On The thesis of intentionality

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    Some philosophers have maintained that there is an important difference between physical phenomena and psychological phenomena. Psychological phenomena are characterized by what Franz Brentano called "intentional inexistence", that is, they are activities which can be said to have objects even though the objects which they can be said to have may not actually exist. For example. I can wish for Montezuma's gold even though it may not exist, but I cannot count it if it does not exist. The former ac- tivity contains an object in itself, viz., an intentional object, while the latter does not, hence Brentano believed we could distinguish between psychological and physical activities by means of the notion of intentionality (or intentional inexistence). His thesis is:

    This intentional inexistence is exclusively peculiar to psychi- cal phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything similar. And so we can def'me psychical phenomena by saying that they are phenomena which intentionally contain an object in thernselvesJ

    Intentionality would, on his view, be a mark of the psychological. In "Sentences About Believing", 2 R.M. Chisholm formulates a

    linguistic thesis of intentionality resembling that of Brentano's. Instead of saying that activities like believing have an intentional object, Chisholm says that sentences about believing are inten- tional sentences, or are used intentionally. By referringto the language we use, Chisholm believes he can more precisely charac- terize Brentano's thesis.

    Let us say (1)that we do not need to use intentional lan- guage when we describe non-psychological, or "physical" phenomena; we can express all that we know, or believe, about such phenomena in language which is not intentional. And let us say (2)that, when we wish to describe certain psychological phenomena - in particular, when we wish to describe thinking, believing, perceiving, seeing, knowing,



    wanting, hoping and the like - either (a)we must use lan- guage which is intentional or (b)we must use a vocabulary which we do not need to use when we describe non-psycho- logical, or "physical," phenomena. 3

    The issue as to the correctness of this version of the thesis of intentionality will depend, in part, on how the intentional use of language is characterized. Toward this end, Chisholm formulates three criteria by which we can identify intentional sentences, or more generally the intentional use of language.

    These criteria have not, however, been found to be generally acceptable; in particular, there are sentences which are prima facie about psychological phenomena, hence are psychological sentences, but they do not satisfy Chisholm's criteria of intentionality. In that case, the criteria would not apparently provide a necessary condition of intentionality. There is, however, a plausible way of reinterpreting these sentences so that they do satisfy his criteria. But there is another more serious criticism that does not seem to have any easy solution. There are some sentences which satisfy these criteria which cannot reasonably be considered to be about any psychological phenomena, hence they are non-psychological sentences. In other words, these sentences are counterexamples to the claim that Chisholm's criteria provide a sufficient condition of intentionality, consistent with the thesis of intentionality. In view of these counterexamples, Chisholm's critics conclude that either he must revise his criteria or abandon them and defend a version of the thesis of intentionality weaker than that given above. 4

    Chisholm's critics have, however, completely ignored the fact that Chisholm intended his criteria to be satisfied by non-psycho- logical sentences, as we shall momentarily see. Nonetheless, he believes that these sentences are not contrary to his version of the thesis of intentionality because he claims that all intentional non- psychological sentences are transformable into non-intentional sentences. This claim, in part, constitutes what I call "The Trans- formation Thesis". Thus I claim because Chisholm's critics have ignored this latter thesis, the mere production of putative counter- examples is not sufficient to prove the inadequacy of Chisholm's criteria of intentionality, as it has been generally assumed. Sup- porting this claim is the aim of the first part of this paper. In the second part, I argue for what seems to be the most plausible inter- pretation of the transformation thesis, and after examining speci- men transformations, I conclude that in the end Chisholm's



    defense of the transformation thesis will not allow him to avoid the consequences which these putative counterexamples present for his criteria and his version of the thesis of intentionality.


    Chisholm formulates three criteria by means of which we can identify those simple declarative sentences which are intentional or are used intentionally, s The pwst criterion is:

    A simple declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a sub- stantival "expression - a name or a description - in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression truly applies.

    The sentence:

    (1) Quine looked for the proper characterization of 'analyticity'.

    is intentional by this criterion. Neither (I), nor the contradictory of (1) implies the existential sentence: 6

    (2) There is a proper characterization of 'analyticity'.

    or the denial of it. Although Chisholm does not specify what sense of 'implies' he intends in this criterion, it is reasonable to suppose that he is using Lewis' notion of "strict implication". 7

    The second criterion of intentionality is :

    A simple declarative sentence, the principal verb of which takes as its object a phrase containing a subordinate verb, is intentional if neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the phrase following the principle verb is true or that it is false.

    For example:

    (3) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.

    is intentional by this criterion. The third criterion is the criterion of indirect reference:

    A simple declarative sentence is intentional if it contains a name or description which has an indirect reference in that sentence.

    Chisholm def'mes 'indirect reference' in the following way: "a name (or description) of a certain thing has an indirect reference



    in a sentence if its replacement by a different name (or descrip- tion) of that thing results in a sentence whose truth-value may differ from that of the original". 8 For example:

    (4) Desdemona is the woman framed by Iago.

    is a true identity statement. If we replace 'Desdemona' in (3) by the description 'the woman framed by Iago', the resulting sentence is false, whereas before the replacement (3) was true. Hence (3) is intentional by the third criterion. As it turns out, (3) is also inten- tional by the second criterion, hence some sentences may satisfy more than one criterion.

    If a simple declarative sentence satisfies any one of the criteria then it is an intentional sentence; hence each criterion is a suffi- cient condition for intentionaiity. No one of these criteria is by itself a necessary condition of intentionality, since each criterion can be satisfied by sentences not satisfying another. In order to specify a necessary condition of intentionality the best we can do is consider the disjunction of the criteria as a necessary condi- tion. 9 Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition of a sentence being intentional is its satisfaction of one of Chisholm's three criteria, 1~ and a necessary and sufficient condition of a sentence not being intentional is its failure to satisfy each of Chisholm's three criteria.

    Chisholm's criteria have been criticized on the ground that they do not provide an adequate characterization of intentionality, n Critics maintain that our preanalytic conception of intentionality, as a property unique to sentences about psychological phenomena, amounts to the conjunction of the following two theses:

    (A) All intentional sentences are psychological sentences. (B) All psychological sentences are intentional sentences.

    It is by reference to (A) and (B) that the adequacy of proposed criteria of intentionality are to be judged. It is claimed that Chisholm's criteria are, consequently, inadequate because they are subject to numerous counterexamples based on (A) and (B). In other words, if the conjunction of (A) and (B) is regarded as stating a version of the thesis of intentionality, then Chisholm's criteria would be inconsistent with it.

    It has, for example, been argued that Chisholm's criteria do not satisfy (B). There are psychological sentences such as

    (5) Iohn is angry.

    which do not turn out to be intentional by Chisholm's criteria, n



    Critics conclude from this that Chisholm's criteria do not state a necessary condition of intentionality. D.H. Sanford 13 suggests that we can accommodate these counterexamples by weakening the thesis of intentionality and say that intentionality may be peculiar to psychological sentences even though not all psychological sen- tences are intentional. He implies that this adjustment does not substantially affect the claim that intentionality is peculiar to the psychological, since this claim is independent of the claim that all psychological sentences are intentional. For Chisholm, however, this move would not be a happy one, for his rejection of the thesis of physicalism, for example, depends upon a version of the thesis of intentionality wherein something like (B) is an essential part. Although Sanford's suggestion is unacceptable, there is another, less radical way of handling sentences like (5). I suggest that sentences like (5) are ellipses of longer sentences that are intentional by Chisholm's criteria; for example:

    (6) John is angry at (about) x.

    is intentional on Chisholm's criteria. If all similar putative counter- examples can be handled in the same way, then Chisholm's criteria are, apparently, adequate as a necessary condition of inten- tionality.

    Chisholm's criteria are still open to the criticism that there are other counterexamples which prove his criteria are not sufficient for intentionality. In particular, this criticism depends upon pro- viding instances of non-psychological sentences which satisfy Chisholm's criteria for intentionality. For example, each of the following sentences has been presented as a counterexarnple to one of Chisholm's three criteria:

    (7) The fire needs some coal. (8) The frost may bring it about that the cliff will fall. (9) It is necessary that Alaska is Alaska. ~4 (8) The frost may bring it about that the cliff will fall. (9) It is necessary that Alaska is Alaska.l 4

    None of these sentences is a sentence about the psychological, but each satisfies one of Chisholm's three criteria for intentional sen- tences. Thus, since each of the three criteria fail to satisfy (A), it is concluded that they are not sufficient conditions for inten- tionality. There is another related objection, namely, that if there are examples of non-psychological intentional sentences, then intentionality would not, contrary to Chisholm, be a mark peculiar to sentences about the psychological.



    Chisholm has a defense against both of these criticisms, but it is a defense which all of his critics have ignored. He maintains that "it is true that we do sometimes use intentional sentences in non- psychological contexts, ''~s and if so, then any adequate criteria for intentionality should reflect this usage. Chisholm has himself presented similar examples of non-psychological sentences which satisfy his criteria, for example:

    (10) The patient will be immune from the effects of any new epidemics.

    (11) It is probable that there is life on Venus. 16

    But according to Chisholm examples of intentional non-psycho- logical sentences are not counterexamples to his criteria of inten- tionality, since those criteria are intended to capture such usage. Thus, instead of being challenged by sentences like these, he be- lieves they illustrate the adequacy of his criteria.

    Although this defense may allow Chisholm to avoid the criti- cism that there are counterexamples to his criteria, his critics might further argue that such a response has undesirable conse- quences. For even if these sentences do not show the criteria to be defective, they are surely counterexamples to (A). Since there are counterexamples to (A), then we cannot claim any particular signi- ficance for the thesis that intentional language is peculiar to our talk about psychological phenomena. The claim that all intentional sentences are psychological sentences is an essential part of the thesis of intentionality. Consequently intentional non-psychological sentences are counter to the thesis of intentionality.

    In response to this criticism, Chisholm states that

    These sentences are not examples counter to our thesis. Any- one who understands the language can readily transform them into conditionals which are not intentional.. . Instead of using intentional sentences, we could have said, ' If there should be any new epidemics, the patient would not be affected by them' . . . I believe that any other ostensibly non-psychological sentence which is intentional can be trans- formed, in an equally obvious way, into a sentence con- forming to our version of Brentano's thesis. That is to say, it will become a sentence of one of two possible types: either (a) it will no longer be intentional or (b) it will be explicitly psychological. Sentences about probability may be inten- tional, but, depending upon one's conception of probability,



    they may be transformed either into the first or into the second type. ~7

    Accordingly, sentence (11) would either be transformed into a non-intentional non-psychological sentence about frequencies of life on planets like Venus, or it would be transformed into an explicitly psychological sentence, such as

    (12) It is reasonable for us to believe that there is life on Venus.

    Following Chisholm's lead, Sanford ts suggests the following as non-intentional non-psychological transformations for (8) and (9), respectively:

    (13) It is possible that the frost will bring it about that the cliff will fall.

    (14) It is necessary that Alaska is self-identical.

    Let us call the thesis that no intentional psychological sentences are transformable into non-intentional sentences and that all inten- tional non-psychological sentences are transformable into non- intentional sentences ~9 the transformation thesis. We can see that if this thesis is correct, then sentences like (7)-(9) are not sen- tences counter to Chisholm's statement of the thesis of intention- ality, as presented above. The first part of his version of that thesis is more modest than thesis (A), for it allows for the non- psychological or "physical" use of intentional language. Moreover, and more importantly, these sentences are not counter to the general thesis that intentionality is peculiar to the psychological. The claim that we do not need to use intentional language when we describe non-psychological, or physical phenomena, is just the claim that non-intentional tran.~formations are readily available. Thus, the plausibility of the view that all intentional sentences are "essentially" about the psychological is enhanced, if the trans- formation thesis is correct. Consequently, although Chisholm does not defend (A), he seems to defend something virtually like (A), viz.,

    (A') All non-transformable intentional sentences are psycho- logical sentences.

    Given (A') and the transformation thesis, intentionality would still be peculiar to psychological sentences because these sentences can- not be transformed into non-intentional sentences.



    II We have seen that by arguing for what I have called "the trans-

    formation thesis", Chisholm is able to defend both his criteria of intentionality and his version of the thesis of intentionality. In order to adequately evaluate this defense, it is essential that we clarify the notion of 'a transformation'. To do this, we may ask what relationship exists between the original intentional non-psy- chological sentence and its non-intentional transformation. There are at least two ways in which we might interpret this relationship.

    First, the relationship between the original sentence S and its transformation T may be expressed by saying that they are about the same thing. However, anyone familiar with the literature on 'about' will recognize that this method of relating the two sen. tences is not unproblematic) ~ Determining what a sentence is about is difficult enough, let alone determining that two morpho- logically different sentences are about the same thing.

    Second, and more plausibly, we might take the relationship between the original intentional non-psychological sentence and its non-intentional transformation to be one of equivalence. There are, however, many different senses of 'equivalence'. Of these, only two seem sufficiently strong to be relevant here, viz., equi- valence of meaning and logical equivalence, in the sense that Lewis has called "strict equivalence". ~1 I shall assume that Chisholm intends the relations of transformation to be understood as equi- valence in one of these two senses.

    If the notion of transformation is characterized in terms of either sense of 'equivalence', then I want to show that the putative non-intentional transformations provided by Chisholm (and others) are either not transformations, or they are still intentional. This is symptomatic of what I believe is a general difficulty facing the transformation thesis, viz., that on Chisholm's criteria of inten- tionality no intentional sentence can be transformed into a logically equivalent or synonymous non-intentional sentence. I shall not, however, argue directly for the claim that Chisholm's transformations are not synonymous. Since logical equivalence is a necessary condition for synonymy, if I can show that a transfor- marion is not logically equivalent to its intentional counterpart, then this will be sufficient to show that it is not synonymous either.

    Consider the specimen transformation Chisholm offers for (lO):

    (15) If there should be any new epidemics, the patient would not be affected by them.



    On one interpretation of 'immune', viz., to be protected from a disease by inoculation, (15) can be true while (10) is false. If there are no new epidemics, then it would be true that the patient would not be affected by them, but it may be false that he is immune from them, in this sense of 'immune'. This is sufficient to show that (10) and (15) are not logically equivalent. One may, however, argue that this begs the question; for Chisholm may be using 'immune' in a wider sense. In this sense, to be immune from a disease is the same as not being affected by it, whether or not the immunity is a result of an inoculation. On the wider inter- pretation of 'immune', however, I do not see how the consequent of (15) is different from (10). If so, then since (10) is intentional, (15) is also intentional, given Chisholm's criterion of intentionality for compound sentences. Thus (10) and (15) are either not logically equivalent or (15) is intentional) 2

    These same difficulties plague sentence (8) and its transfor- mation (13). (8) can be symbolized as:

    (16) (3x) (3y)[ Fx. (z) (FzD(z=x)). Cy" (z) (CzD(z=y)). Bxy]

    where 'OBxy' is "x may bring about the falling of y" and 'Fx' and 'Cy' are, respectively, "the frost" and "the cliff". The symboliza- tion of (13), however, presents a problem. It is ambiguous between (16) where the 'O' attaches to 'B' and:

    (17) (3x) (3y) [Fx.(z) (Fz:>(zffix))-Cy-(z) (Cz~(z=y)).BxYl

    where '0' operates on the entire formula. (16) and (17) are obviously not logically equivalent. If (17) is the correct symbolization of (13), then (8) and (13) are not logically equivalent. On the other hand, if (16) is the proper symbolization of (13), then although (8) and (13) would be logically equivalent, (13) is still intentional; thus (8) and (13) are either not logically equivalent or (13) is intentional. In any event, although (13)'s contradictory implies that the frost will not bring it about that the cliff will fall, there- by not satisfying Chisholm's second criterion, it is still intentional because it satisfies Chisholm's criterion of indirect reference. It is not, therefore, a successful non-intentional transformation.

    We know that sentential contexts like 'It is necessary that . . . ' and other so-called model contexts are unique in that the substan- tive terms that occur in these contexts have an indirect reference. Failure of substitutivity of identity salva veritate in such a context is sufficient for saying that the terms in that context have an indirect reference. In that case, there is no doubt that sentence (9) satisfies Chisholm's third criterion of intentionality. Given the true identity



    (18) Alaska is the 49th state of the Union.

    substitution in (9) results in the following false sentence:

    (19) It is necessary that the 49th state of the Union is Alaska.

    Thus, 'Alaska' has an indirect reference in (9), which is sufficient for saying (9) is an intentional sentence.

    What reason, however, is there for the claim that (14), which seems to be a relatively similar modal sentence, is non-intentional? The only apparent reason is that substitutivity of identity in (14) does not fail. But this is specious, for no one has maintained that modal contexts must obstruct substitutivity, only that such con- texts ordinarily can and do obstruct substitutivity. It is arguable that failure of substitutivity of identity is only an epiphenomenon of the indirect reference of substantive terms. What infects sen- tences like (9) and (14) is not the obstruction of truth preserving substitutions, but rather the fact that the terms in these contexts have an ~ndirect reference. To say that they have indirect reference is to say that they must not be taken as having their ordinary referent. We might say, following Frege, that they take their cus- tomary sense as their referent. If we substitute in sentences like these an extensionally equivalent term, but one that has a dif- ferent customary sense as its referent, then this can, but need not, alter the truth-value of the sentence. Thus, although failure of sub- stitutivity is sufficient for saying that substantive terms in a par- ticular sentential context have an indirect reference, it is not necessary. This is further illustrated by the fact that substitution of a co-referential term or phrase in the clearly intentional sen- tence (9) will preserve truth, provided that the substitution is uniform. The failure to obstruct substitutivity is, therefore, not a good reason for saying that (14) is a non-intentional sentence.

    If this argument is found unconvincing, there is another argu- ment against supposing that (14) is a non-intentional sentence. Unlike the examples considered above, (9) and (14) do appear to be synonymous, hence logically equivalent. To say that Alaska is self-identical is just to say that Alaska is Alaska and to say the latter is just to say that Alaska is self-identical. It is, however, worth noting that those who espouse the non-intentionality of (14), are then committed to the claim that the conjunction of (14) and the true identity (18) imply:

    (20) It is necessary that the 49th state of the Union is self- identical.



    but they claim (20) is not implied by (9) and (18), because (9) is intentional. However, (20) is implied by (9) and (18), if (9) and (14) are synonymous and (14) and (18) imply (20). In that case, we are faced with a dilemma: either (9) and (14) are synonymous, and consequently do not differ in terms of intentionality, or they are not both intentional and hence cannot be logically equivalent, because they have different implications. Thus (14) cannot be a successful transformation of (9), since both sentences are either intentional or they are not logically equivalent.

    This argument suggests a general difficulty facing Chisholm's claim that we can provide non-intentional transformations of intentional sentences. If two sentences are logically equivalent then it is not possible that one will be intentional and the other logically equivalent sentence, non-intentional, since in order for the latter to be a non-intentional sentence it must fail to satisfy all three of Chisholm's criteria of intentionafity (assuming all three are applicable). That is just to say that the non-intentional trans- formation will imply something the intentional sentence does not. If two sentences have different implicatory relations, that is, they are different in terms of the logical property of intentionality, as defined by Chisholm's criteria, then there is no question about their not being logically equivalent as a result of this logical asymmetry. Therefore, for every intentional non-psychological sen- tence, no putative logically equivalent non-intentionai transforma- tion can be: (a)logically equivalent, if the transformation is a non-intentional sentence, or (b)non-intentional, if the transfor- mation is logically equivalent to the intentional non-psychological sentence. This applies mutatis mutandis to the claim that transfor- mations are synonymous. Thus Chisholm's claim that we can easily provide non-intentional transformations of intentional sentences is not only false, it is necessarily false.

    If the transformation thesis is necessarily false, then it cannot be the case that we can so "easily transform away" intentionality without either thereby ignoring it, that is, providing a transforma- tion that is still intentional, or by providing another sentence that is non-intentional, but only tenuously related to the original intentional sentence. Since the former alternative does not appre- ciably aid in the defense of Chisholm's criteria against counter- examples like those discussed above, then in regards to the latter alternative one may wonder what relationship this non-intentional transformation has to the original intentional non-psychological sentence. Unless there is some other more plausible, and as yet



    unspecified interpretation, other than those herein considered, and until the nature of this relationship is made known, the plausi- bil ity of Chisholm's defense is significantly reduced. Consequently, Chisholm must either revise his criteria to exclude those trouble- some intentional non-psychological sentences, or abandon them and defend a weaker version of the thesis of intentionality. The important question we should ask ourselves now is: How much can we weaken the thesis of intentionality and still draw the dis- tinction which Brentano believed gave "intentional ity" its signifi- cance?




    * I would like to express my appreciation to William Lycan and Marshall Swain for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

    t Franz Brentano, Psycholofie yon Empirischen 5tandpunkt, (Vienna: 1874), quoted in Russell's The Analysis o[Mind, (London: 1921), pp. 14-15.

    2 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVI (1955-1956), pp. 125-148; reprinted in H. Feigl et al (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); my references will be from this volume; see also Chisholm's Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), Chap- ter XI, pp. 168-185.

    3 "Sentences About Believing", op. cir., p. 511. Chisholm qualifies (1) because there are sentences which describe relations of comparison like "Some lizards look like dragons" which appear intentional and there- fore may constitute an exception to (1). If they are intentional then (1) is qualified to read: "We do not need any intentional sentences, other than those describing relations of comparison, when we describe non-psychological phenomena".



    Recognizing the force of these criticisms, Chisholm has formulated new criteria of intentionality in "On Some Psychological Concepts and The 'Logic' of Intentionality", in Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, edited by Hector-Neri Castafieda, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967); later revising these and providing another weaker version of the thesis of intentionality in "Believing and Intentionality: A Reply to Mr. Luce and Mr. Sleigh", Philosophy and Phenomenolos~cal Re. search, Vol. XXV (1964-65), pp. 266-269.

    s The criteria I have listed are from "Sentences About Believing", op. cir., pp. 510-511; see also Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, pp. 170-172.

    6 Although it may be more proper to use 'statement' or 'proposition' instead of 'sentence', I shall for the sake of convenience follow Chisholm's terminology.

    7 C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, (New York: Dover Pub- Lications, Inc., 1932); D.J. O'Connor, in "Tests for Intentiouality", American Philosophical Quarterly, IV (1967), pp. 173-178, has argued that Chisholm could not have meant "materially implies" and that strict implication alone seems adequate. He also presents criticisms of this latter interpretation which center on the problem of providing an adequate semantics for 'possible', however, this is not a a problem unique to Chisholm.

    s "Sentences About Believing", op. cir., p. 511; Chisholm allows for the possibility of a name or description having an indirect reference in a sentence even though its replacement by an extensionally equivalent expression does not affect the sentence's truth-value. Failure of substi- tutivity salva veritate is a sufficient condition of intentionality but not a necessary condition.

    9 W. Gregory Lycan, "On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological", American Philosophical Ouarterly, Vol. IV (1969), pp. 305-311, and David H. Sanford, "On Defining lntentionality", Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy, Vol. I1 (1968), pp. 216-221, have both made this suggestion, implying that such a condi- tion will allow us to accommodate many of the putative counterex- amples intended to show that each criterion is not satisfied by some psychological sentence.

    t0 Chisholm has also provided a necessary and sufficient condition of intentionalJty for those simple declarative sentences connected by "or", "and", "if-then", "although" and "because". These sentences are called compound sentences. The criterion is: "A compound sentence is inten- tional ff and only ff one or more of its component sentences is inten- tional".

    I t Alonzo Church, "Logic and Analysis", Proceedings of the Xllth Inter- national Congress of Philosophy, Vol. IV (Florence: Sansoni, 1958-1961), pp. 77-81; James W. Cornman, "lntentionality and Inten- sionality", Philosophical Quarterly, XII (1962), pp. 123-146; Michael



    Clark, "Intentional Objects", Analysis, XXV (1964-1965), pp. 123-128; Herbert Heidelberger, "On Characterizing the Psychological", Philos- ophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVI (1965-1966), pp. 529-536; W. Gregory Lycan, ol7. cir., Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, (London: 1963), Chapter IX.

    12 This counterexample is due to Brown, op. cir.; there axe other putative counterexamples of psychological sentences which fail to satisfy each and every one of Chisholm's three criteria. However, since each of the criteria are designed to be satisfied by sentences not satisfying another, it follows that each criterion cannot alone provide a necessary condi- tion of intentionality. These sentences are, therefore, not counter- examples.

    13 op. cir., p. 218. 14 These examples are due, respectively, to Clark, Brown, and Cornman. I s "Sentences About Believing", op. cir., p. 511. 16 Ibid.; see also Perceiving." A Philosophical Study, p. 173, for other

    examples. Iv Ibid., p. 512. IB D.H. Sanford, op. cir., p. 220. 19 [ am here assuming that intentional sentences which are ostensibly

    non-psychological will be shown to be explicitly non-psychological by their transformations. Sanford, op. cit., regards the thesis I call the transformation thesis, the thesis of intentionality. However, as I will show, this cannot be the case, given Chisholm's criteria.

    2o See Nelson Goodman "About" MIND, VoL LXX (Jan. 1961), pp. 1-24; also see Ginsberg "Concern and Topic", Nous, Vol. V, (May 1971), pp. 107-138.

    21 Lewis and Langford, op. cir.; both O'Connor and Sanford o17. cir., claim that Chisholm intends the relation to be one of equivalence, in one of these senses.

    22 As it turns out (15) is also intentional on the first interpretation, because neither it nor its contradictory imply anything about the exis- tence or lack of existence of any unique patients. Cornman, op. cir., has shown that Chisholm's second criterion of intentionality is also a sufficient condition of intensionality (non-extensionality). If (15) is a subjunctive conditional, as it appears, then it would be intentional on this criterion also.



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