on judging works of art

On judging works of art

by

JAN S R Z E D N I C K I (University of Melbourne)

To Professor Wladysiaw Tatarkiewicz

My object is to show that an objectivist interpretation of aesthetic judgement is possible. This is not an easy matter, for there are difficulties appertaining to any objectivistic conception of value judgements, and some objections specifically against such a theory of aesthetics. However, one finds it very difficult to accept the subjectivist story, for there seems to be room for genuine difference of opinion about works of art. But, for a subjectivist this cannot be so, and these are explained as pseudo or quasi-differences and/or imperatives. What is more, one seems to be committed to the unpalatable view that in judging e.g. an object of art, one is in effect always judging oneself, one’s atti- tude, one’s reaction, one’s liking, and that one is not judging anything else, including the object of art. This sort of view suf- fers from a transparent implausibility, for it is completely contrary to our aims and intuitions in such cases. There is a way of removing this disconcerting consequence open to a subjectivist, he can become a statistical subjectivist. He would then claim that “X is a good work of art” means “X is admired by the majority of people”. This view admits of many variants, for ‘people’ we can substitute ‘experts’, but then we cannot define an expert; we can substitute ‘members of group X’ and then the view becomes relativist of one or another kind. But the main subjectivist difficulty remains, no statement about the aesthetic value of an object can be a statement about this object, but is a statement about the viewing public, which seems absurd. This point is illustrated neatly in the following example. If J. S. Bach was not recognised and Mendelssohn caused his music to be admired,

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according to statistical subjectivism it was not Bach but Mendels- sohn who created the aesthetic value resident in Bach’s music.

Though these objections would constitute a prima facie case for objectivism, it would be only prima facie, and objectivism faces many difficulties.

FIRSTLY : there are plausible arguments in support of subjectivism. For instance, there are many value words that tend to obliterate the distinction that I have just drawn between judging oneself and something else : ‘Good’, ‘Splendid’, ‘Excellent’, ‘Mediocre’, ‘Pleasant’, ‘Lovely’, ‘Uninteresting’, etc. are good examples. So why shouldn’t all aesthetic judgements be like the one where objectivity is no more than a kicked-over trace, e.g. “You are such a nice baby of Mama’s’’.

SECONDLY: there are direct difficulties in the objectivist way. Let us mention:

(a) An apparent lack of any technique for convincing others in

(b) A lack of obviously correct judgements. (c) Dependence of opinions on the critical fashion of the

basic cases.

moment.

Not all objective judgements are authoritative but the whole system of objective reasoning rests on the fact that some objective opinions are invulnerable in a very real sense, that they command assent. I do not mean that they must be incorrigible in the logical sense, but only that they are invulnerable in that they are established beyond any reasonable doubt. Should we accept the view that there are no invulnerable judgements in the field of aesthetics, we would put in jeopardy the whole view that such judgements could be objective, for this is the foundation of an objective system of reasoning. So here we have a serious source of intellectual uneasiness.

Aesthetic value judgements are not formal in that they appertain to the content of a work of art, not merely to formal relations between aspects of the work, or works of art, nor do

ON JUDGING VfORKS OF ART 247

we have a formal system of aesthetics; accordingly such judgements cannot be formally binding and cannot command assent after the fashion of mathematical propositions. This is neither surprising nor disquieting.

Objective empirical statements are grounded in practical consequences, for some misjudgements in this area lead to disaster. E.g. the thought that fire does not harm cannot be put into practice safely, and the opposite commands practical assent. But this does not appertain to aesthetic judgements-here a misjudge- ment leads merely to ugliness invisible to those in error. In case of a moral judgement we face a similar difficulty, for often e.g. immoral selfishness need not impair the life of the selfish person, quite on the contrary, and he could be quite insensitive to the pain of others. Still in ethics we can point to the possibility that a similar treatment might be meted out to our selfish opponent, and we can utilise this point by talking of: social needs; every- body’s need to have a good social system, etc. We could make the formal Kantian point that some maxims can be universalised, others cannot, and that the former enjoy a superiority, since they and they alone, are safe as general principles. These moves could fail to convince, but they are at least p r i m facie arguments against our opponent. No such prima facie moves are available in aesthetics. This is its specific difficulty: no room whatever for an appeal to the practical consequences of putting a given opinion into action.

Because of this, and to some extent even independently of this, there seems to be less general tendency towards agreement in aesthetic than in ethical matters. Here it is harder to convince people, and it is easier to find preposterous views seriously re- presented. The expert in aesthetic matters, much more than an ethics man, tends to find himself in a minority, frequently in a fairly small minority. The agreements that exist seem so tied to cultural groups and critical schools that they look conventional and socially dependent. Not promising for an objective interpretation.

First let us try to find a reason for this state of affairs, and see whether aesthetic judgements are less likely to be objective than

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say ethical judgements. Let us ask also whether the reason for the differences noticed above lies in this, or whether perhaps they are due to other factors.

Let us observe that critical remarks in this area are mostly very general in character. We read that e.g. a work is-full of poetry; pictures a certain kind of emotion (fear) ; is full of elegance (man- nerism), or style; is rich in contrasts, etc. etc. Can we do better than that? If not, aesthetics has problems that do not need to exist in ethics, for there one can produce a description sufficient for a judgement. The following is sufficient on the assumption that it is accurate and complete: - “He promised to support his own children, he has the means to do so without effort, there are no obstacles in his way, i.e. he is not mentally afflicted in any way, etc.; however he does not like spending, and found a way to escape his obligation with impunity, so he does not support them.”’ This though not a complete description of the case, contains all the salient points necessary for passing a moral judgement upon this man’s action.

We cannot offer a description that would support an aesthetic value judgement in a similar fashion. If we offer a description in general terms similar to the above we lose sight of the particularity of a work of art. A painting or a composition is excellent or poor because of its particular character, not in virtue of belonging to a given class of works. Such membership is not even a prima facie reason to think it excellent, yet that this is a case of promise- keeping is at least a prima facie reason for thinking an action right; generalities are quite useless when applied to a work of art. If the general remark is significant value-wise, e.g. “It has beautiful harmony” it begs the question, for it is a value judgement itself, it is a partial judgement not a statement of fact supporting the overall judgement, as was the above cited description. So we either miss the point or beg the question. Yet all the features of the work of art together are responsible for its quality, there is nothing else to account for it. So it would seem reasonable to

My purpose here is to disregard any evaluative overtones the words might have so e.g. ‘impunity’ means only ‘and escape punishment’. It is easy to read the sentence in this way and to write it with all disclaimers would be clumsy.

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expect that a description will be helpful. If we try to be really particular and say e.g.: “We find 288,889 strokes of the brush, 2,987 red, of these 37 about 2 inches long . . . etc.” we are making a bad joke. More seriously, it would appear that a value-free description of a work of art would be helpful in passing an aesthetic value judgement if, and only if, it was so detailed, vivid, etc., that it could replace fully the artistic object itself, but this is an absurd demand.

At least one of the reasons behind this state of affairs consists in the fact that descriptive words are generalizing. In this very feature lies their usefulness. Descriptive words or phrases allot a thing to a given class of objects. A fuller description places the object at a crossing point of many different classes. But this sort of thing does not determine the artistic quality of a work of art. From the point of view of their excellence these works must be considered as completely particular. Their standard depends on features so particular, that they can seldom, if ever, be shared. It is for this reason that even very good copies of masterpieces do not often share their excellence, even though sometimes the particular differences might be hard to find, harder to describe.

The very nature of describing thus makes it unsuitable for the purpose of supporting artistic judgement. Take as an example the colour harmony of a picture. What decides its excellence is the precise character of the relations between actual particular shades that are there. Yet take only one colour spot. If we want to know precisely what shade it is, we have to see it. Yet it would be quite easy to state it to be, for example, yellow, for the class of yellow is relatively homogeneous and narrow. Also we can regard our description as quite precise, for we are concerned only with a single determination in a single range of a single type of surface characteristic. It could be said that for ‘yellow’ we need an osten- sive definition, thus we must be acquainted with the character in order to understand the word. This is quite true, and we could say as a result that we can name, but not describe yellow. Yet once we have the name we can use it in description of objects, and thus if we have ‘yellow’ and ‘spot’ the description “a yellow spot” is adequate, but, I wish to argue, not enough to support an

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aesthetic judgement. If the name is a general name it misses what is important for such a judgement; if it is a proper name it cannot be used in description, or more accurately a proper name is not a description, even if it could be used in a description in special and dependent cases. Further the complete character of an object is complex, offers an indefinitely large number of possibilities of a particular determination, and is many-levelled. All this coexists concurrently.

Whatever other problems might arise with respect to describing for our purpose we can say that a description gives a list of general names of characteristics selectively, in a linear fashion, word after word, determination after determination. To every description we can add ad infinitum. What is more, every determination represents a point of view, an interest.' The distortion is obvious, but usually it matters as little as it does with a distortion in map-projection. For in most practical matters two things are important: (A) that we see the difference, (B) that we agree on the boundary. This is all that is needed for reading road signs for example. Thus it is difficult to spot colour blindness.

For aesthetic purposes this amount of agreement is insufficient, for the impact of a work of art lies precisely in the simultaneous action of all its particular features. They form a characteristic subtle gestalt consisting in the presence of all the elements and their mutual relations, each of these in its most particular character, but as an element of the whole. The whole being what it is in virtue of its elements, the elements having the impact they have in virtue of their position within the whole.

We can see that this is precisely the sort of thing that evades description. Thus arguments based on words will be ineffective, unless there exists an understanding, which they only implement, viz. where they have only an auxiliary role. Most of the specific difficulties of aesthetics can be traced to this source.

These difficulties are seen to arise specifically when we insist on conducting our affairs in terms of descriptions, but need we? There is no reason to believe that we must, so there is still hope.

* I am not referring here to an evaluative point of view, but simply a per- spective or its equivalent.

ON JUDGING WORKS OF ART 25 1

How do we, in practice, reach a decision that a given picture is e.g. a masterpiece? By looking, observing, noticing more and more of the details and their mutual relations. By discovering the form that the artist gave to it, and comparing the whole with other works we know. We check on our decision by paying particular attention to the elements and aspects of the whole and making sure that we did not miss anything of importance; by attuning to the gestalt which emerges from, and is created by the set of elements; by noticing the part played in this set by particular elements and how successful they are in enhancing or obtaining the desired overall effect. In doing this we must see each element as an aspect of the whole, and the whole as a harmonious com- bination of all elements.

If we want to put all this in words the difficulty consists in this, that the great majority of our significant observations cannot be stated in words, in a way sufficiently articulate and precise, not even mentioning the problem of simultaneity. This however need not mean that our observations are unsatisfactory in themselves.

We can communicate those matters, but not by the sole use of a language. If we have the picture before us we can draw some- body’s attention to this or that feature or relationship without losing sight of the whole, which is in front of both of us. We can stress something, point out something, or suggest a way of looking at the thing, that will bring out what is important in reaching a satisfactory judgement. We can do it using the picture itself, showing on it that this and that is significant, pointing to such and such, suggesting a helpful comparison, etc. Thus communication is possible, but it needs more than just words.

It might be objected that people are notoriously unwilling to accept persuasion in this field. In the area of art it is easy for the untutored to be obstinate, an expert has less standing. Perhaps it is not so strange if we reflect that here we deal with matters that are particularly complex and subtle. So, of course, it is more difficult to recognise one’s own shortcomings. What is more, a person of natural good taste will often react sensitively to the work as a whole, for it works as a whole. Thus it is possible to see its quality without being aware of its complex and subtle nature.

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The elements that are operative can act directly without the aid of analytic reasoning.

In order to round off our case for objectivism we should find at least some aesthetic judgements that would be unassailable and obvious in the required sense, for then we would have the basis on which one could claim that judging works of art is not subject to excessive subjective fluctuations.

Everyone has met some works of art whose value was for him, and for most others, beyond question. But still if someone were to disagree, one would have to offer defence of one’s assessment. In contradistinction, if someone maintains that a black thing is white, there is no room for argument, bar questions of the meaning of words. That of the squares below the middle one and the right one are similar and the left is different cannot be in question.

The difficulty in aesthetics is two-fold: firstly, no aesthetic judgement relates to such a simple matter; secondly, the complex matter of the work of art cannot be presented successfully by stringing a number of general names of characteristics together, for then the unity and simultaneity of the whole would be distorted. This difficulty is at its worst where plastic arts are concerned; paintings and sculptures act ‘all at once’. It is least in music and literature. But even there a simple succession of particular parts is almost no art-think here of the limitations of one finger playing. A poem is arguably not just a string of words. Similarly in the case of even the simplest melody. Relations between the words used are of utmost importance in a poem. I t is plausible to suppose that vis d vis literature (poetry especially) words can have overtones and timbre, like tones. After all most poems (if not all) depend on the sense and connotation of words, not merely on their phy- sical presence. Sense and connotation however are usually quite complex.

Let us try to find a judgement concerning a work of art which would be correct beyond question. There are a number of diffi-


culties in this. How are we to describe our basis for such a judgement without distortion? And how are we to relate its elements to a judgement concerning the work of art as a whole? But then, if we found even a partial but certain aesthetic judgement we would have achieved something, for even if only such a judgement, with respect to a work of art as such, was possible, it would be rather difficult to maintain as a matter of principle that in this area authoritative judgements are impossible. However, a victory need not be an end of the war, and in philosophy it seldom is.

We are looking for a judgement, directed at a work of art qua one, and such that anyone disagreeing with the stated opinion puts himself beyond the reach of argument. That is, that by accepting a certain view seriously he has destroyed that minimum of agreement which is necessary for dialogue, if it is to serve any purpose. Such a judgement has to stand for obvious reasons. I can think of just one type of example; let us suppose that someone contem- plates Van Gogh’s “The Corn Field” with a view to judging its excellence. He reaches the following opinion: - “This is rather an excellent painting, but the colour spoils its effect.” Now if you have ever seen this picture you would have to agree that this opinion is impossible in the required sense. We understand the sentence, but we cannot understand the judgement. The thought that seems to be expressed in the statement makes no sense, but the reverse thought viz.: “That the colour enhances the quality of Van Gogh’s “The Corn Field” is perfectly intelligible.” It is not that we do not know what it would be for the colour to spoil a picture, examples of this are plentiful. What we cannot com- prehend is that it should in this case-the whole excellence of the picture lies in its colour, we wish to say if the colour is no good so is the picture. Thus it looks as if this particular judgement concerning this particular work of art was unquestionably incorrect- it is not a matter of subjective preference whether we accept it or not. Of course it is not an entire judgement with respect to this work, it is not even an indubitable judgement concerning its excellence. It is a comparative judgement with respect to some aspects of this work qua a work of art. But that too is a matter of aesthetic values and should be purely subjective on the opposing view, for

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it should have been a subjective matter that this painting reaches its excellence, or lack of it, through its colour harmony.

Now let us suppose that with respect to a given work of art we can find a number of judgements carrying the above kind of authority. Suppose that they concern the majority of this work’s elements, aspects and relations; suppose lastly that all, or an over- whelming majority of them was laudable. Then it would appear that since each of them was a partial assessment of the excellence of the work we would have to say that all taken together show the work to be good. We would have to give good reasons if we dis- sented. We could perhaps even get to the point where looking for further confirmation would lose all point. For whatever we found could not reverse our judgement anymore. The doubt lies here in this, that in the nature of the thing, each element in an aesthetic object must have ramifications far exceeding the statement of the element’s particular character, and this would make collating of particular judgements difficult, and tend to undermine the authoritative character of the final judgement. On the other hand, effects of this kind presumably would show pretty soon in our collection of partial judgements. So it seems that a number of authoritative partial judgements could be authoritatively over- whelming. From the practical point of view it will of course be of little, or no, use, for it would be next to impossible to collect such a set for any actual work of art.

There is however another difficulty of the kind mentioned ahove, namely that the elements of which a work of art is composed are not significant in their own right and cannot be assessed in isolation. This is the reverse side of the coin, for now we see that the very basic judgements on which we wish to base our reasoning are questionable. How then are we to arrive at the favourable ultimate judgement? We can reply that it is not necessary that the support that the total judgement derives from particular judgements should be a matter of composing the former out of the latter. It might be that these partial judgements accen- tuate, stress, and bring out what is relevant for the making of the final one, but together are not equivalent to it, or a part of it, and in this way both the above difficulties are overcome. This is a


weak reply, for the relation between the two kinds of judgement is left rather obscure. Moreover we are left with the problem of transferring the authoritative character .of the judgements across this sort of gap. It is rather hard to hint in a binding way. There is little enough doubt that some support is lent to the opinion that a picture is good if we say that its colour is excellent, but we need more than that. We could stress the fact that such partial judgements do not appertain to the elements of the work as such, that if it be praise it is praise of the work as a whole, not appertaining to an aspect of it. Thus we do not consider parts, and reach judgements about parts that are then composed into judgement about the whole. In fact, the so-called partial judgements are but aspects of the judgement with respect to the whole work, which is the object of judgement in each case. In this case the partial judgements would not strictly speaking be reasons for the general one, but this need not worry us, since we are only interested in finding an authoritative judgement concerning a work of art.

This reply is also far from clear. In particular one is worried about the fact that the aspect-judgements seem more convincing than the whole judgement. It is possible to reply that this is only to be expected. We often notice things about a painting or a poem, and only later see the whole glory of the work. While this is possible it does not seem necessary and our analysis seems to make it so. Yet one could say, obstinately perhaps, that in ‘proof’ it might well be necessary, if only to accord with the scope of one’s sen- sitivity.

This then is the picture of an objectivist account of how we judge works of art that I can offer. I would not wish to pretend that it stills completely my intellectual uneasiness, but I am afraid that were I to become a subjectivist, my uneasiness would turn into despair.

Received on May 25, 1968.

on judging works of art

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