Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo by Iain King; Whit MasonReview by: Robert LegvoldForeign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2007), p. 153Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032387 .

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Recent Books

of Ukrainian nationalism. In short, he was, to use Bojanowska's word, a "compound" until the congealing of a jealous Russian nationalism forced him to choose, which he never could.

Peace atAny Price. How the World Failed Kosovo. BY IAIN KING AND WHIT

MASON. Cornell University Press, 2006, 303 pp. $27.95.

The aim in winning the peace following the 1999 Kosovo war was stated early and often: "to transform Kosovo into a society in which all its members could live in security and dignity." But that is not what has happened. Why not? Because it was a wrong war? No, say the authors. Because the mission was too much for the inter national community? No again. Because the wrong people were in charge? Once

more, no. Rather, because too little was understood about the obstacles, too little was provided for the mission early on, too little was done to overcome the inevitable disunity among multiple agencies, too unrealistic was the timeframe. The authors end with ten lessons, among them: security before democracy, focus less on ending wars than establishing a just and sustainable peace, the "overall vision is more important than detailed objectives," and "a mission

must be prepared to assert its authority from day one."

Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine. EDITED BY DOMINIQUE AREL AND BLAIR A.

RUBLE. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, 384 pp. $S55.00.

If not the culmination, then this book is a creditable sample of the work done in the many post-Soviet-society study groups sponsored by the Kennan Institute over

the last ten years-this one focused on multicultural legacies. Identity, of course, has become the all-purpose drop cloth for vastly disparate subjects. This volume, too, enfolds a random range of topics, from state policy toward religion to popular anti-Chinese sentiments, from migration effects to language revival. What holds the volume together and gives the collection integrity are the editors' introduction and conclusion. The first uses David Laitin's analytic disaggregation of identity to situate each author's contribution. The second groups the issues raised into four clusters: the state's efforts to control identity dynam ics; the role of language in renegotiating identity; the growing divergence in the

way state, society, and identity interact in Russia and Ukraine; and the potential tension between the Russian regime's centralizing preference and the society's underlying diversity.

Russia Transformed: Developing opular Supportfor a New Regime. BY RICHARD ROSE, WILLIAM MISHLER, AND NEIL

MUNRO. Cambridge University Press, 2006, 238 pp. $85.oo (paper, $29.99).

This is an absolutely fascinating political portrait of the Russian public formed from 14 surveys done nearly every year from 1992 to 2005-surveys that measured attitudes about not only the present and the future but also the past. The crucial punch line is that support for the political status quo is in equilibrium. Although most Russians

would prefer to live in a democratic coun try, and know they do not, an ever larger percentage have come to accept the "plebiscitarian autocracy" they have as the way things are and will be. It helps that whereas Si percent of Russians said their situation was "unbearable" in 1998, by

FOREIGN AFFAIRS .May/June2007 [153]

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