather than on their truth. The difference between verbal

models in the two approaches is essentially the difference between a text book on organic chemistry and a cook book.

4) Most of Eastern philosophy especially Indian thought can not be separated from

religion. Both views and religion lead man to salvation, the distinction of all suffering. Western

philosophy concerns only rational and application to society and individual solution. It is quite intellectual not spiritual as found in Eastern thought

2.1 The Origins of Western Thought

Philosophy as a discipline isn't easy to define precisely. Issuing from a sense of wonderment about life and the world, it often involves a keen interest in major questions about ourselves, our

experience, and our place in the universe as a whole. But philosophy is also reflectively

concerned with the methods its practitioners employ in the effort to resolve such questions.

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Emerging as a central feature of Western culture, philosophy is a tradition of thinking and

writing about particular issues in special ways. Thus, philosophy must be regarded both as content and as activity: It considers alternative

views of what is real and the development of reasons for accepting them. It requires both a

careful, sympathetic reading of classical texts and a critical, logical examination of the arguments they express. It offers all of us the chance to create and adopt significant beliefs

about life and the world, but it also requires each of us to acquire the habits of criticical

thinking. Philosophy is both sublime and nitpicking.

Since our personal growth in these matters naturally retraces the process of cultural development, study of the history of philosophy in our culture provides an excellent introduction

to the discipline as a whole. Here our aim is to examine the appearance of Western philosophy

as an interesting and valuable component of our cultural heritage.

2.1.1 Greek Philosophy

Abstract thought about the ultimate nature of the world and of human life began to appear in

cultures all over the world during the sixth century B.C.E., as an urge to move beyond

superstition toward explanation. We focus here on its embodiment among the ancient Greeks,

whose active and tumultuous social life provided ample opportunities for the expression of philosophical thinking of three sorts:

Speculative thinking expresses human curiosity about the world, striving to understand in natural (rather than super-natural) terms how things really are, what

they are made of, and how they function.

Practical thinking emphasizes the desire to guide conduct by comprehending the nature of life and the place of human beings and human behavior in the greater

scheme of reality.

Critical thinking (the hallmark of philosophy itself) involves a careful examination of the foundations upon which thinking of any sort must rely, trying to achieve an

effective method for assessing the reliability of positions adopted on the significant

issues.

Beginning with clear examples of thinking of the first two sorts, we will see the gradual emergence of inclinations toward the third.

Milesian Speculation During the sixth century, in the Greek colony at Miletus, a group of thinkers began to engage

in an extended exploration of the speculative issues. Although these Milesians wrote little

themselves, other ancient authorities recorded some of their central tenets. Their central urge was to show that the complex world has a simple, permanent underpinning in the reality of a

single kind of stuff from which all else emerges.

The philosopher Thales, for example, is remembered as having asserted that all comes from

water. (Fragments) Although we have no record of the reasoning that led Thales to this conclusion, it isn't hard to imagine what it might have been. If we suppose that the ultimate stuff

of the world must be chosen from among things familiar to us, water isn't a bad choice: most of

the earth is covered with it, it appears in solid, liquid, and gaseous forms, and it is clearly essential to the existence of life. Everything is moist.

Thales's student Anaximander, however, found this answer far too simple. Proper attention to

the changing face of the universe, he supposed, requires us to consider the cyclical interaction of

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things of at least four sorts: the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet. (Fragments) Anaximander

held that all of these elements originally arise from a primal, turbulent mass, the the Boundless or Infinite {Gk. απειρων [apeirôn]}. It is only by a gradual process of distillation that

everything else emerges—earth, air, fire, water, of course—and even living things evolve.

The next Milesian, Anaximenes, returned to the conviction that there must be a single kind of stuff at the heart of everything, and he proposed vapor or mist {Gk. αερ [aer]} as the most likely

candidate. (Fragments) Not only does this warm, wet air combine two of the four elements

together, but it also provides a familiar pair of processes for changes in its state: condensation

and evaporation. Thus, in its most rarified form of breath or spirit, Anaximenes's air constitutes the highest representation of life.

As interesting as Milesian speculations are, they embody only the most primitive variety of

philosophical speculation. Although they disagreed with each other on many points, each of the thinkers appears to have been satisfied with the activity of proposing his own views in relative

isolation from those of his teacher or contemporaries. Later generations initiated the move

toward critical thinking by arguing with each other.

Pythagorean Life

The Greek colony in Italy at the same time devoted much more concern to practical matters. Followers of the legendary Pythagoras developed a comprehensive view of a human life in

harmony with all of the natural world. Since the Pythagoreans persisted for many generations as

a quasi-religious sect, protecting themselves behind a veil of secrecy, it is difficult to recover a detailed account of the original doctrines of their leader, but the basic outlines are clear.

Pythagoras was interested in mathematics: he discovered a proof of the geometrical theorem

that still bears his name, described the relationship between the length of strings and the musical pitches they produce when plucked, and engaged in extensive observation of the apparent

motion of celestial objects. In each of these aspects of the world, Pythagoras saw order, a

regularity of occurrences that could be described in terms of mathematical ratios. The aim of human life, then, must be to live in harmony with this natural regularity. Our lives

are merely small portions of a greater whole. (Fragments) Since the spirit (or breath) of human

beings is divine air, Pythagoras supposed, it is naturally immortal; its existence naturally

outlives the relatively temporary functions of the human body. Pythagoreans therefore believed that the soul "transmigrates" into other living bodies at death, with animals and plants

participating along with human beings in a grand cycle of reincarnation.

Even those who did not fully accept the religious implications of Pythagorean thought were often influenced by its thematic structure. As we'll see later, many Western philosophers have

been interested in the immortality of the human soul and in the relationship between human

beings and the natural world. During the fifth century B.C.E., Greek philosophers began to engage in extended

controversies that represent a movement toward the development of genuinely critical thinking.

Although they often lacked enough common ground upon which to adjudicate their disputes and

rarely engaged in the self-criticism that is characteristic of genuine philosophy, these thinkers did try to defend their own positions and attack those of their rivals by providing attempts at

rational argumentation.

Heraclitus and the Eleatics

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Dissatisfied with earlier efforts to comprehend the world, Heraclitus of Ephesus earned his

reputation as "the Riddler" by delivering his pronouncements in deliberately contradictory (or at least paradoxical) form. The structure of puzzling statements, he believed, mirrors the chaotic

structure of thought, which in turn is parallel to the complex, dynamic character of the world

itself. Rejecting the Pythagorean ideal of harmony as peaceful coexistence, Heraclitus saw the

natural world as an environment of perpetual struggle and strife. "All is flux," he supposed;

everything is changing all the time. As Heraclitus is often reported to have said, "Upon those

who step into the same river, different waters flow." The tension and conflict which govern everything in our experience are moderated only by the operation of a universal principle of

proportionality in all things.

Against this position, the Eleatics defended the unity and stability of the universe. Their leader,Parmenides supposed that language embodies a logic of perfect

immutability: "What is, is." (Fragments) Since everything is what it is and not something else,

he argued in Περι Φυσις (On Nature), it can never correct to say that one and the same thing both has and does not have some feature, so the supposed change from having the feature to not

having it is utterly impossible. Of course, change does seem to occur, so we must distinguish

sharply between the many mere appearances that are part of our experience and the one true

reality that is discernible only by intellect. Other Eleatics delighted in attacking Heraclitus with arguments designed to show the

absurdity of his notion that the world is perpetual changing. Zeno of Elea in particular fashioned

four paradoxes about motion, covering every possible combination of continuous or discrete intervals and the direct motion of single bodies or the relative motion of several:

1. The Dichotomy: It is impossible to move around a racetrack since we must first go halfway, and before that go half of halfway, and before that half of half of halfway,

and . . . . If space is infinitely divisible, we have infinitely many partial distances to

cover, and cannot get under way in any finite time.

2. Achilles and the Tortoise: Similarly, given a ten meter head-start, a tortoise can never be overtaken by Achilles in a race, since Achilles must catch up to where the

tortoise began. But by then the tortoise has moved ahead, and Achilles must catch up

to that new point, and so on. Again, the suppostition that things really move leads to an infinite regress.

3. The Arrow: If, on the other hand, motion occurs in discrete intervals, then at any

given moment during its flight through the air, an arrow is not moving. But since its entire flight comprises only such moments, the arrow never moves.

4. The Stadium: Similarly, if three chariots of equal length, one stationary and the

others travelling in opposite directions, were to pass by each other at the same time,

then each of the supposedly moving ones would take only half as long to pass the other as to pass the third, making 1=2!

The patent absurdity that results in each of these cases, Zeno concluded, shows that motion (and, hence, change of any sort) is impossible. (Fragments)

What all of this raises is the question of "the one and the many." How can there be any

genuine unity in a world that appears to be multiple? To the extent that a satisfactory answer involves a distinction betweenappearance and reality and the use of dialectical reasoning in the

effort to understand what is real, this pursuit of the Eleatics set important standards for the future

development of Western thought.

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Empedocles and Anaxagoras

In the next generation, Empedocles introduced the plurality from the very beginning.

Everything in the world, he supposed, is ultimately made up of some mixture of the four

elements, considered as irreducible components. The unique character of each item depends solely upon the special balance of the four that is present only in it. Change takes place because

there are two competing forces at work in the world. Love {Gk. φιλια [philia]} is always putting

things together, while Strife {Gk. νεικος [neikos]} is always tearing them apart. The interplay of

the two constitutes the activity we see in nature. His rival, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, returned in some measure to the Milesian effort to

identify a common stuff out of which everything is composed. Matter is, indeed, a chaotic

primordial mass, infinitely divisible in principle, yet in which nothing is differentiated. But Anaxagoras held that order is brought to this mass by the power of Mind {Gk. νους [nous]}, the

source of all explanation by reference to cosmic intelligence. Although later philosophers

praised Anaxagoras for this explicit introduction of mind into the description of the world, it is not clear whether he meant by his use of this word what they would suppose. (Fragments)

Greek Atomism

The inclination to regard the world as pluralistic took its most extreme form in the work of

the ancientatomists. Although the basic outlines of the view were apparently developed

by Leucippus, the more complete exposition by Democritus, including a discussion of its ethical implications, was more influential. Our best source of information about the atomists is the

poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things) by the later Roman philosopher Lucretius.

For the atomists, all substance is material and the true elements of the natural world are the tiny, indivisible, unobservable solid bodies called "atoms." Since these particles exist, packed

more or less densely together, in an infinite empty space, their motion is not only possible but

ineveitable. Everything that happens in the world, the atomists supposed, is a result of microscopic collisions among atoms. Thus, asEpicurus would later make clear, the actions and

passions of human life are also inevitable consequences of material motions. Although atomism

has a decidedly modern ring, notice that, since it could not be based on observation of

microscopic particles in the way that modern science is, ancient atomism was merely another fashionable form of cosmological speculation.

The Sophists

Fifth-century Athens was a politically troubled city-state: it underwent a sequence of external

attacks and internal rebellions that no social entity could envy. During several decades, however, the Athenians maintained a nominally democratic government in which (at least some)

citizens had the opportunity to participate directly in important social decisions. This contributed

to a renewed interest in practical philosophy. Itinerate teachers known as the sophists offered to

provide their students with training in the effective exercise of citizenship.

Since the central goal of political manipulation was to outwit and publicly defeat an

opponent, the rhetorical techniques of persuasion naturally played an important role. But the best of the Sophists also made use of Eleatic methods of logical argumentation in pursuit of

similar aims. Driven by the urge to defend expedient solutions to particular problems, their

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efforts often encouraged relativism or evan an extreme skepticism about the likelihood of

discovering the truth. A Sophist named Gorgias, for example, argued (perhaps ironically) that: (a) Nothing exists;

(b) If it did, we could not know it; and (c) If we knew anything, we could not talk about

it. Protagoras, on the other hand, supposed that since human beings are "the measure of all things," it follows that truth is subjectively unique to each individual. In a more political vein,

Thrasymachus argued that it is better to perform unjust actions than to be the victim of the

injustice committed by others. The ideas and methods of these thinkers provided the lively

intellectual environment in which the greatest Athenian philosophers thrived.

Socrates: Philosophical Life

The most interesting and influential thinker in the fifth century was Socrates, whose

dedication to careful reasoning transformed the entire enterprise. Since he sought genuine knowledge rather than mere victory over an opponent, Socrates employed the same logical

tricks developed by the Sophists to a new purpose, the pursuit of truth. Thus, his willingness to

call everything into question and his determination to accept nothing less than an adequate account of the nature of things make him the first clear exponent of critical philosophy.

Although he was well known during his own time for his conversational skills and public

teaching, Socrates wrote nothing, so we are dependent upon his students

(especially Xenophon and Plato) for any detailed knowledge of his methods and results. The trouble is that Plato was himself a philosopher who often injected his own theories into the

dialogues he presented to the world as discussions between Socrates and other famous figures of

the day. Nevertheless, it is usually assumed that at least the early dialogues of Plato provide a (fairly) accurate representation of Socrates himself.

Euthyphro: What is Piety?

In the Ευθυφρων (Euthyphro), for example, Socrates engaged in a sharply critical conversation with an over-confident young man. Finding Euthyphro

perfectly certain of his own ethical rectitude even in the morally ambiguous

situation of prosecuting his own father in court, Socrates asks him to define what "piety" (moral duty) really is. The demand here is for something more than

merely a list of which actions are, in fact, pious; instead, Euthyphro is supposed

to provide a general definition that captures the very essence of what piety is.

But every answer he offers is subjected to the full force of Socrates's critical thinking, until nothing certain remains.

Specifically, Socrates systematically refutes Euthyphro's suggestion that what makes right

actions right is that the gods love (or approve of) them. First, there is the obvious problem that, since questions of right and wrong often generate interminable disputes, the gods are likely to

disagree among themselves about moral matters no less often than we do, making some actions

both right and wrong. Socrates lets Euthypro off the hook on this one by aggreeing—only for purposes of continuing the discussion—that the gods may be supposed to agree perfectly with

each other. (Notice that this problem arises only in a polytheistic culture.)

Socrates 469 BC – 399 BC

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More significantly, Socrates generates a formal dilemma from a (deceptively) simple

question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (Euthyphro 10 a) Neither alternative can do the work for which Euthyphro intends

his definition of piety. If right actions are pious only because the gods love them, then moral

rightness is entirely arbitrary, depending only on the whims of the gods. If, on the other hand, the gods love right actions only because they are already right, then there must be some non-

divine source of values, which we might come to know independently of their love.

In fact, this dilemma proposes a significant difficulty at the heart of any effort to define

morality by reference to an external authority. (Consider, for example, parallel questions with a similar structure: "Do my parents approve of this action because it is right, or is it right because

my parents approve of it?" or "Does the College forbid this activity because it is wrong, or is it

wrong because the College forbids it?") On the second alternative in each case, actions become right (or wrong) solely because of the authority's approval (or disapproval); its choice, then, has

no rational foundation, and it is impossible to attribute laudable moral wisdom to the authority

itself. So this horn is clearly unacceptable. But on the first alternative, the authority approves (or disapproves) of certain actions because they are already right (or wrong) independently of it, and

whatever rational standard it employs as a criterion for making this decision must be accessible

to us as well as to it. Hence, we are in principle capable of distinguishing right from wrong on

our own. Thus, an application of careful techniques of reasoning results in genuine (if negative)

progress in the resolution of a philosophical issue. Socrates's method of insistent questioning at

least helps us to eliminate one bad answer to a serious question. At most, it points us toward a significant degree of intellectual independence. The character of Euthyphro, however, seems

unaffected by the entire process, leaving the scene at the end of the dialogue no less self-

confident than he had been at its outset. The use of Socratic methods, even when they clearly result in a rational victory, may not produce genuine conviction in those to whom they are

applied.

Apology: The Examined Life

Because of his political associations with an earlier regime, the Athenian democracy

put Socrates on trial, charging him with undermining state religion and corrupting young people. The speech he offered in his own defense, as reported in Plato's Απολογημα (Apology),

provides us with many reminders of the central features of Socrates's approach to philosophy

and its relation to practical life. Ironic Modesty:

Explaining his mission as a philosopher, Socrates reports an oracular message telling

him that "No one is wiser than you." (Apology 21a) He then proceeds through a

series of ironic descriptions of his efforts to disprove the oracle by conversing with notable Athenians who must surely be wiser. In each case, however, Socrates

concludes that he has a kind of wisdom that each of them lacks: namely, an open

awareness of his own ignorance. Questioning Habit:

The goal of Socratic interrogation, then, is to help individuals to achieve genuine

self-knowledge, even if it often turns out to be negative in character. As his cross-examination of Meletus shows, Socrates means to turn the methods of the Sophists

inside-out, using logical nit-picking to expose (rather than to create) illusions about

reality. If the method rarely succeeds with interlocutors, it can nevertheless be

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effectively internalized as a dialectical mode of reasoning in an effort to understand

everything. Devotion to Truth:

Even after he has been convicted by the jury, Socrates declines to abandon his

pursuit of the truth in all matters. Refusing to accept exile from Athens or a commitment to silence as his penalty, he maintains that public discussion of the great

issues of life and virtue is a necessary part of any valuable human life. "The

unexamined life is not worth living." (Apology 38a) Socrates would rather die than

give up philosophy, and the jury seems happy to grant him that wish. Dispassionate Reason:

Even when the jury has sentenced him to death, Socrates calmly delivers his final

public words, a speculation about what the future holds. Disclaiming any certainty about the fate of a human being after death, he nevertheless expresses a continued

confidence in the power of reason, which he has exhibited (while the jury has not).

Who really wins will remain unclear. Plato's dramatic picture of a man willing to face death rather than abandoning his

commitment to philosophical inquiry offers up Socrates as a model for all future philosophers.

Perhaps few of us are presented with the same stark choice between philosophy and death, but

all of us are daily faced with opportunities to decide between convenient conventionality and our devotion to truth and reason. How we choose determines whether we, like Socrates, deserve

to call our lives philosophical.

Crito: The Individual and the State

Plato's description of Socrates's final days continued in the Κριτων (Crito). Now in prison awaiting execution, Socrates displays the same spirit of calm reflection about serious matters

that had characterized his life in freedom. Even the patent injustice of his fate at the hands of the

Athenian jury produces in Socrates no bitterness or anger. Friends arrive at the jail with a

foolproof plan for his escape from Athens to a life of voluntary exile, but Socrates calmly engages them in a rational debate about the moral value of such an action.

Of course Crito and the others know their teacher well, and they come prepared to argue the

merits of their plan. Escaping now would permit Socrates to fulfil his personal obligations in life. Moreover, if he does not follow the plan, many people will suppose that his friends did not

care enough for him to arrange his escape. Therefore, in order to honor his commitments and

preserve the reputation of his friends, Socrates ought to escape from jail. But Socrates dismisses these considerations as irrelevant to a decision about what action is

truly right. What other people will say clearly doesn't matter. As he had argued in the Apology,

the only opinion that counts is not that of the majority of people generally, but rather that of the

one individual who truly knows. The truth alone deserves to be the basis for decisions about human action, so the only proper apporoach is to engage in the sort of careful moral reasoning

by means of which one may hope to reveal it.

Socrates's argument proceeds from the statement of a perfectly general moral principle to its application in his particular case:

One ought never to do wrong (even in response to the evil committed by another). But it is always wrong to disobey the state.

Hence, one ought never to disobey the state.

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And since avoiding the sentence of death handed down by the Athenian jury would be an action

in disobedience the state, it follows Socrates ought not to escape. The argument is a valid one, so we are committed to accepting its conclusion if we believe

that its premises are true. The general commitment to act rightly is fundamental to a moral life,

and it does seem clear that Socrates's escape would be a case of disobedience. But what about the second premise, the claim that it is always wrong for an individual to disobey the state?

Surely that deserves further examination. In fact, Socrates pictures the laws of Athens proposing

two independent lines of argument in favor of this claim:

First, the state is to us as a parent is to a child, and since it is always wrong for a child to disobey a parent, it follows that it is always wrong to disobey the state. (Crito 50e) Here we

might raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of the analogy between our parents and the state.

Obedience to our parents, after all, is a temporary obligation that we eventually outgrow by learning to make decisions for ourselves, while Socrates means to argue that obeying the state is

a requirement right up until we die. Here it might be useful to apply the same healthy disrespect

for moral authority that Socrates himself expressed in theEuthyphro. The second argument is that it is always wrong to break an agreement, and since continuing

to live voluntarily in a state constitutes an agreement to obey it, it is wrong to disobey that state.

(Crito 52e) This may be a better argument; only the second premise seems open to question.

Explicit agreements to obey some authority are common enough—in a matriculation pledge or a contract of employment, for example—but most of us have not entered into any such agreement

with our government. Even if we suppose, as the laws suggest, that the agreement is an implicit

one to which we are committed by our decision to remain within their borders, it is not always obvious that our choice of where to live is entirely subject to our individual voluntary control.

Nevertheless, these considerations are serious ones. Socrates himself was entirely convinced

that the arguments hold, so he concluded that it would be wrong for him to escape from prison. As always, of course, his actions conformed to the outcome of his reasoning. Socrates chose to

honor his commitment to truth and morality even though it cost him his life.

Plato: Immortality and the Forms

The most illustrious student Socrates had in philosophy was Plato, whose beautifully

written dialogues not only offered an admiring account of the teachings of his master but also

provided him with an opportunity to develop and express his own insightful philosophical views. In the remainder of our readings from Platonic dialogues, we will assume that the

"Socrates" who speaks is merely a fictional character created by the author, attributing the

philosophical doctrines to Plato himself. In the middle and late dialogues, Plato employed the

conversational structure as a way of presenting dialectic, a pattern of argumentation that examines each issue from several sides, exploring the interplay of alternative ideas while

subjecting all of them to evaluation by reason.

Plato was a more nearly systematic thinker than Socrates had been. He established his own

school of philosophy, the Academy, during the fourth century, and he did not hesitate to offer a

generation of young Athenians the positive results of his brilliant reasoning. Although he shared Socrates's interest in ethical and social philosophy, Plato was much more concerned to establish

his views on matters of metaphysics and epistemology, trying to discover the ultimate

constituents of reality and the grounds for our knowledge of them.

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Meno

Plato's Μενων (Meno) is a transitional dialogue: although it is Socratic in tone,

it introduces some of the epistemological and metaphysical themes that we will see developed more fully in the middle dialogues, which are clearly Plato's own. In a

setting uncluttered by concern for Socrates's fate, it centers on the general

problem of the origins of our moral knowledge. The Greek notion of αρετη [aretê], or virtue, is that of an ability or skill in some

particular respect. The virtue of a baker is what enables the baker to produce good

bread; the virtue of the gardener is what enables the gardener to grow nice flowers; etc. In this sense, virtues clearly differ from person to person and from goal to goal. But

Socrates is interested in true virtue, which (like genuine health) should be the same for

everyone. This broad concept of virtue may include such specific virtues as courage, wisdom, or

moderation, but it should nevertheless be possible to offer a perfectly general description of virtue as a whole, the skill or ability to be fully human. But what is that?

When Meno suggests that virtue is simply the desire for good things, Socrates argues that this

cannot be the case. Since different human beings are unequal in virtue, virtue must be something that varies among them, he argues, but desire for one believes to be good is perfectly universal

Since no human being ever knowingly desires what is bad, differences in their conduct must be

a consequence of differences in what they know. (Meno 77e) This is a remarkable claim. Socrates holds that knowing what is right automatically results in the desire to do it, even though

this feature of our moral experience could be doubted. (Aristotle, for example, would

later explicitly disagree with this view, carefully outlining the conditions under which weakness

of will interferes with moral conduct.) In this context, however, the Socratic position effectively shifts the focus of the dialogue from morality to epistemology: the question really at stake is

how we know what virtue is.

The Basis for Virtue For questions of this sort, Socrates raises a serious dilemma: how can we ever learn what we

do not know? Either we already know what we are looking for, in which case we don't need to

look, or we don't know what we're looking for, in which case we wouldn't recognize it if we

found it. (Meno 80e) The paradox of knowledge is that, in the most fundamental questions about our own nature and function, it seems impossible for us to learn anything. The only escape,

Socrates proposed, is to acknowledge that we already know what we need to know. This is the

doctrine of recollection, Plato's conviction that our most basic knowledge comes when we bring back to mind our acquaintance with eternal realities during a previous existence of the soul.

The example offered in this dialogue is discovery of an irrational number, the square root

of 2. Socrates leads an uneducated boy through the sophisticated geometrical demonstration

with careful questions, showing that the boy somehow already knows the correct answers on his own. All of us have had the experience (usually in mathematical contexts, Plato believed) of

suddenly realizing the truth of something of which we had been unaware, and it does often feel

as if we are not really discovering something entirely new but rather merely remembering something we already knew. Such experiences lend some plausibility to Plato's claim that

recollection may be the source of our true opinions about the most fundamental features of

reality. (Meno 85d) What is more, this doctrine provides an explanation of the effectiveness of Socratic method: the goal is not to convey new information but rather to elicit awareness of

something that an individual already knows implicitly.

Plato 428 – 348 BC

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The further question of the dialogue is whether or not virtue can be taught. On the one hand,

it seems that virtue must be a kind of wisdom, which we usually assume to be one of the acquirable benefits of education. On the other hand, if virtue could be taught, we should be able

to identify both those who teach it and those who learn from them, which we cannot easily do in

fact. (Meno 96c) (Here Socrates offers a scathing attack on the sophists, who had often claimed that they were effective teachers of virtue.) So it seems that virtue cannot be taught. Plato later

came to disagree with his teacher on this point, arguing that genuine knowledge of virtue is

attainable through application of appropriate educational methods.

Perhaps our best alternative, Socrates held, is to suppose that virtue is a (divinely bestowed?) true opinion that merely happens to lack the sort of rational justification which would earn it the

status of certain knowledge. Whether or not we agree with this rather gloomy conclusion about

the unteachability of virtue, the distinction between genuine knowledge and mere true opinion is of the greatest importance. For philosophical knowledge, it is not enough to accept beliefs that

happen to be true; we must also have reasons that adequately support them. Phaedo

The Φαιδων (Phaedo) concludes Plato's description of the life of Socrates. Its final pages

provide what appears to be an accurate account of the death of one of the most colorful

personalities in the history of philosophy. (Phaedo 115b) But most of the dialogue is filled with

Plato's own effort to establish with perfect certainty what Socrates had only been willing to speculate about in the Apology, that the human soul is truly immortal.

As Plato saw it, hope of survival comes naturally to the philosopher, whose whole life is one

of preparation for death. What happens when we die, after all, is that the human soul separates from the human body, and it is concern for the soul rather than the body that characterizes a

philosophical life. In fact, Plato argued that since knowledge of the most important matters in

life is clearest to the soul alone, its customary attachment to a mortal body often serves only as a

distraction from what counts. Here I am, thinking seriously about eternal truth, and then . . . I get hungry or sleepy, and the needs of the body interfere with my study. So, Plato concluded, the

philosopher may properly look forward to death as a release from bodily limitations.

(Phaedo 67d) But is there really any reason to believe that the soul can continue to exist and function after

the body dies? Plato supposed that there is, and his arguments on this point occupy the bulk of

the Phaedo.

The Cycle of Opposites

The first argument is based on the cyclical interchange by means of which every quality

comes into being from its own opposite. Hot comes from cold and cold from hot: that is, hot

things are just cold things that have warmed up, and cold things are just hot things that have

cooled off. Similarly, people who are awake are just people who were asleep but then woke up, while people who are asleep are just people who were awake but then dozed off.

But then, Plato argues by analogy, death must come from life and life from death.

(Phaedo 71c-d) That is, people who are dead are just people who were alive but then experienced the transition we call dying, and people who are alive are just people who were

among the dead but then experienced the transition we call being born. This suggests a perpetual

recycling of human souls from the realm of the living to the realm of the dead and back.

If this is an accurate image of reality, it would certainly follow that my soul will continue to exist after the death of my body. But it also supposes that my soul existed before the birth of my

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body as well. This may seem like an extravagant speculation, but Plato held that there is ample

evidence of its truth in the course of ordinary human life and learning. The Forms

As Socrates had proposed in the Meno, the most important varieties of human knowledge are

really cases of recollection. Consider, for example, our knowledge of equality. We have no difficulty in deciding whether or not two people are perfectly equal in height. In fact, they are

never exactly the same height, since we recognize that it would always be possible to discover

some difference—however minute—with a more careful, precise measurement. By this

standard, all of the examples we perceive in ordinary life only approach, but never fully attain, perfect equality. But notice that since we realize the truth of this important qualification on our

experience, we must somehow know for sure what true equality is, even though we have never

seen it. (Phaedo 75b) Plato believed that the same point could be made with regard to many other abstract

concepts: even though we perceive only their imperfect instances, we have genuine knowledge

of truth, goodness, and beauty no less than of equality. Things of this sort are the Platonic

Forms, abstract entities that exist independently of the sensible world. Ordinary objects are imperfect and changeable, but they faintly copy the perfect and immutable Forms. Thus, all of

the information we acquire about sensible objects (like knowing what the high and low

temperatures were yesterday) is temporary, insignificant, and unreliable, while genuine knowledge of the Forms themselves (like knowing that 93 - 67 = 26) perfectly certain forever.

Since we really do have knowledge of these supra-sensible realities, knowledge that we

cannot possibly have obtained through any bodily experience, Plato argued, it follows that this knowledge must be a form of recollection and that our souls must have been acquainted with the

Forms prior to our births. But in that case, the existence of our mortal bodies cannot be essential

to the existence of our souls—before birth or after death—and we are therefore immortal.

A general metaphysical and epistemological theory. Central to all of Plato’s thought, but nowhere systematically argued for. Not stated in any one dialogue; we must cull from several

(but principally Phaedo and Republic). A theory of postulated abstract objects, deriving from the

Socratic “What is X?” question, which presupposes that there is a single correct answer to the “What is X?” question.

The correct answer is not a matter of convention, of what we all (or most of us) think.

What makes such an answer correct: it is an accurate description of an independent entity, a Form.

Forms are thus mind-independent entities: their existence and nature is independent of

our beliefs and judgments about them.

The Phaedo contains an extended description of the characteristics and functions of the forms:

Unchangeable

Eternal Intelligible, not perceptible

Divine

Incorporeal (passim) Causes of being (“The one over the many”)

Are unqualifiedly what their instances are only with qualification

Forms are sometimes called “Ideas” - Plato’s words are eidos and idea, and the latter suggests the English “idea.” But this gives the wrong idea. For Plato’s Forms are not mental

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entities, nor even mind-dependent. They are independently existing entities whose existence

and nature are graspable only by the mind, even though they do not depend on being so grasped in order to exist. The forms are postulated to solve certain philosophical problems:

1) Epistemological: what are the objects of knowledge? How is knowledge possible? How is knowledge distinguished from (mere) belief or opinion?

Plato’s objection to the physical universe: it’s Heraclitean (as he conceived Heraclitus’s

theory). Objects in flux can’t be known.

2) Metaphysical: What things are real? Is there a mind-independent reality? Is there anything permanent behind the changing phenomena that can be perceived?

The two-worlds theory: Cf. the Allegory of the Cave in Republic VII. The intelligible

world is Parmenidean, the visible world is Heraclitean. Forms in the intelligible realm are postulated to be the objects of knowledge. The metaphysical theory is thus designed to fit

epistemological requirements.

3)Moral: can there be moral knowledge? Are there objective moral truths? Is morality founded in nature or convention?

For Plato, goodness and being are intimately connected. Plato’s universe is value-ridden

at its very foundations: value is there from the start, not imposed upon an antiseptic, value-

neutral reality by the likes of us - external imposers of value on what in itself has no intrinsic value.

This connection explains why it is a single theory that aims to answer both metaphysical

and ethical questions. Understanding how this can be so is one of the hardest - but most important - things to do in understanding Plato.

The Form of the Good is at the top of the hierarchy of Forms, illuminating all of the others

(as the sun illuminates objects in the visible realm, to use Plato’s famous metaphor from the Republic).

An interpretation of this: knowing what something is can’t be divorced from knowing

whether it's good. One can’t know what it is to be an F unless one knows what it is to be a

good F: a non-defective example of its kind. Here is one way to see the connection: imagine a good head of lettuce. Now imagine another head of lettuce, but not as good as the first. And

so on. There comes a point at which our example becomes so bad that it ceases to be a head

of lettuce at all. If there were no connection between goodness and being, there would be no reason to expect this.

4)Semantical: what do general terms stand for? What is it that we grasp when we understand

something? Cf. again the Allegory of the Cave in Republic VII.

Immortality of the Soul

Use of the dialogue as a literary device made it easy for Plato not only to present his own

position (in the voice of Socrates) but also to consider (in the voices of other characters)

significant objections that might be raised against it. This doesn't mean that philosophy is merely

an idle game of argument and counter-argument, he pointed out, because it remains our goal to discover the one line of argument that leads to the truth. The philosopher cautiously investigates

every possibility and examines every side of an issue, precisely because that increases the

chances of arriving eventually at a correct account of reality.

Thus, Simmias suggests that the relationship between the soul and the body may be like that

between musical harmony and the strings of a lyre that produces it. In this case, even though the

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soul is significantly different from the body, it could not reasonably be expected to survive the

utter destruction of that physical thing. (This is an early statement of a view of human nature that would later come to be calledepiphenomenalism.) But Socrates replies that this analogy will

not hold, since the soul exercises direct control over the motions of the body, as the harmony

does not over those of the lyre. Plato's suggestion here seems to be that it would become impossible to provide an adequate account of human morality, of the proper standards for acting

rightly, if Simmias were right.

Cebes offers a more difficult objection: what if the body is like a garment worn by the soul?

Even though I continue to exist longer than any single article of my clothing does, there will come a time when I die, and some of my clothes will probably continue to exist. In the same

way, even if the argument from opposites has shown that the soul can in principle outlast the life

of any particular human body, there might come a time when the soul itself ceases to exist. Even if there is life after death, Cebes suggests, the soul may not be truly immortal.

In response to this criticism, Plato significantly revised the argument from opposities by

incorporating an additional conception of the role of the Forms. Each Form, he now maintains, is the cause of all of every particular instance that bears its name: the form of Beauty causes the

beauty of any beautiful thing; the form of Equality causes the equality of any pair of equal

things; etc. But then, since the soul is living, it must participate in the Form of Life, and thus it

cannot ever die. (Phaedo 105d) The soul is perfectly and certainly imperishable, not only for this life, but forever.

Despite the apparent force of these logical arguments, Plato chose to conclude the Phaedo by

supplementing them with a mythical image of life after death. This concrete picture of the existence of a world beyond our own is imagined, not reasoned, so it cannot promise to deliver

the same perfect representation of the truth. But if we are not fully convinced by the certainty of

rational arguments, we may yet take some comfort from the suggestions of a pleasant story.

Plato: The State and the Soul

The Republic

The most comprehensive statement of Plato's mature philosophical views appears

in Πολιτεια (The Republic), an extended treatment of the most fundamental principles for the conduct of human life. Using the character "Socrates" as a fictional spokesman, Plato considers

the nature and value of justice and the other virtues as they appear both in the structure of

society as a whole and in the personality of an individual human being. This naturally leads to discussions of human nature, the achievement of knowledge, the distinction between appearance

and reality, the components of an effective education, and the foundations of morality.

Because it covers so many issues, The Republic can be read in several different ways: as a

treatise on political theory and practice, as a pedagogical handbook, or as a defence of ethical

conduct, for example. Although we'll take notice of each of these features along the way, our

primary focus in what follows will be on the basic metaphysical and epistemological issues, foundational questions about who we are, what is real, and about how we know it. Read in this

fashion, the dialogue as a whole invites us to share in Plato's vision of our place within the

ultimate structure of reality.

What is Justice?

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Book I of The Republic appears to be a Socratic dialogue on the nature

of justice (Gk. δικαιωσυνη [dikaiôsunê]). As always, the goal of the discussion is to discover the genuine nature of the subject at hand, but the process involves the proposal, criticism, and

rejection of several inadequate attempts at defining what justice really is.

The elderly, wealthy Cephalus suggests that justice involves nothing more than telling the

truth and repaying one's debts. But Socrates points out that in certain (admittedly unusual)

circumstances, following these simple rules without exception could produce disastrous results.

(Republic 331c) Returning a borrowed weapon to an insane friend, for example, would be an instance of following the rule but would not seem to be an instance of just action. The

presentation of a counter-example of this sort tends to show that the proposed definition of

justice is incorrect, since its application does not correspond with our ordinary notion of justice. In an effort to avoid such difficulties, Polemarchus offers a refinement of the definition by

proposing that justice means "giving to each what is owed." The new definition codifies

formally our deeply-entrenched practice of seeking always to help our friends and harm our enemies. This evades the earlier counter-example, since the just act of refusing to return the

borrowed weapon would clearly benefit one's friend. But Socrates points out that harsh

treatment of our enemies is only likely to render them even more unjust than they already are.

(Republic 335d) Since, as we saw in the Phaedo, opposites invariably exclude each other, the production of injustice could never be an element within the character of true justice; so this

definition, too, must be mistaken.

The Privilege of Power At this point in the dialogue, Plato introduces Thrasymachus the sophist, another

fictionalized portrait of an historical personality. After impatiently dismissing what has gone

before, Thrasymachus recommends that we regard justice as the advantage of the stronger; those

in positions of power simply use their might to decree what shall be right. This, too, expresses a fairly common (if somewhat pessimistic) view of the facts about social organization.

But of course Socrates has other ideas. For one thing, if the ruling party mistakenly legislates

to its own disadvantage, justice will require the rest of us to perform the (apparently) contradictory feat of both doing what they decree and also doing what is best for them. More

significantly, Socrates argues that the best ruler must always be someone who knows how to

rule, someone who understands ruling as a craft. But since crafts of any sort invariably aim to produce some external goal (Gk. τελος [télos]), good practitioners of each craft always act for

the sake of that goal, never in their own interest alone. Thus, good rulers, like good shepherds,

must try to do what is best for those who have been entrusted to them, rather than seeking their own welfare. (Republic 342e)

Beaten down by the force of Socratic questioning, Thrasymachus lashes out bitterly and then

shifts the focus of the debate completely. If Socrates does happen to be right about the nature of

justice, he declares, then it follows that a life devoted to injustice is be more to one's advantage than a life devoted to justice. Surely anyone would prefer to profit by committing an act of

injustice against another than to suffer as the victim of an act of injustice committed by someone

else. ("Do unto others before they do unto you.") Thus, according to Thrasymachus, injustice is better than justice.

Some preliminary answers come immediately to mind: the personal rewards to be gained

from performing a job well are commonly distinct from its intrinsic aims; just people are rightly regarded as superior to unjust people in intelligence and character; every society believes that

justice (as conceived in that society) is morally obligatory; and justice is the

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proper virtue (Gk. αρετη [aretê]) of the human soul. But if Socrates himself might have been

satisfied with responses of this sort, Plato the philosophical writer was not. There must be an answer that derives more fundamentally from the nature of reality.

Is Justice Better than Injustice?

When Thrasymachus falls silent, other characters from the dialogue continue to pursue the

central questions: what is justice, how can we achieve it, and what is its value? Not everyone

will agree that justice should be defended as worthwhile for its own sake, rather than for the extrinsic advantages that may result from its practice.

It helps to have a concrete example in mind. So Glaucon recounts the story of Gyges, the

shepherd who discovered a ring that rendered him invisible and immediately embarked on a life of crime with perfect impunity. The point is to suggest that human beings—given an opportunity

to do so without being caught and therefore without suffering any punishment or loss of good

reputation—would naturally choose a life of injustice, in order to maximize their own interests. Adeimantus narrows the discussion even further by pointing out that the personal benefits of

having a good reputation are often acquired by anyone who merely appears to act justly,

whether or not that person really does so. (Republic 363a) This suggests the possibility of

achieving the greatest possible advantage by having it both ways: act unjustly while preserving the outward appearance of being just, instead of acting justly while risking the outward

appearance of injustice. In order to demonstrate once and for all that justice really is valuable for

its own sake alone, Plato must show that a life of the second sort is superior to a life of the first sort.

Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus have given voice to a fundamental issue at the

heart of any effort to improve human conduct by appealing to the principles of moral philosophy. If what I am morally required to do can (in some circumstances) be different from

what I would choose do for my own benefit, then why should I be moral? Plato wrote the

remainder of The Republic in an attempt to provide an adequate, satisfying answer to this

question. After Book I, the entire dialogue is pervaded by an extended analogy between the justice of

individual human beings and the that of an entire society or city-state. Since the crucial elements

of justice may be easier to observe on the larger scale (Republic 369a), Plato began with a detailed analysis of the formation, structure, and organization of an ideal state before applying

its results to a description of personal life.

Why We Form a Society

Imagining their likely origins in the prehistorical past, Plato argued that societies are

invariably formed for a particular purpose. Individual human beings are not self-sufficient; no one working alone can acquire all of the genuine necessities of life. In order to resolve this

difficulty, we gather together into communities for the mutual achievement of our common

goals. This succeeds because we can work more efficiently if each of us specializes in the practice of a specific craft: I make all of the shoes; you grow all of the vegetables; she does all

of the carpentry; etc. Thus, Plato held that separation of functions and specialization of labor are

the keys to the establishment of a worthwhile society. The result of this original impulse is a society composed of many individuals, organized into

distinct classes (clothiers, farmers, builders, etc.) according to the value of their role in

providing some component part of the common good. But the smooth operation of the whole

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society will require some additional services that become necessary only because of the creation

of the social organization itself—the adjudication of disputes among members and the defense of the city against external attacks, for example. Therefore, carrying the principle of

specialization one step further, Plato proposed the establishment of an additional class of

citizens, the guardians who are responsible for management of the society itself. In fact, Plato held that effective social life requires guardians of two distinct sorts: there must

be bothsoldiers whose function is to defend the state against external enemies and to enforce its

laws, and rulerswho resolve disagreements among citizens and make decisions about public

policy. The guardians collectively, then, are those individuals whose special craft is just the task of governance itself.

Training the Guardians

In order to fulfill their proper functions, these people will have to be special human beings

indeed.Plato hinted early on that one of their most evident characteristics will be a temperamental inclination toward philosophical thinking. As we've already seen in

the Apology and in the Phaedo, it is the philosopher above all others who excels at investigating

serious questions about human life and at judging what is true and best. But how are personal

qualities of this sort to be fostered and developed in an appropriate number of individual citizens? (Republic 376d)

The answer, Plato believed, was to rely upon the value of a good education. (Remember, he

operated his own school at Athens!) We'll have an opportunity to consider his notions about higher education later, but his plan for the elementary education of guardians for the ideal state

appears in Book III. Its central concern is an emphasis on achieving the proper balance of many

disparate components—physical training and musical performance along with basic intellectual development.

One notable feature of this method of raising children is Plato's demand for strict censorship

of literary materials, especially poetry and drama. He argued that early absorption in fictional

accounts can dull an person's ability to make accurate judgments regarding matters of fact and that excessive participation in dramatic recitations might encourage some people to emulate the

worst behavior of the tragic heros. (Republic 395c) Worst of all, excessive attention to fictional

contexts may lead to a kind of self-deception, in which individuals are ignorant of the truth about their own natures as human beings. (Republic 382b) Thus, on Plato's view, it is vital for a

society to exercise strict control over the content of everything that children read, see, or hear.

As we will later notice, Aristotle had very different ideas. Training of the sort described here (and later) is intended only for those children who will

eventually become the guardians of the state. Their performance at this level of education

properly determines both whether they are qualified to do so and, if so, whether each of them

deserves to be a ruler or a soldier. A society should design its educational system as a means to distinguish among future citizens whose functions will differ and to provide training appropriate

to the abilities of each.

Divisions of the State

The principle of specialization thus leads to a stratified society. Plato believed that the ideal state comprises members of three distinct classes: rulers, soldiers, and the people. Although he

officially maintained that membership in the guardian classes should be based solely upon the

possession of appropriate skills, Plato presumed that future guardians will typically be the

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offspring of those who presently hold similar positions of honor. If citizens express any

dissatisfaction with the roles to which they are assigned, he proposed that they be told the "useful falsehood" that human beings (like the metals gold, silver, and bronze) possess different

natures that fit each of them to a particular function within the operation of the society as a

whole. (Republic 415a) Notice that this myth (Gk. μυθος [mythos]) cuts both ways. It can certainly be used as a

method of social control, by encouraging ordinary people to accept their position at the bottom

of the heap, subject to governance by the higher classes. But Plato also held that the myth

justifies severe restrictions on the life of the guardians: since they are already gifted with superior natures, they have no need for wealth or other external rewards. In fact, Plato held that

guardians should own no private property, should live and eat together at government expense,

and should earn no salary greater than necessary to supply their most basic needs. Under this regime, no one will have any venal motive for seeking a position of leadership, and those who

are chosen to be guardians will govern solely from a concern to seek the welfare of the state in

what is best for all of its citizens.

Having developed a general description of the structure of an ideal society, Plato maintained

that the proper functions performed by its disparate classes, working together for the common

good, provide a ready account of the need to develop significant social qualities or virtues.

Since the rulers are responsible for making decisions according to which the entire

city will be governed, they must have the virtue of wisdom (Gk. σοφια [sophía]), the capacity to comprehend reality and to make impartial judgments about it.

Soldiers charged with the defense of the city against external and internal enemies,

on the other hand, need the virtue of courage (Gk. ανδρεια [andreia]), the willingness to carry out their orders in the face of danger without regard for personal risk.

The rest of the people in the city must follow its leaders instead of pursuing their

private interests, so they must exhibit the virtue of moderation (Gk. σωφρσυνη [sophrosúnê]), the subordination of personal desires to a higher purpose.

When each of these classes performs its own role appropriately and does not try to take over the

function of any other class, Plato held, the entire city as a whole will operate smoothly, exhibiting the harmony that is genuine justice. (Republic 433e)

We can therefore understand all of the cardinal virtues by considering how each is embodied in the organization of an ideal city.

Rulers

Wise Decisions

Soldiers

Courageous Actions

Farmers, Merchants, and other People

(Moderated Desires)

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Justice itself is not the exclusive responsibility of any one class of citizens, but emerges from the harmonious interrelationship of each component of the society with every other. Next we'll see

how Plato applied this conception of the virtues to the lives of individual human beings.

The Virtues in Human Souls

Remember that the basic plan of the Republic is to draw a systematic analogy between the

operation of society as a whole and the life of any individual human being. So Plato supposed that people exhibit the same features, perform the same functions, and embody the

same virtues that city-states do. Applying the analogy in this way presumes that each of us, like

the state, is a complex whole made up of several distinct parts, each of which has its own proper role. But Plato argued that there is ample evidence of this in our everyday experience. When

faced with choices about what to do, we commonly feel the tug of contrary impulses drawing us

in different directions at once, and the most natural explanation for this phenomenon is to distinguish between distinct elements of our selves. (Republic 436b)

Thus, the analogy holds. In addition to the physical body, which corresponds to the land,

buildings, and other material resources of a city, Plato held that every human being includes

three souls (Gk. ψυχη [psychê]) that correspond to the three classes of citizen within the state, each of them contributing in its own way to the successful operation of the whole person.

The rational soul (mind or intellect) is the thinking portion within each of us, which discerns what is real and not merely apparent, judges what is true and what is false,

and wisely makes the rational decisions in accordance with which human life is most

properly lived. The spirited soul (will or volition), on the other hand, is the active portion; its

function is to carry out the dictates of reason in practical life, courageously doing

whatever the intellect has determined to be best.

Finally, the appetitive soul (emotion or desire) is the portion of each of us that wants and feels many things, most of which must be deferred in the face of rational

pursuits if we are to achieve a salutary degree of self-control.

In the Phaedrus, Plato presented this theory even more graphically, comparing the rational soul to a charioteer whose vehicle is drawn by two horses, one powerful but unruly (desire) and the

other disciplined and obedient (will).

On Plato's view, then, an human being is properly said to be just when the three souls perform their proper functions in harmony with each other, working in consonance for the good of the

person as a whole.

Rational Soul (Thinking)

Wisdom

Spirited Soul (Willing)

Courage

Appetitive Soul (Feeling)

Moderation

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As in a well-organized state, the justice of an individual human being emerges only from the interrelationship among its separate components. (Republic 443d)

Plato's account of a tripartite division within the self has exerted an enormous influence on the philosophy of human nature in the Western tradition. Although few philosophers whole-

heartedly adopt hishypostasization of three distinct souls, nearly everyone acknowledges some

differentiation among the functions of thinking, willing, and feeling. (Even in The Wizard of Oz,

Dorothy's quest depends upon the cooperation of her three friends—Scarecrow, Lion, and Tin Woodsman—each of whom exemplifies one of the three aspects of human nature.) Perhaps any

adequate view of human life requires some explanation or account (Gk. λογος [logos]) of how

we incorporate intellect, volition, and desire in the whole of our existence.

In the context of his larger argument, Plato's theory of human nature provides the foundation

for another answer to the question of why justice is better than injustice. On the view developed here, true justice is a kind of good health, attainable only through the harmonious cooperative

effort of the three souls. In an unjust person, on the other hand, the disparate parts are in

perpetual turmoil, merely coexisting with each other in an unhealthy, poorly-functioning, dis-

integrated personality. Plato developed this theme in greater detail in the final books of The Republic.

Plato: Education and the Value of Justice

Men and Women

As an account of political organization on the larger scale, Plato's defense of an aristocratic

government was unlikely to win broad approval in democratic Athens. He used the characters

Glaucon and Adeimantus to voice practical objections against the plan. They are especially concerned (as Plato's Athenian contemporaries may well have been) with some of its provisions

for the guardian class, including the participation of both men and women, the elimination of

families, and the education of children.

Most fifth-century Greeks, like many twentieth-century Americans, supposed that natural

differences between males and females of the human species entail a significant differentiation

of their proper social roles. Although Plato granted that men and women are different in height, strength, and similar qualities, he noted that these differences are not universal; that is, for

example, although it may be true that most men are taller than most women, there are certainly

some women who are taller than many men. What is more, he denied that there is any systematic difference between men and women with respect to the abilities relevant to

guardianship—the capacity to understand reality and make reasonable judgments about it.

(Republic 454d) Thus, Plato maintained that prospective guardians, both male and female,

should receive the same education and be assigned to the same vital functions within the society.

In addition, Plato believed that the interests of the state are best preserved if children are

raised and educated by the society as a whole, rather than by their biological parents. So he proposed a simple (if startlingly unfamiliar) scheme for the breeding, nurturing, and training of

children in the guardian class. (Note that the same children who are not permitted to watch and

listen to "dangerous" art are encouraged to witness first-hand the violence of war.) The

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presumed pleasures of family life, Plato held, are among the benefits that the higher classes of a

society must be prepared to forego.

Philosopher / Kings

A general objection to the impracticability of the entire enterprise remains. Even if we are

persuaded that Plato's aristocracy is the ideal way to structure a city-state, is there any

possibility that it will actually be implemented in a human society? Of course there is a sense in

which it doesn't matter; what ought to be is more significant for Plato than what is, and philosophers generally are concerned with a truth that transcends the facts of everyday life.

But Plato also believed that an ideal state, embodying the highest and best capabilities of

human social life, can really be achieved, if the right people are put in charge. Since the key to the success of the whole is the wisdom of the rulers who make decisions for the entire city, Plato

held that the perfect society will occur only when kings become philosophers or philosophers

are made kings. (Republic 473d) Only those with a philosophical temperament, Plato supposed, are competent to judge

between what merely seems to be the case and what really is, between the misleading, transient

appearances of sensible objects and the the permanent reality of unchanging, abstract forms.

Thus, the theory of forms is central to Plato's philosophy once again: the philosophers who think about such things are not idle dreamers, but the true realists in a society. It is precisely their

detachment from the realm of sensory images that renders them capable of making accurate

judgments about the most important issues of human life. Thus, despite prevalent public skepticism about philosophers, it is to them that an ideal

society must turn for the wisdom to conduct its affairs properly. But philosophers are made, not

born. So we need to examine the program of education by means of which Plato supposed that the future philosopher-kings can acquire the knowledge necessary for their function as decision-

makers for the society as a whole.

The Structure of Human Knowledge

Since an ideal society will be ruled by those of its citizens who are most aware of what really

matters, it is vital to consider how that society can best raise and educate its philosophers. Plato supposed that under the usual haphazard methods of childrearing, accidents

of birth often restrict the opportunities for personal development, faulty upbringing prevents

most people from achieving everything of which they are capable, and the promise of easy fame or wealth distracts some of the most able young people from the rigors of intellectual pursuits.

But he believed that those with the greatest ability—that is, people with a natural disposition fit

for philosophical study—must receive the best education, engaging in a regimen of mental

discipline that grows more strict with every passing year of their lives.

The highest goal in all of education, Plato believed, is knowledge of the Good; that is, not

merely an awareness of particular benefits and pleasures, but acquaintance with the Form itself. Just as the sun provides illumination by means of which we are able to perceive everything in

the visual world, he argued, so the Form of the Good provides the ultimate standard by means of

which we can apprehend the reality of everything that has value. (Republic 508e) Objects are worthwhile to the extent that they participate in this crucial form.

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So, too, our apprehension of reality occurs in different degrees, depending upon the nature of

the objects with which it is concerned in each case. Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the mereopinion (Gk. δοξα [dóxa]) we can have regarding the visible realm of sensible

objects and the genuine knowledge (Gk. επιστημη [epistêmê]) we can have of the invisible

realm of the Forms themselves. In fact, Plato held that each of these has two distinct varieties, so that we can picture the entire array of human cognition as a line divided proportionately into

four segments. (Republic 509d)

At the lowest level of reality are shadows, pictures, and other images, with respect to

which imagination(Gk. εικασια [eikásia]) or conjecture is the appropriate degree of awareness, although it provides only the most primitive and unreliable opinions.

The visible realm also contains ordinary physical objects, and our perception of them

provides the basis for belief (Gk. πιστις [pístis]), the most accurate possible conception of the nature and relationship of temporal things.

Moving upward into the intelligible realm, we first become acquainted with the relatively

simple Forms of numbers, shapes, and other mathematical entities; we can achieve systematic knowledge of these objects through a disciplined application of the understanding (Gk. διανοια

[diánoia]).

Finally, at the highest level of all, are the more significant Forms—true Equality, Beauty,

Truth, and of course the Good itself. These permanent objects of knowledge are directly apprehended by intuition (Gk.νοησις [nóêsis]), the fundamental capacity of human reason to

comprehend the true nature of reality.

The Allegory of the Cave

Plato recognized that the picture of the Divided Line may be difficult for many of us to understand. Although it accurately represents the different levels of reality and corresponding

degrees of knowledge, there is a sense in which one cannot appreciate its full significance

without first having achieved the highest level. So, for the benefit of those of us who are still

learning but would like to grasp what he is talking about, Plato offered a simpler story in which each of the same structural components appears in a way that we can all comprehend at our own

level. This is the Allegory of the Cave.

Suppose that there is a group of human beings who have lived their entire lives trapped in a subterranean chamber lit by a large fire behind them. Chained in place, these cave-dwellers can

see nothing but shadows (of their own bodies and of other things) projected on a flat wall in

front of them. Some of these people will be content to do no more than notice the play of light and shadow, while the more clever among them will become highly skilled observers of the

patterns that most regularly occur. In both cases, however, they cannot truly comprehend what

they see, since they are prevented from grasping its true source and nature. (Republic 514a)

Now suppose that one of these human beings manages to break the chains, climb through the torturous passage to the surface, and escape the cave. With eyes accustomed only to the dim

light of the former habitation, this individual will at first be blinded by the brightness of the

surface world, able to look only upon the shadows and reflections of the real world. But after some time and effort, the former cave-dweller will become able to appreciate the full variety of

the newly-discovered world, looking at trees, mountains, and (eventually) the sun itself.

Finally, suppose that this escapee returns to the cave, trying to persuade its inhabitants that there is another, better, more real world than the one in which they have so long been content to

dwell. They are unlikely to be impressed by the pleas of this extraordinary individual, Plato

noted, especially since their former companion, having travelled to the bright surface world, is

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now inept and clumsy in the dim realm of the cave. Nevertheless, it would have been in the best

interest of these residents of the cave to entrust their lives to the one enlightened member of their company, whose acquaintance with other things is a unique qualification for genuine

knowledge.

Plato seriously intended this allegory as a representation of the state of ordinary human existence. We, like the people raised in a cave, are trapped in a world of impermanence and

partiality, the realm of sensible objects. Entranced by the particular and immediate experiences

these things provide, we are unlikely to appreciate the declarations of philosophers, the few

among us who, like the escapee, have made the effort to achieve eternal knowledge of the permanent forms. But, like them, it would serve us best if we were to follow this guidance,

discipline our own minds, and seek an accurate understanding of the highest objects of human

contemplation.

An Educational Program

Having already described the elementary education and physical training that properly

occupy the first twenty years of the life of prospective guardians, Plato applied his account of

the structure of human knowledge in order to prescribe the disciplined pursuit of their higher

education. It naturally begins with mathematics, the vital first step in learning to turn away from the

realm of sensible particulars to the transcendent forms of reality. Arithmetic provides for the

preliminary development of abstract concepts, but Plato held that geometry is especially valuable for its careful attention to the eternal forms. Study of the (mathematical, not

observational) disciplines of astronomy and harmonics encourage the further development of the

skills of abstract thinking and proportional reasoning. Only after completing this thorough mathematical foundation are the future rulers of the city

prepared to begin their study of philosophy, systematizing their grasp of mathematical truth,

learning to recognize and eliminate all of their presuppositions, and grounding all genuine

knowledge firmly on the foundation of their intuitive grasp of the reality of the Forms. Finally, an extended period of apprenticeship will help them to learn how to apply everything they have

learned to the decisions necessary for the welfare of the city as a whole. Only in their fifties will

the best philosophers among them be fit to rule over their fellow-citizens.

Kinds of State or Person

In order to explain the distinction between justice and injustice more fully, Plato devoted

much of the remainder of The Republic to a detailed discussion of five different kinds of

government (and, by analogy, five different kinds of person), ranked in order from best to worst:

A society organized in the ideally efficient way Plato has already described is said to have anaristocratic government. Similarly, an aristocratic person is one whose rational, spirited, and

appetitive souls work together properly. Such governments and people are the most genuine

examples of true justice at the social and personal levels. In a defective timocratic society, on the other hand, the courageous soldiers have usurped for

themselves the privilege of making decisions that properly belongs only to its better-educated

rulers. A timocratic person is therefore someone who is more concerned with belligerently defending personal honor than with wisely choosing what is truly best.

In an oligarchic government, both classes of guardian have been pressed into the service of a

ruling group comprising a few powerful and wealthy citizens. By analogy, an oligarchic

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personality is someone whose every thought and action is devoted to the self-indulgent goal of

amassing greater wealth. Even more disastrously, a democratic government holds out the promise of equality for all of

its citizens but delivers only the anarchy of an unruly mob, each of whose members is interested

only in the pursuit of private interests. The parallel case of a democratic person is someone who is utterly controlled by desires, acknowledging no bounds of taste or virtue in the perpetual

effort to achieve the momentary satisfaction that pleasure provides.

Finally, the tyrranic society is one in which a single individual has gained control over the

mob, restoring order io place of anarchy, but serving only personal welfare instead of the interests of the whole city. A tyrranic person, then, must be one whose entire life is focussed

upon the satisfaction of a single desire at the expense of everything else that truly matters.

Governments and people of this last variety are most perfectly unjust, even though they may appear to be well-organized and effective.

Although Plato presents these five types of government or person as if there is a natural

progression from each to the next, his chief concern is to exhibit the relative degree of justice achieved by each. The most perfect contrast between justice and injustice arises in a comparison

between the aristocratic and the tyrranic instances.

Justice is Better than Injustice

Thus, we are finally prepared to understand the full force of Plato's answer to the original

challenge of showing that justice is superior to injustice. He offered three arguments, each of which is designed to demonstrate the intrinsic merits of being a just person.

First, Plato noted that the just life of an aristocratic person arises from an effortless harmony

among internal elements of the soul, while the unjust life of a tyrranic person can maintain its characteristic imbalance only by the exertion of an enormous effort. Thus, it is simply easier to

be just than to be unjust. (Republic 580a) This argument makes sense even independently of

Plato's larger theory; it is a generalized version of the fairly common notion that it is easier to be

honest than to keep track of the truth along with a number of false stories about it. Second, Plato claimed that tyrranic individuals can appreciate only pleasures of the body,

monetary profits, and the benefits of favorable public reputation, all of which are by their nature

transitory. Aristocratic people, on the other hand, can accept these things in moderation but also transcend them in order to enjoy the delights of intellectual achievement through direct

acquaintance with the immutable Forms. (Republic 583a) This argument relies more heavily

upon adoption of Plato's entire theory of human nature, as developed in The Republic and other dialogues; it is likely to influence only those who have already experienced the full range of

intellectual advantages for themselves.

Finally, Plato resorted to myth (just as he had at the close of the Phaedo by imagining that

justice will be rewarded with steady progression in a series of lives hereafter. This "Myth of Er" isn't philosophical argument at all. Even if it were literally true and demonstrable that the just

are rewarded in the afterlife, that would be only an extrinsic motive for being just, not a proof of

its intrinsic value. Although it is a masterly treatment of human nature and politics, The Republic was not Plato's

only discussion of these significant issues. His dialogue Gorgias includes an eloquent appeal on

behalf of the life of justice and personal non-violence in all things. The Statesman devotes extended attention to the practical matter of securing effective government under the less-than-

ideal conditions most of us commonly face. And the unfinished Λεγεισ (Laws) is a lengthy

analysis of the history of Athenian political life.

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Aristotle: Logical Methods

The greatest and most influential of Plato's students was Aristotle, who

established his own school at Athens. Although his writing career probably

began with the production of quasi-Platonic dialogues, none of them have

survived. Instead, our knowledge of Aristotle's doctrines must be derived from highly-condensed, elliptical works that may have been lecture notes from his

teaching at the Lyceum. Although not intended for publication, these texts reveal

a brilliant mind at work on many diverse topics. Philosophically, the works of Aristotle reflect his gradual departure from the

teachings of Plato and his adoption of a new approach. Unlike Plato, who

delighted in abstract thought about a supra-sensible realm of forms, Aristotle was intensely concrete and practical, relying heavily upon sensory observation as a starting-

point for philosophical reflection. Interested in every area of human knowledge about the world,

Aristotle aimed to unify all of them in a coherent system of thought by developing a common

methodology that would serve equally well as the procedure for learning about any discipline. For Aristotle, then, logic is the instrument (the "organon") by means of which we come to

know anything. He proposed as formal rules for correct reasoning the basic principles of

the categorical logic that was universally accepted by Western philosophers until the nineteenth century. This system of thought regards assertions of the subject-predicate form as the primary

expressions of truth, in which features or properties are shown to inhere in individual

substances. In every discipline of human knowledge,then, we seek to establish the things of some sort have features of a certain kind.

Aristotle further supposed that this logical scheme accurately represents the true nature of reality. Thought, language, and reality are all isomorphic, so careful consideration of what we

say can help us to understand the way things really are. Beginning with simple descriptions of

particular things, we can eventually assemble our information in order to achieve a

comprehensive view of the world.

Applying the Categories

The initial book in Aristotle's collected logical works is the Categories, an analysis of

predication generally. It begins with a distinction among three ways in which the meaning of

different uses of a predicate may be related to each other: homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy (in some translations, "equivocal," "univocal," and "derivative"). Homonymous uses

of a predicate have entirely different explanations, as in "With all that money, she's really

loaded," and "After all she had to drink, she's really loaded." Synonymous uses have exactly the

same account, as in "Cows are mammals," and "Dolphins are mammals." Paronymous attributions have distinct but related senses, as in "He is healthy," and "His complexion is

healthy." (Categories 1) It is important in every case to understand how this use of a predicate

compares with its other uses. So long as we are clear about the sort of use we are making in each instance, Aristotle

proposed that we develop descriptions of individual things that attribute to each predicates

(or categories) of ten different sorts. Substance is the most crucial among these ten, since it describes the thing in terms of what it most truly is. For Aristotle, primary substance is just the

individual thing itself, which cannot be predicated of anything else. But secondary substances

are predicable, since they include the species and genera to which the individual thing belongs.

Aristotle 384 BC – 322 BC

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Thus, the attribution of substance in this secondary sense establishes the essence of each

particular thing. The other nine categories—quantity, quality, relative, where, when, being in a position,

having, acting on, and being affected by—describe the features which distinguish this individual

substance from others of the same kind; they admit of degrees and their contraries may belong to the same thing. (Categories 4) Used in combination, the ten kinds of predicate can provide a

comprehensive account of what any individual thing is. Thus, for example: Chloë is a dog who

weighs forty pounds, is reddish-brown, and was one of a litter of seven. She is in my apartment

at 7:44 a.m. on June 3, 1997, lying on the sofa, wearing her blue collar, barking at a squirrel, and being petted. Aristotle supposed that anything that is true of any individual substance could, in

principle, be said about it in one of these ten ways.

The Nature of Truth

Another of Aristotle's logical works, On Interpretation, considers the use of predicates in combination with subjects to form propositions or assertions, each of which is either true or

false. We usually determine the truth of a proposition by reference to our experience of the

reality it conveys, but Aristotle recognized that special difficulties arise in certain circumstances.

Although we grant (and can often even discover) the truth or falsity of propositions about past and present events, propositions about the future seem problematic. If a proposition about

tomorrow is true (or false) today, then the future event it describes will happen (or not happen)

necessarily; but if such a proposition is neither true nor false, then there is no future at all. Aristotle's solution was to maintain that the disjunction is necessarily true today even though

neither of its disjuncts is. Thus, it is necessary that either tomorrow's event will occur or it will

not, but it is neither necessary that it will occur nor necessary that it will not occur. (On Interpretation 9)

Aristotle's treatment of this specific problem, like his more general attempt to sort out the

nature of the relationship between necessity and contingency in On Interpretation 12-13, is

complicated by the assumption that the structure of logic models the nature of reality. He must try to explain not just the way we speak, but the way the world therefore must be.

Demonstrative Science

Finally, in the Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics, Aristotle offered a detailed account of

the demonstrative reasoning required to substantiate theoretical knowledge. Using mathematics as a model, Aristotle presumed that all such knowledge must be derived from what is already

known. Thus, the process of reasoning by syllogism employs a formal definition of validity that

permits the deduction of new truths from established principles. The goal is to provide an

account of why things happen the way they do, based solely upon what we already know. In order to achieve genuine necessity, this demonstrative science must be focussed on

the essences rather than the accidents of things, on what is "true of any case as such," rather than

on what happens to be "true of each case in fact." It's not enough to know that it rained today; we must be able to figure out the general meteorological conditions under which rain is

inevitable. When we reason from necessary universaland affirmative propositions about the

essential features of things while assuming as little as possible, the resulting body of knowledge will truly deserve the name of science.

The Four Causes

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Applying the principles developed in his logical treatises, Aristotle offered a general account

of the operation of individual substances in the natural world. He drew a significant distinction between things of two sorts: those that move only when moved by something else and those that

are capable of moving themselves. In separate treatises, Aristotle not only proposed a proper

description of things of each sort but also attempted to explain why they function as they do.

Aristotle considered bodies and their externally-produced movement in the Physics. Three crucial distinctions determine the shape of this discussion of physical science. First, he granted

from the outset that, because of the difference in their origins, we may need to offer different

accounts for the functions of natural things and those of artifacts. Second, he insisted that we clearly distinguish between the basic material and the form which jointly constitute the nature of

any individual thing. Finally, Aristotle emphasized the difference between things as they are and

things considered in light of their ends or purposes. Armed with these distinctions, Aristotle proposed in Physics II, 3 that we employ four very

different kinds of explanatory principle {Gk. αιτιον [aition]} to the question of why a thing is,

the four causes:

The material cause is the basic stuff out of which the thing is made. The material cause of a house, for example, would include the wood, metal, glass, and other building materials used in

its construction. All of these things belong in an explanation of the house because it could not

exist unless they were present in its composition. The formal cause {Gk. ειδος [eidos]} is the pattern or essence in conformity with which

these materials are assembled. Thus, the formal cause of our exemplary house would be the sort

of thing that is represented on a blueprint of its design. This, too, is part of the explanation of the house, since its materials would be only a pile of rubble (or a different house) if they were not

put together in this way.

The efficient cause is the agent or force immediately responsible for bringing this matter and

that form together in the production of the thing. Thus, the efficient cause of the house would include the carpenters, masons, plumbers, and other workers who used these materials to build

the house in accordance with the blueprint for its construction. Clearly the house would not be

what it is without their contribution. Lastly, the final cause {Gk. τελος [télos]} is the end or purpose for which a thing exists, so

the final cause of our house would be to provide shelter for human beings. This is part of the

explanation of the house's existence because it would never have been built unless someone needed it as a place to live.

Causes of all four sorts are necessary elements in any adequate account of the existence and

nature of the thing, Aristotle believed, since the absence or modification of any one of them

would result it the existence of a thing of some different sort. Moreover, an explanation that includes all four causes completely captures the significance and reality of the thing itself.

The Appearance of Chance

Notice that the four causes apply more appropriately to artifacts than to natural objects. The

rise of modern science resulted directly from a rejection of the Aristotelean notion of final causes in particular. Still, the scheme works so well for artifacts that we often find ourselves

attributing some purpose even to the apparently pointless events of the natural world.

In many applications the formal, efficient, and final causes tend to be combined in a single

being that designs and builds the thing for some specific purpose. Thus, the fundamental

differentiation in the Aristotelean world turns out to be between inert matter on the one hand and

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intelligent agency on the other. As we shall soon see, this provides a natural explanation for the

functions of animate natural organisms. As for things that appear to arise by pure chance, Aristotle argued that since the purposeful

origination described by the four causes is the normal order of the world, these instances must

either be things that should have had some cause but happen to lack it or (more likely) things

that actually do have causes of which we are simply unaware. The craft evident in the manufacture of artifacts, he believed, is evidence for the purposive character of nature, and it

shares the same necessity, even though we are sometimes ignorant of its internal operations.

(Physics II, 8) Although I would be hard-pressed to come up with a final cause for the existence of the

mosquito that is now biting me, for example, Aristotle supposed that there must ultimately be

some explanation for its present existence and activity. Many generations of Western philosophers, especially those concerned with reconciling Christian doctrine with philosophy,

would explicitly defend a similar view.

Aristotle: Forms and Souls

Metaphysics

Aristotle considered the most fundamental features of reality in the twelve books of

the Μεταφυσικη(Metaphysics). Although experience of what happens is a key to all

demonstrative knowledge, Aristotle supposed that the abstract study of "being qua being" must delve more deeply, in order to understand why things happen the way they do. A quick review

of past attempts at achieving this goal reveals that earlier philosophers had created more difficult

questions than they had answered: the Milesians over-emphasized material

causes; Anaxagoras over-emphasized mind; and Plato got bogged down in the theory of forms. Aristotle intended to do better.

Although any disciplined study is promising because there is an ultimate truth to be

discovered, the abstractness of metaphysical reasoning requires that we think about the processes we are employing even as we use them in search of that truth. As always, Aristotle

assumed that the structure of language and logic naturally mirrors the way things really are.

Thus, the major points of each book are made by carefully analyzing our linguistic practices as a guide to the ultimate nature of what is.

Fundamental Truths

It is reasonable to begin, therefore, with the simplest rules of logic, which embody the most

fundamental principles applying to absolutely everything that is:

The Law of Non-Contradiction in logic merely notes that no assertion is both true and false, but applied to reality this simple rule entails that nothing can both "be . . . " and "not be . . . " at

the same time, although we will of course want to find room to allow for things to change. Thus,

neither strict Protagorean relativism nor Parmenidean immutability offer a correct account of the nature of reality. (Metaphysics IV 3-6)

The Law of Excluded Middle in logic states the necessity that either an assertion or its

negation must be true, and this entails that there is no profound indeterminacy in the realm of reality. Although our knowledge of an assertion may sometimes fall short of what we need in

order to decide whether it is true or false, we can be sure that either it or its negation is true.

(Metaphysics IV 7-8)

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In order to achieve its required abstract necessity, all of metaphysics must be constructed

from similar principles. Aristotle believed this to be the case because metaphysics is concerned with a genuinely unique subject matter. While natural science deals with moveable, separable

things and mathematics focusses upon immoveable, inseparable things, metaphysics (especially

in its highest, most abstract varieties) has as its objects only things that are both immoveable and

separable. Thus, what we learn in metaphysics is nothing less than the immutable eternal nature, or essence, of individual things.

Universals

In the central books of the Metaphysics, Aristotle tried to develop an adequate analysis of

subject-predicate judgments. Since logic and language rely heavily upon the copulative use of "is," careful study of these uses should reveal the genuine relationship that holds between

substances and their features. Of course, Plato had already offered an extended account of this

relationship, emphasizing the reality of the abstract forms rather than their material substratum.

But Aristotle argued that the theory of forms is seriously flawed: it is not supported by good arguments; it requires a form for each thing; and it is too mathematical. Worst of all, on

Aristotle's view, the theory of forms cannot adequately explain the occurrence of change. By

identifying the thing with its essence, the theory cannot account for the generation of new substances. (Metaphysics VII) A more reasonable position must differentiate

between matter and form and allow for a dynamic relation between the two.

Aristotle therefore maintained that each individual substance is a hylomorphic composite involving both matter and form together. Ordinary predication, then, involves

paronymously attributing an abstract universal of a concrete individual, and our experience of

this green thing is more significant than our apprehension of the form of greenness. This

account, with its emphasis on the particularity of individual substances, provided Aristotle with a firm foundation in practical experience.

Higher Truths

Aristotle also offered a detailed account of the dynamic process of change.

A potentiality {Gk.δυναμις [dynamis]} is either the passive capacity of a substance to be changed or (in the case of animate beings) its active capacity to produce change in other

substances in determinate ways. An actuality {Gk.ενεργεια [energeia]} is just the realization of

one of these potentialities, which is most significant when it includes not merely the movement

but also its purpose. Becoming, then, is the process in which the potentiality present in one individual substance is actualized through the agency of something else which is already actual.

(Metaphysics IX) Thus, for Aristotle, change of any kind requires the actual existence of

something which causes the change. The higher truths of what Aristotle called "theology" arise from an application of these

notions to the more purely speculative study of being qua being. Since every being is a

composite whose form and matter have been brought together by some cause, and since there cannot be infinitely many such causes, he concluded that everything that happens is ultimately

attributable to a single universal cause, itself eternal and immutable. (Metaphysics XII 6) This

self-caused "first mover," from which all else derives, must be regarded as a mind, whose actual

thinking is its whole nature. The goodness of the entire universe, Aristotle supposed, resides in its teleological unity as the will of a single intelligent being.

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The Nature of Souls

According to Aristotle, every animate being is a living thing which can move itself only

because it has asoul. Animals and plants, along with human beings, are more like each other

than any of them are like any inanimate object, since each of them has a soul. Thus, his great

treatise on psychology, On The Soul, offers interconnected explanations for the functions and operations of all living organisms.

All such beings, on Aristotle's view, have a nutritive soul which initiates and guides their

most basic functions, the absorption of food, growth, and reproduction of its kind. All animals (and perhaps some plants) also have a sensitive soul by means of which they perceive features

of their surroundings and move in response to the stimuli this provides. Human beings also

possess (in addition to the rest) a rational soul that permits representation and thought. (On the Soul II 2)

Notice that each living thing has just one soul, the actions of which exhibit some degree of

nutritive, sensitive, and/or rational functioning. This soul is the formal, efficient, and final cause

of the existence of the organism; only its material cause resides purely in the body. Thus, all of the operations of the organism are to be explained in terms of the functions of its soul.

Human Knowledge

Sensation is the passive capacity for the soul to be changed through the contact of the

associated body with external objects. In each variety of sensation, the normal operations of the appropriate organ of sense result in the soul's becoming potentially what the object is in

actuality. Thus, without any necessary exchange of matter, the soul takes on the form of the

object: when I feel the point of a pin, its shape makes an impression on my finger, conveying this form to my sensitive soul (resulting in information). (On the Soul II 5)

Thought is the more active process of engaging in the manipulation of forms without any

contact with external objects at all. Thus, thinking is potentially independent of the objects of

thought, from which it abstracts the form alone. Even the imagination, according to Aristotle, involves the operation of the common sense without stimulation by the sensory organs of the

body. Hence, although all knowledge must begin with information acquired through the senses,

its results are achieved by rational means. Transcending the sensory preoccupation with particulars, the soul employs the formal methods of logic to cognize the relationships among

abstract forms. (On the Soul III 4)

Desire is the origin of movement toward some goal. Every animate being, to some degree, is capable of responding to its own internal states and those of its external environment in such a

way as to alleviate the felt absence or lack of some pleasure or the felt presence of some pain.

Even actions taken as a result of intellectual deliberation, Aristotle supposed, produce motion

only through the collateral evocation of a concrete desire. (On the Soul III 10)

Aristotle: Ethics and the Virtues

The Goal of Ethics

Aristotle applied the same patient, careful, descriptive approach to his examination of moral philosophy in the Εθικη Νικομαχοι (Nicomachean Ethics). Here he discussed the conditions

under which moral responsibility may be ascribed to individual agents, the nature of the virtues

and vices involved in moral evaluation, and the methods of achieving happiness in human life.

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The central issue for Aristotle is the question of character or personality — what does it take for

an individual human being to be a good person? Every activity has a final cause, the good at which it aims, and Aristotle argued that since

there cannot be an infinite regress of merely extrinsic goods, there must be a highest good at

which all human activity ultimately aims. (Nic. Ethics I 2) This end of human life could be called happiness (or living well), of course, but what is it really? Neither the ordinary notions of

pleasure, wealth, and honor nor the philosophical theory of forms provide an adequate account

of this ultimate goal, since even individuals who acquire the material goods or achieve

intellectual knowledge may not be happy. According to Aristotle, things of any variety have a characteristic function that they are

properly used to perform. The good for human beings, then, must essentially involve the entire

proper function of human life as a whole, and this must be an activity of the soul that expresses genuine virtue or excellence. (Nic. EthicsI 7) Thus, human beings should aim at a life in full

conformity with their rational natures; for this, the satisfaction of desires and the acquisition of

material goods are less important than the achievement ofvirtue. A happy person will exhibit a personality appropriately balanced between reasons and desires, withmoderation characterizing

all. In this sense, at least, "virtue is its own reward." True happiness can therefore be attained

only through the cultivation of the virtues that make a human life complete.

The Nature of Virtue

Ethics is not merely a theoretical study for Aristotle. Unlike any intellectual capacity, virtues of character are dispositions to act in certain ways in response to similar situations, the habits of

behaving in a certain way. Thus, good conduct arises from habits that in turn can only be

acquired by repeated action and correction, making ethics an intensely practical discipline. Each of the virtues is a state of being that naturally seeks its mean {Gk. μεσος [mesos]}

relative to us. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit of action is always an intermediate state

between the opposed vices of excess and deficiency: too much and too little are always wrong;

the right kind of action always lies in the mean. (Nic. Ethics II 6) Thus, for example: with respect to acting in the face of danger,

courage {Gk. ανδρεια [andreia]} is a mean between

the excess of rashness and the deficiency of cowardice;

with respect to the enjoyment of pleasures,

temperance {Gk. σωφρσυνη [sophrosúnê]} is a mean between the excess of intemperance and the deficiency of insensibility;

with respect to spending money,

generosity is a mean between the excess of wastefulness and the deficiency of stinginess;

with respect to relations with strangers, being friendly is a mean between

the excess of being ingratiating and the deficiency of being surly; and

with respect to self-esteem,

magnanimity {Gk. μεγαλοψυχι&alpha [megalopsychia]} is a mean between

the excess of vanity and the deficiency of pusillanimity.

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Notice that the application of this theory of virtue requires a great deal of flexibility: friendliness

is closer to its excess than to its deficiency, while few human beings are naturally inclined to undervalue pleasure, so it is not unusual to overlook or ignore one of the extremes in each of

these instances and simply to regard the virtue as the opposite of the other vice.

Although the analysis may be complicated or awkward in some instances, the general plan of Aristotle's ethical doctrine is clear: avoid extremes of all sorts and seek moderation in all things.

Not bad advice, surely. Some version of this general approach dominated Western culture for

many centuries.

Voluntary Action

Because ethics is a practical rather than a theoretical science, Aristotle also gave careful consideration to the aspects of human nature involved in acting and accepting moral

responsibility. Moral evaluation of an action presupposes the attribution of responsibility to a

human agent. But in certain circumstances, this attribution would not be appropriate. Responsible action must be undertaken voluntarily, on Aristotle's view, and human actions are

involuntary under two distinct conditions: (Nic. Ethics III 1)

First, actions that are produced by some external force (or, perhaps, under an extreme duress

from outside the agent) are taken involuntarily, and the agent is not responsible for them. Thus, if someone grabs my arm and uses it to strike a third person, I cannot reasonably be blamed (or

praised) morally for what my arm has done.

Second, actions performed out of ignorance are also involuntary. Thus, if I swing my arm for exercise and strike the third party who (unbeknownst to me) is standing nearby, then again I

cannot be held responsible for having struck that person. Notice that the sort of ignorance

Aristotle is willing to regard as exculpatory is always of lack of awareness of relevant particulars. Striking other people while claiming to be ignorant of the moral rule under which it

is wrong to do so would not provide any excuse on his view.

As we'll soon see, decisions to act voluntarily rely upon deliberation about the choice among

alternative actions that the individual could perform. During the deliberative process, individual actions are evaluated in light of the good, and the best among them is then chosen for

implementation. Under these conditions, Aristotle supposed, moral actions are within our power

to perform or avoid; hence, we can reasonably be held responsible for them and their consequences. Just as with health of the body, virtue of the soul is a habit that can be acquired

(at least in part) as the result of our own choices.

Deliberate Choice

Although the virtues are habits of acting or dispositions to act in certain ways, Aristotle maintained that these habits are acquired by engaging in proper conduct on

specific occasions and that doing so requires thinking about what one does in a specific way.

Neither demonstrative knowledge of the sort employed in science nor aesthetic judgment of the

sort applied in crafts are relevant to morality. The understanding{Gk. διανοια [diánoia]} can only explore the nature of origins of things, on Aristotle's view, and wisdom{Gk. σοφια

[sophía]} can only trace the demonstratable connections among them.

But there is a distinctive mode of thinking that does provide adequately for morality,

according to Aristotle: practical intelligence or prudence {Gk. φρνησις [phrónêsis]}. This

faculty alone comprehends the true character of individual and community welfare and applies

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its results to the guidance of human action. Acting rightly, then, involves coordinating our

desires with correct thoughts about the correct goals or ends. This is the function of deliberative reasoning: to consider each of the many actions that are

within one's power to perform, considering the extent to which each of them would contribute to

the achievement of the appropriate goal or end, making a deliberate choice to act in the way that best fits that end, and then voluntarily engaging in the action itself. (Nic. Ethics III 3) Although

virtue is different from intelligence, then, the acquisition of virtue relies heavily upon the

exercise of that intelligence.

Weakness of the Will

But doing the right thing is not always so simple, even though few people deliberately choose to develop vicious habits. Aristotle sharply disagreed with Socrates's belief that knowing what is

right always results in doing it. The great enemy of moral conduct, on Aristotle's view, is

precisely the failure to behave well even on those occasions when one's deliberation has resulted in clear knowledge of what is right.

Incontinent agents suffer from a sort of weakness of the will {Gk. ακρασια [akrásia]} that

prevents them from carrying out actions in conformity with what they have reasoned. (Nic. Ethics VII 1) This may appear to be a simple failure of intelligence, Aristotle acknowledged,

since the akratic individual seems not to draw the appropriate connection between the general

moral rule and the particular case to which it applies. Somehow, the overwhelming prospect of some great pleasure seems to obscure one's perception of what is truly good. But this difficulty,

Aristotle held, need not be fatal to the achievement of virtue.

Although incontinence is not heroically moral, neither is it truly vicious. Consider the

difference between an incontinent person, who knows what is right and aims for it but is

sometimes overcome by pleasure, and an intemperate person, who purposefully seeks excessive

pleasure. Aristotle argued that the vice of intemperance is incurable because it destroys the principle of the related virtue, while incontinence is curable because respect for virtue remains.

(Nic. Ethics VII 8) A clumsy archer may get better with practice, while a skilled archer who

chooses not to aim for the target will not.

Friendship

In a particularly influential section of the Ethics, Aristotle considered the role of human

relationships in general and friendship {Gk. φιλια [philia]} in particular as a vital element in the

good life.

For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.

Differentiating between the aims or goals of each, he distinguished three kinds of friendships

that we commonly form. (Nic. Ethics VIII 3) A friendship for pleasure comes into being when two people discover that they have common

interest in an activity which they can pursue together. Their reciprocal participation in that

activity results in greater pleasure for each than either could achieve by acting alone. Thus, for example, two people who enjoy playing tennis might derive pleasure from playing each other.

Such a relationship lasts only so long as the pleasure continues.

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A friendship grounded on utility, on the other hand, comes into being when two people can

benefit in some way by engaging in coordinated activity. In this case, the focus is on what use the two can derive from each other, rather than on any enjoyment they might have. Thus, for

example, one person might teach another to play tennis for a fee: the one benefits by learning

and the other benefits financially; their relationship is based solely on the mutual utility. A relationship of this sort lasts only so long as its utility.

A friendship for the good, however, comes into being when two people engage in common

activities solely for the sake of developing the overall goodness of the other. Here, neither

pleasure nor utility are relevant, but the good is. (Nic. Ethics VIII 4) Thus, for example, two people with heart disease might play tennis with each other for the sake of the exercise that

contributes to the overall health of both. Since the good is never wholly realized, a friendship of

this sort should, in principle, last forever. Rather conservatively representing his own culture, Aristotle expressed some rather peculiar

notions about the likelihood of forming friendships of these distinct varieties among people of

different ages and genders. But the general description has some value nevertheless, especially in its focus on reciprocity. Mixed friendships—those in which one party is seeking one payoff

while the other seeks a different one—are inherently unstable and prone to dissatisfaction.

Achieving Happiness

Aristotle rounded off his discussion of ethical living with a more detailed description of the

achievement of true happiness. Pleasure is not a good in itself, he argued, since it is by its nature incomplete. But worthwhile activities are often associated with their own distinctive pleasures.

Hence, we are rightly guided in life by our natural preference for engaging in pleasant activities

rather than in unpleasant ones.

Genuine happiness lies in action that leads to virtue, since this alone provides true value and

not just amusement. Thus, Aristotle held that contemplation is the highest form of moral activity

because it is continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and complete. (Nic. Ethics X 8) In intellectual activity, human beings most nearly approach divine blessedness, while realizing all of the

genuine human virtues as well.

Aristotle: Politics and Art

The Nature of Justice

Since friendship is an important feature of the good life and virtuous habits can be acquired

through moral education and legislation, Aristotle regarded life within a moral community as a

vital component of human morality. Even in the Ethics, he had noted that social order is presumed by the general concept of justice. (Nic. Ethics V 2)

Properly considered, justice is concerned with the equitability or fairness in interpersonal relations. Thus, Aristotle offered an account of distributive justice that made allowances for the

social rectification of individual wrongs. Moreover, he noted that justice in the exchange of

property requires careful definition in order to preserve equity. The broader concept of political justice, however, is to be recognized only within the context of an entire society. Thus, it

deserves separate treatment in a different treatise.

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Political Life

That treatise is Aristotle's Politics, a comprehensive examination of the origins and structure

of the state. Like Plato, Aristotle supposed that the need for a division of labor is the initial

occasion of the formation of a society, whose structure will be modelled upon that of the family.

(Politics I 2) But Aristotle (preferring the mean) declined to agree with Plato's notion of commonly held property and argued that some property should be held privately.

Aristotle also drew a sharper distinction between morality and politics than Plato had done. Although a good citizen is a good person, on Aristotle's view, the good person can be good even

independently of the society. A good citizen, however, can exist only as a part of the social

structure itself, so the state is in some sense prior to the citizen.

Depending upon the number of people involved in governing and the focus of their interests,

Aristotle distinguished six kinds of social structure in three pairs:

A state with only one ruler is either a monarchy or a tyranny;

A state with several rulers is either an aristocracy or an oligarchy; and

A state in which all rule is either a polity or a democracy.

In each pair, the first sort of state is one in which the rulers are concerned with the good of the

state, while those of the second sort are those in which the rulers serve their own private

interests. (Politics III 7) Although he believed monarchy to be the best possible state in principle, Aristotle recognized

that in practice it is liable to degenerate into the worst possible state, a tyrrany. He therefore

recommended the formation of polity, or constitutional government, since its degenerate form is the least harmful of the bad kinds of government. As always, Aristotle defended the mean rather

than run the risk of either extreme.

Poetics

Another sharp contrast between Plato and Aristotle emerges in the latter's Poetics, and

analysis of the effects of dramatic art. Aristotle, unlike his teacher, supposed that the extravagant representation of powerful emotions is beneficial to the individual citizen, providing an

opportunity for the cathartic release of unhealthy feelings rather than encouraging their

development.

Tragedy in particular arouses our fear and pity, as we recognize the inherent flaw of the tragic

hero. Having seen the outcome in dramatic form, we are less likely to commit similar acts of

pride, Aristotle argued, so the literary arts have a direct benefit to human society. This provides no grounds for a Platonic notion of censorship of the arts.

Although their relative reputations often varied widely, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle continued to exert a powerful influence throughout the following centuries. Even now,

it is often suggested that Western thinkers are invariably either Platonic or Aristotelean. That is,

each of us is inclined either toward the abstract, speculative, intellectual apprehension of reality,

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as Plato was, or toward the concrete, practical, sensory appreciation of reality, as Aristotle was.

The differences between the two approaches may be too fundamental for argumentation or debate, but the coordination or synthesis of the two together is extremely difficult, so choice

may be required.

Certainly the philosophy of the Middle Ages, to which we will devote the remainder of this

semester, exhibits some form of this division. As Christian thinkers tried to find ways of

accomodating their religious doctrines to the tradition of Greek philosophy, some version of

Plato and some version of Aristotle were significant factors in their development.

Medieval Philosophy

Having devoted extensive attention to the development of philosophy among the ancient

Greeks, we'll now cover more than a millenium of Western thought more briefly. The very name

"medieval" (literally, "the in-between time") philosophy suggests the tendency of modern thinkers to skip rather directly from Aristotle to the Renaissance. What seemed to justify that

attitude was the tendency of philosophers during this period to seek orthodoxy as well as truth.

Nearly all of the medieval thinkers—Jewish, Christian, and Muslim—were pre-occupied with

some version of the attempt to synthesis philosophy with religion. Early on,

the neoplatonism philosophy ofPlotinus seemed to provide the most convenient intellectual

support for religious doctrine. But later in the medieval era, thanks especially to the work of the Arabic-language thinkers, Aristotle's metaphysics gained a wider acceptance. In every case, the

goal was to provide a respectable philosophical foundation for theological positions. In the

process, much of that foundation was effectively absorbed into the theology itself, so that much of what we now regard as Christian doctrine has its origins in Greek philosophy more than in the

Biblical tradition.

Augustine: Christian Platonism

The first truly great medieval philosopher was Augustine of Hippo, a North African

rhetorician and devotee of Manichaeanism who converted to Christianity under the influence of Ambrose and devoted his career to the exposition of a philosophical system that

employed neoplatonic elements in support of Christian orthodoxy. The keynote of Augustine's

method is "Credo ut intellegiam" ("I believe in order that I may understand"), the notion that human reason in general and philosophy in particular are useful only to those who already have

faith.

Thus, for example, Augustine simply rejected the epistemological criticisms

mounted by the Academic skeptics. Even if it were true that I am mistaken about nearly everything that I suppose to be true, he argued, one inescapable

truth will remain: "Si fallor, sum" ("If I am mistaken, I exist"). [This doctrine is

an interesting anticipation of Descartes's later attempt to establish knowledge on the phrase"Cogito ergo sum".] Upon this foundation, Augustine believed it

possible to employ human faculties of sense and reason effectively in the

pursuit of substantive knowledge of the world.

Augustine 354 – 430 AC

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Human Life

Although Augustine was significantly influenced by the moral philosophy of Cicero, he

generally argued that the Stoics were excessively optimistic in their assessment of human

nature. One of Augustine's central contributions to the development of Christian theology was

his heavy emphasis on the reality of human evil. Each one of us, he believed, is sinful by nature, and the account of his own life provided in the early portions of the Confessions makes it clear

that he did not suppose himself to be an exception.

If, as Augustine certainly believed, the world and everything in it is the creation of a perfectly

good god, then how can the human beings who constitute so prominent a part of that creation be

inherently evil? LikePlato and Plotinus, but unlike the Manichaeans, Augustine now argued that evil is not anything real, but rather is merely the absence of good. Creation of human beings

who have the freedom to decide how to act on their own, he maintained, is so vital a part of the

divine plan for the cosmos that it outweighs the obvious consequence that we nearly always

choose badly.

But if human beings begin with original sin and are therefore inherently evil, what is the point

of morality? Augustine held that the classical attempts to achieve virtue by discipline, training, and reason are all boud to fail. Thus, the redemptive action of god's grace alone offers hope.

Again using his own life as an example, Augustine maintained that we can do nothing but wait

for god to work with us in the production of a worthwhile life. (Our happiness never enters into the picture.)

God's Existence

That there is indeed a god, Augustine proved in fine Platonic fashion: Begin with the fact

that we are capable of achieving mathematical knowledge, and remember that, as Plato

demonstrated, this awareness transcends the sensory realm of appearances entirely. Our knowledge of eternal mathematical truths thus establishes the immateriality and immortality of

our own rational souls. (So far, the argument is straight out of Plato's Phaedo.)

Augustine further argued that the eternal existence of numbers and of the mathematical relations that obtain among them requires some additional metaphysical support. There must be

some even greater being that is the eternal source of the reality of these things, and that, of

course, must be god. Thus, Augustine endorses a Plotinian concept of god as the central core

from which all of reality emanates.

But notice that if the truths of mathematics depend for their reality upon the creative activity

of the deity, it follows that god could change them merely by willing them to be different. This

is an extreme version of a belief known as voluntarism, according to which 2 + 3 =

5 remains true only so long as god wills it to be so. We can still balance our checkbooks with

confidence because, of course, god invariably wills eternally. But in principle, Augustine held

that even necessary truths are actually contingent upon the exercise of the divine will.

Human Freedom

This emphasis on the infinite power of god's will raises a significant question about our own capacity to will and to act freely. If, as Augustine supposed, god has infinite power and

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knowledge of every sort, then god can cause me to act in particular ways simply by willing that I

do so, and in every case god knows in advance in what way I will act, long before I even contemplate doing so. From this, it would seem naturally to follow that I have no will of my

own, cannot act of my own volition, and therefore should not be held morally responsible for

what I do. Surely marionettes are not to be held accountable for the deeds they perform with so many strings attached.

Augustine's answer to this predicament lies in his analysis of time. A god who is eternal must

stand wholly outside the realm of time as we know it, and since god is infinitely more real than we are, it follows that time itself does not exist at the level of the infinitely real. The passage of

time, the directionality of knowledge, and all temporal relations are therefore nothing more than

features of our limited minds. And it is within these limitations, Augustine supposed, that we feel free, act on our volitions, and are responsible for what we do. God's foreknowledge,

grounded outside the temporal order, has no bearing on the temporal nature of our moral

responsibility. Once again, a true understanding of the divine plan behind creation resolves every apparent conflict.

The End of Hellenism

European culture developed only very slowly after the collapse of the Roman Empire in 427.

Theological controversies and narrow-minded defenses of traditional doctrine and practice were

the sole pre-occupations of educated clergy. During these "Dark Ages," concern with the necessities of life and anti-intellectual sentiment in the church did little to encourage

philosophical speculation. Although many nameless individuals worked to preserve the written

tradition of what had gone before, there were few genuine high points in our philosophical history for a few hundred years.

An anonymous Christian writer of the fifth or sixth century (later designated as the pseudo-Dionysius) distinguished between two distinct approaches that human beings might take in their

efforts to understand god. The via positiva is the method of reasoning analogically from the

perceived nature of existing objects through successive layers of causal emanations until we

arrive at some conception of the divine essence from which all flows. The via negativa, on the other hand, denies the literal truth of any comparison between natural things and god and relies

instead upon mystical consciousness as the only possible source of genuine knowledge. Thus, in

good neoplatonic fashion, god's unity and goodness are contrasted with the degenerate plurality and evil of the created order.

Boethius

As classical scholarship began to wane, preservation of the philosophical tradition required

capable translation of the central works from Greek into Latin. This labor was the great contribution of Boethius, whose translation of Aristotle's logical works provided the standard set

of Latin terms for the logic of the middle ages. Moreover, Boethius's Commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry focussed medieval attention on a metaphysical problem that arises from

the simple fact that two or more things may share a common feature. The President of the United States and my youngest child, for example, have something in common, since they are

both human beings.

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The problem of universals asks the metaphysical question of what in reality accounts for this

similarity between distinct individual substances. When we predicate of each substance the name of the species to which they both belong, what kinds of entities are truly involved? If the

species itself is a thirdindependently existing entity, then we must postulate the existence of a

separate sphere of abstract beings like the Platonic forms. If, on the other hand, what is shared by both substances is nothing more than the name of the species, then our account of

resemblances seems grounded on little more than linguistic whim. The difficulty of providing a

satisfactory account of the predication of shared features provoked intense debate throughout the

middle ages. As we'll soon see, the variety of positions adopted with respect to this metaphysical issue often served as a litmus test of academic loyalties.

Since his own life lead to imprisonment and execution, Boethius also gave careful consideration to the intellectual and ethical principles of living well. In De consolatione

philosophiae (The Consolation of Philosophy), he maintained that commitment to rational

discourse and decision-making is vital to the successful human life, even though it offers little prospect of avoiding the personal disasters fate holds for many of us.

John Scotus Erigena

During the ninth century, a British thinker named John Scotus Erigena applied the via

negativa along with Aristotelean logic in order to develop a more carefully systematic

description of the nature of reality in the neoplatonic view. Noting the crucial distinction between active (or creative) beings on the one hand and what they produce (the created) on the

other, Erigena proposed that all of reality be comprehended under four simple categories:

The only creating uncreated being is god, of which we can know nothing except its

role as the central source of all.

Creating created beings are the Platonic forms (including human souls) by whose mediation the divine produces the world.

Ordinary things are uncreating created beings, the distant emanations that

constitute the natural world as we perceive it.

Finally, uncreating uncreated must once again be god alone.

Thus, Erigena completes the logically tidy picture with a fourth category of existence that

contradicts yet must be identified with the first, emphasizing the view that only mystical consciousness can even try to grasp the nature of god. Each human being is a microcosm in

whom analogues of these four fundamental elements combine to produce a dynamic whole

whose existence and activity mirror those of the universe.

Few of Erigena's contemporaries appreciated the subtlety and logic of this view, however.

Subordinating dialectical reasoning to the presumed dictates of revealed religion at every opportunity, many medieval writers defended and even encouraged the kind of deliberate

ignorance that results from an unwillingness to question prevailing opinion. The Socratic spirit

nearly disappeared.

Arab and Jewish Philosophy

Arabic Philosophy

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In the centuries during which scholastic philosophy emerged among the Christians, Muslim

thinkers in the Arab world that spanned Persia, North Africa, and Iberia dealt with many of the same issues. Like their European counterparts, Arabs tried to work out an appropriate synthesis

of philosophy with theology, struggling as the Christians had with the relationship between faith

and reason and the effort to provide an account of human nature that left room for the hope of immortality. But since their culture had preserved both the ancient texts and classical learning to

a greater degree, the Arab thinkers had access to a wealth of material from the Hellenistic world

of which the Latin philosophers of the dark ages were ignorant.

Thus, for example, the neoplatonic philosophy of the first great Arab thinker, al-Kindi set the

tone for many generations of Islamic synthesizers. His near-contemporary al-Farabi not only

made use of the logical treatises of Aristotle (which even the Christians knew) but also employed arguments for the existence of god based upon those in the later books of

Aristotle's Metaphysics as well. Designed to provide a rational foundation for orthodox

monotheism, many of these arguments would make their way into the Christian tradition only in

the thirteenth century.

Not everyone appreciated such applications of the philosophical tradition, however. Several

generations later, al-Ghazali wrote a lengthy treatise called Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers), in which he used logical methods derived from the philosophical

tradition to generate puzzles and contradictions, thereby undermining confidence in the power of

human reason and encouraging reliance on an unreasoned faith instead. Even in the more scientific culture of the Muslim world, philosophical speculation remained suspect for centuries.

Ibn Sina

Among the philosophers who flourished in the eastern portion of the Islamic territory

during the eleventh century, the Persian Ibn Sina (whom the Christians called "Avicenna" in

Latin) was the most subtle and sophisticated. Although his view of the world relied heavily on the familiar neoplatonic emanations, Ibn Sina had learned of the Aristotelean system in his

medical studies and from the work of al-Farabi, and he tried to combine elements from both

sources in a comprehensive account of reality.

All human awareness begins with knowledge of the self, which can be acquired entirely

without the aid of the senses, through the active power of the "agent intellect" which is the human mind. But since the essential quality of human thinking cannot be realized without some

prior existing cause, contemplation of our own reality as thinking things leads naturally to

awareness of the existence of something else. In addition to the merely contingent beings of the created order, then, there must also be a necessary being, god, who is prior to all the rest.

God, then, is the central reality from which all else must be derived. Respecting the power of

god and emphasizing the regularity of the natural order, Ibn Sina maintained that all of the genuinely causal connections that link the central core, through its successive emanations, to its

final outcomes in the material world, must themselves be perfectly necessary. Since the cosmos

is a single unified whole, everything that happens does so as it must; what appear to us to be the local causes of particular events are nothing more than the occasions for our awareness of what

happens. Its ultimate origin is always god.

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Ibn Rushd

A century later, in the lively Andalusian community at the western extreme of Arab

influence, another great Islamic philosopher placed even greater emphasis on the work

of Aristotle. Ibn Rushd ("Averroës" in Latin) wrote so many analyses and explanations of

Aristotelean works that he became known throughout Europe simply as "The Commentator." It was almost exclusively as a result of his labors in translating and explicating the Aristotelean

corpus that the Greek philosopher came to exert a lasting influence on the Western culture.

Devoted to the teachings of Aristotle, Ibn Rushd often disagreed explicitly with his Islamic

predecessors. Writing his Tahafut al-Tahafut against Ghazali, he argued that application of

reason to philosophical problems can lead to genuine knowledge of the truth independently of revelation. Against Ibn Sina and the neoplatonic emanation theory, he maintained that efficient

causation is a genuine feature of relationships among created things, although the first mover

remains the ultimate source of all motion. Following Aristotle's view of the individual human being as a hylomorphic composite of soul and matter, Ibn Rushd could only promise

immortality through absorption into the greater whole of the universal intellect.

Jewish Thought

Medieval Judaism provided another significant stream of philosophical speculation. Social,

personal, and intellectual freedom for Jews was greater in the Islamic world of that era than among the anti-Semitic Christians of Europe, who often simply regarded Jewish thinkers as

Arabs. Though born in Egypt, Gaon Saadiah, for example, spent his most active years studying

the Talmud in Baghdad. Most medieval Jewish philosophers dealt with the familiar difficulty of trying to synthesize philosophy with religion, but theirneoplatonism was often infused with a

greater degree of emphasis on the mystical apprehension of reality.

The greater breadth of learning achieved by Jewish scholars often resulted in the combination

of particular elements derived from diverse philosophical sources. Although Ibn

Gabirol accepted Plotinus'sview of god as the center from which all created reality emanates, for

example, he also defended ahylomorphic account of ordinary objects and proposed a physiological explanation for human conduct and morality. Ibn Daud made an even more

explicit use of Aristotelean metaphysics.

The most widely respected of the medieval Jewish philosophers was Moses Maimonides,

whose patient codification of centuries of commentary on Jewish law in the Mishnah

Torah earned him a place of honor among Jews in the saying, "From Moses until Moses, there was no one like Moses." From the neoplatonic philosophical tradition, he took the central vision

of god as the sole source of all genuine knowledge, of which human reason can only hope to

gain a remote glimpse.

Thus, in the Moreh Nevukhim (Guide to the Perplexed) (1190) Maimonides suggested that

philosophical reasoning about ultimate matters is neither necessary nor even helpful for most

ordinary people, who would be better advised to rely upon faith. For members of the educated elite, who are more capable of understanding abstract philosophical reasoning, however, there

may be at least some hope of success. Balancing the philosophical and prophetic traditions,

Maimonides himself provided Aristotelean arguments for the existence of god, Biblical

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evidence for the creation of the universe, and a carefully-crafted synthesis of reasons for the

possibility of a divinely-produced immortality for embodied human beings.

Bonaventure and Aquinas

Reviving the West

During the thirteenth century, Christian Europe finally began to assimilate the lively intellectual traditions of the Jews and Arabs. Translations of ancient Greek texts (and the fine

Arabic commentaries on them) into Latin made the full range of Aristotelean philosophy

available to Western thinkers. This encouraged significant modifications of the

prevalent neoplatonic emanation-theory. Robert Grosseteste, for example, followed Ibn Sina in emphasizing the causal regularity evidenced by our experience of the world, and Siger of

Brabant used the commentaries of Ibn Rushd as the basis for his thoroughly Aristotelean views.

In England, Roger Bacon initiated a national tradition of empiricist thinking. Bacon proposed a systematic plan for supplementing our meager knowledge of the external world. Although he

granted that consultation of the ancient authorities has some value, Bacon argued that it is even

more important to employ individual experience for experimental confirmation. In coming generations, this reliance upon experimental methods would become vital for the development

of modern science.

When universities developed in the great cities of Europe during this era, rival clerical orders

within the church began to battle for political and intellectual control over these centers of educational life. At Paris during the thirteenth century, two of the newest orders found their

most capable philosophical representatives.

The Franciscans, founded by Francis of Assisi in 1209, were initially the philosophical conservatives. As their leader in mid-century, Bonaventure defended a traditional Augustine's

theology, blending only a little of Aristotle in with the more traditional neoplatonic elements. In

later generations, however, members of this order were leaders in the anti-rationalistic attacks

that brought an effective end to scholastic traditions. The Dominican order, founded by Dominic in 1215, on the other hand, placed great emphasis

on the use of reason and made extensive use of Aristotelean materials. Thus, their finest

expositor was Aquinas, whose works became definitive of Dominican (and, eventually, of Catholic) philosophy. Later Dominicans, like Savonarola, were more likely to pursue political

power than philosophical truth.

Bonaventure

After studying in Paris with Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure taught and wrote extensively, leading his Franciscans in the measured defense of the scholastic synthesis of Platonic

philosophy with Christian doctrine. Like Anselm, Bonaventure supposed that truth can emerge

from rational argumentation only when the methods of philosophy are illuminated by religious

faith. Thus, efforts to prove god's existence naturally begin with religious conviction itself, as an internal evidence of creaturely dependence on the deity.

Bonaventure held that the notion of an eternal material order is contradictory, so that reason itself supports the Christian doctrine of creation. Since god is the central being from which all

else thenemanates, every creature—including even human beings with sinful natures—may be

regarded as a footprint (Lat., vestiguum) of the divine reality. Thus, in the language of Christian

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doctrine, we are made in god's image and likeness; or, as Plato might have put it, we participate

(partly) in the Form of the Good. Even matter itself is endowed by the creator with seminal urges by means of which effective causation can proceed from within.

Despite his general commitment to neoplatonic principles and rejection of Aristotelean

metaphysics, Bonaventure did accept the notion of human nature as a hylomorphic composite. Although the human soul is indeed the form of the human body, Bonaventure maintained

however, it is capable, with the help of god, of continuing to exist after the death of the body.

Thus, as always, he accepted the thought of Aristotle only so far as it could be made to conform to his preconceptions about Christian doctrine. As we'll see next time, one of his contemporaries

at Paris used a very different approach.

Aquinas: Christian Aristoteleanism

The most profoundly influential of all the medieval philosophers was the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, whose brilliant efforts in defence of Christian

theology earned him a reputation as "the angelic teacher." His willingness to

employ rational argumentation generally and the metaphysical and

epistemological teachings of Aristotle in particular marked a significant departure from the neoplatonic/Augustinian tradition that had dominated so

much of the middle ages. Aquinas showed the church that it was possible to

incorporate many of the "new" teachings of "the Philosopher" (Aristotle) without

falling into the mistaken excesses of "the Commentator" (Ibn Rushd), and this became the basis for a lasting synthesis.

For Aquinas, theology is a science in which careful application of reason will yield the demonstrative certainty of theoretical knowledge. Of course it is possible to accept religious

teachings from revealed sources by faith alone, and Aquinas granted that this always remains the

most widely accessible route to Christian orthodoxy. But for those whose capacity to reason is well-developed, it is always better to establish the most fundamental principles on the use of

reason. Even though simple faith is enough to satisfy most people, for example, Aquinas

believed it possible, appropriate, and desirable to demonstrate the existence of god by rational means.

Five Ways to Prove God's Existence

Anselm's Ontological Argument is not acceptable, Aquinas argued, since we are in fact

ignorant of the divine essence from which it is presumed to begin. We cannot hope to

demonstrate the necessary existence of a being whose true nature we cannot even conceive by direct or positive means. Instead, Aquinas held, we must begin with the sensory experiences we

do understand and reason upward from them to their origin in something eternal. In this vein,

Aquinas presented his own "Five Ways" to prove the existence of god.

The first three of these ways are all variations of the Cosmological Argument. The first

way is an argument from motion, derived fairly directly from Aristotle's Metaphysics:

1. There is something moving.

2. Everything that moves is put into motion by something else.

Aquinas 1225 –1274 ac

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3. But this series of antecedent movers cannot reach back infinitely.

4. Therefore, there must be a first mover (which is god).

The first premise is firmly rooted in sensory experience, and the second is based on accepted

notions about potentiality and actuality. In defence of the third, Aquinas noted that if the series were infinite then there would be no first, and hence no second, or third, etc. The second

way has the same structure, but begins from experience of an instance of efficient causation, and

the third way relies more heavily upon a distinction between contingent and necessary being.

In all of its forms, the Cosmological Argument is open to serious challenge. Notice that if the second premise is wholly and literally true, then the conclusion must be false. If, on the other

hand, it is possible for something to move without being put into motion by another, then why might there not be hundreds of "first movers" instead of only one? Besides, it is by no means

obvious that the Aristotelean notions of a "first mover" or "first cause" bear much resemblance

to the god of Christianity. So even if the argument succeeded it might be of little use in defence of orthodox religion.

Aquinas's fourth way is a variety of Moral Argument. It begins with the factual claim that we do make judgments about the relative perfection of ordinary things. But the capacity to do so,

Aquinas argued, presupposes an absolute standard of perfection to which we compare

everything else. This argument relies more heavily on Platonic and Augustinian notions, and has

the advantage of defending the existence of god as moral exemplar rather than as abstract intitiator of reality.

The fifth way is the Teleological Argument: the order and arrangement of the natural world (not merely its existence) bespeaks the deliberate design of an intelligent creator. Although it is

an argument by analogy which can at best offer only probable reason for believing the truth of

its conclusion, this proof offers a concept of god that most fully corresponds to the traditional elements of medieval Christian theology. Since its empirical basis lies in our understanding of

the operation of nature, this line of reasoning tends to become more compelling the more

thorough our scientific knowledge is advanced.

The Created World

Since the nature of god can be known only analogically by reference to the created world, Aquinasbelieved it worthwhile to devote great attention to the operation of nature. Here,

of course, the basic approach is that of Aristotle, but the commentaries of Ibn Rushd provide a

reliable guide as well.

Although we cannot rationally eliminate the possiblity that matter itself is co-eternal with

god, Aquinas held, that undifferentiated prime matter can be nothing but pure potentiality in any case. It is only through god's bestowal of a substantial essence upon some portion of prime

matter that a real material thing comes into existence. Thus, everything is, in some sense,

a hylomorphic composite of matter and form for Aquinas, and god is the creator of all.

But, of course, human beings are a special case. As Aristotle had supposed, the human soul is

the formal, efficient, and final cause of the human body. But in this one special instance,

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Aquinas held that god can add existence directly, without any admixture of prime matter, thus

making possible the immortality of disembodied human souls.

Even in this life, Aquinas argued, the intellect is a higher faculty than the will in virtue of its

greater degree of independence from the body. As the agent of knowledge, the human intellect comprehends the essences of things directly, making use of sensory information only as the

starting-point for its fundamentally rational determinations. Although not all of Aquinas's

contemporaries recognized, understood, or accepted this view of human knowledge, it provided

ample room for the development of empirical investigations of the material world within the context of traditional Christian doctrine.

Modern Philosophy or Renaissance Philosophy

The Renaissance

Medieval philosophy had culminated in the cumulative achievements of scholasticism, a

grand system of thought developed by generations of patient scholars

employing neoplatonic and Aristotelean philosophy in the service of traditional Christian theology. But by the end of the fifteenth century, confidence in the success of this enterprise had

eroded, and many thinkers tried to make a fresh start by rejecting such extensive reliance on the

authority of earlier scholars. Just as religious reformers challenged ecclesiastical authority and

made individual believers responsible for their own relation to god, prominent Renaissancethinkers proposed an analogous elimination of all appeals to authority in

education and science.

Educational practice was revolutionized by the recovery of ancient documents, the rejection

of institutional authority, and renewed emphasis on individual freedom.

The humanists expressed an enormous confidence in the power of reason as a source of profound understanding of human nature and of our place in the natural order. Giovanni Pico

della Mirandola's Oration, for example, held forth the possibilities for a comprehensive new

order of knowledge relying on human understanding without reference to divine revelation. For some, like Desiderius Erasmus and Marsillio Ficino, this spirit found expression in a return to

careful study of classical texts in their own right, without relying on centuries of scholastic

commentary. But for more revolutionary thinkers as diverse as Giordano Bruno and Francisco

Suárez, humanism offered an opportunity to incorporate modern developments along with classical elements in entirely new systems of metaphysical knowledge.

The rise of the new science also offered a significant change in the prospects for human knowledge of the natural world. Copernicus argued on theoretical grounds for a heliocentric

view of the universe, for which Kepler provided a more secure mathematical

interpretation. Galileo contributed not only an impressive series of direct observations of both celestial and terrestrial motion but also a serious effort to explain and defend the new methods.

By abandoning explanation in terms of final causes, by emphasizing the importance of

observation, and by trying to develop quantified accounts of all, renaissance scientists began to

develop the foundations of a thoroughly empirical view of the world.

This emerging emphasis on empirical methods permanently transformed study of the natural

world. Making extensive use of sensory observations made possible by the development of new

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instrumentation fostered an urge to seek quantification of every phenomenon. There were

exceptions like Herbert of Cherbury, who hoped that the natural light of common notions imprinted innately in every human being would provide perfect certainty as a foundation for

Christianity. But most of the moderns gladly embraced the methods, style, and content of the

new science.

The Skeptical Challenge

While the Renaissance encouraged abandonment of the benefits of scholastic learning, it could offer only the promise that new ways of thinking might one day suitably replace them.

Along with high hopes for the achievement of human knowledge came significant doubts about

its possibility. By recovering and translating the work of Sextus Empiricus, humanist scholars introduced the tradition of classical skepticismas an element of modern thought. Turning the

power of reasoning against itself at every opportunity, thePyrrhonists proposed that we suspend

all belief whenever we find ourselves capable of doubting the truth of what we suppose. The trouble is that very little beyond immediate personal experience can pass this test of

indubitability.

The greatest exponent of modern Pyrrhonism was Michel de Montaigne,

whose Essays (1580, 1588) gave prominent place to skeptical arguments. Any attempt to

achieve knowledge is misguided, on his view, because it arrogantly supposes that the natural

world and everything in it exists only for the satisfaction of our idle curiosity. Since the evidence of our senses is notoriously liable to error and the reliability of logical reasoning

cannot be demonstrated without circularity, we would indeed be better off to doubt everything

and rest comfortably with mere opinion. Even the new science offers no hope, Montaigne argued, since it must eventually be surpassed in the same way that it has overcome the old.

These concerns created a challenge to which modern philosophers were bound to respond.

The Central Questions

Against the background of humanistic scholarship, the rise of the new science, and the challenge of skepticism, modern philosophers were preoccupied with philosophical issues in

several distinct areas:

Epistemology: Can human beings achieve any certain knowledge of the world? If so, what are the sources upon which genuine knowledge depends? In particular, how

does sense perception operate in service of human knowledge?

Metaphysics: What kinds of things ultimately compose the universe? In particular, what are the distinctive features of human nature, and how do they function in

relation to each other and the world at large? Does god exist?

Ethics: By what standards should human conduct be evaluated? Which actions are morally right, and what motivates us to perform them? Is moral life possible without

the support of religious belief?

Metaphilosophy: Does philosophy have a distinctive place in human life generally?

What are the proper aims and methods of philosophical inquiry?

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Although not every philosopher addressed all of these issues and some philosophers had much

more to say about some issues than others, our survey of modern philosophy will trace the content of their responses to questions of these basic sorts.

Francis Bacon (22 January 1561 – 9 April 1626)

British politician and entrepeneur Francis Bacon, for example, expressed the modern spirit

well in a series of works designed to replace stultified Aristoteleanism with improved methods

for achieving truth. Assuming that the difficulties we experience are invariably the results of poor training and can therefore be eliminated, Bacon promised that the adoption of more

appropriate habits of thinking will enable individual thinkers to transcend them.

Believing that the first step toward knowledge is to identify its major obstacles, Bacon took

note of four distinct varieties of distractions that too often prevent us from understanding the

world correctly:

Idols of the Tribe, which arise from human nature generally, encourage us to over-

estimate our own importance within the greater scheme of things by supposing that everything must truly be as it appears to us.

Idols of the Cave, which arise from our individual natures, lead each one of us to

extrapolate inappropriately from his or her own case to a hasty generalization about

humanity, life, or nature generally. Idols of the Marketplace, which arise from the use of language as a means of

communication, interfere with an unbiased perception of natural phenomena by

forcing us to express everything in traditional terms. Idols of the Theatre, which arise from academic philosophy itself, produces an

inclination to build and defend elaborate systems of thought that are founded on little

evidence from ordinary experience.

Once we notice the effects that these "Idols" have upon us, Bacon supposed, we are in a position

to avoid them, and our knowledge of nature will accordingly improve.

In a more positive spirit, Bacon proposed a patient method borrowed from the practice of the

new scientists of the preceding generation. First, we must use our senses (properly freed from

the idols) to collect and organize many particular instances from experience. Resisting the urge to generalize whenever it is possible to do so, we adhere firmly to an experimental appreciation

of the natural world. Only when it seems unavoidable will we then tentatively postulate modest

rules about the coordination and reqularity we observe among these cases, subject always to confirmation or refutation by future experiences.

Hobbes's Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes (5 April 1588 – 4 December 1679

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Even more than Bacon, Thomas Hobbes illustrated the transition from

medieval to modern thinking in Britain. His Leviathan effectively developed a vocabulary for philosophy in the English language by using Anglicized versions

of the technical terms employed by Greek and Latin authors. Careful use of

words to signify common ideas in the mind, Hobbes maintained, avoids the

difficulties to which human reasoning is most obviously prone and makes it possible to articulate a clear conception of reality. (Leviathan I 4)

For Hobbes, that conception is bound to be a mechanistic one: the movements of physical objects will turn out to be sufficient to explain everything in the

universe. The chief purpose of scientific investigation, then, is to develop a geometrical account

of the motion of bodies, which will reveal the genuine basis of their causal interactions and the regularity of the natural world. Thus, Hobbes defended a strictly materialist view of the world.

Human Nature

Human beings are physical objects, according to Hobbes, sophisticated machines all of

whose functions and activities can be described and explained in purely mechanistic terms. Even thought itself, therefore, must be understood as an instance of the physical operation of the

human body. Sensation, for example, involves a series of mechanical processes operating within

the human nervous system, by means of which the sensible features of material things produce ideas in the brains of the human beings who perceive them. (Leviathan I 1)

Human action is similarly to be explained on Hobbes's view. Specific desires and appetites

arise in the human body and are experienced as discomforts or pains which must be overcome.

Thus, each of us is motivated to act in such ways as we believe likely to relieve our discomfort, to preserve and promote our own well-being. (Leviathan I 6) Everything we choose to do is

strictly determined by this natural inclination to relieve the physical pressures that impinge upon

our bodies. Human volition is nothing but the determination of the will by the strongest present desire.

Hobbes nevertheless supposed that human agents are free in the sense that their activities are

not under constraint from anyone else. On this compatibilist view, we have no reason to complain about the strict determination of the will so long as we are not subject to interference

from outside ourselves. (LeviathanII 21)

As Hobbes acknowledged, this account of human nature emphasizes our animal nature,

leaving each of us to live independently of everyone else, acting only in his or her own self-interest, without regard for others. This produces what he called the "state of war," a way of life

that is certain to prove "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." (Leviathan I 13) The only

escape is by entering into contracts with each other—mutually beneficial agreements to surrender our individual interests in order to achieve the advantages of security that only a social

existence can provide. (Leviathan I 14)

Human Society

Unable to rely indefinitely on their individual powers in the effort to secure livelihood and contentment,Hobbes supposed, human beings join together in the formation of a

commonwealth. Thus, the commonwealth as a whole embodies a network of associated

contracts and provides for the highest form of social organization. On Hobbes's view, the

Hobbes 1588 – 1679 AC

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formation of the commonwealth creates a new, artificial person (the Leviathan) to whom all

responsibility for social order and public welfare is entrusted. (Leviathan II 17)

Of course, someone must make decisions on behalf of this new whole, and that person will be

the sovereign. The commonwealth-creating covenant is not in essence a relationship between subjects and their sovereign at all. Rather, what counts is the relationship among subjects, all of

whom agree to divest themselves of their native powers in order to secure the benefits of orderly

government by obeying the dictates of the sovereign authority. (Leviathan II 18) That's why the

minority who might prefer a different sovereign authority have no complaint, on Hobbes's view: even though they have no respect for this particular sovereign, they are still bound by their

contract with fellow-subjects to be governed by a single authority. The sovereign is nothing

more than the institutional embodiment of orderly government.

Since the decisions of the sovereign are entirely arbitrary, it hardly matters where they come

from, so long as they are understood and obeyed universally. Thus, Hobbes's account explicitly leaves open the possibility that the sovereign will itself be a corporate person—a legislature or

an assembly of all citizens—as well as a single human being. Regarding these three forms,

however, Hobbes himself maintained that the commonwealth operates most effectively when a

hereditary monarch assumes the sovereign role. (Leviathan II 19) Investing power in a single natural person who can choose advisors and rule consistently without fear of internal conflicts is

the best fulfillment of our social needs. Thus, the radical metaphysical positions defended by

Hobbes lead to a notably conservative political result, an endorsement of the paternalistic view.

Hobbes argued that the commonwealth secures the liberty of its citizens. Genuine human

freedom, he maintained, is just the ability to carry out one's will without interference from others. This doesn't entail an absence of law; indeed, our agreement to be subject to a common

authority helps each of us to secure liberty with respect to others. (Leviathan II 21) Submission

to the sovereign is absolutely decisive, except where it is silent or where it claims control over individual rights to life itself, which cannot be transferred to anyone else. But the structure

provided by orderly government, according to Hobbes, enhances rather than restricts individual

liberty.

Whether or not the sovereign is a single heredetary monarch, of course, its administration of

social order may require the cooperation and assistance of others. Within the commonwealth as

a whole, there may arise smaller "bodies politic" with authority over portions of the lives of those who enter into them. The sovereign will appoint agents whose responsibility is to act on its

behalf in matters of less than highest importance. Most important, the will of the sovereign for

its subjects will be expressed in the form of civil laws that have either been decreed or tacitly accepted. (Leviathan II 26) Criminal violations of these laws by any subject will be

appropriately punished by the sovereign authority.

Despite his firm insistence on the vital role of the sovereign as the embodiment of the

commonwealth, Hobbes acknowledged that there are particular circumstances under which it

may fail to accomplish its purpose. (Leviathan II 29) If the sovereign has too little power, is

made subject to its own laws, or allows its power to be divided, problems will arise. Similarly, if individual subjects make private judgments of right and wrong based on conscience, succomb to

religious enthisiasm, or acquire excessive private property, the state will suffer. Even a well-

designed commonwealth may, over time, cease to function and will be dissolved.

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Descartes: A New Approach

The first great philosopher of the modern era was René Descartes ( 31

March 1596 – 11 February 1650), whose new approach won him recognition as

the progenitor of modern philosophy. Descartes's pursuit of mathematical and

scientific truth soon led to a profound rejection of the scholastic tradition in which he had been educated. Much of his work was concerned with the

provision of a secure foundation for the advancement of human knowledge

through the natural sciences. Fearing the condemnation of the church, however, Descartes was rightly cautious about publicly expressing the full measure of his

radical views. The philosophical writings for which he is remembered are

therefore extremely circumspect in their treatment of controversial issues.

After years of work in private, Descartes finally published a preliminary statement of his

views in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637). Since mathematics has genuinely achieved the certainty for which human thinkers yearn, he argued,

we rightly turn to mathematical reasoning as a model for progress in human knowledge more

generally. Expressing perfect confidence in the capacity of human reason to achieve knowledge,

Descartes proposed an intellectual process no less unsettling than the architectural destruction and rebuilding of an entire town. In order to be absolutely sure that we accept only what is

genuinely certain, we must first deliberately renounce all of the firmly held but questionable

beliefs we have previously acquired by experience and education.

The progress and certainty of mathematical knowledge, Descartes supposed, provide an

emulable model for a similarly productive philosophical method, characterized by four simple rules:

1. Accept as true only what is indubitable.

2. Divide every question into manageable parts. 3. Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more complex.

4. Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at once.

This quasi-mathematical procedure for the achievement of knowledge is typical of a rationalistic

approach to epistemology.

While engaged in such a comprehensive revision of our beliefs, Descartes supposed it prudent to adhere to a modest, conventional way of life that provides a secure and comfortable

environment in which to pursue serious study. The stoic underpinnings of this "provisional morality" are evident in the emphasis on changing oneself to fit the world. Its general

importance as an avenue to the contemplative life, however, is more general. Great intellectual

upheavals can best be undertaken during relatively calm and stable periods of life.

Anticipated Results

In this context, Descartes offered a brief description of his own experience with the proper approach to knowledge. Begin by renouncing any belief that can be doubted, including

especially the testimony of the senses; then use the perfect certainty of one's own existence,

which survives this doubt, as the foundation for a demonstration of the providential reliability of

Descartes 1596 – 1650 AC

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one's faculties generally. Significant knowledge of the world, Descartes supposed, can be

achieved only by following this epistemological method, the rationalismof relying on a mathematical model and eliminating the distraction of sensory information in order to pursue the

demonstrations of pure reason.

Later sections of the Discourse (along with the supplementary scientific essays with which it was published) trace some of the more significant consequences of following the Cartesian

method in philosophy. His mechanistic inclinations emerge clearly in these sections, with

frequent reminders of the success of physical explanations of complex phenomena. Non-

human animals, on Descartes's view, are complex organic machines, all of whose actions can be fully explained without any reference to the operation of mind in thinking.

In fact, Descartes declared, most of human behavior, like that of animals, is susceptible to

simple mechanistic explanation. Cleverly designed automata could successfully mimic nearly all of what we do. Thus, Descartes argued, it is only the general ability to adapt to widely varying

circumstances—and, in particular, the capacity to respond creatively in the use of language—

that provides a sure test for the presence of an immaterial soul associated with the normal human body.

But Descartes supposed that no matter how human-like an animal or machine could be made

to appear in its form or operations, it would always be possible to distinguish it from a real

human being by two functional criteria. Although an animal or machine may be capable of performing any one activity as well as (or even better than) we can, he argued, each human

being is capable of a greater variety of different activities than could be performed by anything

lacking a soul. In a special instance of this general point, Descartes held that although an animal or machine might be made to utter sounds resembling human speech in response to specific

stimuli, only an immaterial thinking substance could engage in the creative use of language

required for responding appropriately to any unexpected circumstances. My puppy is a loyal companion, and my computer is a powerful instrument, but neither of them can engage in a

decent conversation. (This criterion anticipated the more formal requirements of

the Turing test.)

Descartes: Starting with Doubt

For a more complete formal presentation of this foundational experience, we must turn to theMeditationes de prima Philosophia (Meditations on First Philosophy) (1641), in

which Descartesoffered to contemporary theologians his proofs of the existence of god and the

immortality of the human soul. This explicit concern for religious matters does not reflect any loss of interest in pursuing the goals of science. By sharply distinguishing mind from body,

Descartes hoped to preserve a distinct arena for the church while securing the freedom of

scientists to develop mechanistic accounts of physical phenomena. In this way, he supposed it

possible to satisfy the requirements of Christian doctrine, but discourage the interference of the church in scientific matters and promote further observational exploration of the material world.

The arrangement of the Meditations, Descartes emphasized, is not the order of reasons; that is, it makes no effort to proceed from the metaphysical foundations of reality to the dependent

existence of lesser beings, as Spinoza would later try to do. Instead, this book follows the order

of thoughts; that is, it traces the epistemological progress an individual thinker might follow in establishing knowledge at a level of perfect certainty. Thus, these are truly Meditations: we are

meant to put ourselves in the place of the first-person narrator, experiencing for ourselves the

benefits of the philosophical method.

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The Method of Doubt

The basic strategy of Descartes's method of doubt is to defeat skepticism on its own ground.

Begin by doubting the truth of everything—not only the evidence of the senses and the more

extravagant cultural presuppositions, but even the fundamental process of reasoning itself. If any

particular truth about the world can survive this extreme skeptical challenge, then it must be truly indubitable and therefore a perfectly certain foundation for knowledge. The First

Meditation, then, is an extended exercise in learning to doubt everything that I believe,

considered at three distinct levels:

1. Perceptual Illusion

First, Descartes noted that the testimony of the senses with respect to any particular judgment about the external world may turn out to be mistaken. (Med. I) Things are

not always just as they seem at first glance (or at first hearing, etc.) to be. But then, Descartes argues, it is prudent never wholly to trust in the truth of what we perceive.

In ordinary life, of course, we adjust for mistaken perceptions by reference to correct

perceptions. But since we cannot be sure at first which cases are veridical and which

are not, it is possible (if not always feasible) to doubt any particular bit of apparent sensory knowledge.

2. The Dream Problem

Second, Descartes raised a more systematic method for doubting the legitimacy of all sensory perception. Since my most vivid dreams are internally indistinguishible

from waking experience, he argued, it is possible that everything I now "perceive" to be part of the physical world outside me is in fact nothing more than a fanciful

fabrication of my own imagination. On this supposition, it is possible to doubt that

any physical thing really exists, that there is an external world at all. (Med. I)

Severe as it is, this level of doubt is not utterly comprehensive, since the truths of

mathematics and the content of simple natures remain unaffected. Even if there is no

material world (and thus, even in my dreams) two plus three makes five and red looks red to me. In order to doubt the veracity of such fundamental beliefs, I must

extend the method of doubting even more hyperbolically.

3. A Deceiving God

Finally, then, Descartes raises even more comprehensive doubts by inviting us to

consider a radical hypothesis derived from one of our most treasured traditional beliefs. What if (as religion teaches) there is an omnipotent god, but that deity

devotes its full attention to deceiving me? (Med. I) The problem here is not merely

that I might be forced by god to believe what something which is in fact false.

Descartes means to raise the far more devastating possibility that whenever I believe anything, even if it has always been true up until now, a truly omnipotent deceiver

could at that very moment choose to change the world so as to render my belief

false. On this supposition, it seems possible to doubt the truth of absolutely anything I might come to believe.

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Although the hypothesis of a deceiving god best serves the logical structure of

the Meditationsas a whole, Descartes offered two alternative versions of the hypothetical doubt for the benefit of those who might take offense at even a counter-

factual suggestion of impiety. It may seem more palatable to the devout to consider

the possibility that I systematically deceive myself or that there is some evil demon who perpetually tortures me with my own error. The point in each case is that it is

possible for every belief I entertain to be false.

Remember that the point of the entire exercise is to out-do the skeptics at their own game, to raise the broadest possible grounds for doubt, so that whatever we come to believe in the face of

such challenges will indeed be that which cannot be doubted. It is worthwhile to pause here,

wallowing in the depths of Cartesian doubt at the end of the First Meditation, the better to appreciate the escape he offers at the outset of Meditation Two.

I Am, I Exist

The Second Meditation begins with a review of the First. Remember that I am committed to

suspending judgment with respect to anything about which I can conceive any doubt, and my doubts are extensive. I mistrust every report of my senses, I regard the material world as nothing

more than a dream, and I suppose that an omnipotent god renders false each proposition that I

am even inclined to believe. Since everything therefore seems to be dubitable, does it follow that

I can be certain of nothing at all?

It does not. Descartes claimed that one thing emerges as true even under the strict

conditions imposed by the otherwise universal doubt: "I am, I exist" is necessarily true whenever the thought occurs to me. (Med. II) This truth neither derives from sensory

information nor depends upon the reality of an external world, and I would have to exist even if

I were systematically deceived. For even an omnipotent god could not cause it to be true, at one

and the same time, both that I am deceived and that I do not exist. If I am deceived, then at least I am.

Although Descartes's reasoning here is best known in the Latin translation of its expression in theDiscourse, "cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), it is not merely an inference from

the activity of thinking to the existence of an agent which performs that activity. It is intended

rather as an intuition of one's own reality, an expression of the indubitability of first-person experience, the logical self-certification of self-conscious awareness in any form.

Skepticism is thereby defeated, according to Descartes. No matter how many skeptical challenges are raised—indeed, even if things are much worse than the most extravagant skeptic

ever claimed—there is at least one fragment of genuine human knowledge: my perfect certainty

of my own existence. From this starting-point, Descartes supposed, it is possible to achieve

indubitable knowledge of many other propositions as well.

I Am a Thinking Thing

An initial consequence may be drawn directly from the intuitive certainty of the cogito itself.

If I know that I am, Descartes argued, I must also know what I am; an understanding of my

true nature must be contained implicitly in the content of my awareness.

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What then, is this "I" that doubts, that may be deceived, that thinks? Since I became certain of

my existence while entertaining serious doubts about sensory information and the existence of a material world, none of the apparent features of my human body can have been crucial for my

understanding of myself. But all that is left is my thought itself, so Descartes concluded that

"sum res cogitans" ("I am a thing that thinks"). (Med. II) In Descartes's terms, I am a substance whose inseparable attribute (or entire essence) is thought, with all its modes:

doubting, willing, conceiving, believing, etc. What I really am is a mind [Lat.mens]

or soul [Lat. anima]. So completely am I identified with my conscious awareness, Descartes

claimed, that if I were to stop thinking altogether, it would follow that I no longer existed at all. At this point, nothing else about human nature can be determined with such perfect certainty.

In ordinary life, my experience of bodies may appear to be more vivid than self-consciousness, but Descartes argued that sensory appearances actually provide no reliable

knowledge of the external world. If I hold a piece of beeswax while approaching the fire, all of

the qualities it presents to my senses change dramatically while the wax itself remains. (Med. II) It follows that the impressions of sense are unreliable guides even to the nature of bodies.

(Notice here that the identity of the piece of wax depends solely upon its spatial location; that's a

significant hint about Descartes's view of the true nature of material things, which we'll see in

more detail in Meditation Five.)

Descartes: God and Human Nature

Clear and Distinct Ideas

At the outset of the Third Meditation, Descartes tried to use this first truth as the paradigm for his general account of the possibilities for achieving human knowledge. In

the cogito, awareness of myself, of thinking, and of existence are somehow combined in such a

way as to result in an intuitive grasp of a truth that cannot be doubted. Perhaps we can find in

other cases the same grounds for indubitable truth. But what is it?

The answer lies in Descartes's theory of ideas. Considered formally, as the content of my

thinking activity, the ideas involved in the cogito are unusually clear and distinct. (Med. III) But ideas may also be considered objectively, as the mental representatives of things that really

exist. According to arepresentative realist like Descartes, then, the connections among our ideas

yield truth only when theycorrespond to the way the world really is. But it is not obvious that our clear and distinct ideas do correspond to the reality of things, since we suppose that there

may be an omnipotent deceiver.

In some measure, the reliability of our ideas may depend on the source from which they are

derived. Descartes held that there are only three possibilities: all of our ideas are

either adventitious (entering the mind from the outside world) or factitious (manufactured by

the mind itself) or innate (inscribed on the mind by god). (Med. III) But I don't yet know that there is an outside world, and I can imagine almost anything, so everything depends on whether

god exists and deceives me.

God Exists

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The next step in the pursuit of knowledge, then, is to prove that god does indeed

exist. Descartes's starting point for such a proof is the principle that the cause of any idea must have at least as much reality as the content of the idea itself. But since my idea of god has an

absolutely unlimited content, the cause of this idea must itself be infinite, and only the truly

existing god is that. In other words, my idea of god cannot be either adventitious or factitious

(since I could neither experience god directly nor discover the concept of perfection in myself), so it must be innately provided by god. Therefore, god exists. (Med. III)

As a backup to this argument, Descartes offered a traditional version of the cosmological argument for god's existence. From the cogito I know that I exist, and since I am not perfect in

every way, I cannot have caused myself. So something else must have caused my existence, and

no matter what that something is (my parents?), we could ask what caused it to exist. The chain of causes must end eventually, and that will be with the ultimate, perfect, self-caused being, or

god.

As Antoine Arnauld pointed out in an Objection published along with

the Meditations themselves, there is a problem with this reasoning. Since Descartes will use the

existence (and veracity) of god to prove the reliability of clear and distinct ideas in Meditation

Four, his use of clear and distinct ideas to prove the existence of god in Meditation Three is an example of circular reasoning. Descartes replied that his argument is not circular because

intuitive reasoning—in the proof of god as in the cogito—requires no further support in the

moment of its conception. We must rely on a non-deceiving god only as the guarantor of veridical memory, when a demonstrative argument involves too many steps to be held in the

mind at once. But this response is not entirely convincing.

The problem is a significant one, since the proof of god's existence is not only the first

attempt to establish the reality of something outside the self but also the foundation for every

further attempt to do so. If this proof fails, then Descartes's hopes for human knowledge are

severely curtailed, and I am stuck insolipsism, unable to be perfectly certain of anything more than my own existence as a thinking thing. With this reservation in mind, we'll continue through

the Meditations, seeing how Descartes tried to dismantle his own reasons for doubt.

Deception and Error

The proof of god's existence actually makes the hypothetical doubt of the First Meditation a little worse: I now know that there really is a being powerful enough to deceive me at every

turn. ButDescartes argued that since all perfections naturally go together, and since deception

is invariably the product of imperfection, it follows that the truly omnipotent being has no

reason or motive for deception. God does not deceive, and doubt of the deepest sort may be abandoned forever. (Med. IV) It follows that the simple natures and the truths of mathematics

are now secure. In fact, Descartes maintained, I can now live in perfect confidence that my

intellectual faculties, bestowed on me by a veracious god, are properly designed for the apprehension of truth.

But this seems to imply too much: if I have a divinely-endowed capacity for discovering the truth, then why don't I always achieve it? The problem is not that I lack knowledge of some

things; that only means that I am limited. Rather, the question is why I so often make mistakes,

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believing what is false despite my possession of god-given mental abilities. Descartes's answer

derives from an analysis of the nature of human cognition generally.

Every mental act of judgment, Descartes held, is the product of two distinct faculties:

the understanding, which merely observes or perceives, and the will, which assents to the belief in question. Considered separately, the understanding (although limited in scope) is adequate for

human needs, since it comprehends completely everything for which it has clear and distinct

ideas. Similarly, the will as an independent faculty is perfect, since it (like the will of god) is

perfectly free in every respect. Thus, god has benevolently provided me with two faculties, neither of which is designed to produce error instead of true belief. Yet I do make mistakes, by

misusing my free will to assent on occasions for which my understanding does not have clear

and distinct ideas. (Med. IV) For Descartes, error is virtually a moral failing, the willful exercise of my powers of believing in excess of my ability to perceive the truth.

The Essence of Matter

Since the truths of reason have been restored by the demonstration of god's

veracity, Descartesemployed mathematical reasoning to discover the essence of bodies in the

Fifth Meditation. We do not yet know whether there are any material objects, because the dream problem remains in force, but Descartes supposed that we can determine what they would be

like if there were any by relying upon reason alone, since mathematics achieves certainty

without supposing the reality of its objects.

According to Descartes, the essence of material substance is simply extension, the property of

filling up space. (Med. V) So solid geometry, which describes the possibility of dividing an otherwise uniform space into distinct parts, is a complete guide to the essence of body. It

follows that there can be in reality only one extended substance, comprising all matter in a

single spatial whole. From this, Descartes concluded that individual bodies are merely modes of

the one extended being, that there can be no space void of extension, and that all motion must proceed by circular vortex. Thus, again, the true nature of bodies is understood by pure thought,

without any information from the senses.

By the way, this explanation of essences suggested to Descartes another proof of god's

existence, a modern variation on the Ontological Argument. Just as the essence of a triangle

includes its having interior angles that add up to a straight line, Descartes argued, so the essence of god, understood as a being in whom all perfections are united, includes necessary existence in

reality. (Med. V) As Descartes himself noted, this argument is no more certain than the truths of

mathematics, so it also rests on the reliability of clear and distinct ideas, secured in turn by the proofs of god's existence and veracity in the Third and Fourth Meditations.

The Existence of Bodies

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes finally tried to eliminate the dream problem by proving

that there is a material world and that bodies do really exist. His argument derives from the

supposition that divinely-bestowed human faculties of cognition must always be regarded as adequately designed for some specific purpose. Since three of our faculties involve

representation of physical things, the argument proceeds in three distinct stages. (Med. VI)

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First, since the understanding conceives of extended things through its comprehension of

geometrical form, it must at least be possible for things of this sort to exist. Second, since the imagination is directed exclusively toward the ideas of bodies and of the ways in which they

might be purposefully altered, it is probable that there really are such things. Finally, since the

faculty of sense perception is an entirely passive ability to receive ideas of physical objects produced in me by some external source outside my control, it is certain that such objects must

truly exist.

The only alternative explanation for perception, Descartes noted, is that god directly puts the ideas of bodies into my mind without there acutally being anything real that corresponds to

them. (This is precisely the possibility that Malebranche would later accept as the correct

account of the material world.) But Descartes supposed that a non-deceiving god would never maliciously give me so complete a set of ideas without also causing their natural objects to exist

in fact. Hence, the bodies I perceive do really exist.

Mind-Body Dualism

Among the physical objects I perceive are the organic bodies of animals, other human beings, and myself. So it is finally appropriate to consider human nature as a whole: how am I,

considered as a thinking thing, concerned with the organism I see in the mirror? What is the true

relation between the mind and the body of any human being? According to Descartes, the two

are utterly distinct.

The Sixth Meditation contains two arguments in defence of Cartesian dualism: First, since the

mind and the body can each be conceived clearly and distinctly apart from each other, it follows that god could cause either to exist independently of the other, and this satisfies the traditional

criteria for a metaphysical real distinction. (Med. VI) Second, the essence of body as a

geometrically defined region of space includes the possibility of its infinite divisibility, but the

mind, despite the variety of its many faculties and operations, must be conceived as a single, unitary, indivisible being; since incompatible properties cannot inhere in any one substance, the

mind and body are perfectly distinct. (Med. VI)

This radical separation of mind and body makes it difficult to account for the apparent

interaction of the two in my own case. In ordinary experience, it surely seems that the volitions

of my mind can cause physical movements in my body and that the physical states of my body can produce effects on my mental operations. But on Descartes's view, there can be no

substantial connection between the two, nor did he believe it appropriate to think of the mind as

residing in the body as a pilot resides within a ship. Although he offered several tenatative suggestions in his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, Descartes largely left for future

generations the task of developing some reasonable account of volition and sensation, either by

securing the possibility of mind-body interaction or by proposing some alternative explanation

of the appearances.

On the other hand, Cartesian dualism offers some clear advantages: For one thing, it provides

an easy proof of the natural immortality of the human mind or soul, which cannot be substantially affected by death, understood as an alteration of the states of the physical

organism. In addition, the distinction of mind from body establishes the absolute independence

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of the material realm from the spiritual, securing the freedom of scientists to rely exclusively on

observation for their development of mechanistic explanations of physical events.

Locke: The Origin of Ideas

We now leave the Continent for an extended look at philosophy in Great Britain during the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Here the favored model for achieving human knowledge

was not the abstract mathematical reasoning so admired by the rationalists but the more concrete

observations of natural science. Heeding the call of Francis Bacon, British scientists had pursued a vigorous program of observation and experiment with great success. Isaac Newton showed

that both celestial and terrestial motion could be explained by reference to a simple set of laws

of motion and gravitation; Robert Boyleinvestigated the behavior of gasses and proposed a general theory of matter as a collection of corpuscles; and Thomas Sydenham began to use

observational methods for the diagnosis and treatment of disease.

Philosopher John Locke (29 August 1632 – 28 October 1704)greatly admired

the achievements that these scientists (his friends in the Royal Society) had made

in physics, chemistry, and medicine, and he sought to clear the ground for future

developments by providing a theory of knowledge compatible with such carefully-conducted study of nature.

The goal of Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), then, is to establish epistemological foundations for the new science by examining the

reliability, scope, and limitations of human knowledge in contrast with with the

pretensions of uncritical belief, borrowed opinion, and mere superstition. Since the sciences had already demonstrated their practical success, Locke tried to apply their Baconian

methods to the pursuit of his own philosophical aims. In order to discover how the human

understanding achieves knowledge, we must trace that knowledge to its origins in our

experience.

Locke's investigation into human knowledge began by asking how we acquire the basic

materials out of which that knowledge is composed, our ideas. For Locke, an idea is Essay I i 8) (Note that this is an extremely broad definition: it includes concrete sensory images, abstract

intellectual concepts, and everything in between. The colors and shapes I see before me right

now are ideas, and so are my hunger, my memories of the ocean, my hopes for my children, the multiplication tables, and the principles of democratic government.) Ideas, then, are the

immediate objects of all thought, the meaning or signification of all words, and the mental

representatives of all things. Locke's question was, where do we get all of these ideas which are the content of our knowedge?

Ideas from Experience

First, Locke eliminated one bad answer to the question. Most of Book I of the Essay is

devoted to a detailed refutation of the belief that any of our knowledge is innate. Against the

claims of the Cambridge Platonists and Herbert of Cherbury, Locke insisted that neither the speculative principles of logic and metaphysics nor the practical principles of morality are

inscribed on our minds from birth. Such propositions do not in fact have the universal consent of

all human beings, Locke argued, since children and the mentally defective do not assent to them.

Locke 1632 – 1704

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Moreover, even if everyone did accept these principles, their universality could be better

explained in terms of self-evidence or shared experience than by reference to a presumed innate origin. (Essay I ii 3-5) Innatism is the refuge of lazy intellectual dictators who wish thereby to

impose their provincial notions upon others. Besides, Locke held, our knowledge cannot be

innate because none of the ideas of which it is composed are innate.

As the correct answer to the question, Locke proposed the fundamental principle

of empiricism: all of our knowledge and ideas arise from experience. (Essay II i 2) The initially

empty room of the mind is furnished with ideas of two sorts: first, by sensation we obtain ideas of things we suppose to exist outside us in the physical world; second, by reflection we come to

have ideas of our own mental operations. Thus, for example, "hard," "red," "loud," "cold,"

"sweet," and "aromatic" are all ideas of sensation, while "perceiving," "remembering," "abstracting," and "thinking" are all ideas of reflection. ("Pleasure," "unity," and "existence,"

Locke held, are ideas that come to us from both sensation and reflection.) Everything we know,

everything we believe, every thought we can entertain is made up of ideas of sensation and reflection and nothing else.

But wait. It isn't true that I can think only about what I myself have experienced; I can

certainly think about dinosaurs (or unicorns) even though I have never seen one for myself. So Locke's claim must be about the ultimate origin of our ideas, the source of their content. He

distinguished between simple and complex ideas and acknowledged that we often employ our

mental capacities in order manufacture complex ideas by conjoining simpler components. My idea of "unicorn," for example, may be compounded from the ideas of "horse" and "single spiral

horn," and these ideas in turn are compounded from less complex elements. What Locke held

was that every complex idea can be analyzed into component parts and that the final elements of any complete analysis must be simple ideas, each of which is derived directly from experience.

Even so, the empiricist program is an ambitious one, and Locke devoted Book II of theEssay to

a lengthy effort to show that every idea could, in principle, be derived from experience.

A Special Problem

Locke began his survey of our mental contents with the simple ideas of sensation, including those of colors, sounds, tastes, smells, shapes, size, and solidity. With just a little thought about

specific examples of such ideas, we notice a significant difference among them: the color of the

wall in front of me seems to vary widely from time to time, depending on the light in the room and the condition of my eyes, while its solidity persists independently of such factors. Following

the lead of Galileo and Boyle, Locke explained this difference in corpuscularian fashion, by

reference to the different ways in which the qualities of things produce our ideas of them.

The primary qualities of an object are its intrinsic features, those it really has, including the

"Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion" of its parts. (Essay II viii 9) Since these features are

inseparable from the thing even when it is divided into parts too small for us to perceive, the primary qualities are independent of our perception of them. When we do perceive the primary

qualities of larger objects, Locke believed, our ideas exactly resemble the qualities as they are in

things.

The secondary qualities of an object, on the other hand, are nothing in the thing itself but the

power to produce in us the ideas of "Colors, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, etc." (Essay II viii 10) In

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these cases, our ideas do not resemble their causes, which are in fact nothing other than the

primary qualities of the insensible parts of things. The powers, or tertiary qualities, of an object are just its capacities to cause perceptible changes in other things.

Thus, for example, the primary qualities of this rose include all of its quantifiable features, its mass and momentum, its chemical composition and microscopic structure; these are the features

of the thing itself. The secondary qualities of the rose, on the other hand, include the ideas it

produces in me, its yellow color, its delicate fragrance; these are the merely the effects of the

primary qualities of its corpuscles on my eyes and nose. Like the pain I feel when I stick my finger on a thorn, the color and smell are not features of the rose itself.

Some distinction of this sort is important for any representative realist. Many instances of perceptual illusion can be explained by reference to the way secondary qualities depend upon

our sensory organs, but the possibility of accurate information about the primary qualities is

preserved, at least in principle. The botanical expert may be able to achieve detailed knowledge of the nature of roses, but that knowledge is not necessary for my appreciation of their beauty.

Complex Ideas

Even if the simple ideas of sensation provide us with ample material for thinking, what we

make of them is largely up to us. In his survey of ideas of reflection, Locke listed a variety of

mental operations that we perform upon our ideas.

Notice that in each of these sections (Essay II ix-xii), Locke defined the relevant mental

operations as we experience them in ourselves, but then went on to consider carefully the extent to which other animalsseem capable of performing the same activities. This procedure has

different results from Descartes's doctrinal rejection of animal thinking: according to Locke,

only abstraction (the operation most crucial in forming the ideas of mixed modes, on which morality depends) is utterly beyond the capacity of any animal. (Essay II xi 10)

Perception of ideas through the senses and retention of ideas in memory, Locke held, are

passive powers of the mind, beyond our direct voluntary control and heavily dependent on the material conditions of the human body. The active powers of the mind include distinguishing,

comparing, compounding, and abstracting. It is by employing these powers, Locke supposed,

that we manufacture new, complex ideas from the simple elements provided by experience. The resulting complex ideas are of three sorts: (Essay II xii 4-7)

Modes are complex ideas that combine simpler elements to form a new whole that is assumed to be incapable of existing except as a part or feature of something else. The ideas of "three,"

"seventy-five," and even "infinity," for example, are all modes derived from the simple idea of

"unity." We can understand these ideas and know their mathematical functions, whether or not there actually exist numbers of things to which they would apply in reality. "Mixed modes"

similarly combine simple components without any presumption about their conformity to

existing patterns, yielding all of our complex ideas of human actions and their value.

Substances are the complex ideas of real particular things that are supposed to exist on their

own and to account for the unity and persistence of the features they exhibit. The ideas of "my

only son," "the largest planet in the solar system," and "tulips," for example, are compounded

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from simpler ideas of sensation and reflection. Each is the idea of a thing (or kind of thing) that

could really exist on its own. Since we don't understand all of the inner workings of natural objects, Locke supposed, our complex ideas of substances usually rely heavily on their

secondary qualities and powers—the effects they are observed to have on ourselves and other

things.

Relations are complex ideas of the ways in which other ideas may be connected with each

other, in fact or in thought. The ideas of "younger," "stronger," and "cause and effect," for

example, all involve some reference to the comparison of two or more other ideas.

Locke obviously could not analyze the content of every particular idea that any individual has

ever had. But his defence of the empiricist principle did require him to show in principle that any complex idea can be derived from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection. The clarity,

reality, adequacy, and truth of all of our ideas, Locke supposed, depend upon the success with

which they fulfill their representative function. Here, we'll consider one of the most significant and difficult examples from each category:

Free Action

Among our modal ideas, Locke believed that those of mixed modes, which combine both

sensory and reflective elements, are especially important, since they include the ideas of human

actions and provide for their moral evaluation. Among the mixed modes, the ideas of power, volition, and liberty are the most crucial and difficult. To them Locke devoted a chapter (II xxi)

that grew, with alterations in later editions, to become the longest in the Essay.

The idea of power is illustrated every time we do something. Whether we think or move, the

feeling that our mental preference leads to action provides a simple instance of power. The

exercise of that power is volition or will, and the action taken as a result is a voluntary one. Liberty or freedom, on Locke's view, isthe power to act on our volition, whatever it may be,

without any external compulsion or restraint. (EssayII xxi 7-12)

Under these definitions, the question of whether we have free will does not arise for Locke, since it involves what would later come to be called a category mistake. In particular, it does not

matter whether we have control over our own preferences, whether we are free to will whatever

we wish. (Essay II xxi 23-25) In fact, Locke offered a strictly hedonistic account of human motivation, according to which our preferences are invariably determined by the desire to seek

pleasure and avoid pain. (Essay II vii 3) What does matter for freedom and moral responsibility

is that we can act on our preferences, whatever their source, without any outside interference. If I could have done otherwise (given a different preference), then I act freely and am responsible

for my action.

Locke: Knowledge and its Limits

Substance

The idea of a particular substance is the complex idea of a set of coexisting qualities and

powers, together with the supposition that there is some unknown substrate upon which they all

depend. Locke is derisive about the confused idea of this something, "we know not what," that

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is supposed by scholastic philosophers. (Essay II xxiii 2) But he cannot eliminate the concept of

substance altogether, since he, too, must account for the existence and coherence of just this group of features.

About species or kinds of substances, Locke offers a more sophisticated explanation. Our complex idea of a specific kind of substance—"gold" or "horse," for example—is the collection

of features by reference to which we classify individual substances as belonging to that kind.

(Essay II xxiii 6-8) Thesenominal essences, developed for our convenience in sorting things

into kinds, rely heavily upon the secondary qualities and powers that are the most obvious features of such things in our experience—the color, weight, and malleability of gold, for

example, and the shape, noises, and movements of horses.

As a corpuscularian, Locke supposed that individual substances must also have real essences, the primary qualities of their insensible parts, which cause all of their qualities. But since we

cannot observe the "real inner constitutions" of things, we cannot use them for purposes of

classification, nor can we even understand their causal influence on our perception. (Essay III vi 6) Since Locke doubted that real essences could ever be discovered, he was thrown back on the

supposition of an underlying reality which we cannot know.

This account imposes a severe limitation on the possibilities of our knowledge of substances.

According to Locke, the mechanical operations of nature remain hidden to us. Careful observation and experimentation may support a reliable set of generalizations about the

appearances of the kinds of things we commonly encounter, but we cannot even conceive of

their true natures. Personal Identity

Among our ideas of relations, the strongest is that of identity. Locke held that the criteria for

identity depend upon the kind of thing we are considering. Substantial identity requires the

unique spatio-temporal history that is just the existence of each substance, but this is not the only consideration in all cases.

The identity of the tree outside my window, for example, does not depend on the substantial

identity of its parts (in fact, they change from day to day and season to season); what matters in this case is the organization of those parts into a common life. A similar explanation, Locke

held, accounts for the identity of animals and human beings. (Essay II xxvii 4-6) We recognize

living bodies at different times by the organization of their material parts rather than by their substantial composition.

In analogous fashion, Locke explained personal identity independently of identity of

substance. The idea of the person is that of a moral agent who can be held responsible for his or her actions. (Essay II xxvii 9) But Locke used a series of hypothetical examples to show that the

identity of an underlying immaterial substance or soul is neither necessary nor sufficient for

personal identity in this sense. Even the identity of the same human body (though we may rely

upon that for third-person attributions of identity) is not truly relevant. The only thing that does matter, on Locke's view, is that the person self-consciously appropriates actions as its own.

This is, as Locke says, a "forensic" notion of personal identity; its aim is to secure the justice and effectiveness of moral sanctions. (Essay II xxvii 26) If, and only if, I now remember having

committed a particular act in the past can I be justly punished for having done so. If, and only if,

I project myself into the future can the prospect of punishment or reward influence my deliberations about how to act now. Locke's way of thinking about personal identity has shaped

discussions of the issue ever since.

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Words

Locke devoted Book III of the Essay to a discussion of language. His basic notion is

clear: words signify ideas. Thus, the meaning of a word is always the idea it signifies in the

minds of those who use it. (Essay III ii 2) Of course, those ideas are presumed in turn to

represent things, but the accuracy of that representation does not directly affect the meaning of the word. The names of substances, for example, signify the complex ideas Locke called their

nominal essences, not the real nature of the substances themselves. Thus, common names for

substances are general terms by means of which we classify thingsas we observe them to be; we can agree upon the meaning of such terms even though we remain ignorant of the real essences

of the things themselves.

The chief point of Locke's theory of language was to eliminate the verbal disputes that arise

when words are used without clear signification. It is always reasonable to ask for the meaning

of a word, that is, to know what idea it signifies. If a speaker cannot supply the idea behind the word, then it has no meaning. Many of the academic squabbles that obstruct advancement in

human knowledge, Locke believed, could be dissolved by careful attention to the meaning of

words.

Knowledge and its Degrees

Having provided a thorough account of the origins of our ideas in experience, Locke opens Book IV of the Essay with a deceptively simple definition of knowledge. Knowledge is

just perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. (Essay IV i 2) We know the truth

of a proposition when we become aware of the relation between the ideas it conjoins. This can occur in any of three distinct ways, each with its characteristic degree of certainty.

Intuitive knowledge involves direct and immediate recognition of the agreement or

disagreement of two ideas. (Essay IV ii 1) It yields perfect certainty, but is only rarely available

to us. I know intuitively that three is not the same as seven. In demonstrative knowledge we perceive the agreement or disagreement only indirectly, by

means of a series of intermediate ideas. (Essay IV ii 2) Since demonstration is a chain of

reasoning, its certainty is no greater than its weakest link; only if each step is itself intuitively known will the demonstration as a whole be certain. If I know that A is greater than B and that B

is greater than C, then I know demonstratively that A is greater than C.

Although intuition and demonstration alone satisfy the definition of knowledge, Locke held that the belief that our sensory ideas are caused by existing things deserves the name

of sensitive knowledge. (Essay IV ii 14) In the presence of a powerful, present idea of

sensation, we cannot doubt that it has some real cause outside us, even though we do not know what that cause may be or how it produces the idea in us. I have only sensitive knowledge that

there is something producing the odor I now smell.

Types of Knowledge

Locke distinguished four sorts of agreement or disagreement between ideas, perception of which gives us four distinct types of knowledge: (Essay IV i 3-7)

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Since knowledge of identity and diversity requires only a direct comparison of the ideas

involved, it is intuitive whenever the ideas being compared are clear.

Knowledge of coexistence would provide detailed information about features of the natural

world that occur together in our experience, but this scientific knowledge is restricted by our ignorance of the real essences of substances; the best we can do is to rely upon careful

observations of the coincidental appearance of their secondary qualities and powers.

Mathematics and morality rest upon knowledge of relation, which Locke held to be demonstrative whenever we form clear ideas and discover the links between them.

The degree of certainty in our knowledge of real existence depends wholly upon the content of our ideas in each case. Locke agreed with Descartes that we have intuitive knowledge of our

own existence, and he supposed it possible to achieve demonstrative knowledge of god as the

thinking creator of everything. But we have only sensitive knowledge of the existence of other things presently before our senses.

The Extent of Knowledge

The result of all of this is that our knowledge is severely limited in its extent. On Locke's

definition, we can achieve genuine knowledge only when we have clear ideas and can trace the

connection between them enough to perceive their agreement or disagreement. (Essay IV iii 1-6) That doesn't happen very often, especially where substances are at issue. The truths of

mathematics are demonstrable precisely because they are abstract: since my ideas of lines,

angles, and triangles are formed without any necessary reference to existing things, I can prove that the interior angles of any triangle add up to a straight line.

But any effort to achieve genuine knowledge of the natural world must founder on our ignorance of substances. We have "sensitive knowledge" of the existence of something that

causes our present sensory ideas. But we do not have adequate ideas of the real essence of any

substance, and even if we did, we would be unable to discover any demonstrative link between

that real essence and the ideas it produces in us. The most careful observation can establish at best only the secondary qualities and powers that appear to coexist in our experience often

enough to warrant our use of them as the nominal essence of a kind of substance. (Essay IV xi

1-7)

Locke's efforts have therefore led to a sobering conclusion. Certainty is rarely within our

reach; we must often be content with probable knowledge or mere opinion. Locke ultimately recommends that we adopt significantly reduced epistemological expectations.

The Great Concernments

Despite all of these limitations, Locke believed that human knowledge is well-suited for the

conduct of human life. We have all the knowledge we need to secure our "great

concernments:" convenience in this life and the means for attaining a better life hereafter. (Essay IV xii 11)

Survival and comfort in daily life are attainable in spite of our ignorance of the hidden

operations of nature. We don't need to know the real essences of substances in order to make use

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of them productively. (Indeed, Locke suggests, additional information might actually make daily

life more difficult.) Surely demonstrative knowledge of the true nature of fire or food is unnecessary for my survival; my natural aversion to the pain of being burned and desire for the

pleasures of eating provide ample practical guidance.

Doing the right thing is also possible, since our action is properly guided by a demonstrable morality. The truths of morality are demonstrable for the same reason that the truths of

mathematics are: the mixed modes that describe possible human actions, of the moral rules that

govern them, and even of the possible agents that might perform them, are all complex ideas

manufactured by the mind without reference to the real existence of substantial beings, so I can prove that murder is wrong.

Finally, we have all the knowledge we need to enter into a proper relation to our

creator. God's existence is demonstrable on rational grounds, and the scriptures provide us with detailed information about the divine will for our lives. (The precise boundary between reason

and revelation, Locke held, is itself known only as a matter of probable knowledge or opinion.)

In the end, then, Locke believed that we have no reason to complain. Although restricted in extent, our knowledge is sufficient for our needs. (Essay IV xiv 1-2) Respecting its limits will

prevent us from wasting effort on pointless wrangling. Since our experience is itself limited, an

empiricist epistemology can only advise caution and modesty in our claims to know.

Kant: Synthetic A Priori Judgments

The Critical Philosophy

Next we turn to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant(22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804), a

watershed figure who forever altered the course of philosophical thinking in the Western tradition. Long after his thorough indoctrination into the quasi-scholastic German appreciation

of the metaphysical systems of Leibnizand Wolff, Kant said, it was a careful reading of David Hume that "interrupted my dogmatic slumbers and gave my investigations in the field of

speculative philosophy a quite new direction." Having appreciated the full force of such skeptical arguments, Kant supposed that the only adequate response would be a

"Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, a recognition that the appearance of the external world

depends in some measure upon the position and movement of its observers. This central idea became the basis for his life-long project of developing a critical philosophy that could

withstand them.

Kant's aim was to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between

rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists had tried to show that we can understand the world by careful use of reason; this guarantees the indubitability

of our knowledge but leaves serious questions about its practical content.

The empiricists, on the other hand, had argued that all of our knowledge must be firmly grounded in experience; practical content is thus secured, but it turns out

that we can be certain of very little. Both approaches have failed, Kant

supposed, because both are premised on the same mistaken assumption.

Progress in philosophy, according to Kant, requires that we frame the

epistemological problem in an entirely different way. The crucial question is not how we can

Kant 1724 – 1804

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bring ourselves to understand the world, but how the world comes to be understood by us.

Instead of trying, by reason or experience, to make our concepts match the nature of objects, Kant held, we must allow the structure of our concepts shape our experience of objects. This is

the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787): to show how reason determines the

conditions under which experience and knowledge are possible.

Varieties of Judgment

In the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic (1783) Kant presented the central themes of

the firstCritique in a somewhat different manner, starting from instances in which we do appear

to have achieved knowledge and asking under what conditions each case becomes possible. So he began by carefully drawing a pair of crucial distinctions among the judgments we do actually

make.

The first distinction separates a priori from a posteriori judgments by reference to the origin of our knowledge of them. A priori judgments are based upon reason alone, independently of all

sensory experience, and therefore apply with strict universality. A posteriori judgments, on the

other hand, must be grounded upon experience and are consequently limited and uncertain in their application to specific cases. Thus, this distinction also marks the difference traditionally

noted in logic between necessary and contingent truths.

But Kant also made a less familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments,

according to the information conveyed as their content. Analytic judgments are those whose

predicates are wholly contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-

contradiction. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are those whose predicates are wholly

distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate because of some real

connection external to the concepts themselves. Hence, synthetic judgments are genuinely informative but require justification by reference to some outside principle.

Kant supposed that previous philosophers had failed to differentiate properly between these two distinctions. Both Leibniz and Hume had made just one distinction, between matters of fact

based on sensory experience and the uninformative truths of pure reason. In fact, Kant held, the

two distinctions are not entirely coextensive; we need at least to consider all four of their logically possible combinations:

Analytic a posteriori judgments cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.

Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we

come to know by means of our sensory experience (though Wolff had tried to derive

even these from the principle of contradiction). Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and

straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true. Synthetic a priori judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new

information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the

possibility of any such case.

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Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are

possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed (pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural

science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events. What is more,

metaphysics—if it turns out to be possible at all—must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how are synthetic a

priori judgments possible at all? This is the central question Kant sought to answer.

Mathematics

Consider, for example, our knowledge that two plus three is equal to five and that the interior

angles of any triangle add up to a straight line. These (and similar) truths of mathematics are synthetic judgments,Kant held, since they contribute significantly to our knowledge of the

world; the sum of the interior angles is not contained in the concept of a triangle. Yet, clearly,

such truths are known a priori, since they apply with strict and universal necessity to all of the objects of our experience, without having been derived from that experience itself. In these

instances, Kant supposed, no one will ask whether or not we have synthetica priori knowledge;

plainly, we do. The question is, how do we come to have such knowledge? If experience does

not supply the required connection between the concepts involved, what does? Kant's answer is that we do it ourselves. Conformity with the truths of mathematics is a

precondition that we impose upon every possible object of our experience. Just

as Descartes had noted in the Fifth Meditation, the essence of bodies is manifested to us in Euclidean solid geometry, which determines a priori the structure of the spatial world we

experience. In order to be perceived by us, any object must be regarded as being uniquely

located in space and time, so it is the spatio-temporal framework itself that provides the missing

connection between the concept of the triangle and that of the sum of its angles. Space and time, Kant argued in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first Critique, are the "pure forms of

sensible intuition" under which we perceive what we do.

Understanding mathematics in this way makes it possible to rise above an old controversy between rationalists and empiricists regarding the very nature of space and time. Leibniz had

maintained that space and time are not intrinsic features of the world itself, but merely a product

of our minds. Newton, on the other hand, had insisted that space and time are absolute, not

merely a set of spatial and temporal relations. Kant now declares that both of them were correct! Space and time are absolute, and they do derive from our minds. As synthetic a

priori judgments, the truths of mathematics are both informative and necessary.

This is our first instance of a transcendental argument, Kant's method of reasoning from the fact that we have knowledge of a particular sort to the conclusion that all of the logical

presuppositions of such knowledge must be satisfied. We will see additional examples in later lessons, and can defer our assessment of them until then. But notice that there is a price to be

paid for the certainty we achieve in this manner. Since mathematics derives from our own

sensible intuition, we can be absolutely sure that it must apply to everything we perceive, but for the same reason we can have no assurance that it has anything to do with the way things are

apart from our perception of them. Next time, we'll look at Kant's very similar treatment of the

synthetic a priori principles upon which our knowledge of natural science depends.

Preconditions for Natural Science

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In natural science no less than in mathematics, Kant held, synthetic a priori judgments

provide the necessary foundations for human knowledge. The most general laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, cannot be justified by experience, yet must apply to it universally. In

this case, the negative portion of Hume's analysis—his demonstration that matters of fact rest

upon an unjustifiable belief that there is a necessary connection between causes and their

effects—was entirely correct. But of course Kant's more constructive approach is to offer a transcendental argument from the fact that we do have knowledge of the natural world to the

truth of synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of our experience of it.

As we saw last time, applying the concepts of space and time as forms of sensible intuition is necessary condition for any perception. But the possibility of scientific knowledge requires that

our experience of the world be not only perceivable but thinkable as well, and Kant held that the

general intelligibility of experience entails the satisfaction of two further conditions: First, it must be possible in principle to arrange and organize the chaos of our many

individual sensory images by tracing the connections that hold among them. This Kant called

the synthetic unity of the sensory manifold.

Second, it must be possible in principle for a single subject to perform this organization by discovering the connections among perceived images. This is satisfied by what Kant called the

transcendental unity of apperception.

Experiential knowledge is thinkable only if there is some regularity in what is known and there is some knower in whom that regularity can be represented. Since we do actually have

knowledge of the world as we experience it, Kant held, both of these conditions must in fact

obtain.

Deduction of the Categories

Since (as Hume had noted) individual images are perfectly separable as they occur within the

sensory manifold, connections between them can be drawn only by the knowing subject, in

which the principles of connection are to be found. As in mathematics, so in science the

synthetic a priori judgments must derive from the structure of the understanding itself.

Consider, then, the sorts of judgments distinguished by logicians (in Kant's day): each of

them has some quantity (applying to all things, some, or only one); some quality (affirmative, negative, or complementary); some relation (absolute, conditional, or alternative); and some

modality (problematic, assertoric, or apodeictic). Kant supposed that any intelligible thought can

be expressed in judgments of these sorts. But then it follows that any thinkable experience must

be understood in these ways, and we are justified in projecting this entire way of thinking outside ourselves, as the inevitable structure of any possible experience.

The result of this "Transcendental Logic" is the schematized table of categories, Kant's summary of the central concepts we employ in thinking about the world, each of which is

discussed in a separate section of the Critique:

Quantity Quality

Unity Reality

Plurality Negation

Totality Limitation

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Axioms of Intuition Anticipations of Perception

Relation Modality

Substance Possibility

Cause Existence

Community Necessity

Analogies of Experience Postulates of Empirical Thought

Our most fundamental convictions about the natural world derive from these concepts,

according to Kant. The most general principles of natural science are not empirical generalizations from what we have experienced, but synthetic a priori judgments about what we

could experience, in which these concepts provide the crucial connectives.

Kant: Experience and Reality

Analogies of Experience

So Kant maintained that we are justified in applying the concepts of the understanding to the

world as we know it by making a priori determinations of the nature of any possible experience.

In order to see how this works in greater detail, let's concentrate on the concepts of relation, which govern how we understand the world in time. As applied in the Analogies of Experience,

each concept of relation establishes one of the preconditions of experience under one of the

modes of time: duration, succession, and simultaneity.

1. Substance: The experience of any change requires not only the perception of the altered

qualities that constitute the change but also the concept of an underlying substance which persists through this alteration. (E.g., in order to know by experience that the classroom wall has

changed in color from blue to yellow, I must not only perceive the different colors—blue then,

yellow now—but also suppose that the wall itself has endured from then until now.) Thus, Kant supposed that the philosophical concept of substance (reflected in the scientific assumption of an

external world of material objects) is an a prioricondition for our experience.

2. Cause: What is more, the experience of events requires not only awareness of their intrinsic features but also that they be regarded as occurring one after another, in an invariable

regularity determined by the concept of causality. (E.g., in order to experience the flowering of

this azalea as an event, I must not only perceive the blossoms as they now appear but must also regard them as merely the present consequence of a succession of prior organic developments.)

Thus, Kant responded to Hume's skepticism by maintaining that the concept of cause is one of

the synthetic conditions we determine for ourselves prior to all experience.

3. Community: Finally, the experience of a world of coexisting things requires not only the

experiences of each individually but also the presumption of their mutual interaction. (E.g., in order believe that the Sun, Earth, and Moon coexist in a common solar system, I must not only

make some estimate of the mass of each but must also take into account the reciprocity of the

gravitational forces between them.) Thus, on Kant's view, the notion of the natural world as a

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closed system of reciprocal forces is another a prioricondition for the intelligibility of

experience.

Notice again that these features of nature are not generalized from anything we have already

experienced; they are regulative principles that we impose in advance on everything we can experience. We are justified in doing so, Kant believed, because only the pure concepts of the

understanding can provide the required connections to establish synthetic a priori judgments.

Unless these concepts are systematically applied to the sensory manifold, the unity of

apperception cannot be achieved, and no experience can be made intelligible.

Phenomena and Noumena

Having seen Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories as pure concepts of the

understanding applicable a priori to every possible experience, we might naturally wish to ask

the further question whether these regulative principles are really true. Are there substances? Does every event have a cause? Do all things interact? Given that we must suppose them in

order to have any experience, do they obtain in the world itself? To these further questions, Kant

firmly refused to offer any answer.

According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the distinct realms of phenomena

and noumena. Phenomena are the appearances, which constitute the our

experience; noumena are the (presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not the noumenal. (It is only

at this level, with respect to what we can experience, that we are justified in imposing the

structure of our concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself (Ding an sich) would by definition be entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant

of the noumenal realm.

Thus, on Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are

knowable precisely because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather

prescribe the structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms of sensible

intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm. Math and science are certainly true

of the phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct us about the noumena.

The Aim of Metaphysics

Although our knowledge of mathematics and natural science yield easily to a Kantian analysis, the synthetic a priori judgments of metaphysics are much more difficult to explain.

Here the forms of intuition and concepts of understanding are useless, since they find

application only in the realm of our experience, while metaphysics seeks to transcend

experience completely, in order to discover the nature of reality itself as comprehended under pure reason.

Metaphysical speculation properly begins with the same method as the "Aesthetic" and "Analytic," Kant supposed, but it invariably ends up in a "Dialectic." The transcendental

arguments we employ in metaphysics need not restrict their determination to the phenomenal

realm alone, since their aim is genuine knowledge of the noumena. Synthetic a priori judgments

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in metaphysics must be grounded upon truly transcendental ideas, which are regarded as

applicable to things in themselves independently of our experience of them.

Transcendental Ideas

Kant's exposition of the transcendental ideas begins once again from the logical distinction

among categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. From this distinction, as we have

seen, the understanding derives the concepts of substance, cause, and community, which provide

the basis for rules that obtain as natural laws within our experience. Now, from the same distinction, the reason must carry things further in order derive the transcendental ideas of the

complete subject, the complete series of conditions, and the complete complex of what is

possible. Thus, the "completion" of metaphysical reasoning requires transcendental ideas of three sorts, but Kant argued that each leads to its characteristic irresolvable difficulty.

The Psychological Idea is the concept of the soul as a permanent substance which lives forever. It is entirely natural to reason (as in Descartes's cogito) from knowledge that "I think" to

my real existence as one and the same thinking thing through all time, but Kant held that our

efforts to reach such conclusions are "Paralogisms," with only illusory validity. It is true that

thought presupposes the unity of apperception and that every change presupposes an underlying substance, but these rules apply only to the phenomena we experience. Since substantial unity

and immortality are supposed to be noumenal features of the soul as a thing in itself, Kant held,

legitimate a priori judgments can never prove them, and the effort to transcend in this case fails.

The Cosmological Idea is the concept of a complete determination of the nature of the world

as it must be constituted in itself. In this case, Kant held, the difficulty is not that we can conclude too little but rather that we can prove too much. From the structure of our experience

of the world, it is easy to deduce contradictory particular claims about reality: finitude vs.

infinity; simplicity vs. complexity; freedom vs. determinism; necessity vs. contingency. These

"Antinomies" of Pure Reason can be avoided only when we recognize that one or both of the contradictory proofs in each antinomy holds only for the phenomenal realm. Once again, it is the

effort to achieve transcendental knowledge of noumena that necessarily fails.

The Theological Idea is the concept of an absolutely perfect and most real being (or god).

Again it is natural to move from our recognition of dependence within the phenomenal realm to

the notion of a perfectly independent noumenal being, the "Transcendental Ideal." But traditional attempts to prove that god really exists, founded as they are on what we experience,

cannot establish the reality of a being necessarily beyond all experience.

The general point of the Transcendental Dialectic should by now be clear: metaphysical

speculation about the ultimate nature of reality invariably fails. The synthetic a priori judgments

which properly serve as regulative principles governing our experience can never be shown to

have any force as constitutive of the real nature of the world. Pure reason inevitably reaches for what it cannot grasp.

The Limits of Reason

Now that we've seen Kant's answers to all three parts of the Prolegomena's "Main

Transcendental Question" and have traced their sources in the Critique of Pure Reason, we are

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in a position to appreciate his careful delineation of what is possible in metaphysical thought and

what is not.

What most clearly is not possible is any legitimate synthetic a priori judgment about things in

themselves. The only thing that justifies the application of regulative principles in mathematics and natural science is their limitation to phenomena. Both sensible intuition and the

understanding deal with the conditions under which experience is possible. But the whole point

of speculative metaphysics is to transcend experience entirely in order to achieve knowledge of

the noumenal realm. Here, only the faculty of reason is relevant, but its most crucial speculative conclusions, its deepest convictions about the self, the world, and god, are all drawn

illegitimately.

What is possible—indeed, according to Kant what we are bound by our very nature as

rational beings to do—is to think of the noumenal realm as if the speculative principles were

true (whether or not they are). By the nature of reason itself, we are required to suppose our own existence as substantial beings, the possibility of our free action in a world of causal regularity,

and the existence of god. The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes it

impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can in no way diminish the depth

fo our belief that they are.

According to Kant, then, the rational human faculties lead us to the very boundaries of what

can be known, by clarifying the conditions under which experience of the world as we know it is possible. But beyond those boundaries our faculties are useless. The shape of the boundary

itself, as evidenced in the Paralogisms and Antinomies, naturally impels us to postulate that the

unknown does indeed have certain features, but these further speculations are inherently unjustifiable.

The only legitimate, "scientific" metaphysics that the future may hold, Kant therefore held, would be a thoroughly critical, non-speculative examination of the bounds of pure reason, a

careful description of what we can know accompanied by a clear recognition that our

transcendental concepts (however useful they may seem) are entirely unreliable as guides to the

nature of reality. It is this task, of course, that Kant himself had pursued in the First Critique.

Kant: The Moral Order

Having mastered epistemology and metaphysics, Kant believed that a rigorous application of

the same methods of reasoning would yield an equal success in dealing with the problems of

moral philosophy. Thus, in the Kritik der practischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason) (1788), he proposed a "Table of the Categories of Freedom in Relation to the Concepts of Good

and Evil," using the familiar logical distinctions as the basis for a catalog of synthetic a

priori judgments that have bearing on the evaluation of human action, and declared that only

two things inspire genuine awe: "der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir" ("the starry sky above and the moral law within"). Kant used ordinary moral notions as the

foundation ffor a derivation of this moral law in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der

Sitten (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785).

From Good Will to Universal Law

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We begin with the concept of that which can be conceived to be good without qualification, a

good will. Other good features of human nature and the benefits of a good life, Kant pointed out, have value only under appropriate conditions, since they may be used either for good or for

evil. But a good will isintrinsically good; its value is wholly self-contained and utterly

independent of its external relations. Since our practical reason is better suited to the

development and guidance of a good will than to the achievement of happiness, it follows that the value of a good will does not depend even on the results it manages to produce as the

consequences of human action.

Kant's moral theory is, therefore, deontological: actions are morally right in virtue of their

motives, which must derive more from duty than from inclination. The clearest examples of

morally right action are precisely those in which an individual agent's determination to act in accordance with duty overcomes her evident self-interest and obvious desire to do otherwise.

But in such a case, Kant argues, the moral value of the action can only reside in a formal

principle or "maxim," the general commitment to act in this way because it is one's duty. So he

concludes that "Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law."

According to Kant, then, the ultimate principle of morality must be a moral law conceived so

abstractly that it is capable of guiding us to the right action in application to every possible set of circumstances. So the only relevant feature of the moral law is its generality, the fact that it has

the formal property ofuniversalizability, by virtue of which it can be applied at all times to every

moral agent. From this chain of reasoning about our ordinary moral concepts, Kant derived as a preliminary statement of moral obligation the notion that right actions are those that practical

reason would will as universal law.

Imperatives for Action

More accurate comprehension of morality, of course, requires the introduction of a more

precise philosophical vocabulary. Although everything naturally acts in accordance with law, Kant supposed, only rational beings do so consciously, in obedience to the objective

principles determined by practical reason. Of course, human agents also have subjective

impulses—desires and inclinations that may contradict the dictates of reason. So we experience the claim of reason as an obligation, a command that we act in a particular way, or

an imperative. Such imperatives may occur in either of two distinct forms, hypothetical or

categorical.

A hypothetical imperative conditionally demands performance of an action for the sake of

some other end or purpose; it has the form "Do A in order to achieve X." The application of

hypothetical imperatives to ethical decisions is mildly troublesome: in such cases it is clear that we are morally obliged to perform the action A only if we are sure both that X is a legitimate

goal and that doing A will in fact produce this desirable result. For a perfectly rational being, all

of this would be analytic, but given the general limitations of human knowledge, the joint conditions may rarely be satisfied.

A categorical imperative, on the other hand, unconditionally demands performance of an action for its own sake; it has the form "Do A." An absolute moral demand of this sort gives rise

to familiar difficulties: since it expresses moral obligation with the perfect necessity that would

directly bind any will uncluttered by subjective inclinations, the categorical imperative must be

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known a priori; yet it cannot be an analytic judgment, since its content is not contained in the

concept of a rational agent as such. The supreme principle of morality must be a synthetic a priori proposition. Leaving its justification for the third section of the Grounding (and the

Second Critique), Kant proceeded to a discussion of the content and application of the

categorical impetative.

The Categorical Imperative

Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reason of any rational being understands the categorical imperative to be: "Act only according to that maxim whereby

you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." That is, each individual

agent regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way, that everyone (including itself) will always act according to the same general rule in the future. This

expression of the moral law, Kant maintained, provides a concrete, practical method for

evaluating particular human actions of several distinct varieties.

Consider, for example, the case (#2 in the text) of someone who contemplates relieving a

financial crisis by borrowing money from someone else, promising to repay it in the future

while in fact having no intention of doing so. (Notice that this is not the case of finding yourself incapable of keeping a promise originally made in good faith, which would require a different

analysis.) The maxim of this action would be that it is permissible to borrow money under false

pretenses if you really need it. But as Kant pointed out, making this maxim into a universal law would be clearly self-defeating. The entire practice of lending money on promise presupposes at

least the honest intention to repay; if this condition were universally ignored, the (universally)

false promises would never be effective as methods of borrowing. Since the universalized maxim is contradictory in and of itself, no one could will it to be law, and Kant concluded that

we have a perfect duty (to which there can never be any exceptions whatsoever) not to act in this

manner.

On the other hand, consider the less obvious case (#4 in the text) of someone who lives

comfortably but contemplates refusing any assistance to people who are struggling under great

hardships. The maxim here would be that it is permissible never to help those who are less well-off than ourselves. Although Kant conceded that no direct contradiction would result from the

universalization of such a rule of conduct, he argued that no one could consistently will that it

become the universal law, since even the most fortunate among us rightly allow for the possibility that we may at some future time find ourselves in need of the benevolence of others.

Here we have only an imperfect duty not act so selfishly, since particular instances may require

exceptions to the rule when it conflicts either with another imperfect duty (e.g., when I don't have enough money to help everyone in need) or a perfect duty (e.g., if the only way to get more

money would be under a false promise).

Kant also supposed that moral obligations arise even when other people are not involved. Since it would be contradictory to universalize the maxim of taking one's own life if it promises

more misery than satisfaction (#1), he argued, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to commit

suicide. And since no one would will a universalized maxim of neglecting to develop the discipline required for fulfilling one's natural abilities (#3), we have an imperfect duty to

ourselves not to waste our talents.

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These are only examples of what a detailed application of the moral law would entail, but

they illustrate the general drift of Kant's moral theory. In cases of each of the four sorts, he held that there is a contradiction—either in the maxim itself or in the will—involved in any attempt

to make the rule under which we act into a universal law. The essence of immorality, then, is to

make an exception of myself by acting on maxims that I cannot willfully universalize. It is always wrong to act in one way while wishing that everyone else would act otherwise. (The

perfect world for a thief would be one in which everyone else always respected private

property.) Thus, the purely formal expression of the categorical imperative is shown to yield

significant practical application to moral decisions.

Alternative Formulae for the Categorical Imperative

Although he held that there is only one categorical imperative of morality, Kant found it

helpful to express it in several ways. Some of the alternative statements can be regarded as

minor variations on his major themes, but two differ from the "formula of universal law" sufficiently to warrant a brief independent discussion.

Kant offered the "formula of the end in itself" as: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity,

whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and

never simply as a means." This places more emphasis on the unique value of human life as deserving of our ultimate moral respect and thus proposes a more personal view of morality. In

application to particular cases, of course, it yields the same results: violating a perfect duty by

making a false promise (or killing myself) would be to treat another person (or myself) merely as a means for getting money (or avoiding pain), and violating an imperfect duty by refusing to

offer benevolence (or neglecting my talents) would be a failure to treat another person (or

myself) as an end in itself. Thus, the Kantian imperative agrees with the Christian expression of "The Golden Rule" by demanding that we derive from our own self-interest a generalized

concern for all human beings.

Drawing everything together, Kant arrived at the "formula of autonomy," under which the

decision to act according to a maxim is actually regarded as having made it a universal law. Here the concern with human dignity is combined with the principle of universalizability to

produce a conception of the moral law as self-legislated by each for all. As Kant puts it,

A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign,

when as legislator he is himslf subject to the will of no other.

A rational being must always regard himself as legislator in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will, whether as member or as sovereign.

In this final formulation, the similarity of Kant's moral theory with his epistemology should be

clear. Just as the understanding in each of us determines the regulative principles of natural

science that all must share, so the practical reason in each of us determines the universal maxims of morality that all must obey.

Autonomy of the Will

In fact, this final formula for the categorical imperative brings us back to the original concept

of the will itself as that which is good without qualification. At this point in the argument, Kant can provide a more technical statement of its intrinsic moral value by

distinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy of the will.

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A heteronomous will is one in obedience to rules of action that have been legislated

externally to it. Such a will is always submitting itself to some other end, and the principles of its action will invariably be hypothetical imperatives urging that it act in such a way as to

receive pleasure, appease the moral sense, or seek personal perfection. In any case, the moral

obligations it proposes cannot be regarded as completely binding upon any agent, since their maxim of action comes from outside it.

An autonomous will, on the other hand, is entirely self-legislating: The moral obligations by

which it is perfectly bound are those which it has imposed upon itself while simultaneously

regarding them as binding upon everyone else by virtue of their common possession of the same rational faculties. All genuinely moral action, Kant supposed, flows from the freely chosen

dictates of an autonomous will. So even the possibility of morality presupposes that human

agents have free will, and the final section of the Grounding is devoted to Kant's effort to prove that they do.

Human Freedom

As we might expect, Kant offered as proof of human freedom a transcendental

argument from the fact of moral agency to the truth of its presupposed condition of free will.

This may seem to be perfectly analogous to the use of similar arguments for synthetic a priori judgments in the First Critique, but the procedure is more viciously circular here. Having

demonstrated the supreme principle of morality by reference to autonomy, Kant can hardly now

claim to ground free will upon the supposed fact of morality. That would be to exceed the bounds of reason by employing an epistemological argument for metaphysical purposes.

Here's another way of looking at it: Each case of moral action may be said to embody its own

unique instance of the antinomy between freedom and causal determination. For in order to do the right thing, it must at least be possible for my action to have some real effect in the world,

yet I must perform it in complete independence from any external influence. Morality requires

both freedom and causality in me, and of course Kant supposes that they are. I can think of

myself from two standpoints: I operate within the phenomenal realm by participating fully in the causal regularities to which it is subject; but as a timeless thing in itself in the noumenal realm I

must be wholly free. The trick is to think of myself in both ways at once, as sensibly determined

but intelligibly free.

Kant rightly confesses at the end of the Grounding that serious contemplation of morality

leads us to the very limits of human reason. Since action in accordance with the moral law requires an autonomous will, we must suppose ourselves to be free; since the correspondence of

happiness with virtue cannot be left to mere coincidence, we must suppose that there is a god

who guarantees it; and since the moral perfection demanded by the categorical imperative

cannot be attained in this life, we must suppose ourselves to live forever. Thus god, freedom, and immortality, which we have seen to be metaphysical illusions that lie beyond the reach of

pure reason, turn out to be the three great postulates of practical reason.

Although the truth about ourselves and god as noumenal beings can never be determined with

perfect certainty, on Kant's view, we can continue to function as responsible moral agents only

by acting as if it obtains. Things could hardly have been otherwise: the lofty dignity of the moral law, like the ultimate nature of reality, is the sort of thing we cannot know but are bound to

believe.

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Morality and Peace

Kant's interest in moral matters was not exclusively theoretical. In Die Metaphysik der

Sitten(Metaphysics of Morals) (1797) he worked out the practical application of the categorical

imperative in some detail, deriving a fairly comprehensive catalog of specific rules for the

governance of social and personal morality. What each of us must actually will as universal, Kant supposed, is a very rigid system of narrowly prescribed conduct.

In Zum ewigen Frieden (On Perpetual Peace) (1795), Kant proposed a high-minded scheme for securing widespread political stability and security. If statesmen would listen to

philosophers, he argued, we could easily achieve an international federation of independent

republics, each of which reduces its standing army, declines to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and agrees to be governed by the notion of universal hospitality.

Kant's Third Critique

The final component of Kant's critical philosophy found expression in his (Kritik der

Urteilskraft(Critique of Judgment)1790). Where the first Critique had dealt with understanding

in relation to reality and the second had been concerned with practical reason in relation to action, this third Critique was meant to show that there is a systematic connection between the

two, a common feature underlying every use of synthetic a priori judgments, namely the

concept of purpose. In the last analysis, Kant supposed, it is our compulsion to find meaning and purpose in the world that impels us to accept the tenets of transcendental idealism.

In aesthetics, for example, all of our judgments about what is beautiful or sublime derive from the determination to impose an underlying form on the sensory manifold. Like

mathematics, art is concerned with the discovery or creation of unity in our experience of the

spatio-temporal world. Teleological judgments in science, theology, and morality similarly

depend upon our fundamental convictions, that operation of the universe has some deep purpose and that we are capable of comprehending it.

Kant's final word here offers an explanation of our persistent desire to transcend from the phenomenal realm to the noumenal. We must impose the forms of space and time on all we

perceive, we must suppose that the world we experience functions according to natural laws, we

must regulate our conduct by reference to a self-legislated categorical imperative, and we must postulate the noumenal reality of ourselves, god, and free will—all because a failure to do so

would be an implicit confession that the world may be meaningless, and that would be utterly

intolerable for us. Thus, Kant believed, the ultimate worth of his philosophy lay in his

willingness "to criticize reason in order to make room for faith." The nineteenth-century German philosophers who followed him quickly moved to transform his modest critical philosophy into

the monumental metaphysical system of absolute idealism.

Karl Marx

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Karl Marx (1818-1883)was born and educated in Prussia, where he fell under the

influence of Ludwig Feuerbach and other radical Hegelians. Although he shared Hegel's belief in dialectical structure and historical inevitability, Marx held that

the foundations of reality lay in the material base of economics rather than in the abstract

thought of idealistic philosophy. He earned a doctorate at Jena in 1841, writing on the

materialism and atheism of Greek atomists, then moved to Köln, where he founded and edited a radical newspaper, Rheinische Zeitung. Although he also attempted to earn a

living as a journalist in Paris and Brussels, Marx's participation in unpopular political

movements made it difficult to support his growing family. He finally settled in London in 1849, where he lived in poverty while studying and developing his economic and

political theories. Above all else, Marx believed that philosophy ought to be employed in

practice to change the world.

The core of Marx's economic analysis found early expression in the Ökonomisch-

philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (Economic and

Political Manuscripts of 1844) (1844). There, Marx argued that the conditions of modern industrial societies invariably result in the

estrangement (oralienation) of workers from their own labor. In his

review of a Bruno Baier book, On the Jewish Question (1844), Marx decried the lingering influence of religion over politics and

proposed a revolutionary re-structuring of European society. Much

later, Marx undertook a systematic explanation of his economic theories in Das Capital (Capital) (1867-95) and Theorien Über den

Mehrwert (Theory of Surplus Value) (1862).

Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels issued the Manifest der kommunistischen

Partei (Communist Manifesto) (1848) in the explicit hope of precipitating social

revolution. This work describes the class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie,

distinguishes communism from other socialist movements, proposes a list of specific social reforms, and urges all workers to unite in revolution against existing regimes. (You

may wish to compare this prophetic document with the later exposition of similar

principles in Lenin's State and Revolution (1919).)

Marx and Engels: Communism

Nineteenth-century hought about social issues took a different turn with the work of such

reformers asGodwin and Proudhon.

The most comprehensive and influential new way of thinking about social, economic, and political issues was that developed by German philosopher Karl Marx. Like Ludwig Feuerbach,

Marx belonged to a generation of German scholars who appropriated but diverged significantly

from the teachings ofHegel. Early in his own career, Marx outlined his disagreement with the master's political theories

in A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Hegel's emphasis on the

abstract achievements of Art, Religion, and Philosophy overlooked what is truly important in

human life, according to Marx. Religion in particular is nothing more than a human creation

with its own social origins and consequences: it gives expression to human suffering without offering any relief from it by disguising its genuine sources in social and economic injustice.

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Even philosophy, as an abstract discipline, is pointless unless it is transformed or actualized by

direct application to practice. Marx maintained that progress would best be founded on a proper understanding of industry

and the origins of wealth, together with a realistic view of social conflict. Struggle between

distinct economic classes, with the perpetual possibility of revolution, is the inevitable fate of European society. Specifically, Marx argued that the working-class of Germany has become the

ideal vehicle for social revolution because of the loss of humanity it has suffered as a result of

the industrialization of the German economy.

In the unfinished section on "Alienated Labor" from the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (Economic and Political Manuscripts of 1844) (1844) Marx

tried to draw out the practical consequences of the classical analysis of the creation of value

through investment of human labor. To the very extent that the process is effective, he argued, it has a devastating effect on the lives of individual human beings.

Workers create products by mixing their own labor in with natural resources to make new,

composite things that have greater economic value. Thus, the labor itself is objectified, its worth turned into an ordinary thing that can be bought and sold on the open market, a mere

commodity. The labor now exists in a form entirely external to the worker, separated forever

from the human being whose very life it once was. This is the root of what Marx

called alienation, a destructive feature of industrial life. Workers in a capitalistic economic system become trapped in a vicious circle: the harder they

work, the more resources in the natural world are appropriated for production, which leaves

fewer resources for the workers to live on, so that they have to pay for their own livelihood out of their wages, to earn which they must work even harder. When the very means of subsistence

are commodities along with labor, their is no escape for the "wage slave."

Thus, Marx pointed out, workers are alienated in several distinct ways: from their products as externalized objects existing independently of their makers; from the natural world out of which

the raw material of these products has been appropriated; from their own labor, which becomes

a grudging necessity instead of a worthwhile activity; and from each other as the consumers of

the composite products. These dire conditions, according to Marx, are the invariable consequences of industrial society.

The Communist Manifesto

Marx did not suppose the situation to be inescapable, however. Together with his

collaborator,Friedrich Engels, Marx developed not only an analysis of current conditions but also a plan for political action, together with a theory about the historical inevitability of its

success. In the Manifest der kommunistischen Partei (Communist Manifesto) (1848), Marx and

Engels presented their practical proposals for changing the world.

Social history is nothing other than a record of past struggles between distinct social classes. In the modern, industrial world, the most significant classes are the bourgeoisie, people who

own land, resources, factories, and other means of production, and the proletariat, people who

work for wages. In its efforts to succeed, the bourgeoisie must constantly revise and renew the means of production, ensuring a constant infusion of capital by building larger cities, promoting

new products, and securing cheaper commodities.

As capital increases and the means of production expand, however, the labor of the proletariat becomes ever less valuable. Alienated from themselves and each other, workers have little

political influence. Even small shopkeepers and skilled laborers are encouraged to join with the

bourgeoisie in its drive for capital, instead of expressing their natural alliance with wage

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workers. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels noted, the proletariat constitutes a majority of the

population, and the prospect of its organization for effective political action is what raised the "spectre" of Communism in industrial Europe.

Thus, Part II of the Manifesto declares the intention of communism to overthrow the

bourgeoisie and to situate all political power in the proletariat instead. This would have lots of practical consequences: Although the surplus value of capital would be undermined, individual

property interest in one's own labor would be restored, so that alienation can be avoided. Child

labor would be ended, and universal provision for education would guarantee that future

generations have greater control of their own destiny. Women would be empowered in their own right as workers, instead of being subject to domination by male bourgeois. Progressive taxation

would provide for a re-distribution of capital, and the struggle between classes would be ended.

The list of practical aims at the end of Part II is impressive, and many of its features have been implemented throughout the world during the past century-and-a-half.

The Manifesto continues with an effort to position the Communist Party favorably in relation to other social and political movements of the nineteenth century. Its conclusion is a stirring call

for political action by the great, sleeping giant of the proletariat.

Economic Details

For the rest of his life, Marx worked on a massive effort to explain and defend his economic

theories. The multi-volume work, Das Capital (Capital) (1867-95) began to appear during his lifetime, but was left unfinished at his death. More scholarly in tone than the popular Manifesto,

this grand statement of principles provided a legacy of economic theory for future generations.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language

The direction of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century was altered

not once but twice by the enigmatic Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951). By his own philosophical work and through his influence on several generations of other thinkers,

Wittgenstein transformed the nature of philosophical activity in the English-

speaking world. From two distinct approaches, he sought to show that traditional philosophical problems can be avoided entirely by application of

an appropriate methodology, one that focuses on analysis of language.

The "early" Wittgenstein worked closely with Russell and shared his conviction that the use

of mathematical logic held great promise for an understanding of the world. In the tightly-structured declarationss of theLogische-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-

Philosophicus) (1922), Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically constructed

language can (and cannot) be used to say. Its seven basic propositions simply state that language, thought, and reality share a common structure, fully expressible in logical terms.

Wittgenstein 1889 – 1951

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On Wittgenstein's view, the world consists entirely of facts. (Tractatus 1.1) Human beings are

aware of the facts by virtue of our mental representations or thoughts, which are most fruitefully understood aspicturing the way things are. (Tractatus 2.1) These thoughts are, in turn,

expressed in propostitions, whose form indicates the position of these facts within the nature of

reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth-conditions under which they correspond to that reality. (Tractatus 4) Everything that is true—that is, all the facts that constitute the

world—can in principle be expressed by atomic sentences. Imagine a comprehensive list of all

the true sentences. They would picture all of the facts there are, and this would be an adequate

representation of the world as a whole.

The tautological expressions of logic occupy a special role in this language-scheme. Because

they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally nonsense: they convey no information about what the facts truly are. But since they are true under all conditions

whatsoever, tautologies reveal the underlying structure of all language, thought, and reality.

(Tractatus 6.1) Thus, on Wittgenstein's view, the most significant logical features of the world are not themselves additional facts about it.

What cannot be said

This is the major theme of the Tractatus as a whole: since propositions merely express facts

about the world, propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value. The facts are just the

facts. Everything else, everything about which we care, everything that might render the world meaningful, must reside elsewhere. (Tractatus 6.4) A properly logical

language, Wittgenstein held, deals only with what is true. Aestheticjudgments about what is

beautiful and ethical judgments about what is good cannot even be expressed within the logical language, since they transcend what can be pictured in thought. They aren't facts. The

achievement of a wholly satisfactory description of the way things are would leave unanswered

(but also unaskable) all of the most significant questions with which traditional philosophy was

concerned. (Tractatus 6.5) Thus, even the philosophical achievements of the Tractatus itself are nothing more than

useful nonsense; once appreciated, they are themselves to be discarded. The book concludes

with the lone statement: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

(Tractatus 7) This is a stark message indeed, for it renders literally unspeakable so much of

human life. As Wittgenstein's friend and colleague Frank Ramsey put it, "What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either." It was this carefully-delineated sense of what a logical language can properly express that

influenced members of the Vienna Circle in their formulation of the principles of logical

positivism. Wittgenstein himself supposed that there was nothing left for philosophers to do. True to this conviction, he abandoned the discipline for nearly a decade.

New Directions

By the time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1928, however, he had begun to question

the truth of his earlier pronouncements. The problem with logical analysis is that it demands too much precision, both in the definition of words and in the representation of logical structure. In

ordinary language, applications of a word often bear only a "family resemblance" to each other,

and a variety of grammatical forms may be used to express the same basic thought. But under

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these conditions, Wittgenstein now realized, the hope of developing an ideal formal language

that accurately pictures the world is not only impossibly difficult but also wrong-headed. During this fertile period, Wittgenstein published nothing, but worked through his new

notions in classroom lectures. Students who witnessed these presentations tried to convey both

the style and the content in their shared notes, which were later published as The Blue and Brown Books (1958). G.E. Moore also sat in on Wittgenstein's lectures during the early thirties

and later published a summary of his own copious notes. What appears in these partial records is

the emergence of a new conception of philosophy.

The picture theory of meaning and logical atomism are untenable, Wittgenstein now maintained, and there is no reason to hope that any better versions of these basic positions will

ever come along. Claims to have achieved a correct, final analysis of language are invariably

mistaken. Since philosophical problems arise from the intellectual bewilderment induced by the misuse of language, the only way to resolve them is to use examples from ordinary language to

deflate the pretensions of traditional thought. The only legitimate role for philosophy, then, is as

a kind of therapy—a remedy for the bewitchment of human thought by philosophical language.

Careful attention to the actual usage of ordinary language should help avoid the conceptual confusions that give rise to traditional difficulties.

Language as Game

On this conception of the philosophical enterprise, the vagueness of ordinary usage is not a

problem to be eliminated but rather the source of linguistic riches. It is misleading even to attempt to fix the meaning of particular expressions by linking them referentially to things in the

world. The meaning of a word or phrase or proposition is nothing other than the set of

(informal) rules governing the use of the expression in actual life.

Like the rules of a game, Wittgenstein argued, these rules for the use of ordinary language

are neither right nor wrong, neither true nor false: they are merely useful for the particular

applications in which we apply them. The members of any community—cost accountants, college students, or rap musicians, for example—develop ways of speaking that serve their

needs as a group, and these constitute the language-game (Moore's notes refer to the "system" of

language) they employ. Human beings at large constitute a greater community within which similar, though more widely-shared, language-games get played. Although there is little to be

said in general about language as a whole, therefore, it may often be fruitful to consider in detail

the ways in which particular portions of the language are used.

Even the fundamental truths of arithmetic, Wittgenstein now supposed, are nothing more than

relatively stable ways of playing a particular language-game. This account rejects both logicist

and intuitionist views of mathematics in favor of a normative conception of its use. 2 + 3 = 5 is nothing other than a way we have collectively decided to speak and write, a handy, shared

language-game. The point once more is merely to clarify the way we use ordinary language

about numbers.

Pain and Private Language

One application of the new analytic technique that Wittgenstein himself worked out appears

in several connected sections of the posthumously-published Philosophical

Investigations (1953). In discussions of the concept of "understanding," traditional philosophers

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tended to suppose that the operation of the humanmind involves the continuous operation of an

inner or mental process of pure thinking. But Wittgenstein pointed out that if we did indeed have private inner experiences, it would be possible to represent them in a corresponding language.

On detailed examination, however, he concluded that the very notion of such aprivate

language is utterly nonsensical. If any of my experiences were entirely private, then the pain that I feel would surely be

among them. Yet other people commonly are said to know when I am in pain. Indeed,

Wittgenstein pointed out that I would never have learned the meaning of the word "pain"

without the aid of other people, none of whom have access to the supposed private sensations of pain that I feel. For the word "pain" to have any meaning at all presupposes some sort of

external verification, a set of criteria for its correct application, and they must be accessible to

others as well as to myself. Thus, the traditional way of speaking about pain needs to be abandoned altogether.

Notice that exactly the same kind of argument will work with respect to every other attempt

to speak about our supposedly inner experiences. There is no systematic way to coordinate the use of words that express sensations of any kind with the actual sensations that are supposed to

occur within myself and other agents. Wittgenstein proposed that we imagine that each human

being carries a tiny box whose contents is observed only by its owner: even if we all agree to use

the word "beetle" to refer to what is in the box, there is no way to establish a non-linguistic similarity between the contents of my own box and that of anyone else's. Just so, the use of

language for pains or other sensations can only be associated successfully with dispositions to

behave in certain ways. Pain is whatever makes someone (including me) writhe and groan.

Heidegger: Being-There (or Nothing)

German philosopher Martin Heidegger employed the methods

ofphenomenology in pursuit of more comprehensive metaphysical goals. In

Heidegger's full-fledged existentialism, the primary task of philosophy is to

understand Being itself, not merely our knowledge of it.

In the lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger developed several of his

themes in characteristically cumbersome language. The best way to exhibit the

subject-matter of first philosophy is to pursue one actual metaphysical question; since all of them are inter-connected, each inevitably leads us into all of the others. Although

traditional learning focusses on what is, Heidegger noted, it may be far more illuminating to

examine the boundaries of ordinary knowledge by trying to study what is not. What is Nothing, anyway?

It's not anything, and it's not something, yet it isn't the negation of something, either.

Traditional logic is no help, since it merely regards all negation as derivative from something

positive. So, Heidegger proposed, we must abandon logic in order to explore the character of Nothing as the background out of which everything emerges.

Carefully contemplating Nothing in itself, we begin to notice the importance and vitality of

our own moods. Above all else, Nothing is what produces in us a feeling of dread {Ger. Angst}. This deep feeling of dread, Heidegger held, is the most fundamental human clue to the nature

and reality of Nothing.

Heidegger 1889 – 1976

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Human Life as Being-There

Human beings truly exist, yet our "being-there" {Ger. Dasein} is subject to a systematic,

radical uncertainty. Because we know that we will die, concern with our annihilation is an ever-

present feature of human experience: Death is the key to Life. The only genuine question is why we are at all. Once we experience the joy[!?!] of dread, we recognize that our lives are limited—

and therefore shaped—by death.

In just the same way, Heidegger argued, so Nothing is what shapes Being generally. This reveals the most fundamental, transcendent reality, beyond all notions of what-is slipping over

into what-is-not. Even in the historical tradition, according to Heidegger, Nothing is shown to be

the concomitant rather than the opposite of Being. The only genuine philosophical question is why there is something rather than nothing.

The Ground of Metaphysics

Writing allegorically in "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," Heidegger notes

that although metaphysics is undeniably the root of all human knowledge, we may yet wonder

from what soil it springs. Since the study of beings qua beings can only be rooted in the ground of Being itself, there is a sense in which we must overcome metaphysics in order to appreciate

its basis. Looking at beings of particular sorts—especially through the distorted lens of

representational thinking—blocks every effort at profound understanding. We cannot grasp Being by looking at beings.

This was the point of Heidegger's introduction of the term Dasein. It isn't simply a synonym for "consciousness", he maintained, but indicates the vital fact that human beings—and only

human beings—truly exist, in the fullest sense, only when being-there for-themselves. Properly

understood, self-awareness leads to the authenticity of a life created out of nothing, in the face of dread, by reference only to one's own deliberate purposes.

For this process of self-creation, Time is crucial. What we are at present matters less than

what we are becoming, through the dynamic temporal process that constitutes our personal histories. There is no abstract essence of human nature; there are only individual human beings

unfolding themselves historically. In the end, this is the answer to the question of why there is

something rather than nothing.

It is only because we choose being-there.

Sartre: Existential Life

French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (21 June 1905 – 15 April 1980) focussed

more sharply on the moral consequences of existentialist thought. In literary texts as well as in philosophical treatises, Sartre emphasized the vital implications of

human subjectivity.

Sartre's 1946 lecture L'Existentialisme est un humanisme ("Existentialism is a Humanism") offers a convenient summary of his basic views. The most

fundamental doctrine of existentialism is the claim that—for human beings at

Sartre 1905 – 1980

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least—existence precedes essence. As an atheism, Sartre demands that we completely abandon

the traditional notion of human beings as the carefully designed artifacts of a divine creator. There is no abstract nature that one is destined to fill. Instead, each of us simply is in the

world; what we will be is then entirely up to us. Being human just means having the capacity to

create one's own essence in time.

But my exercise of this capacity inevitably makes me totally responsible for the life I choose.

Since I could always have chosen some other path in life, the one I follow is my own. Since

nothing has been imposed on me from outside, there are no excuses for what I am. Since the choices I make are ones I deem best, they constitute my proposal for what any human being

ought to be. On Sartre's view, the inescapable condition of human life is the requirement of

choosing something and accepting the responsibility for the consequences.

Responsibility

But accepting such total responsibility entails a profound alteration of my attitude towards

life. Sharing in the awesome business of determining the future development of humanity

generally through the particular decisions I make for myself produces an overwhelming sense of anguish. Moreover, since there is no external authority to which I can turn in an effort to

escape my duty in this regard, I am bound to feelabandonment as well. Finally, since I

repeatedly experience evidence that my own powers are inadequate to the task, I am driven

to despair. There can be no relief, no help, no hope. Human life demands total commitment to a path whose significance will always remain open to doubt.

Although this account of human life is thoroughly subjective, that does not reduce the

importance of moral judgment. Indeed, Sartre maintained that only this account does justice to the fundamental dignity and value of human life. Since all of us share in the same situation, we

must embrace our awesome freedom, deliberately rejecting any (false) promise of authoritative

moral determination. Even when we choose to seek or accept advice about what to do, we

remain ourselves responsible for choosing which advice to accept. This doesn't mean that I can do whatever I want, since free choice is never exercised

capriciously. Making a moral decision is an act of creation, like the creation of a work of art;

nothing about it is predetermined, so its value lies wholly within itself. Nor does this mean that it is impossible to make mistakes. Although there can be no objective failure to meet external

standards, an individual human being can choose badly. When that happens, it is not that I have

betrayed my abstract essence, but rather that I have failed to keep faith with myself.

Self-Deception

Sartre thoroughly expounded his notion of the self-negation of freedom in l'Être et le

néant (Being and Nothingness) (1943). Since the central feature of human existence is the

capacity to choose in full awareness of one's own non-being, it follows that the basic question is

always whether or not I will be true to myself. Self-deception invariably involves an attempt to evade responsibility for myself. If, for example, I attribute undesirable thoughts and actions to

the influence upon me of the subconscious or unconscious, I have made part of myself into an

"other" that I then suppose to control the real me. Thus, using psychological theory to distinguish between a "good I" and a "bad me" only serves to perpetuate my evasion of

responsibility and its concomitants.

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Sartre offered practical examples of mauvaise foi (bad faith) in action. People who pretend to

keep all options open while on a date by deliberately ignoring the sexual implications of their partners' behavior, for example, illustrate the perpetual tension between facticity and

transcendence. Focussing exclusively on what-we-might-become is a handy (though self-

deceptive) way of overlooking the truth about what-we-are. Similarly, servers who extravagantly "play at" performing their roles illustrate the tendency to embrace an externally-

determined essence, an artificial expectation about what we ought-to-be. But once again, of

course, the cost is losing what we uniquely are in fact.

The ability to accept ourselves for what we are—without exaggeration—is the key, since the

chief value of human life is fidelity to our selves, sincerity in the most profound sense. In our

relationships with other human beings, what we truly are is all that counts, yet it is precisely here that we most often betray ourselves by trying to be whatever the other person expects us to

be. This is invidious, on Sartre's view, since it exhibits a total lack of faith in ourselves: to the

extent that I have faith in anyone else, I reveal my lack of the courage to be myself. There are, in the end, only two choices—sincerity or self-deception, to be or not to be.

Despair

Sartre's short story "The Wall" captures his central philosophical themes in a fictional

setting. Only in the true-to-life moment of someone facing up to the immanence of his own

death will the nature of human life be revealed. Pablo fully experiences his own weakness in the face of death. But then his captors offer him

the choice of saving himself by betraying his comrade. Now he must decide whether to defend

the great cause or to live. After sweating it out, he chooses to give the authorities a phony story, knowing that it will guarantee his death. But the tables are turned when the lie turns out to be

true.

Here are all of the consequences of human responsibility: anguish over the decision,

abandonment in making it alone, and despair when it backfires. This, Sartre believed, is the character of human life.

3.2 Eastern philosophy

3.2.1The Indian philosophy

Indian philosophy has its roots in the Vedic period. The great Rishis, settled in the peaceful,

invigorating environment of the forests, meditated over the fundamental questions of existence:

What is the world? If it’s a creation, what are its constituents? Who is the creator? What is life? What is ‘truth’? What is ‘the nature of reality’?What was revealed to them was expressed in

hymns. With the passage of time, the systematized collection of these hymns constituted the

Vedas and the Upanishads. Indian philosophy distinctly exhibits a spiritual bent. The essence of

religion is not dogmatic in India. Here, religion develops as philosophy progressively scales higher planes.

Some of the fundamentals expressed in the Indian philosophy and the Western philosophy may be similar. However, Indian philosophy differs from the Western philosophy on several

counts. While the Western philosophy deals with metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, ethics

etc. separately, Indian philosophy takes a comprehensive view of all these topics.For an Indian

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philosopher, philosophy is something beyond an intellectual pursuit. The Indian philosopher

exemplifies philosophy in his life. His intelligence, knowledge and wisdom are reflected in his life. This is why his life positively influences the life of masses.

The most obvious problem with this system was that under its rigidity, the lower castes were prevented from aspiring to climb higher, and, therefore, economic progress was

restricted. It is believed by the Western scholars that the Aryans descended from the regions

of the North-Central Asia sometime around 1500 B.C., though this has been challenged by

some other learned scholars. Some of the eminent Indian scholars also differ from their Western counterparts, saying that the Aryans were natives of India for long and that the

Vedic civilization developed about 4000 to 8000 years ago. The renowned Indian scholar

contends that the first Vedic hymns could have been composed nearly 6000 years ago and the later works like the Upanishads themselves could be nearly 3000 years old. The

philosophies of Hinduism develop over long spells of time. It is difficult for the historians to

ascertain the period for the development of a particular Indian philosophy.However, we can safely outline the history of Indian philosophies, as per Dr. Radhakrishnan, as follows:

(1) The Vedic period (1500 B.C. to 600 B.C.)

(2) The Epic period (600 B.C. to 200 A.D.) (3) The Sutra period (200 A.D. to 1700 A.D.)

(4) The Scholastic period ( From Sutra Period to 17th century )

(1) The Vedic Period: This period can be regarded as the dawn of civilization in the world. It witnessed the real transformation of man from a prakrit man to a Sanskrit man. The Vedic

period covers the rise and the development of the Aryan culture and civilization. The literature

of the Vedic period is considered to be the most ancient in the world. It consists of the four Vedas, namely, Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sama Veda and Atharva Veda. Each of the Vedas is

divided into four parts: The Samhitas (the Mantras) , the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the

Upanishads. In this peried Hinduism was devided in to three themes; 1.1 Polytheism

Polytheism is the worship or belief in multiple deities usually assembled into a pantheon

of gods and goddesses, along with their own religions and rituals. Polytheism was the typical

form of religion during the Bronze Age and Iron Age, up to the Axial Age. There are many gods and goddess in Vedas, such as Savitri or Sun god,Varuna or rain god, Indra the creator,

Yama or the god of death.

1.2 Henotheism Henotheism is the belief and worship of a single god while accepting the existence or

possible existence of other deities that may also be worshipped. The Rigveda was the basis

for Max Müller's description of henotheism in the sense of a polytheistic tradition striving towards a formulation of The One (ekam) Divinity aimed at by the worship of different

cosmic principles. Hinduism later developed the concept of Brahman implies a transcendent

and immanent reality, Brahman, which different schools of thought variously interpret as

personal, impersonal or transpersonal. 1.3Monotheism

Monotheism is belief in the existence of one god or in the oneness of God. This advanced

period of theistic view on Hinduism stress on single absolute being or God called as Brahman. Firstly this Brahman was considered as personal deity but later on it became

transcendental being who is the first cause or creator of everything.

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(2) The Epic Period: It is the period of the development of the early Upanishads and the

darshanas and is concerned with the enriching of intellect of man. The darshanas paved the way for the growth of the systems of philosophies in India. The invaluable dharma -shastras,

the great treatises on ethical and social philosophy, are the gifts of this period. Apart from the

extra-ordinary philosophical doctrines, the “non-systemic and the non-technical” literature appeared in this age. The great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata are the gifts of this period.

The period is very significant because it witnessed the rise and early development of

Shaivism and Vaishnavism as well as that of Jainism and Buddhism. The Jainism and the

Buddhism are considered as heterodox religious philosophies as they do not endorse the authority of the Vedas.

(3) The Sutra Period: Over a period of time, the Vedic literature and the subsequent works grew to a massive scale. The great scholars made efforts to safeguard the rich heritage. That

is how the illustrious Sutras were written. The Sutras are, mostly, epigrammatic sentences in

the verse-form. They helped to preserve and transmit the treasure of philosophies expressed in the voluminous ancient works. Badarayana (Veda Vyasa), one of the greatest scholars,

wrote Brahma-Sutra, also known as Vedanta-Sutra. The Sutras laid the foundation of the

different systems of philosophies in India. The six orthodox systems based on the Sutras are

Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa and Uttar-Mimamsa.

(4) The Scholastic Period: This period coinciding with the Sutra period, witnessed the

distinguished scholars like Shamkaracharya, Kumarila, Madhavacharya, Ramanujacharya, Sridhara and others. With the passage of time, the ancient literature became nearly

incomprehensible. The Vedas, expressed in the Chandas, the old form of Sanskrit, became

difficult to follow. Even the interpretation of the Sutras posed challenges to the learned scholars. Hence the scholars wrote commentaries on the ancient literature in general and on

the Sutras in particular. Then a number of commentaries were written. Very often a

commentary was written on the original commentary or on an earlier one. Various scholars wrote commentaries on Brahma-Sutra according to their own interpretation. Chief among

them were Shamkaracharya, Ramanujacharya and Madhavacharya. Incidentally, three

schools of Vedanta were developed: Shamkaracharya’s Advaita Vedanta, Ramanujacharya’s

Vishishtadvaita Vedanta and Madhavacharya’s Dvaita Vedanta.

Systems of Indian Philosophy

The Vedas are the oldest scriptures in the world. The Indian philosophical systems are

classified according as they accept the authority of the Vedas or not. The systems of Indian

philosophy are classified into two groups: (1) The Orthodox Systems called as ‘Astika’

(2) The Unorthodox Systems called as ‘Nastika’

The orthodox systems are: Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa, and Uttar-Mimamsa.The unorthodox systems are: Charvakism, Jainism and Buddhism. The

orthodox systems uphold the supremacy of the Vedas. The unorthodox systems reject the

authority of the Vedas. Truly speaking Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya and Yoga are neither orthodox nor unorthodox. These four systems, while originating, neither accepted nor rejected

the Vedas. The orthodox systems form pairs as follows: Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Yoga-Samkhya,

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Mimamsa-Vedanta. In each of the pairs, the first system is concerned with the practice and the

second system focuses on the theoretical aspects.

Gautama is founder of Nyaya, Kanada for Vaisheshika, Patanjali for Yoga, Kapila for

Samkhya, Jaimini for Purva-Mimamsa and Shamkara for Uttar-Mimamsa. Charvakism is believed to have been promoted by Charvaka. Vardhamana Mahavira is acknowledged as the

founder of Jainism and Gautama Buddha as the founder of Buddhism.

The common characteristics in Indian Philosophies:

The systems of Indian philosophies, with a singular exception of Charvakism, have certain

common characteristics. Charvakism remarkably differs from other systems as it promotes materialism. The following characteristics are common to all other systems:

(1) All the schools emphasize that the philosophy must have a positive impact on life of man. The schools have a general agreement on the importance of the Purushartha. All the schools

agree that the philosophy should help man in realizing the main ends of human life, i.e. artha,

kama, dharma and moksha. All the systems reflect that the philosophy should lead a man from darkness and ignorance to light and knowledge. In this aspect Indian philosophy is a

kind of the search of perfect life, therefore philosophy is religion. There is a general

agreement on man’s essential spirituality. Therefore Indian tradition of thought is philosophy

of life.

(2) There is a general agreement among the systems that the truth and reality should be

verifiable. They should be substantiated with reasoning and experience. An experience may be sensory, conceptual or intuitional. All concerns are involved with consciousness,

originated by consciousness therefore the mentality is the core essence of Dhamrma or truth.

(3) It is accepted by all the schools that man’s suffering results from his ignorance. Man can

conquer ignorance and attain total freedom (moksha) in this bodily existence. In this sense

Indian philosophy is considered as ‘pessimism’ for the West thinkers.

Indian Philosophy (or, in Sankrit, Darshanas), refers to any of several traditions of

philosophical thought that originated in the Indian subcontinent, including Hindu

philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Jain philosophy (see below for brief introductions to these schools). It is considered by Indian thinkers to be a practical discipline, and its goal

should always be to improve human life.

Orthodox (Hindu) Schools

The main Hindu orthodox (astika) schools of Indian philosophy are those codified during the medieval period of Brahmanic-Sanskritic scholasticism, and they take the ancient Vedas (the

oldest sacred texts of Hinduism) as their source and scriptural authority:

Samkhya:

Samkhya is the oldest of the orthodox philosophical systems, and it postulates that everything in reality stems frompurusha (self or soul or mind) and prakriti (matter, creative

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agency, energy). It is a dualist philosophy, although between the self and matter rather than

between mind and body as in the Western dualist tradition, and liberation occurs with the realization that the soul and the dispositions of matter (steadiness, activity and dullness) are

different. An eminent, great sage Kapila was the founder of the Samkhya School.

Based on the Upanishads, two schools of philosophy developed in India: (1) The realistic (e.g. Samkhya) (2) The idealistic (e.g.Vedanta). The Samkhya philosophy combines the basic

doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga. However it should be remembered that the Samkhya represents

the theory and Yoga represents the application or the practical aspects.

The word Samkhya is based upon the Sanskrit word samkhya which means ‘number’. The school specifies the number and nature of the ultimate constituents of the universe and

thereby imparts knowledge of reality. In fact, the term Samkhya also means perfect knowledge.

Hence it is a system of perfect knowledge. Samkhya is dualistic realism. It is dualistic because it advocates two ultimate realities:

Prakriti, matter and Purusha, self (spirit). According to Samkhya the cause is always subtler than

the effect. The Samkhya theory argues: How can so gross atoms of matter can be the cause of such subtle and fine objects as mind and intellect? The Samkhya proposes that some finest and

subtlest stuff or principle underlies all physical existence. Samkhya names it as Prakriti. Prakriti

is the primordial substance behind the world. It is the material cause of the world. Prakriti is the

first and ultimate cause of all gross and subtle objects. Prakriti is the non-self. It is devoid of consciousness Prakriti is unintelligible and gets greatly influenced by the Purusha, the self. It

can only manifest itself as the various objects of experience of the Purusha.it is constituted of

three gunas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas. The term guna, in ordinary sense means quality or nature. But here, it is to be understood in the sense of constituent (component) in Samkhya.

Sattva is concerned with happiness. While rajas is concerned with action, tamas is associated

with ignorance and inaction.

There are two views on the theory of causation in the Indian philosophy:

(1) Satkaryavada(pre-existence of the effect in the cause): It maintains that karya (effect) is sat

or real. It is present in the karana (cause) in a potential form, even before its manifestation.

(2) Asatkaryavada (non-existence of the effect in the cause): It maintains that karya (effect) is asat or unreal until it comes into being. Every effect, then, is a new beginning and is not born

out of cause. Charvakism and Nyaya -Vaisheshika systems favour asatkaryavada. The Samkhya

as well as the Vedanta uphold the satkaryavada but their interpretations are different.

There are two different interpretations of satkaryavada – Prakriti -parinamavada and

Brahma-vivartavada. In accordance with the satkaryavada, the Samkhya maintains that the three gunas of Prakriti are also associated with all the world-objects. Prakriti is the primordial and

ultimate cause of all physical existence. Naturally the three gunas which constitute Prakriti also

constitute every object of the physical world. Prakriti is never static. Even before evolution, the

gunas are relentlessly changing and balancing each other. As a result, Prakriti and all the physical objects that are affected or produced by Prakriti, are also in a state of constant change

and transformation. This is further confirmed by the scientists today. It is now proved beyond

doubt that ultra-minute particles of objects – like electrons – are in a state of incessant motion and transformation.

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According to Samkhya, the efficient cause of the world is Purusha and the material cause is the

Prakriti. Here Purusha stands for the ‘Supreme spirit’ and Prakriti stands for ‘matter’. Purusha (spirit) is the first principle of Samkhya. Prakriti is the second, the material principle of

Samkhya. Purusha is neither produced nor does it produce. Prakriti is not produced but it

produces. Prakriti is uncaused. It is eternal. It itself is not produced but it has inherent potential or tendency to produce.Purusha(like the Brahmanof Vedanta) is the Transcendental Self. It is

absolute, independent, free, imperceptible, unknowable, above any experience and beyond any

words or explanation. It remains pure, “nonattributive consciousness ”.

In evolution, Prakriti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is

followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle

back into Prakriti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other. this evolution results in 23 different

categories of objects. They comprise of three elements of Antahkaranas or the internal organs

as well as the ten Bahyakaranas or the external organs.

Among all these, the first to evolve is Mahat(the great one). Mahat evolves as a result of

preponderance of sattva. Since it is an evolute of Prakriti, it is made of matter. But it has

psychological, intellectual aspect known as buddhi or intellect. Mahat or intellect is a unique faculty of human beings. It helps man in judgment and discrimination. Mahat helps to

distinguish between the subject and the object. Man comes to understand the self and the non-

self, the experiencer and the experienced as distinct entities with Mahat. Mahat, by its inherent association with sattva, possesses qualities like luminosity and reflectivity. Buddhi can reflect

Purusha owing to these qualities.

The second evolution is ahamkara (ego). It arises out of the cosmic nature of Mahat. Ahamkara

is the self-sense. It is concerned with the self-identity and it brings about awareness of “I” and

“mine”. The five subtle elements are also called tanmatras. These five subtle elements or tanmatras are: elemental sound, elemental touch, elemental colour, elemental taste and elemental

smell. They are shabda, sparsha, rupa, rasa and gandha respectively. The gross elements arise as

a result of combination of the subtle elements. The five gross elements are space or ether

(akasa), water, air, fire and earth.

It should be noted here that the manas or the mind is different from Mahat or the buddhi. Manas

or the mind in co-ordination with the sense-organs, receives impressions from the external world, transforms them into determinate perceptions and conveys them to the experiencer or the

ego. Thus manas is produced and is capable of producing also. But though Mahat is produced, it

can not produce. As we have seen ahamkara produces both the subtle and the gross elements. These gross elements are produced by various combinations of subtle elements. For example

shabda produces akasha (space) while shabda and sparsha together produce marut (air). Rupa

produces teja (fire). Shabda, sparsha, rupa and rasa together form ap (water). All five elements

combine to produce kshiti (the earth). The five gross elements combine in different ways to form all gross objects. All the gross elements and the gross objects in the world are perceivable.

Samkhya and the Theory of Knowledge

Samkhya accepts three sources of valid knowledge: Perception, inference and testimony.

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According to Samkhya, the manas(mind), the Mahat (intellect = buddhi) and the purusha play a

role in ‘producing’ knowledge. When the sense-organs come in contact with an object, the sensations and impressions reach the manas. The manas processes these impressions into proper

forms and converts them into determinate percepts. These percepts are carried to the Mahat. By

its own applications, Mahat gets modified. Mahat takes the form of the particular object. This transformation of Mahat is known as vritti or modification of buddhi. But still the process of

knowledge is not completed. Mahat is a physical entity. It lacks consciousness so it can not

generate knowledge on its own. However, it can reflect the consciousness of the Purusha(self).

Illumined by the consciousness of the reflected self, the unconscious Mahat becomes conscious of the form into which it is modified (i.e. of the form of the object). This is better explained by

an illustration. The mirror cannot produce an image on its own. The mirror needs light to reflect

and produce the image and thereby reveal the object. Similarly, Mahat needs the ‘light’ of the consciousness of the Purusha to produce knowledge.

Samkhya cites out two types of perceptions: Indeterminate (nirvikalpa) perceptions and determinate (savikalpa) perceptions. Indeterminate perceptions are sort of pure sensations or

crude impressions. They reveal no knowledge of the form or the name of the object. There is

vague awareness about an object. There is cognition, but no recognition. An infant’s initial

experiences are full of confusion. There is a lot of sense-data, but there are improper or inadequate means to process them. Hence they can neither be differentiated nor be labeled.

Most of them are indeterminate perceptions.

Determinate perceptions are the mature state of perceptions which have been processed and

differentiated appropriately. Once the sensations have been processed, categorized and

interpreted properly, they become determinate perceptions. They can lead to identification and also generate knowledge.

Bondage and Salvation

Like other major systems of Indian philosophy, Samkhya regards ignorance as the root cause

of bondage and suffering. According to Samkhya, the self is eternal, pure consciousness. Due

to ignorance, the self identifies itself with the physical body and its constituents - Manas, ahamkara and Mahat, which are products of Prakriti. Once the self becomes free of this false

identification and the material bonds, the salvation is possible.

Yoga: The Yoga school, as expounded by Patanjali in his 2nd Century B.C. Yoga Sutras,

accepts the Samkhya psychology and metaphysics, but is more theistic, with the addition of a divine entity to Samkhya's twenty-five elements of reality. The relatively brief Yoga

Sutras are divided into eight ashtanga (limbs), reminiscent of Buddhism's Noble

Eightfold Path, the goal being to quiet one's mind and achieve kaivalya (solitariness or detachment).

Patanjali was the proponent of the Yoga system. Yoga is closely associated with Samkhya.

Yoga is largely based on the Samkhya philosophy. They are two sides of the same coin. Samkhya is the theory, Yoga is the practice. It should be noted, however, that Samkhya is

basically an atheistic system, but Yoga is theistic.

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Patanjali propagated his philosophy of Yoga in his great work – Yoga-Sutra. Yoga-Sutra

consists of four parts. While Samkhya uses three terms - Mahat, ahamkara and manas - to refer to antahkarana, Yoga has only one word – Chitta. Yoga adopts a single term, chitta, to refer to a

complex of Mahat, ahamkara and manas.

Chitta is considered as being composed of intellect, ego and mind. Chitta has a predominance of

sattva guna.Patanjali shows the way to emancipation by ashtanga-yoga. Yoga is a self-

disciplining process of concentration and meditation. Such a Yogic practice leads one to higher

states of consciousness. This helps one in acquiring direct knowledge and the result is Self–Realization.

Patanjali lays emphasis on the complete control and mastery of chitta. He proposes the practice of certain physical and mental exercises. They form the basis of ashtanga–yoga.

Ashtanga–yoga comprises of eight anga (steps):

yama, niyama, asana, pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhi.

These eight steps are divided into two parts:

External part of five anga: yama, niyama, asana, pranayama and pratyahara.

Internal part of three anga: dharana, dhyana and samadhi.

Yama means restraint. One must turn to ethics by refraining himself from immoral activities.

This is the first step towards self–discipline. Niyama means observance. It refers to the cultivation of values and virtues in life. These two anga –Yama and Niyama – protects the

aspirant from irresistible temptations and desires and offer a protection from the distractions.

The next two steps, asana and pranayama, prepares the physical body for the Yogic practice.

Asana means posture of the body. A steady but comfortable posture is essential for Yoga.

Pranayama is concerned with the control of breath. The cycles of inspiration, kumbhaka and expiration have to be carefully monitored. Both these anga enhances the steadiness of the body

and mind.

Pratyahara is concerned with the withdrawal of the senses. The senses, by their inherent nature,

remain focused on the external world. Pratyahara helps to detach the sense organs from the

objects of the world. The isolation from the world objects facilitates the concentration of the mind on any particular object.

The ultimate three steps are: dharana (concentration), dhyana (meditation) and Samadhi

(spiritual absorption).

Dharana is concerned with the concentration. It is concerned with concentrating the chitta on a

single object. The subject is focusing on an object. If the mind diverts to some other object, it has to be fixed again on the chosen object of concentration.

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Dhyana is concerned with contemplation. In this stage, the aspirant can keep the mind steady on

the object chosen for contemplation. The mind is focused without interruptions and there is unidirectional flow of chitta. Though the mind is steadfast, yet there is awareness of the mind of

the self. There is an observer; there is also the one that is being observed.

Samadhi is the ultimate stage of Yogic practice. Now all self-awareness of the mind disappears.

The aspirant (seeker) becomes aware that his attachment to the Prakriti was owing to the

ignorance (avidya). The illusion is gone. This is the ultimate, nirbeej Samadhi. There is the

unification of the subject and the object. Now there is no object at all. The duo, the subject and the object, mingles into unity. They are no separate entities. There is only one, but it is not an

object. There is oneness devoid of material existence; it is pure Consciousness.

Samkhya system is based on atheism but Yoga believes in God. Both Yoga and Samkhya holds

that there are many purushas. Unlike Samkhya, Yoga holds that there is one Supreme Purusha

(God) who is above all purushas and that no other Purusha can be like that Supreme Purusha. This Supreme Purusha does not create the Prakriti or other purushas.

Nyaya:

The Nyaya school is based on the Nyaya Sutras, written by Aksapada Gautama in the 2nd

Century B.C. Its methodology is based on a system of logic that has subsequently been adopted

by the majority of the Indian schools, in much the same way as Aristotelian logic has influenced Western philosophy. Its followers believe that obtaining valid knowledge(the four sources of

which are perception, inference, comparison and testimony) is the only way to gain release

from suffering. Nyaya developed several criteria by which the knowledge thus obtained was to be considered valid or invalid(equivalent in some ways to Western analytic philosophy).

Nyaya accepts the basic philosophy of Vaisheshika system. It can be said that the Vaisheshika system is theory, Nyaya is the practice.

Nyaya recognizes god but Gautama does not deal with the problem of existence of god in any detail.

Like the Vaisheshika, Nyaya holds that the self is an individual substance, eternal and all

pervading. Consciousness is not an essential attribute of the self, but it is only an accidental one. According to Nyaya, salvation is the state of absolute freedom. It is freedom from all pains

and pleasures. Then there is freedom from the cycle of the birth and death also.

Vaisheshika:

The Vaisheshika school was founded by Kanada in the 6th Century B.C., and it is atomist and pluralist in nature. The basis of the school's philosophy is that all objects in the

physical universe are reducible to a finite number of atoms, andBrahman is regarded as the

fundamental force that causes consciousness in these atoms. The Vaisheshika and Nyaya schools eventually merged because of their closely related metaphysical theories (although

Vaisheshika only acceptedperception and inference as sources of valid knowledge).

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Dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma(action), samanya(universal), vishesha (particular),

amavaya(inherence) and abhava (non-existence).

Vaisheshika contends that every effect is a fresh creation or a new beginning. Thus this system

refutes the theory of pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Kanada does not discuss much on

God. But the later commentators refer to God as the Supreme Soul, perfect and eternal. This

system accepts that God (Ishvara ) is the efficient cause of the world. The eternal atoms are the

material cause of the world.

Vaisheshika recognizes nine ultimate substances : Five material and four non-material

substances. The five material substances are: Earth, water, fire, air and akasha.The four non-

material substances are: space, time, soul and mind. Earth, water, fire and air are atomic but

akasha is non-atomic and infinite. Space and time are infinite and eternal. The concept of soul is

comparable to that of the self or atman. This system considers consciousness as an accidental

property. In other words, when the soul associates itself to the body, only then it ‘acquires’

consciousness. Thus, consciousness is not considered an essential quality of the soul.

The mind (manas) is accepted as atomic but indivisible and eternal substance. The mind helps to

establish the contact of the self to the external world objects.

The soul develops attachment to the body owing to ignorance. The soul identifies itself with the

body and mind. The soul is trapped in the bondage of karma, as a consequence of actions

resulted from countless desires and passions. It can be free from the bondage only if it becomes

free from actions. Liberation follows the cessation of the actions.

Purva Mimamsa:

The main objective of the Purva Mimamsa school is to interpret and establish the

authority of the Vedas. It requires unquestionable faith in the Vedas and the regular

performance of the Vedic fire-sacrifices to sustain all the activity of the universe. Although in

general the Mimamsa accept the logical and philosophical teachings of the other schools, they insist that salvation can only be attained by acting in accordance with the prescriptions of the

Vedas. The school later shifted its views and began to teach the doctrines

of Brahman and freedom, allowing for the release or escape of the soul from its constraints through enlightened activity.

The first major orthodox philosophical system to develop was Purva Mimamsa. The other one to follow was the Uttar Mimamsa. The orthodox systems accept the authority of the Vedas.

The Sanskrit word 'mimamsa means a ‘revered thought’. The word is originated from the root ‘man’ which refers to ‘thinking’ or ‘investigating’. The word 'mimamsa' suggests "probing and

acquiring knowledge" or "critical review and investigation of the Vedas".

Each of the Vedas is considered to be composed of four parts: The Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. The first two parts are generally focused on the rituals and they

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form the Karma-kanda portion of the Vedas. The later two parts form the Jnana-kanda

(concerned with knowledge) portion of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is based on the earlier (Purva = earlier) parts of the Vedas.

Uttar-Mimamsa is based on the later (Uttar = later) parts of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is also known as Karma Mimamsa since it deals with the Karmic actions of rituals and sacrifices. Uttar-Mimamsa is also known as Brahman Mimamsa since it is concerned

with the knowledge of Reality. In popular terms, Purva-Mimamsa is known simply as

Mimamsa and Uttar-Mimamsa as Vedanta.

Jaimini is credited as the chief proponent of the Mimamsa system. His glorious work is

Mimamsa-Sutra written around the end of the 2nd century A.D. Mimamsa-Sutra is the largest

of all the philosophical Sutras. Divided into 12 chapters, it is a collection of nearly 2500 aphorisms which are extremely difficult to comprehend.

Earlier scholars wrote commentaries on Mimamsa-Sutra. Unfortunately they are lost with the passage of time. The earliest available commentary is Sabarasvamin’s Sabara-bhasya, which is

still the authoritative basis of all subsequent works on Mimamsa. Renowned scholars Kumarila

Bhatta and Prabhakara independently wrote their commentaries on Sabara-bhasya. Prabhakara

was a student of Kumarila Bhatta. However, they differed, to some degree, on the interpretation of Sabara-bhasya and wrote separate commentaries. (Mandan Mishra, the erudite scholar, was

a follower of Kumarila Bhatta. He also wrote a commentary, but at a later stage he changed his

thinking and became a disciple of Shamkaracharya.)

This system out rightly accept the Vedas as the eternal source of ‘revealed truth.’ Thus though it

differs from the earlier four philosophical systems (Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya, Yoga which neither accept nor reject the authority of the Vedas), a great chunk of Mimamsa philosophy is

derived from the Vaisheshika-Nyaya duo.

Mimamsa system attaches a lot of importance to the Verbal testimony which is essentially the

Vedic testimony. Jaimini accepts the ‘Word” or the ‘Shabda’ as the only means of knowledge.

The ‘word’ or the ‘Shabda’ is necessarily the Vedic word, according to Jaimini. This system

strongly contends that the Vedas are not authored by an individual. Since they are ‘self-revealed’ or ‘apaurusheya’, they manifest their own validity.

The system is a pluralistic realist. It endorses the reality of the world as well as that of the individual souls. The soul is accepted as an eternal and infinite substance. Consciousness is an

accidental attribute of the soul. The soul is distinct from the body, the senses and the mind.

Though Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara differ on issues like the self, the soul and it attribute. The earlier mimamsakas do not give much importance to the deities. Hence they do not endorse

God as the creator of the universe. But later mimamsakas show a bent towards theism.

This system has a profound faith in the Vedas. The system supports the law of karma. It

believes in the Unseen Power or ‘apurva’. Apart from accepting the heaven and the hell, the

system supports the theory of liberation.

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Vedanta:

The Vedanta, or Uttara Mimamsa, school concentrates on the philosophical teachings of the Upanishads (mystic or spiritual contemplations within the Vedas), rather than

the Brahmanas (instructions for ritual and sacrifice). The Vedanta focus on meditation, self-discipline and spiritual connectivity, more than traditional ritualism. Due to the rather cryptic

and poetic nature of the Vedanta sutras, the school separated into six sub-schools, each

interpreting the texts in its own way and producing its own series of sub-

commentaries: Advaita (the best-known, which holds that the soul and Brahman are one and the same), Visishtadvaita (which teaches that the Supreme Being has a definite form, name -

Vishnu - and attributes), Dvaita (which espouses a belief in three separate realities: Vishnu, and

eternal soul and matter), Dvaitadvaita(which holds that Brahman exists independently, while soul and matter are dependent), Shuddhadvaita (which believes that Krishna is the absolute

form of Brahman) and Acintya Bheda Abheda (which combines monism and dualism by

stating that the soul is both distinct and non-distinct from Krishna, or God).

The Advaita Vedanta focuses on the following basic concepts:

(1) Brahman is the Ultimate, Supreme Reality. Brahman is eternal. Brahman is beyond

words. It is beyond names and forms. Brahman can not be perceived nor could it be described

by words. It is beyond senses and intellect. It is indefinable. However, if at all it has to be

described; Brahman can be considered as Pure Consciousness.

In Vedanta philosophy, the svaroop of Brahman is referred to as Sachchidananda. Brahman is

Sachchidananda i.e. Sat-Chitta-Ananda(Pure Existence-Pure Consciousness-Pure Bliss). Brahman is eternal, immutable, inexpressible and unthinkable pure-existence, but it is not the

cause or the creator of the universe.

(2) Atman is the inmost Self or Spirit of man but different from the ‘empirical ego’. Atman

is the fundamental, ultimate, eternal, immutable pure consciousness. Thus, it appears that

Brahman is the ultimate reality behind all world-objects and Atman is pure spirit in all beings. Truly speaking, both Brahman and Atman are not different realities. They are identical. For

practical purposes, they are referred to separately, which they are not. They are the eternal, all-

pervading realities underlying all existence. They are two different ‘labels’ for one and the same

reality behind all the objects, all matter, all beings of the universe.

(3) Maya is the unique power (shakti) of Brahman. Maya is trigunatmika; it has three gunas

or attributes. But Shuddha Brahman is nirguna and is free from attributes. Shuddha Nirguna Brahman alone is the Supreme Reality. When Nirguna Brahman comes to acquiesce Maya and

acknowledges the gunas of maya, it is known as Saguna Brahman. Saguna Brahman is God, the

creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. Saguna Brahman is Ishvara or a ‘personal god.’ Man worships gods in different forms and names.

(4) Brahman manifests itself in the world with the help of Maya. The world and the world

objects come into existence due to the power of maya. Maya and its creation is termed illusory. It does not mean that the world is not real. Unreality and illusion are different. An illusion may

not be an unreality for an illusion is grounded in reality. Reality is that which exists on its own.

Maya is dependent on Brahman. Maya has created the world of appearances. So the world is

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illusion. But this does not mean at all that the world is non-existent. The AdvaitaVedanta, with

the help of the famous “rope–snake” illustration, maintains that ‘it is neither ultimately real, nor wholly unreal, illusory and non existent.’

(5) Avidya (ignorance) has its seat in the human intellect. Avidya means not only absence of knowledge, but also erroneous knowledge. A man trapped in Avidya does not know what is real

and thinks that the appearances are real. An individual identifies himself with empirical self. He

equates his existence with the physical body. Under the influence of Maya and Avidya, he

dissociates himself from the Ultimate Reality. When the man acquires knowledge, the duality of the self and Brahman disappears. He realizes that the self is really one with Brahman. This

realization of the self puts an end to the ignorance (avidya).

(6) Moksha is freedom from bondage of ignorance. Man suffers in the grip of incessant

desires and ignorance. Upon realization of the self, one becomes free from the shackles of

desires, aspirations, passions, karma and avidya. This is Moksha (kaivalya) or liberation. Moksha is to be attained here and now during this life-span only.

(7) Knowledge and truth are of two kinds: the lower one and the higher one. The lower, conventional knowledge and truth is referred to as vyavavahrika satya. It is a product of the

senses and the intellect. The higher one is referred to the paramarthika satya. It is absolute. It is

beyond words, thoughts, perception or conception. It is in no way, related to the senses and the

intellect. It is non-perceptual and non-conceptual. It is a product of sublime intuition and "divine vision". The higher knowledge and truth brings about radical transformation in an

individual so it is soteriological.

(8) Advaita Vedanta recognizes the six pramanas (sources and criteria of valid knowledge)

on the basis of the Mimamsa school of Kumarila Bhatta. They are as follows:

(1) Perception (pratyaksha) (2) Inference (anumana) (3) Testimony(shabda) (4) Comparison

(upamana) (5) Postulation (arthapatti) (6) Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)

Heterodox (Non-Hindu) Schools

The main heterodox (nastika) schools, which do not accept the authority of the Vedas, include:

Carvaka:

Also known as Lokayata, Carvaka is a materialistic, sceptical and atheistic school of thought. Its founder was Carvaka, author of the Barhaspatya Sutras in the final centuries B.C.,

although the original texts have been lost and our understanding of them is based largely

on criticism of the ideas by other schools. As early as the 5th Century,Saddaniti and Buddhaghosa connected the Lokayatas with the Vitandas (or Sophists),

and the term Carvaka was first recorded in the 7th Century by the philosopher Purandara, and

in the 8th Century by Kamalasila and Haribhadra. As a vital philosophical school, Carvara appears to have died out some time in the 15th Century.

Like other schools of philosophy, Charvakism explores the sources and validity of man’s

knowledge of reality. The Charvaka materialists validate ‘Pratyaksa’ (perception) as the sole

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source and criterion of knowledge. For the materialist, the sense perception (pratyaksa) is the

only acceptable source and hence they rule out ‘inference’ and ‘testimony’ as the source and criterion of knowledge. The materialists emphasize that what you perceive with your senses

alone is true. They challenge the inference as the source or criterion of knowledge. They argue,

“The man you have encountered are mortal. May be, yes. But how can you say that all men in the past, present and future are mortal?” They contend that limited, perceived instances cannot

lead to unrestricted universal generalizations.

The materialists hold that matter is the only reality. They straight away reject gods and souls, as they are beyond perceptual experience. They also regard heaven and hell as non-

existent as they are not perceivable. For the Charvakas, matter has always existed and will

always exist. Matter is both the material and efficient cause of the universe. Hedonism seems to be a feature of Charvakism. However not all followers seem to endorse them. Many of them

acknowledge the importance of society, law and order.

Buddhist philosophy:

Buddhism is a non-theistic system of beliefs based on the teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, an Indian prince later known as the Buddha, in the 5th Century B.C. The question of

God is largely irrelevant in Buddhism, and it is mainly founded on the rejection of certain

orthodox Hindu philosophical concepts (althought it does share some philosophical views with

Hinduism, such as belief in karma). Buddhism advocates a Noble Eightfold Path to end suffering, and its philosophical principles are known as the Four Noble Truths (the Nature of

Suffering, the Origin of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Path Leading to the

Cessation of Suffering). Buddhist philosophy deals extensively with problems in metaphysics, phenomenology, ethics and epistemology.

Gautama Buddha (563 B.C.– 483 B.C.) was the founder of Buddhism.

Buddhism gives importance to the impermanence of existence and the sufferings associated with

it. All existence, animate or animate, being in a state of flux, undergoes changes incessantly. Nothing is permanent. Existence is the source of all suffering. Life is suffering. The

impermanence itself is the greatest dukha. Ignorance leads to sufferings and bondage. Karma is

born out of ignorance. Karmic impressions are carried from this birth to the next birth. This

means that the present conditions of life are the results of the past karma. Every thought, word or action of the past existence has a bearing on the present existence.

The most ‘striking’ feature of Buddhism is the doctrine of non-self (Anatta). In a glaring and sharp contrast to the major philosophies, the Buddhism does not accept the permanent entity

such as ‘soul’ or the ‘atman’. It maintains that there is no permanent and enduring entity in man.

There is no distinct entity as the self or the soul. Buddhism advances the theory of Nirvana. Nirvana is a state of total freedom and no sufferings. With perfect knowledge, perfect peace and

perfect wisdom, man is free from all bondage in a state of Nirvana.

Lord Buddha has presented four Noble Truths:

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(1) Existence is invariably associated with suffering. (2) Every suffering (dukha) has a cause. (3)

Suffering can be eliminated if the cause is eliminated. (4) There is a path to Nirvana which puts an end to all sufferings.

The eight-fold path to Nirvana suggested by the Buddha is: (1) Right views (2) Right resolve (3) Right speech (4) Right conduct (5) Right livelihood (6) Right effort (7) Right

mindfulness (8) Right concentration.

Buddhism is divided into two sects: Mahayana and Hinayana. Mahayana literature is written in Sanskrit and Hinayana literature is written in Pali.

Jain philosophy

The central tenets of Jain philosophy were established by Mahavira in the 6th

Century B.C., although Jainism as a religion is much older. A basic principle is anekantavada, the idea that reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single

point of view is completely true (similar to the Western philosophical doctrine of Subjectivism).

According to Jainism, only Kevalis, those who have infinite knowledge, can know the true answer, and that all others would only know a part of the answer. It stresses spiritual

independence and the equality of all life, with particular emphasis on non-violence, and

posits self-control as vital for attaining the realization of the soul's true nature. Jain belief

emphasize the immediate consequences of one's behaviour.

The two main sects of Jainism are: (1) Digambara (2) Shwetambara. The Digambaras believe

that a monk must give up all property including clothes and then only they get moksha. They also deny the right of women to moksha. Jainism is both a philosophy and a religion. It is a

heterodox philosophy in the sense that it does not uphold the authority of the Vedas. It is atheist

and does not accept the existence of God. Jainism rejects the concept of a Supreme Being or the Brahman as the creator of the world. The Tirthankaras are the liberated souls. The followers

offer prayers to the Tirthankaras.

Jainism believes that the universe is eternal and boundless (infinite). It classifies all the

things into two groups: ‘jiva’ and ‘ajiva’. Jiva is what is known as the soul or the ‘atman’ or the

‘purusha’ in other systems. Jiva can be considered as ‘the composite unit of body and soul.’ The

soul manifests itself in a material body. Its essential character is consciousness. The jivas or the souls are innumerable and are divided into many grades or categories depending on the sense-

organs they possess. The jiva is not permanent. Its magnitude keeps on changing from body to

body. The soul of an elephant is bigger than that of an insect. While the Hindu philosophies maintain that the karma is immaterial, Jainism advances the material form of karma. According

to Jainism, karma is "paudgolik"; it is constituted of subtle particles of matter.

3.2.1 Chinese philosophy

Chinese Philosophy refers to any of several schools of philosophical thought in the Chinese tradition, includingConfucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and Mohism . It has a long history of

several thousand years.

It is known that early Shang Dynasty (c. 1600 BC - 1046 B.C.) thought was based on cyclicity,

from observation of the cycles of day and night, the seasons, the moon, etc., a concept which

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remained relevant throughout later Chinese philosophy, and immediately setting it apart from

the more linear Western approach. During this time, both gods and ancestors were worshipped and there were human and animal sacrifices.

During the succeeding Zhou Dynasty (1122 BC - 256 B.C.), the concept of the Mandate

of Heaven was introduced, which held that Heaven would bless the authority of a just ruler, but would be displeased with an unwise ruler, and retract the Mandate.

The "I Ching" (or "Book of Changes") was traditionally compiled by the mythical

figure Fu Xi in the 28th Century B.C., although modern research suggests that it more likely

dates to the late 9th Century B.C. The text describes an ancient system of cosmology and philosophy that is intrinsic to ancient Chinese cultural beliefs, centring on the ideas of

the dynamic balance of opposites, the evolution of events as a process, and acceptance of the

inevitability of change. It consists of a series ofsymbols, rules for manipulating these symbols, poems and commentary, and is sometimes regarded as a system of divination.

In about 500 B.C the classic period of Chinese philosophy (known as the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought) flourished, and the four most influential schools (Confucianism,

Taoism, Mohism and Legalism) were established.

During the Qin Dynasty (also know as the Imperial Era), after the unification of China in 221 B.C., Legalism became ascendant at the expense of the Mohist and Confucianist schools,

although the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - A.D. 220) adopted Taoism and later Confucianism as

official doctrine. Along with the gradual parallel introduction of Buddhism, these two schools have remained the determining forces of Chinese thought up until the 20th Century.

Neo-Confucianism (a variant of Confucianism, incorporating elements of Buddhism, Taoism

and Legalism) was introduced during the Song Dynasty (A.D. 960 - 1279) and popularized during the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644).

During the Industrial and Modern Ages, Chinese philosophy also began to integrate

concepts of Western philosophy. Sun Yat-Sen (1866 - 1925) attempted to incorporate elements of democracy, republicanism and industrialism at the beginning of the 20th century,

while Mao Zedong (1893 - 1976) later added Marxism, Stalinism and

other communist thought. During theCultural Revolution of 1966 - 1976, most previous

schools of thought, with the notable exception of Legalism, were denouncedas backward and purged, although their influence has remained.

The main schools of Chinese philosophy are:

Confucianism:

This school was developed from the teachings of the sage Confucius (551 - 479 B.C.), and collected in the Analects of Confucius. It is a system of moral, social, political, and quasi-

religious thought, whose influence also spread to Korea andJapan. The major Confucian concepts include ren (humanity or humaneness), zhengming (similar to the concept of the

Mandate of Heaven), zhong (loyalty), xiao (filial piety), and li (ritual). It introduced the Golden

Rule (essentially, treat others as you would like to be treated), the concept of Yin and

Yang (two opposing forces that are permanently in conflict with each other, leading to perpetual contradiction and change), the idea of meritocracy, and of reconciling opposites in order to

arrive at some middle ground combining the best of both. Confucianism is not necessarily

regarded as a religion, allowing one to be a Taoist, Christian, Muslim, Shintoist or Buddhist

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and still profess Confucianist beliefs. Arguably the most famous Confucian after Confucius

himself was Meng Tzu (or Mencius) (372 – 289 B.C.)

Taoism:

Sometimes also written Daoism, Taoism is a philosophy which later also developed into

a religion. Tao literally means "path" or "way", athough it more often used as a meta-physical

term that describes the flow of the universe, or the force behind the natural order. The Three

Jewels of the Tao are compassion, moderation, and humility. Taoist thought focuses on wu wei ("non-action"), spontaneity, humanism, relativism, emptiness and the strength of softness

(or flexibility). Nature and ancestor spirits are common in popular Taoism, although typically

there is also a pantheon of gods, often headed by the Jade Emperor. The most influential Taoist text is the "Tao Te Ching" (or "Daodejing") written around the 6th

Century B.C. by Lao Tzu (or Laozi), and a secondary text is the 4th Century B.C. "Zhuangzi",

named after its author. TheYin and Yang symbol is important in Taoist symbology (as in Confucianism), as are the Eight Trigrams, and a zigzag with seven stars which represents

the Big Dipper star constellation.

Legalism:

Legalism is a pragmatic political philosophy, whose main motto is "set clear strict laws, or

deliver harsh punishment", and its essential principle is one of jurisprudence. According to Legalism, a ruler should govern his subjects accordoing to Fa (law or principle), Shu (method,

tactic, art, or statecraft) and Shi (legitimacy, power, or charisma). Under Li Si in the 3rd

century B.C., a form of Legalism essentially became a totalitarian ideology in China, which in part led to its subsequent decline.

Mohism:

Mohism was founded by Mozi (c. 470 - 390 B.C.) It promotes universal love with the aim

of mutual benefit, such that everyone must love each other equally and impartially to avoid conflict and war. Mozi was strongly against Confucian ritual, instead emphasizing pragmatic

survival through farming, fortification and statecraft. In some ways, his philosophy parallels

Western utilitarianism. Although popular during the latter part of the Zhou Dynasty, many

Mohist texts were destroyed during the succeeding Qin Dynasty, and it was finally supplanted completely by Confucianism during the Han Dynasty.

Unlike the time of rationality of the Greek reflection in the lucid light and clear sky of the Mediterranean, it was a time of ‘ferocious contemplation,’ marked by the disintegration of the

clan communes and consanguinity, witnessed the most violent changes in ancient Chinese

society. Men fought less for individual honor but more for the survival of the states. However, the internecine warfare seethed with mounting ferocity among the warring states, generation

after generation death became a way of life. The blood and flesh of China's youth irrigated and

fertilized the yellow earth where the “hundred schools of thoughts” sprouted and contended for

intellectual dominance.

Following the Confucian orthodox historiography Fung Yu-Lan makes the Neo-Confucian

milestone of Chinese philosophical origins by suggesting the “hundred schools of thoughts” into

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six categories: “Members of the ju (Confucian) school had their origin in the literati. Members

of the Mohist School had their origin in the knights. Members of the Taoist school had their origin in the hermits. Members of School of Names had their origin in the debaters. Members of

the Yin-Yang school had their origin in the practitioners of occult arts. Members of the Legalists

had their origin in the ‘men of methods’. ” (Fung, 37)

The late Zhou dynesty was a turbulent period. To maintain and increase its power, state

rulers sought the advice of teachers and strategists. This fueled intellectual activity and debate,

and intense reappraisal of traditions. Thus the period (The Golden Age of Chinese Philosophy) became known as the time when the "hundred schools of thought contended." There were

thinkers fascinated by logical puzzles; utopians and hermits who argued for withdrawal from

public life; agriculturists who argued that no one should eat who does not plough; military theorists who analyzed ways to deceive the enemy; and cosmologists who developed theories

about the forces of nature, including the opposite and complementary forces of yin and yang

The three most influential schools of thought that evolved during this period were Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism.

Xunzi took the opposite view of human nature, arguing that people are born selfish and that

it is only through education and ritual that they learn to put moral principle above their own interests. Xunzi stressed the importance of ritual in social and political life, but took a secular

view, arguing that the ruler should pray for rain during a drought because to do so is the

traditional ritual, not because it moves Heaven to send rain.

Taoism (modernly: Daoism) is a philosophical and religious tradition that emphasizes living

in harmony with the Tao (modernly romanized as "Dao"). The term Tao means "way", "path" or "principle", and can also be found in Chinese philosophies and religions other than Taoism. In

Taoism, however, Tao denotes something that is both the source and the driving force behind

everything that exists. It is ultimately ineffable: "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao."

While Taoism drew its cosmological notions from the tenets of the School of Yin Yang, its

keystone work is widely regarded to be the Tao Te Ching, a compact and ambiguous book

containing teachings attributed to Laozi (Chinese: 老子; pinyin: Lǎozǐ; Wade–Giles: Lao Tzu).

Together with the writings of Zhuangzi, these two texts build the philosophical foundation of

Taoism. This philosophical Taoism, individualistic by nature, is not institutionalized.

Institutionalized forms, however, evolved over time in the shape of a number of different

schools. Taoist schools traditionally feature reverence for Laozi, immortals or ancestors, along with a variety of divination and exorcism rituals, and practices for achieving ecstasy, longevity

or immortality.

Taoist propriety and ethics may vary depending on the particular school, but in general tends

to emphasize wu-wei (action through non-action), "naturalness", simplicity, spontaneity, and the

Three Treasures: compassion, moderation, and humility. Taoism has had profound influence on Chinese culture in the course of the centuries, and clerics of institutionalised Taoism (Chinese:

道士; pinyin: dàoshi) usually take care to note distinction between their ritual tradition and the

customs and practices found in Chinese folk religion as these distinctions sometimes appear blurred. Chinese alchemy (especially neidan), Chinese astrology, Chan (Zen) Buddhism, several

martial arts, Traditional Chinese medicine, feng shui, and many styles of qigong have been

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intertwined with Taoism throughout history. Beyond China, Taoism also had influence on

surrounding societies in Asia.

Laozi The doctrines of Daoism, the second great school of philosophy that emerged during

the Warring States Period, are set forth in the Daodejing, Classic of the Way and Its Power, which is attributed traditionally to Laozi (570-490 BC), and in the compiled writings of

Zhuangzi (369-286 BC). Both works share a disapproval of the unnatural and artificial. Whereas

plants and animals act spontaneously in ways appropriate to them, humans have separated

themselves from the Way (Dao) by plotting and planning, analyzing and organizing. Both texts reject social conventions and call for an ecstatic surrender to the spontaneity of cosmic

processes. At the political level, Daoism advocated a return to primitive agricultural

communities in which life could follow the most natural course. Government policy should be one of extreme noninterference, permitting the people to respond to nature spontaneously.

The Zhuangzi is much longer than the Daodejing. A literary masterpiece, it is full of tall tales, parables, and fictional encounters between historical figures. Zhuangzi poked fun at

people mired in everyday affairs and urged people to see death as part of the natural cosmic

processes.

After Laozi and Zhuangzi the literature of Taoism grew steadily and used to be compiled in

form of a canon – the Daozang, which was at times published at the behest of the emperor.

Throughout Chinese history, Taoism was several times nominated as state religion. After the 17th century, however, it fell much from favor. Like all other religious activity, Taoism was

suppressed in the first decades of the People's Republic of China (and even persecuted during

the Cultural Revolution), but continued to be practised in Taiwan. Today, it is one of five religions recognized in the PRC, and although it does not travel readily from its Asian roots,

claims adherents in a number of societies.

Kongfuzi, or Confucius, as he is known in the West, was a teacher from the state of Lu (in

Kongzi, Kongfuzi, Confuciuspresent-day Shandong Province) who lived in the 6th and 5th

centuries BC. It is generally thought that Confucius was born in 551 BC.His birthplace was in

Zou, Lu state (near present-day Qufu, Shandong Province).[10][11] His father Kong He (孔紇),

also known as Shuliang He (叔梁紇), was an officer in the Lu military. Kong He died when

Confucius was three years old, and Confucius was raised by his mother Yan Zhengzai (顏徵在)

in poverty. At age 19 he married his wife, surnamed Qiguan (亓官), and a year later the couple

had their first child, Kong Li (孔鯉). Confucius was born into the class of shi (士), between the

aristocracy and the common people. He is said to have worked as a shepherd, cowherd, clerk,

and a book-keeper. When his mother died, Confucius (aged 23) is said to have mourned for

three years as was the tradition.

Confucius revered tradition and encouraged his disciples to study historical records, music,

poetry, and ritual. He tried in vain to gain high office, traveling from state to state with his disciples in search of a ruler who would employ him. Confucius talked repeatedly of his vision

of a more perfect society in which rulers and subjects, nobles and commoners, parents and

children, and men and women would wholeheartedly accept the roles assigned to them, devoting

themselves to their responsibilities to others. Confucius exalted virtues such as filial piety, reverent respect and obedience toward parents and grandparents, humanity, an unselfish concern

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for the welfare of others, integrity, and a sense of duty. He redefined the term junzi (gentleman)

to mean a man of moral cultivation rather than a man of noble birth. He repeatedly urged his students to aspire to be gentlemen who pursue integrity and duty, rather than petty men who

pursue personal gain. Confucius's teachings are known through the Lunyu (Analects), a

collection of his conversations compiled by his followers after his death.

The philosophy of Confucius emphasized personal and governmental morality, correctness

of social relationships, justice and sincerity. His followers competed successfully with many

other schools during the Hundred Schools of Thought era only to be suppressed in favor of the Legalists during the Qin Dynasty. Confucius's principles had a basis in common Chinese

tradition and belief. He championed strong family loyalty, ancestor worship, respect of elders by

their children (and in traditional interpretations) of husbands by their wives. He also recommended family as a basis for ideal government. He espoused the well-known principle

"Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself", an early version of the Golden

Rule. Although Confucianism is often followed in a religious manner by the Chinese, arguments continue over whether it is a religion. Confucianism discusses elements of the afterlife and

views concerning Heaven, but it is relatively unconcerned with some spiritual matters often

considered essential to religious thought, such as the nature of souls.

In the Analects, Confucius presents himself as a "transmitter who invented nothing". He puts

the greatest emphasis on the importance of study, and it is the Chinese character for study (學)

that opens the text. Far from trying to build a systematic or formalist theory, he wanted his

disciples to master and internalize the old classics, so that their deep thought and thorough study

would allow them to relate the moral problems of the present to past political events (as recorded in the Annals) or the past expressions of commoners' feelings and noblemen's

reflections (as in the poems of the Book of Odes)

One of the deepest teachings of Confucius may have been the superiority of personal

exemplification over explicit rules of behavior. His moral teachings emphasized self-cultivation,

emulation of moral exemplars, and the attainment of skilled judgment rather than knowledge of rules. Confucian ethics may be considered a type of virtue ethics. His teachings rarely rely on

reasoned argument and ethical ideals and methods are conveyed more indirectly, through

allusion, innuendo, and even tautology. His teachings require examination and context in order

to be understood. A good example is found in this famous anecdote:

When the stables were burnt down, on returning from court Confucius said, "Was anyone

hurt?" He did not ask about the horses.

By not asking about the horses, Confucius demonstrates that the sage values human beings

over property; readers are led to reflect on whether their response would follow Confucius's and to pursue self-improvement if it would not have. Confucius, as an exemplar of human

excellence, serves as the ultimate model, rather than a deity or a universally true set of abstract

principles. For these reasons, according to many commentators, Confucius's teachings may be

considered a Chinese example of humanism.

One of his most famous teachings[dubious – discuss][citation needed] was a variant of the

Golden Rule sometimes called the "Silver Rule"[citation needed] owing to its negative form:

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"What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to others."

Zi Gong [a disciple] asked: "Is there any one word that could guide a person throughout

life?"

The Master replied: "How about 'reciprocity'! Never impose on others what you would not

choose for yourself." (Analects XV.24, tr. David Hinton)

Often overlooked in Confucian ethics are the virtues to the self: sincerity and the cultivation

of knowledge. Virtuous action towards others begins with virtuous and sincere thought, which

begins with knowledge. A virtuous disposition without knowledge is susceptible to corruption

and virtuous action without sincerity is not true righteousness. Cultivating knowledge and sincerity is also important for one's own sake; the superior person loves learning for the sake of

learning and righteousness for the sake of righteousness.

The Confucian theory of ethics as exemplified in Lǐ (禮) is based on three important

conceptual aspects of life: ceremonies associated with sacrifice to ancestors and deities of various types, social and political institutions, and the etiquette of daily behavior. It was

believed by some that lǐ originated from the heavens, but Confucius stressed the development of

lǐ through the actions of sage leaders in human history. His discussions of lǐ seem to redefine the term to refer to all actions committed by a person to build the ideal society, rather than those

simply conforming with canonical standards of ceremony. In the early Confucian tradition, lǐ

was doing the proper thing at the proper time, balancing between maintaining existing norms to

perpetuate an ethical social fabric, and violating them in order to accomplish ethical good. Training in the lǐ of past sages cultivates in people virtues that include ethical judgment about

when lǐ must be adapted in light of situational contexts.

In Confucianism, the concept of li is closely related to yì (義), which is based upon the idea

of reciprocity. Yì can be translated as righteousness, though it may simply mean what is ethically best to do in a certain context. The term contrasts with action done out of self-interest.

While pursuing one's own self-interest is not necessarily bad, one would be a better, more

righteous person if one's life was based upon following a path designed to enhance the greater good. Thus an outcome of yì is doing the right thing for the right reason.Just as action according

to Lǐ should be adapted to conform to the aspiration of adhering to yì, so yì is linked to the core

value of rén (仁).Rén consists of 5 basic virtues: seriousness, generosity, sincerity, diligence

and kindness. Rén is the virtue of perfectly fulfilling one's responsibilities toward others, most

often translated as "benevolence" or "humaneness"; "authoritativeness" and "selflessness."

Confucius's moral system was based upon empathy and understanding others, rather than divinely ordained rules. To develop one's spontaneous responses of rén so that these could guide

action intuitively was even better than living by the rules of yì. Confucius asserts that virtue is a

means between extremes. For example, the properly generous person gives the right amount—not too much and not too little.

The eventual success of Confucian ideas owes much to Confucius's followers in the two centuries after his death, particularly to Mencius (371-289 BC) and Xunzi (300-235 BC).

Mencius, like Confucius, traveled to various states, offering advice to their rulers. He tried to

convince them that the ruler who governed benevolently would earn the respect of the people

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and would unify the realm. Mencius proposed concrete political and financial measures for

easing tax burdens and otherwise improving the people's lives. With his disciples and fellow philosophers, he discussed other issues in moral philosophy, arguing strongly, for instance, that

human nature was fundamentally good as everyone is born with the capacity to recognize what

is right and act upon it.

Mohism or Moism was a Chinese philosophy developed by the followers of Mozi (also

referred to as Mo Tzu (Master Mo), 470 BC–c.391 BC. It evolved at about the same time as

Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism, and was one of the four main philosophic schools during the Spring and Autumn Period (from 770 BC to 480 BC) and the Warring States period (from

479 BC to 221 BC). During that time, Mohism (墨 Mo) was seen as a major rival to

Confucianism (儒 Ru). The Qin dynasty, which united China in 221 BC, adopted Legalism as

the official government philosophy and suppressed all other philosophic schools. The Han dynasty that followed adopted Confucianism as the official state philosophy, as did most other

successive dynasties, though Taoism and later Buddhism also played an important part in later

Chinese life and thought, while Mohism all but disappeared as a separate school of thought. Mohist books were later merged into Taoist canon.

Mohism is best known for the concepts of "impartial care" popularized as "Universal Love", which is potentially misleading as Mozi believed that the essential problem of human ethics was

an excess of partiality in compassion, not a deficit in compassion as such. His aim was to re-

evaluate behavior, not emotions or attitudes. Another concept most associated with him is that

of "No Invasion"

In a perfect governmental structure where the ruler loves all people benevolently, and

officials are selected according to meritocracy, the people should have unity in belief and in speech. His original purpose in this teaching was to unite people and avoid sectarianism.

However, in a situation of corruption and tyranny, this teaching might be misused as a tool for

oppression.

Should the ruler be unrighteous, seven disasters would result for that nation. These seven

disasters are:

-Neglect of the country's defense, yet there is much lavished on the palace. -When pressured by foreigners, neighbouring countries are not willing to help.

-The people are engaged in unconstructive work while useless fools are rewarded.

-Law and regulations became too heavy such that there is repressive fear and people only -look after their own good.

-The ruler lives in a mistaken illusion of his own ability and his country's strength.

-Trusted people are not loyal while loyal people are not trusted. -Lack of food. Ministers are not able to carry out their work. Punishment fails to bring

fear and reward fails to bring happiness.

Mozi is known for his insistence that all people are equally deserving of receiving material benefit and being protected from physical harm. In Mohism, morality is defined not by tradition

and ritual, but rather by a constant moral guide that parallels utilitarianism. Tradition varies

from culture to culture, and human beings need an extra-traditional guide to identify which traditions are morally acceptable. The moral guide must then promote and encourage social

behaviors that maximize the general utility of all the people in that society. One of the schools

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of Mohism that has received some attention is the Logicians school, which was interested in

resolving logical puzzles.

Legalism differed from both Confucianism and Daoism in its narrow focus on statecraft.

Thinkers like Han Fei (280-233 BC) reasoned that the extreme disorders of their day called for new and drastic measures. They rejected the Confucian theory that strong government depended

on the moral quality of the ruler and his officials and their success in winning over the people.

Rather, they argued, it depended on effective systems of rewards and punishments. To ensure

his power, the ruler had to keep his officials in line with strict rules and regulations and his people obedient with predictably enforced laws.

Legalism was a philosophy emphasizing strict obedience to the law system. It was one of the main philosophic currents during the Warring States period. It was a utilitarian political

philosophy that did not address higher questions like the purpose and nature of life.[1] The

school's most famous proponent and contributor Han Fei Zi (also spelled Han-fei-tzu] (韓非子)

believed that a ruler should use the following three tools to govern his subjects:

Fa (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law or principle"): The law code must be clearly

written and made public. All people under the ruler were equal before the law. Laws should reward those who obey them and punish accordingly those who dare to break them. Thus it is

guaranteed that actions taken are systematically predictable. In addition, the system of law,

not the ruler, ran the state, a statement of rule of law. If the law is successfully enforced,

even a weak ruler will be strong.

Shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "method, tactic or art"): Special tactics and "secrets"

are to be employed by the ruler to make sure others don't take over control of the state.

Especially important is that no one can fathom the ruler's motivations, and thus no one can

know which behavior might help them get ahead, other than following the 法, or laws.

Shi (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì; literally "legitimacy, power or charisma"): It is the position of

the ruler, not the ruler himself or herself, that holds the power. Therefore, analysis of the

trends, the context, and the facts are essential for a real ruler.

The entire system was set up to make model citizens behave and act how the dynasty wanted.

The laws supported by the Legalists were meant to support the state, the emperor, and his military. They were also reform-oriented and innovative. In theory, the Legalists believed that if

the punishments were heavy and the law equally applied, neither the powerful nor the weak

would be able to escape consequences. The Legalists especially emphasized pragmatism over

precedence and custom as the basis of law. Guided by Legalist thought, the First Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, would weaken the power of the feudal lords, conquer and unify the warring

states into a single empire, create thirty-six administrative provinces, and standardize the writing

system. Reflecting Legalist passion for order and structure, Qin soldiers were only mobilized when both halves of tiger-shaped tallies (one held by the ruler and the other by the commanding

general) were brought together. Likewise, all documents in the empire had to have recorded the

year they were written, the scribe who copied them, and up to the exact hour of delivery. Accepting Shang Yang’s earlier emphasis on the standardization of weights and measures, the

Qin Shi Huang would also accept Shang Yang’s philosophy that no individual in the state

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should be above the law (by ensuring harsh punishments for all cases of dissent) and that

families should be divided into smaller households. While there is reason to doubt Sima Qian’s claim that Qin Shi Huang did in fact divide households into groups of ten, certainly the other

examples of standardization and administrative organization undertaken by the First Emperor

reflect the importance of Legalist thought in Qin law.

In later dynasties, Legalism was discredited and ceased to be an independent school of

thought. However, both ancient and modern Confucian observers of Chinese politics have

argued that some Legalist ideas have merged with mainstream Confucianism and still play a major role in government. The philosophy of imperial China has been described as a Confucian

exterior covering a core of Legalism (Chinese: 儒表法裡; pinyin: rú biăo fă lǐ). In other words,

Confucian values are used to sugarcoat the harsh Legalist ideas that underlie the Imperial

system. During the Sui and Tang dynasty, Buddhist ideas were also part of the external face of

the imperial system.

There was a brief revival of Legalism during the Sui dynasty's efforts to reunify China. After

the Sui dynasty was replaced by the Tang dynasty, the Tang government still used the government structure left behind by the Sui dynasty, albeit with much reduced punishments.

General characteristics of Chinese philosophy (CP) are –

1. CP is neither inward looking or outward looking. It keeps a balance between the two and

is more at home with man in society than the ultimate problems. No problem is probed too deep,

pressed to its logical conclusion. Chines thought affirms man first and never forgets its commitment to man. Confucianism affirms man in society and Taoism man by himself,

although Taoism was inclined to belittle his material existence. On the whole CP is outward

looking if Confucianism is considered typically Chinese.

2. Although a few questions about the ultimate nature of Tao were raised, the inquiry was not

very thorough and everything is related to Human Nature. None probed into the mind systematically or deep and what was found within mind were good feelings, sentiments, all that

which contributes to a happy social life. They are few found in every society and were not

unique to China. Hence CP is somewhat superficial and unsystematic.

3. CP, however, has made a distinct contribution to world philosophy. It persistently tries to

build ethics and even metaphysics on the emotional nature of man but not on his rational nature.

Neither Indian nor Western philosophy consider this aspect.

4. CP is concerned with the immediate life of man, not his past or future birth as is the case

with Indian philosophy. If a doctrine works on building a good state and society, it is not; when it does it is accepted. The Chinese adopted Communism hoping that it would improve their

quality of life. When it did not achieve its objective, they adopted the capitalistic model and

their success is for all to see.

5. CP is more concerned with the Good than with the Beautiful and less with the Truth than

with the Beautiful. It finds the Good in normal human life not necessarily in communication

with God but with other men. It finds Good, not by controlling nature but in controlling oneself with reference to others.

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6. There is some mysticism but not of the kind that we in India are familiar with, a kind of

nature mysticism, concerned with human nature only. Taoism has elements in it and Buddhism deepened it but it was repeatedly brought to the human level in the history of Chinese thought.

7. China does not have a well-developed materialistic philosophy. It was human nature that was elevated to the Tao of the early Taoists or to the material Tao of the later Confucians. They

were interested in human nature but not in spiritual or material nature. This has an important

lesson for Indians. We were excessively concerned with the realization of Atman, in the process

we ignored the well being of man, building of state and society, political thought.

8. Because nature meant human nature, China did not feel the need to develop a method for

understanding nature. There are always examples of men with good nature so there was found no need to study it as good nature was observed and studied. Accordingly, China did not

develop systems of logic and epistemology. The need for both is felt only when we want to

study more. The Chines were not interested in the outward or inward so what was the need to study, probe.

9. For the same reason, there is very little categorization of reality. There is some categorization of human virtues, of which human-heartedness is the highest. To the Chinese,

reality, is human nature? But as the categorization is not carried out methodically and

systematically, we find very little importance attached to categories.

10. Because of a keen interest in human affairs and achievements, China had a strong sense

of history and constructed some philosophies of history, besides a few doctrines of evolution.

The Chinese did not regard history as unreal or insignificant. The aim of the Chinese mind is universal peace and it interpreted human achievements as progressing towards universal peace.

This statement baffles me. The Chinese continue their march towards becoming a world military

power, arm Pakistan to the teeth, and aid its nuclear program and Universal Peace!

11. CP considers Man as the highest object of creation, not because he alone can attain

salvation as the Indian philosophers thought but because he alone can build up culture and civilization.

12. Because of this deep abiding interest in man, culture, civilization China could develop

good social, political thought as also good life-affirming ethics. While Chanakya’s Arthashashtra has some profound thoughts on foreign policy, defense, governance they were

with the exception of a few warriors like Shivaji never followed. If Indians had a strategic

culture, all it had to do was to convert the Khyer Pass into an impregnable fortress and the country’s history might well have been different. The ideal of democracy started with

Confucius and the French Revolution seems to have influenced by his ideas, whether directly or

indirectly. Even semantics must have been discovered by the Chinese school of Names. China was the first to invent paper, printing, and gunpowder but could develop none of these for the

want of systematic methodology. She has to be, therefore, content with only so much credit for

her inventions as Egypt received for the discovery of geometry. Because of her humanistic

interest, China pushed her inquiries in political and social thought, rather than in inventions.

13. In spite of a deep interest in human nature, it appears that pre-communist Chinese

thought viewed man as an emotional and social animal but not as a rational animal. The thought

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that the soul in full or in part is immortal never occurred to the Chinese. This explains the lack

of the development of logic and epistemology in Chinese thought.

14. Another interesting feature is the absence of a definite conception of the spirit, soul in

Chinese thought. They referred to the spirits of the ancestors, spirits of water, mountain and so on but did not think of the spirit of the man.

Differences between the philosophies of the east and west

Four major differences between Eastern and Western philosophies;

1. Western Individualism and Eastern Collectivism

In the Greco-Roman tradition, the image of Prometheus powerfully illustrates the struggle

for individual freedom. Prometheus had gone against Zeus, the all powerful god who ruled the sky from Mt. Olympus. Prometheus annoyed Zeus by creating human beings. To protect the

human beings from Zeus, he stole fire from Hephaestos, the blacksmith god and gave it to the

human beings. This angered Zeus to the extent that Prometheus was chained to a rock and an eagle tore out his liver. In European consciousness, Prometheus had become the hero who:

"...defied the patriarchy in the name of individual freedom, who brought light into our darkness. He was the saviour who sacrificed himself for the sake of mankind, the benefactor who brought

the gift of technology down from heaven, the teacher who taught us that we are not at the whims

of the gods any more, who showed us how to use our intelligence to take control of the world".

By comparison, the Chinese and Indian live in a world of obligations:

"...obligations to serve the ruler, obligations to work for the family, obligations to obey elders, obligations to help relatives, obligations to do well to glorify the name of ancestors, obligations

to defend the country in times of trouble, and obligations to oneself to cultivate one's own virtue.

It would also seem that rights only belong to one individual - the Son of Heaven.

Confucianism promotes conservatism and this stifles creativity and robs the people of

self-introspection.

2. Fragmentary and Holistic

According to Fritjof Capra, the emphasis of rational thought is epitomised in Descartes'

celebrated statement,'Cognito, ergo sum' - 'I think, therefore, I exist.' This has forcefully

encouraged Westerners to equate their identity with their rational mind rather than with the

whole organism. This division between the mind and the body has led to a view of the universe as a mechanical system consisting of separate objects, which in turn were reduced to

fundamental building blocks whose properties and interactions were thought to completely

determine all natural phenomena. This mechanistic conception of the whole world is still the basis of most of our sciences and continues to have a tremendous influence on our lives.

Academic disciplines become fragmented and this has served as a rationale for treating the

universe as if it consisted of separate parts to be exploited by different groups.

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The essence of the Eastern world view is the awareness of the unity and the mutual

inter-relation of all things and events, the experience of all phenomena in the world as manifestation of a basic oneness. All things are seen as independent and inseparable parts of a

cosmic whole, as different manifestations of the same ultimate reality. The Eastern traditions

refer to this ultimate, indivisible reality as Brahman in Hinduism, Dharmakaya in Buddhism and Tao in Taoism.

3. Conflict and Harmony

The Marxist view of history saw change as arising from a 'dialectic ' interplay of

opposites -hence class struggle and conflict. Western civilisation based itself on the struggle

between the Good and Evil, God and Satan or Psyche and Cupid. Eastern philosophical thought is based on this notion of the Yin and the Yang.

Frithjof Capra describes the Yang as the strong, male creative power associated with Heaven

while yin is the dark, receptive, female and maternal element.The dark yin and the bright yang are arranged in a symmetrical manner. They are dynamic - a rotating symmetry suggesting very

forcefully a continuous cyclic movement.The two dots in the diagram symbolise the idea that

each one of the forces reaches its extreme, it contains in itself the seed of the opposite.'Life' says

Chuang Tzu'is the blended harmony of the yin and the yang.'

4. Idealism and Pragmatism.

The Western idea of democracy does not fit into the Eastern scheme of things easily. The Confucianistic idea of social hierarchy where a person's existence is relational, extending from

his family, society and country. The pragmatism of the East is exemplied in the way

Confucianism has been used to emphasize order through social hierarchy and the rules and conventions. Taoism provided the meaning of life and thus compliment Confucianism.

Arguments and Inference

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The Discipline of Logic

Human life is full of decisions, including significant choices about what to believe.

Although everyone prefers to believe what is true, we often disagree with each other about what

that is in particular instances. It may be that some of our most fundamental convictions in life are acquired by haphazard means rather than by the use of reason, but we all recognize that our

beliefs about ourselves and the world often hang together in important ways.

If I believe that whales are mammals and that all mammals are fish, then it would also make

sense for me to believe that whales are fish. Even someone who (rightly!) disagreed with my understanding of biological taxonomy could appreciate the consistent, reasonable way in which

I used my mistaken beliefs as the foundation upon which to establish a new one. On the other

hand, if I decide to believe that Hamlet was Danish because I believe that Hamlet was a character in a play by Shaw and that some Danes are Shavian characters, then even someone

who shares my belief in the result could point out that I haven't actually provided good reasons

for accepting its truth. In general, we can respect the directness of a path even when we don't accept the points at

which it begins and ends. Thus, it is possible to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect

reasoning independently of our agreement on substantive matters. Logic is the discipline that

studies this distinction—both by determining the conditions under which the truth of certain beliefs leads naturally to the truth of some other belief, and by drawing attention to the ways in

which we may be led to believe something without respect for its truth. This provides no

guarantee that we will always arrive at the truth, since the beliefs with which we begin are sometimes in error. But following the principles of correct reasoning does ensure that no

additional mistakes creep in during the course of our progress.

In this review of elementary logic, we'll undertake a broad survey of the major varieties of reasoning that have been examined by logicians of the Western philosophical tradition. We'll see

how certain patterns of thinking do invariably lead from truth to truth while other patterns do

not, and we'll develop the skills of using the former while avoiding the latter. It will be helpful

to begin by defining some of the technical terms that describe human reasoning in general.

The Structure of Argument

Our fundamental unit of what may be asserted or denied is the proposition (or statement)

that is typically expressed by a declarative sentence. Logicians of earlier centuries often

identified propositions with the mental acts of affirming them, often called judgments, but we can evade some interesting but thorny philosophical issues by avoiding this locution.

Propositions are distinct from the sentences that convey them. "Smith loves Jones"

expresses exactly the same proposition as "Jones is loved by Smith," while the sentence "Today is my birthday" can be used to convey many different propositions, depending upon who

happens to utter it, and on what day. But each proposition is either true or false. Sometimes, of

course, we don't know which of these truth-values a particular proposition has ("There is life on

the third moon of Jupiter" is presently an example), but we can be sure that it has one or the other.

The chief concern of logic is how the truth of some propositions is connected with the truth

of another. Thus, we will usually consider a group of related propositions. An argument is a set of two or more propositions related to each other in such a way that all but one of them

(the premises) are supposed to provide support for the remaining one (the conclusion). The

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transition or movement from premises to conclusion, the logical connection between them, is

the inference upon which the argument relies. Notice that "premise" and "conclusion" are here defined only as they occur in relation to

each other within a particular argument. One and the same proposition can (and often does)

appear as the conclusion of one line of reasoning but also as one of the premises of another. A number of words and phrases are commonly used in ordinary language to indicate the premises

and conclusion of an argument, although their use is never strictly required, since the context

can make clear the direction of movement. What distinguishes an argument from a mere

collection of propositions is the inference that is supposed to hold between them. Thus, for example, "The moon is made of green cheese, and strawberries are red. My dog

has fleas." is just a collection of unrelated propositions; the truth or falsity of each has no

bearing on that of the others. But "Helen is a physician. So Helen went to medical school, since all physicians have gone to medical school." is an argument; the truth of its conclusion, "Helen

went to medical school," is inferentially derived from its premises, "Helen is a physician." and

"All physicians have gone to medical school."

Recognizing Arguments

It's important to be able to identify which proposition is the conclusion of each argument, since that's a necessary step in our evaluation of the inference that is supposed to lead to it. We

might even employ a simple diagram to represent the structure of an argument, numbering each

of the propositions it comprises and drawing an arrow to indicate the inference that leads from its premise(s) to its conclusion.

Don't worry if this procedure seems rather tentative and uncertain at first. We'll be studying

the structural features of logical arguments in much greater detail as we proceed, and you'll soon find it easy to spot instances of the particular patterns we encounter most often. For now, it is

enough to tell the difference between an argument and a mere collection of propositions and to

identify the intended conclusion of each argument. Even that isn't always easy, since arguments embedded in ordinary language can take on a

bewildering variety of forms. Again, don't worry too much about this; as we acquire more

sophisticated techniques for representing logical arguments, we will deliberately limit ourselves

to a very restricted number of distinct patterns and develop standard methods for expressing their structure. Just remember the basic definition of an argument: it includes more than one

proposition, and it infers a conclusion from one or more premises. So "If John has already left,

then either Jane has arrived or Gail is on the way." can't be an argument, since it is just one big (compound) proposition. But "John has already left, since Jane has arrived." is an argument that

proposes an inference from the fact of Jane's arrival to the conclusion, "John has already left." If

you find it helpful to draw a diagram, please make good use of that method to your advantage. Our primary concern is to evaluate the reliability of inferences, the patterns of reasoning

that lead from premises to conclusion in a logical argument. We'll devote a lot of attention to

what works and what does not. It is vital from the outset to distinguish two kinds of inference,

each of which has its own distinctive structure and standard of correctness. Deductive Inferences

When an argument claims that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion, it is said to involve a deductive inference. Deductive reasoning holds to a very high

standard of correctness. A deductive inference succeeds only if its premises provide such

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absolute and complete support for its conclusion that it would be utterly inconsistent to suppose

that the premises are true but the conclusion false.

Notice that each argument either meets this standard or else it does not; there is no middle

ground. Some deductive arguments are perfect, and if their premises are in fact true, then it follows that their conclusions must also be true, no matter what else may happen to be the case.

All other deductive arguments are no good at all—their conclusions may be false even if their

premises are true, and no amount of additional information can help them in the least.

For example: All man is dead A is a man

Therefore A is dead

Inductive Inferences

When an argument claims merely that the truth of its premises make it likely or probable that its conclusion is also true, it is said to involve an inductive inference. The

standard of correctness for inductive reasoning is much more flexible than that for deduction.

An inductive argument succeeds whenever its premises provide some legitimate evidence or support for the truth of its conclusion. Although it is therefore reasonable to accept the truth of

that conclusion on these grounds, it would not be completely inconsistent to withhold judgment

or even to deny it outright.

Inductive arguments, then, may meet their standard to a greater or to a lesser degree,

depending upon the amount of support they supply. No inductive argument is either absolutely

perfect or entirely useless, although one may be said to be relatively better or worse than another in the sense that it recommends its conclusion with a higher or lower degree of probability. In

such cases, relevant additional information often affects the reliability of an inductive argument

by providing other evidence that changes our estimation of the likelihood of the conclusion.

It should be possible to differentiate arguments of these two sorts with some accuracy

already. Remember that deductive arguments claim to guarantee their conclusions, while inductive arguments merely recommend theirs. Or ask yourself whether the introduction of any

additional information—short of changing or denying any of the premises—could make the

conclusion seem more or less likely; if so, the pattern of reasoning is inductive.

For example: Thai people are dead Chinese people are dead

American people are dead

African people are dead ………….

Therefore all people are dead

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Truth and Validity

Since deductive reasoning requires such a strong relationship between premises and conclusion, we will spend the majority of this survey studying various patterns of deductive

inference. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the standard of correctness for deductive

arguments in some detail.

A deductive argument is said to be valid when the inference from premises to conclusion is

perfect. Here are two equivalent ways of stating that standard:

If the premises of a valid argument are true, then its conclusion must also be true.

It is impossible for the conclusion of a valid argument to be false while its premises are

true.

(Considering the premises as a set of propositions, we will say that the premises are true only on

those occasions when each and every one of those propositions is true.) Any deductive argument that is not valid is invalid: it is possible for its conclusion to be false while its premises are true,

so even if the premises are true, the conclusion may turn out to be either true or false.

Notice that the validity of the inference of a deductive argument is independent of the truth of its premises;both conditions must be met in order to be sure of the truth of the conclusion. Of

the eight distinct possible combinations of truth and validity, only one is ruled out completely:

Premises Inference Conclusion

True

Valid True

XXXX

Invalid True

False

False

Valid True

False

Invalid True

False

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The only thing that cannot happen is for a deductive argument to have true premises and a valid

inference but a false conclusion.

Some logicians designate the combination of true premises and a valid inference as

a sound argument; it is a piece of reasoning whose conclusion must be true. The trouble with every other case is that it gets us nowhere, since either at least one of the premises is false, or the

inference is invalid, or both. The conclusions of such arguments may be either true or false, so

they are entirely useless in any effort to gain new information.

Language and Logic

Functions of Language

The formal patterns of correct reasoning can all be conveyed through ordinary language, but then so can a lot of other things. In fact, we use language in many different ways, some of which

are irrelevant to any attempt to provide reasons for what we believe. It is helpful to identify at

least three distinct uses of language:

1. The informative use of language involves an effort to communicate some content. When I

tell a child, "The fifth of May is a Mexican holiday," or write to you that "Logic is the study of correct reasoning," or jot a note to myself, "Jennifer—555-3769," I am using

language informatively. This kind of use presumes that the content of what is being

communicated is actually true, so it will be our central focus in the study of logic.

2. An expressive use of language, on the other hand, intends only to vent some feeling, or perhaps to evoke some feeling from other people. When I say, "Friday afternoons are

dreary," or yell "Ouch!" I am using language expressively. Although such uses don't

convey any information, they do serve an important function in everyday life, since how we feel sometimes matters as much as—or more than—what we hold to be true.

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3. Finally, directive uses of language aim to cause or to prevent some overt action by a

human agent. When I say "Shut the door," or write "Read the textbook," or memo myself, "Don't rely so heavily on the passive voice," I am using language directively. The point in

each of these cases is to make someone perform (or forswear) a particular action. This is a

significant linguistic function, too, but like the expressive use, it doesn't always relate logically to the truth of our beliefs.

Notice that the intended use in a particular instance often depends more on the specific

context and tone of voice than it does on the grammatical form or vocabulary of what is said. The simple declarative sentence, "I'm hungry," for example, could be used to report on a

physiological condition, or to express a feeling, or implicitly to request that someone feed me. In

fact, uses of two or more varieties may be mixed together in a single utterance; "Stop that," for example, usually involves both expressive and directive functions jointly. In many cases,

however, it is possible to identify a single use of language that is probably intended to be the

primary function of a particular linguistic unit.

British philosopher J. L. Austin developed a similar, though much more detailed and

sophisticated, nomenclature for the variety of actions we commonly perform in employing

ordinary language. You're welcome to examine his theory of speech acts in association with the discussion in your textbook. While the specifics may vary, some portion of the point remains the

same: since we do in fact employ language for many distinct purposes, we can minimize

confusion by keeping in mind what we're up to on any particular occasion.

Literal and Emotive Meaning

Even single words or short phrases can exhibit the distinction between purely informative

and partially expressive uses of language. Many of the most common words and phrases of any

language have both a literal or descriptive meaning that refers to the way things are and an emotive meaning that expresses some (positive or negative) feeling about them. Thus, the

choice of which word to use in making a statement can be used in hopes of evoking a particular

emotional response.

This is a natural function of ordinary language, of course. We often do wish to convey some

portion of our feelings along with information. There is a good deal of poetry in everyday

communication, and poetry without emotive meaning is pretty dull. But when we are primarily interested in establishing the truth—as we are when assessing the logical merits of an

argument—the use of words laden with emotive meaning can easily distract us from our

purpose.

Kinds of Agreement and Disagreement

In fact, an excessive reliance on emotively charged language can create the appearance of

disagreement between parties who do not differ on the facts at all, and it can just as easily

disguise substantive disputes under a veneer of emotive agreement. Since the degrees of

agreement in belief and attitude are independent of each other, there are four possible combinations at work here:

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1. Agreement in belief and agreement in attitude: There aren't any problems in this instance,

since both parties hold the same positions and have the same feelings about them. 2. Agreement in belief but disagreement in attitude: This case, if unnoticed, may become the

cause of endless (but pointless) shouting between people whose feelings differ sharply

about some fact upon which they are in total agreement. 3. Disagreement in belief but agreement in attitude: In this situation, parties may never

recognize, much less resolve, their fundamental difference of opinion, since they are

lulled by their shared feelings into supposing themselves allied.

4. Disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude: Here the parties have so little in common that communication between them often breaks down entirely.

It is often valuable, then, to recognize the levels of agreement or disagreement at work in any exchange of views. That won't always resolve the dispute between two parties, of course, but it

will ensure that they don't waste their time on an inappropriate method of argument or

persuasion.

Emotively Neutral Language

For our purposes in assessing the validity of deductive arguments and the reliability of inductive reasoning, it will be most directly helpful to eliminate emotive meaning entirely

whenever we can. Although it isn't always easy to achieve emotively neutral language in every

instance, and the result often lacks the colorful character of our usual public discourse, it is worth the trouble and insipidity because it makes it much easier to arrive at a settled

understanding of what is true.

In many instances, the informal fallacies we will consider next result from an improper use

of emotionally charged language in the effort to persuade someone to accept a proposition at an

emotional level, without becoming convinced that there are legitimate grounds for believing it to be true.

Fallacies of Relevance

Informal Fallacies

Assessing the legitimacy of arguments embedded in ordinary language is rather like diagnosing whether a living human being has any broken bones. Only the internal structure

matters, but it is difficult to see through the layers of flesh that cover it. Soon we'll begin to

develop methods, like the tools of radiology, that enable us to see the skeletal form of an argument beneath the language that expresses it. But compound fractures are usually evident to

the most casual observer, and some logical defects are equally apparent.

The informal fallacies considered here are patterns of reasoning that are obviously incorrect.

The fallacies of relevance, for example, clearly fail to provide adequate reason for believing the

truth of their conclusions. Although they are often used in attempts to persuade people by non-

logical means, only the unwary, the predisposed, and the gullible are apt to be fooled by their illegitimate appeals. Many of them were identified by medieval and renaissance logicians,

whose Latin names for them have passed into common use. It's worthwhile to consider the

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structure, offer an example, and point out the invalidity of each of them in turn.

Appeal to Force (argumentum ad baculum)

In the appeal to force, someone in a position of power threatens to bring down unfortunate

consequences upon anyone who dares to disagree with a proffered proposition. Although it is

rarely developed so explicitly, a fallacy of this type might propose:

If you do not agree with my political opinions, you will receive a grade of F for this

course.

I believe that Herbert Hoover was the greatest President of the United States. Therefore, Herbert Hoover was the greatest President of the United States.

It should be clear that even if all of the premises were true, the conclusion could neverthelss be false. Since that is possible, arguments of this form are plainly invalid. While this might be an

effective way to get you to agree (or at least to pretend to agree) with my position, it offers no

grounds for believing it to be true. Appeal to Pity (argumentum ad misericordiam)

Turning this on its head, an appeal to pity tries to win acceptance by pointing out the unfortunate consequences that will otherwise fall upon the speaker and others, for whom we

would then feel sorry.

I am a single parent, solely responsible for the financial support of my children.

If you give me this traffic ticket, I will lose my license and be unable to drive to work.

If I cannot work, my children and I will become homeless and may starve to death. Therefore, you should not give me this traffic ticket.

Again, the conclusion may be false (that is, perhaps I should be given the ticket) even if the premises are all true, so the argument is fallacious.

Appeal to Emotion (argumentum ad populum)

In a more general fashion, the appeal to emotion relies upon emotively charged language to

arouse strong feelings that may lead an audience to accept its conclusion:

As all clear-thinking residents of our fine state have already realized, the Governor's plan

for financing public education is nothing but the bloody-fanged wolf of socialism cleverly

disguised in the harmless sheep's clothing of concern for children. Therefore, the Governor's plan is bad public policy.

The problem here is that although the flowery language of the premise might arouse strong feelings in many members of its intended audience, the widespread occurrence of those feelings

has nothing to do with the truth of the conclusion.

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Appeal to Authority (argumentum ad verecundiam)

Each of the next three fallacies involve the mistaken supposition that there is some

connection between the truth of a proposition and some feature of the person who asserts or denies it. In an appeal to authority, the opinion of someone famous or accomplished in another

area of expertise is supposed to guarantee the truth of a conclusion. Thus, for example:

Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan believes that spiders are insects. Therefore, spiders are insects.

As a pattern of reasoning, this is clearly mistaken: no proposition must be true because some individual (however talented or successful) happens to believe it. Even in areas where they have

some special knowledge or skill, expert authorities could be mistaken; we may accept their

testimony as inductive evidence but never as deductive proof of the truth of a conclusion. Personality is irrelevant to truth.

Ad Hominem Argument

The mirror-image of the appeal to authority is the ad hominem argument, in which we are

encouraged to reject a proposition because it is the stated opinion of someone regarded as

disreputable in some way. This can happen in several different ways, but all involve the claim that the proposition must be false because of who believes it to be true:

Harold maintains that the legal age for drinking beer should be 18 instead of 21. But we all know that Harold . . .

o . . . dresses funny and smells bad. or

o . . . is 19 years old and would like to drink legally or o . . . believes that the legal age for voting should be 21, not 18 or

o . . . doesn't understand the law any better than the rest of us.

Therefore, the legal age for drinking beer should be 21 instead of 18.

In any of its varieties, the ad hominem fallacy asks us to adopt a position on the truth of a

conclusion for no better reason than that someone believes its opposite. But the proposition that

person believes can be true (and the intended conclusion false) even if the person is unsavory or has a stake in the issue or holds inconsistent beliefs or shares a common flaw with us. Again,

personality is irrelevant to truth.

Appeal to Ignorance (argumentum ad ignoratiam)

An appeal to ignorance proposes that we accept the truth of a proposition unless an

opponent can prove otherwise. Thus, for example:

No one has conclusively proven that there is no intelligent life on the moons of Jupiter.

Therefore, there is intelligent life on the moons of Jupiter.

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But, of course, the absence of evidence against a proposition is not enough to secure its truth,

What we don’t know could nevertheless be so. Irrelevant Conclusion (ignoratio elenchi)

Finally, the fallacy of the irrelevant conclusion tries to establish the truth of a proposition by offering an argument that actually provides support for an entirely different conclusion.

All children should have ample attention from their parents. Parents who work full-time cannot give ample attention to their children.

Therefore, mothers should not work full-time.

Here the premises might support some conclusion about working parents generally, but do not

secure the truth of a conclusion focussed on women alone and not on men. Although clearly

fallacious, this procedure may succeed in distracting its audience from the point that is really at

issue.

Categorical Propositions

Now that we've taken notice of many of the difficulties that can be caused by sloppy use of ordinary language in argumentation, we're ready to begin the more precise study of deductive

reasoning. Here we'll achieve the greater precision by eliminating ambiguous words and phrases

from ordinary language and carefully defining those that remain. The basic strategy is to create a narrowly restricted formal system—an artificial, rigidly structured logical language within

which the validity of deductive arguments can be discerned with ease. Only after we've become

familiar with this limited range of cases will we consider to what extent our ordinary-language argumentation can be made to conform to its structure.

Our initial effort to pursue this strategy is the ancient but worthy method of categorical logic. This approach was originally developed by Aristotle, codified in greater detail by

medieval logicians, and then interpreted mathematically by George Boole and John Venn in the

nineteenth century. Respected by many generations of philosophers as the the chief embodiment

of deductive reasoning, this logical system continues to be useful in a broad range of ordinary circumstances.

Terms and Propositions

We'll start very simply, then work our way toward a higher level. The basic unit of meaning

or content in our new deductive system is the categorical term. Usually expressed grammatically as a noun or noun phrase, each categorical term designates a class of things. Notice that these

are (deliberately) very broad notions: a categorical term may designate any class—whether it's a

natural species or merely an arbitrary collection—of things of any variety, real or imaginary.

Thus, "cows," "unicorns," "square circles," "philosophical concepts,"

"things weighing more than fifty kilograms," and "times when the

earth is nearer than 75 million miles from the sun," are all

categorical terms.

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Notice also that each categorical term cleaves the world into exactly two mutually exclusive

and jointly exhaustive parts: those things to which the term applies and those things to which it does not apply. For every class designated by a categorical term, there is another class,

its complement, that includes everything excluded from the original class, and this

complementary class can of course be designated by its own categorical term. Thus, "cows"

and "non-cows" are complementary classes, as are "things weighing more than

fifty kilograms" and "things weighing fifty kilograms or less."

Everything in the world (in fact, everything we can talk or think about) belongs either to the

class designated by a categorical term or to its complement; nothing is omitted.

Now let's use these simple building blocks to assemble something more interesting.

A categorical proposition joins together exactly two categorical terms and asserts that some relationship holds between the classes they designate. (For our own convenience, we'll call the

term that occurs first in each categorical proposition its subject term and other its predicate

term.) Thus, for example, "All cows are mammals" and "Some philosophy

teachers are young mothers" are categorical propositions whose subject terms are

"cows" and "philosophy teachers" and whose predicate terms are "mammals" and

"young mothers" respectively.

Each categorical proposition states that there is some logical relationship that holds between

its two terms. In this context, a categorical term is said to be distributed if that proposition

provides some information about every member of the class designated by that term. Thus, in

our first example above, "cows" is distributed because the proposition in which it occurs

affirms that each and every cow is also a mammal, but "mammals" is undistributed because the

proposition does not state anything about each and every member of that class. In the second

example, neither of the terms is distributed, since this proposition tells us only that the two classes overlap to some (unstated) extent.

Quality and Quantity

Since we can always invent new categorical terms and consider the possible relationship of

the classes they designate, there are indefinitely many different individual categorical

propositions. But if we disregard the content of these propositions, what classes of things they're about, and concentrate on their form, the general manner in which they conjoin their subject and

predicate terms, then we need only four distinct kinds of categorical proposition, distinguished

from each other only by their quality and quantity, in order to assert anything we like about the relationship between two classes.

The quality of a categorical proposition indicates the nature of the relationship it affirms between its subject and predicate terms: it is an affirmative proposition if it states that the class

designated by its subject term is included, either as a whole or only in part, within the class

designated by its predicate term, and it is a negativeproposition if it wholly or partially excludes

members of the subject class from the predicate class. Notice that the predicate term is distributed in every negative proposition but undistributed in all affirmative propositions.

The quantity of a categorical proposition, on the other hand, is a measure of the degree to which the relationship between its subject and predicate terms holds: it is

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a universal proposition if the asserted inclusion or exclusion holds for every member of the

class designated by its subject term, and it is a particular proposition if it merely asserts that the relationship holds for one or more members of the subject class. Thus, you'll see that the subject

term is distributed in all universal propositions but undistributed in every particular proposition.

Combining these two distinctions and representing the subject and predicate terms

respectively by the letters "S" and "P," we can uniquely identify the four possible forms of

categorical proposition:

The Square of Opposition

When two categorical propositions are of different forms but share exactly the same subject and predicate terms, their truth is logically interdependent in a variety of interesting ways, all of

which are conveniently represented in the traditional "square of opposition."

"All S are P." (A)- - - - - - -(E) "No S are P." | * * |

* *

| * * |

*

| * * |

* *

| * * |

"Some S are P." (I)--- --- ---(O) "Some S are not P."

Propositions that appear diagonally across from each other in this diagram (A and O on the one hand and Eand I on the other) are contradictories. No matter what their subject and predicate

terms happen to be (so long as they are the same in both) and no matter how the classes they

designate happen to be related to each other in fact, one of the propositions in each contradictory

pair must be true and the other false. Thus, for example, "No squirrels are

predators" and "Some squirrels are predators" are contradictories because

either the classes designated by the terms "squirrel" and "predator" have at least one

common member (in which case the I proposition is true and the E proposition is false) or they do not (in which case the Eis true and the I is false). In exactly the same sense,

the A and O propositions, "All senators are politicians" and "Some

senators are not politicians" are also contradictories.

The universal propositions that appear across from each other at the top of the square (A and E) arecontraries. Assuming that there is at least one member of the class designated by

their shared subject term, it is impossible for both of these propositions to be true, although both

could be false. Thus, for example, "All flowers are colorful objects" and "No

flowers are colorful objects" are contraries: if there are any flowers, then either

all of them are colorful (making the A true and the E false) or none of them are (making the E true and the A false) or some of them are colorful and some are not (making both

theA and the E false).

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Particular propositions across from each other at the bottom of the square (I and O), on the

other hand, are the subcontraries. Again assuming that the class designated by their subject term has at least one member, it is impossible for both of these propositions to be false, but possible

for both to be true. "Some logicians are professors" and "Some logicians

are not professors" are subcontraries, for example, since if there any logicians, then

either at least one of them is a professor (making the I proposition true) or at least one is not a

professor (making the O true) or some are and some are not professors (making both the Iand

the O true).

Finally, the universal and particular propositions on either side of the square of opposition

(A and I on the one left and E and O on the right) exhibit a relationship known as subalternation. Provided that there is at least one member of the class designated by the subject term they have

in common, it is impossible for the universal proposition of either quality to be true while the

particular proposition of the same quality is false. Thus, for example, if it is universally true that

"All sheep are ruminants", then it must also hold for each particular case, so that

"Some sheep are ruminants" is true, and if "Some sheep are ruminants" is

false, then "All sheep are ruminants" must also be false, always on the assumption

that there is at least one sheep. The same relationships hold for corresponding E and O propositions.

Scientific Explanation

The Structure of Explanations

Next, we consider the basic structure of the most comprehensive and effective deployment of inductive reasoning in human history. Since its development during the Renaissance, modern

science has contributed significantly to our ability to perceive, understand, and manipulate the

natural world. Taken generally as a way of acquiring human knowledge, science is a procedure for the invention and evaluation of hypotheses that may be used to explain why things happen as

they do. Unlike dogmatic appeals to the absolute, unchallengeable truth of unsupported

assertions (as, for example, when a parent tells a child, "Because I say so, that's why."),

scientific explanations are always tentative proposals, offered in hopes of capturing the best outlook on the matter but subject to evaluation, modification, or even overturn in light of further

evidence.

The most productive model for the structure of a scientific explanation is that of a valid

deductive argument whose conclusion is the event to be explained. Some of the premises of this

argument will be factual statements of the antecedent circumstances, while the others will be the scientific hypotheses offered as a way of linking those circumstances to the outcome stated

by the conclusion. Scientific predictions have exactly the same structure; the only difference

between the explanation and the prediction of an event is whether or not it has already occurred.

On this deductive-nomological model for scientific explanation, the conclusion of the

argument must be true (that is, the event must occur) if all of the premises are true. Those of its

premises that state the antecedent circumstances will naturally be true so long as we have our facts straight. But the truth of the hypotheses, which try to capture the lawlike relationship

between those circumstances and the event to be explained, will always remain open to

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question. So the quality of the explanation as a whole typically rests upon the extent to which

these hypotheses are reliable.

This reliability can never be established with absolute certainty. It is sometimes possible to

eliminate bad hypotheses by using them as the premises of a deductive argument predicting that particular consequences will follow from a particular set of circumstances and then showing that

the predicted event does not, in fact, occur. (This amounts to the use of Modus Tollens to show

that since the consequent is false, some part of the antecedent must also be false.) But if the

events turn out as predicted, that only tends to confirm the hypotheses; it cannot prove their truth. (Since that would amount to reliance on the fallacy of affirming the consequent.)

Empirical evidence typically underdetermines scientific explanation, leaving us with multiple

hypotheses, any one of which would account for the facts.

Evaluating Hypotheses

Although it always remains impossible in principle to prove the truth of a scientific

hypothesis, it is possible to compare the distinct hypotheses involved in rival explanations of the

same event. Here are several criteria that can bu used in making these relative judgments about the reliability of any hypothesis offered as part of a scientific explanation:

Relevance. At the very least, it must be possible to use the hypothesis as one of the

premises of a valid deductive argument whose conclusion is the event to be explained. In addition, we normally expect that the best explanation of any event will involve

hypotheses whose relationship to that event is readily apparent. Although it could turn out

that an apparent case of food poisoning was actually caused by wearing uncomfortable shoes, for example, that hypothesis is less relevant than one concerned with the

consumption of victuals.

Testability. There must be some way of acquiring evidence that would tend to confirm or discomfirm the hypothesis. In fact, good hypotheses are always falsifiable in the sense

that it is possible to state specific conditions under which the hypothesis would be

decisively overturned. (If, for example, we fed the tainted coleslaw from Lesson 23 to a

hundred people and none of them got sick, this outcome would prove the falsity of Nurse Hayes's hypothesis that the students' indigestion was caused by eating the coleslaw.) This

is what is wrong with dogmatic hypotheses: there are no circumstances under which they

could be proven false, and that is a measure of their total vacuity. Good scientific hypotheses are always "on the line," subject to falsification by the appearance of counter-

evidence.

Compatibility. The hypothesis should fit well with what we already believe about the natural order of things. Since centuries of scientific investigation have provided us with a

body of knowledge comprising many reliable hypotheses, we should expect that each

newly added hypothesis will be consistent with them. Of course, this criterion is not

absolute; genuine scientific revolutions can involve the abandonment or significant modification of previously accepted hypotheses, and it is important to allow for that

possibility.

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Predictive power. A good hypothesis isn't just a way of explaining events of this one sort,

but will be applicable to many other kinds of circumstances as well. Newton's "Law of Universal Gravitation," for example, has a lot of predictive power, since it can be used to

explain great portions of both celestial and terrestrial motion. The extreme case of poor

predictive power is an ad hoc hypothesis, which can be used to explain only a single occurrence of a particular event.

Simplicity. The best hypotheses are rarely intricate in structure. Again, it would be

possible to overemphasize this criterion, since an adquate complex hypothesis is clearly

preferable to a simple but inadequate one. Still, there is a profound elegance and dignity in the simple character of many scientific hypotheses (universal gravitation is a good

example again).

The Scientific Method

What is often called the scientific method is nothing more than a step-by-step procedure for the conduct of scientific research:

1. State the Problem. It is important to begin with a clear statement of what phenomenon is to be investigated. This isn't always as easy as it sounds; faced with a real-life perplexity,

we sometimes become distracted by issues that aren't really to the point. But careful

adherence to the rest of the method will be useless if we don't focus on the matter of

greatest genuine concern. 2. Invent Preliminary Hypotheses. Next, we spin out as many possible explanations for the

phenomenon as we can. At this stage of the process, there is no reason to limit the range

of our creativity by dismissing anything as irrelevant. We'll have opportunity to weed out bad hypotheses later, but a possibility overlooked at this point may be lost forever.

3. Collect Additional Information. We next try to observe the phenomenon in its natural

context from every angle. Again, at this early stage, the premium is on breadth of investigation rather than on a prematurely narrowed focus. The goal of this wide-ranging

review of the facts is to gain some insight into the relative likelihood of our preliminary

notions.

4. Formulate a Hypothesis. Now we're ready to focus on a specific hypothesis, using the information we've gathered to devise a detailed (though still tentative) explanation of the

phenomenon under investigation. This marks a significant shift in our procedure,

returning to the narrow focus of our original definition of the problem. 5. Deduce Further Consequences. Since a good hypothesis has predictive power that

reaches far beyond its function in any particular explanation, we now consider its

additional consequences. If the hypothesis used to explain this phenomenon were actually true, what else would follow from it? Again, our work at this stage should be narrowly

focussed: exactly what should happen if we have identified a correct hypothesis?

6. Test the Consequences. Now we look at the facts again, to see whether or not these

consequences actually occur. If we can set up a concrete situation in which our hypothesis, if correct, would lead to striking results, then if they do not occur as expected,

we'll know that we were wrong and need to go back to step 4 and come up with another

hypothesis. 7. Apply the Hypothesis. If everything checks out, however, we are ready to apply our new

explanation to the original problem for which it was developed. Of course, there's still no

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guarantee—it may work out everywhere else and yet not deal effectively with this case.

But we can always go again.

In general, we repeat this procedure as often as necessary, going back to start over at step 4, or

step 2, or even step 1 until we arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem.

The Uses of Experimentation

Notice that although scientific method is properly considered to rely upon empirical knowledge, several steps in the process do not appeal to any direct observation of the facts.

Steps 1, 2, and 4 in particular often involve creative leaps of intution that are not warranted by

the evidence. Novel ways of defining a problem and radically different hypotheses about solving it typically arise from insight and imagination rather than from observation. But even in such

cases, the scientists differs from dogmatists in their determination to put every such hypothesis

to the test in steps 5 and 6.

Usually experimentation confirms a hypothesis by eliminating its likely alternatives. Thus,

the most powerful confirmation occurs when we are able to devise a "crucial experiment," a set

of circumstances from which rival hypotheses predict distinct results: when we perform such a test, one hypothesis nearly always emerges as the most likely. But this situation tends to arise

only within the context of a well-developed general theory with which only a few alternative

hypotheses would be relevant. As we've noted before, scientific revolutions can occur only when we step outside the bounds of such a restrictive experimental framework.

It is worth noticing that even apparently factual, "objective" investigations of the natural

world often rely upon the theoretical background of a set of accepted scientific hypotheses. Thus, for example, biological taxonomy and descriptions of historical events usually employ

formal systems of classification that embody significant hypotheses about presumed similarities

of nature or origin. Here, as in all of our efforts to engage in sound reasoning, it is vital to

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recognize and uncover the implicit foundations of what we

believe.