overview of significant ethical approaches on how to “find” moral truth: i. virtue ethics ii....

Overview of Significant Ethical Approaches on how to Overview of Significant Ethical Approaches on how to “find” Moral Truth:“find” Moral Truth:

I.I. Virtue EthicsVirtue EthicsII.II. PlatoPlatoIII.III. Aristotle Aristotle IV.IV. Misconceptions Regarding Virtue EthicsMisconceptions Regarding Virtue EthicsV.V. John DeweyJohn DeweyVI.VI. Kant Kant VII.VII. Social Contract EthicsSocial Contract EthicsVIII.VIII. UtilitarianismUtilitarianismIX.IX. John Stuart MillJohn Stuart MillX.X. Rule vs. Act UtilitarianismRule vs. Act UtilitarianismXI.XI. Act UtilitarianismAct UtilitarianismXII.XII. Kantian Utilitarianism (R. M. Hare)Kantian Utilitarianism (R. M. Hare)XIII.XIII. G. E. Moore’s UtilitarianismG. E. Moore’s UtilitarianismXIV.XIV. IntuitionismIntuitionismXV.XV. Ethical RelativismEthical RelativismXVI.XVI. Moral RealismMoral RealismXVII.XVII. Care EthicsCare EthicsXVIII.XVIII. F. NietzscheF. NietzscheXIX.XIX. David HumeDavid HumeXX.XX. John RawlsJohn Rawls

Welcome to EthicsWelcome to Ethics

Unless your faculties aren’t working Unless your faculties aren’t working properly, you have an interest in ethics properly, you have an interest in ethics

and the reason why is simple:and the reason why is simple:

Ethics is about what is right and Ethics is about what is right and what is wrong and how can we tell the what is wrong and how can we tell the

difference.difference.

Consider the following questions:Consider the following questions:

What does it mean to be moral?What does it mean to be moral?

What are human beings really like: selfish, greedy, noble, or What are human beings really like: selfish, greedy, noble, or good?good?

Are some people “better” at being good than others? If so, how Are some people “better” at being good than others? If so, how and why?and why?

What does it mean to be good? What does it mean to be good?

Are there good ways of teaching children to behave morally?Are there good ways of teaching children to behave morally?

Does anyone have the right to tell anyone else what is right from Does anyone have the right to tell anyone else what is right from wrong?wrong?

What is human nature?What is human nature?

Consider the following questions:Consider the following questions: Why should I be a good person? What does it mean to be a good Why should I be a good person? What does it mean to be a good

person?person?

Is morality about obeying a set of rules or is it about thinking carefully Is morality about obeying a set of rules or is it about thinking carefully about consequences?about consequences?

When people say “cannibalism is wrong”, do they know it is wrong or When people say “cannibalism is wrong”, do they know it is wrong or just believe it very strongly?just believe it very strongly?

Are there certain kinds of acts that are always wrong (e.g., torturing Are there certain kinds of acts that are always wrong (e.g., torturing children, beating up your mother, lying)?children, beating up your mother, lying)?

Is it okay to ever break a law?Is it okay to ever break a law?

Is it wrong to enjoy hurting others?Is it wrong to enjoy hurting others?

Are human beings essentially good or essentially wicked?Are human beings essentially good or essentially wicked?

Plato & Kant say the power of reason

How do you find ethical, moral truth?

Sir W. D. Ross says intuitions

H. Utilitarians say we discover the right act calculating the

balance of pleasure over pain

Social contract theorists say ethical principles are made, not

found, constructed by social groups, and exists for the benefit of those groups.

Nonobject. say there is no truth

Natural/Special Revelation from God

Jainism says ascetic control/suppression of all

feelings.

Care Ethics: Narrative of relationships that extend through

time.

Virtue Ethics says in a virtuous character whereby a person is

able to realize the crucial potentialities that constitute

human excellence. It’s focus is on the person rather than the act.

Overview of Ethical Systems: Virtue Ethics:Overview of Ethical Systems: Virtue Ethics:Rather than focusing on what we ought to do, Virtue ethics offers a distinctive approach

whereby we focus on human character asking the question, “What should I be?” Thus, ethical life involves envisioning ideals for human life and embodying those ideals in one’s life. Virtues

are ways in which we embody those ideals.

Plato (c.427-347c):

To be virtuous we must understand what contributes to our

overall good & have our desire (appetitive;

workers), spirit (warriors), & reason

(ruler-guardians) educated properly so

they will aggregate with the guidance provided by the rational part of the soul (Books 2 & 3 of Republic). When

these 3 parts of the soul conflict with each other, it might move us to act in ways that go against

the greater good (become incontinent).

Virtue is an excellence of some sort.

Originally the word meant “strength”

and referred to as

“manliness.” In Aristotle’s ethics (arete) is used which

is trans. as “excellences of various

types.”

Plato (c. 427-347) is concerned with the quality of a person’s inner state & he prized beauty,

health, harmony, & strength of a soul as the virtues we should emulate.

Aristotle (384-322): The function of man is reason (the good of the thing is when it

performs its function well) which is peculiar to him. Thus, the function of man is reason and the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in accordance with reason. If the function of man is reason, then the good

man is the man who reasons well This is the life of excellence (eudaimonia; human

flourishing & well-being).

G.E.M. Anscombe (1919-2001) argues we can’t rely on moral obligation using a non-

religious ethic but we can rely on the Greek notion of excellence because it is tied to well-

being & appropriateness to the kind of things we are.

Philippa Foot (1920-) ethical naturalist, grounds the virtues in what is good for human

beings; the virtues are beneficial to their possessor or to the community; virtues are

valuable because they contribute to it.

Aristotle: “Must have knowledge, second he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes, & finally

his actions must proceed from a firm character” (1105a).

Aristotle says there are 2 types of virtue: intellectual virtues:

excellences of the mind (e.g., ability to

understand, reason, & judge well);

moral virtues: learned by repetition

(e.g., practicing honesty we become

honest. To be virtuous requires knowledge,

practice, & consistent effort at character

building.

Basic Framework of Virtue Ethics:Basic Framework of Virtue Ethics:

Premise 1: An action is right iff it is what a Premise 1: An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.

Premise 1a: A virtuous agent is one who acts Premise 1a: A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, i.e., one who has and exercises the virtuously, i.e., one who has and exercises the virtues.virtues.

Premise 2: A virtue is a character trait a human Premise 2: A virtue is a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well.being needs to flourish or live well.

3 Central Concepts:3 Central Concepts:

Though there are several modern versions of Though there are several modern versions of virtue ethics, most models have their roots in virtue ethics, most models have their roots in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it:three concepts derived from it:

1.1. arêtearête (excellence or virtue); (excellence or virtue);

2.2. phronesisphronesis (practical or moral wisdom); (practical or moral wisdom);

3.3. eudaimoniaeudaimonia (usually translated as human) (usually translated as human) flourishing; successful living)flourishing; successful living)

Consider the following quote:Consider the following quote:

““We are discussing no small matter, but how We are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live.”we ought to live.”

~ Socrates in ~ Socrates in Plato’s RepublicPlato’s Republic

Overview of Ethical Systems: Plato (427-347 B.C.)Overview of Ethical Systems: Plato (427-347 B.C.)

Plato believed our natural desires are greedy and depraved. Thus, they must be held in tight check by the powers of reason. He compared the human soul to a city-state made up of ruler-guardians, guardians, and the peasants/artisans.

Every reality is an archetype of a corresponding eternal form. The goal of life is to actualize one’s true nature together with one’s many innate potentialities.

If reason for a moment

lets down its guard, then the desires will exert

their power, seize control, and lead the

person to corruption

and immorality.

So long as the individual is governed by the power of reason, and

reason is assisted by

courage and will power

(guardians), the unruly

desires can be suppressed.

The highest good is the well-ordered whole to which

each part contributes

according to its own capacity. A thing in reality is good insofar as it participates in &

corresponds to the form of the good (which is the high

point of the forms).

4 primary integrated

virtues: Wisdom:

corresponds to reason; courage: corresponds to

the will: temperance,

corresponds to desire: justice: links individual

to society.

Essential Terms for Plato:Essential Terms for Plato:1.1. teleologyteleology: "everything in the universe has a proper function to perform within a harmonious : "everything in the universe has a proper function to perform within a harmonious

hierarchy of purposes" hierarchy of purposes"

2.2. reasonreason: the intellectual component of the soul: "calculates, measures and decides" : the intellectual component of the soul: "calculates, measures and decides"

3.3. spiritspirit: "structural element of the soul"; this is our passionate side that desires honor, glory, : "structural element of the soul"; this is our passionate side that desires honor, glory, and respect and respect

4.4. appetiteappetite: the part of the soul that desires things that help us to satisfy our biological and : the part of the soul that desires things that help us to satisfy our biological and material desires material desires

5.5. moral balancemoral balance: situation in which reason governs the soul guarding against the excesses of : situation in which reason governs the soul guarding against the excesses of spirit and appetite. spirit and appetite.

6.6. class systemclass system: In Plato's : In Plato's RepublicRepublic, a way of dividing individuals into different social groups , a way of dividing individuals into different social groups based on their talents. There are three classes: philosopher-kings (rulers [reason] ), based on their talents. There are three classes: philosopher-kings (rulers [reason] ), auxiliaries (guardians [spirit]) who serve as warriors, and a combination of craftsmen, auxiliaries (guardians [spirit]) who serve as warriors, and a combination of craftsmen, artisans, and traders who are driven mostly by appetite. artisans, and traders who are driven mostly by appetite.

7.7. just societyjust society: a society that functions harmoniously by allowing each individual to do the : a society that functions harmoniously by allowing each individual to do the work suited to his/her talents. work suited to his/her talents.

8.8. philosopher kingsphilosopher kings: rulers in Plato's just society from the : rulers in Plato's just society from the RepublicRepublic

9.9. guardian classguardian class: warriors in Plato's just society from the : warriors in Plato's just society from the RepublicRepublic

Main Points to Know:Main Points to Know: Plato writes dialogues rather than philosophical Plato writes dialogues rather than philosophical

treatises. Hence, most of his philosophical treatises. Hence, most of his philosophical positions are voiced through the character of positions are voiced through the character of Socrates. Even though Socrates was Plato's Socrates. Even though Socrates was Plato's actual teacher, the positions and doctrines actual teacher, the positions and doctrines traditionally attributed to Socrates are actually traditionally attributed to Socrates are actually Plato's account of his teacher. Socrates never Plato's account of his teacher. Socrates never wrote anything. wrote anything.

Plato advances a teleological conception of Plato advances a teleological conception of morality, "we live the good life insofar as we morality, "we live the good life insofar as we perform our distinctively human function well." perform our distinctively human function well."

Main Points to Know:Main Points to Know:

The soul is divided into three parts: appetitive, The soul is divided into three parts: appetitive, spirit, and reason. Each part helps us to fulfill spirit, and reason. Each part helps us to fulfill critical needs, but in Plato's view, only the critical needs, but in Plato's view, only the rational part of the soul is fit to rule. rational part of the soul is fit to rule.

In order to live a virtuous life, it is necessary for In order to live a virtuous life, it is necessary for the individual to cultivate balance in his/her soul. the individual to cultivate balance in his/her soul. Thus, persons ruled by appetite or spirit Thus, persons ruled by appetite or spirit (emotion) are "out of balance" and their actions (emotion) are "out of balance" and their actions are apt to provoke personal or social are apt to provoke personal or social disharmony. disharmony.


Appetite: In cases where appetite rules (oligarchic and Appetite: In cases where appetite rules (oligarchic and tyrannical characters fit here) individuals are at the mercy tyrannical characters fit here) individuals are at the mercy of the their biological or material whims. Alcohol addiction of the their biological or material whims. Alcohol addiction fits this profile. Individuals who are addicted to self-fits this profile. Individuals who are addicted to self-destructive patterns of behavior are apt to feed their destructive patterns of behavior are apt to feed their appetites at the expense of other life pursuits. People can appetites at the expense of other life pursuits. People can also be ruled by material greed in much the same way. also be ruled by material greed in much the same way. The key here is that desire is determinative; these are The key here is that desire is determinative; these are cravings of the highest degree. cravings of the highest degree.


Spirit: The emotional, passionate side of our Spirit: The emotional, passionate side of our character is centered on the idea of status on a character is centered on the idea of status on a social level. Ambition, desire for honor and glory, social level. Ambition, desire for honor and glory, moral indignation, and cravings for admiration, all moral indignation, and cravings for admiration, all fit under the umbrella of spirit. Love relationships fit under the umbrella of spirit. Love relationships fit into this category as well. Our interactions with fit into this category as well. Our interactions with others provide core experiences that influence others provide core experiences that influence our emotional development. our emotional development.


Reason: The intellectual, thinking part of the soul Reason: The intellectual, thinking part of the soul that must weigh options, decide between that must weigh options, decide between alternatives, and "suppress dangerous urges.“ alternatives, and "suppress dangerous urges.“ Plato clearly puts reason in control of the soul Plato clearly puts reason in control of the soul because it acts as good counsel seeking because it acts as good counsel seeking understanding and insight before acting. Rational understanding and insight before acting. Rational individuals possess a strong contemplative individuals possess a strong contemplative faculty. They think before they act and are faculty. They think before they act and are unlikely to take rash action in any given situation. unlikely to take rash action in any given situation.

Know Thyself:Know Thyself: Plato contends that each one of us performs/does one thing best. Plato contends that each one of us performs/does one thing best.

We each have one best skill and it is the development of this skill We each have one best skill and it is the development of this skill that is of paramount importance in creating a harmonious existence. that is of paramount importance in creating a harmonious existence. If we do not have insight into what we do best, the chances of If we do not have insight into what we do best, the chances of achieving a balanced soul are likely reduced. Hence the Socratic achieving a balanced soul are likely reduced. Hence the Socratic imperative, "know thyself." imperative, "know thyself."

Just Society: First ask yourself: is it possible to have a just society? Just Society: First ask yourself: is it possible to have a just society? What would it look like? How would we direct education, the What would it look like? How would we direct education, the economy, leisure, and social resources? What is fair? economy, leisure, and social resources? What is fair?

Plato wrestles with the idea of justice in his most famous work Plato wrestles with the idea of justice in his most famous work entitled, entitled, The RepublicThe Republic. .

Plato views social justice exactly parallels his notion of Plato views social justice exactly parallels his notion of individual justice. There are three parts of the soul and three individual justice. There are three parts of the soul and three

corresponding divisions in the social order. The social order is corresponding divisions in the social order. The social order is constructed as follows:constructed as follows:

SOCIETYSOUL

Reason

Spirit

Appetite

Philosopher-King

Auxiliaries/Guardians

Craftsmen/Artisans/Traders

Three Elements in the Soul that are distinguished Three Elements in the Soul that are distinguished by their functions, goal, and activities:by their functions, goal, and activities:

Reason-calculation calculates: calculation is concerned with Reason-calculation calculates: calculation is concerned with the good (i.e., with the best course of action);the good (i.e., with the best course of action);

Appetite-Desire desires: Desire is concerned with pleasure;Appetite-Desire desires: Desire is concerned with pleasure;

Spirit gets spirited: spirit reacts to perceived slights or wrong.Spirit gets spirited: spirit reacts to perceived slights or wrong.

When you revisit these elements in Books 8-8, they no longer When you revisit these elements in Books 8-8, they no longer look like faculties (as they did in book 4); they now seem more look like faculties (as they did in book 4); they now seem more like drives. The desiring element is specified as the drive like drives. The desiring element is specified as the drive toward material satisfaction; spirit as the drive to win and to toward material satisfaction; spirit as the drive to win and to amount to something; calculation as the drive to discover truth.amount to something; calculation as the drive to discover truth.

Interestingly…Interestingly…By Book 9 the calculative element has a goal of its own: seeks wisdom. By Book 9 the calculative element has a goal of its own: seeks wisdom. “Wisdom is a good, of course, arguably the highest good. But this element “Wisdom is a good, of course, arguably the highest good. But this element seeks wisdom because it is wisdom, not because it is good. It has turned seeks wisdom because it is wisdom, not because it is good. It has turned out to be the philosophical element in the soul. For this reason we should out to be the philosophical element in the soul. For this reason we should not be content for the calculative element merely to supervise within us, not not be content for the calculative element merely to supervise within us, not if we want to be happy. Its natural passion is directed at something different if we want to be happy. Its natural passion is directed at something different and better than this. Certainly, it is better that this element in each person and better than this. Certainly, it is better that this element in each person should be supervisor than that it should fall under the control of the other should be supervisor than that it should fall under the control of the other elements of the soul and be reduced to a tool in their service, as described elements of the soul and be reduced to a tool in their service, as described in Books 8 and 9. But although it is appropriate that the calculative element in Books 8 and 9. But although it is appropriate that the calculative element should supervise the others (44Ie), this is not what it loves to do. As the should supervise the others (44Ie), this is not what it loves to do. As the philosophical element in the soul, it takes on the job of ruling the soul with a philosophical element in the soul, it takes on the job of ruling the soul with a reserve comparable in some respects to that with which philosophers take reserve comparable in some respects to that with which philosophers take on the job of ruling the city. Even with the soul, ruling is work….the on the job of ruling the city. Even with the soul, ruling is work….the philosophical element is divine and immortal, the other elements are mortal philosophical element is divine and immortal, the other elements are mortal and animal, and only the necessity of incarnation thrusts them together.”and animal, and only the necessity of incarnation thrusts them together.”

~ ~ Cambridge Companion to Plato’s RepublicCambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, “Three-Part Soul” by G. R. F. , “Three-Part Soul” by G. R. F. Ferrari, pg. 166.Ferrari, pg. 166.

An Ideal CityAn Ideal City Plato attempts to show that on justice is so great a good that it is worth any Plato attempts to show that on justice is so great a good that it is worth any

sacrifice. He portrays an ideal political community: there we will see justice sacrifice. He portrays an ideal political community: there we will see justice writ large, and so we will be better able to find justice in the individual soul. writ large, and so we will be better able to find justice in the individual soul. An ideal city must make radical innovations. It should be ruled by specially An ideal city must make radical innovations. It should be ruled by specially trained philosophers, since their understanding of the Form of the Good will trained philosophers, since their understanding of the Form of the Good will give them greater insight into everyday affairs. Their education is compared give them greater insight into everyday affairs. Their education is compared to that of a prisoner who, having once gazed upon nothing but shadows in to that of a prisoner who, having once gazed upon nothing but shadows in the artificial light of a cave, is released from bondage, leaves the cave, the artificial light of a cave, is released from bondage, leaves the cave, eventually learns to see the sun, and is thereby equipped to return to the eventually learns to see the sun, and is thereby equipped to return to the cave and see the images there for what the are. Everything in the rulers’ cave and see the images there for what the are. Everything in the rulers’ lives is designed to promote their allegiance to the community: they are lives is designed to promote their allegiance to the community: they are forbidden private possessions, their sexual lives are regulated by eugenic forbidden private possessions, their sexual lives are regulated by eugenic considerations, and they are not to know who their children art. Positions of considerations, and they are not to know who their children art. Positions of political power are open to women, since the physical differences between political power are open to women, since the physical differences between them and men do not in all cases deprive them of the intellectual or moral them and men do not in all cases deprive them of the intellectual or moral capacities needed for political office. The works of poets are to be carefully capacities needed for political office. The works of poets are to be carefully regulated, for the false moral notions of the traditional poets have had a regulated, for the false moral notions of the traditional poets have had a powerful and deleterious impact on the general public. Philosophical powerful and deleterious impact on the general public. Philosophical reflection is to replace popular poetry as the force that guides moral reflection is to replace popular poetry as the force that guides moral education.education.

An Ideal CityAn Ideal City

What makes this city ideally just is the What makes this city ideally just is the dedication of each of its components to dedication of each of its components to one task for which it is naturally suited and one task for which it is naturally suited and specially trained. The rulers are ideally specially trained. The rulers are ideally equipped to rule; the soldiers are best able equipped to rule; the soldiers are best able to enforce their commands; and the to enforce their commands; and the economic class, composed of farmers, economic class, composed of farmers, craftsmen, builders, etc. are content to do craftsmen, builders, etc. are content to do their work and to leave the tasks of making their work and to leave the tasks of making and enforcing the laws to others. and enforcing the laws to others.

What makes the soul of person just?What makes the soul of person just?

What makes the soul of a human being just is the same What makes the soul of a human being just is the same principle: each of its components must properly perform principle: each of its components must properly perform its own task. The part of us that is capable of its own task. The part of us that is capable of understanding and reasoning is the part that must rule; understanding and reasoning is the part that must rule; the assertive part that makes us capable of anger and the assertive part that makes us capable of anger and competitive spirit must give our understanding the force competitive spirit must give our understanding the force it needs; and our appetites for food and sex must be it needs; and our appetites for food and sex must be trained so that they seek only those objects that reason trained so that they seek only those objects that reason approves. It is not enough to educate someone’s approves. It is not enough to educate someone’s reasons, for unless the emotions and appetites are reasons, for unless the emotions and appetites are properly trained they will overpower it. Just individuals properly trained they will overpower it. Just individuals are those who have fully integrated these elements of are those who have fully integrated these elements of the soul. the soul.

What makes the soul of person just?What makes the soul of person just?

Just individuals are those who have fully integrated these Just individuals are those who have fully integrated these elements of the soul. They do not unthinkingly follow a elements of the soul. They do not unthinkingly follow a list of rules; rather, their just treatment of others flow list of rules; rather, their just treatment of others flow from their own balanced psychological condition. And from their own balanced psychological condition. And the paradigm of a just person is a philosopher, for the paradigm of a just person is a philosopher, for reason rules when it becomes passionately attached to reason rules when it becomes passionately attached to the most intelligible object there are: the Forms (which the most intelligible object there are: the Forms (which are eternal, changeless, and imperceptible). It emerges are eternal, changeless, and imperceptible). It emerges that justice pays because attachment to these supremely that justice pays because attachment to these supremely valuable objects is part of what true justice of the soul is. valuable objects is part of what true justice of the soul is. The worth of our lives depends on the worth of objects to The worth of our lives depends on the worth of objects to which we devote ourselves. Those who think that which we devote ourselves. Those who think that injustice pays assume that wealth, domination, or the injustice pays assume that wealth, domination, or the pleasures of the physical appetite are supremely pleasures of the physical appetite are supremely valuable; their mistake lies in their limited conception of valuable; their mistake lies in their limited conception of what sorts of objects are worth loving.what sorts of objects are worth loving.

The Forms:The Forms:1.1. PhaedoPhaedo is the first dialogue in which Plato decisively posits the is the first dialogue in which Plato decisively posits the

existence of the abstract objects that he often called “Forms” or existence of the abstract objects that he often called “Forms” or “Ideas”-which exist independently of thought (“Ideas”-which exist independently of thought (eidoseidos and idea). and idea).

2.2. Forms are eternal, changeless, and incorporeal. Since they are Forms are eternal, changeless, and incorporeal. Since they are imperceptible we can come to have knowledge of them only through imperceptible we can come to have knowledge of them only through thought.thought.

a.a. Beautiful roses is not Beauty itself.Beautiful roses is not Beauty itself.b.b. What every rose has in common with every other is What every rose has in common with every other is that itthat it bears a certain relationship-called “participation”-to bears a certain relationship-called “participation”-to one one and the same thing, the Form of Beauty. and the same thing, the Form of Beauty. Thus, what Thus, what makes roses beautiful is the makes roses beautiful is the unchanging unchanging Form-beauty.Form-beauty.

3.3. For Plato the Forms are not merely an unusual item to be added to For Plato the Forms are not merely an unusual item to be added to our list of existing objects. Rather, they are a source of inspiration our list of existing objects. Rather, they are a source of inspiration and their discovery is a decisive turning point in one’s life.and their discovery is a decisive turning point in one’s life.

Example from Example from SymposiumSymposium: Love.: Love.

According to Diotima’s account, those who are in According to Diotima’s account, those who are in love are searching for something they do not yet love are searching for something they do not yet understand; whether they realize it or not, they understand; whether they realize it or not, they seek the eternal possession of the good, and seek the eternal possession of the good, and they can obtain it only through productive activity they can obtain it only through productive activity of some sort. Physical love perpetuates the of some sort. Physical love perpetuates the species and achieves a lower form of species and achieves a lower form of immortality, but a more beautiful kind of offspring immortality, but a more beautiful kind of offspring is produced by those who govern cities and is produced by those who govern cities and shape the moral characteristics of future shape the moral characteristics of future generations. generations.

Example from Example from SymposiumSymposium: Love.: Love.

Best of all is the kind of love that eventually attaches Best of all is the kind of love that eventually attaches itself to the Form of Beauty, since this is the most itself to the Form of Beauty, since this is the most beautiful of objects and provides the greatest happiness beautiful of objects and provides the greatest happiness to the lover. One develops a love for this Form by to the lover. One develops a love for this Form by ascending through various stages of emotional ascending through various stages of emotional attachment and understanding. Beginning with an attachment and understanding. Beginning with an attraction to the beauty of one person’s body, one attraction to the beauty of one person’s body, one gradually develops an appreciation for the beauty gradually develops an appreciation for the beauty present in all other beautiful bodies; then one’s present in all other beautiful bodies; then one’s recognition of the beauty in people’s souls takes on recognition of the beauty in people’s souls takes on increasing strength, and leads to a deeper attachment to increasing strength, and leads to a deeper attachment to the beauty of customs, laws, and systems of knowledge; the beauty of customs, laws, and systems of knowledge; and this process of emotional growth and deepening and this process of emotional growth and deepening insight culminates in the discovery of the eternal and insight culminates in the discovery of the eternal and changeless beauty of Beauty itself.changeless beauty of Beauty itself.

Aristotle Rejection of Plato:Aristotle Rejection of Plato:

Plato’s chief contribution consists in his conception of the Plato’s chief contribution consists in his conception of the observable world as an imperfect image of a realm of observable world as an imperfect image of a realm of unobservable and unchanging “Forms,” and his unobservable and unchanging “Forms,” and his conception of the best life as one centered on the love of conception of the best life as one centered on the love of these divine objects.these divine objects.

Aristotle rejects Plato’s transcendental Form of the Good Aristotle rejects Plato’s transcendental Form of the Good as irrelevant to the affairs of persons, and in general, as irrelevant to the affairs of persons, and in general, had little sympathy with the notion of the absolute good. had little sympathy with the notion of the absolute good. Rather, the goal of choice and action is the human good, Rather, the goal of choice and action is the human good, namely, living well.namely, living well.

Aristotle Rejection of Plato:Aristotle Rejection of Plato:

Plato’s general theory of knowledge, i.e., the “theory of Plato’s general theory of knowledge, i.e., the “theory of forms” has much in common with the theories of innate ideas. forms” has much in common with the theories of innate ideas. What is known, at the highest and most general level, is a What is known, at the highest and most general level, is a collection of objects, with which we have all had direct collection of objects, with which we have all had direct acquaintance prior to birth (the “forms” or “ideas”). All of us, acquaintance prior to birth (the “forms” or “ideas”). All of us, therefore, may have some inkling of general truths; but only therefore, may have some inkling of general truths; but only those whose rational capacities are especially well developed-those whose rational capacities are especially well developed-in short, philosophers-can fully reactivate their memories.in short, philosophers-can fully reactivate their memories.

Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory of knowledge. He locates the Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory of knowledge. He locates the source of ethical insight in experience of life itself. Aristotle source of ethical insight in experience of life itself. Aristotle argues that we need to know how to act, possess practical argues that we need to know how to act, possess practical wisdom (have an “eye” for solutions)—and that can only be wisdom (have an “eye” for solutions)—and that can only be developed through a combination of training in the right habits developed through a combination of training in the right habits and direct acquaintance with practical situations. and direct acquaintance with practical situations.

Aristotle’s Differences with Plato:Aristotle’s Differences with Plato: Read in this way, Aristotle is engaged in a project Read in this way, Aristotle is engaged in a project

similar in some respects to the one Plato carried out similar in some respects to the one Plato carried out in the in the RepublicRepublic. One of Plato's central points is that it . One of Plato's central points is that it is a great advantage to establish a hierarchical is a great advantage to establish a hierarchical ordering of the elements in one's soul; and he shows ordering of the elements in one's soul; and he shows how the traditional virtues can be interpreted to how the traditional virtues can be interpreted to foster or express the proper relation between reason foster or express the proper relation between reason and less rational elements of the psyche. Aristotle's and less rational elements of the psyche. Aristotle's approach is similar: his “function argument” shows in approach is similar: his “function argument” shows in a general way that our good lies in the dominance of a general way that our good lies in the dominance of reason, and the detailed studies of the particular reason, and the detailed studies of the particular virtues reveal how each of them involves the right virtues reveal how each of them involves the right kind of ordering of the soul. kind of ordering of the soul.

Aristotle’s Differences with Plato:Aristotle’s Differences with Plato: Aristotle's goal is to arrive at conclusions similar to Plato's, Aristotle's goal is to arrive at conclusions similar to Plato's,

but without relying on the Platonic metaphysics that plays a but without relying on the Platonic metaphysics that plays a central role in the argument of the central role in the argument of the RepublicRepublic. He rejects the . He rejects the existence of Plato's forms in general and the form of the good existence of Plato's forms in general and the form of the good in particular; and he rejects the idea that in order to become in particular; and he rejects the idea that in order to become fully virtuous one must study mathematics and the sciences, fully virtuous one must study mathematics and the sciences, and see all branches of knowledge as a unified whole. Even and see all branches of knowledge as a unified whole. Even though Aristotle's ethical theory sometimes relies on though Aristotle's ethical theory sometimes relies on philosophical distinctions that are more fully developed in his philosophical distinctions that are more fully developed in his other works, he never proposes that students of ethics need other works, he never proposes that students of ethics need to engage in a specialized study of the natural world, or to engage in a specialized study of the natural world, or mathematics, or eternal and changing objects. His project is mathematics, or eternal and changing objects. His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field.any other field.

Aristotle’s Differences with Plato:Aristotle’s Differences with Plato:

There is another contrast with Plato that should be There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the emphasized: In Book II of the RepublicRepublic, we are told that , we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results (357d-358a). Plato argues and for the sake of its results (357d-358a). Plato argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its is generally agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if assumes that if AA is desirable for the sake of is desirable for the sake of BB, then , then BB is is better than better than AA (1094a14-16); therefore, the highest kind of (1094a14-16); therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. anything else.


To show that To show that AA deserves to be our ultimate end, one deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote instruments that promote AA in some way or other. in some way or other. Accordingly, it would not serve Aristotle's purpose to Accordingly, it would not serve Aristotle's purpose to consider virtuous activity in isolation from all other consider virtuous activity in isolation from all other goods. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and goods. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. like.


Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. Aristotle's methodology in ethics therefore pays pursued. Aristotle's methodology in ethics therefore pays more attention than does Plato's to the connections that more attention than does Plato's to the connections that normally obtain between virtue and other goods. That is normally obtain between virtue and other goods. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part (1094b11-22). Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are (1094b11-22). Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime.of virtue over the course of a lifetime.


1.1. Difference over what is virtue and vice.Difference over what is virtue and vice.

Aristotle differs with Plato’s notion (early dialogues) that Aristotle differs with Plato’s notion (early dialogues) that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice is nothing virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice is nothing more but a lack of knowledge.more but a lack of knowledge.

The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states as as hexeishexeis is his decisive rejection of that thesis. Aristotle is his decisive rejection of that thesis. Aristotle insists that virtues differ from crafts and all branches of insists that virtues differ from crafts and all branches of knowledge for they involve appropriate emotional responses knowledge for they involve appropriate emotional responses rather than pure intellectual conditions.rather than pure intellectual conditions.

Some Similarities between Plato & Aristotle:Some Similarities between Plato & Aristotle:

Aristotle sees the human body as complex of soul and body Aristotle sees the human body as complex of soul and body whereas Plato sees souls temporarily united with bodies (Plato), whereas Plato sees souls temporarily united with bodies (Plato), they are like other things in the world for they have a “function” they are like other things in the world for they have a “function” or “activity” which is peculiar to them.or “activity” which is peculiar to them.

The good life, eudaimonia, will consist in the successful The good life, eudaimonia, will consist in the successful performance of that function.performance of that function.

Nothing can perform its peculiar function successfully unless it Nothing can perform its peculiar function successfully unless it possess the relevant “arete”, i.e., unless it is good of its kind possess the relevant “arete”, i.e., unless it is good of its kind (two platonic examples: the only horses that will be able to win (two platonic examples: the only horses that will be able to win races; the only pruning-knives which can successfully be used races; the only pruning-knives which can successfully be used to cut vines-will be good ones).to cut vines-will be good ones).

For both Plato and Aristotle the content of arete depends on For both Plato and Aristotle the content of arete depends on some prior notion of what it is to be human.some prior notion of what it is to be human.

What is the function of human beings and what is What is the function of human beings and what is the arete which relates to that?the arete which relates to that?

1.1. Plato’s answers are, respectively, Plato’s answers are, respectively, “governing and the like” (i.e., the “governing and the like” (i.e., the governing of the soul by its union with governing of the soul by its union with the body), and “justice.”the body), and “justice.”

2.2. “An active life of that which possesses “An active life of that which possesses reason, and the best of the “arete.”reason, and the best of the “arete.”

Overview of Ethical Systems: Overview of Ethical Systems: Aristotle (384-322 B.C.):Aristotle (384-322 B.C.):

Though we are naturally suited to moral goodness, we don’t automatically develop such inclinations

Ideal of virtue is doing the right thing because you

want to do the right thing: you desire to act virtuously.

Carefully cultivate moral goodness by rigorous

practice.

In order to desire to act virtuously you must

carefully and consistently practice doing right until it

becomes habitual & natural.

If you act selfishly then you will become a selfish person. Eventually what feels right to you may be very wrong.

Your habits &

inclinations develop

with practice; what you

sow is what you

reap.

With practice & diligence you can develop the habits & inclinations of a virtuous

person.

Thus, choose to be virtuous. Desire +

judgment must agree.

Closer Look at Virtue:Closer Look at Virtue: ““A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency

to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait. specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait. It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say "goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-"goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the basis of a single action)” ~ Stanford Encyclopediabasis of a single action)” ~ Stanford Encyclopedia

Why do you want to be happy?Why do you want to be happy? For Aristotle, the ultimate aim of the best life is eudaimonia. If For Aristotle, the ultimate aim of the best life is eudaimonia. If

someone asks why you want to go to college, buy a car, or get a someone asks why you want to go to college, buy a car, or get a divorce, it makes sense to answer that you are doing these things divorce, it makes sense to answer that you are doing these things as part of a long-term plan to achieve happiness. But if someone as part of a long-term plan to achieve happiness. But if someone asks why you want to be happy, there is no answer because asks why you want to be happy, there is no answer because happiness is not a means to anything further. Happiness is valuable happiness is not a means to anything further. Happiness is valuable solely for its own sake. Now, the claim that everything else is solely for its own sake. Now, the claim that everything else is valued for the sake of happiness is somewhat more controversial:valued for the sake of happiness is somewhat more controversial:

Mill agrees with Aristotle, but Kant thinks that duty is desirable solely for Mill agrees with Aristotle, but Kant thinks that duty is desirable solely for its own sake. its own sake.

There is much disagreement about what “happiness” is. Some people There is much disagreement about what “happiness” is. Some people think happiness is sensual pleasure; others think it is wealth, honor, think happiness is sensual pleasure; others think it is wealth, honor, good action, or contemplation.good action, or contemplation.

Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?

What is a virtue?What is a virtue?

A virtue is a habit of excellence, a beneficial tendency, a skilled A virtue is a habit of excellence, a beneficial tendency, a skilled disposition that enables a person to realize the crucial potentialities disposition that enables a person to realize the crucial potentialities that constitute proper human flourishing (that constitute proper human flourishing (eudaimoniaeudaimonia).).

What is a habit? A disposition to think, feel, desire, and act in a What is a habit? A disposition to think, feel, desire, and act in a certain way without having a tendency to consciously will to do so.certain way without having a tendency to consciously will to do so.

What is a character: The sum-total of one’s habits, tendencies, and What is a character: The sum-total of one’s habits, tendencies, and well-being.well-being.

Four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, prudence, and justice. Four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, prudence, and justice. Piety (reverence to the gods) is sometimes considered a fifth virtue.Piety (reverence to the gods) is sometimes considered a fifth virtue.

On Becoming Agathos & EudaimonOn Becoming Agathos & EudaimonFrom Aristotle’s Point of View:From Aristotle’s Point of View:

Cited from Michael Boylan, Cited from Michael Boylan, Basic EthicsBasic Ethics (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 52. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 52. Step 1:Step 1: Master the functional requirements within a given type of task Master the functional requirements within a given type of task or or

behavior.behavior.

Step 2:Step 2: Possess the habitual mastery of the functional requirements to Possess the habitual mastery of the functional requirements to an an appropriate degree.appropriate degree.

Step 3:Step 3: Steps 1 & 2: excellence in that task or behavior.Steps 1 & 2: excellence in that task or behavior.

Step 4:Step 4: Possess habitual excellence in a number of key tasks or behavior.Possess habitual excellence in a number of key tasks or behavior.

Step 5:Step 5: Possess habitual excellence in those tasks or behavior that the Possess habitual excellence in those tasks or behavior that the common opinion judges to be the most worthy.common opinion judges to be the most worthy.

Step 6:Step 6: Steps 4 & 5 leads to agathos.Steps 4 & 5 leads to agathos.

Step 7:Step 7: Possessing Agathos leads to eudaimon.Possessing Agathos leads to eudaimon.

Thus, on balance, excellent traits in human character generally produce excellent Thus, on balance, excellent traits in human character generally produce excellent actionsactions..

What is Virtue:What is Virtue:

Aristotle characterizes virtue as follows:Aristotle characterizes virtue as follows:

Virtue, then, is a state of character, Virtue, then, is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that principle by determined by principle, that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would which the man of practical wisdom would determine it (1106b-1107).determine it (1106b-1107).

The good for man, then, is activity in accordance with virtue or the highest The good for man, then, is activity in accordance with virtue or the highest virtue. Just like the excellence of an lies in cutting, a thing’s excellence is a virtue. Just like the excellence of an lies in cutting, a thing’s excellence is a master of how well it performs its characteristic functions or, we might say, master of how well it performs its characteristic functions or, we might say, how well it realizes it nature.how well it realizes it nature.

The natural functions of persons reside in their exercise of their natural The natural functions of persons reside in their exercise of their natural cognitive faculties, most importantly, the faculty of reason. So human cognitive faculties, most importantly, the faculty of reason. So human happiness consistence in activity in accordance with reason. However, happiness consistence in activity in accordance with reason. However, persons can exercise reason in practical or in purely theoretical matters. The persons can exercise reason in practical or in purely theoretical matters. The first suggest that happiness consists in the practical life of moral virtue, the first suggest that happiness consists in the practical life of moral virtue, the second that is consists in the life of theoretical activity.second that is consists in the life of theoretical activity.

Most of Most of Nicomachean EthicsNicomachean Ethics is devoted to moral virtues but final book is devoted to moral virtues but final book appears to favor theoretical activity (appears to favor theoretical activity (theoriatheoria) as the highest and most choice-) as the highest and most choice-worthy end. It is man’s closest approach to divine activity.worthy end. It is man’s closest approach to divine activity.

The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Character:Character:

When Aristotle says that a virtuous person’s virtuous acts proceed from a firm character, he means to distinguish virtue from other sorts of character. Consider…

1. The acts of a virtuous person do not arise out of some quirk of circumstances. Rather, a virtuous person’s acts are typical of that person because virtue is his/her set of habits of passion, desire, pleasure, thoughts, & the like. Therefore, he/she is not out-of-character. In other words, the virtuous person can be counted on to perform such acts.

CharacterCharacter

3. The acts are not the result of outside pressure or persuasion but come instead from within the person.

4. The act should not be performed by an effort of will against temptation. The virtuous person is not conflicted-not pulled one way be desire and another by duty. He or she is in harmony with himself or herself. Thus even though the continent person is reliably good and internally motivated, his/her act does not “proceed from a firm character.”

Consider the following chart of 6 different types of character:

Character Passion/Desires Principles/Choices Choices

Heroically virtuous very right very right very right

Virtuous right right right

Continent wrong right right

Incontinent wrong right wrong

Vicious wrong wrong wrong

Brutish very wrong very wrong very wrong

1. Heroic person possesses supererogatory virtue, acting & feeling even better than ordinary virtuous people

2. Virtuous person has right passions & desires, makes right choices based on right principles, & reliably performs right acts.

3. The continent person overcomes temptation by will power. He has wrong passions & desires but makes right choices & performs right acts.

4. The incontinent: fails to overcome temptation because of weakness of will: he has wrong passions & desires & makes right choices but performs wrong acts (1150a15).

5. The vicious & brutish characters need no further explanation.

Aristotle’s Descriptions of the Various Sorts of Characters:


Aristotle goes onto characterize virtue Aristotle goes onto characterize virtue further when he states [1106b-1107]:further when he states [1106b-1107]:

Virtue, then is a state of character Virtue, then is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, that determined by a rational principle, that principle by which the man of practical principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.wisdom would determine it.

Character:Character: A State of Character is a set of:A State of Character is a set of:

1.1. Habits,Habits,2.2. Passion,Passion,3.3. Pleasure,Pleasure,4.4. Thoughts, &Thoughts, &5.5. the like. the like.

Thus to say that virtue is a a state of character is to say that a Thus to say that virtue is a a state of character is to say that a virtuous person not only reliably performs virtuous acts but also virtuous person not only reliably performs virtuous acts but also feels the right passions, desires the right objects, enjoys the right feels the right passions, desires the right objects, enjoys the right things, and holds the right beliefs in the each situation.things, and holds the right beliefs in the each situation.

Consider the following example…Consider the following example…


A courageous person will not only stand firm in A courageous person will not only stand firm in battle but will also feel the right amoun of fear battle but will also feel the right amoun of fear and confidence and have the right goals. He will and confidence and have the right goals. He will not be thinking, “I can’t run because I am so not be thinking, “I can’t run because I am so terrified that my legs are off-line, and besides if I terrified that my legs are off-line, and besides if I stand firm, I may get to appear on CNN.” stand firm, I may get to appear on CNN.” Instead, he will be thinking, “The situation is Instead, he will be thinking, “The situation is perilous, but I have a reasonable chance of perilous, but I have a reasonable chance of surviving if I keep alert, and besides I must stand surviving if I keep alert, and besides I must stand firm to keep my city free. It is the brave thing to firm to keep my city free. It is the brave thing to do.”do.”

Character:Character:Is Aristotle demanding an unreasonably high level of perfection from Is Aristotle demanding an unreasonably high level of perfection from his virtuous person? his virtuous person?

1.1. Virtue is a matter of degree and Aristotle is sketching a perfect Virtue is a matter of degree and Aristotle is sketching a perfect virtue. virtue. He is describing an ideal person so that we can have a He is describing an ideal person so that we can have a mark at which to aim and a standard for judgment. mark at which to aim and a standard for judgment.

2.2. A person can be reasonably less than ideal and still be a A person can be reasonably less than ideal and still be a virtuous person.virtuous person.

The bottom line is that your passions and desires are under your The bottom line is that your passions and desires are under your control. To be sure, you can’t change them quickly or easily, but over control. To be sure, you can’t change them quickly or easily, but over time you can modify your passions and desires. In fact, Aristotle says time you can modify your passions and desires. In fact, Aristotle says that you should use your reason to determine which passions and that you should use your reason to determine which passions and desires to have and then go on to develop these passions and desires. desires to have and then go on to develop these passions and desires. You should cultivate a taste for virtue, just as some people cultivate a You should cultivate a taste for virtue, just as some people cultivate a taste for gourmet coffee (1113a-1114b).taste for gourmet coffee (1113a-1114b).

Relationship between Virtue and Vice:Relationship between Virtue and Vice:

Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “hexishexis” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a ” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings (1105b25-6). (1105b25-6).

Defective states of character are Defective states of character are hexeishexeis (plural of (plural of hexishexis) as well, but they are ) as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings. tendencies to have inappropriate feelings.

The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states as The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states as hexeishexeis is his is his decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato's early dialogues, that virtue decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato's early dialogues, that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge. is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge.

Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues (and similarly between physical health and (and similarly between physical health and eudaimoniaeudaimonia), he insists that the virtues ), he insists that the virtues differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions.appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions.


Every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two other Every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26-states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26-b28).b28).

1.1. Virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled Virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in

a a condition intermediate between two extremes. condition intermediate between two extremes.

2.2. For example, the courageous person, for example, judges For example, the courageous person, for example, judges that that some dangers are worth facing and others not, and some dangers are worth facing and others not, and experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or no no fear. fear.


2.2. Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every ethical ethical virtue: all are located on a map that places the virtue: all are located on a map that places the

virtues virtues between states between states of excess and deficiency. of excess and deficiency.

3.3. The mean is to be determined in a way that takes into The mean is to be determined in a way that takes into account account the particular circumstances of the individual the particular circumstances of the individual (1106a36-b7). (1106a36-b7).

Example: The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and Example: The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and this this is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no universal universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete rule, for example, about how much food an athlete should eat, should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10 and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10 lbs. is too lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat 6 lbs. Finding the 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given situation is not a mean in any given situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless mechanical or thoughtless procedure, but requires a full and procedure, but requires a full and detailed acquaintance with detailed acquaintance with the circumstances the circumstances

Duration

Objects

Occasions

Degree

People

Vice (cowardice)

Virtue (courage)

Vice (Rashness)

Brutish

Virtue Excess Deficiency Sphere

Courage Rashness Cowardice Danger

Temperance Self-indulgence Insensibility Sensual pleasure

Liberality Wasteful Stinginess Money

Magnificence Vulgarity Penny pinching Great wealth

Pride Vanity Humility Honor & self-respect

Right Ambition Overly ambitious Lack of ambition Honor

Good temper No emotion Quick-temper Insult

Ready wit Buffoonishness Boorishness Humor

Truthfulness Boastfulness Modesty Self-description

Friendliness Flattery Quarrelsome Social association

Shame Bashfulness Pretense Wrongdoing

Righteous Spite Envy Fortune of others

Justice Greed ? Scarce goods

A Character Trait is a Virtue IFF it is conducive to eudaimonia

How does Aristotle Know which Traits are How does Aristotle Know which Traits are Virtues?Virtues?

It is not by uncritical adoption of values of his It is not by uncritical adoption of values of his time for Aristotle is quite critical of certain time for Aristotle is quite critical of certain institutions within society (e.g., slavery) & is institutions within society (e.g., slavery) & is willing to state that certain traits are virtues/vices willing to state that certain traits are virtues/vices even though they have not been previously been even though they have not been previously been identified as such by his society.identified as such by his society.

Aristotle says that a character trait is a virtue IFF Aristotle says that a character trait is a virtue IFF it is conducive to leading the happy life it is conducive to leading the happy life (eudaimonia). (eudaimonia).

Relationship between Virtue and Relationship between Virtue and Vice:Vice:

It should be evident that Aristotle's treatment of virtues as mean It should be evident that Aristotle's treatment of virtues as mean states endorses the idea that we should sometimes have strong states endorses the idea that we should sometimes have strong feelings—when such feelings are called for by our situation. feelings—when such feelings are called for by our situation. Sometimes only a small degree of anger is appropriate; but at other Sometimes only a small degree of anger is appropriate; but at other times, circumstances call for great anger. The right amount is not times, circumstances call for great anger. The right amount is not some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate to the seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle is committed to the seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle is committed to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. But it fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. But it is possible to be very angry without going to this extreme, and is possible to be very angry without going to this extreme, and Aristotle does not intend to deny this.Aristotle does not intend to deny this.

2 Distinct Theories Regarding the Doctrine 2 Distinct Theories Regarding the Doctrine of the Mean:of the Mean:

11stst:: There is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two There is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency.

22ndnd::There is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to There is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to perform perform a virtuous act, he can be described as aiming at an act that is in a virtuous act, he can be described as aiming at an act that is in some some way or other intermediate between alternatives that he rejects. Iway or other intermediate between alternatives that he rejects. I

Second is more objectionable. A critic might concede that in some cases Second is more objectionable. A critic might concede that in some cases virtuous acts can be described in Aristotle's terms. If, for example, one is trying virtuous acts can be described in Aristotle's terms. If, for example, one is trying to decide how much to spend on a wedding present, one is looking for an to decide how much to spend on a wedding present, one is looking for an amount that is neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many other problems amount that is neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many other problems that confront a virtuous agent are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis. If that confront a virtuous agent are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis. If one must decide whether to attend a wedding or respect a competing obligation one must decide whether to attend a wedding or respect a competing obligation instead, it would not be illuminating to describe this as a search for a mean instead, it would not be illuminating to describe this as a search for a mean between extremes—unless “aiming at the mean” simply becomes another between extremes—unless “aiming at the mean” simply becomes another phrase for trying to make the right decision. The objection, then, is that phrase for trying to make the right decision. The objection, then, is that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical agent Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical agent does when he deliberates, is in many cases inapplicable or unilluminating.does when he deliberates, is in many cases inapplicable or unilluminating.


A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the virtuous person does after A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the virtuous person does after all aim at a mean, if we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort of all aim at a mean, if we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort of aiming is involved. For example, consider a juror who must determine aiming is involved. For example, consider a juror who must determine whether a defendant is guilty as charged. He does not have before his mind whether a defendant is guilty as charged. He does not have before his mind a quantitative question; he is trying to decide whether the accused a quantitative question; he is trying to decide whether the accused committed the crime, and is not looking for some quantity of action committed the crime, and is not looking for some quantity of action intermediate between extremes. Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be intermediate between extremes. Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be described as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct decision, seeks described as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct decision, seeks to express the right degree of concern for all relevant considerations. He to express the right degree of concern for all relevant considerations. He searches for the verdict that results from a deliberative process that is searches for the verdict that results from a deliberative process that is neither overly credulous or unduly skeptical. Similarly, in facing situations neither overly credulous or unduly skeptical. Similarly, in facing situations that arouse anger, a virtuous agent must determine what action (if any) to that arouse anger, a virtuous agent must determine what action (if any) to take in response to an insult, and although this is not itself a quantitative take in response to an insult, and although this is not itself a quantitative question, his attempt to answer it properly requires him to have the right question, his attempt to answer it properly requires him to have the right degree of concern for his standing as a member of the community. He aims degree of concern for his standing as a member of the community. He aims at a mean in the sense that he looks for a response that avoids too much or at a mean in the sense that he looks for a response that avoids too much or too little attention to factors that must be taken into account in making a too little attention to factors that must be taken into account in making a wise decision. wise decision.


Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we ask how Aristotle determines Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we ask how Aristotle determines which emotions are governed by the doctrine of the mean. Consider which emotions are governed by the doctrine of the mean. Consider someone who loves to wrestle, for example. Is this passion something that someone who loves to wrestle, for example. Is this passion something that must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right degree? Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could degree? Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could still live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we not say the same about still live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we not say the same about at least some of the emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of the at least some of the emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of the ethically virtuous agent? Why should we experience anger at all, or fear, or ethically virtuous agent? Why should we experience anger at all, or fear, or the degree of concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle commends? These the degree of concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle commends? These are precisely the questions that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and are precisely the questions that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and they came to the conclusion that such common emotions as anger and fear they came to the conclusion that such common emotions as anger and fear are always inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the contrary, not simply that are always inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the contrary, not simply that these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in the right way at the right times. A defense of his position would have to the right way at the right times. A defense of his position would have to show that the emotions that figure in his account of the virtues are valuable show that the emotions that figure in his account of the virtues are valuable components of any well-lived human life, when they are experienced components of any well-lived human life, when they are experienced properly. Perhaps such a project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself properly. Perhaps such a project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself does not attempt to do so.does not attempt to do so.


He often says, in the course of his discussion, that when the good person He often says, in the course of his discussion, that when the good person chooses to act virtuously, he does so for the sake of the “chooses to act virtuously, he does so for the sake of the “kalonkalon”—a word ”—a word that can mean “beautiful,” “noble,” or “fine.” (See for example 1120a23-4.) that can mean “beautiful,” “noble,” or “fine.” (See for example 1120a23-4.) This term indicates that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction that is This term indicates that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction that is comparable to the beauty of well-crafted artifacts, including such artifacts as comparable to the beauty of well-crafted artifacts, including such artifacts as poetry, music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his discussion of the poetry, music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his discussion of the mean, when he says that every craft tries to produce a work from which mean, when he says that every craft tries to produce a work from which nothing should be taken away and to which nothing further should be added nothing should be taken away and to which nothing further should be added (1106b5-14). A craft product, when well designed and produced by a good (1106b5-14). A craft product, when well designed and produced by a good craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has such elements as balance, craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has such elements as balance, proportion and harmony—for these are properties that help make it useful. proportion and harmony—for these are properties that help make it useful. Similarly, Aristotle holds that a well-executed project that expresses the Similarly, Aristotle holds that a well-executed project that expresses the ethical virtues will not merely be advantageous but ethical virtues will not merely be advantageous but kalonkalon as well—for the as well—for the balance it strikes is part of what makes it advantageous. The young person balance it strikes is part of what makes it advantageous. The young person learning to acquire the virtues must develop a love of doing what is learning to acquire the virtues must develop a love of doing what is kalonkalon and a strong aversion to its opposite—the and a strong aversion to its opposite—the aischronaischron, the shameful and ugly. , the shameful and ugly. Determining what is Determining what is kalonkalon is difficult (1106b28-33, 1109a24-30, and the is difficult (1106b28-33, 1109a24-30, and the normal human aversion to embracing difficulties helps account for the normal human aversion to embracing difficulties helps account for the scarcity of virtue (1104b10-11).scarcity of virtue (1104b10-11).


It should be clear that neither the thesis that virtues lie between It should be clear that neither the thesis that virtues lie between extremes nor the thesis that the good person aims at what is extremes nor the thesis that the good person aims at what is intermediate is intended as a procedure for making decisions. intermediate is intended as a procedure for making decisions. These doctrines of the mean help show what is attractive about the These doctrines of the mean help show what is attractive about the virtues, and they also help systematize our understanding of which virtues, and they also help systematize our understanding of which qualities are virtues. Once we see that temperance, courage, and qualities are virtues. Once we see that temperance, courage, and other generally recognized characteristics are mean states, we are other generally recognized characteristics are mean states, we are in a position to generalize and to identify other mean states as in a position to generalize and to identify other mean states as virtues, even though they are not qualities for which we have a virtues, even though they are not qualities for which we have a name. Aristotle remarks, for example, that the mean state with name. Aristotle remarks, for example, that the mean state with respect to anger has no name in Greek (1125b26-7). Though he is respect to anger has no name in Greek (1125b26-7). Though he is guided to some degree by distinctions captured by ordinary terms, guided to some degree by distinctions captured by ordinary terms, his methodology allows him to recognize states for which no names his methodology allows him to recognize states for which no names exist.exist.


So far from offering a decision procedure, Aristotle So far from offering a decision procedure, Aristotle insists that this is something that no ethical theory can insists that this is something that no ethical theory can do. His theory elucidates the nature of virtue, but what do. His theory elucidates the nature of virtue, but what must be done on any particular occasion by a virtuous must be done on any particular occasion by a virtuous agent depends on the circumstances, and these vary so agent depends on the circumstances, and these vary so much from one occasion to another that there is no much from one occasion to another that there is no possibility of stating a series of rules, however possibility of stating a series of rules, however complicated, that collectively solve every practical complicated, that collectively solve every practical problem. This feature of ethical theory is not unique; problem. This feature of ethical theory is not unique; Aristotle thinks it applies to many crafts, such as Aristotle thinks it applies to many crafts, such as medicine and navigation (1104a7-10). He says that the medicine and navigation (1104a7-10). He says that the virtuous person “sees the truth in each case, being as it virtuous person “sees the truth in each case, being as it were a standard and measure of them” (1113a32-3); but were a standard and measure of them” (1113a32-3); but this appeal to the good person's vision should not be this appeal to the good person's vision should not be taken to mean that he has an inarticulate and taken to mean that he has an inarticulate and incommunicable insight into the truth. incommunicable insight into the truth.


Aristotle thinks of the good person as someone who is Aristotle thinks of the good person as someone who is good at deliberation, and he describes deliberation as a good at deliberation, and he describes deliberation as a process of rational inquiry. The intermediate point that process of rational inquiry. The intermediate point that the good person tries to find is “determined by the good person tries to find is “determined by logoslogos (“reason,” “account”) and in the way that the person of (“reason,” “account”) and in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it” (1107a1-2). To say practical reason would determine it” (1107a1-2). To say that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of registering the point that the good person's reasoning registering the point that the good person's reasoning does succeed in discovering what is best in each does succeed in discovering what is best in each situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in the sense that his views should be regarded as the sense that his views should be regarded as authoritative by other members of the community. A authoritative by other members of the community. A standard or measure is something that settles disputes; standard or measure is something that settles disputes; and because good people are so skilled at discovering and because good people are so skilled at discovering the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought and heeded. and heeded.


Although there is no possibility of writing a book of rules, however long, that Although there is no possibility of writing a book of rules, however long, that will serve as a complete guide to wise decision-making, it would be a will serve as a complete guide to wise decision-making, it would be a mistake to attribute to Aristotle the opposite position, namely that every mistake to attribute to Aristotle the opposite position, namely that every purported rule admits of exceptions, so that even a small rule-book that purported rule admits of exceptions, so that even a small rule-book that applies to a limited number of situations is an impossibility. He makes it applies to a limited number of situations is an impossibility. He makes it clear that certain emotions (spite, shamelessness, envy) and actions clear that certain emotions (spite, shamelessness, envy) and actions (adultery, theft, murder) are always wrong, regardless of the circumstances (adultery, theft, murder) are always wrong, regardless of the circumstances (1107a8-12). Although he says that the names of these emotions and (1107a8-12). Although he says that the names of these emotions and actions convey their wrongness, he should not be taken to mean that their actions convey their wrongness, he should not be taken to mean that their wrongness derives from linguistic usage. He defends the family as a social wrongness derives from linguistic usage. He defends the family as a social institution against the criticisms of Plato (institution against the criticisms of Plato (PoliticsPolitics II.3-4), and so when he II.3-4), and so when he says that adultery is always wrong, he is prepared to argue for his point by says that adultery is always wrong, he is prepared to argue for his point by explaining why marriage is a valuable custom and why extra-marital explaining why marriage is a valuable custom and why extra-marital intercourse undermines the relationship between husband and wife. He is intercourse undermines the relationship between husband and wife. He is not making the tautological claim that wrongful sexual activity is wrong, but not making the tautological claim that wrongful sexual activity is wrong, but the more specific and contentious point that marriages ought to be governed the more specific and contentious point that marriages ought to be governed by a rule of strict fidelity. Similarly, when he says that murder and theft are by a rule of strict fidelity. Similarly, when he says that murder and theft are always wrong, he does not mean that wrongful killing and taking are wrong, always wrong, he does not mean that wrongful killing and taking are wrong, but that the current system of laws regarding these matters ought to be but that the current system of laws regarding these matters ought to be strictly enforced. So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced strictly enforced. So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are inviolable.inviolable.

Aristotle’s Starting PointAristotle’s Starting Point We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere

intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve; presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve; and the task of reasoning is determine how that goal is to be accomplished. and the task of reasoning is determine how that goal is to be accomplished. (This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for (This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?

Aristotle’s Starting PointAristotle’s Starting Point Aristotle replies: “Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things Aristotle replies: “Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things

leading to it” (1144a7-8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for leading to it” (1144a7-8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be occasions when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning occasions when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting point—what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting point—helping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which helping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends—the skill Aristotle calls have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends—the skill Aristotle calls cleverness (1144a23-8)—but often the ends they seek are worthless. The cleverness (1144a23-8)—but often the ends they seek are worthless. The cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to reason—for we are assuming that they are normal in this respect—but in reason—for we are assuming that they are normal in this respect—but in the training of their passions.the training of their passions.

Nicomachean EthicsNicomachean Ethics was written “not in order to know was written “not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good.” what virtue is, but in order to become good.”

The choices and actions will be free of the conflict & The choices and actions will be free of the conflict & pain that inevitably accompanies the pain that inevitably accompanies the aktraticaktratic and and enkraticenkratic agent. This is because the part of the soul that agent. This is because the part of the soul that governs choice and action is so disposed that desire governs choice and action is so disposed that desire and right judgment coincide. Thus, acquiring a stable and right judgment coincide. Thus, acquiring a stable disposition (disposition (hexishexis) of this sort amounts to acquiring ) of this sort amounts to acquiring moral virtue (moral virtue (ethike ethike arete). This disposition is arete). This disposition is concerned with choices as would be determined by the concerned with choices as would be determined by the person of practical wisdom (person of practical wisdom (phronesisphronesis); these will be ); these will be actions lying between extreme alternatives.actions lying between extreme alternatives.

The akratic:

The akratic is the morally weak person

who desires to do other than what he knows ought to be

done and acts on this desire against his better judgment.

The enkratic:

The enkratic is the morally strong

person who shares the akratic agent’s desire to do other

than what he knows ought to be done, but

acts in accordance with his better

judgment.

In the virtuous person, desire and judgment agree whereby the In the virtuous person, desire and judgment agree whereby the choices and actions will be free of the conflict and pain that choices and actions will be free of the conflict and pain that inevitably accompany those who are inevitably accompany those who are akratic akratic and/or and/or enkraticenkratic::

In neither kind of choice are desire and judgment in harmony. In the virtuous desire and judgment agree.

Why does desire and judgment Why does desire and judgment agree for the virtuous?agree for the virtuous?

The reason why the choices and actions will be The reason why the choices and actions will be free of the conflict and pain that inevitably free of the conflict and pain that inevitably accompanies those of the akratic and enkratic accompanies those of the akratic and enkratic agent is because the part of their soul that agent is because the part of their soul that governs choice and action is so disposed that governs choice and action is so disposed that desire and judgment coincide. The disposition is desire and judgment coincide. The disposition is concerned with choices as would be determined concerned with choices as would be determined by the person of practical wisdom (phronesis); by the person of practical wisdom (phronesis); these will be actions lying between extreme these will be actions lying between extreme alternatives. They will lie in a man-popularly alternatives. They will lie in a man-popularly called the “golden mean”-relative to the talents called the “golden mean”-relative to the talents and stores of the agent. and stores of the agent.

Why does desire and judgment Why does desire and judgment agree for the virtuous?agree for the virtuous?

Choosing in this way is not easily done. It involves, for Choosing in this way is not easily done. It involves, for instance, feeling anger or extending generosity at the instance, feeling anger or extending generosity at the right time, toward the right people, in the right way, and right time, toward the right people, in the right way, and for the right reasons. Intellectual virtues, such as for the right reasons. Intellectual virtues, such as excellence at mathematics, can be acquired by teaching, excellence at mathematics, can be acquired by teaching, but moral virtues cannot. I may know what ought to be but moral virtues cannot. I may know what ought to be done and even perform virtuous act without being able to done and even perform virtuous act without being able to act virtuously. Nonetheless, because moral virtue is a act virtuously. Nonetheless, because moral virtue is a disposition concerning choice, deliberate performance of disposition concerning choice, deliberate performance of virtuous acts can, ultimately, instill a disposition to virtuous acts can, ultimately, instill a disposition to choose them in harmony and with pleasure, and hence, choose them in harmony and with pleasure, and hence, to act virtuously.to act virtuously.

What does it take to be fully virtuous?What does it take to be fully virtuous? The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desire; The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desire; possess practical wisdom (phronesis) which is the knowledge or understanding that possess practical wisdom (phronesis) which is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor to do just that in any given situation. Most contend that enables its possessor to do just that in any given situation. Most contend that phronesis comes out of at least two sources:phronesis comes out of at least two sources:

1.1. Comes only with the experience of life. The virtuous are mindful of the Comes only with the experience of life. The virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?and short-sighted if they were not?

2.2. They have the capacity to recognize some features of a situation as more They have the capacity to recognize some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who,

with with their imperfect virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous their imperfect virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature nature of a certain action as competing in of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or importance with its honesty or benevolence benevolence or justice. or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well. In the Aristotelian "eudaimonist" tradition, in life, who know, in short, how to live well. In the Aristotelian "eudaimonist" tradition,

this is expressed in the claim that they have a true grasp of eudaimonia.this is expressed in the claim that they have a true grasp of eudaimonia.

What does it take to be fully What does it take to be fully virtuous? virtuous?

1.1. No struggle against contrary desires.No struggle against contrary desires.

The fully virtuous do what they should without The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise. But if what makes it hard is an to do otherwise. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in one’s character such (e.g., imperfection in one’s character such (e.g., temptation to keep what is not yours or temptation to keep what is not yours or indifference to those who are hurting), then it is indifference to those who are hurting), then it is not.not.

What does it take to be fully What does it take to be fully virtuous? virtuous?

2.2. Practical Wisdom:Practical Wisdom:

Practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that Practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied correctly without practical wisdom, because correct applied correctly without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation — the capacity application requires situational appreciation — the capacity to recognize, in any particular situation, those features of it to recognize, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom. Stated negatively, one can easily fall short practical wisdom. Stated negatively, one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking of full virtue is through lacking phronesisphronesis — moral or — moral or practical wisdom practical wisdom

Eudaimonia:Eudaimonia:

These aspects coalesce in the description These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well. in life, who know, in short, how to live well. In the Aristotelian "eudaimonist" tradition, In the Aristotelian "eudaimonist" tradition, this is expressed in the claim that they this is expressed in the claim that they have a true grasp of have a true grasp of eudaimoniaeudaimonia..

EudaimoniaEudaimonia The concept of The concept of eudaimoniaeudaimonia, a key term in ancient Greek moral , a key term in ancient Greek moral

philosophy, is central to any modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and philosophy, is central to any modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and usually employed even by virtue ethicists who deliberately divorce usually employed even by virtue ethicists who deliberately divorce themselves from Aristotle. It is standardly translated as "happiness" or themselves from Aristotle. It is standardly translated as "happiness" or "flourishing" and occasionally as "well-being.“ Nevertheless, each "flourishing" and occasionally as "well-being.“ Nevertheless, each translation has certain disadvantages:translation has certain disadvantages:

1.1. Eudaimonia = “flourishing” is that animals and plants can Eudaimonia = “flourishing” is that animals and plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings.flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings.

2.2. Eudaimonia = “happiness” is that connotes something which is Eudaimonia = “happiness” is that connotes something which is subjectively determined; I can deceive myself into thinking that subjectively determined; I can deceive myself into thinking that

I I have eudaimonia because I feel happy. In this case, have eudaimonia because I feel happy. In this case, flourishing is a better translation than happiness.flourishing is a better translation than happiness.

3.3. Eudaimonia = living well might be confused with hedonistic Eudaimonia = living well might be confused with hedonistic physical pleasures or luxury. But this is not eudaimonia; it is a physical pleasures or luxury. But this is not eudaimonia; it is a wasted life.wasted life.

EudaimoniaEudaimoniaThere is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links There is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links are matters of dispute and generate different moral versions:are matters of dispute and generate different moral versions:

1.1. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is alsoalso needed are external goods (which are a matter of luck). needed are external goods (which are a matter of luck). In other In other words, the words, the exercise of the virtues is necessary exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for but not sufficient for eudaimonia.eudaimonia.

2.2. For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary AND For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary AND sufficient. sufficient. On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a sufficient, a eudaimoneudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived life is a life that has been successfully lived (where (where "success" of course is not to be "success" of course is not to be understood in a materialistic understood in a materialistic way) way)

3.3. Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the link Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the link between between eudaimoniaeudaimonia and what gives a character trait the status and what gives a character trait the status

of of being a being a virtue. virtue.

Given the shared virtue ethical premise that "the good life is the virtuous Given the shared virtue ethical premise that "the good life is the virtuous life" we have so far three distinguishable views about what makes a life" we have so far three distinguishable views about what makes a

character trait a virtue. character trait a virtue.

EudaimoniaEudaimonia

There is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, There is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links are matters of dispute and generate different further links are matters of dispute and generate different moral versions:moral versions:

For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck.

For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient.For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient.

Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the link between link between eudaimoniaeudaimonia and what gives a character trait and what gives a character trait the status of being a virtue. the status of being a virtue.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the virtues:virtues:

His account proceeds through three stages:His account proceeds through three stages:

11stst: Virtues as qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to : Virtues as qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to practices;practices;

22ndnd: Considers virtues as qualities contributing to the good of a whole life;: Considers virtues as qualities contributing to the good of a whole life;

33rdrd: Relates the virtues to the pursuit of a good for human beings the : Relates the virtues to the pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which can only be elaborated and possessed within an conception of which can only be elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition (i.e., the goods of particular lives have to be ongoing social tradition (i.e., the goods of particular lives have to be integrated into the overall patterns of a tradition informed by a quest for integrated into the overall patterns of a tradition informed by a quest for the good and the best).the good and the best).

““Rather it is the case that no human quality is to be accounted a virtue Rather it is the case that no human quality is to be accounted a virtue unless it satisfies the conditions specified at each of the three stages” unless it satisfies the conditions specified at each of the three stages” ((After VirtueAfter Virtue, pg. 275). This is important because there are qualities , pg. 275). This is important because there are qualities which are derived from this notion of practice, but which are not virtues, which are derived from this notion of practice, but which are not virtues, qualities which survive the tests of the first stage, but fail at the second qualities which survive the tests of the first stage, but fail at the second or third” (pg. 275).or third” (pg. 275).


““Why begin with practices: Other moral philosophers after have Why begin with practices: Other moral philosophers after have begun from a consideration of passions or desires or from the begun from a consideration of passions or desires or from the elucidation of some conception of duty or goodness. In either elucidation of some conception of duty or goodness. In either case the discussion is all too apt to be governed from then on by case the discussion is all too apt to be governed from then on by some version of the means-end distinction according to which all some version of the means-end distinction according to which all human activities are either conducted as means to already given human activities are either conducted as means to already given or decided ends or are simply worthwhile in themselves or or decided ends or are simply worthwhile in themselves or perhaps both. What this framework omits from view are those perhaps both. What this framework omits from view are those ongoing modes of human activity within which ends have to be ongoing modes of human activity within which ends have to be discovered and rediscovered, and means devised to pursue discovered and rediscovered, and means devised to pursue them; and it thereby obscures the importance of the ways in them; and it thereby obscures the importance of the ways in which those modes of activity generate new ends and new which those modes of activity generate new ends and new conception of ends. The class of practices, defined as I defined conception of ends. The class of practices, defined as I defined it, is the class of those modes of activities and the shortest it, is the class of those modes of activities and the shortest answer…as to why some items are included in that class and answer…as to why some items are included in that class and other excluded…is that those items excluded are not such other excluded…is that those items excluded are not such modes of activity” (pg. 273).modes of activity” (pg. 273).


““The importance therefore for beginning from practices The importance therefore for beginning from practices is any consideration of the virtues is that the exercise is any consideration of the virtues is that the exercise of the virtues is not only worthwhile for its own sake-it of the virtues is not only worthwhile for its own sake-it turns out that you cannot be genuinely courageous or turns out that you cannot be genuinely courageous or just or whatever without caring for those virtues for just or whatever without caring for those virtues for their own sake-but has further point and purpose, and their own sake-but has further point and purpose, and indeed that it is in grasping that point and purpose indeed that it is in grasping that point and purpose that we characteristically initially came to value the that we characteristically initially came to value the virtues. Yet the virtues are not related to the goods virtues. Yet the virtues are not related to the goods which provide them with further point and purpose in which provide them with further point and purpose in the way in which a skill is related to the ends that its the way in which a skill is related to the ends that its successful exercise procures or in the way in which a successful exercise procures or in the way in which a skill is related to those objects of our desire that its skill is related to those objects of our desire that its successful exercise may enable us to possess.successful exercise may enable us to possess.

The Happy Life is the Natural Life:The Happy Life is the Natural Life:

Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:

11stst:: Well-organized life has an ultimate Well-organized life has an ultimate aim. An ultimate aim is a good that is aim. An ultimate aim is a good that is desirable solely for its own sake. desirable solely for its own sake. Eudaimonia is that ultimate aim because Eudaimonia is that ultimate aim because eudaimonia there is no greater goal; it is eudaimonia there is no greater goal; it is valuable solely for its own sake; it is not a valuable solely for its own sake; it is not a means to another goal.means to another goal.

The Happy Life is the Natural Life:The Happy Life is the Natural Life:

Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:

22ndnd The happy life is a life that The happy life is a life that appropriately exercises all essential appropriately exercises all essential human abilities. Thus, for Aristotle, the human abilities. Thus, for Aristotle, the happy life is the natural life. happy life is the natural life.

But that now leads us to give an account But that now leads us to give an account of Aristotle’s notion of human nature.of Aristotle’s notion of human nature.

Aristotle’s Account of Human Nature:Aristotle’s Account of Human Nature:

Plants are characterized by the abilities to take Plants are characterized by the abilities to take nourishment, grow, & reproduce.nourishment, grow, & reproduce.

Animals have the abilities of plants plus the Animals have the abilities of plants plus the higher-level abilities to desire, move, and sense.higher-level abilities to desire, move, and sense.

Humans are rational animals, so humans have Humans are rational animals, so humans have all of the animal abilities plus rationality.all of the animal abilities plus rationality.

What is Aristotle’s account of rationality? What is Aristotle’s account of rationality?


Reason has to 2 aspects:Reason has to 2 aspects:

Practical reason:Practical reason: the ability to do means- the ability to do means-ends reasoning, to work out the best way to ends reasoning, to work out the best way to accomplish one’s goals.accomplish one’s goals.

Theoretical reasonTheoretical reason: the ability to do rule-: the ability to do rule-case reasoning, to understand things by case reasoning, to understand things by subsuming them under general principles.subsuming them under general principles.


Higher-level abilities infuse and transform lower-Higher-level abilities infuse and transform lower-level abilities. Reproduction in animals is level abilities. Reproduction in animals is different from reproduction in plants because different from reproduction in plants because animal reproduction is guided by the abilities of animal reproduction is guided by the abilities of desire, motion, and sensation. Similarly, human desire, motion, and sensation. Similarly, human desires are not simply brute urges. They are desires are not simply brute urges. They are channeled and transformed by reason. And so channeled and transformed by reason. And so on. on.

Consider the following chart:Consider the following chart:

Nourishment, Growth, Reproduction

Desire, Motion, Sensation

Practical Reason

Theoretical ReasonPeople

People

Animal

Plant

Type of Life Aim or Goal Abilities Exercised

Life of Enjoyment Sensual Pleasure Desire for sensual pleasure

Money-making life Money Desire for money/material goods

Political Life Honor Desire for honor

Ethical Life Virtuous Activity Practical reason and desire

Contemplative Life Contemplation Theoretical reason

For example: Aristotle rejects life of money-making for he observes that money can’t be the ultimate of eudaimonia because it is instrumentally valuable; it is desirable only because of what it can buy (1196a).

Aristotle rejects the political life because honor depends on the bestowers of honor and is easily lost whereas eudaimonia does not depend on fickle opinions of others and is not easily lost. Moreover, people can be honored even if they do nothing or little and even if they suffer great misfortunes, but eudaimonia requires activity and precludes tragedy (1195b).


Tyrannical Life Power Desire for Power

Religious Life Love and Obey God Soul

Creative Life Novelty Imagination

What say ye about these potential candidates?

Are these a means to and ultimate goal? Or are your goals too short-sighted?

Can you think of any other potential candidates?


Ethical life & Virtuous activity & practical reason & moral money-making life money virtue & desire for money

Ethical life & virtuous activity & practical reason & moral religious life love & obey God & soul.

Ethical life & virtuous activity & practical reason & moral contemplative life contemplation virtue & theoretical reason.

1. Combination of ethical and money-making lives does not exercise all essential human abilities. Moreover, there are times when you must choose between profitable and moral paths.

2. Combination of ethical and religious seems most promising. But people like Kierkegaard argue that conflicts arise between virtuous activity and obeying God (Abraham ordered to kill Isaac). I personally disagree with this because of the commandment to love God with your mind, to meditate upon Him, etc. (Psalm 19).

3. Ethical and contemplative combination exercises all essential human abilities according to Aristotelians (Book X; 1177a-1179 suggest that he thinks contemplative life is supreme & ethical life is secondarily).

Overview of Ethical Systems: Care Ethics:Overview of Ethical Systems: Care Ethics:Rather than the starting point being rationally derived universal principles, ethics starts in caring relationships. Care ethics is the

narrative of relationships that extend through time.

Feelings are the foundation and motivation

for ethical behavior.

They are not saying “If it

feels good, do it.” Feelings

are not be followed blindly.

Sometimes are feelings

must be subjected to

rational scrutiny; not any feeling

will do (e.g., racial

prejudice).

If your morals are motivated

by impersonal rules rather

than personal affection,

then you are morally

impaired.

Feelings must be schooled, developed, and examined

before we use them as the basis of moral behavior; shaping the

right sorts of feelings is a difficult, demanding process.

The world is comprised of relationships, viewing the moral world as a network. Self is defined through connection. Morality and responsibility involves restoring community wherever it is broken (e.g., loneliness).

It is different than “Ethics of justice” (masculine) which views

moral dilemmas as “math problems for humans”, self-contained

problems in moral logic; world is composed of individuals; self is defined through individualism.

Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?Way to memorize: Vast Lacks Self-centered well-being imprecise luck.Way to memorize: Vast Lacks Self-centered well-being imprecise luck.

Criticisms:Criticisms:

Vast differences on what constitutes a virtue. Different people, culture, & Vast differences on what constitutes a virtue. Different people, culture, & societies have vast opinions on what constitutes a virtue.societies have vast opinions on what constitutes a virtue.

Lacks clarity in resolving moral conflicts.Lacks clarity in resolving moral conflicts.

Self-centered because its primary concern is the agent’s own character.Self-centered because its primary concern is the agent’s own character.

Well-being is a master-value & all other things are valuable only to the Well-being is a master-value & all other things are valuable only to the extent the can contribute it.extent the can contribute it.

Imprecise: It fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we Imprecise: It fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we should behave.should behave.

Leaves us hostage to luck: Some will attain moral maturity and others Leaves us hostage to luck: Some will attain moral maturity and others will not.will not.

Problems with Aristotelian Ethics by Problems with Aristotelian Ethics by virtue-care ethicists.virtue-care ethicists.

Aristotelian ethics seems unable to address, much less Aristotelian ethics seems unable to address, much less resolve, certain crucial issues of contemporary moral resolve, certain crucial issues of contemporary moral philosophy. For example, there is no commitment to philosophy. For example, there is no commitment to generalized humanitarianism. generalized humanitarianism.

Recent ethics have been very much concerned with whether Recent ethics have been very much concerned with whether making (large) personal sacrifices for the greater good of needy, making (large) personal sacrifices for the greater good of needy, but distant others is morally obligatory or merely supererogatory, but distant others is morally obligatory or merely supererogatory, but because Aristotle never specifically defends the idea of but because Aristotle never specifically defends the idea of general concern for the well-being of others and because he general concern for the well-being of others and because he leaves no room, in addition, for supererogatory degrees of moral leaves no room, in addition, for supererogatory degrees of moral excellence, his philosophy appears to be largely irrelevant to this excellence, his philosophy appears to be largely irrelevant to this important issue. important issue.

Meta-ethical Problem:Meta-ethical Problem:

Another problem for virtue ethics (which is also shared by Another problem for virtue ethics (which is also shared by utilitarianism and deontology) is "the justification problem." utilitarianism and deontology) is "the justification problem."

Deontology: There is the question of how to justify its claims that Deontology: There is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones.certain moral rules are the correct ones.

Utilitarianism: how to justify its claim that the only thing that really Utilitarianism: how to justify its claim that the only thing that really matters morally is consequences for happiness or well-being. matters morally is consequences for happiness or well-being.

Virtue ethics the problem concerns the question of which Virtue ethics the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.character traits are the virtues.

Misconceptions about Virtue Ethics by Misconceptions about Virtue Ethics by Rosalind Hursthouse:Rosalind Hursthouse:

1.1. Virtue Ethics does not have a peculiar weakness Virtue Ethics does not have a peculiar weakness or problem in virtue of the fact that it involves the or problem in virtue of the fact that it involves the concept of eudaimonia. While eudaimonia is hard concept of eudaimonia. While eudaimonia is hard to grasp, it is no more obscure than the concepts to grasp, it is no more obscure than the concepts of rationality and happiness. While virtue theory of rationality and happiness. While virtue theory has never been dismissed on the grounds of has never been dismissed on the grounds of comparative obscurity of this central concept, it comparative obscurity of this central concept, it has a problem with this which deontology and has a problem with this which deontology and utilitarianism in no way share. This is false utilitarianism in no way share. This is false because the concepts “rationality” and because the concepts “rationality” and “happiness” are rich and difficult concepts (e.g., “happiness” are rich and difficult concepts (e.g., Mill’s introduction of the higher and lower Mill’s introduction of the higher and lower pleasures in view of what constitutes happiness).pleasures in view of what constitutes happiness).


2. Virtue ethics is not trivially circular; it does 2. Virtue ethics is not trivially circular; it does not specify action in terms of virtuous agent not specify action in terms of virtuous agent & then immediately specify the virtuous & then immediately specify the virtuous agent in terms of right action. Rather, it agent in terms of right action. Rather, it specifies her in terms of the virtues, and specifies her in terms of the virtues, and then specifies these, not merely as then specifies these, not merely as dispositions to right action, but as the dispositions to right action, but as the character traits (which are dispositions to character traits (which are dispositions to feel & react as well as act in certain ways) feel & react as well as act in certain ways) required for eudaimonia.required for eudaimonia.


3.3. It does answer the question, “What should I It does answer the question, “What should I do?” as well as the question “What sort of do?” as well as the question “What sort of person should I be?” In other words, it is person should I be?” In other words, it is not, as one of the catchphrases has it, not, as one of the catchphrases has it, concerned only with Being and not with concerned only with Being and not with Doing).Doing).


4. Virtue Theory generates rules/principle for every 4. Virtue Theory generates rules/principle for every virtue generates a positive instruction (e.g., act virtue generates a positive instruction (e.g., act justly, kindly, courageously, honesty, etc) & every justly, kindly, courageously, honesty, etc) & every vice a prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly, like vice a prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly, like a coward, dishonestly). So, one does not need to a coward, dishonestly). So, one does not need to imagine what some ideal exemplar would do in imagine what some ideal exemplar would do in order to know what should do in a given situation. order to know what should do in a given situation. Rather, the agent may ask, ‘If I were to do such Rather, the agent may ask, ‘If I were to do such and such now, would I be acting justly or unjustly and such now, would I be acting justly or unjustly (or neither), kindly or unkindly [and so on].’(or neither), kindly or unkindly [and so on].’


5.5. Virtue ethics is not committed to any sort of reductionism Virtue ethics is not committed to any sort of reductionism which involves defining all our moral concepts in terms of which involves defining all our moral concepts in terms of the virtuous agent. Rather, Virtue ethics relies on a lot of the virtuous agent. Rather, Virtue ethics relies on a lot of very significant moral concepts (e.g., charity/benevolence very significant moral concepts (e.g., charity/benevolence is the virtue whose concern is the good of others; good is is the virtue whose concern is the good of others; good is related to the concept of evil or harm, & they are both related to the concept of evil or harm, & they are both related to the concepts of the worthwhile, the related to the concepts of the worthwhile, the advantageous, & the pleasant). If one has the the wrong advantageous, & the pleasant). If one has the the wrong conception of what is worthwhile, advantageous, & conception of what is worthwhile, advantageous, & pleasant, then one shall have the wrong conception of pleasant, then one shall have the wrong conception of what is good for, & harmful to, myself & others, & , even what is good for, & harmful to, myself & others, & , even with the best will in the world, still lack the virtue of charity, with the best will in the world, still lack the virtue of charity, which involves getting all this right.which involves getting all this right.


6.6. Virtue ethics is said to subject to the threat of moral skepticism, pluralism, or Virtue ethics is said to subject to the threat of moral skepticism, pluralism, or cultural relativism. This is too a problem for both utilitarianism & deontologists, cultural relativism. This is too a problem for both utilitarianism & deontologists, esp. in view 2 their second premises. esp. in view 2 their second premises.

For example:For example:

““Rule deontologists know that they want to get “don’t kill’, ‘keep promises’, Rule deontologists know that they want to get “don’t kill’, ‘keep promises’, ‘cherish your children’, and so on as the rules that meet their specification, ‘cherish your children’, and so on as the rules that meet their specification, whatever it may be. They also know that any of these can be disputed, that some whatever it may be. They also know that any of these can be disputed, that some philosophers may claim, of any one of them, that it is reasonable to reject it, and philosophers may claim, of any one of them, that it is reasonable to reject it, and that at least people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture which that at least people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture which rejected it. Similarly, the virtue theorists know that they want to get justice, rejected it. Similarly, the virtue theorists know that they want to get justice, charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the character traits needed for eudaimonia; charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the character traits needed for eudaimonia; and they also know that any of these can be disrupted, that some philosopher will and they also know that any of these can be disrupted, that some philosopher will say of any one of them that it is reasonable to reject it as a virtue, and that there say of any one of them that it is reasonable to reject it as a virtue, and that there is said to be, for each character trait-some culture that has thus rejected it.”is said to be, for each character trait-some culture that has thus rejected it.”

She goes on to say, “Each theory has to stick out its neck and say, in some She goes on to say, “Each theory has to stick out its neck and say, in some cases, ‘This person/these people/ other cultures (or would be) in error,’ and find cases, ‘This person/these people/ other cultures (or would be) in error,’ and find some grounds for saying this.some grounds for saying this.


7.7. There is the rejection that virtue ethics has un-resolvable conflict built into There is the rejection that virtue ethics has un-resolvable conflict built into it. ‘It is common knowledge,’ it is said, ‘that the requirements of the it. ‘It is common knowledge,’ it is said, ‘that the requirements of the virtues can conflict; charity may prompt me to end the frightful suffering of virtues can conflict; charity may prompt me to end the frightful suffering of the person in my care by killing him, but justice bids me to stay my hand. the person in my care by killing him, but justice bids me to stay my hand. To tell my brother that his wife is being unfaithful to him would be honest To tell my brother that his wife is being unfaithful to him would be honest and loyal, but it would be kinder to keep quiet about it. So which should I and loyal, but it would be kinder to keep quiet about it. So which should I do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.’ So which do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.’ So which should I do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.” should I do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.”

In other words, virtue ethics does not always answer the question, ‘What In other words, virtue ethics does not always answer the question, ‘What should I do?”should I do?”

While this is a problem for virtue ethics, it is not a peculiar problem; it is While this is a problem for virtue ethics, it is not a peculiar problem; it is also found deontology (e.g., preserve life can yield contrary instructions also found deontology (e.g., preserve life can yield contrary instructions in a particular case.in a particular case.


8.8. VE (most major criticism) is that it can’t get VE (most major criticism) is that it can’t get us anywhere in real moral issues because it us anywhere in real moral issues because it is bound to be all assertion & no argument: is bound to be all assertion & no argument: the best it can come up with in the way of the best it can come up with in the way of action-guiding rules are the ones that rely on action-guiding rules are the ones that rely on virtue/vice concepts.virtue/vice concepts.

Consider this criticism more fully:Consider this criticism more fully:

Consider the following…Consider the following…““ Virtue theory can’t get us anywhere in real moral issues bcause it’s Virtue theory can’t get us anywhere in real moral issues bcause it’s

bound to be all assertion and no argument. You admit that the best bound to be all assertion and no argument. You admit that the best it can come up with in this way of action-guiding rules are the one it can come up with in this way of action-guiding rules are the one that rely on the virtue and vice concepts, such as ‘act charitably’, that rely on the virtue and vice concepts, such as ‘act charitably’, ‘don’t act cruelly’, and so on; and, as if that weren’t bad enough, you ‘don’t act cruelly’, and so on; and, as if that weren’t bad enough, you admit that these virtue concepts, such as charity, presuppose admit that these virtue concepts, such as charity, presuppose concepts such as the good, and the worthwhile, and so on. But that concepts such as the good, and the worthwhile, and so on. But that means that any virtue theorist who writes about real moral issues means that any virtue theorist who writes about real moral issues must rely on her audience’s agreeing with her application of all must rely on her audience’s agreeing with her application of all these concepts, and hence accepting all the premisses in which these concepts, and hence accepting all the premisses in which those applications are enshrined. But some other virtue theorist those applications are enshrined. But some other virtue theorist might take different premisses about these matters, and come up might take different premisses about these matters, and come up with very different conclusions, and within the terms of the theory, with very different conclusions, and within the terms of the theory, there is no way to distinguish between the two. While there is there is no way to distinguish between the two. While there is agreement, virtue theory can repeat conventional wisdom, preserve agreement, virtue theory can repeat conventional wisdom, preserve the status quo, but it can’t get us anywhere in the way that a the status quo, but it can’t get us anywhere in the way that a normative ethical theory is supposed to, namely, by providing normative ethical theory is supposed to, namely, by providing rational grounds for acceptance of its practical conclusions” (ibid., rational grounds for acceptance of its practical conclusions” (ibid., 223).223).

Hursthouse admits:Hursthouse admits: When a virtue ethicist discusses real moral issues:When a virtue ethicist discusses real moral issues:

1.1. One has to assert that “certain actions are honest, dishonest, or One has to assert that “certain actions are honest, dishonest, or neither; charitable, uncharitable, or neither.”neither; charitable, uncharitable, or neither.”

2.2. One has to admit that it is often very a very difficult matter to One has to admit that it is often very a very difficult matter to decide; rules are not always easy to apply.decide; rules are not always easy to apply.

““But this counts as a criticism of the theory only if we assume, But this counts as a criticism of the theory only if we assume, as a condition of adequacy, that any adequate action-guiding as a condition of adequacy, that any adequate action-guiding theory must make the difficult business of knowing what to do if theory must make the difficult business of knowing what to do if one is to act well easy, that is must provide clear guidance one is to act well easy, that is must provide clear guidance about what ought not to be done which any reasonably clever about what ought not to be done which any reasonably clever adolescent could follow if she chose. But such a condition of adolescent could follow if she chose. But such a condition of adequacy is implausible” (ibid., 223-4).adequacy is implausible” (ibid., 223-4).

Consider the following…Consider the following…

““Acting rightly is difficult, and does call for much moral Acting rightly is difficult, and does call for much moral wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy, which wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy, which virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an explanation of a truth expressed by Aristotle, namely, explanation of a truth expressed by Aristotle, namely, that moral knowledge-unlike mathematical knowledge-that moral knowledge-unlike mathematical knowledge-cannot be acquired merely by attending lectures and is cannot be acquired merely by attending lectures and is not characteristically to be found in people too young to not characteristically to be found in people too young to have had much experience of life. There are youthful have had much experience of life. There are youthful mathematical geniuses, but rarely, if ever, youthful moral mathematical geniuses, but rarely, if ever, youthful moral geniuses, and this shows us something significant about geniuses, and this shows us something significant about the sort of knowledge that moral knowledge is. Virtue the sort of knowledge that moral knowledge is. Virtue ethics builds this in straight off precisely by couching its ethics builds this in straight off precisely by couching its rules in terms whose application may indeed call for the rules in terms whose application may indeed call for the most delicate and sensitive judgment.”most delicate and sensitive judgment.”

Consider this issue:Consider this issue: Someone hesitating over whether to reveal a hurtful Someone hesitating over whether to reveal a hurtful

truth, for example, thinking it would be kind but dishonest truth, for example, thinking it would be kind but dishonest or unjust to lie, may need to realize, with respect to these or unjust to lie, may need to realize, with respect to these particular circumstances, not that kindness is more (or particular circumstances, not that kindness is more (or less) important than honesty or justice, and not that less) important than honesty or justice, and not that honesty or justice sometimes requires one to act honesty or justice sometimes requires one to act unkindly or cruelly, but that one does people no kindness unkindly or cruelly, but that one does people no kindness by concealing this sort of truth from them, hurtful as it by concealing this sort of truth from them, hurtful as it may be. This is the may be. This is the typetype of thing (I use it only as an of thing (I use it only as an example) that people with moral wisdom know about, example) that people with moral wisdom know about, involving the correct application of involving the correct application of kindkind, and that people , and that people with such wisdom find difficult.”with such wisdom find difficult.”

What about virtue theorist’s reliance on What about virtue theorist’s reliance on concepts such as that of the concepts such as that of the worthwhileworthwhile??

If such reliance on ‘worthwhile” is to count as a fault in If such reliance on ‘worthwhile” is to count as a fault in VE, what condition of adequacy is implicitly in play? VE, what condition of adequacy is implicitly in play? Well, it must be that any good normative theory should Well, it must be that any good normative theory should provide answers to questions about real moral issues provide answers to questions about real moral issues whose truth is in no way determined by truths about what whose truth is in no way determined by truths about what is worthwhile, or what really matters in human life. Now is worthwhile, or what really matters in human life. Now although people are initially inclined to reject out of hand although people are initially inclined to reject out of hand the claim that the practical conclusions of a normative the claim that the practical conclusions of a normative moral theory have to be based on premises about what moral theory have to be based on premises about what is truly worthwhile, the alternative, once it is made is truly worthwhile, the alternative, once it is made explicit, may look even more acceptable. Consider what explicit, may look even more acceptable. Consider what the condition of adequacy entails (ibid., 225).the condition of adequacy entails (ibid., 225).

““Consider what the condition of adequacy entails. If Consider what the condition of adequacy entails. If truths about what is worthwhile (or truly good, or truths about what is worthwhile (or truly good, or serious, or about what matters in human life) do not serious, or about what matters in human life) do not have to be appealed to in order to answer questions have to be appealed to in order to answer questions about real moral issues, then I might sensibly seek about real moral issues, then I might sensibly seek guidance about what I ought to do from someone who guidance about what I ought to do from someone who had declared in advance that she knew nothing about had declared in advance that she knew nothing about such matters, or from someone who said that, such matters, or from someone who said that, although she had opinions about them, these were although she had opinions about them, these were quite likely to be wrong but that this did not matter, quite likely to be wrong but that this did not matter, because they would play no determining role in the because they would play no determining role in the advice she gave me” (pg. 225).advice she gave me” (pg. 225).

She goes on to say…She goes on to say…

I should emphasize that we are talking about real I should emphasize that we are talking about real moral issues and real guidance; I want to know moral issues and real guidance; I want to know whether I should have an abortion, take my mother off whether I should have an abortion, take my mother off life-support machine, leave academic life, and become life-support machine, leave academic life, and become a doctor in the Third World, give up my job with the a doctor in the Third World, give up my job with the firm that that is using animals in its experiments, tell firm that that is using animals in its experiments, tell my father he has cancer. Would I go to someone who my father he has cancer. Would I go to someone who says she has no views about what is worthwhile in says she has no views about what is worthwhile in life? Or to someone who says that, as a matter of life? Or to someone who says that, as a matter of fact, she tends to think that the only thing that matters fact, she tends to think that the only thing that matters is having a good time, but has a normative theory that is having a good time, but has a normative theory that is consistent both with this view and with my own is consistent both with this view and with my own rather more puritanical one, which will yield the rather more puritanical one, which will yield the guidance I need?”guidance I need?”

Her response to such thinking…Her response to such thinking…

This criticism manifests a failure to understand This criticism manifests a failure to understand what an adequate normative theory is. They what an adequate normative theory is. They drastically underestimate the variety of ways in drastically underestimate the variety of ways in which virtue/vice concepts and others, such as which virtue/vice concepts and others, such as that of the worthwhile, figure in the discussion. that of the worthwhile, figure in the discussion. In fact, any normative theory which any clever In fact, any normative theory which any clever adolescent can apply, or which reaches practical adolescent can apply, or which reaches practical conclusions that are in no way determined by conclusions that are in no way determined by premises about what is truly worthwhile, serious, premises about what is truly worthwhile, serious, and so on, is guaranteed to be an inadequate and so on, is guaranteed to be an inadequate theory.theory.

Virtue Ethics is not reductionistic:Virtue Ethics is not reductionistic:

““The character traits that virtue theory The character traits that virtue theory emphasizes are not simply dispositional to emphasizes are not simply dispositional to intentional actions, but a seamless intentional actions, but a seamless disposition to certain actions and disposition to certain actions and passions, thoughts and reactions” (pg. passions, thoughts and reactions” (pg. 230).230).

“…“…virtue theory has a sort of built-in virtue theory has a sort of built-in indexicality.”indexicality.”

Consider the following comparison by MacIntyre:Consider the following comparison by MacIntyre:

Aristotle's assumption that man is as-he-happens-to-be and that this Aristotle's assumption that man is as-he-happens-to-be and that this is distinct from man-as-he-should-be. The Enlightenment, on the is distinct from man-as-he-should-be. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, offers no metaphysical framework whatsoever in place other hand, offers no metaphysical framework whatsoever in place of teleology. of teleology.

Aristotle's claim that rules are based on virtues, which are derived Aristotle's claim that rules are based on virtues, which are derived from an understanding of the telos. The Enlightenment reversed this from an understanding of the telos. The Enlightenment reversed this and predicated virtues on an understanding of subjective (but and predicated virtues on an understanding of subjective (but purported to be universal) principles. purported to be universal) principles.

Aristotle's assertion that virtue and morality are integral parts of Aristotle's assertion that virtue and morality are integral parts of society, as an understanding of the telos must be social and not society, as an understanding of the telos must be social and not individual. In the Enlightenment, however, societies lost their moral individual. In the Enlightenment, however, societies lost their moral authority and the individual became the fundamental interpreter of authority and the individual became the fundamental interpreter of moral questions. moral questions.

John Dewey’s EthicsJohn Dewey’s EthicsPrimary experience is everyday experience as it is found, present and given;

He beings with moral experience as it is lived. Theories and beliefs are in ourLives. Experience is always our starting point (middle and end point) for we

cannot get beyond it) The choice is not between starting in our outsideExperience but between ways of proceeding within it.

Therefore, there are no hardor neutral givens.

Dewey was skeptical of any theory that (1) claimed that our primary experience is

determined (or conditioned) by one single cohesive factor such as one’s historical period,

culture, race, class, or biological make up. These are all reductionistic and, as such, non-empirical

theories overlook the complexity and heterogeneity of factors and interactions that are the conditions for human experience. We do not experience ourselves as inside (or as trapped in) our subjectivity, language, or anything else. The notion, for example, that one’s culture or social class solely determines moral experience is itself

a theory, rather than we experience when we have moral experiences.

The pre-theoretical (i.e., primary experience) is

the more primitive level because it encompasses

the theoretical and because it encompasses

the theoretical and because it is where

things are present in their brute and direct qualitative givenness

and thereness. We need to begin & end

experientially guided inquiries on this level.

Thus, there is no reason to think that everything is experienced as moral in our everyday lives is determined by a theory.

Dewey’s starting point in

philosophical inquiry that led him to

provide one of the most devastating and systematic critiques

of modern moral philosophy, and a

radically new account of moral

experience.

For Dewey, then, experience is “a

starting point and terminal point, as

setting problems and as testing proposed

solutions.”

Overview of Ethical Systems: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804):Overview of Ethical Systems: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804):

. To act morally you must be motivated exclusively by rational commitment to the universal moral law or the categorical

Imperative: “Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, that you can will at the same time be a universal law.”

Right actions flow out of right principles

To act morally

requires the power of the will to rise above all natural

feelings and inclinations. This raises us above

our natural world.

To act morally

requires the rational power to recognize absolute

moral laws that

transcend our natural

world.

Second form of categorical imperative:

“Act in such a way that you always treat humans not merely as a

means to an end but also as an

end.”

Do the act that is motivated

by the sincere belief that

what you are doing is the

right thing not merely for

you, but for anybody

seeking to act properly in

any situation.

Deontological Framework:Deontological Framework:

An action is right if and only if (iff) it is in accordance with a An action is right if and only if (iff) it is in accordance with a moral rule or principle.moral rule or principle.

This is a purely formal specification, forging a link This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between the concepts of right and action and moral rule, between the concepts of right and action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until one knows what a moral and gives one no guidance until one knows what a moral rule is.rule is.

Deontological Framework:Deontological Framework: So, the next thing the theory needs is a premise about that: A moral rule is So, the next thing the theory needs is a premise about that: A moral rule is

one that would have been historically:one that would have been historically:

A.A. Theistic:Theistic:

1.1. Given to us by God;Given to us by God;

2.2. Is required by Natural Law (theistic connection);Is required by Natural Law (theistic connection);

B.B. Secular (though can still be connected to God):Secular (though can still be connected to God):1.1. Is laid on us by reason.Is laid on us by reason.

2.2. Is required by rationality;Is required by rationality;

3.3. Would command universal acceptance;Would command universal acceptance;

4.4. Would be the object of choice of all rational Would be the object of choice of all rational beings.beings.

Deontological Framework:Deontological Framework:

Therefore, the links between right action, Therefore, the links between right action, moral rule, and rationality based upon moral rule, and rationality based upon moral rule + given by God or required by moral rule + given by God or required by natural or laid on us by reason or required natural or laid on us by reason or required by rationality or would command universal by rationality or would command universal rational acceptance or would by the object rational acceptance or would by the object of choice of all rational being—are all of choice of all rational being—are all essential aspects to any deontological essential aspects to any deontological framework.framework.

Basic Terms to Know:Basic Terms to Know:

1.1. Deontological EthicsDeontological Ethics: "rule or duty-based : "rule or duty-based morality; ...emphasizes right action over good consequences“morality; ...emphasizes right action over good consequences“

2.2. a prioria priori: "not in any way derived from experience or dependent : "not in any way derived from experience or dependent upon it"; concepts derived a priori are universal rules that upon it"; concepts derived a priori are universal rules that determine, in advance, the conditions for knowledge in a determine, in advance, the conditions for knowledge in a particular domainparticular domain

3.3. maximmaxim: rule of conduct;: rule of conduct;

4.4. Hypothetical imperativeHypothetical imperative: an action that is good only as a means : an action that is good only as a means to something else;to something else;

5.5. Categorical imperativeCategorical imperative: an action that is good in itself and : an action that is good in itself and conforms to reason; categorical imperatives act as universal rules conforms to reason; categorical imperatives act as universal rules governing a situation regardless of circumstance governing a situation regardless of circumstance

Summary:Summary: Thus, Kantian ethics states an action is right iff it Thus, Kantian ethics states an action is right iff it

is in accord with the Categorical Imperative (the is in accord with the Categorical Imperative (the supreme principle of morality). Right actions supreme principle of morality). Right actions flow from right principles. flow from right principles.

From using our capacity to reason Kant believes From using our capacity to reason Kant believes the Categorical Imperative can be formulated in the Categorical Imperative can be formulated in at least three ways; they are all equivalent with at least three ways; they are all equivalent with the first formulation being the basis. Though the first formulation being the basis. Though they bring out various aspects of the moral law, they bring out various aspects of the moral law, they cannot tell us more than what the first they cannot tell us more than what the first formula does. formula does.

Categorical Imperative:Categorical Imperative: The CI does not depend on a logically prior condition though it The CI does not depend on a logically prior condition though it

assumes the predisposition that one wishes to be rational and will assumes the predisposition that one wishes to be rational and will follow what rationally determined duty dictates (in contrast to follow what rationally determined duty dictates (in contrast to hypothetical imperatives which means that the consequent depends hypothetical imperatives which means that the consequent depends upon the antecedent: If p, then q). Thus, morality is a function of upon the antecedent: If p, then q). Thus, morality is a function of human reason. Human reason is governed by Logic. Q.E.D., to be human reason. Human reason is governed by Logic. Q.E.D., to be irrational is to be inhuman. To be sure, there are perfect and irrational is to be inhuman. To be sure, there are perfect and imperfect duties. Actions are characterized as perfect because they imperfect duties. Actions are characterized as perfect because they follow directly from an application of the universalization of the follow directly from an application of the universalization of the Categorical Imperative in contrast to imperfect duties that follow Categorical Imperative in contrast to imperfect duties that follow from CI only after considering other factors (e.g., seeking our own from CI only after considering other factors (e.g., seeking our own happiness). An imperfect duty is just as strong in its action guiding happiness). An imperfect duty is just as strong in its action guiding force as a perfect duty. Thus, their point of origin highlights their force as a perfect duty. Thus, their point of origin highlights their differences. differences.

Three Formulations of the Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative:Categorical Imperative:

First formulation: “Act in conformity with the maxim and the maxim First formulation: “Act in conformity with the maxim and the maxim only, that you can will at the same time a universal law.” This only, that you can will at the same time a universal law.” This means that what I consider doing, it must be something that I can means that what I consider doing, it must be something that I can will or accept that all do (universal); it is replacing individual will or accept that all do (universal); it is replacing individual preferences with purely universal terms.preferences with purely universal terms.

Second formulation: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, Second formulation: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always an end and whether in your own person or in that of another, always an end and never as a means only.” In essence, every person has intrinsic never as a means only.” In essence, every person has intrinsic value and that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action.value and that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action.

Third formulation: “Therefore, every rational being must act as if he Third formulation: “Therefore, every rational being must act as if he were though his maxim always a legislating member in the universal were though his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends.” In other words, we have to will what is consistent kingdom of ends.” In other words, we have to will what is consistent with the operations of the kingdom as a whole. In sum, all people with the operations of the kingdom as a whole. In sum, all people should consider themselves as both members and heads should consider themselves as both members and heads

Major Points to Consider:Major Points to Consider:

1.1. What gives an act moral worth is our motives because we What gives an act moral worth is our motives because we can’t necessarily control the consequences of our act or/and can’t necessarily control the consequences of our act or/and things do not always turn out as we want. He calls this things do not always turn out as we want. He calls this motive “the good will.” Therefore, we are responsible for motive “the good will.” Therefore, we are responsible for our motives to do good or bad, and thus it is for this that we our motives to do good or bad, and thus it is for this that we are held morally accountable. are held morally accountable.

2.2. What is the right motive is acting out of a will to do the right What is the right motive is acting out of a will to do the right thing; only an act motivated by this concern for the moral thing; only an act motivated by this concern for the moral law is right.law is right.

Consider the following Shopkeeper illustration:Consider the following Shopkeeper illustration:

Major Points to Consider:Major Points to Consider:3.3. Kant’s Shopkeeper illustration: A shopkeeper charges her customers a fair Kant’s Shopkeeper illustration: A shopkeeper charges her customers a fair

price and charges the same to all. But what is the shopkeeper’s motive?price and charges the same to all. But what is the shopkeeper’s motive?

A.A. If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is that it serves If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is that it serves her own her own best interest, then this motive is not praiseworthy.best interest, then this motive is not praiseworthy.

B.B. If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is because she is If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is because she is sympathetic toward her customers, then this motive is still not sympathetic toward her customers, then this motive is still not

praiseworthy.praiseworthy.

C.C. If the shopkeeper’s motive is to do the right thing because it is the If the shopkeeper’s motive is to do the right thing because it is the right right thing, then her motive is indeed praiseworthy. Only doing that which thing, then her motive is indeed praiseworthy. Only doing that which is is morally right is praiseworthy.morally right is praiseworthy.

We do not always know when our acts are motivated by self-interest, We do not always know when our acts are motivated by self-interest, inclination or pure respect for morality. Also, we often act from mixed inclination or pure respect for morality. Also, we often act from mixed motives. However, we are certain that the motive is pure when we do motives. However, we are certain that the motive is pure when we do what is right regardless how we feel or/and the consequences.what is right regardless how we feel or/and the consequences.

Major Points to Consider:Major Points to Consider:

4.4. In order for our action to have moral worth we must not In order for our action to have moral worth we must not only act out of a right motivation but we must also do only act out of a right motivation but we must also do what is right.what is right.

Right Motive Right Act

The motive and the act must be morally right!

We must not only act of duty (have the right motive) but also “according to duty” or as “duty requires” (do what is right).

5.5. How we are to know what the right thing to do is to test our How we are to know what the right thing to do is to test our motives and actions against the categorical imperative. If our motives and actions against the categorical imperative. If our motive and acts meets the criteria of the categorical imperative motive and acts meets the criteria of the categorical imperative we are obligated to do it.we are obligated to do it.

Right Motive

Right Act

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE:

“Oughts” that tell us what we ought to do no matter what, under all conditions, and are

universally binding (categorical imperative).

1st form of Categorical Imperative:

“Act only on that maxim which can will as a

universal law.”

This means that what I consider doing, it must be something that I

can will or accept that all do (universal).

According the first formula:According the first formula:

According to the first formula: the agent According to the first formula: the agent must be willing to eliminate all individual must be willing to eliminate all individual reference from the maxim of her action. reference from the maxim of her action. The most significant exclusion from the The most significant exclusion from the maxim is oneself. Therefore, in order to maxim is oneself. Therefore, in order to pass the test of the categorical imperative pass the test of the categorical imperative in the first formulation, one must be in the first formulation, one must be prepared to go on willing even if it contains prepared to go on willing even if it contains no reference to oneself.no reference to oneself.

6.6. Thus, whatever I consider doing, it must be something that I can Thus, whatever I consider doing, it must be something that I can will or accept all do. will or accept all do.

A law by its very nature has a degree of universality. Act only on A law by its very nature has a degree of universality. Act only on that maxim which you can will as a universal law.that maxim which you can will as a universal law.

Maxim: is a description of the action that I will put to the test.

As a rational being I can only will what is non-contradictory

7. How do I know what I can and cannot will as a universal practice?

8.8. First Two Forms of the Categorical Imperative:First Two Forms of the Categorical Imperative:

2nd form of Categorical Imperative:

“Always treat humanity, whether in

your own person or that of another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an

end.”

This means that every person has intrinsic value & that humanity is a limit or constraint on our

action.

1st form of Categorical Imperative:

“Act only on that maxim which can will as a

universal law.”

This means that what I consider doing, it must be something that

I can will or accept that all do (universal); it is replacing

individual preferences with purely universal terms.

11stst Categorical Imperative: Categorical Imperative: 11stst Categorical Imperative is a decision procedure for Categorical Imperative is a decision procedure for

moral reasoning. 4 Steps:moral reasoning. 4 Steps:

1.1. Formulate a maxim that enshrines your reasoning Formulate a maxim that enshrines your reasoning for acting as you propose.for acting as you propose.

2.2. Recast maxim as universal law of nature Recast maxim as universal law of nature governing governing all rational agents-all people will act upon.all rational agents-all people will act upon.

3.3. Consider whether your maxim is even conceivable Consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in in a world governed by this law of nature.a world governed by this law of nature.

4.4. Ask whether you would or could rationally will to Ask whether you would or could rationally will to act act on this maxim in such a world.on this maxim in such a world.

9.9. Second Form of the Categorical Imperatives:Second Form of the Categorical Imperatives:

2nd Categorical Imperative:

“Always treat humanity, whether in your own person or

that of another, never simply as a means but

always at the same time as an end.”

This means that every person has intrinsic value & that

humanity is a limit or constraint in our action.

Explains how we ought to treat ourselves.

Treat ourselves & other as ends rather than merely as

means.

The moral conclusions should be the same whether we use the 1st or 2nd form of the categorical imperative.

10. Third Formulation of the Categorical 10. Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: Hypothetical Kingdom of EndsImperative: Hypothetical Kingdom of Ends

Key Points:

1. Think of ourselves as members of a society of beings whose permissible ends are to be respected.

2. Test our maxims by asking, whether, supposing the maxims were natural laws, there would be a society of that kind. In other words, we are obligated to act only by maxims which would harmonize a possible

kingdom of ends.

3. We have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural

affairs when we attempt to universalize them;

We have an imperfect duty not to act by maxims that promote unstable or greatly undesirable states of

affairs.

“Kant seems to assume that those who apply the categorical imperative to their maxims will come out with answers that agree when the maxims tested are alike.” J.B. Schneewind,

“Autonomy, Obligation, & Virtue,” pg. 338.

“All maxims as proceeding from

our own law-making ought to harmonize with a

possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom

of nature."

Grounding for the Metaphysics of

Morals, 4:436/104.

Third Categorical Imperative introduces a Third Categorical Imperative introduces a social dimension to Kantian Moralitysocial dimension to Kantian Morality

The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (4:439). kingdom of ends” (4:439).

It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions to the maxims of a legislator of laws (ii) that this lawgiver lays down to the maxims of a legislator of laws (ii) that this lawgiver lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. must be treated always as an end in itself.

The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.legislating these principles for their community.

Summary of first three categorical Summary of first three categorical imperatives:imperatives:

The Categorical Imperative requires that I act The Categorical Imperative requires that I act only on maxims that I can will as universal law.only on maxims that I can will as universal law.

The categorical imperative is supposed to give us a The categorical imperative is supposed to give us a

test for maxims. test for maxims. Maxim is the is “subjective principle of an action.” Maxim is the is “subjective principle of an action.”

The principle of an action is that prescription from The principle of an action is that prescription from which the action follows.which the action follows.

If the maxim meets the test, the action that follows If the maxim meets the test, the action that follows from it has moral worth; if the maxim does not meet it, from it has moral worth; if the maxim does not meet it, the action does not have moral worth. the action does not have moral worth.

11stst Categorical Imperative: Categorical Imperative:

11stst Categorical Imperative requires Categorical Imperative requires willingness to continue to the subscription willingness to continue to the subscription to the maxim of an action even if all to the maxim of an action even if all individual or singular reference is excluded individual or singular reference is excluded from it. Eliminating individual or singular from it. Eliminating individual or singular reference requires eliminating reference to reference requires eliminating reference to me. In other words, think of replacing me. In other words, think of replacing individual references with purely universal individual references with purely universal terms.terms.


““Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”

Rather than thinking that humanity is the goal or proper end of our action, he Rather than thinking that humanity is the goal or proper end of our action, he presupposes that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action. presupposes that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action.

This kind of constraint can be seen mostly clearly by tracing the connection with the first This kind of constraint can be seen mostly clearly by tracing the connection with the first formula, the Formula of Universal Law. Remember, the agent must be willing to eliminate all formula, the Formula of Universal Law. Remember, the agent must be willing to eliminate all individual reference from the maxim of her action. The most significant exclusion here is that of individual reference from the maxim of her action. The most significant exclusion here is that of herself. Therefore, be prepared go on willing the maxim even if it contains no reference to herself.herself. Therefore, be prepared go on willing the maxim even if it contains no reference to herself.

The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of an action must be such The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of an action must be such that any other free and rational person can adopt it. Treating humanity as an end in itself is, for that any other free and rational person can adopt it. Treating humanity as an end in itself is, for Kant, respecting our capacity for free and rational choice; in his term, it is respecting our autonomy. Kant, respecting our capacity for free and rational choice; in his term, it is respecting our autonomy. I am constrained, according to this first formula, by the consideration that is wrong, other things I am constrained, according to this first formula, by the consideration that is wrong, other things being equal, to impede the agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a means is to being equal, to impede the agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a means is to ignore the other as a center of agency. The clearest cases here are those of coercion and deception.ignore the other as a center of agency. The clearest cases here are those of coercion and deception.

For example: If I take the hand of one of my students in my class and with it I strike the For example: If I take the hand of one of my students in my class and with it I strike the neighbouring student’s face, I have bypassed the first student’s agency. I have treated her merely as neighbouring student’s face, I have bypassed the first student’s agency. I have treated her merely as a means, as though she were merely an organic hitting implement. The same is true when I deceive a means, as though she were merely an organic hitting implement. The same is true when I deceive somebody, because if I conceal the nature of the situation, I impede her ability to make a free and somebody, because if I conceal the nature of the situation, I impede her ability to make a free and rational choice for that situation.rational choice for that situation.


The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of an action must be such that any other free and rational person can an action must be such that any other free and rational person can adopt it. Treating humanity as an end in itself is, for Kant, respecting adopt it. Treating humanity as an end in itself is, for Kant, respecting our capacity for free and rational choice; in his term, it is respecting our capacity for free and rational choice; in his term, it is respecting our autonomy. I am constrained, according to this first formula, by our autonomy. I am constrained, according to this first formula, by the consideration that is wrong, other things being equal, to impede the consideration that is wrong, other things being equal, to impede the agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a the agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a means is to ignore the other as a center of agency. The clearest cases means is to ignore the other as a center of agency. The clearest cases here are those of coercion and deception.here are those of coercion and deception.

For example: If I take the hand of one of my students in my For example: If I take the hand of one of my students in my class and with it I strike the neighbouring student’s face, I class and with it I strike the neighbouring student’s face, I

have have bypassed the first student’s agency. I have treated her merely bypassed the first student’s agency. I have treated her merely as as a means, as though she were merely an organic hitting a means, as though she were merely an organic hitting implement. The same is true when I deceive somebody, because implement. The same is true when I deceive somebody, because if I if I conceal the nature of the situation, I impede her ability to conceal the nature of the situation, I impede her ability to make a make a free and rational choice for that situation.free and rational choice for that situation.

What is the connection between the What is the connection between the categorical imperative is the following:categorical imperative is the following:

If I cannot will maxim X as universal law, then I am If I cannot will maxim X as universal law, then I am acting for reasons that it is not possible for everyone to acting for reasons that it is not possible for everyone to share. But to act toward people on the basis of reasons share. But to act toward people on the basis of reasons they cannot possibly share is to they cannot possibly share is to useuse them, to treat them as a them, to treat them as a mere means to my goals. In fact, all people should mere means to my goals. In fact, all people should consider themselves both members and heads because we consider themselves both members and heads because we have a perfect duty not to act in maxims that create have a perfect duty not to act in maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs for it will incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs for it will lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs. lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs. See, the truly autonomous will is not subject to any See, the truly autonomous will is not subject to any particular interest. Kant’s idea here is that one should not particular interest. Kant’s idea here is that one should not treat others in ways they couldn’t rationally assent to.treat others in ways they couldn’t rationally assent to.

10. Perfect and Imperfect Duties:10. Perfect and Imperfect Duties:

Imperfect Duties:

Are those duties that don’t whole heartily conform to the categorical imperative.

e.g., If I were an egoist and concerned only about myself, no one could accuse

me of using other people; I would simply leave them alone. But this

attitude & practice is inconsistent with the duty to treat others as persons. As persons, they also have interests and plans, and to recognize this I must at

least sometimes and in some ways seek to promote their ends and goals.

Perfect Duties: Perfect duties are

absolutes & necessary; they conform to the

categorical imperative.

eg., We can and should absolutely refrain from making false or lying

promises.

The following are 4 examples The following are 4 examples famously used by Kantfamously used by Kant..

1st example: Suicide1st example: Suicide

““Whenever continuing to live will bring Whenever continuing to live will bring more pain than pleasure, I shall more pain than pleasure, I shall commit suicide out of self-love.”commit suicide out of self-love.”

1.1. Suicide can’t be a universal law for one can’t will that Suicide can’t be a universal law for one can’t will that would be universal will.would be universal will.

2.2. Remember, suicide would be morally right if and only Remember, suicide would be morally right if and only if the person who is thinking about suicide can if the person who is thinking about suicide can consistently will that suicide be a universal law.consistently will that suicide be a universal law.

11stst Example: Suicide: Example: Suicide: A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied

of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: 'From self-could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: 'From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.' It is asked then duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.' It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty." (Quoted from the supreme principle of all duty." (Quoted from the Fundamental Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of MoralsPrinciples of the Metaphysic of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott) , as translated by T.K. Abbott)

2nd example: Lying & Not Keeping Promise:2nd example: Lying & Not Keeping Promise:

““Whenever I need money, then I shall borrow Whenever I need money, then I shall borrow the money and promise to repay, even the money and promise to repay, even

though I know I will not repay.”though I know I will not repay.”

1.1. Lying and not keeping promise can’t be a universal law for one Lying and not keeping promise can’t be a universal law for one can’t will that would be universal will.can’t will that would be universal will.

2.2. Remember, lying and not repaying would be morally right if Remember, lying and not repaying would be morally right if and only if the person who is thinking about lying and not and only if the person who is thinking about lying and not keeping promise can consistently will that lying and not keeping keeping promise can consistently will that lying and not keeping promise be a universal law.promise be a universal law.

33rdrd Example: Developing One’s Habits Example: Developing One’s Habits

"A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture "A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes." (Quoted from the him, for all sorts of possible purposes." (Quoted from the Fundamental Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of MoralsPrinciples of the Metaphysic of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott) , as translated by T.K. Abbott)

33rdrd example: Developing One’s example: Developing One’s HabitsHabits

““When I’m comfortable as I am, I shall let all my When I’m comfortable as I am, I shall let all my talents rust.”talents rust.”

1.1. Everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed.Everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed.

2.2. If everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed, If everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed, then no one can consistently will that his non-use of talents to be a then no one can consistently will that his non-use of talents to be a universal law.universal law.

3.3. Non-use of talents is morally right if and only if the agent thinking about Non-use of talents is morally right if and only if the agent thinking about non-use of talents can consistently will that non-use of talents be a non-use of talents can consistently will that non-use of talents be a universal law. universal law. (The Categorical Imperative)(The Categorical Imperative)

4.4. Therefore, allowing one’s talents to rust is morally wrong.Therefore, allowing one’s talents to rust is morally wrong.

44thth Example: Helping Others. Example: Helping Others. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend

with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!' Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, distress!' Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires." (From the deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires." (From the Fundamental Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of MoralsPrinciples of the Metaphysic of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott), as translated by T.K. Abbott)

4th example: Helping Others:4th example: Helping Others:““When I am flourishing and others are in distress, I shall When I am flourishing and others are in distress, I shall

give nothing to charity.”give nothing to charity.”

Everyone necessarily wills that he or she be helped in desperate Everyone necessarily wills that he or she be helped in desperate circumstances.circumstances.

2.2. If everyone necessarily wills this, then no one can consistently will that If everyone necessarily wills this, then no one can consistently will that non-help be a universal law.non-help be a universal law.

3.3. Not helping others is morally right if and only if the agent thinking Not helping others is morally right if and only if the agent thinking about not helping others can consistently will that not helping others be about not helping others can consistently will that not helping others be a universal law. a universal law. (The Categorical Imperative)(The Categorical Imperative)

4.4. Therefore, not helping others is not morally right.Therefore, not helping others is not morally right.

11.11. Advantages of Kant’s Moral Theory:Advantages of Kant’s Moral Theory:

Fairness, Consistency, and morally equal treatment of all people for they are intrinsically valuable.

Emphasizes the Law of Non-contradiction; we would not will anything that is not rational.

Emphasizes doing what is morally right (it is our duty).

It is universally binding and Impartial for in order for an action to Be morally permissible, we should be able to will it for all.

12. Criticisms against Deontological Ethics: 12. Criticisms against Deontological Ethics: Duty centered ethics stressing obedience to rules, Duty centered ethics stressing obedience to rules, as opposed to result-centered or utilitarian ethics.as opposed to result-centered or utilitarian ethics.

1.1. No clear way to resolve moral duties when they come into conflict with each No clear way to resolve moral duties when they come into conflict with each other.other.

2.2. Deontological ethics are consequential moral systems in disguise enshrined Deontological ethics are consequential moral systems in disguise enshrined in customs and law have been known to give the best consequences.in customs and law have been known to give the best consequences.

3.3. Do not readily allow for gray areas because they are based on absolutes.Do not readily allow for gray areas because they are based on absolutes.

4.4. Which duties qualify given time or location: Are old duties still valid?Which duties qualify given time or location: Are old duties still valid?

5.5. Human welfare and misery: Some principles may result in a clash with what Human welfare and misery: Some principles may result in a clash with what is best for human welfare & prescribe actions which cause human misery.is best for human welfare & prescribe actions which cause human misery.

6.6. Rule worship: The refusal to break a generously beneficial rule in those Rule worship: The refusal to break a generously beneficial rule in those areas in which it is not most beneficial is rule worship.areas in which it is not most beneficial is rule worship.

7.7. Exclusive focus on “rationality” ignores our relations to & with other human Exclusive focus on “rationality” ignores our relations to & with other human beings.beings.

There is no clear way to deal with moral conflicts There is no clear way to deal with moral conflicts consider the following:consider the following:

a.a. Killer comes to the door: If a killer comes to the door and ask Killer comes to the door: If a killer comes to the door and ask for a friend of yours inside whom he intends to kill, you must for a friend of yours inside whom he intends to kill, you must tell the truth (illustration by Kant).tell the truth (illustration by Kant).

But there is only one exceptionless rule in Kant’s philosophy and that is But there is only one exceptionless rule in Kant’s philosophy and that is given in the categorical imperative: We are never permitted to do what we given in the categorical imperative: We are never permitted to do what we cannot will as a universal law or what violates the requirement to treat cannot will as a universal law or what violates the requirement to treat persons as persons as persons.persons.

Kant may not give us adequate help in deciding what to do when moral Kant may not give us adequate help in deciding what to do when moral conflicts are involved because in the above example, both to tell the truth conflicts are involved because in the above example, both to tell the truth and preserve life are moral obligations.and preserve life are moral obligations.

Regarding Impartiality & Rationality:Regarding Impartiality & Rationality:

b.b. Kant’s moral philosophy is its belief in impartiality; in order Kant’s moral philosophy is its belief in impartiality; in order for an action to be rally permissible, we should be able to will it for an action to be rally permissible, we should be able to will it for all.for all.

However, persons do differ in significant ways (gender, race, age, and However, persons do differ in significant ways (gender, race, age, and talents). In what way does morality require that everyone be treated equally talents). In what way does morality require that everyone be treated equally and in what does it perhaps require that different person be treated and in what does it perhaps require that different person be treated differently (e.g., gender).differently (e.g., gender).

c.c. Kant’s stress on rationality may be considered to be too male-Kant’s stress on rationality may be considered to be too male-oriented, too Westernized. It is subject to the continental oriented, too Westernized. It is subject to the continental critique of structure (Foucault).critique of structure (Foucault).

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being'shuman being's will in will in

fulfilling his duty” (6:405) and vice as principled immorality. (6:390) fulfilling his duty” (6:405) and vice as principled immorality. (6:390) This definition appears to put Kant's views on virtue at odds with This definition appears to put Kant's views on virtue at odds with classical views such as Aristotle's in several important respects.classical views such as Aristotle's in several important respects.

First, Kant's account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty First, Kant's account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as the trait of acting according to these that basis defines virtue as the trait of acting according to these principles.principles.

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice Second, virtue is for Kant a strength of will, and hence Second, virtue is for Kant a strength of will, and hence

does not arise as the result of instilling a ‘second nature’ does not arise as the result of instilling a ‘second nature’ by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but a disposition of one's will, not a disposition of emotions, a disposition of one's will, not a disposition of emotions, feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz., Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz., continence or self-control.continence or self-control.

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral

principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue differs from vice only in terms of assumes that virtue differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves. (6:404, 432) But prodigality and avarice, each involves. (6:404, 432) But prodigality and avarice, for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough with one's means. They differ in that the prodigal enough with one's means. They differ in that the prodigal acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious act on the intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious act on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them.possessing them.

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice Fourth, in classical views the distinction between Fourth, in classical views the distinction between

moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul , but one finds classical theorists the soul , but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness along side courage treating wit and friendliness along side courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non-moral and moral virtues could not between non-moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of much of AnthropologyAnthropology is given over to is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral.character traits, both moral and non-moral.

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since

it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses. constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses. Morality is ‘duty’ for human beings because it is Morality is ‘duty’ for human beings because it is possiblepossible (and we (and we recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest change the fact that each and every desire and interest could havecould have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they cancan conflict conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually with moral law, not the fact that they actually dodo conflict with it, that conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence virtue essentially a trait makes duty a constraint, and hence virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.concerned with constraint.

Kant’s View of Virtue/ViceKant’s View of Virtue/Vice

Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant's system in other Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant's system in other respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will. (6: 408) That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus a good will. (6: 408) That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one's duty from interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one's duty from duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in ReligionReligion. Kant here describes the natural human condition as one in which no . Kant here describes the natural human condition as one in which no decisive priority is given to the demands of morality over happiness. Until one decisive priority is given to the demands of morality over happiness. Until one achieves a permanent change in the will's orientation in this respect, a revolution in achieves a permanent change in the will's orientation in this respect, a revolution in which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one's pursuits, all which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one's pursuits, all of one's actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, of one's actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one's will to put this must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one's will to put this revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant's considered view is that a good will revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant's considered view is that a good will is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.

Overview of Ethical Systems: Social Contract Ethics:Overview of Ethical Systems: Social Contract Ethics:Ethical principles are made, not found. Ethics are constructed by social group, and

exists for the benefit of those groups: 2 Types: Contractarianism & Contractualism:

John S. Mill:

Cultural, intellectual, &

spiritual pleasures are

of greater values than

mere physical pain or

pleasure.

State of Nature:

Hobbes says we need strong social contract because our natural

tendencies are “every man for himself.”

Rousseau says we are basically good; it is pity for ourselves & others that holds us in check

Locke believes we have relatively peaceful & gentle state of nature:

Rawls has different S.P.: Original position & veil

of ignorance.

Both models stress

reciprocity and mutual consent.

Morality is modeled on a

kind of agreement or

contract.

Hobbes: Would you

prefer social contract or

state of nature?

Contractarianism: morality is a set of social practices that self-

interestedly rational actors can “adopt” in their common interests

(you are born into this model). Underlying motive is rational self-

interest. Thomas Hobbes:

John Locke insists on preserving the individual rights of citizens against the

temptation of social rulers to become tyrants.

Contractualism: Morality consists of principles that

mediate relations of mutual respect between free and equal persons. Underlying motive is

mutual respect between equals: Rousseau, Kant, and

Rawls.

People cooperate when they forgo

the pursuit of their own independent interests & follow rules or roles, the

collective following of which promotes

everyone’s interests better

than would have been done by

everyone pursuing her own interests

independently.

The Collective Action Problem is where the collective pursuit of self-interest leads to an

outcome that is worse for each person pursuing his or her respective desires and

interests.

Overview of Ethical Systems: Utilitarianism:Overview of Ethical Systems: Utilitarianism:A theory of moral reasoning within teleological ethics or consequentialism

that looks to the principle of utility, i.e., the degree to which an act is helpful or harmful in order to determine the rightness or wrongness of an act.

John S. Mill:





pleasure.

J.J. C. Smart:

Preference Utilitarianism: Maximize the achievements

of people’s priorities; it is

for each person to

decide what counts as being

happy.

J. Bentham:

Only 2 intrinsic values: “Good is whatever brings the greatest

happiness to the greatest number.”

Negative Utilitarianism by K. Popper in The Open Society & Its

Enemies (1945): Promote the least amount evil or harm; prevent the greatest amount of harm for the

greatest number:

Ideal Utilitarianism by G.E. Moore: The rightness or wrongness of acts is determined by their actual consequences; our duty: produce the best possible consequences.

Motive Utilitarianism (Robert Adams): Inculcate motives within ourselves that will be generally useful across the

spectrum of the situations we are likely to encounter.

R.M. Hare’s 2-level utilitarianism: The

logic of moral terms & facts about human

nature & condition) leads to

a 2 level version whereby both rule

& act utilitarianism are bridged: intuitive

level (simple, general rules) & critical level (act utilitarianism.

John S. Mill: Though still hedonistic utilitarianism Mill argues that cultural,

intellectual, and spiritual pleasures are of greater values than just mere physical plain

or pleasure.

A Closer look at Consequentialism:A Closer look at Consequentialism:

Classic utilitarianism is a complex Classic utilitarianism is a complex combination of many distinct claims, combination of many distinct claims, including the following claims about the including the following claims about the moral rightness of acts (even though it moral rightness of acts (even though it reduces all morally relevant factors to reduces all morally relevant factors to consequences):consequences):

Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the defined and whether it can be measured in the

way utilitarians requires:way utilitarians requires:

1.1. Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on only on consequencesconsequences ( (not circumstances, the intrinsic not circumstances, the intrinsic nature of the act, or anything that happens before the actnature of the act, or anything that happens before the act). ).

2.2. Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the depends only on the actualactual consequences ( consequences (not foreseen, not foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequencesforeseeable, intended, or likely consequences). ).

3.3. Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of depends only on the consequences of that act itselfthat act itself ( (not not consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so onthat covers other acts of the same kind, and so on). ).

Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be defined and whether Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the way utilitarians requires:it can be measured in the way utilitarians requires:

4.4. Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the valuevalue of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the consequences). consequences).

5.5. Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the pleasurespleasures and and painspains in the consequences ( in the consequences (as opposed to other goods, as opposed to other goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so onsuch as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on). ).

6.6. Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which consequences are consequences are bestbest (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement over the status quo). over the status quo).

7.7. Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some function of the values of function of the values of partsparts of those consequences ( of those consequences (as opposed to as opposed to rankings of whole worlds or sets of consequencesrankings of whole worlds or sets of consequences). ).


8.8. Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the totaltotal net net good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per person). person).

8.8. Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the consequences for consequences for allall people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the individual agent, present people, or any other limited group).individual agent, present people, or any other limited group).

9.9. Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one

person matter person matter just as muchjust as much as similar benefits to any other person (= all as similar benefits to any other person (= all who count count equally).who count count equally).

10.10. Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others

does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer). perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer).


These claims could be clarified, supplemented, and subdivided further. These claims could be clarified, supplemented, and subdivided further. What matters here is just that these claims are logically independent, so a What matters here is just that these claims are logically independent, so a moral theorist could consistently accept some of them without accepting moral theorist could consistently accept some of them without accepting others. Yet classic utilitarians accepted them all. That fact makes classic others. Yet classic utilitarians accepted them all. That fact makes classic utilitarianism a more complex theory than it might appear at first sight.utilitarianism a more complex theory than it might appear at first sight.

It also makes classic utilitarianism subject to attack from many angles. It also makes classic utilitarianism subject to attack from many angles. Persistent opponents posed plenty of problems for classic utilitarianism. Persistent opponents posed plenty of problems for classic utilitarianism. Each objection led some utilitarians to give up some of the original claims Each objection led some utilitarians to give up some of the original claims of classic utilitarianism. By dropping one or more of those claims, of classic utilitarianism. By dropping one or more of those claims, descendants of utilitarianism can construct a wide variety of moral descendants of utilitarianism can construct a wide variety of moral theories. Advocates of these theories often call them consequentialism theories. Advocates of these theories often call them consequentialism rather than utilitarianism so that their theories will not be subject to rather than utilitarianism so that their theories will not be subject to refutation by association with the classic utilitarian theory.refutation by association with the classic utilitarian theory.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873): Hedonistic Utilitarianism:John Stuart Mill (1806-1873): Hedonistic Utilitarianism:

Greatest Happiness Principle: “Acts are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness (intended pleasure), wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (pain and privation of

pleasure). Cultural, intellectual, & spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure, because the former would be valued more highly by competent judges than the latter. A competent judge, according to Mill, is anyone who has experienced both the lower pleasures and the higher.

John S. Mill:





pleasure.

Mill reaffirmed though

developed the hedonistic theory of

Bentham from strict hedonistic path by saying that some kinds

of pleasure, whatever their quantity, are intrinsically superior to

others.

.

Mill was an advocate of rule utilitarianism: you obey those

rules which experience has shown will produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. When you always know what people will do

you get predictability and security.

We ought to choose the action which looks most likely to produce most

happiness. In order to do so we should usually be guided by those general rules

which have been formulated as a result of the long experience of men in society:

The beliefs that have come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and

or the philosopher, until he has succeeded in finding better.”

A rule is valid only because it passes the utilitarian test: and it is difficult to

believe

Pleasures differ from each other qualitatively as well as quantitatively,

a “higher” pleasure being intrinsically better

than a “lower” pleasure.”

“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied

than a fool satisfied.”Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal:

“a pushpin is as good as opera.” Some desires

are primitive: others the result of experience,

training, self-discipline, & special associations.

The only justification society has in interfering with the liberty of action of an individual is self-protection;

People should be allowed to think & do whatever they like. Mill was worried about the “tyranny of the

majority” in his Essay On Liberty.

Qualitative differences easily recognizable

whereas quantitative differences are

difficult to determine.

He also differed with Bentham by denying

that human motivation implies

egoism. Even though we are by nature

pleasure-seekers, we can be trained through proper development of

our feelings to find pleasure in the

pleasure of others.

John Stuart Mill:John Stuart Mill:Essential Terms:Essential Terms:

1.1. higher pleasures:higher pleasures: "pleasures of the intellect, ...relating to our feelings "pleasures of the intellect, ...relating to our feelings and imagination"; also those relating to our moral values. and imagination"; also those relating to our moral values.

2.2. lower pleasures:lower pleasures: bodily and physical pleasures bodily and physical pleasures

3.3. inferior type:inferior type: persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the lower persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the lower pleasures (88-89) pleasures (88-89)

4.4. superior type:superior type: persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the higher persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the higher pleasures pleasures

5.5. altruism: altruism: personal sacrifice; "putting other's interests before one's personal sacrifice; "putting other's interests before one's own" own"

6.6. incommensurable: incommensurable: (in this case) two things that are incomparable (in this case) two things that are incomparable because they are essentially different. Mill uses this word to describe because they are essentially different. Mill uses this word to describe the comparison of pleasure and pain. the comparison of pleasure and pain.

John Stuart Mill:John Stuart Mill:10.10. Although Mill was heavily influenced by Bentham, there are two Although Mill was heavily influenced by Bentham, there are two

specific points of the latter's utilitarian theory that are rejected in Mill's specific points of the latter's utilitarian theory that are rejected in Mill's version: version:

Mill did not regard all pleasures equally. He made a distinction between Mill did not regard all pleasures equally. He made a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. higher and lower pleasures.

Mill rejects Bentham's hedonic calculus because he believes that Mill rejects Bentham's hedonic calculus because he believes that pleasures and pains are incommensurable.pleasures and pains are incommensurable.

11.11. Higher pleasures are such because they: Higher pleasures are such because they:

offer a sense of human dignity, offer a sense of human dignity, offer greater permanency, safety, and un-costliness, and offer greater permanency, safety, and un-costliness, and challenge us to develop our intellectual capabilities. challenge us to develop our intellectual capabilities.

1212 The The only persons qualified to judge the relative merit of only persons qualified to judge the relative merit of pleasurespleasures are those acquainted with the higher pleasures. Mill inserts are those acquainted with the higher pleasures. Mill inserts this qualification so that his ethics can overcome the charge the it is this qualification so that his ethics can overcome the charge the it is an ethics for pigs and because he argues that anyone who is an ethics for pigs and because he argues that anyone who is acquainted with both types or pleasures will certainly affirm the acquainted with both types or pleasures will certainly affirm the superiority of the higher type. superiority of the higher type.

Egoism vs. Altruistic Utilitarianism:Egoism vs. Altruistic Utilitarianism:

Enlightened self-interest is rejected in favor of consider Enlightened self-interest is rejected in favor of consider the greatest happiness of all concerned. the greatest happiness of all concerned.

Persons responsible for making ethical decisions should Persons responsible for making ethical decisions should do so from a disinterested, benevolent perspective. do so from a disinterested, benevolent perspective.

The value of personal sacrifice or altruism takes center The value of personal sacrifice or altruism takes center stage over that of psychological egoism. stage over that of psychological egoism.

If one can see that personal interests are bound up with If one can see that personal interests are bound up with communal interests, then the conflict between ego and communal interests, then the conflict between ego and community will be minimized. community will be minimized.

Other Points on Mills:Other Points on Mills:13.13. Human Suffering:Human Suffering: Mill argues that "we have ... a moral duty to prevent or to Mill argues that "we have ... a moral duty to prevent or to

reduce to human suffering.“reduce to human suffering.“

Selfishness and a want of mental cultivation are the greatest causes of Selfishness and a want of mental cultivation are the greatest causes of unhappiness.unhappiness.

Individuals who have not taken the time to develop their intellectual capabilities are Individuals who have not taken the time to develop their intellectual capabilities are unlikely to share the view that the improvement of the human condition is of unlikely to share the view that the improvement of the human condition is of paramount importance.paramount importance.

On Democracy:On Democracy:

Although he favored democracy, Mill sees the possibility for domination of the Although he favored democracy, Mill sees the possibility for domination of the minority by the majority under a strict system of "mob rule.“minority by the majority under a strict system of "mob rule.“

Accordingly, Mill argues that safeguards be put in place to protect the interests and Accordingly, Mill argues that safeguards be put in place to protect the interests and viewpoints of minorities in the political process. Note that the term minority is not viewpoints of minorities in the political process. Note that the term minority is not meant to denote racial minorities, but rather all types of political and social meant to denote racial minorities, but rather all types of political and social minorities that do not share majority/mainstream views.minorities that do not share majority/mainstream views.

Utilitarianism vs. Deontological Ethics:Utilitarianism vs. Deontological Ethics:

Utilitarian Ethics:

1. Consequential Outcomes-Based.

2. Case-by-Case.

3. Hypothetical Imperative.

4. Happiness (Greatest Happiness Principle)

Deontological Ethics:

1. One universal law for each situation.

2. All times, all places, & all people.

3. Categorical Imperative (Maxim-rule)

4. Duty, Obligation, & Good will.

G. E. Moore’s EthicsG. E. Moore’s Ethics

2nd Argument:

Suppose good were definable. Then the result would be even

worse that that of reducing ethical

propositions to non-ethical propositions-ethical propositions

would be tautologies! For example, define good as pleasure. Then suppose you

maintain that pleasure is good. All you would

be asserting is that pleasure is pleasure, a

tautology.

1st Argument:

To identify good with some other object

(i.e., to define good) is to commit the

naturalistic fallacy. To commit this

fallacy is to reduce ethical propositions

to either psychological

propositions or reportive definitions as to how people use

words.

Why is this naturalistic fallacy? Because good is a non-natural property.

But even it were a natural one, there would still be a fallacy: Definist fallacy.

The Definist fallacy is attempting to define good by any means. This

argument is often known as the open question argument because whatever purported definition of good anyone

offers, it would always be an open question whatever satisfies the

definition really is good.

In last portion of book Moore discusses what sorts of things are the greatest goods which we are acquainted. He

argues for the view that they are personal affection and aesthetic

enjoyments.

Regarding how good is to be

defined, Moore contends that

there can be only one answer: good is good or good is

indefinable;

Thus, good denotes a “unique,

simple object of thought” that is indefinable and un-analyzable.

George Edward Moore (1873-1958) was an English philosopher who spearheaded the attack on idealism and was a major supporter of realism in all its forms. In sum, he appealed to and offered a defense of common sense, arguing that any view which opposed common sense was either factually false or self-contradictory. In his major work in ethics, Principia Ethics (1903), Moore maintained that the central problem in ethics is ‘What is good?-meaning by this, not what things are good, but how “good” is to be defined.

Moore’s Threefold Contribution:Moore’s Threefold Contribution:1.1. ““Good” is the name of a simple indefinable, non-natural property.Good” is the name of a simple indefinable, non-natural property.

2.2. Moore takes it that to call an action right is simply to say that of Moore takes it that to call an action right is simply to say that of the available alternative actions is the one which does or did as a the available alternative actions is the one which does or did as a matter of fact produce the most good. Moore is a utilitarian: matter of fact produce the most good. Moore is a utilitarian: every action is to be evaluated solely by its consequences, as every action is to be evaluated solely by its consequences, as compared with the consequences of alternative possible courses compared with the consequences of alternative possible courses of action. No action is ever right or wrong as such. Anything of action. No action is ever right or wrong as such. Anything whatsoever may under certain circumstances be permitted.whatsoever may under certain circumstances be permitted.

Propositions declaring this or that to be good are what Moore called Propositions declaring this or that to be good are what Moore called “intuitions”; they are incapable of proof or disproof and indeed no “intuitions”; they are incapable of proof or disproof and indeed no evidence or reasoning can be adduced in their favor or disfavor.evidence or reasoning can be adduced in their favor or disfavor.

Moore’s Threefold Contribution:Moore’s Threefold Contribution:

2.2. Moore takes it that to call an action right is Moore takes it that to call an action right is simply to say that of the available alternative simply to say that of the available alternative actions is the one which does or did as a actions is the one which does or did as a matter of fact produce the most good. Moore matter of fact produce the most good. Moore is a utilitarian: every action is to be evaluated is a utilitarian: every action is to be evaluated solely by its consequences, as compared with solely by its consequences, as compared with the consequences of alternative possible the consequences of alternative possible courses of action. No action is ever right or courses of action. No action is ever right or wrong as such. Anything whatsoever may wrong as such. Anything whatsoever may under certain circumstances be permitted.under certain circumstances be permitted.


3.3. In the sixth and final chapter of In the sixth and final chapter of Principia Principia EthicaEthica, that “‘personal affections and aesthetic , that “‘personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments include all the greatest, and by far enjoyments include all the greatest, and by far the greatest goods we can imagine…’ This is the greatest goods we can imagine…’ This is the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy.’ The achievement of friendship Philosophy.’ The achievement of friendship and the contemplation of what is beautiful in and the contemplation of what is beautiful in nature or in art certainly almost the sole and nature or in art certainly almost the sole and perhaps the sole justifiable ends of all human perhaps the sole justifiable ends of all human action.” MacIntyre, After action.” MacIntyre, After VirtueVirtue, 15. , 15.


Critique by MacIntyre:Critique by MacIntyre:

1.1. All three central positions are logically independent of All three central positions are logically independent of each other. There is no breach in consistency if one each other. There is no breach in consistency if one were to affirm any one of the three and deny the other were to affirm any one of the three and deny the other two.two.

2.2. “…“…the first part of what Moore says is plainly false and the first part of what Moore says is plainly false and the second and third parts are at the very least highly the second and third parts are at the very least highly contentious” (pg. 16).contentious” (pg. 16).

3.3. The fallout: An impoverished concept of the “good” The fallout: An impoverished concept of the “good” which contributed to rise of “emotivism.”which contributed to rise of “emotivism.”

Overview of Ethical Systems: Act vs Rule Utilitarianism:Overview of Ethical Systems: Act vs Rule Utilitarianism:

1. Rule Utilitarianism states we ought to consider the consequences of the act performed as a general practice: What if everyone did that? What results would be this were a general practice?

2. Act utilitarianism states we ought to consider the consequences of each act separately.

The consequences of the act under consideration determine what one ought to do.

Rule Utilitarians can claim that

acts are similar to one another and

so can be thought of as practices. Since we should make the same

judgment in similar cases, we should judge this act by comparing it with results of

the actions of everyone in

similar situations.

Act Utilitarians can claim that

ought to consider only what will or is

likely to happen, not what would

happen if we acted in certain ways but is not going to happen because we are not going to act.

Best Proof offered for Utilitarianism is experience

Just as the only way in which we know that something is

visible is its being seen, and the only way we can show that

something is audible is if it can be heard, so, also, the only proof that we have that something is desirable is its being desired.

Because we desire happiness, we thus know it is desirable or

good. In fact, happiness is the only thing we desire for its own sake. All else we dire because

we believe it will lead to happiness. J.S. Mill

They are alike in requiring us to

produce the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure for the greatest number

of people

They differ in what they

believe we ought to consider in estimating the consequences.

Act-Utilitarian Framework:Act-Utilitarian Framework: Act-utilitarian model begins with a premise that provides Act-utilitarian model begins with a premise that provides

a specification of right action:a specification of right action:

An action is right iff it promotes the best An action is right iff it promotes the best consequences.consequences.

It thereby forges the link between the concepts of “right It thereby forges the link between the concepts of “right action” and “consequences.”action” and “consequences.”

The best consequences are those in which The best consequences are those in which happiness is maximized.happiness is maximized.

Act-Utilitarianism vs. Rule-UtilitarianismAct-Utilitarianism vs. Rule-Utilitarianism

Act-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action Act-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself.is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself.

Rule-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action Rule-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.

Individual action are evaluated, in theory, not just in practice, by whether Individual action are evaluated, in theory, not just in practice, by whether actions conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is actions conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is applied only to general rules.applied only to general rules.

Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided that are Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided that are permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such rules.rules.

There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism.There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism.


There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism according to whether one construes “rule” as “actual according to whether one construes “rule” as “actual rule (S. E. Toumlin)” or “possible rule (Kant).”rule (S. E. Toumlin)” or “possible rule (Kant).”

On using Kant as possible rule we would do the On using Kant as possible rule we would do the following: “Act only on that maxim through which you following: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” as “Act only on that maxim which you as universal law” as “Act only on that maxim which you as a humane and benevolent person would like to see a humane and benevolent person would like to see established as a universal law.”established as a universal law.”


Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by J.C.C. Smart via David Lyons:J.C.C. Smart via David Lyons:

11stst: Rule-Utilitarianism collapses into act-: Rule-Utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism:utilitarianism:

““Suppose that an exception to a rule R produces the Suppose that an exception to a rule R produces the best possible consequences. Then this is the evidence best possible consequences. Then this is the evidence that the rule R should be modified so as to allow this that the rule R should be modified so as to allow this exception. Thus we get a new rule of the form ‘do R exception. Thus we get a new rule of the form ‘do R except in circumstances of the sort C’. That is, except in circumstances of the sort C’. That is, whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule would lead the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule. would lead the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule. Thus, an adequate rule-utilitarianism would be Thus, an adequate rule-utilitarianism would be extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism.extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism.


Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by J.C.C. Smart via David Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by J.C.C. Smart via David Lyons:Lyons:

22ndnd Argument: Lyons is interested in “threshold effects”: Argument: Lyons is interested in “threshold effects”:

A difficulty for rule-utilitarianism is on rules like “do not walk on the grass” or “do A difficulty for rule-utilitarianism is on rules like “do not walk on the grass” or “do not fail to vote at an election” or “do not fail to vote at an election.”not fail to vote at an election” or “do not fail to vote at an election.”

In these cases it seems that it is beneficial if some people, though not too many, In these cases it seems that it is beneficial if some people, though not too many, to break the rule (pg. 11).to break the rule (pg. 11).

Lyon points out that we can distinguish the act of doing something (e.g., walking Lyon points out that we can distinguish the act of doing something (e.g., walking on the grass) after some largish numberon the grass) after some largish number n n other people have done it from the other people have done it from the action of doing it when few or no people have done it (pg. 11).action of doing it when few or no people have done it (pg. 11).

When these circumstances are written into the rule, Lyons holds that the rule will When these circumstances are written into the rule, Lyons holds that the rule will come to enjoin the same circumstances as would the act-utilitarian principle (pg. come to enjoin the same circumstances as would the act-utilitarian principle (pg. 11).11).


Smart thinks that an adequate rule-utilitarianism is not only Smart thinks that an adequate rule-utilitarianism is not only extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian principle but it extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian principle but it would consist of one rule only: the act-utilitarian rule: “Maximize would consist of one rule only: the act-utilitarian rule: “Maximize probable benefit” (pp. 11-12).probable benefit” (pp. 11-12).

This is because any rule which can be formulated must be able This is because any rule which can be formulated must be able to deal with an indefinite number of unforeseen types of to deal with an indefinite number of unforeseen types of contingency (pg. 12).contingency (pg. 12).

No rule, short of the act-utilitarian one, can therefore be safely No rule, short of the act-utilitarian one, can therefore be safely regarded as extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian regarded as extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian principle unless it is that very principle itself (pg. 12).principle unless it is that very principle itself (pg. 12).

Thus, act-utilitarianism must become “one-rule” rule-Thus, act-utilitarianism must become “one-rule” rule-utilitarianism which is identical to act-utilitarianism (pg. 12).utilitarianism which is identical to act-utilitarianism (pg. 12).

R. M. Hare’s Two Level Utilitarian Model:R. M. Hare’s Two Level Utilitarian Model:

Two-level utilitarianism or Kantian Utilitarianism is an attempt to accommodate Two-level utilitarianism or Kantian Utilitarianism is an attempt to accommodate deontological intuitions (Kantian universalizability) within the framework of deontological intuitions (Kantian universalizability) within the framework of utilitarianism by synthesizing both act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.utilitarianism by synthesizing both act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

In summary, a person's moral decisions should be based on a set of 'intuitive' moral In summary, a person's moral decisions should be based on a set of 'intuitive' moral rules (derived from the logical feature of moral knowledge, common preferences of rules (derived from the logical feature of moral knowledge, common preferences of humanity, etc) except in certain rare situations (e.g., prima facie principles conflict, humanity, etc) except in certain rare situations (e.g., prima facie principles conflict, unusual cases) where it is more appropriate to engage in a 'critical' level of act unusual cases) where it is more appropriate to engage in a 'critical' level of act utilitarianism.utilitarianism.

Act utilitarianism states that in all cases the morally right action is the one which Act utilitarianism states that in all cases the morally right action is the one which produces the most pleasure.produces the most pleasure.

rule utilitarianism states that the morally right action is the one that is in accordance rule utilitarianism states that the morally right action is the one that is in accordance with a moral rule whose general observance would create the most happiness.with a moral rule whose general observance would create the most happiness.

In terms of two-level utilitarianism, act utilitarianism can be likened to the 'critical' In terms of two-level utilitarianism, act utilitarianism can be likened to the 'critical' level of moral thinking, and rule utilitarianism to the 'intuitive' level.level of moral thinking, and rule utilitarianism to the 'intuitive' level.

Basic Argument:Basic Argument:

1.1. The logic of moral terms like "ought”The logic of moral terms like "ought”

a.a. Moral judgments are by their nature universalizable Moral judgments are by their nature universalizable (they are (they are more than simple imperatives, they commit one more than simple imperatives, they commit one to making the to making the same ought judgment in all circumstances that same ought judgment in all circumstances that share the share the same universal features; moral thinking is a same universal features; moral thinking is a rational pursuit).rational pursuit).

2.2. Facts about human nature and commonly held human Facts about human nature and commonly held human preferences (human condition):preferences (human condition):

a.a. Human basic preferences tend to be uniform Human basic preferences tend to be uniformb.b. Humans vary on their ability to think critically and act on Humans vary on their ability to think critically and act on what what they determine to be moral principles. they determine to be moral principles.

3.3. Warrants a two-level version of utilitarianism.Warrants a two-level version of utilitarianism.

The Intuitive Level is composed of prima facie principles or rules derived from the logical features of moral language (universalizable ought claims) and general facts & commonly held moral preferences. They are also informed by 2nd level principles. Thus, a morally right action is an accordance with a moral rule whose general observance would create the most happiness. Prima facie principles are beneficial when there isn't time for critical thinking, or when one can't trust one's critical thinking.

The Intuitive level also involves

general facts & preferences

commonly held by

humanity.

Regarding the Intuitive Level (Kantian/Rule):

These rules are generated by the logical features of moral language; they are by nature universalizable. This means that moral judgments are more than simple imperatives for they commit one to making the same ought judgment in all circumstances that share the same universal features (e.g., let no one _________ at least, under such and such experience).

The Intuitive level is also informed by

Critical Level when it comes

to unusual cases, etc (rule utilitarianism).

Three Kinds of Intuitive Principles:Three Kinds of Intuitive Principles:

According to Dr. Gary Varner, a proponent According to Dr. Gary Varner, a proponent of this view, notes:of this view, notes:

Common MoralityCommon MoralityProfessional EthicsProfessional EthicsPersonal MoralityPersonal Morality

Three Kinds of Intuitive Level Three Kinds of Intuitive Level Principles:Principles:

Common Morality emerges when members of society face similar problems. This is expected because of the universal features of the human condition as evidenced in the common moralities of various cultures at different times and places.

Professional Ethics emerge because of the similar kinds of situations repeatedly certain roles experience; agreements on basic standards of conduct take place.

Personal Morality. Dr. Varner writes, “And insofar as individuals differ in their abilities to reason critically under various circumstances, critical thinking will lead different individuals to train themselves to adhere to different sets of intuitive level rules, including "metaprinciples" for deciding when to engage in critical thinking and when to stick unquestioningly to one's intuitive level principles.”

When you encounter (1) an unusual situation, (2) determine that two prima facie rules contradict each other, (3) or where the normal rules would specify a course of action that is clearly not the most beneficial, changing one’s mode of moral thinking to the critical act utilitarian level is necessary (utility needs to be maximized).

Act utilitarianism is a necessary compliment to rule utilitarianism because in some cases an individual might pursue a course of action that would obviously

not maximize utility. Conversely, act utilitarianism is criticized for not allowing for a 'human element' in its calculations, i.e. it is sometimes too

difficult (or impossible) for an ordinary person with imperfect knowledge to calculate the action of maximal utility

Regarding the Critical Level (Act Utilitarian):

Description of Model:Description of Model:

Each person shares the traits of the following to limited and varying extents at different times:Each person shares the traits of the following to limited and varying extents at different times: Prole:Prole:

1.1. Human weaknesses to an Human weaknesses to an extreme degree. extreme degree.

2.2. Must rely upon intuitions and Must rely upon intuitions and sound prima facie principles all sound prima facie principles all of the time.of the time.

3.3. Incapable of critical thought. Incapable of critical thought.

4.4. The set of intuitive moral rules The set of intuitive moral rules must be simple, general, easy to must be simple, general, easy to memorize, and use. memorize, and use.

Archangel:

1. Only uses critical moral thinking; no intuitive principles are needed.

2. Superhuman, god-like powers of knowledge, thought, and no human weaknesses.

3. Unbiased, ideal observer who can immediately scan all potential consequences of all possible actions in order to frame a universal principle form which it could decide an appropriate action for the situation.

Objections against 2-Level Objections against 2-Level UtilitarianismUtilitarianism

Apart from the criticisms that are commonly made of utilitarianism:Apart from the criticisms that are commonly made of utilitarianism:

Undermines an agent's commitment to act in accordance with his Undermines an agent's commitment to act in accordance with his moral principles for he knows that his everyday set of moral rules moral principles for he knows that his everyday set of moral rules is merely a guideline (less guilt for breaking an intuitive is merely a guideline (less guilt for breaking an intuitive principles). principles).

It is problematic for one's thinking in the way the two-level It is problematic for one's thinking in the way the two-level account requires — to simultaneously think like a utilitarian and account requires — to simultaneously think like a utilitarian and act in a non-utilitarian way.act in a non-utilitarian way.

Weakness of Will: Problems arise when we try to keep critical Weakness of Will: Problems arise when we try to keep critical thinking separate from intuitive (acting against one’s own thinking separate from intuitive (acting against one’s own judgment).judgment).

How do we know what intuitive principle or How do we know what intuitive principle or prima facie rules to follow?prima facie rules to follow?

According to Dr. Gary Varner:According to Dr. Gary Varner:

1.1. Ideally: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would use Ideally: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would use to choose such principles for people like us.to choose such principles for people like us.

2.2. In practice: Default setting is an acceptance of common morality In practice: Default setting is an acceptance of common morality and professional ethic which we fine-tune in order to arrive at a and professional ethic which we fine-tune in order to arrive at a distinctive personal morality.distinctive personal morality.

How do we decide when to override an intuitive principle:How do we decide when to override an intuitive principle:

1.1. Ideality: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would do.Ideality: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would do.2.2. Practice: Only override when the aggregate harm to be prevented Practice: Only override when the aggregate harm to be prevented

by doing so is both clear and great and the situation is the kind in by doing so is both clear and great and the situation is the kind in which you can really trust your critical thinking.which you can really trust your critical thinking.

Advantages of Two-Level Advantages of Two-Level UtilitarianismUtilitarianism

It is an integrated model which attempts to bypass objections to act It is an integrated model which attempts to bypass objections to act and rule utilitarianism by borrowing the best features of both theories and rule utilitarianism by borrowing the best features of both theories and combining them, and as a way of solving the problem of what to and combining them, and as a way of solving the problem of what to do when moral rules conflict.do when moral rules conflict.

It accounts for "the non-consequentialist (or deontological) feel" of the It accounts for "the non-consequentialist (or deontological) feel" of the principles of common morality. principles of common morality.

It relies on linguistic intuitions (intuitions about the logic of the moral It relies on linguistic intuitions (intuitions about the logic of the moral terms) rather than intuitive moral judgments. Reason is not just terms) rather than intuitive moral judgments. Reason is not just random, subjective, or emotional.random, subjective, or emotional.

It is compatible with consequentialism because it occurs at critical It is compatible with consequentialism because it occurs at critical level and is the source of those “guides” at the lower level.level and is the source of those “guides” at the lower level.

A. Advantages of Utilitarianism: BCPB:A. Advantages of Utilitarianism: BCPB:

1.1. Banishes mystery from moral decision-making; questions become Banishes mystery from moral decision-making; questions become engineering problems.engineering problems.

2.2. Clear practical method of resolving moral conflicts.Clear practical method of resolving moral conflicts.

3.3. Pleasure and pain are in fact considerations even if onePleasure and pain are in fact considerations even if one

can’t capture it.can’t capture it.

4.4. Benefits in view of being incorporated into public policy (inner-city Benefits in view of being incorporated into public policy (inner-city school vs. new turf in football stadium).school vs. new turf in football stadium).

Arguments for Consequentialism:Arguments for Consequentialism:

1.1. Most people begin with the Most people begin with the presumptionpresumption that we morally ought to that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) 1998)

2.2. Even if every possible objection is refuted, we might have no reason Even if every possible objection is refuted, we might have no reason to reject consequentialism (but still no reason to accept it). to reject consequentialism (but still no reason to accept it).

3.3. Attacks opponents. If the only plausible options in moral theory lie Attacks opponents. If the only plausible options in moral theory lie on a certain list (say, Kantianism, contractarianism, virtue theory, on a certain list (say, Kantianism, contractarianism, virtue theory, pluralistic intuitionism, and consequentialism), then pluralistic intuitionism, and consequentialism), then consequentialists can argue for their own theory by criticizing the consequentialists can argue for their own theory by criticizing the others. This others. This disjunctive syllogismdisjunctive syllogism or or process of eliminationprocess of elimination will be will be only as strong as the objections to the alternatives, and the only as strong as the objections to the alternatives, and the argument fails if even one competitor survives. Moreover, the argument fails if even one competitor survives. Moreover, the argument assumes that the original list is complete. It is hard to see argument assumes that the original list is complete. It is hard to see how that assumption could be justified.how that assumption could be justified.


4.4. Consequentialism also might be supported by an Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the inference to the best explanationbest explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might of our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intutions that in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intutions that trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh the costs (including any bad side effects). If consequentialists can the costs (including any bad side effects). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap. III.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this Chap. III.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).2000).


5.5. Consequentialists also might be supported by Consequentialists also might be supported by deductivedeductive arguments from arguments from abstract moral intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to abstract moral intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to think that the principle of utility follows from very general principles of think that the principle of utility follows from very general principles of rationality and universalizability.rationality and universalizability.

6.6. Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they seek foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-seek foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-moral norms. Mill (1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility moral norms. Mill (1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility from empirical observations about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001). from empirical observations about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001). In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to derive his version of utilitarianism In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to derive his version of utilitarianism from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of moral language, and of from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of moral language, and of rationality.rationality.

7.7. Yet another argument for a kind of consequentialism is Yet another argument for a kind of consequentialism is contractariancontractarian. . Harsanyi (1977, 1978) argues that all informed, rational people whose Harsanyi (1977, 1978) argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and extends Harsanyi's argument.extends Harsanyi's argument.

8.8. Even if none of these arguments proves consequentialism, there still might Even if none of these arguments proves consequentialism, there still might be no adequate reason to deny consequentialism. We might have no be no adequate reason to deny consequentialism. We might have no reason either to deny consequentialism or to assert it. Consequentialism reason either to deny consequentialism or to assert it. Consequentialism could then remain a live option even if it is not proven.could then remain a live option even if it is not proven.

B. Objections to Utilitarianism: B. Objections to Utilitarianism:

1.1. Moral ProblemMoral Problem: Utilitarianism lacks any moral component since it is an : Utilitarianism lacks any moral component since it is an engineering problem of calculations (e.g., Anscombe).engineering problem of calculations (e.g., Anscombe).

2.2. Consequential ProblemConsequential Problem: Utilitarianism can’t determine the full range of : Utilitarianism can’t determine the full range of consequences.consequences.

3.3. Quantification ProblemQuantification Problem: Just how much “good” outweighs” evil?: Just how much “good” outweighs” evil?

4.4. Justification of evil ProblemJustification of evil Problem. Outrageous and horrific acts can be justified . Outrageous and horrific acts can be justified (Dostoevsky’s argument in (Dostoevsky’s argument in KaramazovKaramazov BrothersBrothers (1879-1880). (1879-1880).

5.5. Moore’s Naturalistic FallacyMoore’s Naturalistic Fallacy: Moral goodness cannot be adequately defined by : Moral goodness cannot be adequately defined by some natural property (G.E. Moore’s some natural property (G.E. Moore’s Principia EthicaPrincipia Ethica). He argues we must have ). He argues we must have a tacit understanding of moral goodness (though he is consequential). Ross a tacit understanding of moral goodness (though he is consequential). Ross (1877-1971) argues the same.(1877-1971) argues the same.


6.6. Explanation ProblemExplanation Problem: Unable to explain what is wrong with a : Unable to explain what is wrong with a wrong action (obliging stranger who cooks himself in an oven).wrong action (obliging stranger who cooks himself in an oven).

7.7. Kantian-Inclination ProblemKantian-Inclination Problem: People naturally choose a Kantian-: People naturally choose a Kantian-type principle or consequentialism.type principle or consequentialism.

8.8. Psychologically FalsePsychologically False: (e.g., Pleasure Machine).: (e.g., Pleasure Machine).

9.9. Individual Rights ProblemIndividual Rights Problem. Fails to acknowledge intrinsic value of . Fails to acknowledge intrinsic value of individual rights.individual rights.

10.10. Too demanding ProblemToo demanding Problem: Utilitarians demand too much in every : Utilitarians demand too much in every action having the best consequences (e.g., going to the movies).action having the best consequences (e.g., going to the movies).


11.11. Utilitarians are divided on what should be calculated:Utilitarians are divided on what should be calculated:

a.a. Jeremy Bentham’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism: pleasure vs. pain from Jeremy Bentham’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism: pleasure vs. pain from Bentham as the only 2 intrinsic values: “good is whatever brings the greatest Bentham as the only 2 intrinsic values: “good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the great number.”happiness to the great number.”

Ross states: Pleasure is not the only thing we recognize as being intrinsically Ross states: Pleasure is not the only thing we recognize as being intrinsically good; we recognize other things such as a good character & an intelligent good; we recognize other things such as a good character & an intelligent understanding of the world as having intrinsic value.understanding of the world as having intrinsic value.

b. Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism: Cultural, intellectual & spiritual pleasures b. Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism: Cultural, intellectual & spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure.are of greater value than mere physical pleasure.

c.c. JJ.C. Smart: Maximize the achievements of people’s priorities; it is for each JJ.C. Smart: Maximize the achievements of people’s priorities; it is for each person to decide what counts as being happy.person to decide what counts as being happy.

d. d. Karl Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism: We are to promote the least amount Karl Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism: We are to promote the least amount of evil or harm, or try to prevent the greatest amount of harm for the greatest of evil or harm, or try to prevent the greatest amount of harm for the greatest number (1945 The Open Society & Its Enemies).number (1945 The Open Society & Its Enemies).

f.f. Act Utilitarianism: Consider each act separately. Act Utilitarianism: Consider each act separately.

g.g. Rule Utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of acts performed as a Rule Utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of acts performed as a general practice.general practice.

h.h. Motive Utilitarianism by Robert Adams who advocates that we inculcate Motive Utilitarianism by Robert Adams who advocates that we inculcate motives within ourselves that will be generally useful across the spectrum of motives within ourselves that will be generally useful across the spectrum of the situations we are likely to encounter.the situations we are likely to encounter.

i.i. R.M. Hare’s 2 Level Utilitarianism whereby he bridges both act and rule R.M. Hare’s 2 Level Utilitarianism whereby he bridges both act and rule utilitarianism.utilitarianism.

j.j. Preference Utilitarianism: defines the good to be maximized as the Preference Utilitarianism: defines the good to be maximized as the fulfillment of person’s preferences.fulfillment of person’s preferences.

k.k. Ideal Utilitarianism: Good is not identified with pleasure. Rather, goodness Ideal Utilitarianism: Good is not identified with pleasure. Rather, goodness is discovered by intuitionism; the rightness or wrongness of acts is is discovered by intuitionism; the rightness or wrongness of acts is determined by their actual consequences; our duty is to produce the best determined by their actual consequences; our duty is to produce the best possible consequences even though we cannot always predict what the possible consequences even though we cannot always predict what the consequences of our acts will be.consequences of our acts will be.

Ross states: Productivity of maximum good is not what makes all actions Ross states: Productivity of maximum good is not what makes all actions right.right.

Counter-Intuitive Objection by Bernard Counter-Intuitive Objection by Bernard WilliamsWilliams

Bernard Williams argues that all versions of Utilitarianism Bernard Williams argues that all versions of Utilitarianism involve a counter-intuitive view of (a) responsibility for involve a counter-intuitive view of (a) responsibility for acts (b) the virtue of integrity. acts (b) the virtue of integrity.

Suppose Pedro will shoot 20 innocent people unless Jim agrees Suppose Pedro will shoot 20 innocent people unless Jim agrees to shoot 1. Utilitarianism says that Jim should shoot 1. If he to shoot 1. Utilitarianism says that Jim should shoot 1. If he does not, then he is responsible for the deaths of 19 people he does not, then he is responsible for the deaths of 19 people he could have saved. But Williams says that (a) if Jim declines to could have saved. But Williams says that (a) if Jim declines to shoot, then it is obviously Pedro rather than Jim who is shoot, then it is obviously Pedro rather than Jim who is responsible for the 20 deaths. Moreover, b) if Jim is the sort of responsible for the 20 deaths. Moreover, b) if Jim is the sort of person for whom shooting would be absolutely abhorrent, person for whom shooting would be absolutely abhorrent, incompatible with his deepest commitments, then a moral theory incompatible with his deepest commitments, then a moral theory requires him to shoot must be wrong.requires him to shoot must be wrong.

Reply to Utilitarian Objection:Reply to Utilitarian Objection:

A Utilitarian might reply to Williams as follows: (a) if Jim A Utilitarian might reply to Williams as follows: (a) if Jim does not shoot, then both he and Pedro are fully does not shoot, then both he and Pedro are fully responsible for the 20 deaths. There is no “Law of responsible for the 20 deaths. There is no “Law of Conservation of Responsibility.” (Pedro is also Conservation of Responsibility.” (Pedro is also responsible for setting up the situation, of course.). responsible for setting up the situation, of course.). Moreover, (b) there is nothing sacred about integrity. It Moreover, (b) there is nothing sacred about integrity. It is perfectly possible for a person to build a life around is perfectly possible for a person to build a life around morally flawed ideals that should be violated in certain morally flawed ideals that should be violated in certain situations. Huck Fin was committed to the institution of situations. Huck Fin was committed to the institution of slavery, for example. Nevertheless, he had a moral duty slavery, for example. Nevertheless, he had a moral duty to help his enslaved friend escape. Jim may be to help his enslaved friend escape. Jim may be committed to the ideal of never taking human life, but committed to the ideal of never taking human life, but that commitment does not absolve him from killing, when that commitment does not absolve him from killing, when killing is morally required. His ideal, though hardly as killing is morally required. His ideal, though hardly as bad as slavery, is morally flawed. Jim is too squeamish.bad as slavery, is morally flawed. Jim is too squeamish.

Overview of Ethical Systems: W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism (1877-1971):Overview of Ethical Systems: W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism (1877-1971):

We directly, intuitively, immediately, objectively, & undeniably moral truths. 7 Prima facie duties are in fact duties which include fidelity, gratitude, reparations,

non-injury, beneficence (generosity), self-improvement, & justice.

Prima facie duties are moral, conditional

guidelines which can be overridden,

trumped by other duties; they are not

rules without exceptions.

We apprehend P.F. duties the same way

we apprehend mathematics.

There is no ranking of priority with P.F.

duties but some are more incumbent than

others.

They are different from feelings when

you experience them; the truths of

intuitions is self-evident.

They are objective facts

which are applicability dependent.

4 Central Views at the center of Ross’s Intuitionism:

1. Moral Realism (metaphysics): it is built into our everyday ethical discourse & thought.

2. Non-Natural Properties (metaphysics): Transparency argument (we use term “good” without defining it) & open argument (infinite regress on def. of good); it is this worldly (non-natural moral).

3. Irreducible pluralism about the right and good (normative theory).

4. Moral propositions are self evident (epistemological); we have a priori knowledge (no special faculty).

What do you do when these moral

principles or truths come into conflict? It is often difficult to

be sure what the stronger duty is. Nevertheless that

uncertainty doesn’t infect the general

principles. Therefore, I carefully consider which duty is more “weighty”; it

will then become obvious.

Prima facie duties are different than Proper Duties.Proper duties are duties we should perform in the particular situation or choice. You are obligated to do it;

you are bound to it. Rightness is not derived from the value of motive form which it is done. Rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one’s action. Rightness is determined by a plurality of

self-evident prima facie duties. In fact, rightness & goodness are simple non-natural properties.

W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism:W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism:

1.1. Ross, who combines aspects of Aristotle and Kant against utilitarianism, contends for the following:

A. We have an intuitive knowledge of the rightness and wrongness of acts.

B. Unlike Kantianism, Ross contends that this intuitive knowledge doesn't consist of a set of moral absolutes that can not be overridden.

C. Rather, our moral principles present us with prima facie duties (conditional duties). While these duties' value is not upon

circumstances, their applicability is so dependent.

D. There is no special intuitive faculty. Our sense is highly fallible but it is the only guide we have to duty.

E. His moral theory is pluralistic (several duties may make it right; there is no master-value).

F. We have at least seven prima facie duties: fidelity, gratitude, reparations, non-injury, generosity, justice, and self-improvement.

W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism

Objections:Objections:

The The prima facieprima facie list is unsystematic & follows no logical principle. list is unsystematic & follows no logical principle.

Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations are in a Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations are in a particular situation in contrast to both Kant and Mills who do.particular situation in contrast to both Kant and Mills who do.

List of prima facie duties is without justification: how can we be sure it is List of prima facie duties is without justification: how can we be sure it is accurate?accurate?

Clearly people have different intuitions about moral issues.Clearly people have different intuitions about moral issues.

How can we decide which intuitions to trust? How can we decide which intuitions to trust?

Ross says in our immediate experience we don’t think about consequences, we Ross says in our immediate experience we don’t think about consequences, we think about our binding duty (e.g., love for a friend). Hare says that is good think about our binding duty (e.g., love for a friend). Hare says that is good thing that you don’t think about this.thing that you don’t think about this.

Overview of Ethical Systems: Ethical Relativism:Overview of Ethical Systems: Ethical Relativism:

Ethical values and beliefs are relative to the various individuals or societies that hold them; there is no objective right and wrong. Thus, morality is

simply a matter of subjective opinion.

CULTURALRELATIVISM:

Ethical values vary from society to

society; the basis for moral

judgments lies in these social or

cultural values; there are no

trans-cultural values.

There is no general

agreement about what is right and

wrong; there can be no agreement regarding morality.

3 Reasons used to support ethical relativism:

1. Diversity of Moral Views: The existence of moral

diversity among people & cultures;

2. Moral Uncertainty: the great difficult we in knowing what is

morally right or wrong.

3. Situational Differences: The situations and life world of

different people vary so much it is difficult to believe that the same things that would be right

for one would be right for another. Thus, it seems

unlikely that any moral theory can apply in a universal

manner.

INDIVIDUAL OR PERSONAL

RELATIVISM:Ethical judgments

& beliefs are simply the

expressions of the moral outlook &

attitudes of individual

believers. In essence, I have my ethical views & you have yours; neither are right or wrong.

1. Reject moral relativism because we don’t have basis moral disagreements (lying) (but disagreements about facts; did he lie?).

2. People can disagree about what is the right thing to do & yet believe that there is a right thing to do (e.g., be a good steward of environment; Co2 emissions harm or don’t harm? We have different conclusions).

3. Because we are uncertain about answer does not prove that it lacks an answer.

Overview of Ethical Systems: Moral Realism:Overview of Ethical Systems: Moral Realism:Moral Realism is the view that there are real objective moral facts/truths: Reason (Plato;

Kant) that can be known special intuitive powers (Moore), by revelation from God (Aquinas), or by careful scientific investigation of moral lives and beliefs of variety of people and culture.

Dispositional Ethical Realism:

Morality is evident in a relational matter:

A certain fit between actions and situations or actions and our

innate sensibilities.

G.E. Moore claims that we

can intuit moral

qualities such as goodness in people or acts

though we can’t observe it through the senses (e.g., taste, touch

taste, or sight)

Cont. philosophical realism insist that objective moral facts are possible, & it may be possible to discover them; it is a complicated study. Rather than looking

through intuition, pure reflective reasoning, finding real moral facts will

require diligent research, including careful inquiry into the moral lives & beliefs of variety of people & cultures.

Research will yield evidence of real moral facts (maybe not). But in order

to decide we must do the empirical research & investigate in order to see how moral facts are to be established To be sure, It is less certain of itself.

While they are not sure that there are objective moral facts, the insist that

moral truths have not yet been disproved; Following Kuhn, it can legitimately be one of competing

theories; let the facts determine the answer. We may eventually develop consensus. Advocate: Michael Smith.

4 Types of Moral Realism:

1. Natural/Special revelationfrom God;

2. Pure reflective reason;

3. Intuitionism

4. ContemporaryMoral philosophy.

Two reasons offered by B. Waller why contemporary moral realism may fail: (1) A better theory comes along; (2) Lack of moral

consensus.

Friedrich NietzscheFriedrich Nietzsche ““Nietzche’s interprets his thoughts on morality as Nietzche’s interprets his thoughts on morality as

what he calls “a morality for moralists” (KSA 11, what he calls “a morality for moralists” (KSA 11, 34 [194]).34 [194]).

“…“…the power of Nietzsche’s position depends upon the power of Nietzsche’s position depends upon the truth of one central thesis: that all rational the truth of one central thesis: that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail and that vindications of morality manifestly fail and that therefore belief in the tenets of morality need to therefore belief in the tenets of morality need to be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations which conceal the fundamentally non-rational which conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will.” ~ Alasdair MacIntyre, phenomena of the will.” ~ Alasdair MacIntyre, After VirtueAfter Virtue, 117., 117.

F. Nietzsche (1844-1900): Life simply is the will to power:F. Nietzsche (1844-1900): Life simply is the will to power:

Campaign against morality. Greatly troubled by the decline of individuality, the hypocrisy of traditional European morality that has oppressed the unfettered spirit of humanity, proclaims that true morality is that which conforms to

nature and condemns as bad whatever is contrary to it. Nature is essentially the will to power; it is brutal, cruel, frightful, tragic, and beautiful. We must say yes to life as it actually is. The moral person lives “lives dangerously” by

increasing its mastery. Morality is located in nature-process; it is empirical, what we will, not metaphysical.

Genealogy of Morals questions the value of

morality.

Self-deception is a particularly destructive

characteristic of Western culture.

Moral phenomena does not exist; there is only a moral interpretation of phenomena. But once

freed, realize independence is only for

the strong.

The greatest power is found in those who can control their passions &

use them creatively.

Our natural desire is to dominate and reshape the world

to fit our own preferences & to

asset our personal strength to the fullest degree

possible. Struggle, through which

individuals achieve a degree of power commensurate w/

their abilities is the basic fact of human

existence.

The essence of the individual is the will-the will to

power (Dionysus represents frenzied

& passionate); reason (Apollo

represents order & reason) is to facilitate by organizing

efficiently the conditions of

action. The height of Greek civ.

blending of both. We are under

Apollo & are in need of Dionysus.

Morality is not “located” in forms; it does not have a starting point (no origins) but is a nature- process; it is earthly as

opposed to spiritual; it is empirical, not metaphysical. Moral terms become vacuous. In his typology of morals there are 2 types: master morality & slave morality: Moral codes have

originated “either among a ruling group whose consciousness of their difference from the ruled group was accomp. by

delight or among the ruled, the slaves. Noble proclaimed good out of self-affirmation; evil is the slave’s primary

concept. Both types “can have each other.” Every morality is against nature & reason (but not an object.)

There are only verbs; The bird is the will; “their knowing is creating”; "There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ’knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can

use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ’concept’ of this thing, our ’objectivity,’ be.“ Absolute truth means that a certain interpretation has become suspiciously compelling (Third Essay of Genealogy of Morals)..

Regarding asceticism: We could go so far as to say that we are the "inward-looking animal," and that this inward looking has only been generated by a constant struggle

against ourselves and our own nature. The greatest triumph is to delight in and affirm this self-torture and

struggle, to see it as a willful act of creation, whereby we free ourselves of our instincts and our evolutionary past, and fully create ourselves. The will is the will to truth.

Summary from Stanford Encyclopedia:Summary from Stanford Encyclopedia:

Nietzsche's Nietzsche's moral philosophymoral philosophy is primarily critical in orientation: he attacks is primarily critical in orientation: he attacks morality both for its commitment to untenable descriptive (metaphysical and morality both for its commitment to untenable descriptive (metaphysical and empirical) claims about human agency, as well as for the deleterious impact empirical) claims about human agency, as well as for the deleterious impact of its distinctive norms and values on the flourishing of the highest types of of its distinctive norms and values on the flourishing of the highest types of human beings (Nietzsche's “higher men”). His positive ethical views are best human beings (Nietzsche's “higher men”). His positive ethical views are best understood as combining (i) a kind of consequentialist perfectionism as understood as combining (i) a kind of consequentialist perfectionism as Nietzsche's implicit theory of the good, with (ii) a conception of human Nietzsche's implicit theory of the good, with (ii) a conception of human perfection involving both formal and substantive elements. Because perfection involving both formal and substantive elements. Because Nietzsche, however, is an Nietzsche, however, is an anti-realistanti-realist about morality, he takes neither his about morality, he takes neither his positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have any special epistemic status, a fact which helps explain his rhetoric and the any special epistemic status, a fact which helps explain his rhetoric and the circumspect character of his “esoteric” moralizing. Although Nietzsche's circumspect character of his “esoteric” moralizing. Although Nietzsche's illiberalilliberal attitudes (for example, about human equality) are apparent, there attitudes (for example, about human equality) are apparent, there are no grounds for ascribing to him a political philosophy, since he has no are no grounds for ascribing to him a political philosophy, since he has no systematic (or even partly systematic) views about the nature of state and systematic (or even partly systematic) views about the nature of state and society. As an esoteric moralist, Nietzsche aims at freeing higher human society. As an esoteric moralist, Nietzsche aims at freeing higher human beings from their false consciousness about morality (their false belief that beings from their false consciousness about morality (their false belief that this morality is this morality is good for themgood for them), not at a transformation of society at large. ), not at a transformation of society at large.

Nietzsche’s Starting Point:Nietzsche’s Starting Point: In his preface to his Genealogy of Morals, his “a In his preface to his Genealogy of Morals, his “a

priori” starting point is to have a priori” starting point is to have a “suspicious interest “suspicious interest in moralityin morality.” He is interested in the following .” He is interested in the following questions:questions:

““Under what conditions did man devise these value Under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? judgments good and evil? And what value do they And what value do they themselves possess?themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future? (Genealogy of Morals, preface, 3).”future? (Genealogy of Morals, preface, 3).”

What does he mean by What does he mean by “Genealogy?”“Genealogy?”

On one hand, it points to the investigation and On one hand, it points to the investigation and the evolution of a phenomenon: it describes the the evolution of a phenomenon: it describes the successive forms the phenomenon adopts, and successive forms the phenomenon adopts, and it is especially interested in the most significant it is especially interested in the most significant changes or displacements in such an evolution.changes or displacements in such an evolution.

On the other hand, Genealogy points to the On the other hand, Genealogy points to the investigation of the psychological, sociological, investigation of the psychological, sociological, and physiological conditions, functions, and and physiological conditions, functions, and effects of such an evolution.effects of such an evolution.

Outline of Genealogy: Using the genealogical method he examines the Outline of Genealogy: Using the genealogical method he examines the constitutive understanding of the two foundations of morality:constitutive understanding of the two foundations of morality:

1.1. good/evil and good/bad in GM 1.good/evil and good/bad in GM 1.

2.2. Guilt/bad conscience in GM 2.Guilt/bad conscience in GM 2.

3.3. The Ascetic ideal in GM 3.The Ascetic ideal in GM 3.

““The genealogist knows that life is will to power; this The genealogist knows that life is will to power; this enables him to acknowledge the plurality while at the enables him to acknowledge the plurality while at the same time “collecting” it in terms of universal structures” same time “collecting” it in terms of universal structures” (e.g., “the ascetic ideal” in GM III), and it provides him (e.g., “the ascetic ideal” in GM III), and it provides him with a criterion by which he can evaluate what he finds; with a criterion by which he can evaluate what he finds; with this criterion he can evlauate the traditional (moral) with this criterion he can evlauate the traditional (moral) criterion” (pg. 391 of “Nietzsche and Ethics”).criterion” (pg. 391 of “Nietzsche and Ethics”).

Central Points:Central Points:

1.1. His call for a radical reconsideration of His call for a radical reconsideration of everything from life and the world and human everything from life and the world and human existence and knowledge to value and existence and knowledge to value and morality:morality:

a.a. The “de-deification of nature;” The “de-deification of nature;” b.b. The “translation of values,” The “translation of values,” c.c. The tracing of the “genealogy of The tracing of the “genealogy of moral” moral” and their critique;and their critique;d.d. The elaboration of “naturalistic” The elaboration of “naturalistic”

accounts of knowledge, value, accounts of knowledge, value, morality, morality, and our entire “spiritual and our entire “spiritual nature.”nature.”


2.2. He insisted upon the interpretive character of He insisted upon the interpretive character of all human thought; he insisted on the need for all human thought; he insisted on the need for a revaluation of all received values, and for a revaluation of all received values, and for attention to the problems of nature, status, and attention to the problems of nature, status, and standards of value and evaluation.standards of value and evaluation.

3.3. One form of the inquiry he took to be of great One form of the inquiry he took to be of great utility in connection with both of these tasks is utility in connection with both of these tasks is genealogical inquiry into conditions under genealogical inquiry into conditions under which various modes of interpretation and which various modes of interpretation and evaluation have arisen.evaluation have arisen.


4.4. He emphasizes the perspectival character of all thinking and the He emphasizes the perspectival character of all thinking and the merely provisional character of all knowing, rejecting the idea of merely provisional character of all knowing, rejecting the idea of the very possibility of absolute knowledge transcending all the very possibility of absolute knowledge transcending all perspectives. However, because he also rejected the idea that perspectives. However, because he also rejected the idea that things (and values) have absolute existence “in themselves” apart things (and values) have absolute existence “in themselves” apart from the relations which he supposes their reality to consist, he from the relations which he supposes their reality to consist, he held that, if viewed in the multiplicity of perspectives from which held that, if viewed in the multiplicity of perspectives from which various of these relations come to light, they admit of a significant various of these relations come to light, they admit of a significant measure of comprehension. This perspectivism thus does not measure of comprehension. This perspectivism thus does not exclude the possibility of any sort of knowledge deserving of the exclude the possibility of any sort of knowledge deserving of the name, but rather indicates how it is to be conceived and name, but rather indicates how it is to be conceived and achieved. His kind of philosophy, which he characterizes as achieved. His kind of philosophy, which he characterizes as “cheerful science” proceeds by way of a variety of such “cheerful science” proceeds by way of a variety of such “perspectival” approaches to the various matters with which he “perspectival” approaches to the various matters with which he deals.deals.


55 Thus for Nietzsche there is no truth in the sense of Thus for Nietzsche there is no truth in the sense of correspondence of anything we might think or say to correspondence of anything we might think or say to “being,” and indeed no “true world of being” to which it “being,” and indeed no “true world of being” to which it may even be imagined to fail to correspond; no may even be imagined to fail to correspond; no “knowledge” conceived in terms of any such truth and “knowledge” conceived in terms of any such truth and reality; and, no further, no knowledge at all-even of our reality; and, no further, no knowledge at all-even of our selves and the world of which we are a part-that is selves and the world of which we are a part-that is absolute, non-perspectival, and certain. But that is not absolute, non-perspectival, and certain. But that is not the end of the matter. There are, e.g., ways of thinking the end of the matter. There are, e.g., ways of thinking that may be more or less well warranted in relation to that may be more or less well warranted in relation to differing sorts of interest and practice, not only within differing sorts of interest and practice, not only within the context of social life but also in our dealing with our the context of social life but also in our dealing with our envisioning world.envisioning world.

Key Elements to Know:Key Elements to Know:

1. The essence of the individual is the will-the will to power.

2. Transvaluation of values: Reverse the self-deception of Judeo-Christian religion & Greek Rationalism by implementing a moral revolution that presents a corrected table of virtues for the free spirits, the aristocracy of free spirits (not the common herd who are too weak):

a. Humility is replaced with pride;

b. Sympathy is replaced with contempt;

c. Love your neighbor is replaced with no more than tolerance.


3.3. He exhorts the aristocracy of free spirits to prepare for the He exhorts the aristocracy of free spirits to prepare for the highest stage in human development: the Superman.highest stage in human development: the Superman.

Superman symbolizes the unfettered spirit, reveling in his Superman symbolizes the unfettered spirit, reveling in his magnificent strength and his own worth. Although human magnificent strength and his own worth. Although human nature in its present condition may be regarded as the highest nature in its present condition may be regarded as the highest form of existence, our dominance over nature is still precarious: form of existence, our dominance over nature is still precarious:

““Man is something to be surpassed.”Man is something to be surpassed.”


4.4. The conception of evolution is fundamental aspect of his system. However, The conception of evolution is fundamental aspect of his system. However, his interpretation of it departs from the Darwinian hypothesis.his interpretation of it departs from the Darwinian hypothesis.

Darwin’s evolution is conceived as passive and mechanical adaptation to the Darwin’s evolution is conceived as passive and mechanical adaptation to the environment, but Nietzsche finds the true meaning of evolution in an environment, but Nietzsche finds the true meaning of evolution in an aggressive will to power to dominate the environment: aggressive will to power to dominate the environment:

““The strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expression in a The strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expression in a miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War, a Will to miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War, a Will to

Power, a Power, a Will to Overpower.”Will to Overpower.”

There is in evolution no progress toward a goal: each thing in the universe There is in evolution no progress toward a goal: each thing in the universe manifests a ceaseless, blind striving for power, shifting back and forth manifests a ceaseless, blind striving for power, shifting back and forth between success and failure in the competition for master. between success and failure in the competition for master.


5.5. Good is whatever conforms to nature and he condemns as bad Good is whatever conforms to nature and he condemns as bad whatever is contrary to it.whatever is contrary to it.

Affirming the values which enhance the will to power: Saying Affirming the values which enhance the will to power: Saying yes to life as it actually is, constitutes true morality.yes to life as it actually is, constitutes true morality.

6.6. All ethical theories which conceal the hard facts of existence and All ethical theories which conceal the hard facts of existence and teach the repression of the will to power are insidious. Thus, he teach the repression of the will to power are insidious. Thus, he believes that Judeo-Christian thought and rationalism of believes that Judeo-Christian thought and rationalism of traditional philosophy have had a debilitating influence of traditional philosophy have had a debilitating influence of Christianity by holding up the ideal of a human being as a Christianity by holding up the ideal of a human being as a rational animal and suppression of our desires.rational animal and suppression of our desires.


7.7. Nietzsche uses the Greek gods, Dionysus and Apollo to Nietzsche uses the Greek gods, Dionysus and Apollo to dramatize the relationship between the will and reason. dramatize the relationship between the will and reason. Dionysus, the frenzied and passionate, is revered as the symbol Dionysus, the frenzied and passionate, is revered as the symbol of the undisciplined will to power. Apollo, representing of the undisciplined will to power. Apollo, representing rationality and order, must be the instrument by which the will to rationality and order, must be the instrument by which the will to power can increase its mastery.power can increase its mastery.

With the Apollonian element supporting rather than suppressing With the Apollonian element supporting rather than suppressing the Dionysian, humans can defy God and dominate the universe: the Dionysian, humans can defy God and dominate the universe: The moral person “lives dangerously.” The moral person “lives dangerously.”


8.8. The distinction of moral values have either originated in a ruling The distinction of moral values have either originated in a ruling case, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled-or case, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled-or among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts.among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts.

a.a. Master-morality creates the values than honor himself. Master-morality creates the values than honor himself. Therefore, when he helps the unfortunate, but not out of Therefore, when he helps the unfortunate, but not out of

pity, pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance superabundance of power.of power.

b. Slave-morality: Te slave has an unfavorable eye for the b. Slave-morality: Te slave has an unfavorable eye for the virtue of the power, suspicious, and skeptical. Thus, those virtue of the power, suspicious, and skeptical. Thus, those qualities which they generate (helping hand, warm heart, qualities which they generate (helping hand, warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, friendliness, etc) are the most patience, diligence, humility, friendliness, etc) are the most

useful qualities: it is a morality of utility.useful qualities: it is a morality of utility.


9.9. There will always be “weak” types.There will always be “weak” types.

10.10. The worry is that nihilism or “pity” will prevent those who are The worry is that nihilism or “pity” will prevent those who are strong from keeping their strength; that the weak are infecting strong from keeping their strength; that the weak are infecting the strong (e.g., democracy levels precludes the possibility of an the strong (e.g., democracy levels precludes the possibility of an over-rising man from rising).over-rising man from rising).

11.11. Man is a kind of type; the over-man is a type; man is a bridge to Man is a kind of type; the over-man is a type; man is a bridge to the overman. The type we are. But I don’t know if I would read the overman. The type we are. But I don’t know if I would read it as personified.it as personified.

12.12. The weak can triumph but that doesn’t make them strong (e.g., The weak can triumph but that doesn’t make them strong (e.g., his view of Christians).his view of Christians).

Key Elements to Know:Key Elements to Know:13.13. Two stories of conscience: The relationship between the creditor and the debtor. If Two stories of conscience: The relationship between the creditor and the debtor. If

the debtor doesn’t pay back the debts, the creditor will punish him. But on the other the debtor doesn’t pay back the debts, the creditor will punish him. But on the other hand, there is this attachment to “norms” which is through “cruelty” which we are hand, there is this attachment to “norms” which is through “cruelty” which we are made to remember how we ought to behave;made to remember how we ought to behave;

14.14. Being in debt is being guilty and you should be made to suffer and so the origin of Being in debt is being guilty and you should be made to suffer and so the origin of cruelty there is an element of pleasure the debtor takes; there is pleasure in being cruelty there is an element of pleasure the debtor takes; there is pleasure in being cruel.cruel.

15.15. Pleasure is involved in receiving the cruelty.Pleasure is involved in receiving the cruelty.

16.16. Bad conscience emerges as a result of urbanization; the hostility and joy in attacking.Bad conscience emerges as a result of urbanization; the hostility and joy in attacking.

17.17. In this moment that our instincts turn upon ourselves we are at war; we level In this moment that our instincts turn upon ourselves we are at war; we level ourselves.ourselves.

18.18. The weak cannot actualize them.The weak cannot actualize them.

20.20. We can overcome our nature which gives us the capacity that we can become strong We can overcome our nature which gives us the capacity that we can become strong or we can become inward, and thus, weak.or we can become inward, and thus, weak.


21.21. The aesthetic ideals: poverty, chastity, and humility;The aesthetic ideals: poverty, chastity, and humility;

22.22. The aesthetic ideals give an explanation for our suffering. This is where our The aesthetic ideals give an explanation for our suffering. This is where our sin comes in. We can be used in great service but he is concerned with the sin comes in. We can be used in great service but he is concerned with the aesthetic ideals for Christians; for them they are ends in themselves. For aesthetic ideals for Christians; for them they are ends in themselves. For Christians Aesthetic ideals have come to absolute. First claim he makes is Christians Aesthetic ideals have come to absolute. First claim he makes is that the aesthetic ideals show us something of the human will. We need that the aesthetic ideals show us something of the human will. We need meaning ultimately and aesthetic ideals and the needs that give rise to them, meaning ultimately and aesthetic ideals and the needs that give rise to them, show us that we need meaning (this is in the last section of the genealogy; the show us that we need meaning (this is in the last section of the genealogy; the aesthetic ideals that we need a human goal; he turns to the aesthetic priest, aesthetic ideals that we need a human goal; he turns to the aesthetic priest, who re-directs the blame (what is the cause of your suffering? It is your own who re-directs the blame (what is the cause of your suffering? It is your own fault for being bad says the priest). So, the story he tells of the aesthetic fault for being bad says the priest). So, the story he tells of the aesthetic ideals is fascinating. The aesthetic ideals de-value life: this life is worth ideals is fascinating. The aesthetic ideals de-value life: this life is worth doesn’t matter; only this life does. But how did this come to be? How has doesn’t matter; only this life does. But how did this come to be? How has this view of sin become widespread? Well, the aesthetic ideals grew out of a this view of sin become widespread? Well, the aesthetic ideals grew out of a need to preserve life.need to preserve life.

Key Elements to Know:Key Elements to Know:23.23. The aesthetic ideals in the end de-value life…they help us overcome and give The aesthetic ideals in the end de-value life…they help us overcome and give

meaning.meaning.

24.24. In the twilight of the idols, it is a profound moment in the decadence of In the twilight of the idols, it is a profound moment in the decadence of Greece whereby Socrates to comes to the scene. These ideals, Christians, Greece whereby Socrates to comes to the scene. These ideals, Christians, who de-value life gives us a reason (you are sinful). He is both appalled and who de-value life gives us a reason (you are sinful). He is both appalled and marveled by it. marveled by it.

25.25. Sin is not falsifiable; it has tremendous explanatory power.Sin is not falsifiable; it has tremendous explanatory power.

26.26. Who can I blame, though a weak disposition itself, says it is your fault-says Who can I blame, though a weak disposition itself, says it is your fault-says the aesthetic priest. the aesthetic priest.

27.27. Suffering makes you stronger (for Anselm you are paying off that debt).Suffering makes you stronger (for Anselm you are paying off that debt).

28.28. BOTTOM LINE: WE CREATE MEANING FOR OURSELVES!BOTTOM LINE: WE CREATE MEANING FOR OURSELVES!

29.29. The strong person doesn’t resent, so there is no forgiveness.The strong person doesn’t resent, so there is no forgiveness.

30.30. The strong says yes (the eternal return); When Zurathrusta; Absolute The strong says yes (the eternal return); When Zurathrusta; Absolute affirmation of the will; it is an existential compartment; the aesthetic priest affirmation of the will; it is an existential compartment; the aesthetic priest wishes to be elsewhere and Nietzsche affirms life as it is.wishes to be elsewhere and Nietzsche affirms life as it is.

Significant Points by Paul J.M. Van Tongeren on Significant Points by Paul J.M. Van Tongeren on Nietzsche & EthicsNietzsche & Ethics

1.1. One of the most radical critics of morality & One of the most radical critics of morality & ethics in history of philosophy.ethics in history of philosophy.

2.2. There is an unmistakable moral pathos in his There is an unmistakable moral pathos in his philosophy, criticism of morality, & ethics: philosophy, criticism of morality, & ethics: Nietzsche himself interprets his thoughts on Nietzsche himself interprets his thoughts on morality as what he calls “a morality for morality as what he calls “a morality for moralists.” Thus, the critique of morality as moralists.” Thus, the critique of morality as well as the morality of his critique are of utmost well as the morality of his critique are of utmost importance for a correct understanding of his importance for a correct understanding of his whole philosophy.whole philosophy.


3.3. The moral distinctions of “good” and “evil” also lie, according to The moral distinctions of “good” and “evil” also lie, according to Nietzsche, at the heart of religious principles, metaphysical categories, Nietzsche, at the heart of religious principles, metaphysical categories, and aesthetic appreciation. and aesthetic appreciation.

4.4. But, in Nietzsche’s critique of those cultural domains morality has an But, in Nietzsche’s critique of those cultural domains morality has an important role to play: the Christian God has been undermined by the important role to play: the Christian God has been undermined by the morality of truthfulness that unmasked the belief in God a s lie, and the morality of truthfulness that unmasked the belief in God a s lie, and the same morality of truthfulness plays an important role in the criticism of same morality of truthfulness plays an important role in the criticism of science, philosophy, and art.science, philosophy, and art.

5.5. Nietzsche himself can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is Nietzsche himself can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is

inspired and molded by the morality he criticizes. inspired and molded by the morality he criticizes.

6.6. Nietzsche can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is inspired and Nietzsche can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is inspired and molded by the morality he criticizes.molded by the morality he criticizes.

7.7. Therefore, Nietzsche resembles all those he criticizes, continually holding Therefore, Nietzsche resembles all those he criticizes, continually holding them up to an ideal of health and fitness that has an unmistakable moral them up to an ideal of health and fitness that has an unmistakable moral tone. His own thought is certainly not exception to the rule he formulates tone. His own thought is certainly not exception to the rule he formulates in Beyond Good and Evil:in Beyond Good and Evil:


““Gradually it has become clear to me that Gradually it has become clear to me that every great philosophy so far has been: every great philosophy so far has been: namely the personal confession of its namely the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant has grown (BGE 6).”the whole plant has grown (BGE 6).”


8.8. What is the genealogy? The genealogy is What is the genealogy? The genealogy is the method of his critique. Nietzsche, in the method of his critique. Nietzsche, in sum, argues in favor of the study of the sum, argues in favor of the study of the following:following:

a.a. The origination of moral categories; The origination of moral categories;

b. The functioning of moral categories;b. The functioning of moral categories;

c.c. The critical evaluation of those categories. The critical evaluation of those categories.


Three crucial elements of his genealogical Three crucial elements of his genealogical method:method:

(1) History of origin and evolution; (1) History of origin and evolution;

(2) Analysis of function and effectiveness; (2) Analysis of function and effectiveness; (3) Critical evaluation.(3) Critical evaluation.

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the Enlightenment, is “at once absurd and dangerous fantasy,”…it is Enlightenment, is “at once absurd and dangerous fantasy,”…it is worth noting how even that construction began from a genuine worth noting how even that construction began from a genuine insight” (pg. 113-14).insight” (pg. 113-14).

In the In the Gay ScienceGay Science (section 335) Nietzsche mocks the notion of (section 335) Nietzsche mocks the notion of basing morality on inner moral sentiments, on conscience, the basing morality on inner moral sentiments, on conscience, the Kantian categorical imperative, universalizability. In five swift Kantian categorical imperative, universalizability. In five swift paragraphs he disposes the Enlightenment project to discover paragraphs he disposes the Enlightenment project to discover rational foundations for an objective morality and of the confidence rational foundations for an objective morality and of the confidence of the everyday moral agent in post-Enlightenment culture that his of the everyday moral agent in post-Enlightenment culture that his moral practice and utterance are in good order. The underlying moral practice and utterance are in good order. The underlying argument is: “If there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, argument is: “If there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can no place my morality can only be what my will creates. There can no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. I must myself now bring into existence ‘new the greatest number. I must myself now bring into existence ‘new tables of what is good.’ ‘We, however, want to become those we tables of what is good.’ ‘We, however, want to become those we are-human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give are-human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.’ (pg. 266).”themselves laws, who create themselves.’ (pg. 266).”

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:MacIntyre continues:MacIntyre continues:

““The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of the eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion; so, Nietzsche the eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion; so, Nietzsche resolves, let will replace reason and let us make ourselves into resolves, let will replace reason and let us make ourselves into autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the will, and act of the will that by its quality may remind us of that will, and act of the will that by its quality may remind us of that archaic aristocratic self-assertiveness which preceded what archaic aristocratic self-assertiveness which preceded what Nietzsche took to be the disaster of slave-morality and which by its Nietzsche took to be the disaster of slave-morality and which by its effectiveness may be the prophetic precursor of a new era. The effectiveness may be the prophetic precursor of a new era. The problem then is how to construct in an entirely original way, how to problem then is how to construct in an entirely original way, how to invent a new table of what is good and a law, problem which arises invent a new table of what is good and a law, problem which arises for each individual. This problem would constitute the core of a for each individual. This problem would constitute the core of a Nietzschean moral philosophy. For it is in his relentlessly serious Nietzschean moral philosophy. For it is in his relentlessly serious pursuit of the problem, not in his frivolous solutions that Nietzsche’s pursuit of the problem, not in his frivolous solutions that Nietzsche’s greatness lies, the greatness that makes him the moral philosopher greatness lies, the greatness that makes him the moral philosopher if the only alternatives to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy turn out be if the only alternatives to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy turn out be those formulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their those formulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their successors.”successors.”

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique: MacIntyre opposes Nietzsche's return to the aristocratic ethics of Homeric MacIntyre opposes Nietzsche's return to the aristocratic ethics of Homeric

Greece with the teleological approach to ethics pioneered by Aristotle. Greece with the teleological approach to ethics pioneered by Aristotle. Nietzsche’s critique of Enlightenment moral theory does not work against a Nietzsche’s critique of Enlightenment moral theory does not work against a teleological ethics. For MacIntyre,teleological ethics. For MacIntyre,

1.1. "Nietzsche replaces the fictions of the Enlightenment "Nietzsche replaces the fictions of the Enlightenment individualism, of individualism, of which he is so contemptuous, with a set of individualist which he is so contemptuous, with a set of individualist fictions of his fictions of his own.own.

2.2. Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the Enlightenment, Enlightenment, exposes the failure of the Enlightenment's epistemological exposes the failure of the Enlightenment's epistemological project and project and of its search for a subjective yet universal morality. of its search for a subjective yet universal morality.

3.3. Nietzsche neglects the role of society in the formation and Nietzsche neglects the role of society in the formation and understanding of tradition and morality, and "Nietzsche’s great man understanding of tradition and morality, and "Nietzsche’s great man cannot enter into relationships meditated by appeal to shared cannot enter into relationships meditated by appeal to shared standards or standards or virtues or goods; he is his own only moral authority and virtues or goods; he is his own only moral authority and his his relationships to others have to be exercises of that authority... it relationships to others have to be exercises of that authority... it will will be to condemn oneself to that moral solipsism which constitutes be to condemn oneself to that moral solipsism which constitutes Nietzschean greatness.“Nietzschean greatness.“

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:4.4. The attractiveness of Nietzsche’s position lay in its apparent The attractiveness of Nietzsche’s position lay in its apparent

honesty (pg. 258).”honesty (pg. 258).”

5.5. “Since moreover the language of morality is burdened with “Since moreover the language of morality is burdened with pseudo-concepts such as those of utility and of natural rights, it pseudo-concepts such as those of utility and of natural rights, it appeared that Nietzsche’s resoluteness alone would rescue us appeared that Nietzsche’s resoluteness alone would rescue us from entanglements by such concepts; but it is now clear that the from entanglements by such concepts; but it is now clear that the price to be paid for this liberation is entanglement in another set of price to be paid for this liberation is entanglement in another set of mistakes. The concept of the Nietzschean ‘great man’ is also a mistakes. The concept of the Nietzschean ‘great man’ is also a pseudo-concept, although not always perhaps-unhappily-what I pseudo-concept, although not always perhaps-unhappily-what I earlier called a fiction. It represents individualism’s final attempt earlier called a fiction. It represents individualism’s final attempt to escape from its own consequences. And the Nietzschean to escape from its own consequences. And the Nietzschean stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from an alternative to stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from an alternative to the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more representative moment in its internal unfolding. rather one more representative moment in its internal unfolding. And we may therefore expect liberal individualist societies to And we may therefore expect liberal individualist societies to breed ‘great men’ from time to time. Alas!” (pg. 258-9).breed ‘great men’ from time to time. Alas!” (pg. 258-9).

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:He continues:He continues:

““So it was right to see Nietzsche as in some So it was right to see Nietzsche as in some sense the ultimate antagonist of the sense the ultimate antagonist of the Aristotelian tradition. But it now turns out to be Aristotelian tradition. But it now turns out to be the case that in the end the Nietzschean the case that in the end the Nietzschean stance is only one more facet of that very stance is only one more facet of that very moral culture of which Nietzsche took himself moral culture of which Nietzsche took himself to be an implacable critic. It is therefore after to be an implacable critic. It is therefore after all the case that the crucial moral opposition is all the case that the crucial moral opposition is between liberal individualism in some version between liberal individualism in some version or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some version or other” (pg. 259).version or other” (pg. 259).

Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:6.6. “The differences between the two run very “The differences between the two run very

deep. They extend beyond ethics and morality deep. They extend beyond ethics and morality to the understanding of human action, so that to the understanding of human action, so that rival conceptions of the social sciences, of their rival conceptions of the social sciences, of their limits and possibilities, are intimately bound up limits and possibilities, are intimately bound up with the antagonistic confrontation of these two with the antagonistic confrontation of these two alternative ways of viewing the human alternative ways of viewing the human world….Andit will now, I hope, be clear that in world….Andit will now, I hope, be clear that in the chapters dealing with th the topics I was the chapters dealing with th the topics I was merely summing up the arguments against the merely summing up the arguments against the social embodiments of liberal individualism, but social embodiments of liberal individualism, but also laying the basis for arguments in favor of also laying the basis for arguments in favor of an alternative way of envisaging both the an alternative way of envisaging both the social sciences and society, one which the social sciences and society, one which the Aristotelian traditionAristotelian tradition

A Brief Critique:A Brief Critique: First, his moral relativism cannot stand against the logical strength of moral First, his moral relativism cannot stand against the logical strength of moral

absolutism.absolutism.

His basic arguments are self-defeating (in view of his belief in perspectivalism).His basic arguments are self-defeating (in view of his belief in perspectivalism).

There is strong evidence for God’s existence.There is strong evidence for God’s existence.

Ramifications of Nietzsche’s ideas have had horrific consequences in 20Ramifications of Nietzsche’s ideas have had horrific consequences in 20thth Century history. Century history.

Rather than promoting the welfare of others, he promotes selfishness, Rather than promoting the welfare of others, he promotes selfishness, harshness, and suspicion.harshness, and suspicion.

He promotes hatred, bigotry, and discrimination of others.He promotes hatred, bigotry, and discrimination of others.

His radical empiricism is also unwarranted.His radical empiricism is also unwarranted.

His view isn’t livable (as he himself demonstrated in his own life).His view isn’t livable (as he himself demonstrated in his own life).

His views are counter-intuitive.His views are counter-intuitive.

The Scottish Philosopher The Scottish Philosopher

David HumeDavid Hume (1711-1776):(1711-1776):

An Introduction into An Introduction into

Hume’s view of Ethics:Hume’s view of Ethics:

If you want truth look to science or mathematics; ethics If you want truth look to science or mathematics; ethics is ultimately based on our feelings; Natural moral is ultimately based on our feelings; Natural moral

sentiments is where moral decision-making is sentiments is where moral decision-making is grounded.grounded.

Consider the following quote…Consider the following quote…

““Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the destruction of the whole world to the

scratching of my finger.”scratching of my finger.”

~ ~ A Treatise on Human ReasonA Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A. Selby-, edited by L.A. Selby-Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.


““Reason is, and ought only to be the slave Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to of the passions, and can never pretend to

any other office to serve and obey any other office to serve and obey them.”them.”

~ ~ A Treatise on Human ReasonA Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A. Selby-, edited by L.A. Selby-Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.

Consider the following quote:Consider the following quote:““Take any action allowed to be vicious: willful murder, for Take any action allowed to be vicious: willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all its lights and see if you can find instance. Examine it in all its lights and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice…. that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice…. You never can find it, till you turn your affection into your You never can find it, till you turn your affection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in your but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in your self, not in the object. So that which you pronounce any self, not in the object. So that which you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”

~ ~ A Treatise of Human NatureA Treatise of Human Nature, Everyman’s Library , Everyman’s Library (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1956) 2:177.(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1956) 2:177.


““When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume-of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance-volume-of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance-

let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact

and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry [literalism] and can contain nothing but sophistry [literalism] and

illusion.”illusion.”

~ Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 12.3.173.~ Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 12.3.173.

I.I. Major Tenets:Major Tenets:

(1)(1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “rather is the “slave of the passionsslave of the passions.” In other words, .” In other words, reason alone cannot motivate to action; the impulse reason alone cannot motivate to action; the impulse to to act itself must come from moral sentiments.act itself must come from moral sentiments.

(2) (2) Morals are not derived from reason; they are Morals are not derived from reason; they are derived from the experience of people.derived from the experience of people.

(3) (3) Morals are generated from moral sentiments: Morals are generated from moral sentiments: feelings of approbation (approval, esteem, praise) & feelings of approbation (approval, esteem, praise) & disapprobation (disapproval, blame) felt by disapprobation (disapproval, blame) felt by spectators who consider a character trait or spectators who consider a character trait or action;action;


(4)(4) While some virtues and vices are natural, While some virtues and vices are natural, others, including justice, are artificial.others, including justice, are artificial.

(5)(5) Since the human psychological makeup of Since the human psychological makeup of man is similar, moral judgments will tend man is similar, moral judgments will tend to be similar.to be similar.

(6)(6) Since morals will tend to be similar, Since morals will tend to be similar, moralities may be conceived in terms of moralities may be conceived in terms of “social utility”“social utility”


(7)(7) Hume’s ethics comes out of the worldview of Hume’s ethics comes out of the worldview of empiricism: only matters of fact are those discernible empiricism: only matters of fact are those discernible by the senses.by the senses.

(8)(8) Moral facts do not exist; rules of morality are not Moral facts do not exist; rules of morality are not derived from reason.derived from reason.

(9)(9) Vice and virtue are perceptions in the mind and that Vice and virtue are perceptions in the mind and that is all that is needed to regulate moral behavior.is all that is needed to regulate moral behavior.

(10) Moral distinctions are constituted by their (10) Moral distinctions are constituted by their pleasantness & usefulness (he did not synthesize how pleasantness & usefulness (he did not synthesize how the relate to each other).the relate to each other).

II.II. Overview of Significant Points:Overview of Significant Points:

1.1. Primacy of feelings over reason as a guide to ethics;Primacy of feelings over reason as a guide to ethics;

2.2. Human was profoundly influenced by Newtonian scientific Human was profoundly influenced by Newtonian scientific revolution;revolution;

3.3. Empirical science nor science can offer us ethical truths; only Empirical science nor science can offer us ethical truths; only genuine knowledge comes from pure mathematics or genuine knowledge comes from pure mathematics or empirical science. It is not because reason is flawed, but empirical science. It is not because reason is flawed, but because basic ethical preferences are generated from feelings because basic ethical preferences are generated from feelings passions;passions;

4.4. Factual knowledge arises exclusively from the data supplied Factual knowledge arises exclusively from the data supplied by the senses and is extended in usefulness by means of by the senses and is extended in usefulness by means of inferences based on a belief in cause-and-effect relations.inferences based on a belief in cause-and-effect relations.

II.II. Overview:Overview:5.5. Feelings cannot provide an objective foundation for Feelings cannot provide an objective foundation for

ethics; In fact, feelings are not subject to reason.ethics; In fact, feelings are not subject to reason.

6.6. Hume attacks the idea of a necessary “metaphysical” Hume attacks the idea of a necessary “metaphysical” connection between cause and effect.connection between cause and effect.

7.7. The basis of moral assertion is sourced in feelings of The basis of moral assertion is sourced in feelings of approval (pleasure) or disapproval (pain or uneasiness).approval (pleasure) or disapproval (pain or uneasiness).

8.8. Hume is a compatibilist regarding free-will and Hume is a compatibilist regarding free-will and Newtonian determinism (he is a strict empiricist).Newtonian determinism (he is a strict empiricist).

II. Overview:II. Overview:9.9. Hume agrees with the moral sense theorists such as Shaftesbury Hume agrees with the moral sense theorists such as Shaftesbury

and Hutcheson (moral sense) and Butler (conscience) that all and Hutcheson (moral sense) and Butler (conscience) that all requirements to pursue goodness and avoid evil as consequent requirements to pursue goodness and avoid evil as consequent upon human nature, which is so structured that a particular upon human nature, which is so structured that a particular feature of our consciousness (whether moral sense or conscience) feature of our consciousness (whether moral sense or conscience) evaluates the rest. evaluates the rest.

10.Because we are the kinds of creatures we are, with the 10.Because we are the kinds of creatures we are, with the dispositions for pain and pleasure, the kinds of familial and dispositions for pain and pleasure, the kinds of familial and friendly interdependence that make up our life together, and our friendly interdependence that make up our life together, and our approvals and disapprovals of these, Hume believes we can approvals and disapprovals of these, Hume believes we can escape radical relativism, generate natural and artificial virtues escape radical relativism, generate natural and artificial virtues are socially agreeable.are socially agreeable.

II.II. Overview:Overview:

11. 11. This view of moral grounding in “moral This view of moral grounding in “moral sense”, “emotions,” or “passional nature” is sense”, “emotions,” or “passional nature” is contrary contrary to rationalists like Locke, Hobbes, and to rationalists like Locke, Hobbes, and Clarke, Clarke, who believed that good and evil were who believed that good and evil were discovered by discovered by reason.reason.

12.12. Locke, Hobbes, and Clarke believed, in some Locke, Hobbes, and Clarke believed, in some moods, that moral standards or requirements are moods, that moral standards or requirements are requirements of reason.requirements of reason.


13.13. Hume takes an intermediate view Hume takes an intermediate view regarding regarding whether morality is conventional whether morality is conventional (Hobbes) (Hobbes) or natural (Locke). Hume thinks or natural (Locke). Hume thinks natural natural impulses of humanity and impulses of humanity and dispositions to dispositions to approve cannot entirely account approve cannot entirely account for our for our virtue of justice; a correct analysis of virtue of justice; a correct analysis of that that requires the thesis that mankind, an requires the thesis that mankind, an “inventive species,” has cooperatively “inventive species,” has cooperatively constructed rules of property and promise.constructed rules of property and promise.


14.Hume disagrees with Hobbes regarding the 14.Hume disagrees with Hobbes regarding the following:following:

a.a. Necessary psychological Egoism;Necessary psychological Egoism;

b.b. Necessary violent view of a state Necessary violent view of a state of of nature whereby without an nature whereby without an organized organized state “state “all is in a war against all”all is in a war against all”


15.15. Hume disagrees with Locke (and Rawls) about the idea Hume disagrees with Locke (and Rawls) about the idea of of humanity being involved in a highly cooperative domain humanity being involved in a highly cooperative domain of of law-governing citizens for the following reasons:law-governing citizens for the following reasons:

aa It is a hypothetical condition in which we would It is a hypothetical condition in which we would care for our friends and cooperate with care for our friends and cooperate with

them;them;

b.b. Self-interest and preference for friends over Self-interest and preference for friends over strangers would make any wider cooperation strangers would make any wider cooperation

impossible. impossible.

One of the central themes of Hume’s political philosophy is One of the central themes of Hume’s political philosophy is that we are both fundamentally loving and selfish.that we are both fundamentally loving and selfish.

II.II. Overview:Overview:16.16. Turning from reason to sentiment Hume believes that has Turning from reason to sentiment Hume believes that has

avoided radical relativism or mere subjectivism.avoided radical relativism or mere subjectivism.

a. Since people have the same psychological makeup, their a. Since people have the same psychological makeup, their moral responses will be similar. moral responses will be similar.

b. If provided the same data, people will tend to respond b. If provided the same data, people will tend to respond similarly. That does mean that all people will agree similarly. That does mean that all people will agree

about about the moral worth of an action. the moral worth of an action.

c. Ethical disagreements generally stem not from differences c. Ethical disagreements generally stem not from differences in our “passional” nature or feelings but from (a) in our “passional” nature or feelings but from (a) misunderstandings regarding circumstantial misunderstandings regarding circumstantial

evidence or evidence or from (b) incomplete analyses. from (b) incomplete analyses.


17.17. Study of individual assessments reveal that Study of individual assessments reveal that “socially useful acts are approved while those “socially useful acts are approved while those which are socially detrimental are which are socially detrimental are

disapproved.disapproved.

18.18. Since we judge acts generally by their Since we judge acts generally by their conformity conformity to social utility (rather than by to social utility (rather than by immediate, personal immediate, personal preferences), impartiality preferences), impartiality will tend to prevail in will tend to prevail in moral judgments.moral judgments.


19.19. Conjoined events do not prove they are causally connected Conjoined events do not prove they are causally connected any more than there is a causal connection between the any more than there is a causal connection between the “rooster crowing” and the “sun rising.” All one can do is “rooster crowing” and the “sun rising.” All one can do is extrapolate based on oft-repeated occurrences. He does extrapolate based on oft-repeated occurrences. He does not deny the principle of causality; he denies the basis on not deny the principle of causality; he denies the basis on which some people try to prove causality.which some people try to prove causality.

20.20. All objections of human inquiry are relations of ideas All objections of human inquiry are relations of ideas (mathematics; definitions) or matters of fact (everything (mathematics; definitions) or matters of fact (everything known through one or more of the senses).known through one or more of the senses).


21. Laws of nature are habits formed in our 21. Laws of nature are habits formed in our minds on what has occurred in the past and minds on what has occurred in the past and the expectation of similar experiences will the expectation of similar experiences will occur in the future.occur in the future.

III.III. The Nature of Moral Judgment:The Nature of Moral Judgment:3 Textual Interpretations:3 Textual Interpretations:

1.1. Non-propositional View: a moral evaluation does not express any Non-propositional View: a moral evaluation does not express any proposition or state any fact. Either it gives vent to a feeling, or it is proposition or state any fact. Either it gives vent to a feeling, or it is itself a feeling. (A more refined form of this interpretation allows itself a feeling. (A more refined form of this interpretation allows that moral evaluations have some propositional content, but claims that moral evaluations have some propositional content, but claims that for Hume their essential feature, as evaluations, is non-that for Hume their essential feature, as evaluations, is non-propositional).propositional).


2.2. Description of the Feelings of the Spectator: Description of the Feelings of the Spectator: Hume is describing the feelings of the spectator, Hume is describing the feelings of the spectator, or the feelings a spectator would have were she to or the feelings a spectator would have were she to contemplate the trait or action from the common contemplate the trait or action from the common point of view.point of view.


3.3. Dispositional interpretation: Evaluated trait Dispositional interpretation: Evaluated trait or action is so constituted as to cause feelings of or action is so constituted as to cause feelings of approval or disapproval in a (suitably approval or disapproval in a (suitably characterized) spectator. On the dispositional characterized) spectator. On the dispositional view, in saying some trait is good we attribute to view, in saying some trait is good we attribute to the trait the dispositional property of being such as the trait the dispositional property of being such as to elicit approval. to elicit approval.

IV.IV. Moral Sentiments:Moral Sentiments:

1.1. Moral sentiments are emotions which possess unique Moral sentiments are emotions which possess unique phenomenological quality, and special set of causes. phenomenological quality, and special set of causes.

2.2. Moral Sentiments are caused by contemplating the person Moral Sentiments are caused by contemplating the person or or action.action.

3.3. Moral sentiments tend to be clarified or brought into Moral sentiments tend to be clarified or brought into focus by social utility which is a common moral sentiments focus by social utility which is a common moral sentiments or similar responses (collectively).or similar responses (collectively).


Moral sentiments are the sort of pleasure & uneasiness which are Moral sentiments are the sort of pleasure & uneasiness which are associated with 4 passions:associated with 4 passions:

1.1. Pride; Pride;

2.2. humility; humility;

3.3. Love; Love;

4.4. Hatred. Hatred.

Some argue that pleasure and pain cause these 4 passions others Some argue that pleasure and pain cause these 4 passions others believe these 4 passions make up the pleasure or pain.believe these 4 passions make up the pleasure or pain.

Thus, when we feel moral approval we tend to love or esteem, and Thus, when we feel moral approval we tend to love or esteem, and when we approve a trait of our own we are proud of it. when we approve a trait of our own we are proud of it.


Because we share a similar psychological makeup, thus share Because we share a similar psychological makeup, thus share common moral sentiments, we are able to generate or invent artificial common moral sentiments, we are able to generate or invent artificial virtues because we find them to be pleasant and not painful (e.g.,): virtues because we find them to be pleasant and not painful (e.g.,):

1.1. Justice with respect to property, Justice with respect to property, 2.2. Allegiance to government, Allegiance to government, 3.3. The laws of nations,The laws of nations,4.4. Modesty, andModesty, and5.5. Good manners), which (Hume argues) are inventions cGood manners), which (Hume argues) are inventions ccontrived solely for the interest of society. contrived solely for the interest of society.

V.V. Kant vs. HumeKant vs. Hume

1.1. Similarity: Hume and Kant recognized the difference between pure Similarity: Hume and Kant recognized the difference between pure reason (understanding) from practical reason (work of the will). In other reason (understanding) from practical reason (work of the will). In other words, they both recognized an important difference between judgments words, they both recognized an important difference between judgments of facts and judgments of value.of facts and judgments of value.

2.2. Difference: Kant was a rationalist in his conception of morals; Hume Difference: Kant was a rationalist in his conception of morals; Hume was an empiricist. A rationalist derives principles of morality from was an empiricist. A rationalist derives principles of morality from metaphysical assumptions. Stated differently, Kant grounds his morality metaphysical assumptions. Stated differently, Kant grounds his morality in rationalism and Hume on natural moral sentiments.in rationalism and Hume on natural moral sentiments.

3.3. Difference: According to Kant, no matter how unpleasant the command Difference: According to Kant, no matter how unpleasant the command makes you feel, you are obligated to fulfill it according to Kant.makes you feel, you are obligated to fulfill it according to Kant.

VI.VI. Kant vs. Bentham and Mill on “utility”Kant vs. Bentham and Mill on “utility”

Jeremy Bentham argued that the standard of goodness in the greatest Jeremy Bentham argued that the standard of goodness in the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of persons is intrinsically amount of happiness for the greatest number of persons is intrinsically valuable. valuable.

1.1. While Hume and Bentham agree that happiness is good, While Hume and Bentham agree that happiness is good, Hume Hume does not admit that it is the only thing that is good. does not admit that it is the only thing that is good. Human beings are Human beings are complex organisms, and their total complex organisms, and their total welfare includes more than the welfare includes more than the satisfaction of the one satisfaction of the one need for happiness.need for happiness.

2.2. Mill recognizes the cultural, intellectual, and spiritual Mill recognizes the cultural, intellectual, and spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure. pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure. While While Hume will agree that we are complex humans, he Hume will agree that we are complex humans, he would reject Mill’s would reject Mill’s finite godism and would reject his finite godism and would reject his utilitarianism because he grounds utilitarianism because he grounds morality not in utility but morality not in utility but in moral sentiments which all humans share. in moral sentiments which all humans share.

VII.VII. Hume on Justice:Hume on Justice:

1.1. The purposes of justice can be realized only by adapting the methods The purposes of justice can be realized only by adapting the methods that are used to the that are used to the particular situation particular situation that is involved.that is involved.

a.a. Justice is a relative virtue in contrast to a deontological Justice is a relative virtue in contrast to a deontological version of justice, one that is not influenced by the version of justice, one that is not influenced by the situational situational setting.setting.

b.b. He believes our human understanding of justice does He believes our human understanding of justice does vary vary from one time to another and that the application from one time to another and that the application of the principles of the principles of justice will vary with the of justice will vary with the circumstances circumstances under which they are under which they are applied.applied.

c.c. Hume implies that there is an unchanging element in Hume implies that there is an unchanging element in justice: The purpose is always that of meeting the needs justice: The purpose is always that of meeting the needs of society.of society.


““As justice evidently tends to promote public utility As justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other love of life, attachment to offspring, and other passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast, which nature has implanted for like human breast, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes.”salutary purposes.”

~ ~ An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsAn Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, (Chicago: , (Chicago: Open Court, 1966), 35.Open Court, 1966), 35.


2. Justice is “dynamic”:2. Justice is “dynamic”:

a.a. Justice is expressed in laws and customs Justice is expressed in laws and customs which are which are generated when the need arises for them.generated when the need arises for them.

b.b. The nature of justice varies in view of The nature of justice varies in view of situational situational setting (illust. Sexual morality may vary setting (illust. Sexual morality may vary depending depending upon setting).upon setting).


3. In view of his appendix on justice in 3. In view of his appendix on justice in An Enquiry An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsConcerning the Principles of Morals that there are that there are certain certain principles principles which may be recognized that which may be recognized that can advance justice:can advance justice:

A.A. Avoid giving special privileges to some but not others;Avoid giving special privileges to some but not others;

B.B. Take into account the long-range interests of others rather than Take into account the long-range interests of others rather than immediate satisfactions; personal and immediate needs may need to immediate satisfactions; personal and immediate needs may need to be sacrificed in order to achieve the well-being of society.be sacrificed in order to achieve the well-being of society.

C.C. Seek to meet the needs of society as a whole.Seek to meet the needs of society as a whole.


4.4. On Distributive Justice:On Distributive Justice: Justice exists for meeting the needs of society;Justice exists for meeting the needs of society; Justice will be stated in general rules of conduct but particular Justice will be stated in general rules of conduct but particular

situations and other factors may arise whereby the needs and meeting situations and other factors may arise whereby the needs and meeting those needs will mean change (e.g., war).those needs will mean change (e.g., war).

Distributing justice is quite impossible to meet every need.Distributing justice is quite impossible to meet every need. Justice is for the purpose of distributing goods in an equitable Justice is for the purpose of distributing goods in an equitable

manner; there is no exact formula for doing this that will meet the manner; there is no exact formula for doing this that will meet the needs of every situations that comes about.needs of every situations that comes about.

Neither extreme wealth or poverty are in the best interests of others.Neither extreme wealth or poverty are in the best interests of others. Believes in a moderate view of property rights.Believes in a moderate view of property rights. Justice is a relative virtue; nothing remains constant about the nature Justice is a relative virtue; nothing remains constant about the nature

of justice.of justice.

VIII.VIII. Hume on Altruism and Selfishness:Hume on Altruism and Selfishness:

1.1. Altruism and selfishness are not necessarily opposed to one Altruism and selfishness are not necessarily opposed to one another.another.

2.2. We possess a humanitarian sentiment which naturally We possess a humanitarian sentiment which naturally approves approves of what is beneficial and useful to society. of what is beneficial and useful to society.

3.3. Since we share a common morality derived from our nature, Since we share a common morality derived from our nature, principles of morality are not derived from self-love alone.principles of morality are not derived from self-love alone.

4.4. What gains the admiration and respect of others is by acting upon What gains the admiration and respect of others is by acting upon the pleasing moral sentiments that fellow-humans share; this is the pleasing moral sentiments that fellow-humans share; this is virtuous virtuous and meritorious.and meritorious.

Human nature includes both selfish and unselfish sentiments.Human nature includes both selfish and unselfish sentiments. Human nature is selfish to some extent.Human nature is selfish to some extent. Human nature also has the capacity to act beyond one’s selfishness.Human nature also has the capacity to act beyond one’s selfishness. We can feel the pain of others and their misfortune.We can feel the pain of others and their misfortune. Selfishness can over shadow good intentions but does necessarily have to.Selfishness can over shadow good intentions but does necessarily have to.

IX.IX. In Summary:In Summary:

““About Hume's ethics: we have a moral sentiment or feeling of About Hume's ethics: we have a moral sentiment or feeling of approval or disapproval (approbation or disapprobation) about actions approval or disapproval (approbation or disapprobation) about actions that we find pleasing or agreeable. We find actions agreeable (and thus that we find pleasing or agreeable. We find actions agreeable (and thus approve of them) not because of the utility of such actions but because approve of them) not because of the utility of such actions but because we ‘naturally’ have an inclination to approve of what we are attracted we ‘naturally’ have an inclination to approve of what we are attracted to. In thinking about the pleasures or pains of other people, we (along to. In thinking about the pleasures or pains of other people, we (along with all other normal human beings) are attracted to what arouses in us with all other normal human beings) are attracted to what arouses in us natural sentiments of humanity and benevolence. Such sentiments are natural sentiments of humanity and benevolence. Such sentiments are not derived from self-love but from a sense of identifying with other not derived from self-love but from a sense of identifying with other human beings. That sense of fellow-feeling, not the perception of the human beings. That sense of fellow-feeling, not the perception of the utility of actions, is the basis on which we feel moral obligation. Of utility of actions, is the basis on which we feel moral obligation. Of course, promoting social utility is in our own self-interest, but acting course, promoting social utility is in our own self-interest, but acting for the sake of promoting our own self-interest is not a good enough for the sake of promoting our own self-interest is not a good enough reason for acting in a moral way” ~ Dr. Steve Danielreason for acting in a moral way” ~ Dr. Steve Daniel

X.X. Advantages:Advantages:

1.1. Some will appreciate the fact that it removes Some will appreciate the fact that it removes “metaphysical mysteries” from realm of ethics because it “metaphysical mysteries” from realm of ethics because it grounds morality in moral sentiments which all humans grounds morality in moral sentiments which all humans share.share.

2.2. Pleasure and pain are important considerations in ethical Pleasure and pain are important considerations in ethical judgments.judgments.

3.3. It attempts to balance both selfishness and altruism.It attempts to balance both selfishness and altruism.

4.4. It seems to avoid pure egoism, utilitarianism, and radical It seems to avoid pure egoism, utilitarianism, and radical relativism.relativism.

XI:XI: Objections Raised against Hume:Objections Raised against Hume:

1.1. Hume reduces ethics to a matter of taste (e.g., A.J. Ayer & C.L. Hume reduces ethics to a matter of taste (e.g., A.J. Ayer & C.L. Stevenson), relativism, and subjectivism.Stevenson), relativism, and subjectivism.

Hume replies: since people have the same psychological makeup, moral Hume replies: since people have the same psychological makeup, moral responses will be comparable. To be sure, this doesn’t mean everyone will responses will be comparable. To be sure, this doesn’t mean everyone will agree about but if provided the same data, they will generally agree about but if provided the same data, they will generally tendtend to respond to respond similarly:similarly:

a.a. Common NatureCommon Natureb.b. Same Data;Same Data;== Similar response.Similar response.

Ethical differences stem not from differences in our “feelings or “passional” Ethical differences stem not from differences in our “feelings or “passional” nature but from misunderstandings about the actual circumstances nature but from misunderstandings about the actual circumstances surrounding a given act or from incomplete analyses of the consequences surrounding a given act or from incomplete analyses of the consequences accruing from the act.accruing from the act.

XI.XI. Objections:Objections:2.2. Those who embrace “objectivist feelings” will reject Hume’s Those who embrace “objectivist feelings” will reject Hume’s

account of subjectivist feelings. Some believe feelings can account of subjectivist feelings. Some believe feelings can be a source of objective truths of ethics. Consider Blaise be a source of objective truths of ethics. Consider Blaise Pascal’s famous statement: Pascal’s famous statement:

““The heart has its reasons that the reason know not”The heart has its reasons that the reason know not”

For those who embrace objective feelings they would argue For those who embrace objective feelings they would argue that while feelings may not be an infallible guide to ethics, that while feelings may not be an infallible guide to ethics, feelings are not distractions on the path to ethical truth. feelings are not distractions on the path to ethical truth. Rather, feelings can be a source of ethical insight.Rather, feelings can be a source of ethical insight.

Do you agree? Can ethical feelings be objectively true or are they Do you agree? Can ethical feelings be objectively true or are they more like tastes?more like tastes?

XI.XI. Objections:Objections:

3.3. Moral sentiments cannot provide an adequate basis for moral Moral sentiments cannot provide an adequate basis for moral obligations (e.g., justice).obligations (e.g., justice).

Hume’s response: It is obligatory, for example, to be just…but the Hume’s response: It is obligatory, for example, to be just…but the reason we adopt the concept of justice and guide our actions in reason we adopt the concept of justice and guide our actions in conformity to it is because it comes from the moral sentiments we all conformity to it is because it comes from the moral sentiments we all share.share.

Hume doesn’t deny a specific instance of injustice could be more beneficial to Hume doesn’t deny a specific instance of injustice could be more beneficial to society than its corresponding instance of justice in some odd case, but by society than its corresponding instance of justice in some odd case, but by conforming ourselves to the moral sentiments of justice, humanity can be conforming ourselves to the moral sentiments of justice, humanity can be served.served.

Response: Still justice is not absolute, fixed upon absolutes; it is sourced in Response: Still justice is not absolute, fixed upon absolutes; it is sourced in moral sentiments that can change (justice becomes somewhat relative even if it moral sentiments that can change (justice becomes somewhat relative even if it is not radical relativism).is not radical relativism).


4.4. Borrowing the notion of social utility to find a way to maintain social Borrowing the notion of social utility to find a way to maintain social order is using reason. Social utility is powerful enough to incite order is using reason. Social utility is powerful enough to incite action to actually do the good.action to actually do the good.

Hume would respond by saying that the source of utility is not Hume would respond by saying that the source of utility is not reason but “moral sentiment” that we naturally share; we identify reason but “moral sentiment” that we naturally share; we identify with other beings on that sense of “fellow feelings”. Thus, it is not with other beings on that sense of “fellow feelings”. Thus, it is not from “social utility” but moral sentiments that ground our morality. from “social utility” but moral sentiments that ground our morality. Secondly, reasons of social utility is not powerful enough to incite Secondly, reasons of social utility is not powerful enough to incite action; it is the “moral sentiments” of feelings of approval or action; it is the “moral sentiments” of feelings of approval or disapproval that motivates action, not the perception of social disapproval that motivates action, not the perception of social utility. utility.

5.5. Hume’s skepticism is self-defeating because he did not suspend moral Hume’s skepticism is self-defeating because he did not suspend moral judgments regarding God, miracles, and metaphysics. judgments regarding God, miracles, and metaphysics.


6.6. Metaphysical problem: According to Hume, meaningful Metaphysical problem: According to Hume, meaningful propositions are empirical. But this is self-defeating, for the propositions are empirical. But this is self-defeating, for the statement that “only analytic or empirical propositions are statement that “only analytic or empirical propositions are meaningful” is not itself an analytic statement. If one allows that meaningful” is not itself an analytic statement. If one allows that such statements are meaningful, then why cannot metaphysical such statements are meaningful, then why cannot metaphysical statements be meaningful? Stated differently, to say there is no statements be meaningful? Stated differently, to say there is no metaphysics is itself a metaphysical statement, namely that you metaphysics is itself a metaphysical statement, namely that you know that metaphysics doesn’t exist.know that metaphysics doesn’t exist.

7.7. Causality can be experienced internally. I am the cause of this Causality can be experienced internally. I am the cause of this sentence I am typing, and I experience that fact. Everyone sentence I am typing, and I experience that fact. Everyone experiences their own thoughts and actions. experiences their own thoughts and actions.


8.8. Fundamentally to explain what is wrong with a wrong Fundamentally to explain what is wrong with a wrong action because it is solely based on human experience. action because it is solely based on human experience. Reason only reveals matters of fact.Reason only reveals matters of fact.

a.a. Good in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or Good in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or moral sentiments.moral sentiments.

b.b. Evil in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or Evil in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or moral sentiments.moral sentiments.

1.1. Hume’s response is that there is no other way to judge morality. Hume’s response is that there is no other way to judge morality. Moreover, we are naturally constituted in such a way that there is Moreover, we are naturally constituted in such a way that there is present in us a “sense of humanity” which always approves of present in us a “sense of humanity” which always approves of that which promotes human welfare and is useful in society that which promotes human welfare and is useful in society because we all share it.because we all share it.


9.9. Hume is subject to the postmodern critique that are our Hume is subject to the postmodern critique that are our “emotions” are not a product of “moral sentiments”. “emotions” are not a product of “moral sentiments”. Rather, we are morally scripted by our sub-culture. Rather, we are morally scripted by our sub-culture. How does Hume know that our moral sentiments are How does Hume know that our moral sentiments are natural and not socially inscribed values?natural and not socially inscribed values?

10.10. Doesn’t the idea that we all share a “similar Doesn’t the idea that we all share a “similar constitution of moral sentiments” beg the question that constitution of moral sentiments” beg the question that we are “designed” by God (e.g., Thomas Reid)?we are “designed” by God (e.g., Thomas Reid)?

An Enquiry Concerning the An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsPrinciples of Morals

An Introduction/Overview:An Introduction/Overview:

Overview of Overview of EnquiryEnquiry::

An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of MoralsAn Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals (1751) is (1751) is broken down into 9 Units of thought:broken down into 9 Units of thought:

1.1. Of the Great Principle of MoralsOf the Great Principle of Morals2.2. Of BenevolenceOf Benevolence3.3. Of JusticeOf Justice4.4. Of Political SocietyOf Political Society5.5. Why Utility PleasesWhy Utility Pleases6.6. Of Qualities Useful to OurselvesOf Qualities Useful to Ourselves7.7. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to OurselvesOf Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves8.8. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to OthersOf Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others9.9. ConclusionConclusion

What is the aim of book?What is the aim of book?

Thesis Statement: Moral sense makes the ultimate Thesis Statement: Moral sense makes the ultimate distinction between vice & virtue; both moral distinction between vice & virtue; both moral sense and reason play a role in the formation of sense and reason play a role in the formation of moral judgments. The basis of virtue lies in its moral judgments. The basis of virtue lies in its utility (usefulness), fulfilling two requirements for utility (usefulness), fulfilling two requirements for moral sentiments: (1) It is useful to ourselves moral sentiments: (1) It is useful to ourselves (agreeable) or (2) to others. Therefore, the (agreeable) or (2) to others. Therefore, the purpose of this book is the contributions moral purpose of this book is the contributions moral sense and reason make in our moral judgments.sense and reason make in our moral judgments.

What is the aim of book?What is the aim of book?

Complimentary Statement: Reason is important Complimentary Statement: Reason is important because we make moral judgments about what is because we make moral judgments about what is useful to us or to others; it plays the role of an useful to us or to others; it plays the role of an advisor, not decision-maker. In other words, advisor, not decision-maker. In other words, reason does not motivate us to action. Rather, the reason does not motivate us to action. Rather, the capacity of sympathy (moral sentiments), which is capacity of sympathy (moral sentiments), which is rooted in our human constitution, motivate us to rooted in our human constitution, motivate us to act or ignore those judgments. act or ignore those judgments.

Central Points to Hume’s Ethics:Central Points to Hume’s Ethics:

Hume’s list of virtues are:Hume’s list of virtues are:

Qualities useful (pleasurable) to others: benevolence, Qualities useful (pleasurable) to others: benevolence, justice, fidelity.justice, fidelity.

Qualities useful to their possessor: discretion, Qualities useful to their possessor: discretion, industry, frugality, strength of mind, good sense.industry, frugality, strength of mind, good sense.

Qualities agreeable (immediately pleasurable) to their Qualities agreeable (immediately pleasurable) to their possessor: cheerfulness, magnanimity, courage, possessor: cheerfulness, magnanimity, courage, tranquility.tranquility.

Qualities agreeable to others: politeness, modesty, Qualities agreeable to others: politeness, modesty, decency.decency.

Hume’s Distinction between Hume’s Distinction between artificial & natural virtues:artificial & natural virtues:

Artificial virtues depend on social structures and Artificial virtues depend on social structures and include the following:include the following:

a.a. Justice and fidelity to promises; Justice and fidelity to promises; b.b. Allegiance; Allegiance; c.c. Chastity and modesty; Chastity and modesty; d. d. Duties of sovereign states to keep Duties of sovereign states to keep

treaties, to respect boundaries, to protect treaties, to respect boundaries, to protect ambassadors, and to otherwise subject ambassadors, and to otherwise subject themselves to the law of nations. themselves to the law of nations.

Artificial virtues may vary from society to societyArtificial virtues may vary from society to society ..

Hume’s Distinction between artificial & natural virtues:Hume’s Distinction between artificial & natural virtues:

Natural virtues, originate in human nature, thus tend to be more universal:Natural virtues, originate in human nature, thus tend to be more universal:

CompassionCompassion PrudencePrudence TemperanceTemperance Generosity GenerosityGratitudeGratitude FriendshipFriendship FidelityFidelity Charity CharityBeneficenceBeneficence ClemencyClemency CleanlinessCleanliness Decorum DecorumTemperanceTemperance FrugalityFrugality PridePride Modesty ModestyGood SenseGood Sense WitWit HumorHumor Articulateness ArticulatenessPerseverancePerseverance PatiencePatience Good natureGood nature Sensitivity to poetrySensitivity to poetry Self-assertivenessSelf-assertivenessElusive quality that makes a person lovely or valuableElusive quality that makes a person lovely or valuable

Involuntary virtues (e.g., good sense) Involuntary virtues (e.g., good sense) voluntary virtues (e.g., ambition)voluntary virtues (e.g., ambition)

Related to purpose are three Related to purpose are three questions (chapter 1):questions (chapter 1):

(1) Is morality derived from reason or sentiment? (1) Is morality derived from reason or sentiment?

(2) What is the process whereby we obtain knowledge of (2) What is the process whereby we obtain knowledge of moral judgments: chain of arguments and induction or by moral judgments: chain of arguments and induction or by some internal sense?some internal sense?

(3) Are moral judgments the same for every rational (3) Are moral judgments the same for every rational intelligent person? In his pursuit for the origins of intelligent person? In his pursuit for the origins of morality he presupposes an anti-supernatural claim, thus morality he presupposes an anti-supernatural claim, thus dismissing any theological metaphysical perspectives of dismissing any theological metaphysical perspectives of this matter and advances a utilitarian model. this matter and advances a utilitarian model.

Chapters 2-5:Chapters 2-5:

In chapters 2-5 Hume surveys three kinds of In chapters 2-5 Hume surveys three kinds of conduct that are virtuous; they are virtuous conduct that are virtuous; they are virtuous because they are useful:because they are useful:

Benevolence;Benevolence;

Justice;Justice;

Political Society.Political Society.

Chapter 2: On Benevolence:Chapter 2: On Benevolence:

““On benevolence,” “nothing can bestow On benevolence,” “nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society” bestow happiness on human society” (2.2.14). (2.2.14).

Chapter 3: On Justice:Chapter 3: On Justice:

““On Justice”, Hume writes, “public utility is On Justice”, Hume writes, “public utility is the sole origin of justice, and that reflections the sole origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequence of this virtue are on the beneficial consequence of this virtue are the sole foundation of its merit” (3.1.15). This the sole foundation of its merit” (3.1.15). This particular virtue is the considerable source of particular virtue is the considerable source of merit ascribed to “humanity, benevolence, merit ascribed to “humanity, benevolence, friendship, public spirit, and other social friendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that stamp [justice]” (3.2. 38).virtues of that stamp [justice]” (3.2. 38).

Chapter 4: Of Political Society:Chapter 4: Of Political Society:

““Of Political SocietyOf Political Society,” ,” the fundamental value the fundamental value of the duty of allegiance is the “advantage, of the duty of allegiance is the “advantage, which it procures to so society, by preserving which it procures to so society, by preserving peace and order among mankind”peace and order among mankind” (4. 39). He (4. 39). He concludes that “concludes that “common interest and utility common interest and utility begets infallibly a standard of right and wrong begets infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concernedamong the parties concerned” (4. 45).” (4. 45).

Chapters 5-7Chapters 5-7 Chapter 5: Why utility pleases is because we are social Chapter 5: Why utility pleases is because we are social

beings.beings.

Chapter 6: Qualities that are USEFUL to us Chapter 6: Qualities that are USEFUL to us INDIVIDUALLY include happiness, joy, triumph, INDIVIDUALLY include happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, honesty, fidelity, truth, temperance, patience, prosperity, honesty, fidelity, truth, temperance, patience, perseverance, sobriety, and physical fitness.perseverance, sobriety, and physical fitness.

In chapter 7 what is In chapter 7 what is immediatelyimmediately AGREEABLE to AGREEABLE to OURSELVES include pleasure accompanied with OURSELVES include pleasure accompanied with temperance and decency; greatness of mind, character, temperance and decency; greatness of mind, character, philosophical tranquility or magnanimous predisposition, philosophical tranquility or magnanimous predisposition, benevolence, and bravery.benevolence, and bravery.

Chapter 8: Of Qualities Immediately Chapter 8: Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others:Agreeable to Others:

What is What is immediately agreeable to othersimmediately agreeable to others: wit, politeness, modesty, : wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality which one possesses which we decency, or any agreeable quality which one possesses which we characterizes as good manners and character. characterizes as good manners and character.

How one determines those qualities is whether they have a How one determines those qualities is whether they have a beneficial, useful, extensive, and positive influence; not only will beneficial, useful, extensive, and positive influence; not only will they harmonize with the moral sensibilities of others and they harmonize with the moral sensibilities of others and ourselves, but will produce pleasure personally and socially. ourselves, but will produce pleasure personally and socially.

To be sure, no quality is absolutely either blamable or To be sure, no quality is absolutely either blamable or praiseworthy; it is all according to its degree and coherence (6.1. praiseworthy; it is all according to its degree and coherence (6.1. 68). But for those that produce public affection, they must be 68). But for those that produce public affection, they must be pursued (e.g., self-love vs. community-centered) (5.1. 48-49). pursued (e.g., self-love vs. community-centered) (5.1. 48-49).

Chapter 9: Conclusion:Chapter 9: Conclusion:

Reason does not cause our actions.Reason does not cause our actions.

Our actions are caused by a combination of utility and sentiment Our actions are caused by a combination of utility and sentiment whereby reason is embedded in the passions, desires, habits, and whereby reason is embedded in the passions, desires, habits, and sentiments of mind. In other words, morality cannot be sentiments of mind. In other words, morality cannot be separated from psychology. separated from psychology.

There is no such thing as good and evil outside of human There is no such thing as good and evil outside of human sentiments. sentiments.

What promotes happiness among our fellow humans “What promotes happiness among our fellow humans “is goodis good” ” and what tends to their misery “and what tends to their misery “is evilis evil”; we do not need to go ”; we do not need to go any further in our reflection or deliberation on these matters. any further in our reflection or deliberation on these matters.

What is virtuous is useful.What is virtuous is useful.

Chapter 9: Conclusion:Chapter 9: Conclusion:

Hume writes:Hume writes:

““What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish these What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish these sentiments, dependent on humanity, from those sentiments, dependent on humanity, from those connected with any other passion , or to satisfy us, why connected with any other passion , or to satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, not the latter? the former are the origin of morals, not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures also the applause of all my humanity, procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them; but mankind, by affecting the same principle in them; but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me alone, and affects not the avarice and passions in me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of mankind. There is no ambition of the rest of mankind. There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided it has a circumstance of conduct in any man, provided it has a beneficial tendency that is not agreeable to my beneficial tendency that is not agreeable to my humanity…” (9.1.112-13).humanity…” (9.1.112-13).

Central Ideas:Central Ideas:

1.1. Moral sentiment is where moral decision-making Moral sentiment is where moral decision-making is grounded.is grounded.

2.2. Sympathy is the capacity to be moved or affected Sympathy is the capacity to be moved or affected by the happiness & suffering of others-to be by the happiness & suffering of others-to be pleased when others prosper and distressed when pleased when others prosper and distressed when others suffer.others suffer.

3.3. The inclination for this capacity is experienced to The inclination for this capacity is experienced to be a principle of human nature (V.17).be a principle of human nature (V.17).

Central Ideas:Central Ideas:

4.4. Sympathy is not a virtue but the source of moral Sympathy is not a virtue but the source of moral approval.approval.

5.5. When we ascribe moral praise or blame, the praise or When we ascribe moral praise or blame, the praise or blame derives from an attitude of sympathy.blame derives from an attitude of sympathy.

6.6. Sympathy, if not universal, is a feature for any normal Sympathy, if not universal, is a feature for any normal human being. human being.

7.7. Hume attempts to describe and explain how we do in fact Hume attempts to describe and explain how we do in fact make moral judgments; he does not tell us how we ought make moral judgments; he does not tell us how we ought to make them. In other words, he is concerned with to make them. In other words, he is concerned with judgments about personal qualities rather than judgments about personal qualities rather than judgments about actions.judgments about actions.

8. Three Stages of Judgments:8. Three Stages of Judgments:

First Stage: Sympathy induces us to take into account the First Stage: Sympathy induces us to take into account the happiness and suffering others and ourselves.happiness and suffering others and ourselves.

Second Stage: General standards correct the operation of Second Stage: General standards correct the operation of sympathy so that we attach the same moral importance to sympathy so that we attach the same moral importance to the happiness or suffering of anyone, ourselves, or others, the happiness or suffering of anyone, ourselves, or others, close to us or remote to us.close to us or remote to us.

Third stage: In some cases we need to take into account Third stage: In some cases we need to take into account not merely the utility or particular acts, but the usefulness not merely the utility or particular acts, but the usefulness to society of a whole system of general rules and to society of a whole system of general rules and conventions.conventions.

8. Three Stages of Judgments:8. Three Stages of Judgments:

Each of these three is a move from a limited to a Each of these three is a move from a limited to a more generalized standpoint.more generalized standpoint.

Together they challenge the Platonic-Together they challenge the Platonic-Aristotelian view that one’s moral assessments Aristotelian view that one’s moral assessments are necessarily made from the standpoint of a are necessarily made from the standpoint of a concern for one’s own well-being.concern for one’s own well-being.

9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:

““When a man dominates another his enemy, his rival, his When a man dominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments peculiar to language of self-love, and to express sentiments peculiar to himself and arising form his particular circumstances and himself and arising form his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments in which he expects all language, and expresses sentiments in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must therefore, his audience are to concur with him. He must therefore, depart, from his private and particular situation and must depart, from his private and particular situation and must choose a point of view common to him with others; he must choose a point of view common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame (IX.6).”move some universal principle of the human frame (IX.6).”

9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:

““This universal principle is the sentiment of humanity or This universal principle is the sentiment of humanity or sympathy. And though this affection of humanity may not sympathy. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the formulation being common to all men, it can alone be the formulation of morals or of any general system of blame or praise of morals or of any general system of blame or praise (Ibid).”(Ibid).”

10. Similarities:10. Similarities:

Hume agrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:Hume agrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:

A.A. Moral judgments are primarily about virtues and vices. We Moral judgments are primarily about virtues and vices. We praise people insofar as they exhibit virtues and blame then praise people insofar as they exhibit virtues and blame then insofar as they exhibit vices. Only secondarily are our moral insofar as they exhibit vices. Only secondarily are our moral judgments concerned with specific actions. We praise or judgments concerned with specific actions. We praise or blame others because they reveal morally admirable qualities blame others because they reveal morally admirable qualities in the agent.in the agent.

B.B. Virtues would not be virtues unless possession of them Virtues would not be virtues unless possession of them were in some sense an advantage. In fact, Hume, an were in some sense an advantage. In fact, Hume, an action is action is only virtuous if it proceeds from a virtuousonly virtuous if it proceeds from a virtuous motive. motive. So if an action lacks a virtuous motive, that So if an action lacks a virtuous motive, that action is not action is not virtuous even if it is the same type of action virtuous even if it is the same type of action as a genuinely as a genuinely virtuous action.virtuous action.

11. Differences:11. Differences:

Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:

A.A. Differences emerges when we look at what Hume Differences emerges when we look at what Hume counts as virtues.counts as virtues.

1.1. For Hume, what makes various qualities For Hume, what makes various qualities “virtues” is that they are useful or “virtues” is that they are useful or

agreeable with, either to the agreeable with, either to the possessor or possessor or to others.to others.

2.2. For Hume, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, For Hume, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, thinks that not only qualities useful or agreeable thinks that not only qualities useful or agreeable

to their possessor, but also qualities useful to their possessor, but also qualities useful or or agreeable to others, are regarded virtues.agreeable to others, are regarded virtues.


Hume contends that virtues may be immediately pleasing, in Hume contends that virtues may be immediately pleasing, in which case he describes the qualities as “agreeable”; or may which case he describes the qualities as “agreeable”; or may be an indirect advantage-i.e., possession of such qualities may be an indirect advantage-i.e., possession of such qualities may help to promote states of affairs which in their turn are help to promote states of affairs which in their turn are pleasurable, and these are these are the qualities which Hume pleasurable, and these are these are the qualities which Hume describes as ‘useful.’ He parts company from Plato and describes as ‘useful.’ He parts company from Plato and Aristotle, however, in that he thinks that not only qualities are Aristotle, however, in that he thinks that not only qualities are useful or agreeable to their possessor, but also qualities useful useful or agreeable to their possessor, but also qualities useful or agreeable to others, are regarded as virtuesor agreeable to others, are regarded as virtues

11. Differences:11. Differences:B.B. Benevolence also marks a decisive shift from the standpoint of Benevolence also marks a decisive shift from the standpoint of

the Greeks.the Greeks.

1.1. Hume states that ‘the epithets [labels] sociable, good-Hume states that ‘the epithets [labels] sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents… generous, beneficent, or their equivalents… universally express the highest merit which human universally express the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining (II.1).’nature is capable of attaining (II.1).’

2.2. Benevolence is a quality the exercise of which Benevolence is a quality the exercise of which promotes the happiness or well-being of people in promotes the happiness or well-being of people in general, and because, through sympathy, we take general, and because, through sympathy, we take pleasure in this general happiness or well-being, we pleasure in this general happiness or well-being, we are led to admire the quality which promotes it.are led to admire the quality which promotes it.


3.3. Since Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle’s Since Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics and believes these virtues are metaphysics and believes these virtues are

sourced in sourced in man’s constitution we understand why he man’s constitution we understand why he would would regard benevolence the highest merit. regard benevolence the highest merit.

4.4. In fact, Hume’s notion of sympathy sets him apart from In fact, Hume’s notion of sympathy sets him apart from the egoistic perspective of Plato and Aristotle the egoistic perspective of Plato and Aristotle

though he though he does abandon his reliance on sympathy does abandon his reliance on sympathy and revert to and revert to self-love in part II of self-love in part II of Enquiry’sEnquiry’s conclusion.conclusion.

11. Differences:11. Differences:B.B. Hobbes:Hobbes:

1.1. Hume rejects Hobbes harsh egoistic depiction of human Hume rejects Hobbes harsh egoistic depiction of human psychology and strong authoritarianism and states psychology and strong authoritarianism and states

(Hume) that we are not wholly self-(Hume) that we are not wholly self-seeking; we can take seeking; we can take immediate pleasure in the immediate pleasure in the flourishing of others. flourishing of others.

2.2. Virtue of justice develops out of the self-regulation of Virtue of justice develops out of the self-regulation of our desire for possessions, in an implicit denial of our desire for possessions, in an implicit denial of

Hobbes’ view that there can be no justice Hobbes’ view that there can be no justice without without external regulations by a stronger external regulations by a stronger ruler. Life in a secular ruler. Life in a secular world need not be grim; it world need not be grim; it can be both enjoyable and can be both enjoyable and free.free.

An Introduction to John RawlsAn Introduction to John RawlsJohn Rawls, John Rawls,

A Theory of Justice:A Theory of Justice: Cambridge: Harvard, 1971) Cambridge: Harvard, 1971)

&&The Law of PeoplesThe Law of Peoples

(Cambridge: Harvard, 1999), (Cambridge: Harvard, 1999), a book that extends a book that extends

distributive justice to a global distributive justice to a global context.context.

Lived from 1921-2002,Lived from 1921-2002,Dr. Rawls was professor at Dr. Rawls was professor at

Harvard UniversityHarvard University, author of , author of such as works as such as works as A Theory of A Theory of JusticeJustice, , Justice as FairnessJustice as Fairness, ,

and and Lectures on the History of Lectures on the History of Moral PhilosophyMoral Philosophy..

Summary of Rawls ContributionSummary of Rawls Contribution

A.A. American political philosopher who made a tremendous American political philosopher who made a tremendous impact in Anglo-American political philosophy in a series impact in Anglo-American political philosophy in a series of articles that culminated in of articles that culminated in A Theory of Justice.A Theory of Justice.

B.B. Rawls opposed utilitarianism with its exclusive concern Rawls opposed utilitarianism with its exclusive concern with aggregate happiness. Rather, Rawls argues that the with aggregate happiness. Rather, Rawls argues that the fundamental or essential political value is individual rights fundamental or essential political value is individual rights or “justice as fairness.” or “justice as fairness.”


C.C. The most reasonable principle of justice are those everyone The most reasonable principle of justice are those everyone would accept and agree to from a fair position. would accept and agree to from a fair position.

D.D. A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is impartially A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is impartially situated as equals (the original position) and a certain situated as equals (the original position) and a certain degree of rationality (a certain conception of the good we degree of rationality (a certain conception of the good we want to realize and that it requires a certain set of primary want to realize and that it requires a certain set of primary goods (all purpose or good needs) to realize a fair goods (all purpose or good needs) to realize a fair agreement) and is situated by a hypothetical veil of agreement) and is situated by a hypothetical veil of ignorance ( no extra bargain powers). ignorance ( no extra bargain powers).

E.E. The veil of ignorance demands that people set aside their The veil of ignorance demands that people set aside their knowledge of their particular differences, including knowledge of their particular differences, including knowledge of philosophical, religious & social positions, knowledge of philosophical, religious & social positions, conception of values, and wealth.conception of values, and wealth.


1.1. Let’s say two parties are disputing the future arrangement Let’s say two parties are disputing the future arrangement of a set of primary goods—income, for example. In what of a set of primary goods—income, for example. In what Rawls terms the “original position,” both parties as equals, Rawls terms the “original position,” both parties as equals, know the benefits and disadvantages that will flow from a know the benefits and disadvantages that will flow from a particular distribution of those goods: that a worker will particular distribution of those goods: that a worker will achieve a particular wage, a manager a certain salary, a achieve a particular wage, a manager a certain salary, a stakeholder a certain return on investment, and so on. But stakeholder a certain return on investment, and so on. But a veil of ignorance exists for the parties. Neither party in a veil of ignorance exists for the parties. Neither party in the original position knows their specific place in that the original position knows their specific place in that future arrangement, they come as equals (original future arrangement, they come as equals (original position), setting aside their particular differences (veil of position), setting aside their particular differences (veil of ignorance).ignorance).

Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that maximizes the benefits to all. arrangement that maximizes the benefits to all.

Summary of Rawls ContributionSummary of Rawls Contribution2.2. Stated differently, for fairness, you want to ignore your own Stated differently, for fairness, you want to ignore your own

personal circumstances when you come to the discussion table.personal circumstances when you come to the discussion table.

3.3. Theoretically we use the “veil of ignorance” to convey the idea Theoretically we use the “veil of ignorance” to convey the idea that if you don’t know your own personal situation, you are that if you don’t know your own personal situation, you are forced to create laws that can be universally applied. By having forced to create laws that can be universally applied. By having this “blind” point of view, you are not motivated by personal or this “blind” point of view, you are not motivated by personal or national self-interests, inclinations, desires, etc. All that remains national self-interests, inclinations, desires, etc. All that remains is reason. is reason.

4.4. Why? Each person as a rational being wills to enjoy the primary Why? Each person as a rational being wills to enjoy the primary social goods and primary natural goods. Social primary goods social goods and primary natural goods. Social primary goods include rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and include rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and wealth are social goods. Primary natural goods include health, wealth are social goods. Primary natural goods include health, vigor, intelligence, & imagination. These goods are desirable for vigor, intelligence, & imagination. These goods are desirable for any rational plan of life. Our rationality is flexible in that we are any rational plan of life. Our rationality is flexible in that we are willing to give some of these liberties up to help those who are in willing to give some of these liberties up to help those who are in need or less fortunate.need or less fortunate.


F.F. Rawls proceeds by arguing for a “social contract” as Rawls proceeds by arguing for a “social contract” as articulated in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. articulated in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.

G.G. Said differently, the ultimate basis of society is a set of tacit Said differently, the ultimate basis of society is a set of tacit agreements. The question then becomes, what conditions agreements. The question then becomes, what conditions will satisfy all parties.will satisfy all parties.

H.H. In the hypothetical original position everyone would reject In the hypothetical original position everyone would reject utilitarianism & intuitionist views. Rather, everyone would utilitarianism & intuitionist views. Rather, everyone would unanimously accept justice as fairness.unanimously accept justice as fairness.


I.I. Justice as fairness consists of two principles:Justice as fairness consists of two principles:

11stst Principle: Certain liberties are basic and are to be Principle: Certain liberties are basic and are to be equally provided to all: Freedom of conscience, freedom equally provided to all: Freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of association, equal political thought, of thought, freedom of association, equal political thought, freedom and integrity of the person, and the liberties that freedom and integrity of the person, and the liberties that maintain the rule of law.maintain the rule of law.

They are basic because they are necessary to exercise They are basic because they are necessary to exercise one’s “moral powers.” one’s “moral powers.”

..


1.1. They are basic liberties because they are necessary to They are basic liberties because they are necessary to exercise one’s “exercise one’s “moral powersmoral powers.” The two moral powers .” The two moral powers are:are:

a.a. The capacity to be rational, to have a rational The capacity to be rational, to have a rational conception of one’s good.conception of one’s good.

b.b. The capacity for a sense of justice, to The capacity for a sense of justice, to understand, apply, and act from understand, apply, and act from

requirements requirements of justice.of justice.

Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that maximizes the benefits to all. maximizes the benefits to all.


1.1. They are basic liberties because they are necessary to They are basic liberties because they are necessary to exercise one’s “moral powers.” The two moral powers exercise one’s “moral powers.” The two moral powers are:are:

a.a. The capacity to be rational, to have a rational The capacity to be rational, to have a rational conception of one’s good.conception of one’s good.

b.b. The capacity for a sense of justice, to The capacity for a sense of justice, to understand, apply, and act from understand, apply, and act from

requirements requirements of justice.of justice.

Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that maximizes the benefits to all. maximizes the benefits to all.


22ndnd Principle is the difference principle: Principle is the difference principle:

The difference principle regulates permissible differences The difference principle regulates permissible differences in rights, powers, & privileges. It defines the limits of in rights, powers, & privileges. It defines the limits of inequalities in income, positions, powers, and wealth that inequalities in income, positions, powers, and wealth that may exist in a just society.may exist in a just society.

The difference principles asserts that social positions are to The difference principles asserts that social positions are to be open to all to compete for on terms of fair equality of be open to all to compete for on terms of fair equality of opportunity. Inequalities in income, social powers, and opportunity. Inequalities in income, social powers, and wealth are permissible only if they maximally benefit the wealth are permissible only if they maximally benefit the least advantaged class in society.least advantaged class in society.


2.2. Therefore, the difference principle contends Therefore, the difference principle contends that a just economic system distributes income that a just economic system distributes income

and wealth so as to make the class of least and wealth so as to make the class of least advantaged persons better off than advantaged persons better off than

they would be under any alternative economic system. they would be under any alternative economic system.

3.3. To be sure, this principle is to be consistent with the To be sure, this principle is to be consistent with the “priority” of the first principle which requires that equal “priority” of the first principle which requires that equal basic liberties cannot be traded for other benefits. basic liberties cannot be traded for other benefits.

4.4. A basic liberty can be limited only for the sake of A basic liberty can be limited only for the sake of maintaining other basic liberties.maintaining other basic liberties.


J.J. Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:

11stst: Certain liberties are basic and equally provided to all;: Certain liberties are basic and equally provided to all; 22ndnd: Difference principle which regulates permissible differences in : Difference principle which regulates permissible differences in

rights, powers, and privileges;rights, powers, and privileges;

a.a. A just society maximizes the worth to the least A just society maximizes the worth to the least advantaged for the basic liberties shared by all advantaged for the basic liberties shared by all

(Theory, (Theory, pg. 205). pg. 205).

b.b. Priority of basic liberty implies a liberal egalitarian Priority of basic liberty implies a liberal egalitarian society in which each person is ensured adequate society in which each person is ensured adequate resources to effectively exercise her basic liberties resources to effectively exercise her basic liberties

and and become independent and self-governingbecome independent and self-governing


J.J. Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:

c.c. Thus, a just society is governed by a liberal-Thus, a just society is governed by a liberal-democratic democratic constitution that protects the basic liberties constitution that protects the basic liberties and provides and provides citizens with equally effective rights to citizens with equally effective rights to participate in participate in electoral processes and influence legislation.electoral processes and influence legislation.

d.d. Economically, a just society incorporates a Economically, a just society incorporates a modified modified market system that extensively distributes market system that extensively distributes income and income and wealth-either a property-owning democracy wealth-either a property-owning democracy with with widespread ownership of means of widespread ownership of means of production, or liberal production, or liberal socialism.socialism.


K.K. In sum, Rawls general conception of Justice:In sum, Rawls general conception of Justice:

All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored. (303)advantage of the least favored. (303)

This flows from Kant’s categorical imperative, This flows from Kant’s categorical imperative, ““Desire to treat one another not as means only but as Desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselvesends in themselves.” People are be treated as ends in .” People are be treated as ends in themselves because of their capacity for moral themselves because of their capacity for moral choice.choice.


L.L. In conclusion, if we accept Rawls’ tenets of the In conclusion, if we accept Rawls’ tenets of the following:following:

Original Position: Original Position: A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is impartially situated as equals; this is a justice of fairness. If I want to justify impartially situated as equals; this is a justice of fairness. If I want to justify policy to other people, then I have to adopt a perspective that forces me to adopt policy to other people, then I have to adopt a perspective that forces me to adopt the good of others. It is a powerful heuristic device. It is offering respect to the good of others. It is a powerful heuristic device. It is offering respect to others (intuitive principle).others (intuitive principle).

Veil of Ignorance: Veil of Ignorance: people set aside their knowledge of their particular people set aside their knowledge of their particular differences, preferences, abilities, and position (including knowledge of differences, preferences, abilities, and position (including knowledge of philosophical, religious & social positions, conception of values, and wealth). It philosophical, religious & social positions, conception of values, and wealth). It is offering respect to others (intuitive principle).is offering respect to others (intuitive principle).

Difference Principle: Difference Principle: a just economic system distributes income and a just economic system distributes income and wealth so as to make the class of least advantaged persons better off than they wealth so as to make the class of least advantaged persons better off than they would be under any alternative economic system. would be under any alternative economic system.

We have a foundational, universal, systematic method We have a foundational, universal, systematic method for judging the moral actions of a society (s)for judging the moral actions of a society (s)

Rawls vs. Plato:Rawls vs. Plato: Why Rawls is different than Plato (c. 427-347 Why Rawls is different than Plato (c. 427-347

B.C.)?B.C.)?

Plato raises an interesting question: Plato raises an interesting question:

“ “What advantage is there in being just?What advantage is there in being just?

1.1. In presenting an ideal state as articulated in In presenting an ideal state as articulated in The RepublicThe Republic, Plato , Plato contends that on occasion, the leaders must manipulate some citizens contends that on occasion, the leaders must manipulate some citizens through the social device of a “Noble Lie” in order to achieve a well-through the social device of a “Noble Lie” in order to achieve a well-ordered state. ordered state.

2.2. Rawls contends that no individual, of his or her own volition, Rawls contends that no individual, of his or her own volition, will agree to a social principle which reduces him or her to mere means. will agree to a social principle which reduces him or her to mere means. Rather, contract must be such that if they were made public, everyone Rather, contract must be such that if they were made public, everyone would continue to support them. In Plato’s case, publicity would surely would continue to support them. In Plato’s case, publicity would surely work toward the disaffection of those being lied to. Indeed, this would work toward the disaffection of those being lied to. Indeed, this would be the case even if individuals acknowledged their inferior abilities.be the case even if individuals acknowledged their inferior abilities.

Rawls vs. Hobbes:Rawls vs. Hobbes: Why Rawls is different than Hobbes (1588-1679)?Why Rawls is different than Hobbes (1588-1679)?

1.1. Hobbes insists that we agree to subordinate ourselves Hobbes insists that we agree to subordinate ourselves completely to an absolute sovereign power because of our self-serving completely to an absolute sovereign power because of our self-serving desire for security. But even if we subordinate ourselves to a sovereign desire for security. But even if we subordinate ourselves to a sovereign power and achieve a measure of security, we, more than likely, wouldn’t power and achieve a measure of security, we, more than likely, wouldn’t remain bound by the agreements made. Ex. On a Hobbesian account if remain bound by the agreements made. Ex. On a Hobbesian account if a citizen in a secure environment desires to steal, is confident that he can a citizen in a secure environment desires to steal, is confident that he can avoid detection, there is no reason in theory or practice for him to feel avoid detection, there is no reason in theory or practice for him to feel morally constrained from acting on that desire.morally constrained from acting on that desire.

If there is no fear, there is no obligation!If there is no fear, there is no obligation!

2.2. Rawls believes that basic social agreements must be such that Rawls believes that basic social agreements must be such that they are acceptable in perpetuity, i.e., contracts are not conditional upon they are acceptable in perpetuity, i.e., contracts are not conditional upon on the happenstance of one’s position in a society at a given time. on the happenstance of one’s position in a society at a given time.

Rawls vs. Hume:Rawls vs. Hume:

Why Rawls is different than Hume?Why Rawls is different than Hume?

1.1. Hume states, “There is a maxim very current in the world, which few Hume states, “There is a maxim very current in the world, which few politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons.” persons.” Treatise Treatise pg. 597.pg. 597.

While morality may extend to princes, it does not have the same force as While morality may extend to princes, it does not have the same force as that of private persons.that of private persons.

2.2. Hume believes that neither justice or injustice is in the state of nature Hume believes that neither justice or injustice is in the state of nature because justice and injustice are conventional. Questions of justice arise because justice and injustice are conventional. Questions of justice arise exclusively in connection with social rules, adopted in the expectation of exclusively in connection with social rules, adopted in the expectation of mutual benefit, & observed in expectation of mutual conformity.mutual benefit, & observed in expectation of mutual conformity.

3.3. Rawls would respond by saying that contracts need to made in such a Rawls would respond by saying that contracts need to made in such a way that it bears equality & responsibility on both prince and pauper.way that it bears equality & responsibility on both prince and pauper.

Rawls vs. Marx:Rawls vs. Marx:

Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):

1.1. Marx contends that only in a classless society, where all people become Marx contends that only in a classless society, where all people become workers, where the means of production are socially owned, can all workers, where the means of production are socially owned, can all participate equally in making the decisions that shape their lives. Only participate equally in making the decisions that shape their lives. Only socialism allows us to have “an association , in which the free socialism allows us to have “an association , in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” development of each is the condition for the free development of all” ((The Communist ManifestoThe Communist Manifesto, 491)., 491).

““In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association , which the free development antagonisms, we shall have an association , which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (pg. 491). In of each is the condition for the free development of all” (pg. 491). In other words, a society without class conflict will permit all people to other words, a society without class conflict will permit all people to freely develop their human powers. Human freedom is the self-freely develop their human powers. Human freedom is the self-actualization as conscious, human beings. Moreover, he argues, actualization as conscious, human beings. Moreover, he argues, “Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual “Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen” (pg. 46).man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen” (pg. 46).

Rawls vs. Marx:Rawls vs. Marx:

Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):

2.2. For one, Rawls would respond by contending for For one, Rawls would respond by contending for ““reasonablereasonable” pluralism because classes will not escape ” pluralism because classes will not escape fundamental conflicts of interests among various groups; we fundamental conflicts of interests among various groups; we have to be realistic. Moreover, inequality in economic have to be realistic. Moreover, inequality in economic resources is permitted, but only as long as it benefits the resources is permitted, but only as long as it benefits the least advantaged. Secondly, we must protect the equal least advantaged. Secondly, we must protect the equal liberties of citizenship: political liberty, freedom of speech liberties of citizenship: political liberty, freedom of speech and speech; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; and speech; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to have personal freedom of the person along with the right to have personal property; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure is a right property; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure is a right for all. Marxism removes these essential freedoms as for all. Marxism removes these essential freedoms as demonstrated in the oppression of people as clearly evident demonstrated in the oppression of people as clearly evident in history.in history.

Rawls vs. Nozick:Rawls vs. Nozick:

Why Rawls is different than Robert Nozick (1938-2002): Why Rawls is different than Robert Nozick (1938-2002): The individual takes precedence over the state. In fact:The individual takes precedence over the state. In fact:

1.1. Nozick calls for a minimal view of state (libertarianism) Nozick calls for a minimal view of state (libertarianism) because people far-reaching intrinsic human rights, which because people far-reaching intrinsic human rights, which includes the rights of ownership, entitlement, private includes the rights of ownership, entitlement, private property; people are not burdened distributive justice and property; people are not burdened distributive justice and legislation. Rather, they have entitlements and will pay for legislation. Rather, they have entitlements and will pay for services of protection. If we follow Rawls, we lose certain services of protection. If we follow Rawls, we lose certain freedoms, and entitlements; it also curtails creativity and freedoms, and entitlements; it also curtails creativity and productivity.productivity.

2.2. Rawls would respond by contending for distributive justice Rawls would respond by contending for distributive justice that is end-goal and patterned; Nozick’s view of justice that is end-goal and patterned; Nozick’s view of justice lacks fairness (fair opportunity of equality).lacks fairness (fair opportunity of equality).

II. Basic Argument of Laws of Peoples:II. Basic Argument of Laws of Peoples:

A.A. First, this book consists of two parts: First, this book consists of two parts:

1.1. The essay “The Idea of Reason The essay “The Idea of Reason Revisited,” first published in Revisited,” first published in 1997.1997.

2.2. A revised essay “The Law of A revised essay “The Law of Peoples” first published in Peoples” first published in 1993.1993.

I. Basic ArgumentI. Basic Argument

B.B. The Idea of Public Revisited offers a The Idea of Public Revisited offers a detailed account of how a modern detailed account of how a modern constitutional democracy, based on a liberal constitutional democracy, based on a liberal political conception, could (ideal) and would political conception, could (ideal) and would (real) viewed as legitimate by reasonable (real) viewed as legitimate by reasonable citizens who on religious, philosophical, or citizens who on religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do not themselves accept a moral grounds do not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive doctrine.liberal comprehensive doctrine.

I. Basic ArgumentI. Basic ArgumentC.C. In essence, Rawls conceives the “Law of People” as being a “particular In essence, Rawls conceives the “Law of People” as being a “particular

conception of rights and justice that applies to the principles and norms conception of rights and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice.of international law and practice.

D.D. ““Society of Peoples” means “all those people who follow the ideals and Society of Peoples” means “all those people who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of people in their mutual relations. These peoples principles of the Law of people in their mutual relations. These peoples have their own internal governments, which may be constitutional have their own internal governments, which may be constitutional liberal democratic or non-liberal but decent governments.liberal democratic or non-liberal but decent governments.

E.E. Rawls rejects the difference people on global level. Rawls rejects the difference people on global level. F.F. He has a deeper view of pluralism; he doesn’t want to impose He has a deeper view of pluralism; he doesn’t want to impose

“liberalism” upon other countries. It is about the principle of toleration “liberalism” upon other countries. It is about the principle of toleration seriously (respecting others); there is a much deeper level of pluralism seriously (respecting others); there is a much deeper level of pluralism on the international society that is required.on the international society that is required.

1.1. There is diversity among liberal societies and illiberal societies. There is diversity among liberal societies and illiberal societies. 2.2. Recognize the autonomy of societies as I do for individuals; I don’t have to Recognize the autonomy of societies as I do for individuals; I don’t have to

enforceenforce

E. 5 Types of SocietiesE. 5 Types of Societies

BenevolentAbsolutisms

Societies burdened

by unfavorableConditions

Outlaw states

Decent Peoples

ReasonableLiberal Peoples

Types of Societies

Honor human rights but denied meaningful

participation in political decision-making

Non-liberal societies whose basic institutions meet certain conditions

of political right & justice (e.g., just law;

participation in politics)

Well-ordered peoples

Not well-ordered peoples

Not well-ordered peoples

“The aim of the Laws of Peoples would be fully achieved when all societies have been able to establish either a liberal or a decent regime, however unlikely that may be (pg.5).” pp. 3-5.

Conditions of societies whose

historical, social, and economic circumstances

make their achieving a well-ordered regime difficult if not

impossible

Non-compliance: they refuse to comply with a

reasonable Law of People (e.g., war advances

national interests).

I. Basic Argument: Political I. Basic Argument: Political liberalism or “realistic utopia”liberalism or “realistic utopia”

F. F. Rawls presupposes a series of actions based upon rational Rawls presupposes a series of actions based upon rational principles, developing the ideas of justice and public reason principles, developing the ideas of justice and public reason to argue that a reasonable Law of Peoples based upon the to argue that a reasonable Law of Peoples based upon the tenets of political liberalism is both possible and realistic. tenets of political liberalism is both possible and realistic. Several features mark this argument. Several features mark this argument.

1.1. Rawls conceives of governments as an outgrowth of Rawls conceives of governments as an outgrowth of the the need of citizens to act, to express their common and need of citizens to act, to express their common and

moral nature (23). moral nature (23).

2.2. Governments are thus a means, not an end; the basic Governments are thus a means, not an end; the basic unit unit to be considered, then, is the people—and thus the to be considered, then, is the people—and thus the Law Law of Peoples, not the Laws of States. of Peoples, not the Laws of States.


3.3. Democracy seems to be the most practicable means of Democracy seems to be the most practicable means of government for achieving the ends of justice (though it may government for achieving the ends of justice (though it may not the only means of governance that might work).not the only means of governance that might work).

a.a. Hierarchical societies may also achieve the ends of Hierarchical societies may also achieve the ends of justice. Some argue that Rawls' work is particularly justice. Some argue that Rawls' work is particularly relevant at this point in dealing with problems in the relevant at this point in dealing with problems in the countries of Middle East and Asia” (via) decent countries of Middle East and Asia” (via) decent consultation hierarchy" to achieve similar ends to those consultation hierarchy" to achieve similar ends to those of the liberal democratic state. of the liberal democratic state.

b.b. The approach helps us move beyond the icily reified The approach helps us move beyond the icily reified conflict recorded in Samuel Huntington's “clashes of conflict recorded in Samuel Huntington's “clashes of culture." culture."


4.4. TThe fundamental division is not between he fundamental division is not between democratic and non-democratic peoples democratic and non-democratic peoples or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and non-decent or outlaw peoples. Decent non-decent or outlaw peoples. Decent peoples allow toleration and subscribe peoples allow toleration and subscribe to eight principles:to eight principles:


5.5. Liberal peoples allow autonomy and on-Liberal peoples allow autonomy and on-intervention and subscribe to eight principles intervention and subscribe to eight principles and hope to show their acceptability to illiberal and hope to show their acceptability to illiberal peoples (this is the full list of guiding peoples (this is the full list of guiding principled for international ethics):principled for international ethics):

a.a. Peoples are free and independent, and Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to their freedom and independence are to

be be respected by other peoples. respected by other peoples.

b. Peoples are to observe treaties and b. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. undertakings.

c.c. Peoples are equal and are parties to Peoples are equal and are parties to the the agreements that bind them. agreements that bind them.


d.d. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.

e.e. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-to instigate war for reasons other than self-

defense.defense.

f.f. Peoples are to honor human rights.Peoples are to honor human rights.

g.g. Peoples are to observe certain specified Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. restrictions in the conduct of war.

h.h. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their under unfavorable conditions that prevent their

having a just or decent political and social having a just or decent political and social regime. regime. (37)(37)

I. Basic ArgumentI. Basic Argument6.6. Description of a decent society:Description of a decent society:

a.a. Not aggressiveNot aggressiveb.b. Engages in war only in self-defense.Engages in war only in self-defense.c.c. Common good idea of justice that assigns human rights to all Common good idea of justice that assigns human rights to all its its members.members.d.d. Includes a decent consultation hierarchy which protects these Includes a decent consultation hierarchy which protects these and and other rights and ensures that all groups in society are decently other rights and ensures that all groups in society are decently represented by elected bodies in the system of consultationrepresented by elected bodies in the system of consultatione.e. Fair, reasonable, & sincere judicial system.Fair, reasonable, & sincere judicial system.f.f. Laws grounded by force are grounds for rebellion and Laws grounded by force are grounds for rebellion and rebellion.rebellion.g. A slavery cannot belong to a decent society.g. A slavery cannot belong to a decent society.

I. Basic ArgumentI. Basic Argument7.7. Rawls's methodology thus places peoples behind a suitable veil Rawls's methodology thus places peoples behind a suitable veil

of ignorance, and inquires about what principles could be of ignorance, and inquires about what principles could be developed to guide the interactions between them. The analysis developed to guide the interactions between them. The analysis proceeds in three stages:proceeds in three stages:

The first develops the appropriate content of the veil of ignorance in The first develops the appropriate content of the veil of ignorance in this context, and discusses what principles could be developed between this context, and discusses what principles could be developed between liberal peoples for their mutual interaction. liberal peoples for their mutual interaction.

The second extends the analysis to illiberal peoples, and tries to show The second extends the analysis to illiberal peoples, and tries to show the acceptability of the principles to illiberal peoples as well. the acceptability of the principles to illiberal peoples as well.

Illiberal are states that do not respect freedom and equality but are not Illiberal are states that do not respect freedom and equality but are not expansionist and offer some sort of legal system that is able to impose expansionist and offer some sort of legal system that is able to impose moral duties on its citizens (benevolent absolutisms; societies burdened moral duties on its citizens (benevolent absolutisms; societies burdened by unfavorable conditions). by unfavorable conditions).

The final stage extends these principles of ideal theory to such non-The final stage extends these principles of ideal theory to such non-ideal contexts as partial compliance and unfavorable conditions (other ideal contexts as partial compliance and unfavorable conditions (other burdened and benevolent peoples but we must condemn outlaw states).burdened and benevolent peoples but we must condemn outlaw states).


Liberal or illiberal—which are able to take responsibility of their collective political life, maintain minimally decent political institutions, and have acceptable moral relations with outside nations have an obligation moral to assist all societies become a well-ordered society. Such a duty is based upon the notion of the international community as itself a well-ordered society of well-ordered societies, in which each state is enjoined to respect and tolerate the different methods of governance of each other state.

I. Basic Argument”I. Basic Argument”

8.8. Rawls international ethics is a weaker form of his Rawls international ethics is a weaker form of his domestic ethics. Consider the following:domestic ethics. Consider the following:

a.a. Method: Respect the circumstances of the world Method: Respect the circumstances of the world as as they currently are. As a result, the original they currently are. As a result, the original position position must be set up in such a way that illiberal must be set up in such a way that illiberal states can states can accept as well.accept as well.

b. Those countries who violate human rights, free b. Those countries who violate human rights, free speech, and coercive legal structures are entitled to speech, and coercive legal structures are entitled to full and equal participation in the original position full and equal participation in the original position because respect is a simple consequence of the liberal because respect is a simple consequence of the liberal respect for autonomy and tolerance of diversity.respect for autonomy and tolerance of diversity.

c. Primary rights are rights of states to independence c. Primary rights are rights of states to independence and non-intervention.and non-intervention.

I. Basic Argument”I. Basic Argument”

d.d. Distributive Justice is inapplicable on the international level for it Distributive Justice is inapplicable on the international level for it is is unfair for wealthy nations to foot the bill for another nation’s unfair for wealthy nations to foot the bill for another nation’s lack of lack of effective and productive political structure and decision-making.effective and productive political structure and decision-making.

e.e. Difference principle is only applied domestically not Difference principle is only applied domestically not internationally. In internationally. In fact, Rawls see no need to equalize resources fact, Rawls see no need to equalize resources across borders and no across borders and no moral reason to repair the gap between moral reason to repair the gap between wealthy and impoverished wealthy and impoverished nations as being morally problematic. There nations as being morally problematic. There are two reasons why are two reasons why difference principle can’t be implemented:difference principle can’t be implemented:

1.1. Too controversial to be agreed upon internationally.Too controversial to be agreed upon internationally.2.2. It can’t be grounded by illiberal and liberal societiesIt can’t be grounded by illiberal and liberal societies

f.f. Rawls international proposal is similar to the domestic model in Rawls international proposal is similar to the domestic model in the the sense that it rest on a contractual agreement by members in sense that it rest on a contractual agreement by members in original original position (a morally defensive position or situation of choice).position (a morally defensive position or situation of choice).

Duty of Assistance for Burdened Societies:Duty of Assistance for Burdened Societies:

G.G. First Guideline for Duty of Assistance is by means of a just (real) First Guideline for Duty of Assistance is by means of a just (real) savings principle is to establish (reasonably) a just basic institution for a savings principle is to establish (reasonably) a just basic institution for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens. Savings account may stop once just or decent basic citizens. Savings account may stop once just or decent basic institutions are established. Great wealth is not necessary to establish a institutions are established. Great wealth is not necessary to establish a just or decent institutions. How much is needed will depend on a just or decent institutions. How much is needed will depend on a society’s particular history as society’s particular history as well as on its conception of justice.well as on its conception of justice.

H.H. Second guideline: Consultation: dispensing funds will not suffice to Second guideline: Consultation: dispensing funds will not suffice to rectify basic political and social injustices: emphasis on human rights rectify basic political and social injustices: emphasis on human rights may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of callous may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of callous rulers against their people (distribution of food; treatment of women).rulers against their people (distribution of food; treatment of women).

I.I. Third guideline: Target of assistance: To help them manage their own Third guideline: Target of assistance: To help them manage their own affairs reasonably and rationality whereby freedom and equality are affairs reasonably and rationality whereby freedom and equality are achieved by self-determination.achieved by self-determination.

J. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:J. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:11st st reason for reducing inequalities within a domestic society is to relieve the reason for reducing inequalities within a domestic society is to relieve the

suffering and hardships of the poor. suffering and hardships of the poor. A.A. Yet this does not require that all person be equal in wealth. In Yet this does not require that all person be equal in wealth. In itself;itself;

B.B. It doesn’t matter how great the gap between the rich and poor It doesn’t matter how great the gap between the rich and poor may may be. What matters are the consequences. For example:be. What matters are the consequences. For example:

1.1. In a liberal domestic society that gap cannot be wider In a liberal domestic society that gap cannot be wider than the criterion of reciprocity allows.than the criterion of reciprocity allows.

2.2. Why? In order that the least advantaged, as agreed Why? In order that the least advantaged, as agreed upon, have sufficient all-purpose means to make upon, have sufficient all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and to intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and to lead reasonable and worthwhile lives.lead reasonable and worthwhile lives.

a. When that situation exists, there is no further need to a. When that situation exists, there is no further need to narrow the gap. narrow the gap.

““Similarly, in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty Similarly, in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty of assistance is satisfied and all people have a working liberal or decent of assistance is satisfied and all people have a working liberal or decent

government, there is again no reason to narrow the gap between the government, there is again no reason to narrow the gap between the average wealth of different peoples.”average wealth of different peoples.”

Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:22ndnd reason for narrowing the gap between rich & poor within a domestic reason for narrowing the gap between rich & poor within a domestic

society is that such a gap often leads to the following:society is that such a gap often leads to the following:

A.A. Some citizens being stigmatized;Some citizens being stigmatized;B.B. Some citizens treated as inferiors;Some citizens treated as inferiors;

Stigmatization and inferior treatment is unjust.Stigmatization and inferior treatment is unjust.

Therefore, in a liberal or decent society, conventions that establish ranks Therefore, in a liberal or decent society, conventions that establish ranks to be recognized socially in view of admiration or esteem, must be to be recognized socially in view of admiration or esteem, must be guarded against, for they may unjustly wound the self-respect of those not guarded against, for they may unjustly wound the self-respect of those not so organized. so organized.

““The same would be true of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples The same would be true of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples should citizens in one country feel inferior to the citizens of another should citizens in one country feel inferior to the citizens of another because of its greater riches, provided that those feelings are justified. Yet because of its greater riches, provided that those feelings are justified. Yet when the duty of assistance is fulfilled, and each people has its own liberal when the duty of assistance is fulfilled, and each people has its own liberal or decent governments, these feelings are unjustified. For then each or decent governments, these feelings are unjustified. For then each people adjusts the significance and importance of the wealth of its own people adjusts the significance and importance of the wealth of its own society for itself. If it is not satisfied, it can continue to increase savings, society for itself. If it is not satisfied, it can continue to increase savings, or, if that is not feasible, borrow from other members of the Society of or, if that is not feasible, borrow from other members of the Society of Peoples” (pg. 114).Peoples” (pg. 114).

Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:33rdrd Reason for considering the inequalities among peoples concerns the Reason for considering the inequalities among peoples concerns the

important role of fairness in the political processes of the basic structure important role of fairness in the political processes of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples.of the Society of Peoples.

A.A. Domestically, the concern is evident in securing the fairness of Domestically, the concern is evident in securing the fairness of elections and of political opportunity…the background social elections and of political opportunity…the background social

conditions are such that each citizens, regardless of class or origin, conditions are such that each citizens, regardless of class or origin, should have the same chance of attaining a favored social position, should have the same chance of attaining a favored social position, given the same talents and willingness to try. Policies for achieving given the same talents and willingness to try. Policies for achieving this fair equality of opportunity include for example, securing fair this fair equality of opportunity include for example, securing fair education for all and eliminating unjust discrimination. education for all and eliminating unjust discrimination.

B.B. Fairness also plays an important role in the political processes of Fairness also plays an important role in the political processes of the the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, analogous, to, though basic structure of the Society of Peoples, analogous, to, though not not the same as, its role in the domestic case.the same as, its role in the domestic case.

H. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:H. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:Basic fairness:Basic fairness:

1.1. Given by being represented equally in the original position with Given by being represented equally in the original position with its veil of ignorance.its veil of ignorance.

2.2. Representatives of peoples will want to preserve the Representatives of peoples will want to preserve the independence independence of their own society and its equality in relation to others.of their own society and its equality in relation to others.

3.3. Working of organizations and loose confederation of Working of organizations and loose confederation of peoples, peoples, inequalities are designed to serve the many ends that people share.inequalities are designed to serve the many ends that people share.

4.4. The larger and smaller peoples will be ready to make The larger and smaller peoples will be ready to make larger and larger and smaller returns.smaller returns.

5.5. Parties will formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative Parties will formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations, and will agree to standards of fairness for trade as well organizations, and will agree to standards of fairness for trade as well as as to certain provisions for mutual assistance. to certain provisions for mutual assistance.

6.6. Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified distributive distributive effects, these have to be corrected in the basic structure effects, these have to be corrected in the basic structure of the of the Society of Peoples.Society of Peoples.

II. Criticisms:II. Criticisms:

1.1. Don’t we have a moral reason to repair the gap between Don’t we have a moral reason to repair the gap between wealthy and impoverished nations?wealthy and impoverished nations?~~ If so, how without violating human rights?If so, how without violating human rights?

2.2. How do we enforce cooperation when violations occur?How do we enforce cooperation when violations occur?~ But at what lengths we will go to “punish” or execute ~ But at what lengths we will go to “punish” or execute judgments upon “states” which are made up of people-judgments upon “states” which are made up of people-groups (s)?groups (s)?

3.3. The problem of tolerating inequalities.The problem of tolerating inequalities.

4.4. Less powerful set of principles than his domestic view.Less powerful set of principles than his domestic view.

5.5. Respecting states is not the same as respecting people Respecting states is not the same as respecting people because states can hold coercive power over people. because states can hold coercive power over people. Toleration commits us to accepting certain problems Toleration commits us to accepting certain problems (e.g., oppression of women’s rights).(e.g., oppression of women’s rights).


C.C. “The Idea of Public Revisited” offers an “The Idea of Public Revisited” offers an account of how a modern constitutional account of how a modern constitutional democracy, based on a liberal political democracy, based on a liberal political conception, could and would viewed as conception, could and would viewed as legitimate by reasonable citizens who on legitimate by reasonable citizens who on religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive doctrine.doctrine.


D. D. We must support and strengthen hope by developing a workable, We must support and strengthen hope by developing a workable, reasonable conception of political right & justice & apply to the relations reasonable conception of political right & justice & apply to the relations of peoples. To accomplish this Rawls argues that we must follow Kant’s of peoples. To accomplish this Rawls argues that we must follow Kant’s leading and begin from the political conception of a reasonably just leading and begin from the political conception of a reasonably just constitutional democracy and proceed to extend that conception outward to constitutional democracy and proceed to extend that conception outward to the Society of liberal and decent peoples (pp. 22-23). A constitutional the Society of liberal and decent peoples (pp. 22-23). A constitutional democratic govt. is one that is effectively under the political and electoral democratic govt. is one that is effectively under the political and electoral control, it answers to and protects their fundamental interests as specified control, it answers to and protects their fundamental interests as specified in a written or unwritten constitution, and in its interpretation. We also take in a written or unwritten constitution, and in its interpretation. We also take into account that the Laws of people starts with the need for common into account that the Laws of people starts with the need for common sympathies, no matter what their source may be, and a certain moral sympathies, no matter what their source may be, and a certain moral character whereby rational conduct, fair terms, and cooperationcharacter whereby rational conduct, fair terms, and cooperation

Criticisms of Rawls:Criticisms of Rawls:Seyla Benhabib & Jurgen Habermas: Seyla Benhabib & Jurgen Habermas:

Post-Colonial CritiquePost-Colonial Critique

A.A. Post-colonial Critique:Post-colonial Critique:

1.1. Distrust of reason as a Western Distrust of reason as a Western Construct (situatedness) by S. Benhabib.Construct (situatedness) by S. Benhabib.

2.2. An appeal to a “Kantian Universal of An appeal to a “Kantian Universal of Rationality to extend Colonial or patriarchial societies Rationality to extend Colonial or patriarchial societies (discourse) by J. Habermas.(discourse) by J. Habermas.

B.B. Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise.Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise.

C.C. Problems of reconciliation between liberty and equality.Problems of reconciliation between liberty and equality.

Benhabib’s Criticisms of Rawls:Benhabib’s Criticisms of Rawls:

1.1. Seyla Benhabib, a critical Seyla Benhabib, a critical theorist/feminist ethicist has the theorist/feminist ethicist has the problem of situatednessproblem of situatedness::

“ “The problem is that the Kantian presuppositions The problem is that the Kantian presuppositions also guiding the Rawlsian theory are so weighty also guiding the Rawlsian theory are so weighty that the equivalence of all selves qua rational that the equivalence of all selves qua rational agents dominates and stifles any serious agents dominates and stifles any serious acknowledgment of difference, alterity, and of the acknowledgment of difference, alterity, and of the standpoint of the ‘concrete other’” (167). standpoint of the ‘concrete other’” (167).

In other words, the self is always a situated self, and that it In other words, the self is always a situated self, and that it makes no sense in pretending to abstract it. makes no sense in pretending to abstract it.

Criticisms of Rawls:Criticisms of Rawls: Jurgen HabermasJurgen Habermas

2.2. Habermas’ problem is discourse: Habermas feels Habermas’ problem is discourse: Habermas feels that it is “unnecessary to resort to Rawls’s fictitious original that it is “unnecessary to resort to Rawls’s fictitious original position with its ‘veil of ignorance’” (198) because the free position with its ‘veil of ignorance’” (198) because the free play of “practical discourse” i.e., “unforced force of the play of “practical discourse” i.e., “unforced force of the better argument,” will better fulfill the function of creating better argument,” will better fulfill the function of creating a model of, what Benhabib terms, a “free public reason” or a model of, what Benhabib terms, a “free public reason” or resolve the contradictions of multiple perspectives in, again resolve the contradictions of multiple perspectives in, again her terms, “the foray of public contestation” (12). her terms, “the foray of public contestation” (12).

Response to Post-Colonial Continental Critiques:Response to Post-Colonial Continental Critiques:

Rawls would respond post-colonial Rawls would respond post-colonial situationalists, that his system embraces situationalists, that his system embraces “reasonable pluralism.” In fact, they should “reasonable pluralism.” In fact, they should appreciate this approach because it puts forth appreciate this approach because it puts forth procedural means to conceive of, if not to procedural means to conceive of, if not to achieve, a "reasonable pluralism" among achieve, a "reasonable pluralism" among peoples. peoples.

““Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise”Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise”

3.3. In view of Rawls second principle that inequality is In view of Rawls second principle that inequality is permissible to the extent that it serves everyone’s permissible to the extent that it serves everyone’s advantage:advantage:

““Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage, consistent with both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage, consistent with the just saving principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open the just saving principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”

Isn’t this just rendition of Bentham’s utilitarianism that advocated “the Isn’t this just rendition of Bentham’s utilitarianism that advocated “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.”greatest happiness for the greatest number.”

Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate justification of equal Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate justification of equal liberty in society is not that a mere means to an end; the principle of liberty in society is not that a mere means to an end; the principle of equal liberty is logically prior to the difference principle. Remember, equal liberty is logically prior to the difference principle. Remember, Rawls adopts Kant’s categorical imperative, “Rawls adopts Kant’s categorical imperative, “desire to treat one desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselvesanother not as means only but as ends in themselves.”.”


Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate justification of equal liberty in society is not justification of equal liberty in society is not that a mere means to an end; the principle of that a mere means to an end; the principle of equal liberty is logically prior to the equal liberty is logically prior to the difference principledifference principle ..


Rawls states:Rawls states:

““Each person possesses an inviolability founded on Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override…. Therefore … the rights secured cannot override…. Therefore … the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.” to the calculus of social interests.” Theory of Theory of JusticeJustice, pg. 4., pg. 4.

Criticisms of Rawls:Criticisms of Rawls:

4.4. Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they are applicable on an international level by exchanging are applicable on an international level by exchanging individuality to nations.individuality to nations.

1.1. Rawls principles do not reconcile liberty and Rawls principles do not reconcile liberty and equality:equality:

a.a. Don’t the social and economic inequalities Don’t the social and economic inequalities permitted by the second principle of justice permitted by the second principle of justice (difference principle) subvert the political (difference principle) subvert the political equality of the first principle? (e.g., won’t the equality of the first principle? (e.g., won’t the poorest citizens lack the economic means to poorest citizens lack the economic means to exercise these rights fully?).exercise these rights fully?).

b.b. Even if you could guarantee equal liberty and Even if you could guarantee equal liberty and equal opportunity, would this insure equal equal opportunity, would this insure equal

dignity dignity for all?for all?


c.c. Sacrifice individual liberty in the pursuit of Sacrifice individual liberty in the pursuit of social equality by sharing the successes of social equality by sharing the successes of

the the greatest to those who are less fortunate. greatest to those who are less fortunate.

d. The difference principle require a stance of d. The difference principle require a stance of “affirmative action” which commits reverse “affirmative action” which commits reverse discrimination. discrimination.


4.4. Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they are applicable on an international level by exchanging are applicable on an international level by exchanging individuality to nations.individuality to nations.

e.e. If the distribution of natural talent is to be If the distribution of natural talent is to be seen as seen as a common asset exploited for the a common asset exploited for the good of all, then good of all, then doesn’t that go against Kant’s doesn’t that go against Kant’s categorical categorical imperative, “imperative, “desire to treat desire to treat one another not as one another not as means only but as ends in means only but as ends in themselvesthemselves.”.”

f.f. If the distribution of natural talent is to be If the distribution of natural talent is to be seen as seen as a common asset exploited for the a common asset exploited for the good of all, then good of all, then doesn’t that dehumanize a doesn’t that dehumanize a person by taking away person by taking away the independent nature the independent nature of that person and by of that person and by treating that person as a tool treating that person as a tool for the use of others?for the use of others?

Criticisms of Rawls:Criticisms of Rawls:Will not the poorest nations lack the economic means to exercise Will not the poorest nations lack the economic means to exercise

the rights of liberty and opportunity fully?the rights of liberty and opportunity fully?

If a nation’s success in depends largely on character of If a nation’s success in depends largely on character of nation, nurture, resources, some will never have an equal nation, nurture, resources, some will never have an equal success in life.success in life.

Rawlsian response:Rawlsian response:

1.1. While absolute equality of opportunity is impossible under While absolute equality of opportunity is impossible under his principles, we must stress the importance of equality of his principles, we must stress the importance of equality of opportunity in allowing the poor nations to improve their opportunity in allowing the poor nations to improve their conditions.conditions.

Concluding Summary:Concluding Summary:

Rawls, extends his social contract to the “Society of Rawls, extends his social contract to the “Society of People” and laws out the general principles that can and People” and laws out the general principles that can and should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one another.”another.”

1.1. All citizens must equal in their basic liberties All citizens must equal in their basic liberties (liberties)(liberties)

2.2. All must have equal opportunities to develop their All must have equal opportunities to develop their talents talents and abilities (opportunities).and abilities (opportunities).

3.3. Liberties and opportunities should secure equality Liberties and opportunities should secure equality and and respect for all.respect for all.

4.4. Inequality in economic resources is permitted, but Inequality in economic resources is permitted, but only as only as long as it benefits the least advantaged.long as it benefits the least advantaged.

Bibliography:Bibliography:

Benhabib, Seyla. Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary EthicsContemporary Ethics. New York: . New York: Routledge, 1992.Routledge, 1992.

Habermas, Jurgen. Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness Moral Consciousness and Communicative Actionand Communicative Action. Trans. . Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: The MIT Press, Nicholsen. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990.1990.

Genealogy:Genealogy:

““The key intellectual opposition of our age, such critics will The key intellectual opposition of our age, such critics will declare, is that between liberal individualism and some declare, is that between liberal individualism and some version of Marxism or neo-Marxism. The most version of Marxism or neo-Marxism. The most intellectually compelling exponents of this point of view intellectually compelling exponents of this point of view are likely to be those who trace a genealogy of ideas are likely to be those who trace a genealogy of ideas from Kant and Hegel through Marx and claim that by from Kant and Hegel through Marx and claim that by means of Marxism the notion of human autonomy can be means of Marxism the notion of human autonomy can be rescued from its original individualist formulations and rescued from its original individualist formulations and restored within the context of an appeal to a possible restored within the context of an appeal to a possible form of community in which alienation has been form of community in which alienation has been overcome, false consciousness abolished, and the overcome, false consciousness abolished, and the values of equality and fraternity realized” (pg. 261).lvalues of equality and fraternity realized” (pg. 261).l

Genealogy:Genealogy:““The first is that the claim of Marxism to a morally distinctive standpoint is The first is that the claim of Marxism to a morally distinctive standpoint is undermined by Marxism’s own moral history. In all those crises in which undermined by Marxism’s own moral history. In all those crises in which Marxists have had to take explicit moral stances [e.g., Khruschev’s Marxists have had to take explicit moral stances [e.g., Khruschev’s repudiation of Stalin and Hungarian revolt in 1956]…Marxists have always repudiation of Stalin and Hungarian revolt in 1956]…Marxists have always fallen into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism. fallen into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism. Nor is this surprising. Secreted within Marxism from the outset is a certain Nor is this surprising. Secreted within Marxism from the outset is a certain radical individualism. In the first chapter of Capital when Marx characterizes radical individualism. In the first chapter of Capital when Marx characterizes what it will be like when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man what it will be like when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations’ what he pictures is ‘a none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations’ what he pictures is ‘a community of free individuals’ who have all freely agreed to their common community of free individuals’ who have all freely agreed to their common ownership of the means of production and to various norms of production ownership of the means of production and to various norms of production and distribution. This free individual is described by Marx as a socialized and distribution. This free individual is described by Marx as a socialized Robinson Crusoe; but on what basis he enters into his free association with Robinson Crusoe; but on what basis he enters into his free association with others Marx does not tell us. At this key point in Marxism there is a lacuna others Marx does not tell us. At this key point in Marxism there is a lacuna which no later Marxist has adequately supplied. It is unsurprising that which no later Marxist has adequately supplied. It is unsurprising that abstract moral principle and utility have in fact been the principles of abstract moral principle and utility have in fact been the principles of association which Marxists have appealed to, and that in their practice association which Marxists have appealed to, and that in their practice Marxists have exemplified precisely the kind of moral attitude which the Marxists have exemplified precisely the kind of moral attitude which the condemn in others as ideological.” condemn in others as ideological.”

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