perils in transferring technology to the frontier: a case study

Society for Historians of the Early American Republic

Perils in Transferring Technology to the Frontier: A Case StudyAuthor(s): Thomas R. WinpennySource: Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter, 1985), pp. 503-521Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of the EarlyAmerican RepublicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3123064 .

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PERILS IN

TRANSFERRING

TECHNOLOGY TO THE

FRONTIER: A CASE

STUDY

Thomas R. Winpenny Prudent investors in mid-nineteenth century America had reason to believe that the industrial technology responsible for a burgeon- ing textile industry in the East was readily transferable to the Midwest. The application of steam power to cotton textile production in the 1830s and 1840s had produced dramatic results from Newburyport, Massachusetts, to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and there was nothing mysterious or opaque about this technology. Indeed, the steam engine dated from the seventeenth century, had undergone substantial change and refinement in the eighteenth century, and most recently had benefited from the insight of George H. Corliss. Admittedly, there were some subtleties and nuances not perfectly understood, and these gaps in understand- ing were periodically dramatized by violent explosions. Never- theless, mid-nineteenth century engineers were likely to exude confidence on most matters relating to the application of steam power to industry.' There was no apparent reason, therefore,

Mr. Winpenny is a member of the Department of History at Elizabethtown

College in Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania. He wishes to acknowledge a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities in support of the research for this paper, and to thank an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.

1 See Thomas R. Winpenny, "The Engineer as Promoter: Charles Till- inghast James and the Gospel of Steam Cotton Mills," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 105 (Apr. 1981), 166-181; Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Early Stationary Steam Engines in America.: A Study in the Migration of a Technology (Washington 1969); R. H. Thurston, Memoirs and Professional Reports (Hoboken

JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 5 (Winter 1985). @ Society tor Historians of the Early American Republic.



504 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC

why a technology flourishing in New England and the Mid- Atlantic states should not generate comparable good fortune in the Ohio Valley. This essay examines the combined efforts of a New England promoter and a Louisville entrepreneur to bring steam-powered textile production to Cannelton, Indiana, in the 1850s, with particular attention paid to the unexpected frustrations and setbacks involved.

Very little has been published that either describes or analyzes specific instances of the transfer of steam technology to the frontier. There are primarily two reasons for this. First, the avalanche of historical writing on industrialization has concentrated over-

whelmingly on settings east of the Alleghenies. Second, those works concerned with the diffusion of steam power from one region to another invariably view the issue in the aggregate. For example, Peter Temin's well known article in 1966 examining the relative diffusion of steam and water power in the nineteenth century identified 343 stationary steam engines operating in the West as

early as 1838. A later study, based on random samples taken from the manuscript schedules of the United States Census of Manufactures for 1850 and 1860, also dealt with aggregates and also emphasized the rapid diffusion of steam power in the West. The authors of this analysis noted, for example, that the Midwest was roughly equal to the Mid-Atlantic region in the number of

stationary steam engines in 1850; by 1860, however, the Midwest had a decided lead in this category over all other regions.2 Both studies provide sweeping overviews without revealing the details of any one episode. There is an obvious need for a case study, a close examination of a single firm.

The particular case to be examined involves the promotion, construction (1850), and operation of the Cannelton Cotton Mill-later known as the Indiana Cotton Mills. Cannelton is

1871); and Thomas R. Winpenny, "Mill Hands and Boilers: The Anatomy of a Disaster," Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society, 84 (Trinity 1980), 110-124.

2 Peter Temin, "Steam and Waterpower in the Early Nineteenth Cen-

tury," Journal of Economic History, 26 (June 1966), 187-205; Jeremy Atack, Fred

Bateman, and Thomas Weiss, "The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the

Steam Engine in American Manufacturing," Journal of Economic History, 40 (June

1980), 285. In Temin's analysis, the West included the western portions of

New York and Pennsylvania.



TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY 505

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CANNELTON COTTON MILL, 1849

Source: E. Chamberlain, 7he Indiana Gazetteer (3d ed,, Indianapolis 1849). Courtesy Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis.

situated at the tip of south central Indiana on the northern bank of the Ohio River, the town's major connection with the outside world. In some respects Cannelton might be considered a satellite of Louisville, Kentucky, but it is a distant satellite; the meander-

ing Ohio River covers roughly 125 miles between the two points. In the 1840s, although the contemporary estimates vary widely, there were probably fewer than a thousand residents of Cannel- ton, and the community today remains small, isolated, and remote. Why, then, was Cannelton singled out as a site for manufactur-

ing? The answer lies in the resources of the site coupled with the vigorous promotional efforts of a Louisville entrepreneur, Hamilton Smith, and a nationally known promoter and consulting engineer, Charles Tillinghast James.

James, of Providence, Rhode Island, was one of antebellum America's premier industrial promoters. Trained in the practical




dimensions of steam-powered textile production at Slater's Mill in Providence, this peripatetic engineer traveled through New

England, the Mid-Atlantic region, and the South in the 1830s and 1840s heralding the merits of a new technology that promised to revitalize economies. "The Savior of Newburyport" promoted mills in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Newport and Bristol, Rhode Island, and Salem, Massachusetts-the latter project in-

volving 24,000 spindles and an investment of almost $700,000. In Pennsylvania James was responsible for steam-powered cotton mills from Reading to Lancaster to Harrisburg to Pittsburgh.3 The formula for success was reasonably simple: any established

community that could raise $250,000 to $300,000 could have a

fully equipped cotton mill featuring the latest technology. Some skilled labor would have to be imported, but essentially the investors were purchasing a "turn key operation" designed to take

advantage of America's growing demand for cotton goods. Could this formula for success, tested and validated in

established eastern communities, be readily transferred to the frontier? The frontier, in this context, means not the West written about by urban historians Richard Wade and John Reps, but a raw, sparsely populated region remote from urban centers.4

Clearly James made such an effort when invited to Cannelton, but it came about only because his promoter's inclinations were

vigorously reinforced by Hamilton Smith, a western promoter. While it would be easy to lump Charles James and Hamilton

Smith together and see no critical difference in their motivation or vested interests in the Cannelton project, the two men ap- proached the experiment on the banks of the Ohio from very different perspectives. James was first and foremost an industrial

promoter who had built a national reputation. He earned a fee of a few thousand dollars per project for overseeing-from a distance-the erection of a mill, the purchase and installation of

machinery, and the initial operation of the mill. He normally received stock in the company as well. His major flaw, beyond apparent blind optimism and exaggeration, was taking on too

3 Winpenny, "The Engineer as Promoter," passim. 4 See, for example, Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in

Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis (Cambridge 1959), and John W. Reps, Town Planning in Frontier America (Princeton 1969).




many obligations at once. Nevertheless, despite consulting com- mitments scattered across the country, James became a United States senator in 1851 and, in his spare time, developed the "James Rifle," a small cannon used in the Civil War. His motivation in the Cannelton project was simply to meet a new challenge, make some money, and add to his reputation. James had no particular personal interest in the wilds of southern Indiana. He was simply a promoter, spring-loaded as always, eager to respond to opportunity.5

Hamilton Smith, in contrast, had a vested interest in Can- nelton. A native of New Hampshire and a graduate of Dartmouth College, Smith moved in 1832 from Washington, D.C., to Louisville, where he prospered in the practice of law. A second marriage provided ties with in-laws in southern Indiana who had considerable land holdings and looked forward to the development of the region. They convinced Smith to join them in the endeavor. In the early 1840s he invested in the American Can- nel Coal Company-at work in the Cannelton area-and when the firm moved its office from Boston to Louisville he became a director. Given this investment in Cannelton, Smith proceded to think and sound like a visionary on industrial development. He foresaw a great textile mill for the community that would serve as a model to the South and West, and a host of other industrial enterprises as well. Indeed, the state granted twelve charters for industrial ventures in the Cannelton area at mid- century. Furthermore, conscious of the criticisms leveled at the social consequences of industrialization, Smith was anxious to have Cannelton serve as a utopian model that would include homes for workers, schools, Sunday schools, a church, a temperance society, and a newspaper. Beyond all of the rhetoric and dream- ing, however, it is abundantly clear that Hamilton Smith cast aside the dreams and visions in response to the dictates of the balance sheet.6 In reality, he was simply an investor financially committed to Cannelton. In this sense he differed from James.

5 Winpenny, "The Engineer as Promoter," passim. 6 For a discussion of Hamilton Smith's career see Kate Douglas Torrey,

"Visions of a Western Lowell: Cannelton, Indiana, 1847-1851," Indiana Magazine of History, 73 (Dec. 1977), 280-285, 287. See also the Hamilton Smith Mss. (Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington), and Smith's writings in DeBow's Review for August and September 1849 and July 1851. Many of the




Beyond the promoters, the other major consideration in the

emergence of the Cannelton Cotton Mill was resources. The

primary attraction was coal. Efforts to exploit the supply of bituminous coal in Cannelton dated from the 1830s, but the first real success came with the America Cannel Coal Company. A tie-in between the coal company and a coal-consuming cotton mill was logical enough, and a recent author contends that the two firms were separate on paper only.7 Cannelton coal was considered inviting, in part, because it was readily available on the surface. In fact, Hamilton Smith in a fit of bragging to the Lon- don Economist pointed out that "a good miner with a common

pick, shovel & wheel-barrow" could dig and deliver seventy to a hundred bushels of lump coal in a ten-hour work day.8 This bituminous could also be used to fuel a gas works if illumination became desirable.

Less obvious, perhaps, but highly significant were the limitations of Cannelton coal. Cannel coal is a variety of bituminous, and in Indiana it is low grade bituminous-only slightly superior to lignite. It burns readily with considerable flame and smoke and has a high proportion of volatile matter to carbon. It is low in heat value and steamboat engineers on the Ohio hesitated to

buy Cannelton coal because they believed it would not make steam. James believed, correctly, that anthracite was superior, and his previously built mills employed anthracite exclusively.9 The difference between the two fuels in this particular instance was substantial. The supply of coal at Cannelton was more limited than realized. One estimate indicated the deposits may have

charters issued for the Cannelton mill did not go to Smith or members of his

family; it appears that others had visions of industrial growth for the area as well.

7 Torrey, "Visions of a Western Lowell," 283. See also Harold S. Wilson, "The Indiana Cotton Mills: An Experiment in North-South Cooperation," Indiana History Bulletin, 42 (May 1965), 75. At one point the coal company donated eight acres of land to the textile mill.

8 Unsigned letter in Hamilton Smith's handwriting to the editor of the

Economist, London, dated July 1, 1849, Hamilton Smith Mss.

9 Howard N. Eavenson, The First Century and a Quarter of American Coal

Industry (Pittsburgh 1942), 277-285, includes a report by Hamilton Smith to

the secretary of the Indiana State Board of Agriculture lamenting the sorry

history of the American Cannel Coal Company. See also Thomas R. Win-

penny, "Hard Data on Hard Coal: Reflections on Chandler's Anthracite

Thesis," Business History Review, 53 (Summer 1979), 247-255.




covered seventy acres, but did not extend more than a few feet beneath the surface. In any event, most of the main coal beds were depleted as early as 1858, or at about the time that steam power began to function effectively in the cotton mill.1o

Less important than coal, though still noteworthy, was the local availability of sandstone, bricks, and lumber for construction purposes. The Ohio River was an obvious source of water for the mill, yet water supply proved problematic and a waterworks had to be constructed in 1851. Other factors said to favor Cannelton were its proximity to cotton markets, low food prices, and cheap labor."1 Actually, western labor was not cheap, unless one planned to use, as they did, many nine- to thirteen-year-old children. Perhaps the idea of cheap labor was more dream than reality. The aforementioned "advantages" of Cannelton, nevertheless, coupled with the promotional efforts, were sufficient to form a company and launch this venture on the Ohio.

Planning the Cannelton mill and finding funds to complete it turned out to be two very different problems. Hamilton Smith did his utmost to bring influential friends and relatives into the venture. Indiana Judge Elisha Huntington was involved, as was Salmon P. Chase. Robert and Richard Owen of New Harmony were small investors, as were the rapidly rising Newcombs of Louisville. Smith was well connected in Louisville and James was a legitimate national figure. James Montgomery, the Scottish authority on steam-powered cotton mills, offered a glowing en- dorsement. Having said all of this, Smith had a difficult time raising $250,000. Pamphlets praising the Cannelton Cotton Mill as an investment opportunity had been sent to leading industrialists as early as January 1848, but by the spring of 1850 construction was slowing to a halt for lack of funds.12 Apparently the luminaries that Smith drew to the project contributed more prestige than capital, and the remaining sum was hard to raise in the New York capital market.

10 Wilson, "The Indiana Cotton Mills," 78. 1 E. Wilbur to D. H. Newcomb, Sept. 17, 1851, Cannelton Cotton Mill

Letter Press Copybook (1850-1852) [CCM Copybook], Indiana Cotton Mills Mss. (Lilly Library); Hamilton Smith, "Indiana-Her Resources and Pros- pects," DeBow's Commercial Review, Sept. 1849, 246-261.

12 James Montgomery to Hamilton Smith, Aug. 21, 1850, Hamilton Smith Mss. For a discussion of the prominent individuals involved with the early Can- nelton Cotton Mill, see Wilson, "The Indiana Cotton Mills," 76.




Through the spring of 1850 Charles James wrote to Hamilton Smith and complained bitterly about the prejudices of New York bankers who were willing to lend money to anyone wanting to establish industry in New England, but showed total indifference to any mention of an industrial venture in the West. James was sure that New York bankers had ties to New York commission houses that in turn served New England mills that were not anxious to have western competition. The promoter's fund raising efforts in New York were also hurt by his running battle of words with the venerable Amos A. Lawrence in Hunt's Merchants'

Magazine. Lawrence spoke for established and respectable New

England textile magnates utilizing water power; James assumed the role of the gadfly or Jacksonian agitator who promoted a new

technology and argued for expanding textile manufacture into the South and West.'3

Failing to find the needed purchasers of stock in New York, James at least twice recommended bonded indebtedness to Smith. While considering this alternative, however, Smith encountered a not-so-subtle tactic from James in the form of a blistering letter dated June 21, 1850, in which James found myriad ways of call-

ing the investors of the southern Indiana-Louisville area spineless and lacking in imagination. James then hastened to add that this

pervasive "pusilanimity" did not apply directly to Hamilton Smith and his cadre of investors. James refused to make another trip to Louisville. He argued that Cannelton was almost finished and that if local investors could not see the logic in providing funds to complete it, they deserved to fail. In an aside designed to ap- peal to regional pride, he added that the total investment in Can- nelton was child's play compared to the three million dollars New

Englanders had invested in the Hadley Falls Mills.14 When all of this pushing, prodding, and bullying failed, the Cannelton Cot- ton Mill successfully raised the remaining money through the sale of bonds. Financing also included the sale of stock to cotton

growers in return for cotton. The physical plant that emerged from all of this was im-

pressive, and situated on the banks of the Ohio in 1850 must

13 James to Smith, May 4, 29, 1850, Hamilton Smith Mss.; Hunt's Mer-

chants' Magazine and Commercial Review (Nov. 1849 - Mar. 1850). 14 James to Smith, June 21, May 29, 1850, Hamilton Smith Mss.




have seemed even more so. The one feature that set it apart from other James mills was the use of three-foot wide blocks of In- diana sandstone brought in by tramway from a nearby quarry. The dimensions of the building were otherwise rather standard: 65 feet wide by 287 feet long and five stories high, with the fifth story including a pitched tin roof with dormers. The building had stone gutters. It was intended to house 10,000 spindles and 372 looms. An early Victorian example of Romanesque architec- ture, the mill profile was majestically accented by twin towers, centrally located on the front of the building, that reached skyward approximately 106 feet. These towers had several purposes. They were a conscious (yet routine) effort to add architectural "style" in response to those who posited that textile mills were drab and dreary. More practically, the north tower housed a bell and fire escape and the south tower held water that could be used to flood an area of the mill in case of fire. To the side and rear of the main building were an engine house with a substantial chimney, a heavily insured warehouse, and cisterns housing several thousand gallons of water to combat fire.'5

In many ways this was a typical James mill, and he is often credited with designing it. Twenty years ago, however, an architectural historian traced the actual drawing of the plans to a Thomas Tefft of the Providence, Rhode Island, architectural firm of Tallman and Bucklin.16 Most of the machinery for the mill, including a steam engine rated at 250 horsepower, came from William Mason and Company of Taunton, Massachusetts, a firm with which Charles James had longstanding ties.'7

Many nineteenth century mills benefited from landscaping. In Cannelton this meant a substantial lawn and trees surrounded by a fence. The reason for the fence was a mystery until an early picture of the mill revealed horses grazing on the lawn. Horses might have been employed on the tramway connecting the quarry and the mill or later on the railroad built between the coal fields and the mill.

Viewed in its entirety, the addition of the cotton mill to Can- nelton in 1850 was the development that would elevate this fron-

15 Barbara Wriston, "Who Was the Architect of the Indiana Cotton Mill, 1849-1850?" Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 24 (May 1965), 171.

16 Ibid. 17 CCM Copybook, passim.




tier hamlet. The intrepid Charles Tillinghast James and Louisville

entrepreneurs were going to show the New England textile clique.8 In the view of its promoters, the village was destined to become a boom town, with more industries sprouting up followed by many of the amenities one might expect to find in the East. This great experiment, once labeled a beacon to the South and West, was

destiny's child, and success was foreordained. Company records, however, reveal a different story.

What emerges from Cannelton in 1850-1851 is the story of a textile mill going into production at a very difficult time that was rescued by the Newcombs of Louisville in 1853. They, in

turn, struggled mightily with a new technology in an isolated location and ultimately succeeded. The mill managed to make

money, paid handsome dividends in the 1860s and 1880s, and endured for a century.'9 The project failed, however, in three of its more idealistic aims: (1) its humanitarian notions of a workers' paradise were quickly abandoned, (2) the West and South were neither inspired nor awe-stricken by the venture, and (3) Cannelton never became a frontier boom town that grew into a significant urban area. In brief, the Cannelton experiment succeeded as a business but failed in other respects.

At a time when the number of American economists could be counted on the fingers of one hand, there was little likelihood that James, Smith, Montgomery, or Newcomb knew that 1850 was an unfortunate year to launch a new cotton mill, but there are at least three reasons why this was so. The overriding consideration was an imbalance between supply and demand. Too

many promoters and too much enthusiasm had, quite simply, produced too many cotton mills and too many yards of cloth.

Overproduction was exacerbated by cotton imports that constituted an increasing threat since the tariff reduction of 1846. The price of raw cotton, which also responded to changing market condi-

tions, was quite high at mid-century, thereby raising costs and

reducing profits. The published complaints regarding low return on capital in the textile industry by Amos A. Lawrence also might have been harmful under other market conditions, but this had

only a limited detrimental effect in 1850. It may be noted that

"8 James to Smith, Mar. 8, 1850, Hamilton Smith Mss. 19 Minute Book, Stockholders' Meetings, Indiana Cotton Mills Mss.




the Conestoga Steam Mills of Lancaster, Pennsylvania-another James project of the same era-ran headlong into the same difficulties. In each instance, a change in ownership ensued.20

At Cannelton, an inability to appreciate the subtle and mysterious workings of the economy led to much bickering and infighting, charges and countercharges. The most fascinating part of this was the growing distance between promoter James and entrepreneur Smith, who represented the owners of the Cannelton Cotton Mill. As already shown, relations became a bit strained during the long and drawn out process of raising capital. A careful reading of the relevant correspondence for the years 1849-1851

suggests that there were essentially three major and recurring sources of friction. First, James was experienced and therefore confident in the promotion and erection of cotton mills-having been through the process at least thirty times prior to Cannelton- while the Louisville group was new at the game, hesitant, and insecure. Understandably, the Cannelton investors sought more "hand holding" than James was able or willing to provide. Sec- ond, and clearly related to the first point, James was often a thousand miles away in Providence, Boston, or New York City at- tending to a variety of business matters and was slow in respond- ing to letters from Indiana or Kentucky. He became ill during this period and was confined to bed, he lost a daughter to scarlet fever, and his hired clerk was often swamped with paper work. James never carried out transactions as rapidly as the Cannelton folk believed he should. There always seemed to be delays.21

Finally, decided underfinancing of the mill, including a shortage of working capital at the outset, made a host of tasks more difficult than they otherwise might have been, and James carried some of the weight of this underfinancing by allowing the mill to discount bills on his own personal credit. In addition, the in- tegrity of the bonds issued hinged, in part, on his association with the mill. A revealing letter in July 1851, apparently written by Hamilton Smith, observed: "If James breaks and we are called on to meet our acceptances we must get time. ... I hope sincerely

20 Thomas R. Winpenny, Industrial Progress and Human Welfare (Washington 1982), 25-49.

21 See James to Smith, Jan. 21, 1850, and passim, 1850-1851, Hamilton Smith Mss.




that he will be able to stand up. We have given him all we had and all he asked."22 Ironically, then, James managed to become the scapegoat for an operation that readily would have failed without him. James was also condemned for having appointed Ziba Cook to run the mill after Cook turned out to be less than a glowing moral example for young mill operatives. Cook, brought in from New York in the fall of 1850, drank heavily and swore without reservation.

The decision at the annual meeting of the Cannelton Cotton Mill in 1851 to lease the plant to Newcomb and Company of Louisville for $10,000 a year without first consulting James constituted the final stroke separating James from the mill. The Prov- idence promoter argued that Hamilton Smith and his colleagues had no right to do so, and that the rental figure was ridiculously low-comparable to giving the mill away.23 The mill had started off poorly, however, was in desparate need of funds, and the Newcomb family of Louisville was already involved in Cannelton coal and textile enterprises. Furthermore, led particularly by Horatio Dalton Newcomb, Newcomb and Company was committed to adding the needed capital and persevering.

An additional infusion of $30,000 plus assumption of $200,000 in debts gave a Newcomb-led group complete control of the mill in 1853. The new owners of the reorganized operation, renamed the Indiana Cotton Mills, represented a broad geographical spread. The Newcombs of Louisville held 24 percent of the new stock while planter James C. Ford, also of Louisville, owned 12 percent. Boston investors led by Hamilton Willis and Edmund Dwight held just over 50 percent while Louisiana planters led by M.B. Sellers owned another 10 percent.24 This reorganization provided sufficient capital and stability to allow the mills to succeed, even

though the Boston investors withdrew in 1857, as did most of the Louisiana planters in the early 1860s. This left the Newcombs with 80 percent of the stock and planter James C. Ford with the rest.

The correspondence relating to the Indiana Cotton Mills for the 1850s reveals endless patience on the part of the Newcombs

22 Smith to James Boyd, July 31, 1851, ibid. 23 James to Smith, Sept. 10, 1851, ibid. 24 Minute Book, Stockholders' Meetings, 1853, Indiana Cotton Mills Mss.




as they encountered one frustration after another before establishing a reasonably smooth factory operation. Most of their difficulty after 1853 was a function of technological problems exacerbated by being hundreds of miles away from help, expertise, new machinery, and spare parts. Admittedly, some problems could be solved through firms in Louisville or Cincinnati, but often the answer resided in Providence, Boston, or Taunton-rarely in Cannelton.

The village of Cannelton did grow, particularly between 1849 and 1851, but, ironically, two kinds of additions were missing: those that would have complemented the textile mill, and those that would have made life in Cannelton more attractive. Beyond the coal company and the cotton mill there was a church, a hotel, a bank, two private schools (probably without their own buildings), a library association (rather than a free lending library), and a newspaper- The Economist-created expressly by Cannelton's industrialists to expound their point of view.25 The village also included a tailor, a baker, a shoemaker, a shingle maker, a cabinet- maker, a seller of stoves, a steam planing mill, and the Etna works that made castings of all kinds. Dr. S.D. Moore was said to "practice medicine" while Dr. S.D. Clark "healed the sick."26 Miss- ing from this oasis were free lending libraries, free schools, mechanics' institutes, lecture halls, varieties of churches, theatres, dance halls, opera houses, restaurants, parks, jewelry stores, clothing stores, confectioners, brewers, clockmakers, gunsmiths, silversmiths, saddlemakers, and coppersmiths. These were not only missing but missed, if letters written from the village can be believed.

Services created by municipalities in the East in the name of the general welfare or as a kind of public utility had to be developed privately by the user in Cannelton. By comparison, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, a much older community, had a public waterworks as early as 1837 and a significant upgrading of the public facility occurred in 1851. Quite possibly this improvement was prompted by the needs of the new textile mills, but the tax- payer paid the bill. In Cannelton, the textile mill had to harness

25 Torrey, "Visions of a Western Lowell," 286. 26 See T. J. De La Hunt, Perry County (Indianapolis 1916); and History

of Warrick, Spencer, and Perry Counties, Indiana (Chicago 1885).




its own water supply. Similarly, the privately owned Lancaster Gas Works produced coal gas for illumination and made it available to the entire community; in Cannelton the mill had to build its own gas works in order to operate past sundown.27

Access to Cannelton was severely limited in 1850. The Ohio River was the main artery, the singular means of practical access; however, the river had not been canalized, and it was not

always passable. A spring flood, a summer drought, or a winter freeze had the potential to halt the flow of steamboat traffic, to

say nothing of an occasional boiler explosion that littered the water-

way with splinters, arms, legs, and lost cargo. The dream of a railroad was always compelling, and the letters of Hamilton Smith make it clear that he kept abreast of, and lobbied for, expanded rail facilities in his region. But, realistically, a rail line to Can- nelton was out of the question. An improved road was the goal of the Cannelton, Troy, and Jasper Plank Road Company formed in 1850 and attracting perhaps as much as $28,000 in capital. Only a few miles of the road, however, were constructed before the project was abandoned. In brief, Cannelton remained hard to reach.28

The town's transportation problems serve to underscore the dramatic limitations of some frontier or western sites as locations for modern manufacturing. It is all the more unfortunate, therefore, that the steam-powered installation at Cannelton func- tioned as poorly as it did through the 1850s, thereby compound- ing the problems. What is puzzling about this is that not only had Charles James, the engineer with overriding responsibility, been through the process countless times, but he had an established and proven network through which he worked. For example, the

developers of a James mill did not go shopping for machinery hoping to find good equipment, but rather went directly to a leader in the field-William Mason and Company of Taunton, Massachusetts.29

27 J. I. Mombert, An Authentic History of Lancaster County (Lancaster, Pa.

1869), 442; E. Wilbur to D. H. Newcomb, Sept. 17, 1851, CCM Copybook;

Winpenny, Industrial Progress and Human Welfare, 82-83; Chapin, Treadwell, and Co. to Edmund Dwight, Jan. 28, 1856, Indiana Cotton Mills Mss.

28 History of Warrick, Spencer, and Perry Counties, 608. A bad steamboat acci-

dent occurred at Cannelton on March 14, 1854, scalding between thirty-five and fifty deck hands and passengers. CCM Copybook (1852-1855).

29 CCM Copybook (1850-1852).




It is possible, given the remote location, that some of the per- sonnel on this project were substandard in their experience or qualifications. Most engineers at that time were not formally trained; rather, they learned their skills on the job under other self-trained individuals. The on-site engineer who supervised construction of the Cannelton mill was one Alexander McGregor, whose previous experience included working for the army at Fort Adams in Rhode Island. There is nothing to suggest that he had worked for James before. The drawing of the plans for the Can- nelton Cotton Mill, as noted earlier, was left to a young designer, Thomas Tefft, while the senior partners in the firm of Tallman and Bucklin drew up the plans for boarding houses, the superintendent's house, and a hotel.30 The initial superintendent of the mill, Ziba Cook, was hired on the recommendation of James, but there is no way of knowing whether he was first-rate or simply the best man willing to relocate in the West. Several have contended that Cook as superintendent was a disaster, but he took his work seriously, sought solutions to a host of technological problems, and generally labored under difficult circumstances.31

The mill that produced its first cloth on January 7, 1851, had to close less than two months later in order to scrape lime from the bottom of its boilers. The presence of lime in the water supply meant that every few weeks it was necessary to shut down for a few days. Boilers would have to cool before they could be worked on, and the process of chipping off the lime deposits was tedious. Superintendent Cook wrote to James and to other authorities seeking a solution, but none was forthcoming. In May Cook was still complaining of the problem, noting that the boilers were coated again and that they had just been cleaned two weeks ago. His next approach was to follow the recommendation of Scien- tific American and coat the boilers with coal tar, but the problem continued. Investor James Boyd, writing to Hamilton Smith in September, caustically noted that the mill might run better if the company could find a superintendent who knew the difference between a steam engine and a water wheel. (Cook was fired shortly

30 Wilson, "The Indiana Cotton Mills," 77; Wriston, "Who Was the Ar- chitect?" 172. One might wonder why the assignments were not reversed. Evidently the senior figures considered the house and hotel designs more in- teresting work.

31 James Boyd to Smith, Sept. 9, 1851, Hamilton Smith Mss.




thereafter.) A solution to the build-up of lime in the boilers might have resided in the construction of a waterworks in September, which provided an opportunity to reduce or eliminate the lime- stone in the water either by filtration, dilution, or the addition of chemicals. This was not attempted, and as late as January 1854 the mill was still closing periodically for a week to scale the boilers.32

Another technological "snag," this one perhaps as much

perceived as real, was the six months between the time cloth was first produced and the point at which the mill put all its equipment into operation: 10,800 spindles and 372 looms, operated by three hundred employees. In short, why did it take half a

year or more to flick the switch or turn the key in a "turn key operation"? James freely admitted, as late as June 1851, that it would take some time for the mill to get into full swing and reach peak efficiency.33 This was, at best, a half-truth. On the one hand he was correct in alleging that workers needed time to learn the machinery (known to students of industrialization as the Horndahl effect); on the other hand he was no doubt pain- fully slow in starting up because of market conditions and a serious

shortage of operating capital. A host of difficulties with steam power continued to plague

the mill, and this is chronicled in the letters between Dwight Newcomb, residing in Cannelton, and his brother in Louisville. In September 1852, a cast iron pipe supplying the boilers broke, causing the mill to shut down. In October one of the boilers burnt

out, again stopping work. Newcomb didn't want to "start up again until the new boilers are ready," and urged his brother to press Glover, Gantt and Company to rush their work on the new boilers. Meanwhile, the mill would stay closed and get a coat of paint. On October 28, 1852, the mill got started again, but the new furnace worked poorly. They pushed the fires to build up steam to power the mill, but there was no draft to the furnace. They managed to operate for half a day, but only by

32 Ziba Cook to , Mar. 5, 1851, CCM Copybook (1852-1855); Ziba Cook to Willis Raney, May 24, 1851, ibid.; James Boyd to Smith, Sept. 9, 1851, Hamilton Smith Mss.; Dwight Newcomb to H. D. Newcomb, Jan. 18, 1854, CCM Copybook (1852-1855).

33 James to Smith, June 16, 1851, Hamilton Smith Mss.




cutting out half of the machinery.34 The Newcombs clearly struggled, were often confused, and

generally longed for an expertise that rarely was available in their remote corner of the universe. On January 28, 1853, H.D. Newcomb wrote to his brother in Cannelton suggesting that the solution to a better draft required a chimney perhaps as tall as 140 to 160 feet. The very next day he wrote again and claimed that the real problem was leaks in the furnace. A letter a few weeks later, however, from a Louisville engineer reinforced the former notion by pointing out that the current cotton mill chimney was about half the size required for the amount of boiler in use.35 With this knowledge in hand Newcomb had to confront the dislocation and expense involved in building a massive new chimney, the scaffolding costs alone being substantial. He and others seemed blissfully unaware of the extent to which the fuel supply may have been the root of the problem.

Perhaps equally disconcerting was the kind of condescending letter that Greenwood and Fifield of Cincinnati sent to H.D. Newcomb in January 1853. The Ohio firm was shipping to Can- nelton three condensers to replace the one burst at the mill. It said, in essence, that the new ones were almost impossible to damage, but to be careful with the pipefitting work. Several months later a plaintive letter from Dwight Newcomb to Green- wood and Fifield charged that "if the pipes are not put up right it is your fault. You agreed to send a man here who would do the work in a proper manner. We have no one here who knows anything about putting up pipes or condensors."36

One final illustration of the frustrations the Newcombs faced with their steam power system in the 1850s can be seen in a quest for new boilers. William Inman of Louisville, on whom they had relied for some work in the past, declined the job because he would have to do far too much of it by hand. H.D. Newcomb concluded that he would have to turn to Providence to get the

34 Dwight Newcomb to H. D. Newcomb, Sept. 14, Oct. 8, Oct. 28, 1852, CCM Copybook (1852-1855).

35 H. D. Newcomb to Dwight Newcomb, Jan. 28, 29, 1853, Indiana Cot- ton Mills Mss.; William Inman to Dwight Newcomb, Feb. 15, 1853, ibid.

36 Greenwood and Fifield to H. D. Newcomb, Jan. 31, 1853, ibid.; Newcomb to Greenwood and Fifield, Oct. 15, 1853, CCM Copybook (1852-1855).




work done, even though dealing with a distant city was not always a simple matter. On one occasion the Providence firm was unable to work on a boiler destined for Cannelton for some time because it had been buried in a snow drift and could not be taken into the shop. Some two months later, when the boilers were finished and loaded on a freight car in Baltimore bound for Wheeling, they were again snowed in. The manufacturer promised to ride

along with the boilers and see to it that they found safe passage down the river to Cannelton.37 What he did not say, but the Newcombs had to know because they owned steamboats, was that no one wanted to transport something the size and weight of boilers down the Ohio. Moving boilers from Rhode Island to Indiana in the 1850s was not a task to be taken lightly.

Here, then, is a brief chronicle of some of the difficulties encountered by the owners of the Indiana Cotton Mills as they employed steam power on the banks of the Ohio in the 1850s.

Frequently they stated an open sense of ignorance and helplessness only to find that those at a distance who might help were reluc- tant to make their way to Cannelton. After the 1850s complaints regarding steam power at the mill diminished sharply, suggesting decided improvement with the system.

In conclusion, it is necessary and useful to place this case

study in historical perspective. Certainly the frustrations and setbacks experienced by Hamilton Smith, Charles James, and Ziba Cook throughout the early 1850s reveal a great deal regarding the difficulties inherent in transferring technology from New

England to the Midwest. At the same time it is vital to note that the cotton mill established at Cannelton in 1850 did, indeed, sur- vive and go on to provide jobs and income in the region for almost a century. Furthermore, what took place at Cannelton was part of a much larger trend that saw the Midwest industrialize and become-in many ways-remarkably like the East in its economic

development. The parallels to be seen in the development of the two regions

are made abundantly clear in Douglass North's classic study of the American economy for the period 1790-1860. Like others

37 D. Newcomb to E. Wilbur, Apr. 9, 1853, Indiana Cotton Mills Mss.; N. G. Greene to D. Newcomb, Jan. 30, 1857, ibid.; N. G. Greene to D.

Newcomb and E. Wilbur, Mar. 11, 1857, ibid.




before him, North divided the United States into three major sections: North, South, and West. He further posited a strong degree of specialization and heavy inter-regional trade. North then asked what each region did with its export income. He concluded that the South used its export wealth to enhance and expand the institution of slavery while both the North and West (Midwest) used their export income to create the infrastructure for a modern urban-industrial society.38

In choosing this road to economic growth and development, midwesterners were opting for more than just modernity. They were asserting regional pride and-in the best Jacksonian tradition-pursuing equal economic opportunity as they sought to challenge the industrial monopoly of the East. It was surely embarrassing to trip and stumble at the outset the way the folks at Cannelton did, but there would be other days and, ultimately, success.

38 See Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860 (New York 1961), 135-176.



perils in transferring technology to the frontier: a case study

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