options for change: mayors, cabinets or the status quo?
TRANSCRIPT
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Options for Change: Mayors, Cabinets orthe Status Quo?Nirmala RaoPublished online: 14 Sep 2010.
To cite this article: Nirmala Rao (2003) Options for Change: Mayors, Cabinets or the Status Quo?, LocalGovernment Studies, 29:1, 1-16, DOI: 10.1080/714004172
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Options for Change: Mayors, Cabinets or the Status Quo?
NIRMALA RAO
The concept of local authorities providing ‘community leadership’lies at the heart of the Blair government’s modernisation agenda.The Local Government Act, 2000, embodied three models ofpolitical leadership to support this new community leadership role.To date, a number of authorities have held referendums formayoral or cabinet systems of local leadership, with some havinggone on to elect a mayor. This paper reviews the new executivestructures and, based on surveys of public attitudes, explorespublic receptiveness to the options, comparing it with councillors’own responses. The consequences of adopting a cabinet ormayoral model are examined, together with their implications forofficer–member relationships within the decision-making process.
The Local Government Act, 2000, makes it mandatory for local authoritiesto consider making a transition from traditional processes of council andcommittee decision-making to a mayoral or cabinet system of localleadership. Previous attempts to secure such changes, which date back to theMaud Committee report of 1967, were foiled by councillor resistance, afactor that impelled the government to conclude that the status quo couldnot be an option. Local people have the right to call for a referendum onwhether there should be a directly elected mayor. Such a referendum wouldbe triggered by a petition, signed by ten per cent – later reduced to five percent – of the council’s electorate. It must be held not less than two monthsand not more than four months after a valid petition, and the result will bebinding. Where a council has developed proposals with a timetable but hasnot carried them forward, or has not yet developed any proposals at all, theSecretary of State has the power to require the council to hold a referendumon one of the approved models. The government can set the proposition,again with binding effect. In the event of a negative vote, the council maycontinue with their existing arrangements or bring forward alternative
Local Government Studies, Vol.29, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.1–16PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
Nirmala Rao, Goldsmiths College.
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proposals. And in any five-year period, only one referendum on the politicalmanagement structure for a council will be allowed, triggered by thegovernment, council or by public petition.
To what extent has the on-going debate shifted councillor opinion toaccept new forms of local executive? And are councillor responses in linewith those of the general public? For some localities, the acid test is to befound in the referendums held under the Act, some of which have beeninitiated by local petition, and some by the councils themselves. ByNovember 2001, a number of referendums had taken place in authorities asvaried as Berwick-on-Tweed, Gloucester, Cheltenham, Sedgefield,Middlesborough, North Tyneside, Hartlepool, Lewisham, Doncaster andWatford. Turnout ranged from ten per cent to 36 per cent, with the soleexception of Berwick on Tweed, which polled on general election day witha turnout of 64 per cent. Only in six of these authorities did proposals for a
2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
TABLE 1MAYORAL REFERENDUM RESULTS
Council Date Result For % Against % Turnout %
Berwick Upon Tweed 7 June 01 No 3,617 26 10,212 74 64Cheltenham 28 June 01 No 8,083 33 16,602 67 31Gloucester 28 June 01 No 7,731 31 16,317 69 31Watford 12 July 01 Yes 7,636 52 7,140 48 25Doncaster 20 Sep 01 Yes 35,453 65 19,398 35 25Kirklees 4 Oct 01 No 10,169 27 27,977 73 13Sunderland 11 Oct 01 No 9,593 43 12,209 57 10Hartlepool 18 Oct 01 Yes 10,667 51 10,294 49 31Lewisham 18 Oct 01 Yes 16,822 51 15,914 49 18North Tyneside 18 Oct 01 Yes 30,262 58 22,296 42 36Middlesbrough 18 Oct 01 Yes 29,067 84 5,422 16 34Sedgefield 18 Oct 01 No 10,628 47 11,869 53 33Brighton and Hove 18 Oct 01 No 22,724 38 37,214 62 32Redditch 8 Nov 01 No 7,250 44 9,198 56 28Durham 20 Nov 01 No 8,327 41 11,974 59 29Harrow 7 Dec 01 No 17,502 42 23,554 58 26Plymouth 24 Jan 02 No 29,553 41 42,811 59 40Harlow 24 Jan 02 No 5,296 25 15,490 75 36Newham 31 Jan 02 Yes 27,163 68 12,687 32 26Shepway 31 Jan 02 No 11,357 44 14,438 56 36Southwark 31 Jan 02 No 6,054 31 13,217 69 11West Devon 31 Jan 02 No 3,555 23 12,190 77 42Bedford 21 Feb 02 Yes 11,316 67 5,537 33 16Hackney 2 May 02 Yes 24,697 59 10,547 41 32Mansfield 2 May 02 Yes 8,973 54 7,350 44 21Newcastle-under-Lyme 2 May 02 No 12,912 44 16,468 56 32Oxford 2 May 02 No 14,692 44 18,686 56 34Stoke-on-Trent 2 May 02 Yes 28,601 58 20,578 42 28Corby 3 Oct 02 No 5,351 46 6,239 54 31
Source: New Local Government Network
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directly elected mayor command sufficient electoral support, and they heldtheir mayoral elections in May 2002. By the time another 12 months hadpassed, a total of 29 authorities had held referendums, with just 11 resultingin a ‘yes’ vote for an elected mayor.
Results in this handful of authorities that have so far held a referendum,and in the smaller number going on to elect a Mayor, are shown in Tables 1and 2. The election results have been remarkable mainly for the strikingsuccess of independent candidates and for the low turnouts – ranging from18 to 42 per cent – that obtained in these contests. Low turnouts in ahandful of localities provide no guide to the broader patterns of opinionabout the mayoral option. For this, survey data is a more useful tool, and canprovide a rounded measure of public attitudes across the country. This paperdraws on such data to explore public receptiveness of the options andcompares it with councillors’ own responses, as revealed in a nationalsurvey carried out by the author in 1999. The new executive structures arereviewed, and in the light of the evidence the implications of adopting acabinet or mayoral model for the present duality of councillor roles – asboth decision-maker and representative – are considered. One of the mostpersistent aspects of management reform centres on increasing delegation toofficers, an issue that has been revived by the government’s proposedrestructuring of roles, and is re-examined here.
THE POLICY FRAMEWORK
Early in 1998 the new government published its proposals for modernisinglocal government in a series of six consultation papers. These papers rangedwidely, from community leadership and improved financial accountabilityto a new ethical framework for the conduct of people in local government.
3MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
TABLE 2MAYORAL ELECTION RESULTS, 2002
Authority Date Turnout % Mayor’s political affiliation
Doncaster May 27 LabourHartlepool May 29 IndependentLewisham May 25 LabourMiddlesborough May 41 IndependentNewham May 26 LabourNorth Tyneside May 42 ConservativeWatford May 36 Liberal DemocratBedford October 25 IndependentHackney October 26 LabourMansfield October 18 IndependentStoke-on-Trent October 24 Independent
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Subsequently, in July 1998, the government published the White PaperModern Local Government: In Touch With the People, which set out itsoverall strategy for the reform of local government (DETR, 1998a).
The strategy for local government, with its new duty to promote localwell-being, amounts to a fundamental change of ethos and approach. Toensure that local authorities are equipped to function in this new era, thewholesale modernisation of political structures was urged, together with theimprovement of standards of conduct within councils. Appropriatemanagement structures were seen as crucial in making councils moreresponsive and accountable to their local communities. The concept of‘community leadership’ lies at the heart of the role of ‘modern’ localgovernment: ‘local authorities have a responsibility to reflect localconcerns, promote debate and ensure that those concerned are aware of andresponsive to local views’ (DETR, 1998b: 40). Ministers were adamantabout the shortcomings of the traditional system:
We have to re-ignite the enthusiasm of local people in local politics byending the outdated, arcane committee system. It is easier to trace themedieval origins of the current committee system than to state itsrelevance for the twenty-first century. With its cumbersome andcorrosive impact on the interest and involvement of local people, thecouncil committee system should be consigned to the history books.(Armstrong, 1999: 21)
Accordingly, New Labour introduced legislation to bring about a radicalreconstruction of local government decision-making. The House of Lordsamended the Local Government bill to make new executive arrangementsoptional rather than mandatory, but the government over-rode Conservativeand Liberal Democrat opposition in the Commons to restore their originalproposals.
The provisions of the Local Government Act, 2000, were generally wellreceived by commentators. Even the new single representative body, theLocal Government Association, whilst acknowledging the many strengthsof the traditional committee system, conceded that modern councils neededmore effective decision-making structures. The traditional system, it agreed,was not designed to support the new community leadership role envisagedfor local government. Individual authorities, on the other hand, weredivided in their responses. Some – Hammersmith and Lewisham arenotable examples – had already anticipated the legislation. By the end of1999, three-quarters of councils had considered proposals for some form ofnew executive system (LGC, 1999). Many of the more partisan urbanauthorities appeared comfortable with the idea of local cabinet governmentor mayoral leadership. But others, especially the more rural councils, had
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argued that none of the new arrangements were consonant with the realitiesof their local circumstances, and at a late stage the bill was amended topermit the smaller district councils to adopt a ‘fourth option’ of retaining thebasics of the traditional structure.
The tide of reform was flowing strongly, with a heightened expectationthat changes sought over several decades would at last come to pass. TheNew Local Government Network was established to support and encouragelocal authorities to modernise their structures and processes. Information oncurrent arrangements and plans was sought from all authorities, and visitsmade to a number of them. The overall stance of authorities wassummarised as being generally open to change, but the difficulties involvedwere acknowledged (Filkin et al., 1998). A series of reports – the Startingto Modernise series – were published arising from this work. Practicalguidance followed, in particular on how to provide for a council’s scrutinyrole, and how to think through the issues surrounding leaders and cabinets(Charteris and Corrigan, 1999; Leach, 2001).
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Under the Act, three options exist for local authorities: a directly electedmayor with a cabinet; a directly elected mayor and council manager; and acabinet with a leader. The fourth option, approximating to the status quo,will not be generally available.
The first of the three options is to have a directly elected mayor with acabinet. Chosen by the local electorate, a directly elected mayor wouldserve as the political leader for that community, supported by a cabinetdrawn from among the council members. Depending on local politicalcircumstance, the cabinet may be a formed from a single party or from acoalition of parties. Cabinet members, endowed with their own portfolios,will be empowered to take executive decisions.
In the second model, based upon a directly elected mayor and councilmanager, the mayor’s role would be primarily one of influence, guidanceand leadership, defining strategic policy and delegating day-to-daydecision-making to the council manager. Of all the models, this is the onemost obviously an import from the political experience of the United Statesand Germany. A fundamental change of process, it cannot be said to evolveout of the traditional manner of conducting business, unlike the third model,which represents some kind of logical progression.
The third model – a cabinet with a leader – is the closest to existingpractice in partisan authorities. Under this model a leader would be electedby the council, while the cabinet would be made up of councillors, eitherappointed by the leader, or elected by the council. As with a directly elected
5MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
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mayor model, the cabinet could be drawn from a single party or a coalition.This model is similar to the first, except that the leader (who may assumethe role of indirectly elected mayor) relies on the support of members of thecouncil rather than the electorate for his or her authority and can be replacedby the council. While the leader could have similar executive powers to adirectly elected mayor, in practice they are likely to be constrained by theabsence of a direct mandate from the electorate. As at present, a leaderwould be as powerful as his or his colleagues allowed them to be.
Under the first and second models, the directly elected mayor is intendedto be seen as the political leader for the entire community, putting forwardpolicy for approval by the council and steering implementation by councilofficers. The mayor depends for his authority on the electorate at large, andthus has a mandate separate from that of the council, enjoying thereby anelectoral visibility unparalleled in British local government. Will thatgreater visibility encourage people to vote as the government hopes?
In its modernisation programme, New Labour introduced newmechanisms to enhance voter turnout, including weekend voting, electronicand postal voting, all in the hope of boosting turnout. Equally, the focus ofresponsibility upon a single executive mayor was assumed to have anindependent effect of encouraging people to go to the polls. A surveycarried out by MORI suggested that the introduction of a directly electedmayor will make a significant impact on local electoral turnout, with someten per cent of the electorate saying they would be more likely to vote. Forthose living in London, where proposals for a directly elected London-widemayor were being carried through, this figure rose to 22 per cent (MORI,1999). Polls of this sort, being simple declarations of intention to vote underhypothetical circumstances, need to be treated with caution. To date, turnoutin the mayoral elections (Table 2) has been generally lower than that in localcouncil elections.
COUNCILLOR SCEPTICISM, PUBLIC WARMTH
Since the early 1990s, when proposals of this sort first surfaced underMichael Heseltine’s stewardship, councillors have consistently expressedwidespread reservations about reform. A comparison of the findings of twocouncillor surveys carried out in 1993 and 1999 show that there has been nochange in their almost unanimous opposition to executive mayors, whichwon just three per cent in support in both years (see appendix for details).Yet, while the majority of councillors still prefer the existing decision-making structures, there has been since 1993 a considerable shift – of some20 percentage points – in favour of a ‘cabinet’ system with responsibilityvested in a small group of councillors. These findings are consistent with a
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survey by the LGA which revealed scarcely any support for directly electedmayors, while showing that 80 per cent of authorities favoured changing toa cabinet and leader system. This almost total absence of support fordirectly elected mayors among councillors might have been expected togive the government pause for thought. Far from it. Elected mayors remainthe cornerstone of New Labour’s plans for the reform of local government. Councillors’ views on the advantages and disadvantages of establishing asystem of directly elected executive mayors to provide a focus forcommunity leadership were explored in the 1999 survey. As to theadvantages, a mayoral focus of authority is claimed to establish clearer linesof accountability locally, by making it explicit just who should be heldresponsible when things go wrong. A directly elected mayor is alsoportrayed as providing a clear ‘voice’ for the local area. At the same time,by-passing the traditional committee cycle enables a mayor to expeditedecision-making and get things done. Objections, however, have beenlevelled against elected mayors. The most significant of these is that toomuch power would reside with one person, leaving ordinary councillorswith too little influence. The views of councillors on these issues can alsobe compared with those of the public, ascertained in responses to identicalquestions posed in the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey (Rao andYoung, 1999).
7MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
TABLE 3COUNCILLORS’ AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE ADVANTAGES OF HAVING
AN ELECTED MAYOR
Public Councillors’responses responses
% %
Having an elected mayor would make it easier to get things doneStrongly agree/agree 37 20Neither agree nor disagree 33 20Disagree/strongly disagree 27 61
Having an elected mayor means there was someone who could speak up for the whole areaStrongly agree/agree 59 29neither agree nor disagree 22 23Disagree/strongly disagree 16 49
Having an elected mayor would mean that it was always clear who was responsible when things go wrongStrongly agree/agree 46 33neither agree nor disagree 24 21Disagree/strongly disagree 26 46
(base) 2,071 1,063
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The claimed advantages of mayoral governance are contained in threepropositions: that having an elected mayor would make it easier ‘to getthings done’; that it would provide ‘voice’ – someone who could speak upfor the whole area; and that it would make it clear ‘who was responsiblewhen things go wrong’.
As Table 3 shows, while more than a third of the public see theadvantages of an elected mayor in terms of ‘making it easier to get thingsdone’, just one-fifth of councillors do so. Three in five members of thepublic interviewed agreed that an elected mayor would provide ‘someonewho could speak up for the whole area’, perhaps the principal advantageclaimed for such a role. Almost a third of councillors concur, while half ofthem disagree, or disagree strongly. The government has staked itsmodernisation proposals in part on the blurred accountability thatcharacterises the traditional council and committee system. We wouldexpect councillor and public opinions to diverge on this issue. They do, butto a lesser degree than might be expected. As many as one-third ofcouncillors concede that having an elected mayor would mean ‘it wasalways clear who was responsible when things go wrong’, while almost halfof the members of the public questioned did so.
Opponents of the government’s plan consistently argued against theproposed new executive structures on the grounds that an executive mayor,in particular, would risk an excessive concentration of power and depriveordinary councillors of influence. Regarding the accusation that mayoralgovernance risks bringing about an undue concentration of power, almostnine in ten councillors agreed that having an elected mayor ‘would give too
8 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
TABLE 4COUNCILLORS’ AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF
HAVING AN ELECTED MAYOR
Public Councillors’responses responses
% %
Having an elected mayor would give too much power to one personStrongly agree/agree 45 86neither agree nor disagree 28 4disagree/strongly disagree 24 11
Having an elected mayor means that local councillors would havetoo little sayStrongly agree/agree 26 80neither agree nor disagree 32 8Disagree/strongly disagree 37 11
(base) 2,071 1,063
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much power to one person’, while 45 per cent of members of the publicquestioned shared this concern. The second claimed disadvantage of amayoral system, that ordinary councillors would be deprived of influenceon local decision-making, produced a greater divergence between peopleand their councillors. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority – 80 percent – of councillors took this view, with just one in ten disagreeing. Justa quarter of the public agree that councillors would have ‘too little say’(Table 4)
Clearly, then, while the public at large appear reasonably receptive to themodernisation of local decision-making structures, it is harder to impresscouncillors with the claimed advantages of elected mayors. On the contrary,they are very much alive to the supposed disadvantages. This can beattributed to understandable concerns about the ways in which such changesmight impact upon their own work as councillors and, indeed, on theirmotivation to become, and remain, a council member. At the heart of theseconcerns lies an integral feature of the modernisation proposals: theseparation of executive and representative roles.
THE SEPARATION OF ROLES
Underlying all three models of new political leadership embodied in theLocal Government Act, 2000, is the idea of a clear separation of councillorroles. Indeed, restructuring councillors’ roles is the primary means by whichthe aims of the modernising agenda are to be achieved. A small executivebody of councillors will provide for community leadership, while themajority will play only a representative role. Here is to be found a newdoctrine of representative government, and it is one on which councillorsthemselves have decided views.
Executive and Non-Executive Councillors
The government maintains that ‘each role can only be fully effective whenit is separated from the other’. Such a separation of roles is expected notonly to provide a sharper focus for executive responsibility, but also toenable the majority of non-leading members to be freed up from thepressures of council business, and so devote more time to representing theirconstituents. Moreover, bringing about radical change requires ‘clear andclose relationships’ between executive and non-executive councillors, andbetween both types of councillor and their communities.
While the executive role is to propose the policy framework andimplement policies within the agreed framework, the role of non-executivecouncillors is to represent their constituents. A small executive, in thegovernment’s view, will speed up decision-making, enhance responsiveness
9MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
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and enable local authorities to meet community needs. Increasedtransparency will enable people to measure the executive’s actions againstthe policies on which it was elected, and thus sharpen local political debateand increase interest in local elections. The non-executive councillors willalso share in the policy and budget decisions of the full council, suggestpolicy improvements, and scrutinise the executive’s policy proposals andtheir implementation. More specifically, they would play an advisory roleon local issues, reviewing decisions of the executive and taking quasi-judicial decisions.
At the same time, the non-executive role will also provide for greaterscrutiny of executive action. While the government acknowledges that theformation of a small separate executive will confirm their exclusion, non-executive councillors will, they claim, gain the compensatory power tochallenge or scrutinise decisions. To this end, councils will be required toestablish scrutiny committees composed of non-leading councillors, whoseduty would be to review and question the decisions of the executive. Thesecommittees will also review broad policy and submit alternative proposalsto the executive. The principle of proportionality, introduced in the wake ofWiddicombe by the Local Government Act, 1989, will apply to scrutinycommittees, which must reflect the political balance on the council.
Apart from scrutinising the executive, non-executive councillors will beexpected to spend less time in council meetings. Their effort will instead bedeployed in the local community, representing their constituents’aspirations, concerns and grievances to the council and bringing to itsdecision-making processes ‘a full knowledge of what their localcommunities need and want’ (Armstrong, 1999: 21). The government aimsto persuade councillors that this enhanced role will open up newopportunities to non-executive councillors. It could be less time-consumingbut will be high profile, involving real and direct responsibilities for thewell-being of their community.
On the fact of it, these proposals have several merits, but manyreservations have been expressed. County councillors in particular havebeen sceptical, arguing that the government’s proposals were‘disappointingly light in identifying meaningful roles for non-executivecouncillors’ (CCN, 1999). The Joint Select Committee on the LocalGovernment (Organisation and Standards) Bill, set up to consider theimplementation and workability of the original legislative proposals, hadexpressed considerable doubts about the separation between executive andscrutiny roles, considering them to be ‘unrealistic’ and based on amisreading of overseas experience. The committee thought it inevitable that‘there would be far more interaction’ between executive and backbenchmembers than the government seemed to suppose. It highlighted the extent
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of ministers’ powers to determine these matters by regulation, andexpressed concern at the lack of criteria for their application. These werenot matters that should be settled nationally; rather, the interaction betweenthe executive and the council was something to be worked out locally.Again, the government disagreed.
Councillor Views on the Separation of Roles
For councillors, the key issue is whether the concentration of power infewer hands would have a negative impact on their own roles. It would beperfectly consistent for councillors to acknowledge the greater space thatreform will give them to devote to non-executive tasks, and at the same timedeplore the loss of that more significant decision-making role. Table 5shows that in 1999 a large majority of the councillors surveyed – some 65per cent – felt that the government’s changes would ‘deprive ordinarymembers of influence over decision making’, although this figure representsa marked shift from the 80 per cent agreeing with this statement in 1993.Moreover, a majority of councillors (57 per cent) still agree that ‘ordinarymembers would be deprived of the incentive to remain on the council’,although here too there has been a softening of opposition since the 76 percent level recorded in 1993.
The government argues that a more streamlined system will enable themajority of councillors, who will take up non-executive roles, to devotemore time to representing their constituents. On this point too, as the tableshows, councillor opinion has shifted. The proportion of councillors whoaccept that the reforms would enable members to devote more time to theirconstituents has doubled from 22 to 43 per cent. Those who feel that moretime would be devoted to performance review and monitoring by suchcouncillors has trebled from an inconsequential 15 per cent in 1993 to a
11MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
TABLE 5VIEWS ON EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE HANDS OF
LEADING MEMBERS
1993 1999% %
Agree that concentrating responsibility would...enable ordinary members to devote more time to performancereview and monitoring 15 42enable ordinary members to devote more time to the problemsof their constituents 22 43deprive ordinary members of influence over strategic policy-making 80 65deprive ordinary members of the incentive to remain on the council 76 57
(base) 1,636 1,226
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substantial 42 per cent today. Thus, the government’s plans appear to havewon far greater acceptance than the similar proposals of their predecessors.
Opinion, then, is changing quite rapidly in the direction of accepting thenew system. Whether it will move far enough, swiftly enough, to make thegovernment’s programme workable remains to be seen. To some extent, theswing towards acceptance of the cabinet system reflects the predominanceof Labour councillors in the 1999 survey, for they are markedly warmertowards the new executive structures than councillors from other parties.
In any event, the argument is only half won, for there remains theseparate issue of whether scrutiny and representation of constituents’interests together amount to a meaningful role for the non-executivecouncillor. Notwithstanding this greater acceptance of reforms to politicalmanagement, councillors still retain their attachment to the traditionalcommittee system as something that allows them to participate effectively.In both 1993 and 1999, a similar proportion – in excess of 70 per cent –agreed that the committee system enabled the generality of members to playan effective role.A good number of authorities, however, have already experimented withstreamlining their committee structures and decision processes. Bothsurveys asked whether councillors had experienced such changes and, if so,whether they considered the revised structures to have increased theireffectiveness as councillors. In 1999, nearly 60 per cent had experience oftheir authorities changing their committee system, but opinion on whetherthis enabled councillors to play a more effective role was equally divided.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OFFICER–MEMBER RELATIONSHIPS
Implementing the new arrangements will be more than just a matter ofreassigning roles and establishing new structures. Adoption of any of theprescribed models will require a willingness to see power and responsibilityredistributed. The discussion so far has centred upon the impliedrelationships between councillors: those in leading positions, and thosewhose responsibility will primarily be to represent and scrutinise. Similarly,the relationship between members and officers will also undergo change:
A modern council, based on the proposed separation of roles, will relyon the ability of all of its members, whether in the executive orbackbench role, to adapt to different ways of working. All councilsshould give those serving as councillors or as co-opted members theofficer support, facilities and training necessary for them to fulfil theirrole, be it executive or otherwise, as effectively as possible. (DETR,1998a: 35)
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Equally, some further degree of delegation to council officers will berequired if local authorities are to meet the expectations of the new politicalmanagement regime. Streamlining political management has beenportrayed as freeing up council officers to ‘devote more of their time to theeffective management of the council and successful policy implementation,with clear direction from the political leadership’. This is bound to implicateofficers in the policies of the executive, much as civil servants areimplicated in those of their ministers. The government foresees that‘backbench [sic] members will scrutinise the actions of the executive –both those of the executive’s political leadership and those of officersimplementing that leadership’s policies’.
On the one hand, then, officers will continue to serve the whole counciland support all councillors in their new roles, providing councillors withthe information and facilities they need, whether as members of theexecutive or as the scrutineers of executive actions. On the other hand,some officers will have the specific role of supporting non-executivecouncillors, others that of supporting the mayor, or the leader and cabinet.There will, then, be a division of function – arguably of interest – withinthe officer body. Meanwhile, the chief executive will continue as the headof the paid service, and to him or her will fall much of the burden ofensuring officer – member relations, and those between officers, operate inthe council’s interest. So far, only the new Greater London Authority hashad to face up to these dilemmas, and with ambiguous result (Pimlott andRao, 2002).
At the same time, government continues to press the case for moreextensive delegation. Exactly what is implied by delegation under these newcircumstances is far from clear for, as we have seen, new arrangementsmean new roles for both councillors and officers. The extent of delegationto officers will depend on the precise arrangements a council adopts, but inany event is expected to be greater than is currently the norm. The mayorand council manager model, in particular, envisages considerably moredelegation to officers than might be expected of other models. The advocacy
13MAYORS, CABINETS OR THE STATUS QUO?
TABLE 6COUNCILLORS’ VIEWS ON DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWERS
FROM COMMITTEES TO OFFICERS
1993 1999% %
more delegation preferred 13 18less delegation preferred 31 26officers’ powers are ‘about right’ 56 56
(base) 1,651 1,217
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of greater delegation to officers is no new thing. Nor is the reluctance ofmany councillors to accept it. Councillors are often opposed to delegatingany of their powers to officers, and securing greater delegation is oftenfrustrated by this resistance. In the 1993 survey, 87 per cent of councillorsdid not want to see further delegation to officers; in 1999, the figure was acomparable 82 per cent. As Table 6 shows, councillor hostility to acceptingany further transfer of power from themselves to the council’s officersremains overwhelming.
CONCLUSION
Like the government’s proposals themselves, this paper has revisited an olddebate, one that can be readily traced back to the Maud Committee reportof 1967. The advantages of a strong local executive have been proclaimedat intervals since then. Equally, they have been disputed on the grounds thatwhile such a system focuses public attention, it may lead to unduepersonalisation and a dangerous concentration of power. The advantages tobe gained through clearer electoral choice and accountability could beoutweighed by the personalisation of local politics through direct electionsfor an executive mayor.
The issues of diversity and choice in the adoption of any of the newmodels remains confused. Prior to 2000, all authorities operated under acommon statutory framework which prescribed the council and committeesystem, allowing the government to argue that the new arrangements willreplace uniformity with greater diversity, in that any one of the three newmodels may be adopted. In actuality, councils always expressed theirdiversity within the limits of the committee system, and were able –within those limits – to choose just how to configure councillor roles andresponsibilities. When the government pressed home the requirement fornew executive arrangements, the Liberal Democrats proposed a ‘fourthoption’, whereby councils would have the right to formulate arrangementsreflecting their own local circumstances. Although the governmentinsisted that the status quo was not among the options, a form ofcompromise was reached whereby the Secretary of State could makeregulations to allow other structures to be adopted for such authorities ashe approved.
Councillor opinion has shifted quite significantly since 1993 towardsacceptance of the need to adopt new decision-making structures, thoughthere is less sign of their accepting the division of roles implied by thesemodels. Moreover, there is scarcely any willingness to accept a greaterdelegation to the council’s officers. Directly elected mayors are notfavoured, and here a gulf opens up between the views of councillors and
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those of the public at large. Actual referendum results seem to point in adifferent direction. That minority of electors who have cast their votes in thereferendums held to date have generally not supported proposals for electedmayors. The answer to this apparent paradox is that dissatisfaction with thepresent system is strongest among those electors least likely to vote (Raoand Young, 1999). Habitual voters are more cautious in their judgements,and less quick to condemn, while councillors are more cautious still. It isreasonable, then, to expect the ‘modernisation agenda’ to make slow, ifsteady, progress. The prospect of it transforming the landscape of localpolitics by mobilising voter dissatisfaction will depend much on the impactof other measures to engage public interest in local affairs.
APPENDIX: THE SURVEYS
In the 1993 JRF survey, all councillors in a representative sample of authorities were selectedto give a ten per cent sample of councillors, and achieved a 67 per cent response rate (Youngand Rao, 1994). The 1999 survey was funded by Goldsmiths College and was intended toupdate the data collected in the 1993 study. A sample of councillors in all authorities wasdrawn. The reason for this change of design was to attain a comprehensive coverage ofresponses to the Blair government’s modernisation agenda, which was expected to be receivedvery differently in authorities of different type. Non-response was higher among Labourcontrolled authorities, a small number of which explicitly declined to co-operate. An overallresponse rate of 60 per cent was obtained, with a return of 1,242 completed questionnaires(Rao, 2000)
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