performance as an incentive in traditional societies

7
Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies Author(s): Tarsis B. Kabwegyere Source: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1973), pp. 63-68 Published by: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40173759 . Accessed: 14/06/2014 05:42 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Spectrum. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Upload: tarsis-b-kabwegyere

Post on 22-Jan-2017

213 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

Performance as an Incentive in Traditional SocietiesAuthor(s): Tarsis B. KabwegyereSource: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1973), pp. 63-68Published by: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/GermanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40173759 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 05:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Africa Spectrum.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

TARSIS B. KABWEGYERE

The main object of this paper is to compare and contrast some of the characteristics of incentives in both the monetary and subsistence econo- mies. An attempt will be made to point out the sociological implications in the conclusion. The main examples will be drawn from East Africa.

In a survey of "African Labour Efficiency" C. H. Northcott, who was the director of the project, put down in the following words the object of that survey: "To discover what incentives appeal to Africans, what is the degree of their efficiency, what factors impair the effective use of their la- bour and by what means their output and their willingness to work may be improved1." This survey was concerned with the study of the African eco- nomic behaviour in a changing East African environment. These changing circumstances were in the main a consequence of the introduction of a monetary economy following the entrenchment of colonial rule in the re- gion. To Northcott the main problem that lay in the future for East Africa and needed to be studied in detail was the Africans' "adjustment" to these circumstances and a full grasp of the "knowledge of their feelings towards the complex life of town and factory2."

That the Northcott team was concerned with "town and factory" life is clearly shown by the types of incentives they hoped would influence the Africans' economic behaviour. At this point it is necessary to point out the main biases of this project in order to provide a setting for the discussion that will follow.

First of all the East African was considered to be a different kind of eco- nomic animal from the European for whom he was working in the opera- tion of the monetary economy. The main differences were attributed to "native life". "The East African has not been bent under the discipline of organised work." On top of that, "In his primitive economy, the steady continuous work is carried out by women3", while in Europe the proletar- ians were mainly men. The study was interested in studying which incen- tives would be used to make the East African male a proletarian. For the purposes of this paper, a better understanding of the above views entails the distinction between a monetary and a subsistence economy and the

1 Northcott, C. H.: African Labour Efficiency Survey = Colonial Research Publications No. 3, His Majesty's Station- ery Office.

2 Northcott, C. H.: African Labour Efficiency Survey . . . pp. 78 - 79.

3 Northcott, C. H.: African Labour Efficiency Survey ... p. 7.

63

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

pertaining conditions of work and the consequent division of labour. Se- condly what does "organised work" mean?

The characteristics of a monetary economy are many and any list is in- fluenced by the main focus of the individual writer. Hereunder three char- acteristics will be highlighted.

A monetary economy is by nature a large scale bureaucratically organ- ised human activity. Directly or indirectly everyone works for a "boss". Directly one may be an employee, earning a wage or salary in a factory. Alternatively a person may be producing for a market. In this latter case the "boss" does not have to be an individual but a "behaviour group", the market. Thirdly, because a person "works" for another, the question of the reward for labour used is very crucial in a monetary economy. This reward, in a monetary economy, is evaluated in terms of money - mate- rial benefits. After all both the "employer" and the employee need money for its convertible value to satisfy other needs. As a result of this, work is given a material value and because this is so, efficiency is a requisite factor in a monetary economic activity. In summary one could say that labour - efficiency and reward are the tripods of a monetary economic activity.

The Northcott study of the East African Railway Labour Force was lar- gely influenced by these considerations. The question then was what incen- tive schemes would motivate the worker to produce a high output. The team was on the side of the employer. The project was financed by the Colonial Social Science Research Council, an organization that was set up to increase social science knowledge largely about colonial peoples but also to apply social science techniques in order to increase output from colonial resources. The question was thus how much "carrot" should be used in order to accelerate "adjustment" and hence increase output. Such were the questions: was financial reward adequate for the African to be motivated to do more work? Did workers take pride in the work they did? Did they enjoy it? Did the workers have skills required on their job? Were they given enough food for their nutrition? Was the management effective i. e. were the aptitudes of the workers maximally utilised? In short what is it that could be done to make the African man of the "town and factory"?

The next point to consider is what is meant by "organised work". This is related to the general questions of under what conditions does work take place. Simply defined, organised work is activity aimed at realizing set goals4, and to take a factory as an example, the set goals are deter- mined more often than not by someone or forces outside the working group. Often the place of work is enclosed in four walls covered with a roof. The work situation is more or less permanently structured. Within this set up, Northcott's set of questions is relevant. What happens in a traditional situation which we should immediately describe, where most of the characteristics so far discussed are absent?

A subsistence economy is a small scale human activity. There is no re- cognisable boss who appropriates labour. A family produces for itself. The

4 This is a general definition which in- cludes individually or organised activity

but in this paper we are concerned with group activity.

64

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

father of the family is in no way similar to the factory owner. In the event of a surplus, the family barters it in return for those products the family could not produce or does not have in enough supply. In most African so- cieties, the extended family was the economic unit. What was produced was basically for domestic consumption, so that the producers were at the same time the consumers. There was no direct or indirect boss who would be interested in the economic output of this economic unit. It was a question of survival or extinction of the family if enough food, clothing and shelter were not produced. One must not overlook the fact that there were some people who vegetated on the produce of other people. The case in point are those who were in positions of authority. The subjects paid tribute to those in authority. Nevertheless, this was rarely defined in precise meas- ure. A person gave away to the chief a portion of what he had produced. The chief did not determine what the individual was to produce. The indi- vidual did not produce to satisfy a "boss" as a factory work does. In a situation like this, the main problem is to discover what incentives were used to motivate people to engage in organised activity if by incentive we mean external stimuli applied to an economic unit to maximise its output.

Organised work in a monetary economy is based on the principles we have already mentioned: labour as input, efficiency as a measure of per- formance and salary or wage as reward. Thus organised work in "town and factory" is characterised by wage scales, workshop opportunities, housing systems, and ordered routine5. Organised work in this context is not seasonal but ordered routine that is ever increasing in complexity. The work discipline is obtained by manipulating the conditions of work and the reward schemes. Participation of the individual in this organised activity is on the understanding that there is a monetary reward.

In traditional society work was organised within the framework of a subsistence economy. Among other things the participation of an individual was not in anticipation of material rewards. Participation in organised work was conditioned by the overriding concern with communal survival. This needs illustration.

A person who wanted to build a new house knew he could not do this job alone. Even if he were able to do it, he would not attempt it because this would mean that he was an isolate6. He therefore told his relatives of his plans and sought advice on the best material, the best season during which to undertake the job, and if need be he consulted a diviner about the suitability of the location of the house. All he needed on top of this was to prepare food and drink for the people on the given day to under- take the task. If the man was not self-sufficient in food supply, some of the drink and food may be contributed by the very people coming to work.

The activity of house building was highly organised and operated on sophisticated division of labour. The women prepared the food, some of

5 This point does not include occupat- ions like pottery, blacksmith and carpen- try. These were highly specialised activities which produced surpluses for exchange. Me- dicinemen also provided services beyond the boundaries of their kindred works.

6 This does not mean that there were no social isolates. However this involved social costs, and social isolation was a de- viation rather than the norm.

65

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

the men prepared the ground, others collected materials and so on. Those who knew how to do the roof worked on it. One obvious point is that house building, much as it was organised, was occasional because house build- ing was not "ordered routine", in which men and women participated for a living nor can one argue that the food and drink were the incentives because these were part and parcel of the social activity.

A similar but much more common activity was communal cultivation. At peak seasons like bush clearing, sowing and harvesting of crops like mil- let or sorghum, activities which required a lot of labour, people from re- lated and friendly families came together and worked together at each field in turn. The participant at one of the fields knew that his contribution would be reciprocated with a contribution from the man at whose field he was working in combination with others who expected him to do the same. The simple point is that it is performance for the common good that motivated neighbours, friends or relatives to work for each other rather than material reward. The food he ate and the drink he took were not different from those he had taken before or he had left in his house. He did not work for profit. This was a situation where hankering after ma- terial benefits for their own sake did not exist. In this situation doing one's best in the name of the community was the source of satisfaction and social security and an object for emulation. Individual performance al- though individually recognised, was subordinated to the common will. Working collectively in building a house or working in the field was incen- tive enough for the future behaviour of the individuals in the group be- cause they knew that they will, when need be, get the same service.

Two more examples, namely hunting and war, may illustrate this kind of co-operation. Hunting was one of the most common social activities that required communal co-operation. Hunting may be untertaken to get rid of pest animals which menaced the community's crops. It may be un- dertaken to fight against man eating animals like lions. Hunting was also undertaken partly as sport und partly in an effort to supplement the meat supply to the community.

Dogs for chasing the animal were required. Therefore someone indi- vidual or two supplied the dogs. Everyone needed a spear and sometimes bows and arrows on which poison was smeared for the effective kill of the animal. Nets may also be necessary to make snares for capturing the ani- mals.

A hunting expedition involved a division of labour. Some must carry the nets and place them in position; some must follow the animal. Others must surround it and finally kill it. The ultimate and most sociologically interest- ing part was the sharing of the meat in the case of an edible animal. This is yet another case of how performance is rewarded but in a way that is still embraced within a non-monetary economic set up.

The man who speared the animal was given the largest piece of the animal, often (in Ankole - Western Uganda) the chest including the fore legs and the head. The next in succession was the person who had de- tected the footmarks of the animal and alerted the hunting expedition. Third in order was one who owned the dog which chased the animal. The

66

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

rest came in order of age, ability to run after the animal and so on. The most important point to note is that this hierarchy was not a basis for so- cial differentiation in the community as a whole but simply an adhoc basis for the division of the animal. If a person consistently performed well at hunting expeditions, he may acquire prestige and respect and become an object for emulation. But this did not accrue to him any material rewards. A well known hunter may have killed a lion with a spear. The younger gen- eration or people of his age may come to him to learn about hunting. For this service to the community he did not ask for a wage. However, in his old age or if he should be disabled, the hunter may still get a piece of meat from every hunting expedition even if he did not have a marked worth to the community.

War is yet another social activity which involved many people who need- ed to be organised. War was untertaken to protect or to save a communi- ty. The successful warrior acquired a kind of distinction that added to his social prestige rather than to his material position. If one listens to the war songs or war dances that are still prevalent in Uganda, one will not fail to note the weight put on performance. A successful fighter left the bat- tle field with bravery and honour rather than wealth, unlike promotion in a factory which is above all accompanied by material perquisites. Some of the successful warriors may become chiefs as in Lango and Acholi in Northern Uganda but this was not the norm. Instead, they were given nick- names in recognition of their performance in whatever activity they engag- ed in. In Western Uganda names like Rutatera hansi (he never misses when he aims), Rutabanzibwa (no one can go before him - he goes first) Ruba nda mahwa, (he cannot be hindered by thorns because he walks on

them) and so on were given. The emphasis was not on what was acquired materially but rather on social evaluation and community recognition. One

might say that social recognition was the chief incentive in these circum- stances.

One may argue that performance is as important in "town and factory life" as it was in the traditional setting. Promotion to the higher ranks in a factory is based on the individual performance. One point of distinction, however, needs to be observed, that in a monetary economy promotion without a corresponding monetary reward would be meaningless. Besides, the monetary reward is clearly defined in a person's terms of employment and service. Northcott observed of the African in East Africa, that "To work steadily and continuously at the will and direction of another was one of the hard lessons he (the African) had to learn when he began to work for Europeans." This is true in historical fact. The most important thing is not that he was working for the Europeans but the fact that he was operat- ing within a monetary economy, for traditionally the work he did for others was not for material returns nor for a boss. Northcott observed this: "Though the tasks he performed were prescribed by tribal law and

custom, he could do them in his own way and at his own speed. The work he did for others was not for wages. It was one of the duties arising out of his relationship with his fellows."

In the early years of the monetary economy in East Africa, financial in- 67

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: Performance as an Incentive in Traditional Societies

centives did not achieve the desired goals for which they were intended, especially that of keeping the African in the urban area readily available for industrial employment. This was not so much a result of what was call- ed the "native culture" as to the economic ethos in which the African was born and reared. When the African found the "town und factory life" hos- tile and left it, some scholars called him a "target worker". When he found "Gemeinschaft" (relationship) absent in the work situation and absented himself, the African was regarded as lazy. In the East African states where the majority are still peasants and only a small minority in town, the dis- tinction between town and country life, between the subsistence and the monetary economy has still to be made if one is interested in understand- ing the behaviour of the would be proletarians. Elkan tried to explain the high rate of turnover in an African labour force in Kampala not in terms of the conflict between the norms of subsistence economic life and those of a monetary economy, but in terms of ethnic origin. For example he found the Baganda to be more proletarian than any other ethnic group7. One crucial variable overlooked was the degree of exposure to the new norms of economic life in Buganda - the heartland of Uganda's economy. Among other things money was seen as a possible tool against absentee- ism, as if absenteeism was simply an economic phenomenon without a social content.

Let us suggest some of the sociological implications arising out of the discussion. The fact that in a monetary economy a person works for a "boss", the person who determines the nature of work, the goal of work and the reward ultimately, leads to the phenomenon known as alienation. The worker in this context is highly substitutable - the person is reduc- ed to an object for production. Whether the goods he is assisting in pro- ducing are to his liking or not may not so much matter so long as he earns his living. This is in a marked contrast to participation in communal ac- tivities in a traditional set up. Because the scale of social organzation is small and because organised work had a purpose i. e. the common good of the community, and because people involved knew each other through a web of affiliations, alienation was virtually non-existent in traditional so- cieties.

Lastly, in a traditional society, social differentiation was minimal. This was largely because labour was not rewarded with material benefits which would lead to capital accumulation which leads to differentiation. Because capital accumulation was virtually non-existent, class differentiations were minimal. The question that is often asked by those interested in economic development is can Gemeinschaft (relationships) lead to economic inno- vation and development? The answer seems to be in the negative. Since a monetary economy is inescapable in modern life, a more important question that should be asked constantly and researched into is whether material accumulation can go hand in hand with human dignity. Perhaps this is one of the questions that economic planners in new nations should ponder while they plan for increased GNP.

7 Elkan, W.: An African Labour Force. = East African Studies No. 7, East Af-

rican Institute of Social Research. Kam- pala 1956.

68

This content downloaded from 91.229.248.187 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:42:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions