Answering the Call:

A study of major contributions to UN peacekeeping missions

The demand for UN peacekeepers has grown in recent years. Consequently,

the willingness of states to contribute to peacekeeping missions is an issue of

practical importance. A wide variety of explanations have been put forward to

account for why some states contribute troops to peacekeeping missions while

others do not. This paper develops a mid-range theory, bridging macro-level

analysis and micro-level studies, to explain major contributions of peacekeepers.

The integrated theory stresses concrete incentives for High Income States but

also develops an explanation of peacekeeping contributions among Low Income

States, centered on state capacity. The main contribution of the integrated theory

is not in incorporating a number of factors but in specifying the conditions under

which they are salient to understanding peacekeeper contributions. This theory

is tested for its ability to predict major contributors to fourteen UN peacekeeping

missions over the last eight years.

Word Count: 8,426

Over the last twenty years, UN peacekeeping missions have become prominent features

on the landscape of international security. These “new” peacekeeping missions often involve

a more proactive role for the forces deployed, including peace making and enforcing (Ratner

1995). These missions have also grown in size, many demanding thousands of soldiers. The

personnel contributions made by states to peacekeeping efforts are voluntary, and the ability

of UN missions to operate depends in large part on the willingness of states to step forward

and send their citizens to far off lands for the cause of global stability.

Why states volunteer peacekeepers is, thus, a question of practical importance, but it is

also one of theoretical interest. The question has been tackled from a number of perspectives.

Realists have stressed the narrow self-interest motivating contributions (Neack 1995). The

liberal perspective emphasizes a broader interpretation of self-interest rooted in security as a

public good (Bobrow and Boyer 1997). Critical theorists have suggested that “peacekeeping

can be considered a form of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to

uphold the liberal peace” (Pugh 2004, 41).

To supplement these larger theoretical perspectives, scholars have developed other ad hoc

explanations. Explanations have stressed the financial windfall to states for contributing,

the quest of middle power states to obtain a place on the security council, or thankfulness

for prior UN peacekeeping efforts that benefited contributing states. These explanations are

somewhat unsatisfactory or case specific, and these explanations do not always mesh well

with the experiences of the post-Cold War world. What is needed is a more integrated theory

to explain why states answer the UN’s call for peacekeepers. In this study I try to meet

this challenge, integrating the various hypotheses on peacekeeper contribution into a single

coherent argument. This argument is then tested against contributions to UN peacekeeping

operations from 2001 to 2008.

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1 Theoretical Explanations

A recent survey of peacekeeping literature by Bures (2007) reveals a wide variety of case

specific work, often offering practical advice for improving peacekeeping missions but a dearth

of theoretical literature that is specific to peacekeeping. This is particularly true in that much

of the theoretical work done on peacekeeping has been woven seamlessly into the realist-

liberal debate. Bures argues that what is needed in the peacekeeping literature is a series of

mid-range theories to bridge the gap between macro-level theory and micro-level analysis. I

begin this process of developing a mid-range theory by working through the strengths and

weaknesses of the various macro-level perspectives on peacekeeper contributions.

The realist explanation is identified most closely with Laura Neack (1995),1 who argues

that the most frequent contributors to peacekeeping are states that “have attempted to es-

tablish themselves as regional and/or non-aligned or rising global powers.” Peacekeeping,

therefore, is a way for states to flex muscle and assert influence on the world stage. Mon-

nakgotla (1996) goes one step further, arguing that “peacekeeping is self-interested action to

establish, preserve, or increase a state’s own position and power base in the world.” Peace-

keeping in the realist view is yet another forum for power politics to play out. Given this

view of the world, the realist perspective would predict that major contributors to peacekeep-

ing operations would be powerful states or states seeking to advance their position. States

fitting this characterization do contribute to peacekeeping operations, yet there are numer-

ous prominent examples that this approach cannot easily explain. States such as Nepal, Sri

Lanka, and the Fiji have provided large numbers of troops to peacekeeping operations. These

states play a bit part in great power politics and their national interests are only minimally

affected by the outcomes of conflicts occurring thousands of miles away.

Realism has laid claim to the “peacekeeping as power politics” explanation. Liberal

theory has, predictably, taken up opposite position by emphasizing the “benevolent action”

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overtones of peacekeeping. Liberal theory stresses that states have a general interest in seeing

the preservation of peace and stability in the system. When violence in some corner of the

world threatens the system, the magnifying power of the “CNN effect” forges a constituency

for action. Images of needless suffering evoke concern among the public, which pressures

policy makers, who then use international organizations to send up distress flares on behalf

of the helpless (Jakobsen 1996). At this point, democratic states, an essential leg of the

Kantian tripod,2 step forward to defend international stability (Anderson 2000). If this

scenario is correct, then sending peacekeepers is idealpolitik at its best (Anderson 2000, 2),

as states work collaboratively to provide a global public good.

The role of international cooperation in the provision of peacekeepers has been itself

a dynamic research agenda among idealist-leaning scholars. Shimizu and Sandler (2002),

focusing primarily on the financing of peacekeeping, argue that in a pure public goods en-

vironment the burden of public goods provision will fall to the largest actors. Bobrow and

Boyer (2005, 248-249), by contrast, observe that while there is a steady core of states that

provide personnel to peacekeeping missions, the burden carried by these states has actually

declined as a more diverse pool of states have stepped in to take on the task of providing

peacekeepers. The public goods approach is a conceptually useful framework for understand-

ing peacekeeping. However, this approach requires additional refinements to offer predictive

utility.

To hone the predictive power of the public goods approach requires the recognition that

states may benefit from peacekeeping in ways that are not related to the public good being

provided. These “country specific” benefits are important in providing additional incentives

to states to contribute peacekeepers. Shimizu and Sandler (2002, 656) suggest that states

may benefit from prestige, status enhancement, and stability for neighboring countries. They

also suggest that when countries have economic links to the state in conflict, there may be

direct economic benefits to a state from successful peacekeeping operations. Bobrow and

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Boyer (1997) also stress the immediate benefits to neighboring countries when a conflict

ends, but they also touch on the immediate financial benefits to countries that provide

peacekeepers. Some countries are able to deploy peacekeepers for less than the stipend

offered by the United Nations, which creates the possibility of deploying peacekeepers as a

way to make money. Pakistan is often cited as an example of peacekeeping as a for-profit

activity. Bobrow and Boyer (1997, 727) identify less direct benefits as well. Peacekeeping

may be a way for states to provide training and experience to their soldiers, or it may serve

the goal of keeping troops busy, far away, and out of trouble. Boyer (1993) has argued that

these country specific benefits can create opportunities for a division of labor in how public

goods are provided, which can lead to greater efficiency in public good provisions. Liberal

explanations for peacekeeper provision, thus, hinge on a mix of benevolence and self-interest.

Realist explanations, however, have also put forward a variation on the benevolent self-

interest position by focusing on the desire of states to protect a system in which they benefit.

Neack (1995) stresses that peacekeeping, at least during the Cold War, tended to be domi-

nated by middle powers because the middle power states had a vested interest in protecting

the existing order. She argues that “for these states it is unrealistic to imagine completely

revising the world system to better serve their interests” (Neack 1995, 184).

The benevolent self-interest position is coherent and flexible. It is able to incorporate

many different elements as it ascribes motives to countries that support peacekeeping, but it

to is limited in its predictive power. Many states view stability in the current international

system as desirable. It is unclear what prompts some states to contribute large numbers of

peacekeepers and other states with perhaps equal levels of concern for international stability

to free ride or commit only a small handful of peacekeepers. Placing emphasis on the

extraordinary benefits to contributing states offers a stop gap explanation but raises a new

problem. If peacekeeping, with all of its training, equipment, and compensatory benefits, is

such a profitable venture for poor states, why are poor states not clambering to contribute

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peacekeepers? Why are poor states not demanding more peacekeeping operations to increase

the opportunities for states to contribute? Why is peacekeeping not widely seen as a wealth

redistribution scheme? This does not invalidate the additional benefits argument, which was

developed in relation to peacekeeping as a public good, but it does suggest that additional

reflection is warranted. The next section builds on the explanations put forward by others

to hone the predictive power of these arguments.

2 An Integrated Mid-Range Theory

The development of a mid-range theory requires that the theory’s scope first be established.

This explanation of peacekeeper contributions is limited in the following ways. First, this

study focuses on the contributions of soldiers (not police) to UN peacekeeping operations.

The theory may be less applicable to peacekeeping operations spearheaded by regional or-

ganizations, and parts of the theory may have no relevance in attempting to explain foreign

intervention.

Second, the explanation developed here is focused on explaining “major contributions.”

Major contributions involve a large number of peacekeepers, typically more than 200 to a

single mission. The vast majority of states do not deploy peacekeepers, and of the states

that do deploy peacekeepers, the vast majority send only a small handful (less than 25).3

Thus, this theory seeks to explain the behavior of a small but important group of states.

I argue that the vast majority of major contributions can be explained in terms of two

elements: capacity and incentives. Capacity and incentives are umbrella concepts, which

can be met in a number of ways. Furthermore, these elements are inter-related, and how

they operate is conditional on features of the states themselves. The next section sketches

out how these two elements defined and how they are affect contributions to peacekeeping

missions.

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2.1 Capacity

Although the issue of capacity (a state’s ability to take some action) is not addressed in the

above discussion of why states contribute to peacekeeping missions, it is an essential part of

understanding the difference between contributors and non-contributors. We cannot assume

that all states are equal in their ability to provide a large number of peacekeepers. States

are diverse not only in their levels of power but also in their ability to project power and

the cost associated with the projection of power. Thus, when we talk about capacity, we are

talking about the conditions that make the provision of peacekeeping by a state possible.4

Capacity, as it is used here, not only involves the ability to do some action, but also

includes an element of cost effectiveness of an action given the fixed incentives available for

an activity. As has been noted in the theoretical debates, peacekeeping offers states a range

of incentives. Some incentives are tangible, such as the peacekeeper stipend, while others,

like prestige or desire to give back to the international community for past peacekeeping

missions, are less tangible. The value of benefits from peacekeeping and the provision of

peacekeepers can be viewed in terms of supply and demand. When the UN Security Council

authorizes a peacekeeping force, the UN effectively issues a want-ad for peacekeepers. To

entice potential suppliers of peacekeepers to step forward, a range of incentives is offered.

Who answers the call is primarily determined by market forces. Countries that are able

to meet the UN’s call for peacekeepers in an economically advantageous way likely have a

confluence of favorable conditions, including a low cost of supplying peacekeepers, effective

military and governmental institutions, and linguistic capacity.

Chief among these favorable conditions is the cost of supplying peacekeepers, but this

condition is not sufficient for a state to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers. As was

noted earlier, there are a large number of countries that could field peacekeepers for less than

the UN stipend. Most of the large contributions do in fact come from states in the developing

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world, but these states represent a small minority of the states that could theoretically deploy

peacekeepers for profit. This prompts consideration of other factors that might explain why

some developing states contribute large numbers of peacekeepers while others contribute

none.

Military Capacity: The deployment of a small number of peacekeepers is relatively sim-

ple. Commercial airlines or a UN cargo plane can deploy a dozen would-be peacekeepers to

virtually any location. Command and control, logistics, and training all become more com-

plicated when deploying thousands of troops. At the risk of being tautological, I argue that

if a state lacks the military capacity to deploy a large number of troops at great distance,

the state will not do so. There are, of course, ways to overcome a deficit in military capac-

ity. States with limited force projection capability may be able to deploy peacekeepers if

the destination is relatively close (a neighboring state) or if they receive logistical assistance

from the UN or from another state, but states that have the necessary capacity already in

place are better positioned to contribute to UN missions (Roomy 2004, 124-125).

Hypothesis 1a: States that are able to project military force will be more likely to con-

tribute troops than states that are unable to project force.

This factor is relevant for all states in the international system; however, it is likely to

be more of a factor when looking at developing countries. High Income States tend to have

militaries with more advanced technical and logistical capabilities and in most instances

should not be constrained by this aspect of capacity.

Linguistic Capacity: Linguistic interoperability is a central challenge of multinational

military operations. Linguistic interoperability is essential if orders are to be effectively dis-

seminated and if peacekeepers are to be able to communicate with units from other states

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(Crossey 2005). A military that can operate in a major world language (particularly En-

glish) is better positioned to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers than militaries that

are only able to operate in local languages with limited speakers internationally. Some coun-

tries, for historical and political reasons, are more likely to have large numbers of officers and

enlisted soldiers who are proficient in English. English has wide usage internationally due

to the legacy of the British colonial empire and more recently because of the pervasiveness

of American business, academic, and popular culture (Berger 1997). There are also political

motivations for a military to voluntarily adopt a foreign language. Many NATO countries

strive to have their officer corps functional in English to ensure effective coordination of

NATO forces. As part of this effort, NATO developed English language training materials

specifically designed for peacekeepers.5 The British Council has since distributed these ma-

terials to help with communication and coordination for UN peacekeeping missions (Crossey

2005).

Language is critical factor that affects a state’s ability to contribute to international

peacekeeping operations. While there are many states with incentives to send peacekeepers,

some states are linquistically better positioned to deploy large numbers of peacekeepers.

These states are the first to step forward and answer the call for peacekeepers, and they

are able to sustain their contributions for longer periods of time. Linguistic capacity helps

to create a comparative advantage, particularly for Low Income States, in the provision of

peacekeepers.

Hypothesis 1b: States that have the linguistic capacity to integrate their militaries into

international forces will be more likely to contribute troops than states that do not

have the linguistic capacity to support peacekeeper provision.

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2.2 Incentives

The previous section stressed that peacekeepers were provided by states who might conceiv-

ably find the UN stipend enticing and who were able to actually field peacekeepers. High

Income States are unlikely to be swayed by the UN stipend, but other factors might cre-

ate the necessary incentives to make peacekeeper provision a worthwhile activity for High

Income States. Both the realist and liberal explanations suggest that contributions to peace-

keeping are related to self-interest. How this self-interest is framed and why it is important

differs, but contributions seem to be related to the utility states derive from contributing.

Rather than trying to plant the flag for realism or liberalism, I attempt to incorporate both

perspectives while refining their predictions.

The public goods approach argues that states contribute peacekeepers as a way to provide

system-wide stability and security or because there are “country specific benefits.” The

more cynical realist approach stresses that indeed states have an interest in security, but

it is primarily their own security with which they are concerned, rather than the general

provision of security for others. Both theories stress different aspects of security or self-

interest, which are reflected in the three types of incentives outlined below.

Backyard Situations: States are not always interested in stability as an abstract concept.

Often their concerns are closer to home. Conflicts may unnerve neighboring countries that

fear refugee flows, regional destabilization, or a loss of influence over a neighbor. Partici-

pation in a peacekeeping mission can help states advance their own immediate security or

advance their national interests. Russia’s stabilization force in Georgia may fit this model.

Similarly, NATO and later the the European Union’s presence in the former Yugoslavia is

consistent with backyard motivations. This pattern can be seen in UN peacekeeping missions

as well. The UN stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has over 1,000 peacekeepers

from Brazil. This is a far greater commitment of human resources than Brazil has made

9

for any of the current UN peacekeeping missions.6 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that

backyard situations are an important driver of peacekeeper provision.

Hypothesis 2a: States that have a backyard interest in a conflict are more likely to con-

tribute peacekeepers than states that perceive no direct strategic dimension to the

conflict.

The backyard explanation for peacekeeper provision differs somewhat from the other

factors discussed thus far. If a conflict occurs in a state’s backyard, the capacity requirement

is rendered largely moot. Even states with limited capacity can usually deploy medium-sized

forces to neighboring countries. Backyard situations should create important incentives for

states to contribute regardless of a state’s level of wealth or institutional effectiveness.

Destabilizing Situations Both realist and liberal theory suggest that states contribute

to peacekeeping out of a benevolent self-interest. When the international order is under

assault, states that are vested in the system’s stability work to restore order. Conflicts that

spill across borders may create a greater urgency for the international community to act.

Thus, a desire to protect the status quo is yet another source of incentives that can induce

states to contribute when it is not cost effective.

Hypothesis 2b: States that have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers globally (High In-

come States) are more likely to do so for conflicts that are potentially destabilizing to

international order than for conflicts that do not threaten the status quo.

The impact of this factor, may vary from one situation to another. As was noted above,

not all states have the minimum capacity to deploy a large number of peacekeepers. Low

Income States that are readily able to provide peacekeepers already have a sizable incentive

to contribute, thus this factor is expected to have its greatest impact among High Income

States, which would include most great powers and middle powers.

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Protection of Markets: States may need an extra prompting to contribute to peace-

keeping. One source of tangible incentives that has been offered by Shimizu and Sandler

(2002) is increased opportunities for trade. Stabilizing a trading partner can yield concrete

gains for a state. In short, the greater the trade relations between a potential contributor

to peacekeeping and the target state, the greater the potential payoff if the peacekeeping

mission is a success.

Hypothesis 2c: States that have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers globally (high income

states) are more likely to do so when they have trade relations to protect than when a

potential contributor has no economic stake in the success of the peacekeeping mission.

As with high profile situations, the protection of markets is expected to matter most

among states that could easily contribute but do not find the fixed benefits, such as the

monthly stipend, to be enticing. High Income States are most likely to increase their will-

ingness to contribute given the additional economic incentives.

The argument developed here focuses on two different elements, capacity and incentives,

but these elements are not equally important for all states. I have posited that the impact

of these factors is conditional on a state’s level of economic wealth. This assertion, however,

needs to be tested empirically to evaluate its predictive power.

3 Research Design

3.1 Methodology and Sample

To test the above explanation for the contribution of peacekeepers to UN missions, I employ

a series of rare event logistic regression models.7 The analysis looks at major contributions

to fourteen different UN peacekeeping missions from 2001 to 2008.8 Because the integrated

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theory argues that the salient explanatory factors for a major contributions to peacekeeping

missions change as states become wealthier, three separate models are run, each representing

a different range of countries. The differences between the three models are as central

to the testing of the integrated theory as are the coefficients on any particular variable.

The integrated theory is not supported simply by the finding of a statistically significant

relationship in one of the three models. Several aspects of the theory apply solely to high

income or low income states, thus it is only in these models that the integrated theory can

be tested.

Unfortunately, there is no objective standard for dividing states along the continuum

of rich and poor. The division adopted here is a slight modification of the World Bank’s

country classification scheme. The World Bank classification system sorts countries as low,

lower middle, upper middle, and high income. In 2000 High Income States had levels of

GNP per capita starting at $9,361 USD. This reflects the top 30% of the world’s states.

Low income states are defined here as countries with GDP per capita of less than $3,031

GDP per capita. This includes both the Low Income and Lower Middle Income groups.

Approximately 37% of states fall into this group. This leaves 33% of countries in Upper

Middle Income range, which I will refer to as “Middle Income States” in this analysis.

3.2 Operationalizing Motivations for Peacekeeping

To test the integrated model, six different aspects of the theory are examined using eight

different indicators. The following section operationalizes these indicators in a way that will

allow for a statistical analysis of the integrated theory. In addition to the various aspects

of the integrated theory, several control variables are also discussed. Because the dependent

variable was coded by analyzing peacekeeper contributions from 2001-2008, the independent

and control variables reflect values from 2000. Lagging the independent variables by one year

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ensures that any causal inferences meet the minimum requirement that the posited cause

pre-dates the effect being studied.

Military Capacity (1 Variable): A country’s ability to project force is assessed using

the COW National Material Capabilities Data v.3.02 (Singer et. al. 1972). The approach

used to operationalize force projection is to take the product of a country’s relative military

size and the relative capital intensity of a country’s military machine.9 The emphasis on

relative size is intuitive in that larger militaries are more powerful ceteris paribus. But large

militaries are not enough for a state to be able to project force. Fordham argues in favor

of weighting relative size by capital intensity because “whatever the technology of the time,

power projection capability requires a substantial investment in equipment relative to the

number of personnel in the armed forces” (Fordham 2006, 17). In 2000 the Force Projection

Score runs from 0 to 25 with higher numbers corresponding to larger, more capital-intensive

militaries.

Linguistic Capacity (1 Variable): I argue that language interoperability is an essential

feature in explaining peacekeeper provision. In a rough attempt to account for English

language usage, a dichotomous variable is employed to identify states with a British colonial

heritage. Information on colonial heritage was collected from the Issue Correlates of War

Colonial History Data v.4.0.

Backyard Situations (2 Variables): A peacekeeping mission is considered to fall within

a state’s backyard if the mission is geographically close.10 This is measured in terms of the

distance in miles between the capital of a potential contributor to peacekeeping missions

and the capital of the target state.11 Gleditsch and Ward’s (2001) data on distance between

state capitals is used. The second attempt at identifying backyard situations focuses on

former colonial relationships. A dichotomous variable was used to identify former colonial

13

powers with historical ties to the targets of peacekeeping operations. As with the variable

for British Colonial Heritage, information on Colonial Legacies was collected from the Issue

Correlates of War Colonial History Data v.4.0.

Destabilizing Situations (2 Variables): For a conflict to be prominent enough to warrant

a commitment of peacekeepers by High Income States, the conflict must capture the attention

of policy makers. I attempt to identify attention grabbing conflict in two ways. First,

international conflicts are more likely to draw media coverage and to be seen as destabilizing

than conflicts that take place within a single country. A dichotomous variable was coded

indicating whether the conflict underlying the peacekeeping mission was an interstate conflict

or not. The second approach to identifying destabilizing situations is to examine refugee flows

associated with a conflict. When conflicts spill across borders, they are more likely to incite

the international community to action out of concern for a humanitarian crisis or out of

concern for neighboring states, which could potentially be destabilized by a large influx of

refugees. Data on refugee flows was drawn from the data set Forcibly Displaced Populations,

1964-2006, which was compiled by Monte G. Marshal at the Center for Systemic Peace.12

Protection of Markets (1 Variable): Economic linkages between states are operational-

ized as the volume of trade (exports + imports) between a given country to the state (or

states) involved in the peacekeeping operations. The logic behind this has been laid out

in the intervention literature, which argues that economic links between states can provide

a motivation for intervention in conflicts.13 The data on trade was taken from Gleditsch’s

(2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data.

Control Variables (2 Variables): In addition to the independent variables needed to

test the integrated theory theory, two control variables are also included in this analysis.

First, a control is included for the authorized strength of the UN mission, as larger missions

14

require more peacekeepers than smaller missions. Second, the Polity IV score of potential

contributors is included to control for level of democracy.14

4 Evaluating the Integrated Model

Major contributions to peacekeeping missions are rare. For each of the fourteen peacekeep-

ing missions examined from 2001-2008, only a handful of states contributed more than 200

peacekeepers. Among Low Income States (under $3,030 GNP per capita in USD), there

were 966 opportunities for states to contribute to peacekeeping. Only 63 (6.5%) of these

opportunities resulted in a major contribution of peacekeepers. These 63 contributions were

provided by 22 different states. A similar pattern is seen for Middle Income States ($3,031-

9,360 GNP per capita in USD). In these states 3.2% of the 854 opportunities involved a

major contribution of peacekeepers. In total, fifteen Middle Income States stepped forward

to assume this burden. Among High Income States (over $9,361 GNP per capita in USD),

twenty states made major contributions of peacekeepers, several making multiple contribu-

tions. These major contributions, however, account for only 3.7% of the 784 opportunities for

High Income States to contribute to the fourteen different UN peacekeeping missions active

during this period. A Chi Square test15 shows a statistically significant difference between

these three groups, with Low Income States contributing more than would be expected if

contributions were distributed randomly. While the distribution of these contributions is

worth noting, it does not offer new insights into the motivations of contributing states. For

that, three rare event logistic regression models are run (see Table 1).

[Table 1 About Here]

15

In evaluating the first set of hypotheses, which argues that Low Income States with

the necessary capacity will be more likely to make major contributions, there are two in-

dependent variables to be assessed. Military capacity is reflected in the Force Projection

Score. Linguistic capacity is approximated using the British Colonial Heritage variable,

which serves as a proxy for the widespread use of English. In the first two models, focusing

on Low Income and Middle Income States, there is some evidence to support the logic of ca-

pacity and comparative advantage as drivers of peacekeeper provision. The Force Projection

Score and British Colonial Heritage have a positive and statistically significant impact on

the probability that a state will make a major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

The expectation of the integrated theory was that capacity would be less of a constrain on

High Income States. This also seems to be supported in that the coefficients associated with

Force Projection Score and British Colonial Heritage are not statistically distinguishable

from zero.

Taken together, this suggests that while effective military institutions and linguistic inter-

operability are critical factors in distinguishing major contributors from non-major contribu-

tors among Low Income and Middle Income States, these factors are not constraints on High

Income States. In total, there seems to be strong support for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis

1b. This in turn lends support to the larger argument that among Low Income States a

comparative advantage is an important factor in understanding peacekeeper provision.

Having addressed the role of capacity, I now turn to the role of incentives as laid out

in the second set of hypotheses. For Hypothesis 2a all three models are relevant. Back-

yard situations are hypothesized to be salient regardless of a state’s wealth, although for

slightly different reasons. In Middle Income and High Income States, backyard situations

are primarily a function of security. In Low Income States backyard situations involve a

security component, but geographic proximity also reduce the challenge of peacekeeper de-

ployment, thus reflecting an element of capacity as well as security.16 In all three models,

16

the coefficients associated with Miles Between Capitals are negative, suggesting that states

are less likely to become involved in peacekeeping missions in distant locations than they

are to become involved when the peacekeeping operation is in their neighborhood. Although

the coefficients are in the predicted direction for all three models, the effect is statistically

significant only in the models for Low Income and High Income states.

A second aspect of backyard situations that pertains primarily to High Income States is

the presence of a colonial legacy linking the contributing state to the peacekeeping mission.

A Prior Colonial Relationship has a statistically significant positive effect on the probability

that a High Income State will contribute to peacekeeping missions. Given the measures for

backyard situations were statistically significant in the appropriate models, it seems that

there is support for Hypothesis 2a.

Hypothesis 2b proposed that High Income States may be prompted to contribute to

peacekeeping missions that address potentially destabilizing situations. Destabilizing situa-

tions are defined here as either an interstate conflict or a conflict involving a large volume

of refugees. In the logistic regression model associated with High Income States, neither

variable lends support to the destabilizing situations hypothesis. For the Interstate Con-

flict variable the coefficient is positive but falls well short of a statistical significance. For

Refugees the impact is statistically significant, but the negative coefficient is in the wrong

direction. It appears that destabilizing situations, as operationalized here, do not increase

the probability that a High Income State will make a major contribution of personnel to a

UN peacekeeping mission.

Hypothesis 2c focuses on economic incentives as measured by volume of trade between

a contributing country to a state affected by the peacekeeping mission. The expectation

was that the incentives from trade relations would be most decisive for High Income States.

Based on the results of the three models it appears that this expectation was incorrect. The

volume of trade has no statistically significant impact on peacekeeper provision for High

17

Income States. High levels of trade do, however, appear to provide additional incentives

for Middle and Low Income States. For both groups the coefficient associated with Trade

was positive and statistically significant. Although Trade was not statistically significant in

the model associated with High Income States, the fact that Trade was significant among

Middle Income States does offer limited support for the idea that additional incentives can

make states more inclined to make major contributions.

Before moving onto a discussion of the substantive effects of these models, it is worth

discussing several of the control variables included in this analysis. Authorization in all

three models was positive, which is intuitive. The greater the number of troops needed, the

more states are likely to answer the call for contributions. Authorization was statistically

significant for both Low and Middle Income States. The Polity Score partially conformed

to expectations. Past research (Anderson 2000) has suggested that democracies are more

likely to shoulder the burden of peacekeeping than non-democracies. This study offers some

evidence in favor of this finding but also points to a potential limitation. In all three models

the Polity Score was associated with a positive coefficient, but it was only among Low Income

States that the effect was statistically significant. Although further research is needed, it

appears that the impact of democracy on a state’s willingness to contribute to peacekeeping

is conditional on a state’s wealth.

4.1 Substantive Impact

The argument put forward in this paper is tested using multiple variables. Consequently,

it can be difficult to extract the impact of a constellation of variables on the probability of

states making a major contribution to peacekeeping missions. To help illustrate how capacity

and incentives affect who contributes, I focus in this section on the substantive effects of the

various independent variables on the probability of making a major contribution.

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Among ordinary Low Income States (with all continuous explanatory variables set to the

median), the probability of states contributing a large number of troops to peacekeeping

missions is relatively low (4.8%). Holding all other factors constant, the probability of

contributing more than doubles (11.1%) for states with a British colonial heritage compared

to states without a British colonial heritage. From this point, the effect doubles again

for states that are geographically proximate. The median distance between capitals for

Low Income States is 3,267 miles. For states whose capitals are only 500 miles apart, the

probability of major peacekeeping operations jumps an additional 5.6% to 16.7%

Table 2 attempts to illustrate the importance of capacity in understanding contributions.

For states lacking in military capacity, defined as a Force Projection Score of 0.0, and lacking

in linguistic capacity, there is only a 4.7% chance that a state will attempt to shoulder a

major contribution of peacekeepers. By contrast, when looking at Low Income States for

whom capacity issues are not a barrier, as defined as having a Force Projection Score that

is two standard deviations above the mean and a British colonial legacy, over 16% will

contribute in a sizable way to UN peacekeeping efforts.

Capacity variables are powerful predictors of contributions for Low Income States. Among

High Income States, Prior Colonial Relationship is the dominant predictive variable. The

median High Income State is very unlikely to make a major contribution to UN peacekeeping

missions (3.6%). An identical state that has a colonial link to the state in conflict is far more

likely to make a contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts. With a colonial link the probability

that a state will contribute to a peacekeeping operation jumps to 56.1.% This is illustrated in

Table 3, which also includes the impact of the conflict underlying the peacekeeping mission

being an interstate conflict.

[Table 2 About Here]

19

[Table 3 About Here]

5 Conclusions

This study has attempted to explain why states might make substantial contributions of

human resources to UN peacekeeping operations. Rather than looking for general factors

that correlate with contributing states, this study began with the premise that states may

have different motivations depending on their level of economic development. Low Income

States are well compensated for peacekeeping, thus the explanations developed focused on

the capacity of these states to actually contribute troops. High Income States are unlikely

to be swayed by the fixed level of compensation offered by the UN and are less likely to

struggle with the issue of capacity. Thus, their behavior must be driven by other factors. In

particular, former colonial relationships and geographic proximity seem to be the primary

drivers for High Income States.

The result is two conceptual models, one largely consistent with High Income States and

one largely consistent with Low Income States, that highlight different motivations. The

statistical analysis lends support to certain aspects of the integrated theory but leaves other

parts unsupported. For example, the integrated theory suggested that economic links would

provide important motivations for High Income States, yet High Income States appear not

to be swayed by the potential economic gains that come from stabilizing conflicts. Yet, on

further reflection this is not entirely unexpected. High Income States tend to have much

higher levels of trade than Low Income States. Perhaps the volume of trade in these cases

was simply not large enough to provide sufficient incentives for High Income States given

the greater costs associated with the deployment of peacekeepers from High Incomes States.

A preliminary examination of Trade relative to the size of a state’s economy supports this

20

line of thinking. The Trade variable is on average equivalent to 4.5% of GDP for High

Income States. This is roughly half as much as the corresponding percentage for Middle

Income States (8.15%) and is a fraction of the percentage associated with Low Income

States (16.1%).

A second area where the integrated theory failed to find statistical support is the ex-

pectation that destabilizing situations would create incentives for action. The benevolent

self-interest explanation, which is found in both realist and liberal explanations for peace-

keeping, was unsuccessful in explaining the behavior of High Income States. So what is to

be made of this?

There are several possible explanations for the failure of this dimension of the theory.

First, it is possible that these factors do not drive the behavior of states; this aspect of

the theory may simply be wrong. Alternatively, a case could be made that the concept of

destabilizing situations was not well operationalized, so the test is inconclusive. It is quite

possible that the proxy variables used to identify highly destabilizing situations were too

crude. There is, however, a third possible explanation: benevolent self-interest may indeed

be relevant but not in the way the original model proposed. High Income States may not be

more likely to contribute to destabilizing situations, but destabilizing situations may be more

likely to be selected by the United Nations for peacekeeping. Thus, benevolent self-interest

is not at work in explaining the question “who contributes” but may be more relevant to the

question “contributes to what.”

Other aspects of liberal theory fare better in the statistical analysis, particularly the strain

of thinking on peacekeeping as a public good. The integrated theory suggests that states are

indeed looking for “country specific benefits.” For Low Income States the UN stipend may

be sufficient, assuming the state has the necessary capacity to deploy peacekeepers. High

Income States, by contrast, hold back from making major contributions of peacekeepers

unless it touches on some larger strategic issue. This of course does not mean that High

21

Income States are not contributing to the provision of global security. High Income States

still bear the lion’s share of the burden in financing peacekeeping (Bobrow and Boyer 2005,

254-256). Thus, there is a division of labor in peacekeeper provision, which seems consistent

with the notion of burden sharing in the provision of a public good. Boyer (1989), building

off of Ricardo’s economic theory of comparative advantage, argues that states may be able

to provide public goods in a more efficient way by specializing in the areas in which they are

best able to make a contribution. The integrated model developed in this paper is largely

consistent with the division of labor and public goods perspective.

In all, the integrated theory is an important step in merging competing macro level per-

spectives into a more actor-centric explanation for why states contribute to UN peacekeeping

efforts. This is by no means the end of this discussion. Rather, it is the start of a new dis-

cussion that places economic differences among states at the forefront of how we explain

contributions to peacekeeping.

22

Notes

1Also see Neack (1992) “Empirical Observations on ‘Middle’ Power Behavior at the Start

of a New International System.”

2The Kantian tripod refers to democracy, trade, and international organizations, which

are part of Kant’s vision for a more peaceful world. For more on this theme see, Russett et.

al (1998).

3Explaining the difference in behavior for states that make “negligible” contributions and

states that do not contribute at all is an interesting question, but, ultimately, it is beyond

the scope of this project. My own intuition suggests that a norm based approach is perhaps

better suited to explaining the behavior of states that routinely make a small contribution

of peacekeepers.

4This parallels what Harvey Starr refers to as “opportunity” in his discussion of the

various correlates of war. Opportunity, according to Starr, involves technology and geography

that make it possible for states to engage in war, irrespective of their motivations for doing

so (Starr 1978, 368).

5NATO developed a CD Rom titled Tactical English for Land Forces in Peace-Support

Operations to help new NATO members prepare for deployment on NATO peacekeeping

operations.

6As of January 2007, Brazil had 1,213 peacekeepers on the ground in Haiti. At the time,

Brazil was contributing to 6 other peacekeeping missions. Of these 6 other UN peacekeeping

missions, Brazil’s largest troop commitment was 27 peacekeepers deployed to Sudan.

7Because major contributions of peacekeepers is a rare event, standard logistic regression

can provide biased estimates that understate the impact of explanatory variables. To correct

for this, I follow the recommendations of King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b), employing an altered

version of Stata’s logit command, relogit (Tomz et al. 1999).

23

8During this time period there were many other peacekeeping missions in operation.

These missions were not included in this analysis either because the total authorization for

the mission was so low that no major contributions were needed or because the mission was

primarily a police operation and did not involve large contributions of troops.

9The details of how this score was constructed and the logic behind this operationalization

can be found in Bejamin O. Fordham’s (2006) paper “What Makes a Major Power?”

10While I rely upon geographic proximity as an indicator of Backyard Situations, it also

can be read in terms of capacity. The task of deploying peacekeepers is less challenging when

states neighbor each other (Boulding 1963).

11For peacekeeping involving inter-state conflicts, the target state with a capital closest to

the disputed border is used as the target country.

12This data is available through the Integrated Network for Societally Conflict Research

(INSCR).

13See Yoon (1997).

14The Polity score, which subtracts a country’s Autocracy score from its Democracy score,

is used. This score potentially runs from -10 to 10, with countries considered to be “coherent

democracies” if they score 7 or higher (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 474).

15χ2(2, N = 2604) = 13.686, p < .05

16Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 43) argues that distance is less of a constraint for

powerful states than it is for developing states.

24

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Table 1: (re)Logit Analysis of Major Peacekeeping Operations

Low Income Middle Income High IncomeStates States States

Force Projection 0.169∗ 0.072 ∗ ∗ −0.041Score (0.081) (0.026) (0.067)

British Colonial 0.869 ∗ ∗ 1.210 ∗ ∗ 0.401Heritage (0.277) (0.452) (0.502)

Miles Between −0.185 ∗ ∗ −0.121 −0.184∗Capitals (in 1,000s) (0.075) (0.102) (0.083)

Colonial Legacy —– 2.511 3.521 ∗ ∗∗(2.068) (0.708)

Interstate Conflict −1.132∗ −0.122 0.402(0.450) (0.660) (0.465)

Refugees −0.000003 −0.003∗ −0.003 ∗ ∗(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Trade Volume 0.001∗ 0.003∗ −0.002(in millions of USD) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)

Mission Authorization 0.066∗ 0.106∗ 0.033(in 1,000s) (0.030) (0.051) (0.046)

Polity Score 0.110 ∗ ∗∗ 0.018 0.097(0.030) (0.033) (0.051)

Constant −2.832 ∗ ∗∗ −3.643 ∗ ∗∗ −2.548 ∗ ∗(0.457) (0.673) (0.820)

N 795 670 583X2 69.97 25.31 41.59Sig. 0.000 0.003 0.000Log likelihood −185.2 −94.1 −94.5Asterisks correspond to the following thresholds for rejection of the null-hypothesisin a two-tail test. * p > .05; ** p > .01 ; *** p > .001

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Table 2: Impact of Capacity in Low Income States

Scenario British Force Projection Probability ofHeritage Score Contributing

Comparative Yes 2.81 16.27%Advantage (x+ 2σ)

Comparative No 0.00 4.69%Disadvantage

General Note: Probabilities are calculated with all other continuous variables set to their medianvalue and all dichotomous variables set to their mode.

Table 3: Impact of Incentives in High Income States

Scenario Colonial Interstate Probability ofLegacy Conflict Contributing

Strong Incentives Yes Yes 63.9%

Minimal Incentives No No 3.61%

General Note: Probabilities are calculated with all other continuous variables setto their median value and all dichotomous variables set to their mode.

28